Four people have been sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of engineer Oscar Hlatshwayo in a drive-by shooting in Ladysmith in 2019, the South African Police Service (SAPS) said on Wednesday.
The SAPS Political Killings Task Team secured the convictions in the Madadeni High Court.
At the time of his murder, Hlatshwayo was an Executive Director in the Engineering and Infrastructure Services Department of the Alfred Duma Local Municipality in KwaZulu-Natal.
The following accused were each sentenced to life imprisonment for their roles into the murder of the late engineer are as follows: • Nomaswazi Shabalala who was a senior engineer at the Alfred Duma Local municipality is believed to have ordered the hit. • The second accused, Mondli Mabaso is a businessman linked to tenders at the municipality. • The third accused, Mduduzi Njuza’s role was to coordinate and organise the firearms used in the commission of the crime and the fourth accused, Brown Ngcobo was the shooter in the matter.
The National Commissioner of the SAPS, General Fannie Masemola welcomed the life imprisonment sentence for each accused and said he hopes the convictions will provide the necessary closure to the family of the murdered Civil Engineer. – SAnews.gov.za
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abdifatah Ismael Tahir, Honorary Research Fellow, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester
Around 98 million children and youth in sub-Saharan Africa are out of school, accounting for nearly 40% of the global out-of-school population. This is disproportionately high, considering that the region accounts for roughly 15% of the world’s population. In simple terms, “out-of-school children” is defined as those within the age bracket for primary or lower secondary education who are not enrolled in either level.
One of the primary barriers to access is conflict. This is particularly evident in Somalia, which has endured violence and upheaval since the collapse of its central government in 1991. Various armed groups, including clan militias and al-Shabaab militants, have vied for control over the capital, with devastating consequences.
At present, nearly 3 million children and youth are out of school in Somalia out of an estimated 7.6 million school-age population. As the epicentre of conflict and displacement, Mogadishu experiences profound disruptions to educational access. Less than 23% of children eligible for primary education are enrolled, according to 2020 government statistics. Only 17% progress to secondary education.
I am a scholar of urban geography with a research focus on urban politics and governance. My co-researcher and I sought to examine the historical, social and economic factors over and above conflict contributing to the high number of out-of-school children in Mogadishu.
We found that public education is both limited and unevenly distributed. Government-run schools make up only 4% of the total number of schools in the city. These few public schools are disproportionately located in areas dominated by major clans, leaving minority communities and conflict-displaced populations with limited access to formal education.
A key barrier is the prohibitive cost of schooling. Equally important are entrenched cultural dynamics in areas populated by minority clans, where formal education, particularly for girls, is often undervalued in favor of technical skills or small-scale entrepreneurial training passed down through generations. Much like Somali society’s historical resistance to colonial education through Islamic schooling, many minority communities today rely on vocational skills as strategies of autonomy from dominant clans that control political and economic power and often restrict their access to opportunity.
By narrowing our focus to Mogadishu, our study offers a more detailed and localised understanding of the educational barriers within the city. It highlights the everyday choices, institutional fragmentation, and socio-religious imperatives that reproduce exclusion in ways that other studies have overlooked. It contributes to a more nuanced analysis of Somalia’s educational challenges, supporting the development of more targeted and effective policy recommendations and interventions.
The findings
Our qualitative study was conducted in two stages. We started with a review of academic literature, government and non-governmental reports and education policy documents. The aim was to trace the historical and structural causes of exclusion. This was followed by 21 semi-structured interviews with families of out-of-school children, teachers, education officials and policymakers at both regional and federal level.
Our findings suggest that the reasons children are out of school in Mogadishu are complex and deeply structural. On one level, we found that formal education is largely inaccessible. Government-funded public education is limited by the small number of schools and by its uneven distribution. Formal private school fees on the other hand range from US$120 to US$300 per year. This is far beyond the reach of most households, whose average monthly income stands at US$350.
Though no official statistics exist, anecdotal evidence suggests that hundreds of thousands of children are enrolled in Qur’anic schools, also known as madrassas. This is because madrassa instruction is culturally embedded and widely trusted. Many families also rely on madrassas because the fees are lower or negotiable and they offer flexible arrangements, such as discounted fees or waivers.
