Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

Attacks by non-state armed groups are a security challenge in the Sahel, including Nigeria.

In northern Nigeria, the activities of Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (also known as Boko Haram), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) contribute to the instability of the Nigerian state.

On 16 August 2025, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s national security adviser, announced the arrest of two leaders of Ansaru: Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri.

They appeared before the Federal High Court in Abuja on 11 September. Usman pleaded guilty to the charge of illegal mining activities and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. They are currently facing a 32-count charge including engagement in acts of terrorism, and other violent crimes.

As a scholar of security studies, I can offer some thoughts about the importance of the arrest, possible responses from Ansaru and how Nigeria should respond.

Who are the two men arrested?

Mahmud Muhammed Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri are two key leaders of Ansaru, a terrorist organisation that formed as a breakaway faction of Boko Haram in 2012 in Kano state. Boko Haram is a Salafi Jihadist militant group operating in north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad region. It’s known for its efforts since 2010 to establish an Islamic state governed by Islamic law.

Ansaru functioned until 2013 before it appeared to fizzle out. Its operations included a prison break in November 2012, an attack on a Nigerian military convoy heading to Mali in January 2013 and the kidnapping of seven expatriates working with Setraco Construction Company in Bauchi in February 2013.

Since 2013, not much has been heard about the group. Some linked its silence to the death of its leader Abubakar Adam Kambar in 2012. Others said it had been forced back into mainstream Boko Haram by that group’s then leader Abubakar Shekau.

But Ansaru revived between 2018 and 2020 and has been recruiting and involved in rising banditry and kidnapping in North West and North Central.

The arrested leaders are prominent figures in Ansaru. An official statement revealed that Mahmud Muhammad Usman is the amir (leader) and Mahmud al-Nigeri serves as the deputy and chief of staff.

Both have undergone extensive training from al-Qaeda in the Maghreb region. Al-Qaeda is a pan-Islamic militant group leading a global Islamist revolution aimed at uniting the Muslim world. It was established by Osama Bin Laden in 1988 and he remained its leader until 2011, when he was killed.

Strategic significance of the arrest

Arresting leaders is known in counterterrorism as “leadership decapitation” or “snakehead strategy”. This involves capturing or killing the leaders or high-ranking commanders of terrorist organisations.

Not all policymakers and academics agree about the effectiveness of that tactic. States facing terrorism challenges, such as Israel, the United States and Russia, often use it, but most research shows it is not that effective.

It may temporarily incapacitate the group, but the group may bounce back even more brutally.

The targeted killing of Osama Bin Laden decimated al-Qaeda but paved the way for the rise of the Islamic State as a global caliphate. Islamic State has been lethal in its operations, particularly in the Sahel.

And the 2009 killing of Muhammed Yusuf, the former leader of Boko Haram, led to the emergence of Abubakar Shekau. Under him, Boko Haram became more formidable until he died in 2021.

The case of the Ansaru leaders is different, however. It is target arrest and incarceration.

This strategy has advantages for Nigeria and the broader Sahel region.

Incarceration of the two leaders means Ansaru won’t be able to take key decisions for some time. And it will deny the group some key technical know-how. Terrorist organisations seldom get new leaders while others are still alive.

Al-Nigeri is not only deputy and chief of staff, he is an expert in planning and implementing attacks and kidnapping in Nigeria and Niger. He underwent training in the Maghreb in handling weapons and making explosive devices.

It’s possible that lack of access to their expertise and authority will drastically reduce the activities of Ansaru.

Shortly after their arrest, Abduraham Yusuf, son of the Boko Haram founder, who is also a leader of one of ISWAP cells in the region, was arrested in Chad. Similarly, Boko Haram leader Ibrahim Mahamadu, also known as Bakura, was reportedly killed in Niger Republic on 20 August.

I believe these two incidents may be related to intelligence obtained following the arrest of the two Ansaru leaders.

Likely responses from the group

Considering the importance of the two leaders to Ansaru, there are two likely responses from the group.

• breaking them out of prison – the group carried out prison breaks in 2012 and 2022

• high-profile kidnapping and hostage taking, a trademark of Ansaru.

The March 28 2022 Abuja-Kaduna train bombing incident was believed to have been carried out by Ansaru with the support of some bandits as a retaliation for the Nigerian Police raid of Ansaru Camp in Kaduna State in which two commanders of the group were killed.

