Sudão têm milhões de pessoas que mal sobrevivem por causa da guerra

Source: Africa Press Organisation – Portuguese –

Baixar .tipo

Após mais de 900 dias de confrontos e fome, mais de 30 milhões de sudaneses precisam de ajuda urgente; agências da ONU apelam por ação imediata; mulheres e crianças são as mais afetadas; apenas 25% do apelo humanitário para este ano foram entregues até agora.

O Sudão enfrenta uma das piores crises humanitárias do mundo. Após mais de 900 dias de conflito, colapso dos serviços básicos e fome generalizada, milhões de pessoas mal podem sobreviver.

Mulheres e crianças são as principais vítimas de uma situação que ameaça transformar-se numa catástrofe sem precedentes. O alerta é das Nações Unidas e de suas agências humanitárias.

Uma das piores crises de em décadas

De acordo com a Agência das Nações Unidas para Refugiados, Acnur, o país tornou-se o epicentro de uma crise humanitária “sem precedentes”. Mais de 30 milhões necessitam de assistência urgente, incluindo 9,6 milhões de deslocados internos e quase 15 milhões de crianças que lutam diariamente para sobreviver.

O conflito no Sudão começou em meados de abril de 2023 quando o grupo rebelde e paramilitar Força de Reação Rápida, RSF, entrou em choque com tropas do Exército do Sudão.

A alta-comissária adjunta do Acnur, Kelly Clements, afirmou que “esta é uma das piores crises de proteção” já vistas em décadas. O apelo conjunto do Acnur, da Organização Internacional para Migrações, OIM, do Fundo das Nações Unidas para a Infância, Unicef, e do Programa Mundial de Alimentos, WFP, visa chamar a atenção internacional para “o sofrimento e os perigos crescentes” enfrentados pela população sudanesa.

Retorno em meio à destruição

Com a redução dos combates em Cartum, capital do Sudão, e outras regiões, cerca de 2,6 milhões de pessoas começaram a regressar às suas comunidades, apenas para encontrar casas destruídas e serviços básicos em colapso.

Ugochi Daniels, vice-diretora-geral de operações da OIM, relatou que encontrou famílias retornando a cidades ainda marcadas pela guerra, onde quase nada funciona e que “a vontade de recomeçar é admirável, mas a vida permanece extremamente frágil”.

A OIM também alertou que o avanço de doenças como cólera, dengue e malária, somado aos altos índices de desnutrição, ameaça a vida de milhares de pessoas que continuam sem acesso a cuidados médicos e alimentação adequada.

260 mil civis sob cerco

A situação é especialmente crítica em El Fasher, no Norte do Darfur, onde 260 mil civis, incluindo 130 mil crianças, permanecem sitiados há mais de 16 meses, sem acesso a comida, água potável ou serviços de saúde.

Ted Chaiban, diretor executivo adjunto do Unicef declarou que “comunidades inteiras vivem em condições que desafiam a dignidade humana”, sublinhando que as crianças estão desnutridas, expostas à violência e morrendo de doenças evitáveis.

Ajuda insuficiente diante da urgência
Apesar dos esforços humanitários, que já atingiram 13,5 milhões de pessoas este ano, a resposta da ONU enfrenta sérias limitações de financiamento.

O Plano de Resposta Humanitária de 2025, avaliado em 4,2 mil milhões de dólares, recebeu apenas 25% dos recursos necessários.

As agências da ONU reafirmaram o compromisso de continuar a apoiar as populações afetadas, mas alertaram que “a comunidade humanitária não pode agir sozinha”, e que é urgente a comunidade internacional unir forças para salvar vidas e ajudar o Sudão a reconstruir o que foi perdido.

Distribuído pelo Grupo APO para UN News.

Two thirds of children surveyed in South Sudan engaged in child labour: New Report

Source: APO


.

Nearly two-thirds of South Sudanese children surveyed aged between 5 and 17 years are engaged in the worst form of child labour, with rates soaring to as high as 90% in the worst hit regions, according to a new report by the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, and Save the Children.

The landmark National Child Labour Study involved more than 418 households from across seven states in South Sudan and found that 64% or nearly two in three children surveyed were engaged in the worst form of child labour, which include forced labour, sexual exploitation and involvement in illicit activities e.g. stealing, drug abuse and armed conflict [1]. 

In some parts of the country, the survey found nearly all children were involved in child labour. In Kapoeta South, 90% of children were engaged in child labour, with gold mining, pastoralism and farming combining to keep children out of school and working to support their families. The report also found that local conflict and child marriages are contributing to extremely high rates of child labour in Yambio region, with 90% of children surveyed found to be involved. 

According to the report, children usually move from ‘light’ to hazardous or coercive labour, progressively reaching the worst forms that leave them enslaved, separated from families, exposed to serious hazards, illnesses or left to fend for themselves, said Save the Children.

About 10% of children surveyed reported experiences linked to conflict-related engagement with armed groups, particularly in counties of Akobo, Bentiu, and Kapoeta South.

The children reported to have been involved in a wide variety of activities ranging from tasks such as cattle herding and farming to jobs such as gold mining, brickmaking, street vending, and fighting alongside armed groups.

According to the report, boys are more often exposed to hazardous and military-related labour, while girls face heightened risks of domestic work, child marriage, and exploitation.

