Category: English

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Burtram C. Fielding, Dean Faculty of Sciences and Professor in the Department of Microbiology, Stellenbosch University

Millions of people who recover from infections like COVID-19, influenza and glandular fever are affected by long-lasting symptoms. These include chronic fatigue, brain fog, exercise intolerance, dizziness, muscle or joint pain and gut problems. And many of these symptoms worsen after exercise, a phenomenon known as post-exertional malaise.

Medically the symptoms are known as myalgic encephalomyelitis or chronic fatigue syndrome (ME/CFS). The World Health Organization classifies this as a post viral fatigue syndrome, and it is recognised by both the WHO and the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a brain disorder.

Experiencing illness long after contracting an infection is not new, as patients have reported these symptoms for decades. But COVID-19 has amplified the problem worldwide. Nearly half of people with ongoing post-COVID symptoms – a condition known as long-COVID – now meet the criteria for ME/CFS. Since the start of the pandemic in 2020, it is estimated that more than 400 million people have developed long-COVID.

To date, no widely accepted and testable mechanism has fully explained the biological processes underlying long-COVID and ME/CFS. Our work offers a new perspective that may help close this gap.

Our research group studies blood and the cardiovascular system in inflammatory diseases, as well as post-viral conditions. We focus on coagulation, inflammation and endothelial cells. Endothelial cells make up the inner layer of blood vessels and serve many important functions, like regulating blood clotting, blood vessel dilation and constriction, and inflammation.

Our latest review aims to explain how ME/CFS and long-COVID start and progress, and how symptoms show up in the body and its systems. By pinpointing and explaining the underlying disease mechanisms, we can pave the way for better clinical tools to diagnose and treat people living with ME/CFS and long-COVID.

What is endothelial senescence?

In our review, our international team proposes that certain viruses drive endothelial cells into a half-alive, “zombie-like” state called cellular senescence. Senescent endothelial cells stop dividing, but continue to release molecules that awaken and confuse the immune system. This prompts the blood to form clots and, at the same time, prevent clot breakdown, which could lead to the constriction of blood vessels and limited blood flow.

By placing “zombie” blood-vessel cells at the centre of these post-viral diseases, our hypothesis weaves together microclots, oxygen debt (the extra oxygen your body needs after strenuous exercise to restore balance), brain-fog, dizziness, gut leakiness (a digestive condition where the intestinal lining allows toxins into the bloodstream) and immune dysfunction into a single, testable narrative.

From acute viral infection to ‘zombie’ vessels

Viruses like SARS-CoV-2, Epstein–Barr virus, HHV-6, influenza A, and enteroviruses (a group of viruses that cause a number of infectious illnesses which are usually mild) can all infect endothelial cells. They enable a direct attack on the cells that line the inside of blood vessels. Some of these viruses have been shown to trigger endothelial senescence.

Multiple studies show that SARS-CoV-2 (the virus which causes COVID-19 disease) has the ability to induce senescence in a variety of cell types, including endothelial cells. Viral proteins from SARS-CoV-2, for example, sabotage DNA-repair pathways and push the host cell towards a senescent state, while senescent cells in turn become even more susceptible to viral entry. This reciprocity helps explain why different pathogens can result in the same chronic illness. Influenza A, too, has shown the ability to drive endothelial cells into a senescent, zombie-like state.

What we think is happening

We propose that when blood-vessel cells turn into “zombies”, they pump out substances that make blood thicker and prone to forming tiny clots. These clots slow down circulation, so less oxygen reaches muscles and organs. This is one reason people feel drained.

During exercise, the problem worsens. Instead of the vessels relaxing to allow adequate bloodflow, they tighten further. This means that muscles are starved of oxygen and patients experience a crash the day after exercise. In the brain, the same faulty cells let blood flow drop and leak, bringing on brain fog and dizziness.

In the gut, they weaken the lining, allowing bits of bacteria to slip into the bloodstream and trigger more inflammation. Because blood vessels reach every corner of the body, even scattered patches of these “zombie” cells found in the blood vessels can create the mix of symptoms seen in long-COVID and ME/CFS.