Even the parent group, Boko Haram, possibly executed the Chibok kidnapping in 2014 in retaliation for some of its commanders under incarceration of Nigerian government. Given these antecedents, the arrest of their prize leaders may trigger retaliation from the group.

Although the group’s ability to retaliate largely depends on whether it can still function effectively without the inputs of its two leaders in incarceration, the current cordial relationship between Ansaru and some bandits operating in the North West may make this possible.

Responses from the state

The Nigerian government and security forces must brace for likely retaliation from Ansaru. I expect that these two leaders should not be kept together in the same prison facility, and there is a need to adequately fortify prison facilities where they are kept to fend off any possible attack.

Furthermore, security needs to be provided for key places, especially schools, communities, and other vulnerable people that Ansaru may attack in the North West and North Central regions.

– Ansaru terror leaders’ arrest is a strategic change for Nigeria: what could happen next
– https://theconversation.com/ansaru-terror-leaders-arrest-is-a-strategic-change-for-nigeria-what-could-happen-next-264921

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Imraan Valodia, Pro Vice-Chancellor, Climate, Sustainability and Inequality and Director, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The relationship between inequality and economic growth is a complex one, especially in Africa. Inequality is the result of a host of factors, including policy choices, institutional legacies and power structures that favour elites. Professor Imraan Valodia, director of the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies spoke to Ernest Aryeetey, emeritus professor of Development Economics at the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana about the issues.

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What policy choices have African governments made that have worsened inequality?

Firstly, structural adjustment policies. Many African countries undertook these during the late 20th century, often encouraged by international financial institutions. These policies included public sector retrenchments, the removal of subsidies, and reduced social services. They disproportionately affected the poor by weakening the state’s role in redistributing public goods, and limiting access to essential services.

The programmes also increased income inequality by choosing free markets over social protection. Later efforts to address the consequences were often “too little, too late.”

Secondly, taxation and fiscal policies. Most tax systems in Africa have relied on indirect taxes (such as VAT or consumption taxes) rather than progressive, direct taxes on income and wealth. As a result, poorer households often bear a heavier relative tax burden while the wealthiest benefit from exemptions or evasion.

Early post-independence taxation rarely did much to redistribute wealth, and efforts to tax the informal sector have been minimal or poorly designed. They have failed to capture significant resources for social spending.

Thirdly, education and healthcare investment. Policy choices have often perpetuated access gaps between urban and rural populations and among socioeconomic classes. Investments tended to favour cities and privileged groups, so that not everyone had the same opportunities. This “urban bias” in public spending reinforced existing inequalities. Rural people’s needs remained unmet.

Fourthly, weak social protection. Until the expansion of more comprehensive schemes in the 2000s, many Africans were left poor and vulnerable, without adequate safety nets.

Fifth, economic structures favour elites. African governments have often maintained or even reinforced economic structures that concentrate wealth and opportunity for just a few. Examples include policies favouring extractive industries or resource sectors controlled by politically connected groups. Land tenure, trade policies and access to state contracts and licences have frequently favoured the powerful.

Sixth, limited regional and gender inclusion. Early public policies rarely met the needs of women, youth, rural areas, or marginalised regions. Exclusion from land ownership or financial services, and limited emphasis on affirmative action, reinforced systemic inequalities. Only in recent decades have some governments begun to address these gaps, but progress remains uneven.

Are these choices linked to the capture of public policy by elites?

Yes. Privileged groups have often shaped or manipulated state policies in ways that protect their interests and reinforce inequality.

Colonial and postcolonial legacy. Policies and institutions established during and after colonialism often allocated resources and power to a narrow elite, either colonial settlers, expatriates or local collaborators. Today’s elites inherited and sustained many of these structures. They still control wealth, land, and market opportunities.

Economic structure and resource control. Many African economies remain oriented around extractive industries and primary commodities such as oil and minerals. Policies around resource extraction, trade and land tenure have often favoured elites through preferential access, tax exemptions and regulatory loopholes.

Policy design and fiscal choices. The design of tax systems has typically favoured indirect taxes (like VAT). These do not affect elite wealth. Efforts to tax high incomes, property or capital gains are underdeveloped or easily evaded.

