Category: English

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kevin J.A. Thomas, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Rice University, Rice University

The Donald Trump administration issued an executive order in June 2025 banning nationals from 12 countries from travelling to the United States. It also imposed entry restrictions on nationals from seven others.

About half of the countries affected by these measures are in Africa. This raises concerns about the future of African migration to the US.

The restrictions are among several new threats and opportunities that affect the dynamics of African migration.

I am a social demographer and in a recent study my co-author and I identified trends that will shape the future of African migration flows and are different from migration patterns of the past. There are at least five emerging trends:

• Migration between African countries is not following colonial labour migration patterns.

• Africans are migrating to new destinations (for example in South America and Asia).

• There’s more diversity in the types of African migrants, based on who they are, why they are migrating and how they are doing it.

• There is significant migration to Africa from non-African countries (like China).

• Institutions (such as municipal and traditional authorities) have an expanding role in migration.

I argue that these trends are likely to be accelerated by changes in Africa’s demography. For example, the continent is expected to have the world’s largest population of youth by 2050.

The tendency to migrate is typically concentrated in younger age groups. So Africa’s large youth population is likely to shape the course of future international migration flows more than migrant populations elsewhere.

Shaping the trends

One factor shaping the trends is the expansion of efforts to regulate African international migration. Trump’s executive order is only one example of these strategies.

Many western countries have developed new policies that directly or indirectly restrict the opportunities available for migration from Africa.

For example, there is Canada’s Strong Borders Act, tabled as a bill in June 2025. There are fears it will restrict refugee protections and cause refugee applicants in Canada without legal status to live in hiding. These consequences could negatively affect the resettlement of African refugees in the country.

As part of the tighter controls, countries in the west are restricting Africans’ access to visas. Africans applying for visas to travel to Europe experience disproportionately high rates of visa rejections.

Read more: Africans who apply for Schengen visas face high rejection rates – migration scholar explains why

Such restrictions are not accounted for in major theories of migration, most of which focus on the influence of economic, social and political factors. It’s possible that these restrictions by themselves will negatively affect overall African migration flows.

The second driver of trends in African migration is the changing patterns within the continent.

The number of Africans migrating to other African countries has always been higher than the number migrating to the west. In the past, these intra-continental migrations revolved around the movement of labour migrants to facilitate the colonial extraction of resources in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa.

In recent years, however, the dynamics of these movements have been changing. For example, the fastest growing destinations for Africans on the continent are now in Central Africa. The United Nations’ estimates of international migrants living in African countries indicates that between 1990 and 2020, the number of migrants increased from 2,740 to 230,618 in Equatorial Guinea; from 33,517 to 656,434 in Angola; and from 74,342 to 547,494 in Chad.

Other new destinations are also emerging on the continent. According to the International Organisation for Migration, these include Egypt, Morocco, Burkina Faso and Ethiopia.

These changes suggest that factors like better economic opportunities and the search for safe havens from conflict are causing many Africans to migrate to destinations that are different from those that were most attractive to African migrants during the colonial period.

A third important driver of trends has been a change in the global destinations to which Africans now migrate. As opportunities for migration to the west decline, African migrants are increasingly exploring opportunities for migration to Asia, South America and Australia.

Africans have been arriving in Asian countries such as China and Japan in significant numbers over the past three decades to study or pursue business opportunities.

For example, it’s estimated there are now around 500,000 Africans living in China.

Many are entrepreneurs in business hubs such as Guangzhou. But they also include Africans who have settled in large numbers in places such as Hong Kong, Shanghai and Beijing.

The African-born populations living in Australia, Israel, Japan and Russia are also increasing. For example, although there were very few African immigrants in Japan before 1980, by 2015 there were about 12,000.

African migrants are also increasingly travelling to Central and South American countries, either as transit destinations in their efforts to migrate to the US or as countries of permanent settlement.

Migrants from Africa are also increasingly willing to take risks while migrating to high-income countries. This has resulted in the loss of thousands of lives among migrants attempting to travel to Europe by crossing the Saharan desert and the Mediterranean Sea.

There is no doubt that policy restrictions that affect African migration to western countries will have many negative consequences. However, migration flows always adapt to support the welfare of communities around the world.

– African migration: 5 trends and what’s driving them
– https://theconversation.com/african-migration-5-trends-and-whats-driving-them-261511

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Samantha Kriger, Lecturer, Cape Peninsula University of Technology

In South Africa, children’s admission to a particular public school is decided by province. Each provincial education department manages its own digital admissions system. The Western Cape province introduced an online admissions portal in 2018 which became fully operational in 2024. The aim was to make school placement more transparent. This is important because historically, under apartheid, South African education was racially segregated and unequally funded. White schools received the best resources.

Education researcher Samantha Kriger took a closer look at what actually happens in admissions to schools in the Western Cape that used to be exclusively white (known as Model C schools). She set out her findings in a book coauthored with education academic Jonathan Jansen. Though Who Gets In and Why was published in 2020, she says the circumstances remain the same in most of these schools. Here she answers some questions about what she found.

