President Cyril Ramaphosa has noted with sadness the passing of former Judge President of the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Justice Clement Temba Sangoni.
Judge Sangoni retired in 2017 and passed away earlier today, Tuesday, 10 June 2025, after a short illness.
President Ramaphosa offers his condolences to the extended family of the late Judge Sangoni Aah! Dilizintaba, who was a senior traditional leader of the Qokolweni-Zimbane Traditional Council at Mthatha.
President Ramaphosa said: “The passing of Justice Sangoni is a devastating loss to his family and immediate community and it is a profound loss to our judiciary and our legal heritage.
“Judge Sangoni lived for justice and the improvement of the material conditions of communities in the Eastern Cape and elsewhere through constitutionally sound, progressive jurisprudence.
“Under his leadership, the Judiciary in the Eastern Cape also applied its mind collectively and individually to matters pertaining to the development of this economically vital province.
“Judge Sangoni served the people of the Eastern Cape from the Bench and through his deep involvement in community life in his role as a traditional leader – a role which enriched his adjudication of a broad range of matters placed before the courts.
“We will continue to appreciate his contribution to the rule of law and the wisdom of law in our country and to the communities in which he lived and served with distinction.
“May his soul rest in peace.”
Media enquiries: Vincent Magwenya, Spokesperson to the President – media@presidency.gov.za
President Cyril Ramaphosa will tomorrow, Tuesday 10 June 2025, engage with youth beneficiaries of the Presidential Youth Employment Intervention (PYEI) and Presidential Employment Stimulus (PES) flagship programmes in Pretoria.
The President will visit three sites: the Sefako Makgatho Primary School in Saulsville; the South African Creative Industries Incubator (SACCI) in Eersterust, and the Foundation for Professional Development (FPD) in Pretoria East.
These visits will highlight innovative implementation models and public-private partnerships that are delivering dignified, high-quality employment and skilling outcomes for youth at scale.
The President will during the visits interact directly with youth beneficiaries, educators, and implementing partners, and see first-hand how the PES and PYEI’s community-based, demand-led approach is reshaping labour market access for the country’s most excluded youth.
The site visits will commence with the Sefako Makgatho Primary School, a part of the Basic Education Employment Initiative (BEEI) and a flagship programme of the PES, designed to address the dual challenges of youth unemployment and support, for the basic education system by placing young people in roles within public schools as education and general school assistant.
The programme is implemented by the Department of Basic Education (DBE) and administrated by the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC).
The President will then proceed to the South African Creative Industries Incubator (SACII) which is a creative hub providing technical skills training, business incubation, production facilities and networking for artists and entrepreneurs in the creative industries.
The organisation is funded by National Pathway Management Network, a grant initiative of the PYEI, led by the National Department of Employment and Labour (DEL) and administered by the IDC.
The funding assists with improving and expanding the Visual Special Effects (VFX) programme, which is one of its kind in South Africa, specifically designed to train youth in the highly technical field of VFX.
The programme connects young people to industry jobs in the creative gig economy. One hundred trainees have been enrolled into the programme through the Innovation Fund.
The President will conclude his visit at the Foundation for Professional Development (FPD) which provides health sector professionals and unemployed youth interested in the health field access to affordable, accessible quality education through management and clinical skills development courses.
These courses are customised to the needs of healthcare managers, practitioners and organisations.
The programme is funded through the Jobs Boost Outcomes Fund, an outcome-based instrument to unlock jobs for excluded young people by linking contracted payments with desired outcomes.
This intervention of the PYEI that is led by the Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) with the National Skills Fund (NSF) as the lead implementer.
The media programme will unfold as follows: Date: Tuesday, 10 June 2025 Time: 10h00 (Media arrival at 09h00) Venue: Sefako Makgatho Primary School, 2 Sakweng street, Saulsville, Pretoria
Members of the media wishing to attend are requested to send their details to Ndivhuwo Kharivhe on Ndivhuwo@presidency.gov.za by no later than 13h00 today Monday, 09 June 2025.
NOTE TO MEDIA/EDITORS: The visit to the school will be open to all media to cover the engagement between President and Teacher Assistants. However, due to space limitations, the other two sites will only be restricted to the Government Communications and Information System (GCIS), which will disseminate the materials to all media post the visits.
Media enquiries: Vincent Magwenya, Spokesperson to the President – media@presidency.gov.za
Programme Directors, The Farisani Family, Premier of Limpopo, Dr Phophi Ramathuba, Representatives of the African National Congress and the broader liberation movement, Leadership of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Southern Africa, Traditional and religious leaders present, Leadership of the University of Venda, Fellow Mourners,
Fellow South Africans, batho ba Limpopo, muta waDean Farisani,
We are to bid farewell to Dean Tshenuwani Farisani.
His life bears witness to the mission of Christ espoused in the Gospel of Luke chapter 4.
“The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has chosen me to bring good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim liberty to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind; to set free the oppressed.”
We have lost an extraordinary man who led an extraordinary life.
He was born in 1948, a year that was a turning point in South Africa’s history.
This was the year the National Party swept to power and ushered in the reviled system of apartheid.
Dean Farisani was born into circumstances that mirrored the lives of millions of black South Africans at the time.
He was just a child, barely three years old, when his family was confronted with the ugly face of injustice.
Many years later, in 1996, he would testify at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on how his family were victims of forced removed from the Songozi Tsapila area near then Louis Trichardt, now Makhado.
The authorities arrived one day without warning, and his parents were ordered to vacate the area immediately.
