Energy solutions provider Zarein Energy will participate as a Gold Sponsor at the 2026 edition of African Energy Week (AEW) 2026, scheduled for October 12–16 in Cape Town. The company’s participation comes as it accelerates development of the Kwale Free Trade Zone gas and petrochemical project in Delta State, Nigeria, targeting large-scale gas processing, captive power generation and petrochemical manufacturing.
Held under the theme “Invest in African Energies: Affordable and Abundant Energy Additions,” AEW 2026 serves as the premier platform connecting investors, operators, infrastructure developers and policymakers across the African energy sector. Zarein Energy’s sponsorship underscores growing investor attention on Nigeria’s gas monetization, industrialization and special economic zone strategies.
Incorporated in July 2024, Zarein Energy operates as a private midstream-focused company targeting gas-to-industry commercialization. The company’s strategy avoids upstream exploration risk, instead focusing on processing infrastructure, logistics integration and captive utility systems designed to bridge stranded gas reserves with industrial consumers across West Africa.
Its flagship Kwale Free Trade Zone project is being developed as a 1,000-hectare integrated industrial and midstream hub in Delta State. The project, formally launched during a groundbreaking ceremony led by Delta State Governor Sheriff Oborevwori, is designed to provide reliable lower-cost utilities for energy-intensive manufacturing sectors operating within Nigeria’s expanding industrial corridor.
The development is strategically anchored to the OB3 (Obiafu-Obrikom-Oben) gas pipeline network and incorporates a four-layer gas supply structure. Primary feedstock sources include the Kwale Gas Gathering Hub alongside supply connections linked to Zenergie’s Processing Plant, Ebendo-Energia, Pillar and Agip’s Kwale-Okwai flow stations. Infrastructure plans support regional throughput volumes ranging from 40 million standard cubic feet per day (MMscf/d) to 300 MMscf/d.
Zarein Energy’s industrial framework includes scalable gas processing plants, petrochemical production lines and centralized captive power generation facilities positioned directly alongside industrial tenants. By collocating utility infrastructure with manufacturing operations, the company aims to reduce transmission losses, stabilize power availability and lower operational costs for manufacturers establishing operations within the free trade ecosystem.
The broader Kwale Free Trade Zone master plan also segments operations into dedicated petrochemical, agro-processing, manufacturing and logistics zones. High-clearance transport corridors and logistics yards are being designed to improve regional trade flows to Nigerian coastal ports and neighboring West African markets. Eight major corporate entities including Zarein Energy, have already secured operational layouts within the industrial development.
“Zarein Energy’s participation as a Gold Sponsor at African Energy Week 2026 reflects the growing momentum behind Nigeria’s gas commercialization and industrialization agenda. The development of the Kwale Free Trade Zone demonstrates how African companies are creating integrated infrastructure that converts natural gas resource into power, petrochemicals and long-term industrial growth,” says NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman, African Energy Chamber.
As the Kwale Free Trade Zone advances through FEED compliance, permitting and pipeline route validation stages, Zarein Energy continues expanding technical recruitment partnerships and strategic financing discussions. Their participation at AEW 2026 is expected to support the company’s broader capital formation, partnership outreach and regional visibility objectives as Nigeria intensifies efforts to commercialize domestic gas reserves and expand industrial energy infrastructure.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.
Construction begins on Eskom’s R1.2 billion 75MW solar power plant
Eskom has broken ground on a new R1.2 billion 75MW solar power plant to be based at the Lethabo Power Station in the Free State, marking a major step in integrating renewable generation within the power utility’s coal-fired power station-heavy fleet.
“Once completed, the plant is expected to generate approximately 147GWh of electricity annually, supplying power to an estimated 60,000 households. In addition to its energy contribution, the project will create vital local economic opportunities and contribute significantly to skills development during both the construction and operational phases,” Eskom said on Wednesday.
Speaking at a ceremony marking the start of construction, Eskom’s Group Chief Executive, Dan Marokane, noted that the much-improved performance of the coal-fired fleet is setting a platform to phase in renewable energy.
“Last week we celebrated 365 days without loadshedding, as a result of the focused delivery over the past three years of the generation recovery plan by our skilled employees.
“Now that we have delivered a stable electricity platform for the South African economy to grow from, we can seamlessly enable the integration of renewable energy sources as required by the 2025 Integrated Resource Plan [IRP] to maintain future energy security.
“We are playing our part in bringing online the new generation capacity required by focusing on the deep technical and institutional capability of our employees, built over decades of public investment, that remains a critical part of our national capacity towards delivering cleaner sources of energy,” Marokane said.
Eskom’s Group Executive for Renewables, Rivoningo Mnisi, described the solar power plant as “a significant milestone” in the power utility’s renewable energy pipeline and forms part of the “broader strategy to diversify the generation mix, support South Africa’s Just Energy Transition objectives and provide customers with lower carbon electricity”.
