Author: MIL-OSI Publisher

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lisette IJssel de Schepper, Chief Economist Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University

It is forgivable to think that an oil shock mainly hurts at the petrol pump. After all, that is where households feel it first. But when my colleagues and I at the Bureau for Economic Research started digging through South Africa’s fuel data, a different story emerged – one that says as much about the country’s infrastructure failures as it does about global geopolitics.

As we began modelling the likely impact on the South African economy, it quickly became clear that diesel would inflict even more pain on the economy than petrol. (Our insights are based on ongoing analysis that has not yet been published.)

There are two reasons for this.

Firstly, diesel underpins the South African economy’s cost structure. It powers the systems that keep the economy functioning: freight transport, food distribution, mining operations, agricultural machinery, generators and large parts of the country’s logistics network. Higher diesel prices therefore raise the cost of transporting goods, distributing food, operating mines and running backup generators during electricity disruptions.

This means the dominant economic impact of the Gulf war on South Africa is not simply that households are paying more at the pump. The impact is also being felt through higher logistics, freight and operating costs as they feed through supply chains into broader inflation.

Secondly, the price of diesel has spiked markedly more than the price for petrol. Relative to the first quarter of 2026, diesel prices in the second quarter increased by almost 60%, compared with about 25% for petrol.

Our calculations suggest that higher fuel prices could add roughly R45 billion (US$2.7billion) – just over 2% of quarterly GDP spend – in additional fuel costs to the South African economy in the second quarter of 2026 alone. Nearly 70% of that additional cost burden would come from diesel rather than petrol.

The main conclusion we draw from our insights is that South Africa needs to fix its fundamentals and shore up buffers so that it is better placed to withstand external shocks when they strike.

South Africa’s shift in fuel consumption

To understand why diesel matters so much today, it is important to recognise how fuel consumption has changed.

Over the past two decades, diesel consumption has steadily overtaken petrol consumption in the South African economy.

In 2005, petrol accounted for close to half of total fuel consumption, while diesel accounted for roughly a third (see figure below). Today, diesel accounts for almost half of all fuel consumed nationally, while petrol’s share has declined steadily.

Part of the explanation is relatively benign. Petrol vehicles have become significantly more fuel-efficient over time, allowing households to travel further on less fuel. Weak household income growth, higher fuel prices and expensive vehicle financing have also constrained discretionary driving and slowed petrol demand growth.

Diesel, however, is different. Diesel is primarily an operational input into the economy rather than a form of discretionary consumption. As such, its increased use reflects deeper structural changes in the South African economy:

• More freight has shifted to roads and trucks as the state-owned transport monopoly Transnet’s rail capacity has deteriorated. These freight trucks run on diesel.

• Use of diesel accelerated sharply during the severe power-cut years between 2022 and 2024. This was particularly evident in businesses in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors as well as hospitals, shopping centres and data centres. All have increasingly come to rely on diesel generators to keep operating.

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Read more: Does South Africa have a future without power cuts? Ramaphosa intervenes, but the drama isn’t over

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During the worst periods of load-shedding in 2023, Eskom relied heavily on diesel-fired open-cycle gas turbines to help keep the lights on when the coal fleet failed. At times, Eskom’s diesel usage was estimated to account for 20%-30% of national diesel demand. Fortunately, that dependence has eased considerably as electricity supply stabilised and diesel-fired open-cycle gas turbines usage declined.

Still, diesel has quietly become South Africa’s shadow infrastructure system – the fuel that has compensated for failures elsewhere in the economy, from electricity generation to freight transport.

This means South Africa’s vulnerability to oil shocks cannot be easily remedied just by getting consumers to ditch their fossil fuel-guzzling SUVs in favour of electric vehicles. Vulnerability is embedded in the diesel-intensive systems that move goods, power operations, and keep the economy running.

The impact

South Africa has always been vulnerable to oil shocks because it imports virtually all of its crude oil. But the nature of that vulnerability has changed. As domestic refining capacity has declined as several domestic refineries closed between 2020 and 2023, fuel (rather than crude) imports have increased. This means South Africa has become exposed not only to higher oil prices, but also to disruptions in global fuel supply chains themselves.

