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July 7, 2025

International Monetary Fund (IMF) Reaches Staff-Level Agreement with Cameroon on the Third Review of Resilience and Sustainability Facility and Eighth Reviews of Extended Credit Facility and Extended Fund Facility

Source: APO

The IMF and the Cameroonian authorities have reached a staff-level agreement on the eighth reviews of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), and the third review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF).
Cameroon’s economy picked up slightly with real growth estimated at 3.5 percent in 2024, up from 3.2 percent in 2023. Inflation is trending down but remains elevated with an average inflation of 4.5 percent in 2024.
Program performance was mixed. Higher-than-expected current spending led to a slippage on the fiscal deficit target at end 2024, requiring corrective measures. The authorities have made progress on a broad structural agenda. They are encouraged to sustain efforts to restructure SONARA, complete key infrastructure projects, and strengthen the financial sector.

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team, led by Ms. Cemile Sancak, Mission Chief for Cameroon, visited Yaoundé from April 30 to May 8 and held subsequent meetings to discuss progress on reforms and the authorities’ policy priorities in the context of the eighth review of their four-year economic program supported by the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) and the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangements, and the third review of the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF). The ECF/EFF arrangements were approved by the IMF Executive Board for a total amount of SDR 483 million (US$689.5 million) in July 2021 (see press release 21/237). An extension of these arrangements of 12 months was approved in December 2023 to allow more time to implement the policies and reforms, and access was augmented by SDR 110.4 million (US$147.6 million) (see press release 23/469). The 18-month RSF was approved by the Executive Board in January 2024 in the amount of SDR 138 million (US$183.4 million) (see press release 24/30).

At the conclusion of the discussions, Ms. Sancak issued the following statement:

“The IMF and the Cameroonian authorities have reached a staff-level agreement on the eighth reviews of the ECF/EFF arrangements, and the third review of the RSF arrangement. The agreement is subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board. Completion of the review would enable disbursement under the ECF-EFF arrangements of SDR 55.2 million (US$75.9 million) and disbursement under the RSF arrangement of SDR 51.7 million (US$71.1 million).

“Cameroon’s economy expanded by 3.5 percent in 2024, up from 3.2 percent growth in 2024. Inflation remains in decline with a twelve-month average inflation of 4.5 percent in 2024, down from 7.5 percent in 2023.

“The 2024 fiscal outturn was weaker than expected with a non-oil primary deficit of 2.4 percent of GDP, exceeding the target of 2 percent of GDP. An overrun on current expenditures led to an accumulation of new payment arrears and reduced space for pro-growth investment expenditure. The authorities will revise the 2025 budget to take into consideration the 2024 outturn and announce supporting measures to address the source of the fiscal slippage and assure a net reduction of payment arrears over 2025.

“The economic outlook remains favorable assuming fiscal discipline over the coming electoral period and continued reform implementation. Nevertheless, downside risks have increased, notably with heightened global economic uncertainty. The growth forecast for 2025 has been marked down slightly to 3.8 percent amidst weakening global demand and tighter financing conditions. With the implementation of corrective measures, the authorities expect to resume fiscal consolidation and target a non-oil primary deficit of 1.4 percent in 2025. Over the medium-term, economic growth is forecast to reach 4.5 percent and inflation to slow gradually toward the regional convergence criterion of 3 percent.

“The authorities have made progress on a broad structural reform agenda. Over the course of their Fund-supported program, some 40 structural benchmarks will have been implemented, aligning with the objectives set out under the national development strategy (SND30). Going forward, it will be important to advance the restructuring of SONARA, sustain efforts to complete key infrastructure projects, and strengthen the financial sector by addressing persistent weaknesses and fully implementing the national financial inclusion strategy and the financial sector development strategy.

“Under the RSF, Cameroon has made substantial progress on its climate policy framework and enhanced readiness for climate adaptation and mitigation. The authorities have implemented most of the remaining four reform measures: the establishment of climate guidelines for evaluating investment projects, adoption of a national climate plan, and elaboration of a national strategy for disaster risk financing.

“The IMF team met with the Prime Minister, Joseph Dion Ngute, the Minister of State, Secretary General of the Presidency, Ferdinand Ngoh Ngoh, the Minister of Finance, Louis Paul Motaze, and other senior officials. The mission also met with representatives of development partners, the private sector, and civil society. The team wishes to thank the Cameroonian authorities for their excellent cooperation and for the open and constructive dialogue.”

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of International Monetary Fund (IMF).

July 7, 2025

Driving Angolan Hydrocarbon Production: bp Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Murray Auchincloss Joins Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) 2025

Source: APO – Report:

Murray Auchincloss, CEO of global energy company bp, has joined the Angola Oil & Gas (AOG) conference as a keynote speaker. His participation comes as bp – through its joint venture Azule Energy – advances a series of large-scale oil and gas developments in Angola, covering strategic investments from upstream exploration to oil production to non-associated gas development. Auchincloss’ participation at the event reflects bp’s broader commitment to Angola and is expected to unlock new opportunities for collaboration across the sector.