“By leveraging existing power station infrastructure, this project demonstrates the practical integration of renewable energy technology within our existing coal-fired power station fleet infrastructure and signals Eskom’s continued commitment to strengthening security of supply while transitioning toward a lower-carbon future,” Mnisi said.
Investing in renewable energy
According to Eskom, the solar power plant is one of 17 high‑priority projects expected to be implemented across the electricity supplier’s existing coal‑fired power station footprint.
Construction on these is expected to kick off between now and 2028, with those projects representing 6GW of new capacity by the end of the decade.
“These developments will be strategically located at power stations including Arnot, Duvha, Majuba, Tutuka, Lethabo, Komati, Kendal, Kusile, Hendrina, Camden and Grootvlei, leveraging existing infrastructure to accelerate deployment, reduce costs and strengthen grid resilience.
“The Lethabo project also forms part of Eskom’s construction‑ready pipeline of at least 2GW of renewable energy and pumped storage projects progressing during 2026.
“Funding for these projects has been provisioned within Eskom’s approved capital expenditure program and will be financed through on‑balance sheet funding, in line with National Treasury debt relief conditions, without reliance on additional project finance borrowing,” Eskom explained.
Eskom Green will also adopt a “proactive growth strategy that extends beyond Eskom-owned land and existing decommissioning sites”.
“While these anchor projects provide a critical foundation, Eskom Green’s long-term value creation requires expanding into new geographic and technological opportunities.
“To this end, Eskom Green will actively pursue partnerships, co-development opportunities and strategic acquisitions of advanced-stage development projects and operating renewable assets located in high-resource areas with superior wind and solar irradiation,” the power utility said.
This will enable Eskom to “optimise its generation portfolio, diversify its revenue base, and ensure alignment with customer load profiles” by balancing technological advancements like pumped-storage, wind, PV, BESS and other alternatives such as green hydrogen.
“Eskom Green will provide a fit-for-purpose structure to facilitate utility-scale renewables through public-private partnerships, leveraging Eskom’s existing footprint and system knowledge.
“The proposed funding framework ensures limited recourse to the Eskom balance sheet using project finance principles for the renewable energy projects through dedicated project Special Purpose Vehicles.
“This will lead to the advancement of Eskom’s pipeline of more than 32GW of cost-competitive renewable energy and storage projects by 2040 to diversify its energy mix as part of the emissions reduction strategy and enable customers to decarbonise over the life of their operations,” Eskom concluded. – SAnews.gov.za
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bizuneh Yimenu, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen’s University Belfast
Ethiopia is preparing for a national election on 1 June amid deep political uncertainty and growing insecurity. Officially, the polls are expected to reinforce the country’s democratic transition and political stability. But the conditions suggest that the elections are unlikely to be genuinely competitive.
Elections are competitive when parties campaign openly, voters participate freely, and political actors engage without fear of violence or intimidation.
There are two main reasons why this will not be the case.
First, opposition actors remain fragmented, weakened or excluded from effective political participation. Second, there are armed conflicts and political tensions in several parts of the country. The most tense regions are Amhara, Oromia and Tigray. This has created an unstable environment for electoral competition.
Together, these conditions may make the upcoming elections among the least politically competitive Ethiopia has held since multiparty elections were introduced in the 1990s.
Ethiopia has held six national elections since adopting the federal constitution in 1995. Most took place under conditions of strong ruling-party dominance. The 2005 election was widely considered the country’s most competitive contest. But violence, mass arrests and a severe crackdown on opposition supporters followed, after disputed results and protests.
Elections in 2010 and 2015 took place in a more restrictive political environment dominated by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.
The 2021 election happened under Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party during the Tigray war. It was marred by delays, insecurity and opposition boycotts. No voting took place in several constituencies. Unsurprisingly, the incumbent won in a landslide.
The current electoral environment appears even more challenging.
As a scholar of federalism and Ethiopian politics, I see the present conditions as particularly restrictive to meaningful political competition.
Opposition fragmentation and exclusion
Ethiopia’s opposition parties remain fragmented along ideological, ethnic and regional lines. Many lack strong national organisational structures or the capacity to mobilise voters effectively across the country.
Attempts to build durable opposition coalitions have faltered. This is due to political mistrust, leadership rivalries, and competing visions of the Ethiopian state. Some parties want stronger regional autonomy and ethnic self-determination. Others favour a more centralised national political framework.
These divisions prevent a unified electoral challenge. Even those in the same camp, such as parties advocating for ethnic self rule, are unable to a form united front.
Opposition actors continue to face political and institutional constraints too. Several have previously been arrested or detained. Civic actors have come under pressure.
During the 2021 elections, prominent Oromo opposition leaders were detained. This prompted the Oromo Liberation Front and Oromo Federalist Congress, the two main opposition groups in the region, to boycott the polls.
Ethiopia formally operates a multiparty system. But meaningful political competition depends also on parties’ ability to organise, campaign and compete on relatively equal terms. Genuine opposition actors have struggled to do so effectively.