However, these institutions typically exclude academic subjects such as science, mathematics and language.
Families must choose between two parallel systems – formal and Islamic – that are neither harmonised nor mutually reinforcing. In many cases, children complete madrassa instruction without acquiring basic literacy or numeracy skills, stalling their educational progression.
This two-track education system goes back to the colonial era. There was resistance to western-style schools introduced in the 1930s which were seen as a foreign influence and religious dilution.
Spatial inequality and social identity also exclude people. Peripheral districts and neighbourhoods where minorities are concentrated suffer from underinvestment in educational infrastructure. These areas may be absent from national and municipal development plans. Some existing schools lack adequate sanitation facilities, libraries, and trained teaching staff.
For internally displaced persons, tenure insecurity and legal ambiguity further limit access to public services, including education.
What needs to happen
This situation is not unique to Somalia, but the scale of exclusion in Mogadishu is alarming. Education is more than academic instruction – it offers safety, structure and hope. When children can’t go to school, the consequences are profound: increased poverty, higher crime and weakened social cohesion.
The solution requires more than constructing classrooms. Based on our research and policy analysis, we propose some recommendations.
With a federal budget of only US$1 billion, the options are limited. For a start, the government should authorise madrassas to provide education up to grade 6 and repurpose primary schools into secondary institutions.
Flexible madrassas and mobile classrooms have shown notable resilience in times of crisis. In Hodan district of Mogadishu, Qur’anic schools adapted to the influx of the internally displaced by extending hours and reducing fees. These locally embedded systems should be formally recognised. They also deserve direct national support to ensure quality and alignment with strategic education goals.
Many community-run schools currently operate outside public planning and budgeting frameworks, yet they deliver critical services. In Somaliland, some schools have been financed through zakat (charitable donations) and diaspora contributions. Mogadishu should adapt this model.
While Islamic education enjoys broad legitimacy, its narrow curriculum constrains students’ prospects. This calls for a hybrid curriculum blending Qur’anic instruction with core academic subjects: literacy, numeracy and science. This has proven successful in pilot schools in Puntland state.
Finally, school construction and rehabilitation efforts should go to historically underserved districts first.
Mogadishu’s out-of-school children are not invisible. They are the future of the city. Including them requires more than donor-led programmes or technical solutions. It requires a political commitment to equity. This means formally recognising community efforts, bridging religious and secular traditions, and investing where it is needed most.
– Somalia’s education crisis: why so few children attend school and what could be done to change that – https://theconversation.com/somalias-education-crisis-why-so-few-children-attend-school-and-what-could-be-done-to-change-that-261721
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Robert J. Gordon, Emeritus Professor, University of Vermont and Research Associate, University of the Free State
The genocide of Namibia’s Ovaherero and Nama people by German colonial forces (1904-1907) is widely documented. But much less is made of what came next – the genocide of the country’s Bushmen, also known as the San.
In 1992, anthropologist Robert J. Gordon published a book, The Bushman Myth and the Making of a Namibian Underclass, about these indigenous people of Namibia and how they were hunted and turned into servants by German colonisers.
Now it has been thoroughly revised and has been republished as The Bushman Myth Revisited: Genocide, Dispossession and the Road to Servitude. We asked him five questions.
Why a revised, rewritten book?
Today, most Bushmen still live a life of servitude in their own country. Local San and human rights activists encouraged me to bring out an updated and inexpensive version, which the University of Namibia Press has just published. The original editions were published in the US, making them virtually unobtainable in Namibia, where they needed to be read and discussed.
UNAM Press
Since the first edition, an extraordinary number of books on German colonialism have been published, including my own. These inspired the use of key concepts in the book like platzgeist, where a particular zeitgeist (spirit of the times) is anchored in a specific place (platz) that makes people engage in activities they might not normally do.
What was life like for indigenous people before colonialism?
The Kalahari Basin in southern Africa is one of the world’s richest ethnographic zones (areas with distinct cultures). The region is home to some of the oldest languages still in existence and the genetic diversity found in the zone indicates that it is home to one of the world’s original ancestral populations.