With a long history in Angola, bp has played an instrumental role in unlocking significant value from the country’s oil and gas resources. Initial forays by the energy major in the 1990s included the acquisition of four deepwater blocks, with a further five deep and ultra-deepwater blocks across the Kwanza and Benguela basins acquired in 2011. These investments marked the start of a decades-long commitment to Angola, with the energy major contributing significantly to the country’s oil production. Many of these blocks continue to account for a significant share of the country’s production portfolio, including Block 18 and 31 in the Lower Congo basin and Blocks 19 and 24 in the Kwanza and Benguela basin.

Following a merger of bp’s Angolan assets in 2022 with those of energy major Eni, the companies further strengthened their operational stronghold in Angola. The merger led to the establishment of the largest independent equity producer of oil and gas in the country and one that continues to play a central role in Angola’s oil and gas market. The company’s asset portfolio comprises 18 licenses – of which 11 are operated by Azule Energy and one is situated in Namibia. Azule energy also has a stake in the country’s sole LNG facility: Angola LNG. With a target to increase oil production to 250,000 barrels per day – up from the current 210,000 bpd – while advancing non-associated gas development, Azule Energy is accelerating the development of several impactful projects.

The company is preparing to start operations at the Agogo FPSO vessel in the second half of 2025. The vessel – arriving in Angolan waters in May 2025 – will be situated at the Agogo Integrated West Hub Development, joining the operational Ngoma FPSO to harness resources from Block 15/06. The vessel will increase the block’s production capacity by 120,000 bpd and features a combined cycle power generation unit, advanced electrification and digital automation, a seawater-driven turbine generators and a vapor recovery unit to eliminate flaring. The vessel will add to Azule Energy’s existing portfolio of operational FPSOs in Angola, with four deepwater vessels. currently in production.

Beyond Agogo, Azule Energy is developing Angola’s first non-associated gas projects through its operatorship of the New Gas Consortium. The project will harness gas resources at the Quiluma & Maboqueiro shallow water fields, thereby enhancing feedstock for the Angola LNG facility. As of February 2025, the project partners – namely, Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, Sonangol P&P and Totalenergies – completed the offshore platforms for the project. Production is expected to start in late-2025 or early-2026, six-months ahead of schedule.

These developments coincide with a drive to enhance clean energy development in Angola, with Azule Energy spearheading projects in biorefining and solar. The company is developing the Caraculo solar photovoltaic plant through Solenova – a joint venture with Sonangol – which will be located in the province of Namibe. The project targets a total capacity of 50 MW, with the first 25 MW phase coming online in 2023. In 2024, Azule Energy and Sonangol signed an agreement to enhance decarbonization at the operational Luanda Refinery – the country’s sole operating refining facility. The agreement will see the partners conduct a feasibility study for the development of a biorefinery at the facility, aiming to advance low-carbon energy solutions in Angola. These projects reflect the commitment by bp to advance Angolan energy production and Auchincloss’ participation at the country’s premier industry event is expected to generate greater understanding of the company’s portfolio, ongoing projects and future investment plans.

– on behalf of Energy Capital & Power.

Media files

July 7, 2025

Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) and Interstellar unveil African Currency Marketplace eliminating $5 Billion trade bottleneck

Source: APO – Report:

Building on the successful rollout of its groundbreaking continental payment infrastructure, the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), in strategic collaboration with Interstellar, a leading African deep-tech company, have announced the launch of the PAPSS African Currency Marketplace (PACM). The launch was announced on the sidelines of the 2025 Afreximbank (www.Afreximbank.com) Annual Meeting (AAM2025) held in Abuja from June 25 – 28.

This next-generation Financial Market Infrastructure (FMI) represents a bold evolution of the PAPSS mission, addressing Africa’s longstanding challenge of currency inconvertibility and enabling seamless, sovereign currency exchange for intra-African trade.

For decades, Africa’s economic momentum has been hindered by a fragmented financial landscape. The continent’s 41 currencies, diverse regulatory environments, and lack of convertibility have created significant friction. To trade with neighbouring countries, African businesses have often relied on external (hard) foreign currencies for foreign exchange, creating what experts call the “hard and costly currency bottleneck.” This workaround drains an estimated $5 billion annually in fees, delays, and opportunity costs, undermining the competitiveness of African enterprises and slowing progress toward realising the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

“PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is fully transparent, order book-driven, and operates with trusted counterparties, strictly adhering to local regulatory frameworks and global best practices,” affirmed Mike Ogbalu III, CEO of PAPSS. “By creating a single, continent-wide liquidity pool, PACM serves as a powerful liquidity engine for intra-African commerce.” This launch marks a major strategic evolution in the PAPSS journey. According to Mr Ogbalu, since its official launch in 2022, PAPSS has enabled real-time cross-border payments across 17 countries, connecting 14 national switches and over 150 commercial banks. Initially piloted in the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), PAPSS rapidly expanded to become the core settlement layer of the AfCFTA’s financial infrastructure. But while payment rails were laid, a deeper issue remained.