Political tensions and armed conflict
The second major challenge is the country’s deteriorating security environment. Ethiopia is experiencing armed conflict and political instability in several regions. It is difficult to conduct competitive elections in these conditions.
In the Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has intensified over the past two years. Large areas have experienced insecurity, militarisation and disruptions to normal political activity.
Tigray also remains politically fragile. This is despite the 2022 Pretoria agreement. The pact formally ended the civil war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.
Important aspects of the agreement remain unresolved. These include:
the return of internally displaced people
the return of pre-war Tigray territories
security arrangements
relations between regional and federal authorities.
Such conditions narrow political space and reduce the possibility of open electoral competition.
Elections without competitiveness?
The incumbent is running uncontested in 64 of Ethiopia’s 547 constituencies. Voting will not take place in Tigray. And voting will not happen in notable constituencies in Oromia and Amhara because of security concerns.
But it’s not enough for voting to take place. Political competitiveness depends on whether opposition parties can take full part, whether citizens can engage freely and whether the broader political environment allows genuine contestation for power.
Current conditions raise serious doubts about those requirements. Even compared with previous elections held under authoritarian conditions, today’s environment may prove more restrictive. Insecurity and conflict now intersect with longstanding political constraints.
This does not necessarily mean the elections will lack administrative significance or political consequences. For example, the Oromo Liberation Front is running for the first time since 1992. This is symbolically meaningful.
But elections alone will not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper political crisis. The country continues to face unresolved disputes over political representation, federalism, security and state authority. Without broader political inclusion and a reduction in armed conflict, the elections are unlikely to provide the level of political competition associated with genuinely open democratic contests.
– Ethiopia’s elections will not be politically competitive: two reasons why – https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-elections-will-not-be-politically-competitive-two-reasons-why-283896
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for Constitutional Democracy, Indiana University
Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed has revived debate over whether the country should impose term limits on its head of government. Speaking before the National Dialogue Commission in May 2026 – just weeks before national elections – he said executive power should be “limited by law”. He suggested the issue could form part of wider constitutional reform that many Ethiopians have been calling for since 1995.
At first glance, the proposal seems straightforward. But Ethiopia operates under a parliamentary system, not a presidential one. Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, who has studied Ethiopia’s constitutional design and law, explains why the real issue isn’t term limits, but the failure of the parliamentary mechanisms meant to constrain executive power.
Why don’t parliamentary systems usually impose term limits on prime ministers?
In parliamentary systems, prime ministers derive their authority from parliament. They remain in office for as long as a majority in parliament is willing to support them. There are no fixed term limits.
In presidential systems, leaders get their authority directly from voters and serve fixed terms set by the constitution.
Prime ministers may be removed at any time through a vote of no confidence, internal party revolt or electoral defeat. In contrast with presidential systems, the removal of a prime minister doesn’t always trigger a national election.
When a prime minister loses office, a new leader may be selected within the governing party. The underlying parliament still has democratic legitimacy, so there is no need to return to voters – or to cap tenure.
Margaret Thatcher served for 11 years in the UK. Angela Merkel governed Germany for 16 years. Their longevity was evidence that parliamentary accountability and electoral competition were functioning as intended. They remained in office because they continued to command confidence within competitive parliamentary democracies. Thatcher’s premiership ended when Conservative MPs withdrew support through a leadership challenge. Merkel stepped down after choosing not to seek another term.
By contrast, in presidential systems, the executive and legislature derive their mandates independently. Removing a president interrupts a fixed term chosen directly by voters, and a successor cannot be appointed simply through parliament.
In Ethiopia, executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister. The difficulty is that the formal parliamentary logic has often failed to operate in practice.
First, the House of People’s Representatives has rarely functioned as an independent body capable of holding the prime minister politically accountable. This has made a no-confidence vote against the prime minister politically unrealistic.
Second, leadership transitions have taken place through ruling-party decisions rather than genuine parliamentary contestation. The replacement of Hailemariam Desalegn by Abiy Ahmed in 2018, for example, occurred through internal party politics. Parliament then formalised it.
How has Ethiopia’s system produced concentrated executive power?
Parliamentary systems don’t operate the same way in every political context. They function differently in:
a dominant-party state: this is a political system in which several parties may legally exist and elections may be held, but one party monopolises political power over an extended period.
transitional democracies: these are political systems moving from authoritarian rule toward democratic governance. The transition is often fragile, especially if political instability, economic hardship or legacies of conflict continue to shape public life.
politically fragmented countries: here, political authority and party competition are divided among rival groups, making stable governance and national consensus difficult.
When ruling parties dominate parliament, opposition parties are weak and lawmakers rely heavily on party leaders. Parliament may stop acting as a real check on executive power. In such situations, a prime minister can begin to resemble an elected monarch. He or she is technically accountable to parliament, but in practice holds highly concentrated power.
This is what makes Ethiopia’s constitutional experience complex.