How is the admissions portal supposed to work?

Parents apply online to a minimum of three and maximum of ten schools, via the Western Cape education department admissions portal. The schools receive the applications via the portal and assess them based on provincial guidelines. That implies schools can discriminate between applications.

Schools submit a list of accepted, declined and waiting-list learners to the province via the portal.

Why and how did you research school admissions?

We wanted to know why formerly white schools still looked much as they had under apartheid (with high enrolment of white pupils).

The initial research included school data from the Centralised Education Management Information System, the official data management system used by the Western Cape Education Department. This digital database records and tracks all key information about learners, teachers and schools in the province. The data revealed that many former “Model C” schools continued to preserve their historically exclusive enrolment criteria.

Under apartheid Model C schools were whites-only public schools. In 1990 they were semi-privatised, giving their governing bodies greater control over finances, admissions and staffing.

Read more: South Africa’s no-fee school system can’t undo inequality

We used a qualitative case study approach, focusing on 30 historically white primary schools in the wealthier southern suburbs of Cape Town. All the schools allowed us to visit and shared information about their admissions processes.

As researchers we visited sites and interviewed principals, admissions officers, staff and stakeholders (such as estate agents and provincial education officials). We also analysed school documents and enrolment data. The study used pseudonyms to protect participant anonymity.

We then analysed admissions practices in relation to broader political, policy and socio-economic contexts.

Some of the schools were wealthy institutions, as measured by the school location and facilities, tuition fees and the range of extramural activities that they offered. Others were not wealthy.

What did you find?

The majority of the schools maintained their white enrolment. This was not simply the result of lingering residential segregation, but was often tied to school-level practices and socio-economic gatekeeping.

These schools frequently employ subtle, yet effective, admissions strategies that indirectly exclude lower-income, predominantly Black families. For example they choose applicants from specific feeder areas with high property prices, emphasise English or Afrikaans proficiency tests, or charge high school fees. Strong alumni networks and parent bodies, historically dominated by white families, also play a role in sustaining existing demographics by influencing school governance and admissions decisions.

South Africa’s public education policy promotes equal access. Yet we found that, in practice, these schools filter who gets in.

In South Africa, prior to 1994, the racially segregated education system privileged white learners while systematically underfunding schools for Black African, Coloured and Indian communities. More than 30 years later, deep inequalities persist because race and class remain closely linked.

High-fee former white schools often exclude, in practice, many Black, Indian and Coloured families who cannot afford the costs or meet other socio-economic entry barriers.

Read more: What young people have to say about race and inequality in South Africa

Admissions criteria such as language preference, application deadlines, early registration practices and school proximity can function as indirect mechanisms of exclusion.

For example, many parents are unaware that certain schools “lock in” preferred candidates years before formal Grade R or Grade 1 enrolment. This often occurs through unofficial feeder systems, where pre-primary schools enrol children as young as two years old, typically at a substantial financial cost. By the time applications open to the general public, most places have already been informally allocated.

This dynamic is evident in high school admissions too. Preference is frequently given to learners from designated primary schools. Candidates without prior affiliation may stand a chance only if they bring added value, such as athletic excellence, or musical or artistic abilities that align with the school’s interests.

These practices can unintentionally disadvantage families from lower socio-economic backgrounds who engage the system later or lack access to early-stage enrolment opportunities.

Language requirements are often framed as necessary for ensuring that learners can cope with the school’s curriculum. But they may indirectly exclude applicants from homes that mostly use African languages. For many black African families, especially those from lower-income or rural backgrounds, limited exposure to English or Afrikaans before school entry can disadvantage their children in admissions assessments or interviews.

The emphasis on early “lock in” and complex documentation also benefits families who are digitally literate, well-resourced and socially networked.

Another troubling finding was the role of parental profiling in admissions. Some schools assess the social standing of families, including their income, occupation, and perceived “fit” with the school’s culture.

Why does it matter that school admissions work this way?

The implications are serious. While the constitution and education policy mandate non-discrimination and the right to basic education, the reality is that access to elite public schools remains stratified. This is not only by geography or academic ability but by social capital. The effect is to reinforce existing race and class divides.

Read more: South Africa can’t crack the inequality curse. Why, and what can be done

If transformation in education is to be more than cosmetic, policies must be matched with oversight, transparency, and a commitment to dismantling the quiet mechanisms of exclusion.

– Elite schools in South Africa: how quiet gatekeeping keeps racial patterns in place
– https://theconversation.com/elite-schools-in-south-africa-how-quiet-gatekeeping-keeps-racial-patterns-in-place-258720

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Astrid R.N. Haas, Research associate at African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town

Africa’s population is projected to nearly double by 2050, with 80% of that growth being concentrated in urban areas, leaving two out of three Africans living in cities. This expansion of cities at an unprecedented rate will bring both challenges and opportunities for African countries. In this edited extract from a discussion with the OECD’s Women Leading Change podcast series, feminist urban economist Astrid R.N. Haas explores three pillars for inclusive and sustainable growth: governance, planning and financing.