“We soon realised that solving for payments alone was not enough,” explained Mike Ogbalu. “Corporations, airlines, reinsurance firms, and multinationals operating across Africa still faced a persistent hurdle: trapped capital, arising from limited currency convertibility and overreliance on hard currencies.” For example, he explained, over $2 billion is currently ‘trapped’ in African countries where airlines operate, unable to repatriate their funds due to exchange restrictions or depreciation of local currencies. “The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is the answer to that problem — an extension of our commitment to building sovereign, frictionless financial infrastructure for Africa.” He added.

The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace jointly developed by PAPSS and Interstellar, enables the direct exchange of African currencies without passing through hard currencies. As a transparent, continent-wide, peer-to-peer platform, it allows businesses to trade directly in local currencies in near real-time while remaining compliant with national regulations. It unlocks liquidity, releases trapped capital, eliminates excessive foreign exchange costs, and supports the continent’s long-term goal of financial sovereignty. In partnership with PAPSS, the PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is built on Interstellar’s enterprise-grade, blockchain-agnostic infrastructure, which enables the use of permissioned blockchain technology while ensuring institutional grade-security, scalability, and near instant settlement.

“This is not just about technology, it is about fulfilling a continental vision,” said Ernest Mbenkum, Founder and CEO of Interstellar during a fireside chat at the launch. “PAPSS African Currency Marketplace was built from the ground up to serve Africa’s specific needs. PAPSS and Interstellar are not just collaborators, we are co-architects of a new financial future, aligned in purpose and committed to transformation.”

Ernest Mbenkum further emphasised, “African currencies deserve a better place in the world. With this marketplace, your local currency is no longer just a medium of exchange, it becomes a vehicle of opportunity.” He also highlighted that this is only the beginning of Interstellar’s vision, stating, “We’re building a future where Africa no longer needs to wait for foreign rails to move value. Our infrastructure will power Africa’s financial renaissance.”

Haytham El Maayergi, Executive Vice President of Afreximbank, noted: “The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace gives us the power to transform trade dramatically, bringing us to trade with each other with a major benefit that we can now accept each other’s currency.”

The impact is already being felt. During its pilot phase, more than 80 African corporates transacted across 12 currency pairs, with all transactions settled in local currencies. For example, a company like Kenya Airways, which earns Nigerian Naira from ticket sales, can now use PACM to directly exchange Naira for Kenyan Shillings—without converting through a third currency. Early adopters include ZEP-RE (PTA Reinsurance Company) and Access View Africa, which called the platform “a dream come true.”

PAPSS African Currency Marketplace liberates trapped capital, eliminates excessive FX costs, and transforms multi-week settlement delays into near real-time execution. PAPSS CEO Mr. Ogbalu noted that following positive experiences of some early adopters, PAPSS had received interest from institutions outside Africa seeking to join the ecosystem. “This demand proves the value of what we’ve built,” he said.

With over 150 banks already connected through PAPSS and growing demand across the continent, PAPSS African Currency Marketplace stands as a game-changing financial tool for a more unified, sovereign, and efficient Africa.

Concluding his opening keynote, Mr. Haytham El Maayergi, Executive Vice President – Global Trade Bank at Afreximbank reiterated: “Africa will not rise by ideas. Africa will rise by actions. “

The PAPSS African Currency Marketplace is now open to eligible corporations, financial institutions, and other market participants across the continent.

– on behalf of Afreximbank.

Media Contact:
Papa Thiongane
communications@papss.com

Website:
marketplace@papss.com

About PAPSS:
The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System – PAPSS is a centralised Financial Market Infrastructure that enables the efficient flow of money securely across African borders, minimising risk and contributing to financial integration across the regions. PAPSS collaborates with African central banks to offer payment and settlement solutions that commercial banks and licensed payment service providers (switches, fintechs, aggregators, etc.) across the continent can connect to, making these services accessible to the public. To date, PAPSS has developed and launched 3 payment solutions: PAPSS Instant Payment System (IPS), PAPSS African Currency Marketplace (PACM), and the PAPSSCARD.

Afreximbank and the African Union (“AU”) first announced PAPSS at the Twelfth Extraordinary Summit of the African Union held on July 7, 2019, in Niamey, Niger Republic, therefore adopting PAPSS as a key instrument for the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). Further, in its thirteenth (13th) extraordinary session, held on December 5, 2020, the assembly of the African Union directed Afreximbank and the AfCFTA secretariat to finalise, among others, work on the Pan-African Payments and Settlements System (PAPSS). The 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU further directed the AfCFTA and Afreximbank to deploy the system to cover the entire continent. PAPSS was officially launched in Accra, Ghana, on January 13, 2022, thus making it available for use by the public.