He recounted how they had to carry their belongings on their backs and leave, on foot. That which could not be carried, including all the family’s livestock, was left behind.
They were relocated to another empty piece of land and told this was their new home. They were never compensated for the land that was stolen from them.
Eight years later, in 1959, the family were forcibly removed again.
Two years later, in 1961, again.
These experiences instilled in him a deep sense of justice.
They planted the seeds of his political consciousness when he was still in his teens.
He only entered formal schooling at the age of 12. Like most children in rural areas at the time, he was a child labourer on the white farms.
At school a missionary from the Evangelical Lutheran Church noticed his academic brilliance and he was prepared to enter theological training.
It was at Maphumulo Theological Seminary in KwaZulu-Natal that he first became acquainted with the Black Consciousness Movement.
Its teachings fired his growing political awareness.
For him, there was no contradiction between the teachings of his faith and the mission of national liberation.
He soon became attracted to liberation theology, and its message that true Christian faith demands active resistance to all forms of oppression and solidarity with the poor.
Apartheid was a great injustice, and he, heroic heart, was not content to choose a quiet life of pastoralism.
He was eventually expelled from the seminary after hebecame involved with underground political organisations like the South African Students Organisation, the Black People’s Convention and the Black Consciousness Movement.
By then he was at the Beuster Mission at Maungani outside Thohoyandou and a rising figure in the BCM, going on to be elected its president in 1973.
I first met Dean Farisani when he spoke at my high school, Mpaphuli.
We formed an immediate and lasting bond.
For many years we worked alongside each other in the Black Evangelical Youth Organisation.
There were many points in the life of the great man we lay to rest today where he found himself sorely tested.
During the late 1970s and 1980s was arrested on a number of occasions for his political activities. But it was his third detention, in 1981, that he found his courage truly tested. His faith tested. His principles tested.
He was detained by the Venda police on suspicion of being involved in the bombing of a police station in Sibasa.
He was held for more than eight months and severely tortured.
In his book, Diary from a South African Prison, he recounts the unimaginable ordeal of beatings, electricshocks, being forced to squat for days and being smothered.
In an interview given years later he recounts how his torturers tried everything to force a confession, even offering him the position of Bishop of Venda.
And yet he, strong in will, did not yield.
Fellow Mourners, Comrades, Fellow South Africans,
Dean Farisani was a courageous revolutionary who inspired a generation to reclaim their pride and stand up for their rights. I was amongst them.
He was a beloved father and a grandfather who will be sorely missed by his wife, mufumakadzi Mudzunga, his daughters Nzumbululo and Ndamulelo, by his son Zwovhonala and by the entire extended family.
He was a renowned academic and prolific scholar whose writings gave voice to the voiceless.
He was a guide and mentor to many. He was a dear friend.
And yet it is Dean Farisani’s most salient quality that I will most remember him for: he was a man of unwavering principle.
Nothing could sway him from what was right, from his dedication to the cause of the South African people, and to their total emancipation.
In detention, he was offered positions and status. He refused them.
When he was released and went into exile in the United States, he could have easily put the entire experience behind him and led a quiet life.
Instead he campaigned vigorously against the regime from abroad.
When Venda was proclaimed as a so-called independent homeland by the apartheid regime he was outspoken in his opposition, even when this brought him into conflict with church leaders in his circuit.
His activism continued into the democratic South Africa.
He was determined to be part of the struggle to overcome the injustice and inequality bred of apartheid.
He was elected to the first democratic Parliament in 1994.
He would go on to serve further as an MEC here in Limpopo and as speaker of the Legislature.
These roles placed him in a position of power and influence. Yet they did not change him.
He did not succumb to the allure of high office. He was never arrogant.
He was a servant leader who came, served and left, and continued to contribute to the betterment of his beloved country.
He did not regard loyalty to a political cause or party as being above his own principles.
When he saw corruption being perpetrated by those entrusted with public funds, he was vocal and scathing in his criticism. He held power to account.
The Foundation that bears his name continues to be an influential voice in the public space in advancing social justice, including for apartheid’s many victims.
Fellow Mourners,
Neither beatings nor torture could make Dean Farisani surrender his principles. The trappings of power did not interest him. He was content to walk in the footsteps of his Lord with the downtrodden, the oppressed and the marginalised.
He understood his life’s mission and it was not negotiable.
These are the greatest lessons we take from his life. These are the reflections we take today as we lay this great son of the soil to rest.
To the family, we share in your great sorrow. Yet even amidst our mourning we celebrate a man who has left such a deep and lasting impact on all of us. He was an inspiration.
In Dean Farisani’s book of poetry, titled Justice in my Tears, there is a moving poem.
It is called “The Lord is my Shepherd: Psalm 23 in Pietermaritzburg and Howick.”
It was published in 1977, the period of his first imprisonment.
In it he writes:
“The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not buckle He rests me in the land of freedom I drink from the cup of liberty, Even when I wander in the valley of torture. I shall fear no human beasts,
He shall fight my fight. His angels and his visions Guide me through brutal interrogations He gives me life in the hands of murderers Giving me a crown for a victory his own”
Dean Farisani, yours was a life of service to others. As the South African people we crown you as you go to your eternal rest.
In the words of the Psalm 23 you so loved, surely goodness and mercy did follow you all the days of your life. May you dwell in the house of the Lord for ever.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Scott Firsing, Senior Research Associate, University of South Africa
The African Space Agency was officially inaugurated in Cairo’s Space City in April 2025. The event marked a milestone in a process that had been in the works since the early 2000s. Drawing inspiration from the European Space Agency, it unites African Union (AU) member states to harness space technology for development. This is in line with the AU’s Agenda 2063, aimed at advancing Africa into a prosperous future.
foster partnerships with international space agencies like the European Space Agency and others.