This creates the risk that external and domestic shocks will begin to reinforce one another. A global fuel disruption on its own is painful but manageable. But fuel stress becomes considerably more destabilising.

The impact is likely to be felt in a number of ways.

Firstly, in the country’s agricultural sector. South Africa is unlikely to face an immediate food supply crisis as domestic agricultural production conditions remain relatively favourable. Nor is there an immediate risk of food inflation as consumer food inflation began moderating earlier this year, supported by ample supplies of grains, fruits and vegetables.

Nevertheless, the sector will be affected. Fuel accounts for a substantial share of food distribution costs in South Africa’s highly road-dependent transport system. Wandile Sihlobo, chief economist of the Agriculture Business Chamber of South Africa, notes that roughly 80% of South African grain is transported by road. Higher diesel prices, therefore, feed directly into the cost of moving food across the country.

Farming is also highly diesel intensive. In addition, fertiliser prices have spiked as a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. These price hikes will squeeze margins across farming and food distribution long before they fully appear in supermarket prices.

Farmers may also lose important export markets. The Gulf states, together with Iraq and Iran, are important destinations for South African fruit and meat exports, much of which moves through shipping routes linked to the Strait of Hormuz.

The second major impact will be on the government’s finances.

In April 2026, the government introduced temporary fuel levy relief of R3 per litre (or $0.18/litre), before extending and expanding the support specifically to diesel. By May, diesel levy relief had effectively increased to R3.93 per litre ($0.24/litre), temporarily reducing the general fuel levy on diesel to zero.

The total relief provided between April and June is expected to cost the fiscus roughly R17.2 billion in forgone tax revenue. Since this exceeds the roughly R10 billion contingency reserve available in the current budget, the fiscal cost will need to be absorbed either through stronger-than-expected revenue or expenditure adjustments elsewhere.

The third area of impact is inflation. The cost of fuel shapes inflation expectations because it is highly visible and purchased frequently. Even temporary fuel spikes therefore risk de-anchoring inflation expectations. This is particularly important in the South African economy, where the Reserve Bank has spent several years cementing its credibility to aid the move to a lower inflation target. This depends on inflation expectations continuing to fall towards 3%.

This helps explain why policymakers are concerned not only about fuel prices themselves, but also about the possibility that higher fuel costs may become embedded in broader pricing behaviour and wage expectations.

The bigger lesson: resilience matters

South Africa did not consciously choose to become more diesel dependent. It happened gradually, one workaround at a time. It spent years building diesel into its coping mechanisms. When rail failed, the country used trucks. When electricity failed, it used generators and open cycle gas turbines.

Those adaptations kept the economy moving, but they also quietly increased South Africa’s exposure to global fuel shocks.

The lesson from the current crisis is, therefore, not simply that oil prices are volatile. It is that resilience matters – just not the kind of home-grown resilience which depends on costly workarounds just to keep the lights on and the goods moving.

– Iran war is exposing South Africa’s dependency on diesel: what went wrong
– https://theconversation.com/iran-war-is-exposing-south-africas-dependency-on-diesel-what-went-wrong-283516

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marew Abebe Salemot, Researcher in Political Sciences and International Studies, Debark University

When conflicts break out, most people around the world rely on international media to understand what is happening. These reports do more than inform. They shape how crises are interpreted, which actors are seen as responsible and where global attention is directed.

In complex situations, what is left out can matter as much as what is included.

Ethiopia is a clear example of this problem. Since 2020, the country has experienced multiple, overlapping conflicts.

The war in Tigray (2020-2022) has been one of the most widely reported, drawing sustained global attention because of its scale and humanitarian impact. But at the same time, violence has broken out and continues in Ethiopia’s Amhara and Oromia regions, causing severe consequences for civilians and deepening regional instability.

Our research set out to understand how these conflicts, which targeted ethnic groups, have been reported by the international media, and how the media understand the country’s current complex crises. As a team of media scholars, we analysed news coverage from four major global outlets – BBC from Britain, CNN from the US, Al-Jazeera from Qatar, and CGTN from China – over a five-year period from January 2020 to March 2025. We collected 1,412 stories from the four outlets on Ethiopia’s complex conflict.