About Interstellar:
Interstellar Inc. is Africa’s leading enterprise blockchain infrastructure company —enabling secure cross-border transactions, stablecoin integration, and next-generation financial solutions across the continent. Its core platform, STARGATE, is a critical blockchain-agnostic, enterprise-grade infrastructure that empowers major institutions to build and scale secure, high-performance financial applications, including tokenization platforms and payments solutions.

Media files

July 7, 2025

Alcohol and colonialism: the curious story of the Bulawayo beer gardens

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maurice Hutton, Research Associate, School of Environment, Education and Development, University of Manchester

Kontuthu Ziyathunqa – Smoke Rising – was what they used to call Bulawayo when the city was the industrial powerhouse of Zimbabwe. Now, many of its factories lie dormant or derelict. The daily torrent of workers flowing eastward at dawn, and back out to the high-density western suburbs at dusk, has diminished to a trickle.

But there is an intriguing industrial-era institution that lives on in most of the older western suburbs (formerly called townships). It is the municipal beer hall or beer garden, built in the colonial days for the racially segregated African worker communities. There are dozens of these halls and garden complexes, still serving customers and emitting muffled sounds of merriment to this day.

Like other urban areas in Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe), Bulawayo was informally segregated from its inception, and more formally segregated after the second world war. Under British rule (1893-1965) and then independent white minority rule (1965-1980), municipal drinking amenities were built in the townships to maintain control of African drinking and sociality. At the same time, they raised much-needed revenue for township welfare and recreational services.

I researched the history of these beer halls and gardens as part of my PhD project on the development of the segregated African townships in late colonial Bulawayo. As my historical account shows, they played a key role in the contested township development process.

From beer halls to beer gardens

Bulawayo’s oldest and most famous beer hall, MaKhumalo, also known as Big Bhawa, was built more than a century ago. It still stands at the heart of the historic Makokoba neighbourhood. It’s enormous, but austere, and in the early days it was oppressively managed. Drinkers would describe feeling like prisoners there.

The more picturesque beer gardens began to emerge in the 1950s, reflecting the developmental idealism of Hugh Ashton. The Lesotho-born anthropologist was educated at the Universities of Oxford, London and Cape Town, and took up the new directorship of African administration in Bulawayo in 1949.

Beer gardens emerged in the 1950s. Bulawayo Housing and Amenities Department

He was tuned into new anthropological ideas about social change, as well as developmental ideas spreading through postwar colonial administrations – about “stabilising” and “detribalising” African workers to create a more passive and productive urban working class. He saw a reformed municipal beer system as a key tool for achieving these goals.

Ashton wanted to make the beer system more legitimate and the venues more community-building. He proposed constructing beer garden complexes with trees, rocks, games facilities, food stalls and events like “traditional dancing”. So the atmosphere would be convivial and respectable, but also controllable, enticing all classes and boosting profits to fund better social services. As we shall see, this strategy was full of contradictions…

Industrial beer brewing

A colonial beer advert. Masiyepambili

MaKhumalo, MaMkhwananzi, MaNdlovu, MaSilela. These beer garden names, emblazoned on the beer dispensaries that stick up above the ramparts of each garden complex, referenced the role that women traditionally played in beer brewing in southern Africa. This helped authenticate the council’s “home brew”.

But the reality was that the beer was now produced in a massive industrial brewery managed by a Polish man. It was piped down from steel tanks at the tops of the dispensary buildings into the plastic mugs of thirsty punters at small bar windows below. (It was also sold in plastic calabashes and cardboard cartons.)

Masiyepambili

And the beer garden bureaucracy, which offered a rare opportunity for African men to attain higher-grade public sector jobs, became increasingly complex and strictly audited.

As the townships rapidly expanded, with beer gardens dotted about them, sales of the council’s “traditional” beer – the quality of which Ashton and his staff obsessed over – went up and up.

Extensive beer advertising in the council’s free magazine mixed symbols of tradition (beer as food) with symbols of modern middle-classness.

Beer monopoly system

The system’s success relied on the Bulawayo council having a monopoly on the sale of so-called “native beer”. This traditional brew is typically made by malting, mashing, boiling and then fermenting sorghum, millet or maize grains. Racialised Rhodesian liquor laws restricted African access to “European” beers, wines and spirits.

So, the beer hall or garden was the only public venue where Africans could legally drink (apart from a tiny elite, for whom a few exclusive “cocktail lounges” were built). The council cracked down harshly on “liquor offences” like home brewing.

This beer monopoly system was quite prevalent in southern and eastern Africa, though rarely at the scale to which it grew in Bulawayo. Nearly everywhere, the system caused resentment among African townspeople, and so it became politically charged.

Beer delivery lorry at Esiqonweni. Maurice Hutton

In several colonies, beer halls became sites of protest, or were boycotted (most famously in South Africa). And they usually faced stiff competition from illicit drinking dens known as shebeens.

In Bulawayo, the more the city council “improved” its beer system after the Second World War, the more contradictory the system became. It actively encouraged mass consumption of “traditional” beer, so that funds could be raised for “modern” health, housing and welfare services in the townships. Ashton himself was painfully aware of the contradictions.