“Bushman” is used as a blanket term encompassing more than 200 ethnic groups. There is no “typical Bushman”; rather, they constitute a miscellany of fluid groups. “Bushman” is preferred by many local communities, possibly as a form of resistance against officialdom’s categorisation of them as San and “Marginals”. The term “San” is found only in one language, Khoekhoegowab, and means the same as Bushman.
I see them as convivial with a strong ideology of sharing. Colonial power is based on controlling access to what people desire, like money or livestock. Bushmen lived as hunter-gatherers, roaming across the landscape. They had a different concept of property, desiring neither money or livestock; they were uncontrollable and so they were treated as animals and subject to annihilation.
What was the genocidal platzgeist?
First, some background. Today’s Namibia was a German colony called German South West Africa from 1884. The 1904-1907 genocidal Herero-Nama war was decisive, as Germany sought to create a German haven by encouraging settlers.
The north-east arc of the territory, stretching from Otavi to Gobabis with Grootfontein as the epicentre, served as a magnet, with a newly completed railway line, mines, vast agricultural potential and accessible land. In Grootfontein alone, the number of settler farms increased from 15 in 1903 to 175 by 1913. Almost all these cattle ranches were on land occupied by Bushmen.
Settlers were soon in trouble. By 1911, the Namibian press headlines screamed “Bushman Plague”. Two factors fed the panic. First, the killing of a policeman and a few white farmers. And second, Bushman activities, allegedly “brigandage” or banditry, were hindering the flow of sorely needed migrant contract workers from the Owambo and Kavango regions to work on the newly discovered Luderitzbucht diamond fields. The Chamber of Mines wanted the area “sanitised”.
Accordingly, the German governor ordered that Bushmen could be shot if they were believed to be attempting to resist arrest by officials or settlers. Over 400 anti-Bushman patrols covering some 60,000km² were deployed from 1911 to 1913.
But settlers and officials considered these measures inadequate. Settlers continued to terrorise Bushmen without as much as a slap on the wrist. “Bushman hunts” continued until the South African takeover of the territory in 1915 when the country became known as South West Africa.
We don’t know how many Bushmen died, but as I explain in my book, official estimates put Bushmen numbers in 1913 at 8,000-12,000. In 1923 it was 3,600. This gives an indication of the magnitude of the killings.
What oiled the genocide was the settler platzgeist. The dominant ethos was one of besiegement, of being threatened by unpredictable external forces. The farmers, attracted by generous government support and subsidies, were mostly discharged soldiers, ill-trained in farming, lacking crucial local knowledge, and schooled in racist arrogance. The situation bred insecurity, fear and hyper-masculinity.
Bushmen, with their reputed ability to camouflage themselves and to track and hunt using poisoned arrows for which there was no known antidote, epitomised their worst nightmare as they sought to establish overlordship on their isolated farms. Believed to be like predatory game, Bushmen had to be exterminated as a group. This was genocide.
What happened after the genocide?
Repression continued under South African rule from 1915 until independence in 1990, although it was less extreme. The possession of Bushman bows and arrows was made illegal. Bushmen were steadily dispossessed of their territory to make way for game reserves and settler farms.
As late as the 1970s, the administration was still thinking of relocating 30,000 Bushmen to the proclaimed artificially created Bushmanland, which constituted 2% of the territory they had once occupied.
The vast majority remained in their traditional areas now under the overlordship of settler farmers, where they sank into a situation of servitude. With Namibia’s independence, the situation worsened. New labour laws set a minimum wage, making it uneconomical to keep Bushmen workers. And many farmers switched to game farming or sold to black farmers who preferred to hire their kinsfolk.
The result was that Bushmen were forced into communal areas or peri-urban informal settlements, where they eke out a precarious living.
Where does this find these people today?
Bushmen are currently found in varying states of servitude, doing largely menial labour in the north and north-eastern regions, where they were once the ancestral inhabitants. The government is trying to assist Bushmen, mainly with welfare grants and a few overcrowded resettlement farms.