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Read more: Tax season in South Africa: the system is designed to tackle inequality – how it falls short

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Social protection and service delivery. Safety nets and public goods (like quality education, healthcare, or infrastructure) often target formal sector workers or urban residents (where elites reside). They neglect the informal sector, rural poor and marginalised groups.

Political patronage and governance. State resources, positions and contracts go to loyalists, family members, or ethnic/regional networks.

What have been the 3 biggest inequality drivers?

Firstly, regressive fiscal policies. These include broad based taxes such as transaction levies and VAT. They take a larger share of low income earners’ cash flows. Wealthier groups benefit from exemptions or low tax rates.

Secondly, rapid, elite led privatisation and market liberalisation. Selling state assets or opening key sectors (energy, telecoms and transport) to politically connected investors concentrates profits and market power. Informal workers and small firms are left with reduced earnings.

Patronage, corruption and political capture keep things that way.

Thirdly, under-investment in universal social services. Cuts to health, education and social safety nets limit upward mobility for the poor and maintain regional and gender gaps.

Lastly, resource dependence and economic structure. Many African economies focus on industries like oil, minerals and cash crops. These benefit political and business elites but don’t diversify industries or create jobs. The benefits of growth go mostly to the already privileged. Most citizens and entire regions are excluded.

Which countries have managed best to change this?

Rwanda has a progressive income tax structure. Low value mobile money transactions are exempt from tax. Key utilities such as electricity and water remain largely public, which has reduced the impact of taxes on the poor.

Rwanda has also made efforts towards inclusive governance. Examples include quotas for women, investments in health and education, and a focus on rural inclusion.

Botswana has pursued a cautious privatisation agenda. The state retains majority ownership in diamonds, telecoms and banking. Revenues were channelled into universal primary education and health.

Despite its dependence on diamonds, it does well at channelling resource wealth into national savings, infrastructure and public services. This while maintaining relatively high institutional quality and political stability.

Ethiopia, pre 2020 reforms which saw the role of the private sector being broadened.

Before then, the country had focused on massive public investment in primary education, health extension services and rural road networks. At the same time it avoided large scale privatisation of basic utilities. This limited the social service gap.

In addition, it has invested in manufacturing and export-led growth. This has generated jobs and gradually shifted the economy away from depending on primary commodities. Inequality has reduced compared to resource-dependent peers.

Have technology advances affected inequality differently on the continent?

Yes.

Technology has the potential to reduce inequality by expanding access to markets, services, information and financial inclusion. But gaps in digital infrastructure, affordability and skills have caused technology to sometimes reinforce, rather than alleviate, disparities in African countries.

• Digital divide and urban-rural gaps. Access to digital technologies is highly uneven. Rural areas, the poor, women and less-educated groups are less likely to use the internet or benefit from digital services. This divide is much starker in Africa than in advanced economies, where technology adoption is nearly universal. As a result, new technologies can benefit urban, educated and higher-income groups the most. This widens inequalities if not accompanied by robust, inclusive policies.

• Mobile leapfrogging, but patchy inclusion. Africa’s rapid leap to mobile phone use has often skipped fixed-line infrastructure. This has brought financial inclusion and new markets to millions, such as M-Pesa in Kenya. Still, large parts of the continent remain excluded due to affordability, lack of electricity, limited digital skills and language barriers.

• Economic structure and global value chains. Limited integration into global value chains and a small high-tech sector mean most jobs on the continent remain in low-productivity informal work.

Why do the effects differ?

Firstly, late, unequal adoption. The industrial revolution and subsequent technological advances arrived late and unevenly. Colonial and postcolonial legacies left Africa behind in both education and infrastructure. This made it harder for broad segments of the population to benefit from new technologies.

Infrastructure scarcity forces societies to adopt mobile solutions directly, bypassing legacy banking but also making them vulnerable to policy shocks.

Secondly, policy and market failures. Inadequate regulation, weak competition and high costs of devices and data are brakes on digital transformation. Digital public goods, such as e-government and online education, reach only connected groups. And digital skills gaps further entrench the social digital divide.

– Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right
– https://theconversation.com/inequality-in-africa-what-drives-it-how-to-end-it-and-what-some-countries-are-getting-right-265265