In his guest introduction to a 1974 ethnographic monograph on Bulawayo’s beer gardens, he wrote:

The ambivalence of my position is obvious. How can one maintain a healthy community and a healthy profit at one and the same time? I can almost hear the critical reader questioning my morality and even my sanity. And why not? I have often done so myself.

Many citizen groups – both African and European – questioned the system too. They called it illogical, if not immoral; even some government ministers said it had gone too far. And when some beer gardens were constructed close to European residential areas, to cater for African domestic workers, many Europeans reacted with fear and fury.

As Zimbabweans’ struggle for independence took off in the 1960s, African residents increasingly associated the beer halls and gardens with state neglect, repression, or pacification. They periodically boycotted or vandalised them. Nevertheless, with few alternative options, attendance rates remained high: MaKhumalo recorded 50,000 visitors on one Sunday in 1970.

After independence

After Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the township beer gardens remained in municipal hands. They continued to be popular, even though racial desegregation had finally given township residents access to other social spaces across the city.

The colonial-era municipal beers continued to be produced, with Ngwebu (“The Royal Brew”) becoming a patriotic beverage for the Ndebele – the city’s majority ethnic group.

Beer dispensary valves at Umhambi. Maurice Hutton

But with the deindustrialisation of Bulawayo since the late 1990s, tens of thousands of blue collar workers have moved to greener pastures, mostly South Africa. The old drinking rhythm of the city’s workforce has changed, and for the young, the beer gardens hold little allure. Increasingly, they have been leased out to private individuals to run.

Nevertheless, there is always a daily trickle of regulars to the beer gardens, where mugs and calabashes are passed around among friends or burial society members. Some punters play darts or pool. And there are always some who sit alone, ruminating – perhaps in the company of ghosts from the past.

The beer gardens of Bulawayo embody the moral and practical contradictions of late colonial development – and the ways in which such systems and infrastructures may live on, but change meaning, in the post-colony.

– Alcohol and colonialism: the curious story of the Bulawayo beer gardens
– https://theconversation.com/alcohol-and-colonialism-the-curious-story-of-the-bulawayo-beer-gardens-256511

July 7, 2025

Samora Machel’s vision for Mozambique didn’t survive: what has taken its place?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Luca Bussotti, Professor at the PhD Course in Peace, Democracy, Social Movements and Human Development, Universidade Técnica de Moçambique (UDM)

Samora Moisés Machel, the first president of independent Mozambique, was born in 1933 in Gaza province, in the south of the country. He died in an unexplained plane crash on 19 October 1986, in Mbuzini, South Africa.

Authoritarian and popular, humble and arrogant, visionary and tactical. All these words have been used to describe Machel. Despite these contradictions, there was one quality that everyone recognised in him: his charisma. At the time this gift wasn’t lacking in many political leaders of emerging countries, especially those of Marxist-Leninist inspiration. Cuba’s revolutionary leader Fidel Castro above all.

Their common faith went beyond any personal or family interest. It was a faith for the progress of humanity, for the liberation of oppressed peoples from the colonial yoke, from the chains of capitalism and from traditional values and practices considered regressive.

Machel’s enlightenment programme was as fascinating as it was difficult to achieve in Mozambique in the mid-1970s. Small farmers, with all their “traditional” beliefs, made up the majority of the population. It was a political battle for social justice as well as a cultural crusade.

Machel’s speech on 25 June 1975, at the Machava Stadium in Maputo, proclaiming Mozambique’s independence from Portugal, highlighted the contradictions. The new head of state addressed the “workers”, who represented a small minority of the Mozambican people. At the same time, he called for freedom from colonial-capitalist oppression and the effective, total independence of the new country, already identifying its possible enemies: the unproductive and exploitative bourgeoisie.

The task of nation-building

Machel’s charisma recalled that of the proto-nationalist hero Gungunhana, who had tried to resist the Portuguese occupation at the end of the 19th century. Machel’s grandfather, Maguivelani, was related to the “terrible” Gungunhana, the last emperor of Gaza, who was defeated in 1895 by Mouzinho de Albuquerque after years of struggle. He was deported to Portugal, where he died in 1906.

Paradoxically, the anti-traditionalist Machel was the descendant of a great traditional chief. This heritage played a role in shaping his personality and political action.

Machel’s main task was to build a nation that only existed because of political unification under the Portuguese. The initial choices, embedded in the Cold War atmosphere, forced the nationalist Machel to opt for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Mozambique formally adopted a Marxist-Leninist doctrine at its Third Congress in 1977.

That approach meant political intolerance and the repression of “dissidents”, as well as the marginalisation of certain ethnic groups, above all the Amakhuwa people, who did not sympathise with Machel’s party, Frelimo.

The forces opposed to the Marxist-Leninist solution expected democratic elections to be held after the proclamation of independence from Portugal. But this opportunity never came. Portugal handed over power to Frelimo (Lusaka Accords, 1974), ignoring the existence of other political groups.