Ethiopia’s former president Sahle-Work Zewde (left) hands over to her successor Taye Selassie in 2024.Wikimedia Commons
The constitution adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1995 follows the formal logic of a parliamentary government. Article 70(4) limits the president – a largely ceremonial head of state – to two six-year terms. Articles 73 and 74 impose no limit on the prime minister.
On paper, this is orthodox parliamentarism.
In practice, Ethiopia has the formal structure of a parliamentary system without the political conditions needed for real parliamentary accountability. These conditions are strong opposition parties, meaningful intra-party competition, independent committees and the real possibility that parliament could withdraw support from the executive.
The result is that political power is concentrated in the executive and the dominant ruling coalition.
What role does Ethiopia’s electoral system play in this?
Electoral systems shape how votes are translated into political power and legislative representation.
First-past-the-post systems mean that modest electoral victories can be transformed into overwhelming legislative dominance.
Article 54 of Ethiopia’s constitution adopts this system. Ethiopia, therefore, combines parliamentary government with an electoral model that magnifies majorities into monopolies.
What does Ethiopia’s political history show?
Ethiopia’s post-1995 political record illustrates this pattern clearly.
Meles Zenawi served three full parliamentary terms as prime minister. He was two years into his fourth term when he died in 2012.
The issue is that a prime minister can be repeatedly reappointed because the electoral and party systems limit meaningful contestation from the outset.
Would term limits solve the problem?
Only partially.
A constitutional term limit could encourage leadership circulation, reduce the personalisation of executive office and create incentives for succession planning.
In fragile democracies, such limits may serve as a safeguard against indefinite incumbency.
But term limits alone would not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper constitutional problem. A dominant party can rotate prime ministers while preserving the same electoral advantages, patronage systems and concentration of power.
The deeper reform question is whether Ethiopia can achieve:
stronger opposition rights
more independent parliamentary committees
greater transparency in legislative voting
more credible intra-party competition.
Formally, Ethiopia isn’t a one-party state. As of 2026, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia has accredited 24 national political parties and 45 regional parties. A total of 48 parties are confirmed to participate in the seventh general election scheduled for 1 June 2026.
The absence of prime ministerial term limits in Ethiopia is not the problem. A lack of parliamentary competition and independence is.
– Should Ethiopia limit how long its prime minister can serve? Why this won’t fix a deeper democracy problem – https://theconversation.com/should-ethiopia-limit-how-long-its-prime-minister-can-serve-why-this-wont-fix-a-deeper-democracy-problem-283405
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Redie Bereketeab, Associate Professor of Sociology and Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute
Ethiopia’s general election on 1 June 2026 will take place amid armed conflicts and political fragmentation. This has raised questions over voter participation and legitimacy and the future of the country’s multi-ethnic federal system. Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country and a key regional actor in the Horn of Africa. Redie Bereketeab, who researches state- and nation-building, identity and nationalism in the Horn of Africa, unpacks the 2026 election.
Who is on the ballot, and what is at stake?
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party remains by far the strongest political force nationally. The party controls most federal and regional state institutions. The incumbent faces more than 45 opposition parties that are contesting the election. These include the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, the National Movement of Amhara, Enat Party, the Freedom and Equality Party and the Oromo Federalist Congress.
But the result will not necessarily indicate broad political inclusion. This partly stems from widespread restrictions on opposition parties, such as arbitrary arrests and preventing meetings. This has been documented by rights groups, including the US-based Freedom House.
Most of the parties face organisational, financial and security constraints too. Others have limited regional reach.
Some of the country’s most influential political actors are either weakened, fragmented or excluded altogether. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, long the dominant political force in Tigray and previously central to Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades, has been banned from the election by the National Election Board. As it now controls the region, an election there is highly unlikely.
So, there is little uncertainty over who will govern after the votes have been counted. Instead, the key election issue is whether the process itself will be regarded as sufficiently inclusive and legitimate across Ethiopia’s highly diverse regions and political constituencies.
How significant is the shadow of conflict on the election?
The elections will take place against the backdrop of multiple overlapping conflicts. These have displaced millions and weakened state authority in several parts of the country. Insecurity is expected to limit voting in large areas. Among constituencies reportedly considered too unstable for normal polling operations are Humera, Raya Alamata and Tselemti in northern Ethiopia.
The central question will be how much of the population can realistically participate.
In the north-western Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has continued since 2023. Armed conflict persists in parts of Oromia to the south, involving the Oromo Liberation Army. In both regions, insecurity, displacement and communications restrictions have complicated political organising and voter mobilisation. Elections are therefore unlikely to be organised across large areas.
Map of Ethiopia highlighting conflict-affected regions: Tigray, Amhara and Oromia.https://nai.uu.se/
In the northern region of Tigray, large-scale fighting formally ended in 2022. Nevertheless, unresolved disputes over territory, political representation and the return of displaced populations continue to fuel tensions. The fragile post-war environment is further complicated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front being barred from contesting the election. The party’s legal status was cancelled by the National Election Board of Ethiopia in May 2025 for failure to hold a national assembly within the legally mandated period.