Over 20 African countries operate space programmes and more than 65 African satellites have been launched. It is my view as a global space diplomacy expert that the agency can help ensure that Africa isn’t a bystander in the space economy. This sector is projected to be worth US$1.8 trillion by 2035.
The space agency positions Africa to address pressing challenges and take advantage of opportunities in the global space economy. These include using satellite data, boosting connectivity, driving economic growth, fostering global partnerships and training future leaders.
Five benefits
Valuable eyes in the sky
Space assets, particularly Earth observation satellites, offer a number of advantages. The continent faces significant climate risks like droughts, fires and floods. This is particularly problematic as the agricultural sector is approximately 35% of Africa’s GDP and employs about half of its people across over 1 billion hectares of arable land.
Satellite data optimises crop yields, supports climate-resilient farming, and enhances sustainable fisheries and port modernisation. Nigeria’s National Space Research and Deveopment Agency, for example, has used satellites like the NigSat-2 to monitor crop health and predict yields.
Beyond agriculture, satellites assist in project planning in cities across Africa. Kenya uses a satellite to track urban development trends and enhance municipal urban planning capacities.
Satellites also keep an eye on Africa’s resource-abundant territories while tackling problems like armed conflict, deforestation, and illegal migration and mining.
The African Space Agency will help provide access to AI-enhanced satellite data. This will enable even nations with constrained resources to tackle local needs. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire’s first locally made satellite, launched in 2024, shows how African nations are building their own capabilities.
By making it easier to share data, the African Space Agency also positions the continent to generate revenue in the global space data market. That fuels innovation.
Enhancing connectivity and enabling cutting-edge technology
Africa’s digital divide is stark. Only 38% of its population was online in 2024, compared to the global average of 68%. The African Space Agency aims to bridge this gap through satellite-based communications. This technology can deliver broadband to remote regions where cell towers and undersea cables are impractical.
Connectivity enables education, e-commerce and telemedicine.
Satellite services, like those provided by SpaceX’s Starlink in 21 African countries, will drive digital inclusion. In turn this promises to reduce unemployment and help entrepreneurs.
The African Space Agency is also positioning Africa to embrace new space technologies. Examples include Japan’s 2025 demonstration of beaming solar power from space, following a US achievement in 2023.
This could revolutionise energy access. Space-based solar power captures solar energy in orbit via satellite and transmits it as microwaves to Earth. This offers a solution to Africa’s energy poverty. It could provide reliable power to remote areas without extensive grid infrastructure.
The African Space Agency’s role in coordinating satellite launches and data sharing will make these technologies more accessible and cost-effective.
Driving economic growth and innovation
Africa’s space sector, now worth over US$20 billion, is growing rapidly. The industry has seen an increase of private companies and investor support, moving beyond sole dependence on government funding. Investment is being fuelled by 327 NewSpace firms, a term used for the new emerging commercial space industry in nations such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. These firms often excel in satellite communication, Earth observation and component manufacturing.
But many African nations lack resources. The agency will lower barriers by fostering collaboration, coordinating national space programmes, and reducing duplication.For example, the African Space Agency’s efforts to streamline satellite development and launches will spur local manufacturing and tech hubs.
This means that smaller economies will be able to participate.
Strengthening regional and global connections
Africa’s space sector relies on partnerships with space agencies and commercial space companies based in the “space powers”. These include the US, Russia, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. These institutions provide launch services, satellite development and ground stations.
An example is Senegal’s GaindeSAT-1A, a CubeSat launched in 2024 via America’s SpaceX with French collaboration.
Meanwhile, countries like South Africa are exploring local rocket programmes to enhance the agency’s self-reliance. Africa’s space ground stations are already located across the continent, supporting the European Space Agency and commercial missions. They will soon host a deep space ground station for America’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Funding remains a challenge. African nations allocated just US$426 million to space programmes in 2025. That’s less than 1% of global spending. The European Space Agency has an US$8 billion budget.
However, initiatives like the €100 million Africa-EU Space Partnership Programme (2025–2028) aim to boost Africa’s space sovereignty and innovation.
The agency’s vision extends beyond Earth, with an eye on the Moon. Some members, notably Angola, Nigeria and Rwanda, have already signed the US-led Artemis Accords for lunar exploration. For their part Egypt and South Africa are collaborating with China and Russia on the International Lunar Research Station.
A skilled workforce is critical to Africa’s space industry. The Africa Space Agency Space City plans to host a training academy. It will build on Egypt’s programmes in space project management, satellite design, and orbital simulation.
Partnerships like the Africa-EU programme offer scholarships, while private initiatives, such as the Pathways to Space programme by Boeing and the Future African Space Explorers STEM Academy, engage students in 63 schools in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania.
– 5 benefits Africa’s new space agency can deliver – https://theconversation.com/5-benefits-africas-new-space-agency-can-deliver-258098
This absence of women in prominent positions in politics subtly reinforces societal biases and moulds public opinion, which subconsciously excludes women from political leadership.
We are a group of researchers who have expertise in gender and African politics and childhood political socialisation. We have been researching the political socialisation of children in Nigeria for the past three years.