The treatment of leaders who opposed Frelimo’s vision was harsh. On their return from abroad, many were imprisoned in concentration camps in the north of the country.

They included the resistance leader Joana Simeão, along with others such as Uria Simango, former vice-president of Frelimo, his wife, Celina Simango, and Lázaro Kavandame, the former Makonde leader who left Frelimo because he didn’t agree with its political line.

They were put on arbitrary trial and executed. The dates and the method of execution are still officially unknown, despite the former president Joaquim Chissano’s public apology, in 2014, for these deaths.

About a year after independence, an armed opposition, Renamo, was formed. It was financed first by Ian Smith’s Southern Rhodesian government, and then by the South African apartheid regime.

Renamo, contrary to Machel’s expectations, had a solid popular base in central and northern Mozambique, especially among peasant populations who had expressed opposition to the policies of collectivisation and cooperation imposed by the Marxist-Leninist government.

And it was war which led Machel to a controversial agreement with the South African apartheid enemy. The Nkomati Accords, signed in 1984, provided for the end of Mozambique’s logistical support to the exiled African National Congress in Mozambique and South Africa’s military and financial support to Renamo.

This agreement did not bring peace. On the contrary, the war intensified, as the South African regime continued to finance Renamo.

Machel died in 1986, with the war still raging, unable to see the end of a conflict that had devastated Mozambique and which defeated the socialist principles.

The General Peace Accords between the Mozambican government, represented by the president, Chissano, and Renamo, represented by its leader, Afonso Dhlakama, were only signed in Rome in 1992.

End of an era

Machel took the first, important steps towards a rapprochement with the west, as demonstrated by his visit to Ronald Reagan in Washington in September 1985.

It can be said that with his death the First Mozambican Republic ended, with all its positive and negative elements. The dream of building a fair Mozambique with an equitable distribution of national wealth came to an end.

Machel had worked hard to ensure that health, education, transport, water and energy were distributed equally among Mozambicans. A poor but fair welfare state was born. But it was quickly dismantled in the years following his death. The Mozambican state had very few resources to devote to the welfare state. The rest was done by the rapid abandonment of an ideology, the socialist ideology, which by then the Frelimo elite no longer believed in.

In addition, international financial institutions entered the country, with the notorious structural adjustment policies, as early as 1987.

Corruption, which Machel sought to combat with various measures, and which he addressed at many of his rallies, spread across the country and all its institutions. The Frelimo political elite soon became the richest slice of the nation.

Several observers began to speak of a kleptocracy. The country suffered from continuous corruption scandals. One of the biggest became known as “hidden debt,” in which the political elite, including one of ex-president Armando Guebuza’s sons and former intelligence chief, Gregório Leão, were convicted of a scheme that cost the public treasury more than US$2 billion.

However, the main defeat was the fall of an inapplicable socialism.

The adoption of a capitalist, liberal and democratic model, at least formally, put an end to the arbitrary violations of human rights as in the age of the socialist state, such as “Operation Production” of 1983. The programme aimed to move “unproductive” people living in cities to the countryside to promote agricultural production.

In reality, it turned into arbitrary detentions and displacement of entire families, increasing the systematic violation of human rights by the state.

At the same time, the end of socialism meant democratic openness. Since the 1990 constitution, Mozambique has had as its fundamental principles respect for civil and political freedoms based on the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights. Still, socio-economic rights have been denied as a result of the dismantling of the welfare state.

How he’s remembered

Today, many people miss Machel’s rule. Those who were close to him, such as José Óscar Monteiro, the former interior minister, recall him as an ethical statesman, intolerant of corruption and abuses against “his” people. So do some of the international media.

Others, since the 1980s, such as Amnesty International, have denounced the serious violations of the most basic human rights by the Mozambican government and its leader.

What remains of Machel today is above all his ethical teaching. He died poor, committed to the cause of his nation, leaving his heirs moral prestige.

It is curious that his figure is associated, even in musical compositions by contemporary rappers from Mozambique, with his historical enemy, Dhlakama, who died in 2018.

This popular tribute is proof of the distance between the country’s current ruling class and a “people” who are looking to the charismatic figure of Venâncio Mondlane, the so-called “people’s president”. But that’s another story that won’t fit here.

– Samora Machel’s vision for Mozambique didn’t survive: what has taken its place?
– https://theconversation.com/samora-machels-vision-for-mozambique-didnt-survive-what-has-taken-its-place-260110

July 7, 2025

West Africa terror: why attacks on military bases are rising – and four ways to respond

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

More than 40 Malian soldiers were killed and one of the country’s military bases was taken over in early June 2025 in a major attack by an al-Qaeda linked group, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), on the town of Boulikessi.

The same group launched an attack on the historic city of Timbuktu. The Malian army claimed it repelled the Timbuktu attack and killed 14 terrorists.