To further assess how they frame the conflict and the nature of their reporting, 60 stories were systematically selected from each media outlet, yielding a total sample of 240 conflict-related articles. This allowed us to track patterns in attention, framing and sourcing.

We found that the coverage tended to present Ethiopia’s crisis through a narrow lens, centred largely on one conflict: the Tigray war.

More than three-quarters (77.2%) of all the stories we analysed focused on the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Conflicts in Amhara (at 2.7%) and Oromia (at 0.4%) appeared only marginally in coverage.

This risks producing a partial understanding of a much more complex reality.

Ethiopia’s conflicts are not easily reduced to a single narrative. They involve multiple actors, regions and historical trajectories. Capturing this complexity is challenging, but it is essential. When global media coverage is too narrow, it risks shaping responses that address only part of the problem.

Based on our findings, we recommend that there needs to be a more balanced approach to reporting. Secondly, a greater emphasis must be placed on context, which would include explanations of the historical and political background of conflicts.

A more comprehensive approach would not only improve understanding. It would also contribute to more informed and balanced international engagement with one of the most important and complex regions in Africa today. This matters because Ethiopia is a key player in the Horn of Africa. Instability here has implications for regional security and international diplomacy.

Our findings

Our analysis revealed three major trends in the media coverage of conflict in Ethiopia.

The first was that the Tigray conflict received significantly more media attention than other conflicts in the country. The war, which began in November 2020 between Ethiopian federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, drew widespread international attention because of its scale. The conflict was marked by mass atrocities, civilian displacement and famine conditions. An estimated 800,000 civilians were killed.

Although violence persists across several regions – particularly Amhara and Oromia – the war in Tigray dominated reporting, accounting for 77.2% of total news coverage. This means conflicts were not subjected to the same level of scrutiny or narrative. Humanitarian suffering in Amhara and Oromia was far less visible in our dataset. This does not mean it was absent on the ground. Rather, it suggests that some forms of suffering were more likely to be reported than others.

Second was a lack of context. We identified what we term “episodic reporting”. Around two-thirds of the stories we analysed focused on immediate events – including military clashes, political statements or humanitarian emergencies – without providing much background or context. This meant that complex political dynamics were often reduced to simplified narratives. Long-standing tensions related to governance, federalism, identity and power were rarely explored in detail. Instead, the focus remained on visible crises and urgent developments.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s national dialogue was meant to heal the nation, but divisions are deepening

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Third, that coverage was predominantly negative towards the Ethiopian government. Sources critical of the government were used far more frequently than those offering alternative perspectives. While critical reporting is an essential part of journalism, the imbalance in sourcing suggests that some voices were amplified more than others.

The implications

This imbalance in the reporting has broader implications. Media coverage plays a significant role in shaping international agendas.

Media reports could assist policymakers, humanitarian organisations and international institutions to assess crises and determine priorities. In this regard, the Tigray war alone was discussed over 10 times at the UN Security Council.

In this sense, visibility can translate into political and humanitarian action. Conversely, conflicts that receive limited coverage may not attract the same level of concern.

What needs to be done

Improving this situation requires a number of steps.

Firstly, a more balanced approach to reporting is needed. International media need to widen their scope and pay closer attention to underreported conflicts. This does not mean reducing coverage of major crises, but rather ensuring that other significant developments are not overlooked.

Secondly, context needs to be given. Explaining the historical and political background of conflicts can help audiences understand not just what is happening, but why. Without this context, reporting risks reinforcing simplified narratives that do not capture the full picture.

Thirdly, audiences themselves play a role. Recognising that media coverage is selective can encourage more critical engagement with news. Seeking out multiple sources and perspectives can help build a more nuanced understanding of complex situations.

– Global media networks simplify Ethiopia’s conflicts: insights from 5 years of data
– https://theconversation.com/global-media-networks-simplify-ethiopias-conflicts-insights-from-5-years-of-data-282776

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

Mali and Nigeria, two of the countries in the Sahel region of west Africa, are separated by approximately 1,000 kilometres, with the Niger Republic between them. They differ in population size and government, but they face some of the same threats.

Mali has a population of about 22.4 million, while Nigeria has about 223.8 million. While Nigeria has been a democracy since 1999, Mali has had a military government since 2020.