Our research in Ogun State reveals that children are internalising what they see on the political stage. We asked children aged 5 to 16 at 12 schools in Ogun State to imagine and draw a leader such as a president, governor, or member of a national or state assembly at work. Only 5% of 981 children drew a woman as a political leader.
Ninety-two percent of girls drew a man, compared to 98% of boys.
A drawing of a political leader by an 11-year-old girl.Source: The authors
Why do so few children draw women as political leaders? Children absorb the power dynamics and gender roles they observe in political happenings, shaping their understanding of politics.
In democracies, a lack of women interested in politics, as well as running for and winning political office, matters. If women are absent in decision-making spaces, their concerns might not be considered. While men can represent women’s interests, women committed to change can draw on their experiences and those of women in their networks to bring new ideas to the table.
We conducted our study in the three senatorial districts of Ogun State, one of Nigeria’s 36 states. In Ogun State, the deputy governor, Noimot Salako-Oyedele, is a woman, and her picture is on many classroom walls.
The late anti-colonial activist and leader Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti was from Ogun State too. The presence of visible women leaders could encourage some children in the state to imagine and depict women as political leaders. Thus, it is possible that our sample of children were more likely to draw a woman than children in other states.
Six other states have women deputy governors: Akwa Ibom, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Kaduna, Plateau and Rivers States.
But women’s representation in state assemblies throughout the country is low. No woman has ever been elected to be a governor in Nigeria.
In our study, we asked children what jobs they would like to have in the future. In general, boys were more interested in jobs in politics (president, governor, local government chair) than girls were. For the specific job of president or governor, however, girls seemed to be just as interested as boys.
The children’s response isn’t specific to Nigeria. In a study conducted in 2017 and 2018 in the United States (where 19.3% of members of the House of Representatives at the time were women), only 13% of children drew a woman political leader.
Multiple factors hinder women’s representation in elected offices in Nigeria. These include political party practices that favour the recruitment and selection of men candidates, the high costs of running for office, as outlined in Ayisha Osori’s book Love Does Not Win Elections, and societal biases against women holding positions of political power.
Deeply entrenched societal biases add to the challenges. Cultural norms assign leadership roles to men and certain religious interpretations restrict women’s public participation.
The perception that women are more suited for domestic roles, or lack assertiveness, impedes their ability to garner support for political leadership.
Low numbers of women representatives also suggest there are systemic biases in the democratic electoral process.
Recent research shows that when girls observe women in political power or running for political office, they are more engaged in politics later in life. This suggests that positive exposure to women in politics may have positive effects on girls’ political engagement. Negative exposure could have negative effects.
Take, for example, the “Natasha-Akpabio case” in Nigeria. Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan alleged that Senate president Godswill Akpabio had sexually harassed her. The Senate president denied the allegation. Akpoti-Uduaghan was suspended from her position by the Senate ethics committee for what it described as misconduct and disregard for the Senate standing orders.
Experiences like those may influence future generations’ understanding of gender equality in leadership. When young Nigerians observe powerful women facing harassment and retaliation for voicing their concerns, it may undermine the notion that women are equally capable of political authority.
Girls may internalise the idea that politics is a hostile space for women. For boys, seeing women leaders undermined might reinforce a sense of male dominance.
Our finding that children largely see politics as a “man’s world” prompts reflection on societal and political biases. To address the under-representation of women in political leadership positions in Nigeria, it is important to invest in civic education programmes. Children should be helped to understand the significance of equitable political participation from an early age.
Campaigns should use different media platforms to challenge gender stereotypes in leadership.
Finally, enacting and enforcing legislated gender quotas across all levels of Nigerian government and within political parties is a crucial step to improve the representation of women in leadership positions.
– Nigerian children don’t imagine women as political leaders: what shapes their view – https://theconversation.com/nigerian-children-dont-imagine-women-as-political-leaders-what-shapes-their-view-256638
The Savanes region in northern Togo, bordering Burkina Faso, has become an area of insecurity since a jihadist attack in 2021. This security crisis is part of a broader context of growing destabilisation in west African countries, centred on the Sahel region. It led to the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in July 2024. The survey also covered perceptions of foreign influence in Togo and discrimination against women and girls among other topics.
Koffi Amessou Adaba, a political sociologist and one of the lead authors of the study, shares insights into the survey’s key findings, and the potential implications for Togo’s future.
What are the key findings of the survey?
The survey, which involved 1,200 people, reveals that 64% of Togolese respondents believe the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to form the Alliance of Sahel States is “somewhat” or “very” justified. This view is driven by three main factors:
• a perception that Ecowas is influenced by foreign powers
• a widespread rejection of Ecowas sanctions against Sahel states
• the belief that Ecowas failed to provide military support during those countries’ security crises.
In addition, 54% of Togolese consider the presence of Russia (or the Wagner Group, now known as Africa Corps) in the Alliance of Sahel States to be beneficial. This trust in a non-western external actor reflects a profound shift in geopolitical perceptions in the region.
Another important finding of this study is that 54% of Togolese believe their country would benefit from leaving Ecowas to join the Alliance of Sahel States.
But opinions are split on whether the Alliance of Sahel States helps or hurts west African integration: 39% believe it doesn’t undermine regional integration, but 37% think it does.
How do you make sense of the Togolese push to leave Ecowas?
This sentiment reflects growing frustration with Ecowas, which many Togolese now see as out of touch with the region’s realities.
The bloc is widely perceived as being too close to foreign powers and ineffective in responding to major security threats. Its repeated failures to help resolve Togo’s political crises (of 2005 and 2017 for example) have only deepened public disillusionment.