The report also revealed that caregiver awareness does not guarantee protection for the children involved, with the survey finding over 70% of children involved in hazardous work come from households where caregivers were aware of child labour laws. 

On their part, children were found to be broadly unaware of existing protection services, with only 33% aware of any protection or support service available in their area, highlighting severe service gaps and fragmented referral systems.

The findings come at a time when a collision of crises has created food shortages across South Sudan with 7.7 million people – or 57% of the population – facing acute levels of hunger and putting 2.3 million children aged under 5 at risk of acute malnutrition. 

Anthony, 16, a Child Representative in South Sudan, said: “No child should have to work when they should be learning. When children are forced into labour, they are denied their basic right to education and the chance to build a better future. Let us stand together and say no to child labour, let us protect every child’s right to grow, learn, and succeed. Every child in South Sudan deserves the opportunity to dream and to become who they are meant to be.” 

Deng Tong, Undersecretary, Ministry of Labour, Republic of South Sudan said, during the launch event in Juba:

“This national study provides a critical foundation for action. We must build on this evidence to establish a national child labour database that enables continuous monitoring and informed decision-making. As the Ministry of Labour, we are at the forefront of protecting our children across the country—raising awareness that child labour is unacceptable and that education is every child’s right. Let us now move from commitment to implementation, from promises to protection, and from words to results. Together, we can make child labour a thing of the past and give every child in South Sudan the chance to dream and to thrive.”

Minister of Public Service, Hon. Dak Duop Bichiok, who was representing the Minister of Labour, said:

“This study has given us the evidence we need to reform policies, strengthen protection systems and ensure that every child in South Sudan enjoys their right to education, safety and a childhood free from exploitation.”  

Save the Children’s South Sudan Country Director Chris Nyamandi said: 

“When nearly two-thirds of a country’s children are working—and in some areas, almost every child—it signals a crisis that goes beyond poverty. 

“Education remains the strongest protective factor, with children who attend school far less likely to be engaged in exploitative labour. This shows the incredible value of education in South Sudan. Equally the report highlights that children from food-secure households and educated caregivers face significantly lower risk, underscoring the link between poverty reduction and child protection.

“If we strengthen education, rebuild livelihoods, and prioritise child protection, we can reverse this trend. Every child deserves the chance to learn and thrive—not to work to survive.”

Barbara Egger, European Union Representative, said: 

 “Every child deserves the chance to learn, grow, and become a leader of tomorrow. The European Union stands proudly with the children of South Sudan, the Government, and our partners, including Save the Children, to close legal and policy gaps, strengthen education and social protection, and ensure no child is left behind. Together, we are turning commitments into action, so that every girl and boy in South Sudan can realize the future they rightfully deserve.”

Save the Children has worked in South Sudan since 1991, when it was part of Sudan. The child rights organization provides children with access to education, healthcare and nutritional support, and families with food security and livelihoods assistance.


[1] The National Child Labour Study was conducted under Save the Children’s Empowering Futures initiative with funding from the European Union. Using a mixed-methods approach, the study surveyed 418 households and engaged over 200 stakeholders through interviews and focus groups. The study was conducted across eight counties in seven states including Akobo, Kapoeta South, Magwi, Wau, Yambio, Juba, Bentiu (Rubkona), and Renk.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Save the Children.

The East African Community (EAC) deploys Election Observation Mission to Tanzania ahead of 2025 General Elections

Source: APO


.

The East African Community (EAC) today officially launched and flagged off its Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe the General Elections in the United Republic of Tanzania.

The deployment of the mission follows an invitation by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and is in line with a directive of the EAC Council of Ministers requiring the Secretariat to observe elections in all Partner States. This underscores the EAC’s unwavering commitment to democratic governance, peace, and stability in the region.

The Head of Mission, H.E. Dr. Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe, is the former Vice President of the Republic of Uganda (1994–2003). She is celebrated as the first woman in Africa to hold the position of Vice President in a sovereign nation. A trained surgeon and champion of public health and gender equality, Dr. Kazibwe also served as the United Nations Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa.

“As a Community founded on the principles of good governance, rule of law, and respect for human rights, the EAC considers credible elections a cornerstone of democracy and regional integration,” Dr. Kazibwe noted during the flag-off ceremony.

The EAC Election Observation Mission comprises a multidisciplinary team of 67 observers drawn from all EAC Partner States, including Members of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), representatives of National Electoral Commissions, National Human Rights Commissions, civil society, and the EAC Secretariat. The observers have been carefully selected for their expertise, impartiality, and commitment to the values of the Community.

The observers were officially dispatched to various regions across Tanzania to assess the conduct of the electoral process.

“Their mandate is to evaluate the elections in line with national laws, the EAC Principles for Election Observation and Evaluation, and relevant international standards,” Dr. Kazibwe explained.

On her part, the EAC Secretary General, Hon. Veronica Nduva, noted that the Mission will issue a preliminary statement shortly after the elections, followed by a comprehensive final report.

“These reports will present our findings and offer recommendations aimed at strengthening future electoral processes within the region,” she said.

The Secretary General further explained that the Observers will engage with electoral stakeholders, monitor the final campaign activities, and observe the polling, voting, counting, and transmission of results processes.