Immune exhaustion locks in the damage

Some parts of the immune system kill senescent cells. They are natural-killer cells, macrophages and complement proteins, which are immune molecules capable of tagging and killing pathogens. But long-COVID and ME/CFS frequently have impaired natural-killer cell function, sluggish macrophages and complement dysfunction.

Senescent endothelial cells may also send out a chemical signal to repel immune attack. So the “zombie cells” actively evade the immune system. This creates a self-sustaining loop of vascular and immune dysfunction, where senescent endothelial cells persist.

In a healthy person with an optimally functioning immune system, these senescent endothelial cells will normally be cleared. But there is significant immune dysfunction in ME/CFS and long-COVID, and this may enable the “zombie cells” to survive and the disease to progress.

Where the research goes next

There is a registered clinical trial in the US that is investigating senescence in long-COVID. Our consortium is testing new ways to spot signs of ageing in the cells that line our blood vessels. First, we expose healthy endothelial cells in the lab to blood from patients to see whether it pushes the cells into a senescent, or “zombie,” state.

At the same time, we are trialling non‑invasive imaging and fluorescent probes that could one day reveal these ageing cells inside the body. In selected cases, tissue biopsies may later confirm what the scans show. Together, these approaches aim to pinpoint how substances circulating in the blood drive cellular ageing and how that, in turn, fuels disease.

Our aim is simple: find these ageing endothelial cells in real patients. Pinpointing them will inform the next round of clinical trials and open the door to therapies that target senescent cells directly, offering a route to healthier blood vessels and, ultimately, lighter disease loads.

– Long-COVID, viruses and ‘zombie’ cells: new research looks for links to chronic fatigue and brain fog
– https://theconversation.com/long-covid-viruses-and-zombie-cells-new-research-looks-for-links-to-chronic-fatigue-and-brain-fog-261108

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Leila Demarest, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, Leiden University

Democratic consolidation is a continuing struggle, in Africa as elsewhere. The turn to democracy gained momentum in Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s but has petered out since. Can new generations turn the tide?

The need to prepare young people to become democratically minded is well established. In western societies, school-based civic education has been considered the means to do it since as early as the 1960s. The assumption is that better knowledge about the democratic functioning of the state promotes stronger democratic values and norms. It is also thought to increase trust in institutions and a willingness to participate in politics in the future.

Research in western settings indeed shows that classroom instruction strengthens political attitudes and behaviour. Yet can we expect civic education to work in the same way in newer democracies? In weak democracies studies have found that civic education could actually lead young people away from political participation. Young people may become more aware of the flaws of their own system and turn away from politics.

Nigeria made the move from military rule to multiparty democracy in 1999 but remains a flawed democracy struggling with political corruption, vote buying and episodic violence. Individual liberties are only weakly protected.

As Africa’s most populous democracy, with a big young population, Nigeria needs young people to participate in democratic politics. And they have done so, as can be seen from events like the #EndSARS protests. Nevertheless many youths also show voter apathy. Or they engage in the country’s well-known cycles of election violence.

As scholars, we have conducted extensive research on how young people in African countries can overcome some dark legacies, like violent conflict, ethnic tensions and authoritarianism. In a recent study, we focused on democratic engagement among young Nigerians and how formal education could strengthen it.

Our research among secondary school students in Lagos state shows promising results. A survey of over 3,000 final year students found that those with greater political knowledge and stronger democratic values were more likely to express intent to vote, contact officials, or protest in the future.

However, these same students rejected party membership and campaigning, which are commonly associated with corruption and violence in Nigeria. In contrast, students with lower levels of knowledge and democratic values remained inclined to participate in party activities. This might be to gain economic benefits.

These findings show that the core objectives of civic education are not likely to lead youth to abandon democratic politics. Fostering knowledge about how the system (ideally) works and strengthening democratic attitudes remains a valuable approach to achieving democracy.

Our findings

Ten years after the transition from military to democratic rule, the Nigerian government made civic education mandatory in primary and secondary schools. The curriculum covers issues such as Nigeria’s independence, the structures of the state, civic rights, political parties and national unity. It also covers corruption and clientelism (the exchange of political support for economic benefits).