Terrorist groups have attacked Boulikessi in large numbers before. In October 2019, 25 Malian soldiers were killed. The target was a G5 Sahel force military camp.

Timbuktu has been in the sights of terrorist groups since 2012. JNIM laid siege to the city for several months in 2023. Timbuktu has a major airport and a key military base.

In neighbouring Burkina Faso, there have been running battles in recent months between the military and terrorist groups. About 40% of the country is under the control of groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Military bases in the country have also been targeted.

Mali and Burkina Faso are under military rule. Insecurity, especially increasing terrorist attacks, were key reasons the military juntas gave for seizing power in both countries.

I have been researching terrorism and the formation of insurgent groups in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. What I am observing is that the terrorist groups are becoming more daring and constantly changing tactics, with increased attacks on military camps across the region.

Military camps are attacked to lower the morale of the soldiers and steal ammunition. It also sends a message to locals that military forces are incapable of protecting civilians.

I believe there are four main reasons for an increase in large scale attacks on military bases in the region:

the loss of the US drone base in Niger, which has made surveillance difficult
an increase in human rights abuses carried out in the name of counter terrorism
a lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism
constant changes of tactics by the terrorists.

Identifying and addressing these issues are important to counter the trend.

Why are the attacks increasing?

First is the loss of the US drone base in Agadez, Republic of Niger, in 2024 after the military seized power in the country.

I was initially sceptical when the drone base was commissioned in 2019. But it has in fact acted as a deterrent to terrorist groups.

Terrorist organisations operating in the Sahel knew they were being watched by drones operating from the base. They were aware surveillance information was shared with member states. The loss of the base has reduced reconnaissance and surveillance activities in the region.

Second, an increase in human rights abuse in the fight against terrorism in the region is dividing communities and increasing recruitment into terrorist groups. A report by Human Rights Watch in May 2025 accused the Burkina Faso military and allied militias of killing more than 130 civilians during counter-terrorism operations.

The report argued that members of the Fulani ethnic group were targeted in the operations because they were perceived to have relationships with terrorist groups. Terrorist groups are known to use such incidents to win the hearts and minds of local populations.

Third, the lack of a coordinated approach to counter terrorism in the region is reversing the gains made in the last decade. Major developments have included the dissolving of the G5 Sahel. This grouping was created in 2014 to enhance security coordination between members. The members were Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad and Niger. The organisation launched joint counter-terrorism missions across member states but was dissolved in December 2023 after Niger and Burkina Faso withdrew.

The weakening of the Multinational Joint Task Force due to the military coup in Niger and the countries’ strategic repositioning is undermining counter-terrorism initiatives. Task force members were Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin.

The mandate of the task force is to combat Boko Haram and other terrorist groups operating around the Lake Chad basin. After its establishment in 2015 the task force achieved significant progress. In January 2025, Niger suspended its membership, putting the fight against terrorism in the region in jeopardy.

Fourth, terrorist groups in the region are becoming more sophisticated in their approach. In April 2025, JNIM terrorists were suspected of launching a suicide drone attack on Togolese military positions.

For its part, the military in the Sahelian countries are struggling to adapt to the terrorists’ new tactics. In the last few years, there has been a proliferation of drones in Africa by states and non-state actors.

Halting the trend

To combat the increasing attacks by terrorist groups, especially large-scale attacks on military positions, four immediate steps are necessary.

First, nation states need to invest in surveillance capabilities. The loss of the drone base in Niger means Sahelian states must urgently find new ways of gathering and sharing intelligence. The topography of the region, which is mainly flat, with scattered vegetation, is an advantage as reconnaissance drones can easily detect suspicious movements, terrorist camps and travel routes.

There is also a need to regulate the use of drones in the region to prevent use by non-state actors.

In addition, countries fighting terrorism must find a way to improve the relationship between the military (and allied militias) and people affected by terrorism. My latest publication on the issue shows that vigilante groups engaged by the military forces are sometimes complicit in human rights abuse.

Training on human rights is essential for military forces and allied militias.

Terrorism funding avenues must be identified and blocked. Large scale terrorist attacks involve planning, training and resources. Funding from illegal mining, trafficking and kidnapping must be identified and eradicated. This will also include intelligence sharing between nation states.

Finally, the Sahelian countries must find a mechanism to work with the Economic Community of West African States.

As the numbers and intensity of terrorist activities are increasing across the Sahel, immediate action is necessary to combat this trend.

– West Africa terror: why attacks on military bases are rising – and four ways to respond
– https://theconversation.com/west-africa-terror-why-attacks-on-military-bases-are-rising-and-four-ways-to-respond-258622

July 7, 2025

South Sudan: Margret takes the helm in the battle for women’s rights, inspiring both change and others

Source: APO

Margret Ceasar is not just a 60-year-old mother of six but also stands at the forefront of the women’s rights movement in South Sudan’s capital Juba.

As the leader of a local development association, she has taken on the immense challenge of giving other women knowledge about the roles and the protection they are entitled to have in their communities.