The Deputy Head of the Election Observation Mission, Hon. Maina Karobia, who is also a Member of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), reiterated the Mission’s mandate.

“We are here in a spirit of partnership and solidarity with the people of the United Republic of Tanzania. Our role is not to interfere but to observe and report objectively,” he emphasized.

He affirmed that all stakeholders have a shared responsibility to ensure a peaceful, transparent, and credible electoral process.

The deployment of the Mission is anchored in Article 6(d) of the EAC Treaty, which obliges Partner States to uphold the principles of good governance, including democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender equality, and the promotion and protection of human and people’s rights in line with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of East African Community (EAC).

President Ramaphosa arrives in Malaysia for Working Visit

Source: Government of South Africa

Friday, October 24, 2025

By Neo Bodumela

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia – President Cyril Ramaphosa has arrived in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for a Working Visit to the nation.

The President is expected to be a Guest of the Chair at the 47th ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Summit and the East Asian Summit in that country.

“The President’s participation in the ASEAN Summits follows South Africa’s recognition as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner of ASEAN in 2023, marking a significant milestone in advancing South-South cooperation and fostering inclusive, sustainable development throughout enhanced political, economic and multilateral collaboration,” a Presidency statement read.

Full diplomatic relations between the two countries were established in November 1998.

“South Africa and Malaysia enjoyed exceptionally warm and dynamic relations in the decade following 1994, marked by close collaboration on multilateral platforms such as the Non-Aligned Movement, South-South Cooperation and Dialogue Partnerships.

“The relations with Malaysia and, by extension, Southeast Asia and ASEAN are of strategic importance to South Africa’s Foreign Policy. They offer a gateway to dynamic regional markets, emerging technologies and help reinforce South Africa’s position as a proactive and globally engaged partner in the Global South,” the statement concluded. 

President Ramaphosa is on a three-nation visit to the Southeast Asia region, which kicked off in Indonesia, followed by a State Visit to Vietnam. The President is now on a Working Visit to Malaysia. – SAnews.gov.za

International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) Expands Strategic Cooperation with Hamkorbank through an Additional US$30 Million Syndicated Line of Financing Facility

Source: APO

The International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) (www.ITFC-IDB.org), a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group, and Joint-Stock Commercial Bank with Foreign Capital Hamkorbank, have reinforced their partnership through the signing of an increase in the Line of Trade Financing Agreement, with an additional US$30 million.

The signing ceremony took place at ITFC Headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, during the official visit of a high-level delegation from Hamkorbank. The agreement was signed by Eng. Adeeb Y. Al Aama, CEO of ITFC, and Mr. Bakhtiyorjon Juraev, Chairman of the Management Board of Hamkorbank, in the presence of senior officials from both institutions.

This facility brings the total financing between ITFC and Hamkorbank to US$90 million, marking the highest stand-alone ITFC private sector facility in Uzbekistan. The expanded collaboration aims to support SME and private sector growth, promote women’s entrepreneurship, foster green finance, and enhance food security, in alignment with Uzbekistan’s national development priorities.

The financing is part of the US$600 million Framework Agreement signed between the Republic of Uzbekistan and ITFC in March 2024. The Framework Agreement prioritizes support for the private sector and SMEs through trade finance facilities, reaffirming ITFC’s commitment to enhancing economic resilience and promoting sustainable growth in Uzbekistan.

On this occasion, Eng. Adeeb Y. Al Aama, CEO of ITFC, commented: “This expanded partnership with Hamkorbank reflects ITFC’s strong commitment to deepening private sector support and advancing Islamic finance in Uzbekistan. By extending this new facility, we are enabling greater access to trade finance for SMEs and contributing to the country’s efforts to build a more inclusive and sustainable economy.”

Mr. Bakhtiyorjon Juraev, Chairman of the Management Board, JSCB Hamkorbank, stated: “We are delighted to have reached this significant agreement with ITFC, with a total exposure of US$90 million. This collaboration will play a crucial role in supporting and expanding Hamkorbank’s Islamic Financing portfolio, which aligns with our commitment to providing ethical and innovative financial solutions. We believe that this partnership will not only enhance our service offerings but also contribute to the growth of key sectors within the region. We look forward to a long and successful relationship with ITFC as we continue to support sustainable economic development.”

Uzbekistan became a member of ITFC in 2019, and since then, ITFC has played a pivotal role in supporting the country’s trade finance needs, advancing the private sector, and promoting access to Shariah-compliant financial solutions by approving a cumulative US$950 million in favour of the banks in the country.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC).

Contact Us:
Tel: +966 12 646 8337
Fax: +966 12 637 1064
E-mail: ITFC@itfc-idb.org

Follow International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC):
Twitter: @ ITFCCORP (https://apo-opa.co/4otL7oe)
Facebook: @ ITFCCorp (https://apo-opa.co/4oBK0TI)
LinkedIn: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) (https://apo-opa.co/4oydotI)

About the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC):
The International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) is the trade finance arm of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group. It was established with the primary objective of advancing trade among OIC member countries, which would ultimately contribute to the overarching goal of improving the socio-economic conditions of the people across the world. Commencing operations in January 2008, ITFC has provided more than US$90 billion of financing to OIC member countries, making it the leading provider of trade solutions for these member countries’ needs. With a mission to become a catalyst for trade development for OIC member countries and beyond, the Corporation helps entities in member countries gain better access to trade finance and provides them with the necessary trade-related capacity-building tools, which would enable them to successfully compete in the global market.