In addition, tensions within the movement have produced rival factions. In early May, Tigray People’s Liberation Front chairman Debretsion Gebremichael assumed full control of the region, pushing out Addis Ababa-backed Tadesse Werede. These developments raised tensions with the federal government.
The government needs to hold elections to demonstrate its legitimacy. But with Tigray not participating, as well as major parts of Amhara and Oromia, that legitimacy will be in doubt.
What are the other factors shaping the election?
The economy is one main factor.
Ethiopia has high rural poverty, a mounting public debt burden and the economic, social and humanitarian consequences of years of conflict and displacement.
The last general election was held in 2021. This was before the economic impact of the Tigray war hit the country. Since then, the currency has been devalued, contributing to rising inflation and living costs. Higher prices of imported goods and fuel placed additional pressure on households already affected by conflict and economic hardship.
Deteriorating economic conditions could fuel further internal unrest and strengthen the position of armed movements in parts of the country.
Regional tensions could also influence the political atmosphere and security environment surrounding the election. Relations with Eritrea have deteriorated sharply in recent months amid disputes over Red Sea access and growing fears of renewed confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara.
Ethiopia’s involvement in the wider Sudan conflict is another source of tension. An escalation with Eritrea or further spillover from Sudan could intensify nationalist rhetoric and divert political attention away from domestic reform. It could further complicate already fragile security conditions during the electoral period.
Civic and political space has also narrowed in recent years. Journalists, activists and opposition figures have faced arrests, harassment, travel restrictions and pressure from security forces, particularly under emergency measures introduced during the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia.
Several opposition parties have accused the government of using state institutions and security structures to tilt the political playing field in favour of the ruling party. This further undermines faith in the electoral system.
How does the election shape Ethiopia’s federal project?
Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic federal system was introduced in 1991. It was designed to accommodate diversity and grant significant autonomy to regional states. But in practice it has also sharpened struggles over territory, autonomy and access to political power.
Today those unresolved tensions are visible in the insurgency in Amhara, the conflict in Oromia and the fragile post-war order in Tigray. If voting cannot take place across those three major regions and ethnic groups, then the elections lose legitimacy.
Rather than resolving competing claims, the federal system has in many cases institutionalised them by linking territory, political representation and state power to ethnic identity. For some the system has failed as power was never fully devolved to the states. For others it could never succeed as it fuels ethno-nationalism at the expense of national identity.
The result is that identity has been turned into a central axis of political competition.
What conclusions do you draw?
Without broader political dialogue and efforts to address the underlying conflicts, the election risks reinforcing divisions.
A better approach would be to resolve the conflicts and then convene an election where the entire population can participate.
There is scope for the European Union and the US to play a constructive role. They have the capacity to exert pressure on the Ethiopian government given their strong economic, military and diplomatic ties, and their weight in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
There may be little appetite in Brussels or Washington for such moves.
– Ethiopia votes: dominant ruling party seeks a new mandate in a deeply fragmented nation – https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-votes-dominant-ruling-party-seeks-a-new-mandate-in-a-deeply-fragmented-nation-283783
Correctional Services Minister advocates for alternative sentencing to curb overcrowding
The Minister of Correctional Services, Dr Pieter Groenewald, has advocated for alternative approaches to address overcrowding in the country’s correctional services.
Speaking during a Parliamentary Questions for Oral Reply session for the Peace and Security cluster on Wednesday, the Minister said the Department of Correctional Services currently has some 107 000 beds available for inmates, with sentenced inmates already occupying at least 106 280 beds.
He said the main pressure stems from remand detainees — people held in custody while awaiting trial — who currently number 62 002. This has pushed overcrowding levels at correctional facilities to 58%.
“We have to accommodate all the people who are arrested and sent to correctional services. There are also other ways…the Criminal Procedures Act, where we can ask for a bail review, we do that. In the previous financial year, we referred 8 849 of these cases, but we were only successful for 1 278.
“We [also] have about 3 300 remand detainees who couldn’t afford bail of less than R1 000, but it is costing the state taxpayer R463 per day to keep them there,” he said.
Groenewald also referred to the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS) Bail Fund initiative, which was led by former Inspecting Judge Edwin Cameron.
“The previous inspecting judge…started a bail fund and it became operational, where, for instance, a private fund has been established to pay this bail to get the people out. There are ways to do this, but I’m strongly in support of community service that should be part of sentencing in our courts,” he said.
Groenewald added that his department is in contact with the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development to explore alternatives to imprisonment where appropriate.
“Probation is one option and we are also in the process of using electronic bracelets to ensure that probationers can move along safely while protecting the community,” he said. – SAnews.gov.za
IEC officially launches the 2026 Local Government Elections campaign
The Electoral Commission has officially launched the 2026 Local Government Elections (LGE), marking the commencement of the mass awareness campaign towards Election Day in November.
