Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maureen Fubara, PhD candidate, University of Amsterdam
Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, elections have consistently been marred by violence. The elections between 1999 and 2019 and in 2023 saw party clashes, physical attacks, assassinations and intimidation.
As Nigeria prepares for the 2027 elections, the threat of violence lurks again. Already, reports have emerged of clashes between supporters of the ruling All Progressives Congress and the opposition African Democratic Congress in northern states like Jigawa, Kogi and Kebbi.
The violence is largely carried out by hired thugs, party supporters and members, gangs and militias. But the issue is not only that politicians are willing to use violence, it is that they can afford to fund it.
My research across Lagos, Rivers, Plateau and Nasarawa States shows that the perpetrators are different across states. This difference is linked to how much funding governors control, in the form of resource rents or state fiscal allocations.
In a recently published paper based on my PhD research on the political economy of electoral violence in Nigeria, I argue that the distinction in electoral violence perpetrators is driven by governors’ financial capacity to “rent” violence. While those with access to more resource rents or state fiscal allocations hire armed groups, others rely on ordinary citizens.
In both cases, the implication is that democracy is undermined, but the organised violence of high-rent states is especially harmful because it embeds one-party dominance and long-term insecurity.
Read more: There’s violence every election season in Nigeria: what can be done to stop it
‘Rents’ and the political marketplace
At the heart of Nigeria’s political and economic system are natural “resource rents” – public funds allocated to states by the federal government under the Federation Account. They are mostly from oil revenues and value added tax. The allocations are based on a formula that includes factors like population size, landmass, and natural resource wealth. This sharing results in uneven distribution across states. Although intended to fund development, “rents” have become a tool for politicians to finance their aspiration to stay in power.
Where governors have high rents, they engage expensive organised groups like transport unions, who in some instances are illegally armed, and cult groups to manipulate elections in their favour.
Where rents are limited, they rely on ordinary citizens, offering cash, food, or alcohol in exchange for violence.
This creates two outcomes:
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in high-rent states (Lagos and Rivers), incumbents can sustain long-term alliances with armed groups
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in low-rent states (Nasarawa and Plateau), violence is carried out by ordinary citizens in the form of party and ethnic supporters.
Read more: Vote buying is a big problem in Kenya. How to curb it before the 2022 elections
Why this matters for democracy
Not all violence perpetrators are the same. Armed groups are organised, feared, and able to systematically intimidate and harm voters. Their alliances with ruling parties go beyond elections. They spill into extortion in the transport sector, oil bunkering, piracy and crime.
In Lagos, much of the election violence is linked to the National Union of Road Transport Workers. This is a powerful trade union with close ties to the ruling All Progressives Congress. During elections, street touts known as agberos, who are affiliated with the union, perpetrate violence on behalf of the ruling party. In return, they receive payments from commercial bus drivers and maintain control over parts of Lagos’s lucrative public transport system.
For instance, during Nigeria’s 2023 elections, some voters in Lagos, especially those from minority ethnic groups, reported being attacked or threatened by members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers. These incidents were allegedly aimed at pressuring them to vote for the All Progressives Congress. The group’s strong influence in the transport sector gives it unrivalled access to neighbourhoods, making violence both effective and difficult to resist.
Similarly, in Rivers, cult groups such as the Icelanders and Deewell have become political instruments.
Financed with millions of naira, sometimes even equipped with sophisticated weapons, armed groups are deployed to silence rivals and scare voters. Their reputations for violence mean that just the rumour of their presence can keep voters at home.
In “low-rent” states, perpetrators of violence look different. To recruit citizens for election violence in Nasarawa State, politicians often offer as little as ₦5,000 (about US$4), well below Nigeria’s minimum monthly wage of ₦70,000 ($47). They also compensate them with alcohol or hard drugs. Similarly, in Plateau State, north central Nigeria, unemployed young people are promised small cash rewards, sometimes alongside drugs, to disrupt rival rallies or attack opposition neighbourhoods.
Read more: They Eat Our Sweat – new book exposes daily struggles of transport workers in Lagos
‘Rents’ and one-party dominance
The risk of “renting” violence is that it becomes self-sustaining. Governors splurge resources on armed groups while granting them access to lucrative criminal markets such as oil bunkering (crude oil theft).
These alliances secure ruling parties’ dominance across elections. In Lagos and Rivers, violence has become a permanent feature of politics, not a temporary campaign strategy.
In Nasarawa and Plateau, violence is cheaper and ad hoc. Citizens involved in violence return to farming, hustling or unemployment once elections end. Competition remains more open, but insecurity at the polls still undermines elections.
Read more: New book reveals what drives election rigging – and when citizens resist it
Why 2027 may not be different
There are warning signs that the 2027 elections are likely to be violent. There have been incidents of attacks and intimidation in several states. Governors with high “rents” are likely to strengthen ties with armed groups, given the prevalent impunity in Nigeria’s political space.
In previous elections, Human Rights Watch flagged the lack of accountability for political violence. Politicians have no reason to stop when the risks are low and the rewards, such as political, economic and social power, are so high.
Since many Nigerians have low trust in the government and democratic institutions, another violent election risks pushing citizens further away from the polling units and closer to apathy. When voters expect violence, many will stay at home, leaving elections to be decided not by choice but by violence.
Next steps
Nigeria is not unique; other resource-rich countries like Tanzania also struggle with electoral violence.
Breaking the cycle requires more than election monitoring. It demands fiscal reforms that limit governors’ control over rents, and institutions strong enough to prosecute sponsors and perpetrators of violence.
Nigerians deserve elections where voters’ choices, not violence, decide winners.
– Thug culture in Nigerian politics: the links between state governors, funding and violent armed groups
– https://theconversation.com/thug-culture-in-nigerian-politics-the-links-between-state-governors-funding-and-violent-armed-groups-265695