Media files

.

Orange Basin, Hard Choices: Ports, Local Content, and Permitting in a Pre-Final Investment Decision (FID) Year (By Tom Alweendo)

Source: APO


.

By Tom Alweendo, Founder of Alvenco Advisory. 

Namibia is in a narrow window between discovery and decision. TotalEnergies has asked to extend its exploration licence and has already signalled a smaller Venus development, with final investment decision now discussed for 2026. That moves us from big headlines to unglamorous execution: ports, people, permits. If we get those right over the next year, the investment case strengthens. If not, capital that is already mobile will drift somewhere else – Guyana, Brazil or Nigeria.

Start with logistics. Namibia needs a serviceable, phased plan for Lüderitz and a sensible overflow role for Walvis Bay. Instead, the market saw Namport pause southern-harbour upgrades to “clarify scope” and cancel a Lüderitz supply-base tender days after launch. That injects uncertainty into drilling schedules where rig days and marine spreads cost real money. The fix is not a megaproject. It is modular delivery tied to actual rig activity, such as quay length, lay-down, bunkering, and waste handling, that is commissioned in tranches with clear go/no-go gates. Publish a simple 12-month build schedule co-signed by Namport and all the relevant Ministries (Works, Finance and Industries, Mines & Energy), and ring-fence port user charges from Orange Basin activity to repay works. These moves are reversible and protect downside if activity slows.

Investors should meet government halfway. Minimum-throughput and take-or-pay commitments can underwrite the first phase. Operators can synchronise rig sequences to smooth peaks and co-fund common-user assets that reduce everybody’s costs. Baker Hughes’ move to establish a Walvis Bay drilling-fluids base shows how targeted, shared infrastructure can de-risk timelines. It also reminds us that practical bottlenecks—mud, storage, maintenance—matter more than glossy port drawings. Publish quarterly schedule-certainty metrics to make performance visible.

Second, local content. The draft National Upstream Petroleum Local Content Policy sets the right direction, but intent needs teeth. Three design choices will determine whether we get real capability transfer or box-ticking. First, set transparent, phased targets by service category such as logistics, catering, HSE, fabrication. These targets are to be reviewed annually against supplier capacity. Second, require a modest training levy (for example, 1% of contract value) channelled to accredited centres, audited independently. Third, enforce prompt-payment standards for SMEs—say, 15 days—with penalties for late settlement. Pair this with a live supplier register and public spend dashboards by category. For operators, the ask is simple: pre-announce procurement six to twelve months ahead, split packages to fit SME balance sheets, and second engineers into Namibian firms with dual KPIs, namely safety and skills transfer. These steps cost little now and prevent friction later when the basin scales.

Third, permitting. South Africa’s courts have shown how fragile projects become when environmental processes are thin. In August 2025, the Western Cape High Court set aside an environmental authorisation for offshore Block 5/6/7; this month Shell and the government sought leave to appeal. Whatever the outcome, the lesson for Namibia is to build legitimacy into the timetable: cumulative impact assessments along the southern coast, rigorous oil-spill modelling including transboundary scenarios, and funded independent review capacity so regulators can keep pace with submissions. Establish a single-window desk for Orange Basin approvals with statutory service-level agreements, and publish monthly dashboards of decisions taken. Speed and scrutiny are not opposites; done right, they reinforce each other and lower litigation risk.

Capital is watching our signal. Galp is marketing a 40% stake in Mopane and aims to finalise a partnership by year-end. That is both validation and a reminder that portfolios rotate fast. Clear, credible delivery on ports, local content and permitting reduces the country risk premium investors price into Orange Basin projects. Drift raises it.

Mind the base rates. The International Energy Agency estimates that, in recent years, new conventional upstream projects have taken close to 20 years on average from licence award to first production, with five years to discovery, around eight for appraisal and approval, and six for construction. There are quicker tie-back exceptions, but new hubs rarely sprint. Our ambition should be disciplined: build only what is needed for appraisal and early development now; leave option value for scale-up post-FID. That respects our constraints—people, cash, clock, and complexity—and avoids the “risk of ruin” that comes with over-build.

Macroeconomics reinforce the case for restraint with focus. Government has just trimmed the 2025 growth forecast to 3.3%, down from 4.5% in March. In that context, the Orange Basin is not a silver bullet; it is a credibility test. Deliver a few visible, bankable steps in the next six to nine months and we convert promise into jobs and tax. Miss them and scepticism about execution grows, raising costs for everyone.

What does success look like by mid-2026? Lüderitz Phase 1 operating with extended berth, lay-down and night operations; a one-stop permitting desk hitting published timelines; supplier-development cohorts running against a live procurement schedule; and operators reporting local-spend and payment discipline alongside safety performance. None of this is flashy. All of it is doable within existing budgets and institutions if we prioritise and coordinate.