This is after President Cyril Ramaphosa has announced 4 November 2026 as the date for South Africa’s upcoming Local Government Elections.
Wednesday’s launch set the stage for political parties and voters to begin preparations for the polls with the Commission to rollout a national campaign across multiple platforms, including television, radio, digital, and social media, to ensure broad reach and accessibility.
Speaking at the launch held in Midrand, near Johannesburg, the Commission’s Chief Electoral Officer Sy Mamabolo said since the dawn of democracy in 1994, the Electoral Commission has successfully delivered five LGEs, each marking a significant milestone in the evolution of local democracy and the consolidation of municipalities as theatres of civic engagement.
“As the 6th instalment, the 2026 Local Government Elections take place amid notable changes in domestic and global political landscapes. The announcement of the 4 November 2026 election date by His Excellency, President Cyril Ramaphosa, has provided the Electoral Commission and all stakeholders with clarity and certainty for planning,” Mamabolo said.
Mamabolo said the launch is a practical manifestation of that certainty and an assurance that plans are firmly in the execution phase for delivering an election that meets the standard envisioned in the Constitution.
On 1 April 2026, the Commission unveiled the elections logo and media campaign under the tagline, “Get Up, Show Up, Vote.”
This powerful call to action is aimed at motivating all eligible voters, particularly young people to actively participate in the electoral process.
According to Mamabolo, Wednesday’s launch marks the beginning of intensified public awareness ahead of the national voter registration weekend on 20 and 21 June 2026. Just under 24 000 registration stations across 4 488 municipal wards will open over the two days to enable citizens to register, verify their personal details and ensure correct registration.
“Preparations are well advanced, with the Department of Home Affairs ensuring that offices will be open nationwide to facilitate citizens’ applications for identity documents, which are a prerequisite for voter registration.
“The Commission has deployed over 800 Municipal Outreach Coordinators, including persons with disabilities, across the country to drive voter education and awareness, reinforcing inclusive participation ahead of the elections.”
Mamabolo said since the beginning of 2026, more than 62,336 community events have been conducted nationwide, strengthening sustained voter education and public engagement adding that a targeted door-to-door voter communication and registration campaign has been completed across 99% of municipalities (212 out of 214) between 11 and 24 May 2026.
“This campaign informed citizens of recent Municipal Demarcation Board changes to certain ward boundaries and the consequential revision of some voting districts. The Commission thanks the Board for its cooperation in completing the ward delimitation process and handing over final ward boundaries.
“The Commission’s voter education and registration programmes continue to yield strong results. The Tertiary Institutions Campaign has reached 97 894 students across 1086 activations in all nine provinces, with 45 757 students successfully registered – demonstrating its impact in promoting youth participation.
“The Schools Democracy Programme, implemented in partnership with the Department of Basic Education, continues to build awareness by educating learners on democratic principles and electoral processes, while encouraging eligible learners aged 16 and older to pre-register,” he said.
Draft code of conduct
With regard to combating disinformation, Mamabolo said the Electoral Commission recognises that the pervasive use of social media is a double-edged sword.
“The Commission has previously mitigated disinformation through, among others, collaboration with civil society and the use of the Real411 platform for flagging and reporting misleading content. This work has been strengthened through policy development.
Guided by the Constitution and other relevant prescripts, the Commission will issue a draft Code of Conduct on Misinformation for public comment. The draft seeks to embed safeguards against fraudulent and manipulated content to preserve information integrity during the elections,” he said.
Online registrations
The Commission said the online registration portal has improved the accuracy and stability of the voters’ roll by enabling real-time updates and offsetting losses due to mortality. Between January and May 2026, 376,140 new registrations were recorded, reflecting strong uptake – particularly among young voters.
The total number of registered voters currently stands at 27,912,415, exceeding the figures recorded at the time of the 2024 general elections.
Mamabolo said the achievement comes despite an average monthly loss of 34 000 voters due to mortality.
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Minister Inkosi Velenkosini Hlabisa said he is confident that the number of registered young people will increase.
“I am confident that this time we are going to have more young people registering to vote and taking part in the elections,” he said.
In a bid to encourage young people to participate the elections, the Commission has introduced a youth-focused series, “Beats for My Peeps,” in partnership with the SABC.
The programme uses music, culture, and digital creators to address voter apathy, dispel misinformation, and promote participation.
It will air on SABC1 at 6pm from 3 June 2026. Meanwhile, the IEC Podcast launched in April 2026 and provides accessible, real-time information via mobile and digital platforms.
How can citizens register
Get your identity document ready and register or check your address details online at: registertovote.elections.org.za
Find your correct voting station to visit on the registration weekend at maps.elections.org.za/vsfinder
Visit your local Electoral Commission offices on weekdays between 8am and 5pm. – SAnews.gov.za
Qrent (www.Qrent.co.za), a provider of IT asset management and sustainable refurbished technology solutions, says organisations that continue delaying technology refresh cycles in an effort to protect budgets may be exposing themselves to greater operational and continuity risk.