This frustration is unfolding alongside a broader wave of pan-Africanism in the region, marked by a growing rejection of former colonial powers and their institutional ties.
But this momentum should be approached with caution. The desire to leave Ecowas reflects anger and a strong appetite for change, not necessarily a clear assessment of the economic and diplomatic fallout such a move could bring.
What do respondents think about terrorism in the north of the country?
Nearly six in ten Togolese (59%) say they trust the government to contain or root out the terror threat. This shows broad support for official counter-terrorism efforts, although some question the current strategy.
Opinions are especially split on how the crisis is communicated. Some find the messaging vague or lacking in transparency. Others think it helps keep people alert without sparking panic.
The survey reveals deeper concerns. Even Togolese outside conflict zones report growing insecurity. The northern crisis appears to be fuelling nationwide anxiety.
Since tensions flared, Togo has been neutral. It has not openly condemned the Alliance of Sahel States countries and has maintained its membership of Ecowas. This careful stance reflects national sentiment – which leans towards support for the Alliance of Sahel States – while preserving Togo’s strategic and economic interests.
Togo’s careful balancing act remains its safest bet. The truth is, no one knows what the future holds for the Alliance of Sahel States bloc. But this middle ground gives Togo strategic flexibility regardless of how regional politics evolve.
Togo’s position leaves it well-placed either way. If the Alliance of Sahel States countries rejoin Ecowas, Togo keeps its influence. If they don’t, it still benefits from its neutrality.
Ultimately, Togo should keep playing this diplomatic card. Its measured approach offers rare stability in a volatile region.
– Togo’s citizens want to leave Ecowas – new survey suggests why – https://theconversation.com/togos-citizens-want-to-leave-ecowas-new-survey-suggests-why-256928
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University
The civil war in Sudan between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023, has had an impact on its neighbours. One of the most keenly affected countries is South Sudan, which became an independent state in 2011 and went on to endure its own civil war. This ended in 2018 with a tenuous peace agreement.
The impact of the Sudanese war on South Sudan, however, isn’t a straightforward spillover catastrophe. The picture is more nuanced, and this is most clearly seen in South Sudan’s oil economy. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan, explains.
What is the current status of oil exports from South Sudan through Sudan?
Landlocked South Sudan is reliant on its neighbour to the north to transport oil from its fields to the international market. Crude oil is transported via pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
Soon after, the Sudanese army formally notified South Sudan that it would have to halt exports. Following hectic negotiations, the South Sudanese government released a statement that the stoppage could be prevented.
This back and forth has reopened the pressing question of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan’s economy and, in particular, the role of crude oil.
However, South Sudan’s 2024-25 budget suggests a high reliance on non-oil revenue.
In fact, government oil revenues for 2024-25 are based on a volume of only around 16,000 barrels per day. This is the share of total production of about 130,000 barrels per day controlled by South Sudan. Attempts to increase production to pre-war levels of up to 400,000 barrels failed. The substantial drop in production is explained by a decline in the quality of South Sudan’s oil wells, especially in Paloch in the north-east’s Upper Nile State, and Unity State in the north-central region.
South Sudan additionally lacks the operational capacity to extract the oil it has in the ground.
The 2024-25 budget projects a hefty fiscal deficit. The revenues projected will cover only about half of total planned state spending. Oil and non-oil revenues – which mainly include tax income from international NGOs and businesses – each account for about half of the revenue that’s expected to come in.
Oil income has to account for debt (capital and interest) repayments on loans, as well as pipeline transport fees paid to Sudan. This means that even the optimistically assessed net contributions of oil revenue would only pay for 16% of planned government spending. South Sudan remains with a hefty deficit.
What are the challenges South Sudan is facing in growing oil revenues?
First, Petronas, a Malaysian multinational oil and gas company, withdrew from South Sudan in August 2024 after three decades.
It left behind substantial challenges, including an arbitration process worth more US$1 billion. This followed the government preventing Petronas from selling its shares to the British-Nigerian group Savannah Energy.
As a short-term solution, South Sudan de facto nationalised Petronas’ shares. It did this by transferring the shares to the state’s oil and gas company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (NilePet). This was perhaps in the hope of increasing revenue in the short term.
However, NilePet hasn’t been able to replace Petronas’ production logistics. This has resulted in huge challenges in restoring production to levels before the 2024 pipeline disruptions.
A second factor is the sale of oil forward. The then finance minister said in 2022 that most of the oil production had been sold in advance until 2027. He later retracted the statement, saying instead that some oil advances were merely “spread up to 2027”. While this walk-back attempted to soften the political fallout, it reinforced wider uncertainty about how much control NilePet actually retains over the revenues formally under its authority.
Given the limited relevance of oil revenues for the official South Sudanese budget, why the major concern about disruptions?
There are three reasons.
First, NilePet plays a structural role in South Sudan’s informal and often dubious hard currency circulation, which international observers would call large-scale corruption. NilePet’s accounts rarely appear in any official financial accounts and are often channelled off-budget. NilePet functions as a black box within the public finance system where real money flows can only rarely be traced. Recent intentions by the president to structurally reform the company might implicitly confirm this.
Second, there are indirect oil revenues that are important to the country’s security apparatus. This includes protection rents which come from protecting South Sudanese oil fields. This revenue never hits the budget. It pays the National Security Service either directly as salaries, or is reinvested in the considerable conglomerate of companies owned by the security service to multiply profits. Losing this revenue could destabilise the country because the funds are used to pay the salaries of the best-trained and best-equipped security service in the country.