The choice is between narrative and navigation. We can celebrate “frontier basin” status while confusing the market with paused tenders and fuzzy scopes. Or we can move in tight, reversible steps that keep late-2026 FID credible: build the minimum we truly need; codify local content that actually transfers capability; and run permitting at speed with legitimacy. Investors will respond to proof, not promises. Policymakers can set the cadence. If both do their part, the Orange Basin will move from exciting news to investable reality; on our terms, and on time.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

About African Energy Chamber:
The African Energy Chamber is the voice of the African Energy Sector.  

Bassin d’Orange, choix difficiles : ports, contenu local et octroi de permis dans une année précédant la décision finale d’investissement (Par Tom Alweendo)

Source: Africa Press Organisation – French


Par Tom Alweendo, fondateur d’Alvenco Advisory. 

La Namibie se trouve dans une période critique entre la découverte et la décision. TotalEnergies a demandé de prolonger sa licence d’exploration et a déjà annoncé un développement plus modeste du gisement Venus, la décision finale d’investissement étant désormais prévue pour 2026. Cela nous fait passer des gros titres à une mise en œuvre moins glamour : ports, personnel, permis. Si nous y parvenons au cours de l’année prochaine, le projet d’investissement s’en trouvera renforcé. Sinon, les capitaux déjà mobiles iront ailleurs, en Guyane, au Brésil ou au Nigeria.

Commençons par la logistique. La Namibie a besoin d’un plan réalisable et échelonné pour Lüderitz et d’un rôle de débordement raisonnable pour Walvis Bay. Au lieu de cela, le marché a vu Namport suspendre la modernisation du port sud afin de « clarifier la portée » et annuler un appel d’offres pour la base d’approvisionnement de Lüderitz quelques jours après son lancement. Cela introduit une incertitude dans les calendriers de forage, où les jours de forage et les coûts maritimes représentent des sommes considérables. La solution n’est pas un mégaprojet. Il s’agit d’une livraison modulaire liée à l’activité réelle des plates-formes, telle que la longueur des quais, le stockage, l’avitaillement et le traitement des déchets, qui est commandée par tranches avec des conditions claires de lancement ou d’annulation. Publier un calendrier de construction simple sur 12 mois, cosigné par Namport et tous les ministères concernés (Travaux publics, Finances et Industries, Mines et Énergie), et réserver les redevances portuaires provenant de l’activité du bassin Orange pour rembourser les travaux. Ces mesures sont réversibles et protègent contre les risques de ralentissement de l’activité.

Les investisseurs devraient faire un compromis avec le gouvernement. Des engagements minimaux en termes de débit et de prise en charge peuvent garantir la première phase. Les opérateurs peuvent synchroniser les séquences des plates-formes afin de lisser les pics et cofinancer des actifs communs qui réduisent les coûts pour tous. La décision de Baker Hughes d’établir une base de fluides de forage à Walvis Bay montre comment une infrastructure ciblée et partagée peut réduire les risques liés aux délais. Elle nous rappelle également que les goulots d’étranglement pratiques (boue, stockage, maintenance) importent plus que les plans de port sur papier glacé. Publier des indicateurs trimestriels de fiabilité des calendriers pour rendre les performances visibles.

Deuxièmement, le contenu local. Le projet de politique nationale sur le contenu local en amont pétrolier va dans la bonne direction, mais l’intention doit être renforcée. Trois choix de conception détermineront si nous obtenons un véritable transfert de capacités ou une simple formalité. Premièrement, fixer des objectifs transparents et échelonnés par catégorie de services, tels que la logistique, la restauration, la santé, la sécurité et l’environnement, la fabrication. Ces objectifs doivent être révisés chaque année en fonction de la capacité des fournisseurs. Deuxièmement, exiger une modeste taxe de formation ( par exemple, 1 % de la valeur du contrat) versée à des centres agréés et contrôlés de manière indépendante. Troisièmement, appliquer des normes de paiement rapide pour les PME, par exemple 15 jours, avec des pénalités en cas de retard. Associez cela à un registre des fournisseurs en temps réel et à des tableaux de bord des dépenses publiques par catégorie.

Pour les opérateurs, la demande est simple : annoncer les achats six à douze mois à l’avance, diviser les lots pour les adapter aux bilans des PME et détacher des ingénieurs dans des entreprises namibiennes avec deux indicateurs de performance clés, à savoir la sécurité et le transfert de compétences. Ces mesures coûtent peu aujourd’hui et évitent les frictions plus tard, lorsque le bassin prendra de l’ampleur.

Troisièmement, les autorisations. Les tribunaux sud-africains ont montré à quel point les projets deviennent fragiles lorsque les processus environnementaux sont insuffisants. En août 2025, la Haute Cour du Cap-Occidental a annulé une autorisation environnementale pour les blocs offshore 5/6/7 ; ce mois-ci, Shell et le gouvernement ont demandé l’autorisation de faire appel. Quelle que soit l’issue, la leçon à tirer pour la Namibie est qu’il faut intégrer la légitimité dans le calendrier : évaluations d’impact cumulatif le long de la côte sud, modélisation rigoureuse des marées noires, y compris des scénarios transfrontaliers, et capacité d’examen indépendante financée afin que les régulateurs puissent suivre le rythme des soumissions. Mettre en place un guichet unique pour les autorisations dans le bassin Orange avec des accords de niveau de service statutaires, et publier des tableaux de bord mensuels des décisions prises. Rapidité et examen minutieux ne sont pas antagonistes ; lorsqu’ils sont bien menés, ils se renforcent mutuellement et réduisent le risque de litige.