The warning comes as global hardware costs continue to rise amid ongoing supply chain disruption and increased demand for AI infrastructure..
According to Gartner, memory pricing is expected to increase significantly, with DRAM forecast to rise by 125% and NAND by 234%, contributing to widespread increases in IT hardware costs globally.
Kwirirai Rukowo, Managing Executive (MEA) at Qrent, says many organisations are being forced into difficult procurement decisions as financial pressure intensifies across the market.
“Businesses are facing a growing imbalance between operational demand and available budget. Projects are being delayed, refresh cycles are being extended and procurement decisions are increasingly being driven by cost pressure rather than operational requirements. The role of IT is not to wait for perfect market conditions, it is to keep the organisation running regardless of them.” says Rukowo.
“While these decisions may appear financially responsible in the short term, they often create greater long-term risk by reducing agility, delaying deployment and placing strain on ageing infrastructure.”
Qrent says refurbished technology is increasingly being adopted as a practical solution that allows organisations to maintain continuity while managing rising procurement costs and hardware shortages.
Unlike new hardware procurement, refurbished technology is less exposed to manufacturing delays, semiconductor allocation challenges and international shipping constraints, allowing businesses to deploy infrastructure more quickly and predictably.
The company says refurbished enterprise-grade devices also offer organisations greater financial flexibility by lowering upfront costs while maintaining the performance required for most business environments and workloads.
“Most organisations do not require the latest hardware specifications to maintain productivity. What matters most is having reliable technology available when the business needs it,” says Rukowo.
In addition to long-term procurement strategies, refurbished devices are increasingly being used as short-term rental and bridging solutions where new hardware lead times become impractical.
Qrent says this approach enables organisations to continue operating and scaling without placing additional pressure on already constrained capital budgets.
The company believes the broader market shift toward lifecycle extension, refurbishment and circular technology models will continue accelerating as organisations prioritise cost optimisation, sustainability and operational resilience.
“Waiting for pricing or supply chains to stabilise is no longer a strategy. Businesses that adopt more flexible sourcing and lifecycle management approaches will be significantly better positioned to maintain continuity and respond to changing market conditions,” says Rukowo.
“Refurbished technology is no longer simply an alternative option. In the current market, it has become an important mechanism for enabling business continuity and smarter technology investment.”
– on behalf of Qrent.
Media contact:
Kwirirai Rukowo
Email: krukowo@qrent.co.za
About Qrent:
Qrent is a leading provider of sustainable Information Technology solutions specialising in the refurbishment, rental and sale of high-quality refurbished computers, laptops and enterprise IT equipment across the Middle East and Africa.
Focused on extending the lifecycle of technology through refurbishment and circular economy practices, Qrent helps organisations reduce e-waste, lower carbon impact and improve the sustainability of their technology environments while maintaining operational performance and cost efficiency.
The company provides flexible technology solutions including refurbished hardware sales, short and long-term rentals, IT asset recovery, responsible recycling and lifecycle management services designed to help organisations optimise infrastructure investment while supporting environmental objectives.
By combining sustainability with practical business value, Qrent enables organisations to adopt smarter, more resilient and cost-effective approaches to technology procurement and asset management.
Government moves to tackle student housing disputes
The Department of Human Settlements and the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) are set to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) aimed at addressing growing disputes between student tenants and landlords in the rental housing sector.
Human Settlements Minister Thembi Simelane announced the planned agreement when she was delivering the department’s 2026 Budget Vote in Parliament on Tuesday.
The agreement seeks to formalise a collaborative partnership between the National Department of Human Settlements, NSFAS and Rental Housing Tribunals across the country.
According to Simelane, the partnership will focus on educating student tenants and landlords about their respective rights and responsibilities amid growing concerns over exploitation and contractual disputes in student accommodation.
“We are concerned about reports of student tenants being exploited by landlords, as well as instances where some students fail to honour their contractual obligations with landlords, despite receiving NSFAS funding,” Simelane said.
The Minister said the department has already engaged student formations and other stakeholders, and awareness programmes will soon be rolled out across all provinces.
Addressing growing unlawful occupation of land and buildings
The Minister noted that Rental Housing Tribunals are now operational in all nine provinces and provide free dispute resolution services to both tenants and landlords in the public and private rental markets.
This comes as government intensifies efforts to address the increasing unlawful occupation of land and buildings across the country.
Simelane said illegal occupation continues to place severe pressure on municipalities and property owners, while also creating dangerous living conditions.
“We all witnessed the tragic consequences of illegally occupied buildings in the City of Johannesburg, where lives were lost,” she said.
In response, government has drafted and published the Prevention of Illegal Eviction (PIE) Amendment Bill for public comment.