After learning how the government works and gaining awareness of civic rights and responsibilities, would young Nigerians remain committed to political participation with all the country’s democratic flaws?

We conducted a survey among final year secondary school students in Lagos state in 2019. About 3,000 students across 36 randomly selected schools answered our questions. The results revealed three political participation profiles:

• disengaged youth – those who do not wish to take part in any type of political activity

• non-party activists – intent on voting, contacting politicians or officials and protesting, but they reject party membership and campaigning

• party activists – interested in joining a political party and campaigning as well as voting, contacting politicians or officials and protesting.

Disengaged youths tended to come from richer socio-economic backgrounds. They showed low trust in institutions. Non-party activists were more informed and held stronger democratic values than party activists. This is likely because they saw political parties as corrupt or violent.

In a democracy where party politics are often tainted by corruption, the youths’ selective engagement may be a sign not of apathy but of a thoughtful and principled rejection of flawed party politics.

Despite a growing distrust in political parties, civic education does not appear to discourage pro-democratic political behaviour overall.

A ‘reverse’ participation gap

Schools are not the only shapers of youths’ political behaviour. Caregivers and peers play a role. In a large number of countries, youth from richer socio-economic backgrounds are more politically informed, more trusting of institutions, and active. This results in a so-called participation gap between richer and poorer citizens.

Where democracy is yet to take root, research shows that middle- and higher-middle class citizens also have higher levels of knowledge and stronger democratic norms. But they have lower levels of institutional trust and are less likely to participate in institutional politics. This presents a “reverse” participation gap, so to speak.

In our research, we found partial evidence of this “reverse participation gap”. Students from wealthier backgrounds were less likely to participate, but not necessarily because they had stronger democratic norms. One possible explanation is that these students were less economically dependent on the state. With no need to rely on public institutions for jobs or welfare, they might feel less of a need to engage with them.

Retreat from political participation

In non-established democracies, research shows that more educated citizens often are more critical of their governments. In Ghana and Zimbabwe, these citizens were less likely to participate in elections.

Concerning civic education programmes specifically, an intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo showed that these programmes might increase political knowledge and commitment to democratic values, but also decrease satisfaction with democracy in their country.

School-based research from the continent is lacking. But studies examining school-based civic education in electoral democracies elsewhere also show a retreat from institutionalised political participation. This spans voting, party membership, campaigning, and contacting politicians.

Our study finds more optimistic results for civic education programmes in Africa. Youths with high knowledge and values – the core objectives of civic education – remain committed to democratic political behaviour.

– Young Nigerians learn about democracy at school: how it’s shaping future voters
– https://theconversation.com/young-nigerians-learn-about-democracy-at-school-how-its-shaping-future-voters-261030

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rose Nakayi, Senior Lecturer of Law, Makerere University

Populism is rife in various African countries. This political ideology responds to and takes advantage of a situation where a large section of people feels exploited, marginalised or disempowered. It sets up “the people” against “the other”. It promises solidarity with the excluded by addressing their grievances. Populism targets broad social groups, operating across ethnicity and class.

But how does populism fare when it informs state interventions to address long-standing societal issues under capitalism? Do populist state measures – especially when launched by a politically powerful leader – deliver improvements for the stated beneficiaries?

As academics who have researched populism for years, we were interested in the implementation and outcomes of such policies and programmes. To answer these questions, we analysed a populist intervention by President Yoweri Museveni in Uganda to address rampant land conflicts. In 2013 he set out to halt land evictions.

What good came of this? Did it help the poor?

We analysed land laws, court cases, government statements and media reports and found that, for the most part, the intervention offered short-term relief. Some people returned to the land, but the underlying land conflict was unresolved.

This created problems that continue to be felt today, including land disputes and land tenure insecurity. The intervention also increased the involvement of the president and his agents personally in providing justice.

It didn’t make pro-poor structural changes to address the root of the problem.