Les capitaux surveillent notre signal. Galp commercialise une participation de 40 % dans Mopane et vise à finaliser un partenariat d’ici la fin de l’année. Cela confirme et rappelle que les portefeuilles tournent rapidement. Une mise en œuvre claire et crédible des ports, du contenu local et des autorisations réduit la prime de risque pays que les investisseurs intègrent dans les projets du bassin Orange. La dérive l’augmente.

Attention aux taux de base. L’Agence internationale de l’énergie estime que, ces dernières années, les nouveaux projets conventionnels en amont ont pris en moyenne près de 20 ans entre l’octroi de la licence et la première production, avec cinq ans pour la découverte, environ huit pour l’évaluation et l’ approbation, et six pour la construction. Il existe des exceptions plus rapides, mais les nouveaux hubs sont rarement des sprints. Notre ambition doit être disciplinée : ne construire que ce qui est nécessaire pour l’évaluation et le développement initial dès maintenant ; laisser la valeur d’option pour l’extension après la décision finale d’investissement. Cela respecte nos contraintes (personnel, trésorerie, temps et complexité) et évite le « risque de ruine » qui accompagne la reconstruction.

La macroéconomie renforce l’argument en faveur de la retenue et de la concentration. Le gouvernement vient de réduire ses prévisions de croissance pour 2025 à 3,3 %, contre 4,5 % en mars. Dans ce contexte, le bassin d’Orange n’est pas une solution miracle, mais un test de crédibilité. Si nous prenons quelques mesures visibles et rentables au cours des six à neuf prochains mois, nous transformerons nos promesses en emplois et en recettes fiscales. Si nous échouons, le scepticisme quant à la mise en œuvre grandira, ce qui augmentera les coûts pour tout le monde.

À quoi ressemblera le succès à la mi-2026 ? La phase 1 de Lüderitz fonctionnera avec des opérations prolongées, des opérations de stockage et des opérations de nuit ; un guichet unique pour les permis respectera les délais publiés ; les cohortes de développement des fournisseurs fonctionneront selon un calendrier d’approvisionnement en temps réel ; et les opérateurs rendront compte des dépenses locales et de la discipline de paiement, ainsi que des performances en matière de sécurité. Rien de tout cela n’est spectaculaire. Tout cela est réalisable dans le cadre des budgets et des institutions existants si nous établissons des priorités et coordonnons nos efforts.

Le choix se situe entre le discours et la navigation. Nous pouvons célébrer le statut de « bassin pionnier » tout en semant la confusion sur le marché avec des appels d’offres suspendus et des périmètres flous. Ou nous pouvons avancer par étapes serrées et réversibles qui maintiennent la crédibilité de la décision finale d’investissement fin 2026 : construire le minimum dont nous avons vraiment besoin ; codifier le contenu local qui transfère réellement les capacités ; et gérer les autorisations rapidement et légitimement. Les investisseurs réagiront aux preuves, pas aux promesses. Les décideurs politiques peuvent donner le rythme. Si les deux parties jouent leur rôle, le bassin Orange passera du statut de nouvelle prometteuse à celui de réalité investissable, selon nos conditions et dans les délais impartis.

Distribué par APO Group pour African Energy Chamber.

Le Nigérian Philip Mshelbila élu secrétaire général du Forum des pays exportateurs de gaz (GECF) à un moment décisif pour le gaz africain

Source: Africa Press Organisation – French


Philip Mshelbila, directeur général de Nigeria LNG Limited, a été élu secrétaire général du Forum des pays exportateurs de gaz (GECF). M. Mshelbila succède au secrétaire général sortant, Mohamed Hamel, qui a dirigé l’organisation pendant une période de croissance et de développement importants. En tant que voix prépondérante dans le dialogue mondial sur le gaz, le GECF réunit les principaux producteurs autour d’un objectif commun : promouvoir le dialogue et faire progresser la sécurité énergétique dans le monde entier. Avec le passage de relais entre deux Africains, le choix du GECF renforce la place prépondérante de l’Afrique dans les discussions mondiales sur le gaz et devrait soutenir les efforts du continent pour positionner le gaz comme la solution énergétique de l’avenir.

En tant que porte-parole du secteur énergétique africain, la Chambre africaine de l’énergie (AEC) salue la nomination de M. Mshelbila comme une étape importante pour la représentation africaine dans la gouvernance énergétique mondiale. L’AEC défend depuis longtemps le rôle du gaz naturel dans le mix énergétique futur de l’Afrique et du monde. Sous la direction de Mme Mshelbila, les producteurs de gaz africains disposeront d’une plateforme plus solide pour influencer les décisions énergétiques mondiales, tout en alignant les politiques internationales sur les objectifs de développement du continent. L’AEC félicite également le ministre d’État nigérian chargé des ressources pétrolières (gaz), Ekperikpe Ekpo, qui a été choisi comme président de la réunion ministérielle du GECF de 2026.