Search “Namibian Bushmen” on the internet and one is bombarded with glamourised images of Bushmen in traditional dress demonstrating hunting and tracking. Such narratives, largely the result of tourism boosters, reinforce the myth of the “pristine” Bushmen. The history of genocide and servitude is airbrushed out.
– Namibia’s forgotten genocide: how Bushmen were hunted and killed under German colonial rule – https://theconversation.com/namibias-forgotten-genocide-how-bushmen-were-hunted-and-killed-under-german-colonial-rule-261267
The Directorate of Humanitarian and Social Affairs of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has commenced a four-day regional workshop to review the draft ECOWAS Civil-Military Coordination Strategy for Humanitarian Action.
The workshop, taking place from 5th to 8th August 2025 in Abuja, Nigeria, brings together technical experts from ECOWAS Member States, Centres of Excellence, Civil Society Organizations, media establishments, and humanitarian partners across West Africa.
During the workshop, participants will review and refine the draft strategy, ensuring that the final version aligns with international best practices. Once finalized, the document is expected to be adopted as a regional policy framework guiding civil-military relations in humanitarian contexts.
In his opening remarks, Dr. Mohammed Ibrahim, Head of the Disaster Management and Risk Reduction Division, representing the Director of Humanitarian and Social Affairs, Dr. Sintiki Tarfa-Ugbe, highlighted the increasing complexities of the humanitarian environment in West Africa. He noted that ECOWAS, since the adoption of its Humanitarian Policy in 2012, has acknowledged the importance of a well-coordinated relationship between civilian actors and the military/security operatives.
“Disasters, internal displacement, refugee crises, food insecurity, pandemics — these are all scenarios that often require cooperation between humanitarian actors and security personnel. Unfortunately, we’ve also witnessed instances of misunderstanding between both parties during such operations. This strategy aims to resolve that,” Dr. Ibrahim stated.
The workshop builds on Strategic Objective 7 of the ECOWAS Humanitarian Policy Plan of Action, which mandates the Community and its Member States to “establish and implement standards and guidelines for the use of military assets in emergencies.” This mandate is further reinforced by the ECOWAS Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Peacekeeping, and Security adopted in 1999, which emphasizes the need for multidimensional missions involving civilians, military, and police forces.
The ECOWAS Civil-Military Coordination Strategy is designed to serve as a framework for seamless interaction between civilian humanitarians and military/security actors during emergencies. The initiative acknowledges the increasing involvement of the military in humanitarian settings and seeks to ensure that such participation remains coordinated, respectful of humanitarian principles, and effective.
At the end of the workshop, participants are expected to produce a comprehensive, internationally aligned strategy document that will enhance humanitarian coordination and delivery in West Africa. ECOWAS also anticipates valuable recommendations from the participants to enrich the regional process and further institutionalize civil-military cooperation for humanitarian effectiveness.
– on behalf of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The ECOWAS Commission, through its Early Warning Directorate (EWD) and the ECOWAS Peace Fund (EPF), is carrying out a joint technical mission to Ghana and Benin from July 31 to August 05, 2025, to assess the equipment procured for their National Early Warning and Response Centers. This mission is part of broader regional efforts to ensure that these centers are fully operational and contributing effectively to national and regional mechanisms for anticipating and responding to emerging peace and security threats.
The visit forms part of ECOWAS’ strategic support to Member States under the African Peace and Security Architecture Support Programme (APSA-SP), with funding from the European Union and the African Union Commission. The mission seeks to evaluate the state and use of logistics, IT, and office equipment provided to these centers, identify challenges, and propose enhancements that align with international standards and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).
The establishment of National Early Warning and Response Centers is a key regional initiative aimed at bolstering the capacity of Member States to monitor and respond to socio-political, humanitarian and security-related risks. With support from the ECOWAS, five countries: Benin, Cabo Verde, Ghana, Niger and Senegal have received technical and material assistance to enhance their national systems.
This technical assessment will provide valuable insights into the functionality and impact of the support provided, helping to guide future interventions and reinforce the Peace and Security architecture across West Africa.