Yet, the intervention had several political benefits:

• it enhanced the political legitimacy of the president and state

• it offered a politically useful response to a land-related crisis and conflict

• it addressed broader criticisms over injustice and poverty by sections of the public and opposition leaders, some of whom (like Robert Kyagulanyi) also relied on populist rhetoric.

The promise to deal with land evictions “once and for all” has yet to be realised over a decade later. During Heroes Day celebrations on 9 June 2024, Museveni’s speech repeated his promise to stop evictions.

Such promises of getting a grip on and ending evictions via decisive state actions, including proposed new legal guidelines, were also made more recently, for example during Heroes Day 2025. This indicates that evictions – and state responses to them – remain a top issue on the political agenda ahead of Uganda’s 2026 election.

Persistent evictions

Evictions were rampant in the 2010s, especially in central Uganda’s Buganda region. They were driven by increased demand for land amid a growing population and legal reforms that seemed to protect tenants over landlords. Some landlords, desperate to free their land of tenants, were carrying out the evictions themselves.

The president condemned the evictions, but they continued. Soon, the number of evictees was in the thousands.

In response, Museveni set up a land committee within the presidency. He announced at a press conference in early 2013 that:

all evictions are halted. There will be no more evictions, especially in the rural areas. All evictions involving peasants are halted.

The dynamics of populism-in-practice

Museveni’s attempts to personally deal with evictions illustrate a continued power shift in Uganda, from institutions to the president’s executive units.

Despite its shortcomings, such as case backlogs, the judicial system offers an opportunity to present cases in a more neutral environment. It also allows parties to appeal decisions. This way, higher courts can correct errors where necessary.

The presidential land committee, we found, tended to be biased in favour of tenants, paying less attention to the landlords’ cases.

The president’s intervention wasn’t adequate to address the immediate causes and effects of the evictions, nor the root causes.

Those included land tenure insecurities. Due to legal reforms, land-rich landlords were unable to get rent at market value from tenants. Neither could they evict them lawfully where rent was in arrears.

In some cases, legal options such as land sales between landlords and tenants were applied. This was often to the detriment of tenants, especially where there was no neutral actor to oversee negotiations.

Land reforms need to be institutionalised and funded to deliver the intended outcomes. Otherwise, unlawful sales and evictions become a quick option for landlords.

Museveni’s populist initiative also unleashed new problems for beneficiaries. Some secured land occupancy in the interim but lived in fear of a relapse of conflict. Mistrust and scarred interpersonal relationships hampered cohesion in some communities. Disputes over land put political actors who would ideally be working together to restore calm at loggerheads.

Populism as power

The creation of populist presidential units has become routine in Uganda. More recently, Museveni created a unit to protect investors, which has resolved some investment-related land disputes. Another one was established to fight corruption. Both units remain very active.

Our research finds that the government needs these units and interventions for a number of reasons. It uses them to govern the country’s conflict-ridden economy and society. They allow the government to assemble a politically useful response to crises and to address some on-the-ground problems. They make the state look concerned and responsive to people’s needs. And they allow ruling party political actors to increase their popularity locally.

Museveni and his ruling party, the National Resistance Movement, therefore, benefit from a key aspect of populism. It allows the merging of disparate, competing and contradictory views, interests and demands of members of various societal classes and groups into a significantly simplified and uniform narrative that (potentially) speaks to all. This could mean: end corruption, end evictions, wealth for all, and so on.

A general election is due in early 2026. The steps Museveni has taken on evictions, and the units set up to fight corruption or protect investors, need to be seen with this political context in mind.

Museveni has put protecting people from evictions high on his government’s agenda. Speaking to party members in August 2024, he emphasised

the importance of adhering to the mass line, which prioritises the needs and rights of the masses over those of the elite.

In our view, this pre-election narrative signifies the continued political and social relevance of populism in today’s Uganda. This could result in heightened populist state activity in the run-up to and after the election.

– Uganda’s land eviction crisis: do populist state measures actually fix problems?
– https://theconversation.com/ugandas-land-eviction-crisis-do-populist-state-measures-actually-fix-problems-260512