« Avec le leadership africain à la tête du GECF, nous avons l’opportunité de façonner le dialogue mondial sur le gaz, de plaider en faveur d’investissements équitables et de positionner notre gaz comme la pierre angulaire de la sécurité énergétique mondiale. Nous remercions le secrétaire général sortant, M. Hamel, qui a été un grand ami et partenaire de l’AEC et de l’Afrique. Il a fait entrer la Mauritanie, le Mozambique, l’Angola et le Sénégal dans la famille mondiale du gaz et s’est fait le champion de la lutte contre la pauvreté énergétique. Avec le transfert du leadership d’un Africain à un autre, le GECF continuera à faire du gaz la priorité du développement de notre continent », déclare NJ Ayuk, président exécutif de la Chambre africaine de l’énergie.

Ces nominations interviennent alors que les pays africains s’imposent comme les moteurs de la production mondiale de gaz. Des marchés gaziers établis tels que le Nigeria, l’Angola, la Libye et l’Algérie aux producteurs émergents tels que le Sénégal, la Mauritanie, le Mozambique et la République du Congo, l’Afrique positionne rapidement le gaz comme un élément central du développement futur du continent. Pour le Nigeria, la nomination de M. Mshelbila intervient alors que le pays continue de faire progresser ses ambitions en matière de GNL. Avec l’usine de GNL du Nigeria en production depuis 1999, le pays a mis en place des mesures pour renforcer ses capacités et ses exportations. Le développement d’un septième train, qui permettra d’augmenter la production de 22 millions de tonnes par an (mtpa) à 30 mtpa, est la pierre angulaire de cette stratégie. Le train 7 devrait être mis en service en 2025.

Au-delà du Nigeria, l’Angola développe son premier projet de gaz non associé, mené par le New Gas Consortium, qui fournira des matières premières à l’usine Angola LNG. Le projet devrait être mis en service fin 2025, après la première découverte de gaz du pays dans le bloc 1/14 au début de cette année. L’Algérie et la Libye augmentent également leur production en vue d’accroître leurs exportations vers l’Europe. L’Algérie prévoit d’augmenter sa production à 200 milliards de mètres cubes d’ici 2030, tandis que la Libye développe une série de projets, notamment Structures A&E.

La production gazière africaine devrait connaître un essor important grâce à l’émergence de nouveaux acteurs dans le secteur du GNL. En 2025, le projet Greater Tortue Ahmeyim, situé à la frontière maritime entre le Sénégal et la Mauritanie, a démarré sa production. La première phase a une capacité de 2,3 millions de tonnes par an, tandis que la deuxième phase prévue doublera la production pour atteindre 5 millions de tonnes par an. Le Mozambique se lance également dans la production de GNL avec une série de projets majeurs dans le bassin de Rovuma. Le pays a commencé la production de GNL sur le navire Coral Sul FLNG en 2022 et poursuit actuellement le développement du projet Mozambique LNG mené par TotalEnergies, du projet Rovuma LNG mené par ExxonMobil et du projet Coral North mené par Eni. En 2025, Coral North a pris une décision finale d’investissement (FID), tandis que la FID pour le projet Rovuma est attendue en 2026. En Afrique centrale, la République du Congo a récemment rejoint les rangs des producteurs africains de GNL avec le lancement de Congo LNG en 2024. La première phase du projet a une capacité de 600 000 tonnes par an, tandis que la deuxième phase prévue porte la production à 3 millions de tonnes par an. La deuxième phase sera mise en service en 2025.

Parallèlement, de nouvelles frontières émergent rapidement. Le Zimbabwe poursuit son premier projet de développement de gaz naturel dans le bassin de Cabora Bassa, où l’exploration menée par Invictus Energy a déjà confirmé la présence d’importantes réserves d’hydrocarbures. La Tanzanie avance dans ses projets de construction d’un terminal GNL de 42 milliards de dollars à Lindi, qui devrait permettre d’exploiter plus de 57 000 milliards de pieds cubes de réserves. Ensemble, ces projets illustrent une évolution continentale vers l’exploitation du gaz comme catalyseur de l’industrialisation, de la production d’électricité et de la croissance durable.

Distribué par APO Group pour African Energy Chamber.

Governo assina contratos programa para implementação de medidas sociais de emergência em São Vicente

Source: Africa Press Organisation – Portuguese –

Baixar .tipo

O Governo de Cabo Verde, através do Ministério da Família, Inclusão e Desenvolvimento Social, realizou, esta sexta-feira, 24 de outubro, na ilha de São Vicente, o ato de assinatura dos Contratos Programa, tendo em vista a implementação das medidas sociais de emergência, destinadas a apoiar as famílias afetadas pela situação de calamidade registada em agosto passado.

O evento, presidido pela Secretária de Estado da Inclusão Social, Lídia Lima, decorreu na Capela da Igreja de Jesus Cristo dos Santos dos Últimos Dias e contou com a presença da Vereadora dos Assuntos Sociais da Câmara Municipal de São Vicente, bem como de representantes de instituições públicas, associações comunitárias e empresas locais envolvidas na execução das medidas.

Lídia Lima sublinhou, na sua intervenção, que este ato representa um gesto concreto de solidariedade e compromisso do Governo com as famílias de São Vicente, destacando a importância da ação articulada entre o Estado, as autarquias, as associações e o setor privado.