What can policymakers do to plan effectively for this rapid growth?

Policymakers must be more proactive. They need to anticipate future needs for infrastructure, services and housing. And they need to plan and invest in those spaces.

To do this, national policymakers must treat urbanisation not just as a city issue, but as a national priority. If they work properly, cities are engines of growth for the whole country. National strategies must support cities with appropriate policies, financing mechanisms and investments.

So African institutions must fit the purpose and context. Institutions must have clear responsibilities to avoid fragmented decision making. Administrative structures must underpin this, not only from a sectoral but also from a geographic perspective.

One challenge is that local governments are often positioned under the authority of national governments, and in many contexts, working at the local level may not carry the same level of recognition or prestige as national roles, despite the critical responsibilities they shoulder.

The one place that is working to overcome this is South Africa, where the municipal government is a separate sphere of government but equal to the other levels. Here the national treasury is working towards developing a single remuneration framework so that employees performing the same tasks in different spheres of government are compensated equitably.

More thought needs to go into how to support other cities across the continent in a similar way, ensuring they are adequately staffed in terms of numbers and skills. It is about making local government a more attractive place for talent to work and grow.

Most importantly, effort needs to go into making sure governance structures are both legitimate and responsive to citizens. Local government, as the level of government closest to the people, plays a critical role in this. Local authorities must be equipped to engage with residents and incorporate their priorities into decision-making.

What steps can governments take to create long term financing strategies?

African governments must plan beyond the typical two-, three- or five-year horizons. Long-term planning is often challenging because it doesn’t align with shorter political cycles. But infrastructure and service delivery require sustained, long-term investment and commitment.

We also need to think carefully about which services and investments should be the responsibility of government, and which can be delivered by the private sector. Policymakers play a crucial role in prioritising interventions that offer the greatest public benefit, whether by boosting productivity, advancing key social goals like livability through expanded social housing and services, or, ideally, both. Once priorities are set, investments must be appropriately balanced between public and private actors to ensure impact and equity.

How can policymakers guide sustainable and economically productive urban growth?

By making investments in the places people are moving to. This can be done through projections and then urban expansion planning. And here the OECD is at the forefront of some innovative work on data production for African cities.

Together with the United Cities and Local Governments, an association of local and regional governments, they’ve also produced what is probably the most comparable data on subnational financing: the World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment.

Used well, data like this can help more equitable decisions to be made. These tools can show us where populations are expanding, where services are lagging, and how people move and work across urban areas. Policymakers can then respond with targeted investments that improve livelihoods and expand opportunity. Therefore, for people like me who work with cities, data is an invaluable resource.

A note of caution is also in order. It’s not just about what the data shows, it’s also about what it leaves out. Who’s missing from the numbers? Who isn’t represented? What don’t we see? And why?

If people are underrepresented in official data sets, they risk being forgotten in policymaking too. That is why it is so important that institutions like the OECD not only produce data, but also help identify and fill these gaps. Governments also need to find ways to complement official statistics to “see the unseen” and build a fuller picture of urban life.

An example is the role of women in the informal food economy, urban agriculture, and service sectors. Their contributions are immense, yet often invisible in the data. That invisibility poses a major challenge for urban planning.

Can municipal financing be reimagined to prioritise gender equity and inclusivity?

Most cities around the world have been designed predominantly by men, and, more specifically, by white men from privileged backgrounds. As a result, even today, in cities across Europe and the US, urban spaces continue to reflect patriarchal notions of livability. They often fail to account for the different ways that women and other marginalised groups experience life in cities.

In Africa most urban spaces are yet to be built as most countries have yet to fully urbanise. So there is this unique opportunity to design cities from the outset that are truly inclusive. And here, municipal financing is key. Where we get the money from, and how we spend it, will ultimately shape the urban outcomes that define our cities for generations.

On the revenue side, African countries must carefully examine how both formal taxes and informal fees affect different groups, men, women, and other marginalised communities, and consider who is bearing the greatest burden.

The expenditure side is, in some ways, deemed to be more straightforward. However, it involves trade-offs as African countries need to invest in infrastructure and services that expand not only economic but also social opportunity, such as accessible public transport, affordable childcare, and adequate public spaces.

Borrowing is another critical component of the municipal finance equation. If you look at the OECD-UCLG data, you’ll see that very few African cities currently have access to capital markets. This severely limits their ability to finance the infrastructure they need.

Even where borrowing becomes possible, it carries long-term responsibilities. Borrowing is not just a short-term financial tool; it’s an intergenerational contract. The funds borrowed today will be repaid not only by current taxpayers but by future generations as well.

The full discussion is available via this link.

– 2 in 3 Africans will live in cities by 2050: how planners can put this to good use
– https://theconversation.com/2-in-3-africans-will-live-in-cities-by-2050-how-planners-can-put-this-to-good-use-251414