The delegation used the opportunity to visit Training Institutions and Training Centres of Excellence (TIs/TCEs) that received funding under Phase Two of the support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA II) to conduct monitoring and evaluation exercises on funding and equipment procured for the centres.
Through sustained collaboration and regional solidarity, ECOWAS reaffirms its commitment to supporting Member States in building resilient and responsive institutions for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
– on behalf of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Significant cuts to humanitarian aid are causing a rapid deterioration of the living conditions for refugees in Ethiopia’s Gambella region.
This has led to the suspension of nutrition services in four out of seven refugee camps, putting 80,000 children under five at risk of life-threatening malnutrition.
We urge humanitarian organisations and the Ethiopian authorities to scale up support and strengthen the healthcare system.
Living conditions for refugees in Ethiopia’s Gambella region are rapidly deteriorating following significant cuts to humanitarian aid in the region. The sharp decline is largely due to global reductions in support from key donors such as USAID, straining basic services such as food distribution, healthcare, access to clean water, and sanitation services.
Located in southwestern Ethiopia near the South Sudanese border, Gambella has hosted a large number of mostly South Sudanese refugees since 2014. Today, more than 395,000 refugees are living in seven camps, including Kule refugee camp, where Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) has provided healthcare services for more than a decade.
Essential services on the brink of collapse
The general decline of humanitarian funding in the region has led to the suspension of nutrition services in four out of the seven refugee camps, leaving around 80,000 children under the age of five at risk of life-threatening malnutrition.
“We receive food once a month—maize, wheat, and sorghum—but it always runs out before the month ends,” says Nyauahial Puoch, a mother who travelled about eight kilometres from Tierkidi refugee camp to seek treatment for her 17-month-old daughter at MSF’s facility in Kule camp. “Since last year, there has been a big decline. Some of the items we used to get are no longer provided at all.”
Puoch’s daughter was subsequently diagnosed with malnutrition.
Since October 2024, refugees in Kule camp have received as little as 600 calories a day—less than 30 per cent of the recommended daily minimum of 2,100 calories per person. Other refugee camps in the region are also experiencing a similar situation. At times, food distribution has stopped for months, due to international supply chain disruptions and funding shortages.
So far in 2025, MSF has recorded a 55 per cent increase in child admissions to our therapeutic feeding centre compared to the previous year, with half of these children coming from other camps in the region.
“We walked three hours from our home in Akula camp to get to the MSF hospital,” says Kuoth, whose one-year-old child received treatment at MSF’s hospital in Kule. “Our child had cough, diarrhoea, and severe malnutrition, and she had to be hospitalised for 15 days until she recovered.”
Access to healthcare is difficult
MSF’s outpatient department has seen a 58 per cent rise in patient visits compared to the same period last year, with many patients arriving from surrounding camps. The number of women attending antenatal care sessions has also increased by 72 per cent compared to 2024, indicating the growing demand for maternal healthcare services.
“We’re receiving more patients from other camps,” says Armand Dirks, MSF project coordinator in Gambella. “Largely because these services are no longer available locally due to many NGOs withdrawing from the region due to funding cuts. MSF is overwhelmed by the increased patient load, and we fear this number will likely keep rising in the coming months.”
Disease prevention reduced
Funding cuts have also caused disease prevention activities—such as malaria prevention programmes—to be downsized.
As malaria is endemic in the region, our teams are anticipating a sharp increase in the number of malaria patients during the current rainy season, which lasts from May to October.
In July 2025, the number of malaria patients coming to our facility has risen by approximately 125 per cent compared to June 2025. MSF has treated more than 23,800 cases since January, with over half of these patients coming from neighbouring refugee camps.
With key malaria prevention activities such as the distribution of bed nets, indoor and outdoor spraying, and timely access to healthcare services being significantly decreased this year, we fear that the region will have a hard time controlling the spread of the disease, which will potentially increase the burden on the already-fragile health system.
“Cases are expected to rise sharply during this peak transmission period,” says Birhanu Sahile, MSF deputy medical coordinator. “This poses a serious threat to already vulnerable refugees who face heightened exposure to malaria-infected mosquitos due to overcrowded living conditions and limited sanitation.”