Third, South Sudan’s ability to attract new loans depends on the repayment of existing ones. These repayments largely depend on oil production. As the 2024-24 budget shows, South Sudan desperately needs new loans to keep even core state functions operational. Yet, funding from multilateral agencies has dwindled to small-scale loans from the African Development Bank. The International Monetary Fund has currently ended all its funding programmes.
These factors show that the flow of oil to Port Sudan is significant to the availability of hard currency in South Sudan’s economy. But this is in more indirect ways than the outdated claim of an 80% budgetary dependency would suggest.
The war in Sudan has a significant yet multifaceted impact on South Sudan’s economic health. But Juba’s biggest challenges are internal.
South Sudan’s economy over the last six years has been mainly dependent on international loans coming in – a flow which has now dried up, resulting in a severe economic crisis unprecedented in the young country’s history.
– Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue – https://theconversation.com/is-sudans-war-the-reason-for-south-sudans-economic-crisis-whats-really-going-on-with-oil-revenue-257375
One of the most vicious groups operating in the region is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims). The militant group emerged in 2017 in Algeria and Mali, and has targeted civilian populations.
The UN listed the group as an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2018. Al-Qaeda is an Islamist organisation founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s.
The 2024 global terrorism index listed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organisations. Its influence has expanded in most parts of the Sahel. The group emerged to strengthen the jihadist insurgency under al-Qaeda. It combines violence with diplomacy to expand its influence and challenge state authorities.
Despite growing pressure from counter militancy campaigns spearheaded by local, regional and international militaries, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin continues to survive and adapt by regrouping and reorganising. This was demonstrated in its latest operation in Burkina Faso in 2024. The group exerted significant control by closing schools, setting up taxation checkpoints and abducting locals.
Its engagement in illicit economies has been key to the group’s successful expansion. This revenue is used to carry out devastating attacks.
We research jihadi-based insurgencies, and have found that this is a common tactic among terrorist groups in the west Africa-Sahel axis, including Boko Haram militants.
From our research, we find that Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin funds its activities by relying on
artisanal mining
kidnapping
livestock theft
money laundering.
Dismantling the group’s illicit economies and blocking its financial flows are key to countering its activities.
Financial resources
The group needs money for fighting, and to sustain political and social influence in its areas of operation.
Artisanal gold mining has proven to be a major factor in its expansion and resilience. In areas where the group exerts influence, illicit gold mining generates over US$30 billion annually. According to a report by Swissaid, a development group based in Switzerland, the main destinations for this gold are the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Switzerland.
The jihadists gain access to gold by controlling mining sites and transport routes to and from mines. They sometimes allow trusted allies, who include local armed groups, bandits and other criminal networks, to mine in exchange for a payout. The extent of gold mining funds is not exactly known, but the artisanal sites in areas controlled by the group have the capacity to produce 725 kilograms of gold per year, valued at US$34 million.
Another source of income – and political influence – is kidnapping for ransom. Kidnap victims include cattle owners, businessmen, state officials and foreigners. The group received a ₤30 million ransom in 2020 to release one French and two Italian hostages. Between 2017 and 2023, the group and its affiliated units were responsible for 845 out of approximately 1,100 recorded kidnappings in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali remain the epicentre of the group’s violent activities. In the first quarter of 2023, over 180 cases of kidnapping were recorded in these countries’ war-torn areas.
Livestock theft has also been a critical source of funds. The practice of livestock theft as economic warfare and a means to generate funds has led to livestock being forcibly taken from herders who fail to pay zakat (a religious fee among Muslims) or subscribe to the group’s ideology. The stolen livestock are sold in Mali, Mauritania or Senegal. The ability to monetise stolen livestock makes their theft a cornerstone of the Sahelian war economy and a source of cash for weapons and vehicles.
Money laundering is another illicit economy central to the militant group’s financing. It lends money to merchants, invests with banks and funds small shops with the aim of getting profits. This helps ensure a constant flow of money and provisions to support the group’s terrorist acts. It has attached much importance to this illicit economy, to the extent of assassinating those who interfere with its investments.
Way out
To cut down Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s financial base – and thereby weaken its capacity for militancy – counterinsurgency efforts need to take the following actions.
Government security actors should collaborate with local self-defence militias to regulate artisanal mining and thwart kidnappings.
Financial intelligence units need to identify merchants who receive money from the militant group to block the flow of illicit funds.
Specialised courts that deal with money laundering and terrorism financing cases should be established and made operational in Burkina Faso and Mali, the epicentres of the group’s activities.
Burkina Faso and Mali should increase security around civilians to minimise civilian casualties from terror operations.
Since finance is the basis of the militant group’s strength, regional security co-operation should be strengthened. This would help with systematically tracking illicit flows and stopping them.
– Funding terror: how west Africa’s deadly jihadists get the money they need to survive – https://theconversation.com/funding-terror-how-west-africas-deadly-jihadists-get-the-money-they-need-to-survive-242306
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand
South Africans are wearily attuned to governments’ Orwellian misuse of language. After all, South Africa is a country where a one-time government passed a law (the Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952) which extended rather than abolishing the notorious pass system. This made it compulsory for black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a passbook. And the same government passed the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 which made it more, not less, difficult for black students to register at “open” (or white) universities.
So perhaps they should not be unduly surprised that the government of the US has imported 49 Afrikaners and labelled them as “refugees”. The claim is that they are escaping from the persecution of Afrikaners – and white people more broadly – in South Africa today.