“Like so many of us, I lost my husband in the violence that took place across the country in 2016. It was a devastating time, with families being torn apart, women becoming widows, young girls suffering from unspeakable acts,” Margret recalls. “To make matters worse, survivors were often not aware of their human and legal rights.”

As a result, Margret decided to step up her efforts to assist the most vulnerable – often women and girls – and became the Chairperson of the Women’s Association in Juba County. Through various trainings and studies, she turned into an influential human rights activist, dedicated to making a difference for her people.

“Mobilizing women politically is essential if we want to unlock leadership opportunities,” she concludes.

Ms. Ceasar shared her story and rich experience at a grassroots forum organized by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), targeting more than 40 members of the Women’s Association in Juba. They gathered to learn more about their rights and roles in peacebuilding and governance, hoping to become more able to contribute to a more inclusive and resilient society.

“Workshops like this help people, both women and men, to examine and re-evaluate gender biases and become equal partners in decision-making at all levels of governance,” said Gladys Jambi, an UNMISS Associate Gender Affairs Officer.

In her role, Margret works tirelessly for justice for survivors of gender-based violence.

“The best way to help them is to inform them about their rights, and to have constructive talks with their spouses,” she believes.

Over the years, she has contributed to the resolution of numerous cases, not least by encouraging open discussions about domestic violence and its dire consequences.

Fueled by passionate determination, Margret wants to be heard and influence others beyond her county by forming strategic alliances with other women’s affairs associations and offices.

“The road ahead is long, but since I believe in the cause and take pride in helping other women grow their confidence and abilities, I’m fearless in my pursuit.”

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

July 7, 2025

Kenya: Ambassador Guo Haiyan Attends Events of the 4th Edition Nairobi City Marathon

Source: APO

On July 6, Ambassador Ms. Guo Haiyan was invited to attend the related activities of the 4th Edition Nairobi City Marathon. Accompanied with PS for Sports Mr. Elijah Mwangi, President of the Kenya Athletics and officials from UNEP, she signaled the start of the race and presented awards to the winners.

First held in 2022, the Nairobi City Marathon has attracted over 17,000 runners from more than 70 countries and regions, including about 300 Chinese, with its main course on the Nairobi Expressway, a key project of the “Belt and Road Initiative” built by a Chinese company.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya.

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July 7, 2025

Police Commissioner commends sentencing in Magaqa case

Source: Government of South Africa

Monday, July 7, 2025

The National Police Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS), General Fannie Masemola has commended the efforts of the investigating team in securing a 25-year imprisonment sentence imposed on hitman Sibusiso Ncengwa for the murder of Sindiso Magaqa in July 2017.

The SAPS Political Killings Task Team took over the case in July 2018 after their formation. Within a month, the first hitman, Ncengwa was arrested in August 2018 by the team. Six others were later arrested in December of the same year.

This as the Pietermaritzburg High Court on Monday found Ngcengwa guilty on 11 counts with the breakdown as follows:
•    Count 1: Conspiracy to commit murder-25years
•    Count 2: Murder -25 years
•    Count 3: Attempted murder- 5 Years
•    Count 4: Attempted murder- 5 years
•    Count 5: Attempted murder-5years
•    Count 6: Malicious damage to property – 3years
•    Count 7: Malicious damage to property- 3 years
•    Count 8: Malicious damage to property-3 years
•    Count 9: Unlawful possession of a fully automatic firearm- 5years
•    Count 10: unlawful Possession of firearms – 5 years.
•    Count 11: unlawful possession of ammunition- 1year
•    Count: 1,3 to 11 will run concurrently with Count 2 which is 25 years.

“Three other accused are still in custody with the third declared mentally unfit to stand trial.

“The third accused is in a mental institution. The trial of the two who are fit to stand trial is expected to be heard between 19 September 2025 to 21 October 2025 in the Pietermaritzburg High Court,” the police said. – SAnews.gov.za

July 7, 2025

Kenya: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)-China South-South Cooperation High-level Meeting Held in Nairobi

Source: APO

On July 4, the high-level meeting of the FAO-China South-South Cooperation Project was held at the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development. Attendees included Mr. Jiang Wensheng, Vice Minister of China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs; Ms. Tipo, FAO Representative in Kenya ad interim; Dr. Ronoh, Principal Secretary of Kenya’s State Department for Agricultural Development; and Ms. Guo Haiyan, Chinese Ambassador to Kenya. The meeting focused on deepening agricultural South-South cooperation, enhancing food security, addressing climate change, and promoting rural development.

China has been supporting Kenya for integrated fall armyworm control and low-carbon tea value chain through the FAO SSC/SSTC framework with promising results. The three parties expressed their commitment to further cooperation in promoting Chinese technologies and experience in developing countries to enhance agricultural productivity, facilitate poverty reduction and rural development, and address climate change. The Kenyan side welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest in agricultural sector in Kenya and hopes that China provide trade facilitation for Kenyan agricultural exports to its vast market.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of Kenya.