To address this situation, we are enhancing our malaria treatment services in the region, and plan to establish a dedicated malaria health post in Tierkidi refugee camp—a large refugee camp in Gambella region, home to more than 74,000 refugees. Our teams are also distributing bed nets, and supporting vector control and other preventive measures for refugees living in Kule camp.
A call for urgent action
“Walking through the camp, you’ll see many empty buildings—spaces once used by NGOs that have now withdrawn,” says Dirks. “Their absence is deeply felt. Services that once supported this community have now disappeared.”
In Kule refugee camp, MSF is providing a range of essential services including basic and specialised healthcare, maternal and child health including comprehensive sexual and gender-based violence care, mental health care, water and sanitation, and health promotion and nutrition programmes.
“MSF is working at full capacity, but the scale of needs in Kule far exceeds what we can address alone,” says Sahile. “Without urgent support and interventions from other organisations, this crisis will continue to escalate, putting thousands of vulnerable lives at even greater risk.”
As NGOs are increasingly unable to meet the healthcare needs within refugee camps, we urge the Government of Ethiopia to take clear and decisive steps in Gambella to advance refugee integration into local services. This includes strengthening the current healthcare system for everyone and enhancing its capacity to withstand future cuts.
H.E. Dr. Rania A. Al-Mashat, Minister of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation, held a bilateral meeting with Mr. Bui Thanh Son, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, and Ms. Phan Thi Thang, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade. This meeting took place during the visit of H.E. Luong Cuong, President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to Egypt, where he met with H.E. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi.
At the beginning of the meeting, H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat welcomed the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister, and highlighted the continuous development of relations between the two countries, which is reflected in the exchange of high-level visits, the meetings between the two countries’ leaders, the convergence of many shared visions and positions, and the announcement by the two presidents to elevate their relations to the level of a Strategic Partnership.
The Minister of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation explained that since establishing full diplomatic relations in 1963, Egypt and Vietnam have maintained distinguished historical ties. She pointed out that 2025 marks the 62nd anniversary of these diplomatic relations, which have seen close cooperation to achieve development in accordance with shared interests.
H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat and the Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam discussed preparations for the sixth session of the Joint Committee, in implementation of the directives of the two countries’ leaders. They also highlighted the importance of the agreement reached during the current presidential visit to form sub-committees in areas of mutual interest to leverage available potential and open up more avenues for cooperation.
H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat added that Egypt is Vietnam’s largest trading partner and its most important export market in North Africa. Each country serves as a strategic gateway for the other’s exports—Egypt to the Middle East and Africa, and Vietnam to the Asian market.
The mutual will to strengthen bilateral relations is further demonstrated by two historic presidential visits: H.E. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s visit to Vietnam in September 2017 was the first by an Egyptian president, and the late Vietnamese President H.E. Tran Dai Quang’s state visit to Egypt in August 2018, which was also the first of its kind.
The two sides also touched on the importance of holding a business forum and workshops during the next Joint Committee meeting to exchange knowledge in areas such as economic development strategies, attracting foreign investment, aquaculture, entrepreneurship, green development, and development financing. Cooperation in exchanging expertise on renewable energy was also discussed.
H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat also reviewed the measures taken by the government to enhance the business and investment environment and implement economic and structural reforms to increase the competitiveness and attractiveness of the Egyptian market for private sector companies from Vietnam. She reiterated Egypt’s appreciation for Vietnam’s development experience and its keenness to strengthen the partnership and benefit from that experience through the exchange of knowledge and expertise between the two countries.
For his part, the Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs lauded the development achievements made by Egypt in various sectors, and expressed his welcome to the elevation of bilateral relations to a Comprehensive Partnership. He also emphasized the necessity of creating an executive plan to finalize the agreements reached during the meeting between the two presidents.
It is worth noting that Egyptian-Vietnamese relations date back to the 1960s. In 1997, an agreement was signed to form a joint ministerial committee, which has held five sessions to date. Vietnam is a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. In 2017, H.E. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt visited Vietnam, the first visit by an Egyptian president to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the visit witnessed the signing of numerous joint cooperation documents.
– on behalf of Ministry of Planning, Economic Development, and International Cooperation – Egypt.