The Trump administration knows perfectly well this claim is a complete fabrication. As President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government have pointed out, there is no evidence whatsoever that Afrikaners or white people more generally are subject to genocide.
True, South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. But it is poor black South Africans – not whites – who are principal victims of such deadly violence. Nor are Afrikaners/whites subject to persecution. Along with all other South Africans, their human rights are protected by a constitution. This is no mere piece of paper. Its provisions are (albeit imperfectly, and unlike in the US these days) largely enforced by the courts.
Worse, the characterisation of Afrikaners as refugees at a moment in time when the people of Gaza are daily subject to a regime of death, terror, and murder inflicted on them by the Israeli government is not merely an absurdity but a downright insult to those genuinely subject to genocide.
So, what is really going on?
The drivers
Extensive commentary has correctly highlighted the motivations of the Trump administration.
First, the administration has launched an attack on what it terms the “tyranny” of “diversity, equity and inclusion” policies across the entire spectrum of public and private institutions in America. Critics argue this is driven by an appeal to Trump’s white Christian nationalist political base. Because post-apartheid South Africa, rightly or wrongly, has become the poster-country of diversity, equity and inclusion policies internationally, because of its constitutional commitment to non-racialism and diversity, it has been singled out for attack.
Third, characterising Afrikaners as subject to genocide is a very deliberate response to South Africa’s charging of Israel as guilty of genocide against the Palestinian people before the International Court of Justice. But this is unacceptable to the US Christian nationalist right. For them the existence of Israel represents the realisation of Biblical truth – the return of Jews to the Holy Land.
Trump is saying that the US can and will play the same game, using it to clobber South Africa regardless of the groundlessness of the charge. But, being Trump, he will balance pandering to his support base against what economic benefits he can extract from South Africa.
The landscape
But what of the 49 Afrikaners themselves? Why have they chosen to accept the opportunity offered to them by the US government? After all, extensive attention in the South African media has been given to Afrikaners who have defiantly stated that they are committed to staying in South Africa. The reasons they give are that it’s their home. And they fully accept that, at least formally, South Africa has become a non-racial democracy.
Likewise, as I have detailed in my book on Whites and Democracy in South Africa, Afrikaners and whites have not only survived in democratic South Africa but, generally, have prospered economically. Furthermore, whites as a “population group” (to use outdated apartheid-era terminology) have participated fully in South African democracy. They are more highly disposed to voting in elections than other racial groupings, and de facto, they are well represented in parliament and local government by the Democratic Alliance, which is a vigorous defender of their interests.
But (there is always a but), if we want to guess the motivations of Trump’s 49 “refugees”, we need to bear in mind the following.
First, until we know more about the personal circumstances of the individuals involved, we cannot really know what has driven them to take the drastic step of leaving families and their personal history behind by moving to America.
Second, most whites have responded to the arrival of democracy pragmatically. They have their numerous complaints, notably about equity employment (affirmative action policies in favour of blacks) which they view as discriminatory against whites. But they have continued to enjoy high rates of employment. Indeed they continue to occupy the higher ranks of employment in the private sector in disproportionate numbers.
However, although many whites continue to live in a de facto overwhelmingly white world, both at work and at their homes in suburbia, there remains a minority which has remained wholly unreconciled to the changes which have taken place politically and economically since 1994. The armed opposers linked to the far-right have long been defeated. But we may presume the 49 belong to a broader category of passive resisters who have withdrawn into a white world as much as possible.
Third, although most whites continue to do well economically, the changes which have taken place since 1994 have led to the re-appearance of a small class of largely uneducated poor whites who feel excluded from employment by equity employment legislation. And who generally feel the loss of their racial status under democracy.
Opportunists, not refugees
Having said all that, some interesting questions remain.
Presumably the Afrikaner 49 belonged to that category of whites which, for one reason or another, is disposed to leave South Africa. However, emigrating requires jumping through numerous hoops; meeting educational and professional qualifications, getting a job offer, having sufficient financial resources to take with them to support themselves and their families before they can qualify for recipient countries’ social security systems, and so on. Apart from the emotional costs involved, emigration is not always the easiest of options, even for those who wish to “escape”.
The evidence suggests that the heads of household among the Afrikaner 49 are drawn not only from that minority of Afrikaners who are totally unreconciled to democracy, but who – quite simply – are opportunists who have availed themselves of a short cut to emigrate.
– Trump’s Afrikaners are South African opportunists, not refugees: what’s behind the US move – https://theconversation.com/trumps-afrikaners-are-south-african-opportunists-not-refugees-whats-behind-the-us-move-257017
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ekta Patel, Scientist, International Livestock Research Institute
Pastoralist communities, their livestock and diverse wildlife species coexist within a biodiversity-rich landscape stretching along the Kenya–Tanzania border.
However, at this wildlife-livestock interface, local communities face mounting challenges. Shifts in land use, prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall patterns and increasing land degradation are placing growing pressure on the landscape. In addition, conflict between people and wildlife is on the rise, and many households rely on wild animals for food.
Communities in the region eat a wide range of wild animals, from rodents, elephant shrews and birds to small antelopes and larger ungulates like bushbuck. This meat (“bush meat” as it is also popularly known in Africa) provides a valuable source of animal protein and minerals, especially where alternative domestic protein sources are scarce.
Although hunting and consuming wild animals is illegal in Kenya, this is not the case in Tanzania, where certain forms of hunting for wild animals are permitted. Yet in both countries, many people eat wild meat regularly, often without awareness of the risks. These risks include zoonotic disease transmission and potential impacts on wildlife populations.