The two are similar in that they are threatened by multiple armed groups operating in their territories.

Three armed groups – Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP/ISGS), Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) – are shaping the conflict in Mali.

This reached a new high in April 2026 when Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and the Azawad Liberation Front carried out coordinated attacks across Mali.

The northern cities of Kidal and Mopti, as well as military bases in Sevare and Gao, were captured. The heart of Bamako, the capital city of Mali, was also struck, leading to the death of the defence minister, Sadio Camara.

Nigeria too has been threatened by jihadist insurgence and banditry in the north as well as secessionists and militancy in the south. Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are active in the north.

Nigeria lost two brigadier generals fighting the insurgents in the north-east between November 2025 and April 2026.

The weakness of the state plays a significant role in the vulnerability of both countries to attacks. As a scholar who has followed the unfolding events in the Sahel, I draw lessons for Nigeria from the April attacks in Mali.

Those lessons include the possibility of alignment among armed groups, the danger of the jihadists advancing to other Sahelian countries, the audacity of the groups, and the possibility that gains of JNIM in Mali could incite rival groups in Nigeria.

Key lessons for Nigeria

The first lesson concerns armed groups teaming up to fight the state. The April attackers were a combined force of FLA and JNIM. These groups share a common aim: securing enclaves within Mali. They joined efforts to carry out the attacks, each focusing on the areas they wished to control.

In the same vein, Nigeria has battled many armed groups. Competition, rather than cooperation, has defined the relationship between these groups, especially in northern Nigeria. This has always been to the advantage of the Nigerian state. The erstwhile charismatic leader of terror group Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, survived for more than a decade but died during clashes between his group, JAS and ISWAP members.

This led to a decline in Boko Haram’s activities, although they are now gradually resurging.

However, there is evidence of an unfolding alliance between terrorists in the north-east and bandits in the north-central and north-west areas of Nigeria. Such alliance have often been in terms of tactical cooperation as well as exchange of members and arms.

There is also a possibility of closing ranks and joining forces between Boko Haram and ISWAP, especially if leaders who favour working together with ISWAP take over Boko Haram from Bakura Doro, the current leader of JAS, after the death of Abukakar Shekau. If this happens, it may escalate terrorist activities that may be difficult for Nigeria to manage.

The second lesson is that the audacity of the JNIM/FLA coalition and the results achieved can motivate related groups to act in other parts of the Sahel. The al-Qaeda-linked and ISIS-linked terrorist groups have been involved in a competition for control of the Sahel for a long period.

This comes in the form of direct armed attacks against each other, competition over territory and recruiting, and attempting to demonstrate the ability to cause more violence than the other. This has led to an increase in jihadist attacks.

JNIM’s takeover of some cities in Mali may encourage its ISIS-affiliated rivals in the Greater Sahara and Lake Chad to also increase their violence.

In the Lake Chad Region, ISWAP has intensified attacks against military formations while also building parallel states in many areas of the Lake Chad basin, with Nigeria being the most affected.

Lastly, with the capture of Kidal and attacks near Bamako, JNIM may be close to capturing Mali. If Mali falls, it could be a training ground for terrorists in the Sahel. This fear was the reason Nigeria mobilised its forces for a peacekeeping mission in Mali in 2012. And if Mali falls, Burkina Faso and Niger will be threatened.

The threat to Niger is a significant problem because it is a buffer zone for Nigeria. Meanwhile Nigeria is a major target of the jihadist insurgents in their move to extend towards coastal west Africa.

What should Nigeria do?

Mali’s experience could turn the lens on Nigeria. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have opted out of the Economic Community of West African States, Ecowas. But Nigeria and other countries in the region should not abandon the breakaway states at this stage. Necessary regional support should be galvanised and Nigeria can still play a leading role in this.

In my view, Nigeria also needs to rejig its counter-terrorism to be more responsive. Rather than its current defensive posture, which gives jihadists the opportunity to plan, Nigeria ought to adopt sophisticated and strategic offensive counter-terrorism that takes the war to the jihadists.

– Mali’s security crisis holds warnings for Nigeria: here’s why
– https://theconversation.com/malis-security-crisis-holds-warnings-for-nigeria-heres-why-282180