The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) has registered its strong objection and concern regarding circumstances around the recent visit of an eminent South African leader, former South African President Mr Jacob Zuma, who is Leader of Umkhonto We Sizwe Party, visited the Kingdom of Morocco and held a meeting in Rabat on 15 July 2025, with His Excellency Mr Nasser Bourita, Minister of Foreign Affairs, African Cooperation and Moroccan Expatriates.
Whilst recognition we respect the sovereign right of Morocco to invite individuals and groups, DIRCO, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, strongly protests the use of South African national symbols, in this instance the use of the South African National Flag, in the meeting between Mr Jacob Zuma and the Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco.
The use of the South African National Flag in a meeting with a member of a political party in opposition, which is a non-state actor, constitutes an abuse of existing protocol and decorum, and undermines official bilateral relations between the Republic of South Africa and the Kingdom of Morocco.
South Africa has indicated to the Kingdom Morocco that the display of national symbols inherently conveys official state endorsement and elevates the perception of the encounter to that of a state-to-state engagement. This characterisation is inconsistent with established diplomatic protocol, as the participants did not represent the official positions or engagements of the South African state.
Consequently, this portrayal cannot be recognised as an official bilateral meeting, and the implications drawn from it are firmly rejected.
The Government of the Republic of South Africa holds the firm view that the use of its national symbols in contexts implying official state endorsement of non-governmental engagements is inappropriate, irrespective of setting. In the spirit of fostering and maintaining cordial and friendly bilateral relations, and consistent with the fundamental principles of mutual respect between sovereign states and non-interference in internal affairs, South Africa respectfully encourages the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco to refrain from such actions. Upholding these shared principles is essential for the continued positive development of relations between our two nations.
– on behalf of Republic of South Africa: Department of International Relations and Cooperation.
President Wavel Ramkalawan on Wednesday morning welcomed the newly ordained Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Port Victoria, the Right Reverend Danny Elizabeth, for a courtesy call at State House, following his ordination on Sunday, 3rd August 2025.
The meeting served as an opportunity for President Ramkalawan to extend his congratulations to Bishop Elizabeth as he assumes his new spiritual leadership role within the Anglican Church. The two leaders engaged in a cordial exchange, reflecting on the Church’s enduring contribution to the nation and the values it upholds.
Discussions centred on the long-standing relationship between the Anglican Church and the State, with a shared emphasis on the importance of continued collaboration in key areas such as education, social development, national unity, and moral guidance.
President Ramkalawan reiterated the Government’s commitment to religious freedom and the maintenance of open dialogue with all faith-based institutions. He also underscored the Church’s potential role in strengthening spiritual values within society and expressed openness to increased partnership in social initiatives, particularly those focused on the welfare of children and youth.
Bishop Elizabeth conveyed his gratitude to the President for the warm reception and, on behalf of the Anglican Diocese of Port Victoria, expressed a firm commitment to continued cooperation with Government and other national institutions in the service of the Seychellois people.
In addition to discussions on social engagement, both parties also addressed the upcoming consecration of St Agnes Chapel in Plaisance as a full Anglican Church, as well as the role of the Church in promoting peace and national unity ahead of the forthcoming elections. They agreed on the importance of sustaining a strong Church-State partnership to advance the common good and reinforce the values of tolerance and cohesion throughout the nation.
HE Minister of State for International Cooperation Dr. Maryam bint Ali bin Nasser Al Misnad on Wednesday participated in the High-Level Thematic Round Table 2, held as part of the Third United Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDC3), currently taking place in the city of Awaza, Turkmenistan.
The conference aims to review progress in implementing the Awaza Programme of Action (APoA) for LLDCs (2024–2034) a roadmap to enhance the ability of landlocked developing countries to integrate into the global economy through infrastructure development, trade facilitation, investment stimulation, and the strengthening of institutional and digital capabilities.
Qatar’s participation in the event reflects its commitment to supporting international efforts to promote sustainable development and reaffirms its dedication to assisting landlocked developing countries that face unique challenges due to their geographical location, particularly in the areas of transportation, logistics, and regional integration.