Wild meat is a known source of zoonotic infections and disease spillover to humans. In fact, as many as three-quarters of emerging infectious diseases originate from wildlife. Illnesses such as anthrax, mpox, Ebola, and HIV have all been linked to close interactions between humans and wild animals.
Despite these risks, wild meat consumption remains widespread, with some households eating it daily or weekly. Preventing future disease outbreaks requires a clear understanding of these health risks, as well as the underlying social, cultural and economic reasons that drive people to rely on wild meat.
We set out to understand why people were eating wild meat along the Kenya-Tanzania border and whether they understood the risks of zoonotic diseases. Cases of anthrax have already been reported in this area.
Our study involved interviews in border communities during the COVID pandemic – the most famous case of zoonotic disease transmission in recent times. We wanted to know whether communities understood the pandemic’s link to wild meat and if this affected their consumption of it.
What stood out was that people at the border settlements kept eating wild meat or even ate more of it. This shows that economic necessity, cultural preferences and limited alternatives remain key drivers even when the world is in crisis.
Though this research was done during COVID-19, it gives us insights into how people react when things get tough, especially when it comes to food and health.
What’s driving wild meat consumption
We found that several factors drove wild meat consumption, despite growing awareness of the health risks.
Poverty
Economic factors, particularly household income and limited financial means, strongly influenced wild meat consumption, particularly in communities with limited alternative protein sources. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on local economies. Tourism, a key source of income for border communities, experienced sharp declines. As household revenues fell, reliance on wild meat as an affordable protein source increased.
Economic stability plays a crucial role in shaping consumption behaviours: 81% of those surveyed at the border settlements indicated they would stop eating wild meat if cheaper alternatives were available.
The type of animal
Perceptions of disease risks varied depending on the species consumed.
Approximately 79% of respondents believed that certain animals posed a higher risks of zoonotic disease transmission. Hyenas were perceived as the most dangerous, followed by primates and snakes. These findings suggest that while economic necessity influences wild meat consumption, risk perception also shapes dietary choices.
Gender plays a role
Men expressed more concern over conservation and health risks than women. Men were also more likely to advocate against selling wild meat. Women exhibited lower concern regarding zoonotic disease risks, including COVID-19. These insights highlight the need for gender-sensitive interventions to address wild meat consumption.
Education levels
Education levels also influenced risk perception. Respondents with formal education displayed a stronger awareness of zoonotic transmission pathways. They were also more receptive to conservation and public health messaging. This highlights the importance of education in promoting safer and more sustainable practices within communities.
National policies
Despite sharing ecosystems and wildlife populations, Kenya and Tanzania have adopted fundamentally different governance approaches to wild meat. This in turn shapes outcomes for conservation, biodiversity and public health.
Kenya follows a centralised and protectionist model. Hunting and consumption of wild animals are prohibited under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act. This zero-tolerance policy is rooted in strong conservation principles aimed at protecting biodiversity.
However, in practice, it has driven the activity underground, creating a thriving black market. This undermines conservation and enforcement efforts. It also increases the risk of zoonotic disease transmission due to unregulated handling and consumption of wild animals.
Tanzania, by contrast, uses a decentralised, regulated slaughterhouse model. Licensed wild meat hunting and consumption is legal under regulation, particularly through game-controlled areas and permits introduced in 2020. This approach is meant to enable communities to benefit economically from wildlife and reduce incentives for illegal hunting.
The existence of two divergent systems across a porous border creates challenges. These include illegal cross-border trade, conflicting conservation objectives, and uneven protection of biodiversity. There are also difficulties in implementing coordinated surveillance or public health interventions.
The contrasting regulations in Kenya and Tanzania significantly influence wild meat consumption choices.
In Kenya, where wild meat is strictly prohibited, consumption appears to be through informal and unregulated channels. This increases health risks and limits consumer awareness. In contrast, Tanzania’s regulated licensing system provides a legal pathway for access. This makes wild meat consumption more visible and, in some cases, perceived as safer. These differing policies shape how communities access, justify and engage with wild meat, often driving cross-border trade and complicating enforcement and risk communication efforts.
What’s next?
Addressing the risks associated with wild meat trade requires a multifaceted strategy that balances health, equity and sustainability.
We suggest an intervention that prioritises economic stability and ensuring affordable alternative protein sources are accessible, especially in food-insecure settings.
Public health education is also essential. An increasing awareness of zoonotic disease risks can help shift consumption behaviour.
Because men and women perceived the dangers of wild meat consumption differently, gender-sensitive approaches should be integrated. It should also be noted that, although women are rarely the primary hunters, they are often prosecuted for possession or sale of wild meat. Gender disparities on how laws are applied must be addressed.
Legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms must be strengthened to address cross-border wildlife trade, particularly in regions with differing policies like Kenya and Tanzania. They should also reduce the risks faced by individuals who may unknowingly engage in illegal practices due to a lack of clarity.
We continue to work with national and regional stakeholders. This includes government bodies and technical partners who are actively engaging with us to co-develop One Health solutions. These solutions integrate public health, environmental sustainability and community well-being.
Finally, community engagement and participation should be at the core of any intervention. This will ensure that policies are locally relevant, culturally sensitive and supported by those directly affected to reduce the risks of zoonotic disease spillover.
– Eating wild meat carries serious health risks – why it still happens along the Kenya-Tanzania border – https://theconversation.com/eating-wild-meat-carries-serious-health-risks-why-it-still-happens-along-the-kenya-tanzania-border-252947