The proposed legislation aims to strengthen the management of unlawful occupation while balancing the rights of vulnerable groups, including women-headed households, children, older persons and people with disabilities, alongside the rights of property owners and municipalities.
“Parallel to this, we are also conducting nationwide public information sessions to solicit inputs from various stakeholders. To date, we have covered KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Western Cape. By the closing date, 16 June 2026 we would have covered all the provinces,” Simelane said.
The department intends to table the Bill before Parliament in August 2026.
Simelane reiterated that no tenant or landlord should be forced into expensive legal proceedings when accessible mechanisms already exist to ensure fair and legally binding resolutions.
She said the amendments form part of broader efforts to restore order in the housing sector, while ensuring that constitutional protections remain in place for vulnerable communities.
The Minister also reiterated the department’s commitment to accelerating housing delivery and improving access to affordable and secure accommodation across the country. – SAnews.gov.za
Human Settlements tables R26.9bn budget amid housing delivery push
Human Settlements Minister Thembi Simelane has tabled a R26.972 billion budget allocation for the 2026/27 financial year, which outlines ambitious housing delivery targets, despite mounting fiscal pressures and a growing housing backlog.
Presenting the department’s Budget Vote in Parliament on Wednesday, Simelane said the allocation forms part of a broader R81.364 billion Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) budget aimed at advancing sustainable human settlements and restoring dignity to vulnerable communities.
Conditional grant funding for the current financial year amounts to R23.679 billion, with provincial departments receiving R15.183 billion and metropolitan municipalities allocated R8.486 billion.
However, Simelane warned that ongoing budget reductions will place significant pressure on the department’s ability to meet its Medium-Term Development Plan (MTDP) targets.
“Our baseline has been reduced by R20.6 billion over the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. This has resulted in the reduction of Urban Settlement Development Grant (USDG) by R19.7 billion over the MTEF with R5.7 billion in 2026/27, R6.4 billion in 2027/28 and R7.1 billion in 2028/29) to fund the metro trading services,” the Minister said.
Despite the constraints, the department has set a number of delivery targets for the current financial year, and these include:
• Delivery of 39 058 housing units; • Completion of 25 186 serviced sites across programmes; • Registration of 21 918 title deeds; • Delivery of 2 878 social housing units, with 2000 units fully tenanted; • Eradication of 6 950 mud houses; • Delivery of 744 housing units for military veterans, and • Installation of 11 215 solar systems to advance energy resilience and sustainability.
The department also plans to unblock 195 stalled housing projects and ensure that 11 358 First Home Finance subsidy applications are approved, and 9 231 subsidies disbursed to qualifying beneficiaries.
Simelane acknowledged that housing delivery remains below target, revealing that only 23 027 housing units were delivered against a target of 37 779 during the previous financial year.
“This situation cannot continue,” she said, adding that the department will take decisive action against underperforming contractors, and officials responsible for procurement delays.
Significant strides made in housing delivery
Despite challenges linked to land availability, natural disasters and funding constraints, the department reported notable progress in several key programmes during the previous financial year.
Among the achievements highlighted include:
• Eradication of 8176 unhabitable mud houses; • Unblocking of 85 stalled housing projects; • Acquisition of 2 447 hectares of land for human settlements development through the Housing Development Agency; • Delivery of 24 251 serviced sites by provinces, exceeding annual targets of 13 995, and • Delivery of 3 031 social housing units by the Social Housing Regulatory Authority (SHRA).
The social housing programme also generated more than 12 000 job opportunities nationally, highlighting the programme’s role in supporting economic activity and employment.
In line with the Property Practitioners Act 22 of 2029, the department continued to make significant progress in advancing transformation, skills development, and participation of the previously disadvantaged within the property sector.
“Through the One Learner, One Property Practitioner Programme, we successfully placed 619 candidate property practitioners with property industry employer/host employers, thus strengthening workplace-based learning opportunities and promoting sustainable entry into the sector. We also exceeded our target for women empowerment through the Principalisation Programme, supporting 1 153 women against a target of 484,” Simelane highlighted.
The Minister said government remains committed to leveraging innovative building technologies to accelerate housing delivery and improve climate resilience.
Simelane said government has resolved that at least 2% of the Human Settlements Development Grant (HSDG) may be allocated to Innovative Building Technologies (IBTs)-related housing projects.
The department has also prioritised local manufactures, emerging contractors, youth, women and township-based enterprises, in ensuring IBTs drive inclusive economic participation and job creation.
The Minister noted that South Africa continues to face a persistent, complex and multi-layered human settlements challenge.
The housing backlog currently stands at an estimated 2.6 million units, while rapid urbanisation, historical spatial inequality, and significant unmet housing demand, continue to place pressure on municipalities and housing infrastructure.
Simelane said the department remained committed to ensuring that investments in housing translate into meaningful improvements in the lives of South Africans.
“Housing is more than shelter. It is about restoring dignity, hope and security,” the Minister said. – SAnews.gov.za