“Estamos a transformar solidariedade em ação. Este é um trabalho conjunto, de todos para todos, onde o foco é colocar as pessoas em primeiro lugar”, afirmou.

A governante destacou ainda que as medidas abrangem apoios alimentares, mobiliário e equipamentos domésticos, reabilitação de habitações, subsídios de inclusão social e apoio ao arrendamento, permitindo restabelecer condições dignas de vida às famílias afetadas.

Durante o ato, foram assinados contratos com associações e empresas locais que irão executar as ações no terreno, numa lógica de parceria e responsabilidade partilhada. A Secretária de Estado realçou o papel fundamental das instituições locais e apelou à transparência, celeridade e coordenação entre todos os intervenientes no processo de implementação.

Com esta iniciativa, o Governo de Cabo Verde reafirma o seu compromisso com a proteção social, a solidariedade e a inclusão, garantindo respostas eficazes e sustentáveis às famílias em situação de vulnerabilidade, num trabalho conjunto que reforça a coesão social na ilha de São Vicente.

Distribuído pelo Grupo APO para Governo de Cabo Verde.

Nigeria’s Philip Mshelbila Elected Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) Secretary General in Defining Moment for African Gas

Source: APO


.

Philip Mshelbila, Managing Director of Nigeria LNG Limited, has been elected Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). Mshelbila assumes the position from outgoing Secretary General Mohamed Hamel, who led the organization through a period of significant growth and development. As a leading voice in global gas dialogue, the GECF unites major producers under a common goal of promoting dialogue and advancing energy security worldwide. With leadership moving from one African to another, the GECF’s selection cements Africa’s prominence in global gas discussions and is expected to support the continent’s efforts to position gas as the energy solution of the future.

As the voice of the African energy sector, the African Energy Chamber (AEC) welcomes Mshelbila’s appointment as a momentous step for African representation within global energy governance. The AEC has long-advocated for the role natural gas plays, both in Africa’s and the world’s future energy mix. Under Mshelbila’s leadership, African gas producers will gain a stronger platform to influence global energy decisions, while aligning international policies with the continent’s development objectives. The AEC also commends Nigeria’s Minister of State for Petroleum Resources (Gas) Ekperikpe Ekpo, who has been selected as President for the 2026 GECF Ministerial Meeting.

“With African leadership at the helm of the GECF, we have the opportunity to shape global gas dialogue, advocate for fair investment and position our gas as a cornerstone of global energy security. We thank outgoing Secretary General Hamel, who has been a great friend and partner of the AEC and of Africa. He brought Mauritania, Mozambique, Angola and Senegal into the global gas family and championed the fight against energy poverty. With leadership moving from one African to another, the GECF will continue making gas the priority of our continent’s development,” states NJ Ayuk, Executive Chairman of the African Energy Chamber.

The appointments come as African nations emerge as drivers of global gas production. From established gas markets such as Nigeria, Angola, Libya and Algeria, to emerging producers such as Senegal, Mauritania, Mozambique and the Republic of Congo, Africa is rapidly positioning gas as a central component of the continent’s development future. For Nigeria, the appointment of Mshelbila comes as the country continues to advance its LNG ambitions. With the Nigeria LNG facility producing since 1999, the country has put in place measures to strengthen capacity and exports. The development of a seventh train – which will increase production from 22 million tons per annum (mtpa) to 30 mtpa – is a cornerstone of this strategy. Train 7 is expected to come online in 2025.

Beyond Nigeria, Angola is developing its first non-associated gas project – led by the New Gas Consortium – which will provide feedstock to the Angola LNG plant. The project is expected to come online in late-2025 and following the country’s first gas discovery at Block 1/14 earlier this year. Algeria and Libya are also ramping up production with a view to increase exports to Europe. Algeria plans to increase production to 200 billion cubic meters by 2030 while Libya is developing a series of projects – including Structures A&E.

Africa’s gas production is expected to get a major boost through the emergence of new LNG players. In 2025, the Greater Tortue Ahmeyim development – situated on the maritime border of Senegal and Mauritania – began production. The first phase has a capacity of 2.3 mtpa, while a planned second phase will double production to 5 mtpa. Mozambique is also making forays into LNG production with a series of major projects in the Rovuma Basin. The country started LNG production at the Coral Sul FLNG vessel in 2022 and is now advancing the development of the TotalEnergies-led Mozambique LNG project, the ExxonMobil-led Rovuma LNG project and the Eni-led Coral North project. In 2025, Coral North reached a final investment decision (FID), while FID for the Rovuma project is expected in 2026. In Central Africa, the Republic of Congo recently joined the ranks of African LNG producers with the start of Congo LNG in 2024. The first phase of the project has a capacity of 600,000 tons per annum while a planned second phase increases output to 3 mtpa. The second phase will come online in 2025.

Meanwhile, new frontiers are fast emerging. Zimbabwe is pursuing its first natural gas development in the Cabora Bassa Basin, where exploration by Invictus Energy has already confirmed the presence of substantial hydrocarbons. Tanzania is advancing plans for a $42-billion LNG terminal in Lindi, expected to unlock more than 57 trillion cubic feet of reserves. Together, these projects illustrate a continental shift toward harnessing gas as a catalyst for industrialization, power generation, and sustainable growth.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.