Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Arno J. van Niekerk, Senior lecturer in Economics, University of the Free State

Over the past two decades, economic strength, trade flows, technological leadership and even consumer demand have been moving steadily from west to east. This transformation is redrawing economic maps. It is also raising urgent questions about co-operation, competition and inclusion in a multipolar world. Lecturer in economics and finance Arno van Niekerk answers questions about these issues, which he explores in a new book, West to East: A New Global Economy in the Making?

What indicates a shift from west to east?

Brics countries, largely driven by China and India, overtook the G7 countries in their share of global GDP in 2018. As Figure 1 shows, the Brics contribution has grown from 32.33% of global GDP to 35.43% in 2024 (after being at 21.37% in 2000).

Figure 1

The G7’s share decreased to 29.64%, from 43.28% in 2000.

This marks a historic turning point. Economic leadership that was long concentrated in the west has decisively shifted towards emerging economies.

Another strong indicator of the shift is the change in global shares of trade of the G7 and Brics countries. This is particularly true of exports. Data shows that Brics+ (11 countries, including new members) captured 28% of world exports in 2024, closing in on the G7’s 32%.

The rebalancing of global trade dynamics has wide-ranging consequences for international business. It means, especially in the case of China and India, that these economies are doing more than expanding in scale. They are also integrating effectively into global value chains, improving productivity and raising living standards.

As shown in Figure 2, the share of global merchandise exports of the G7 countries fell from 45.1% in 2000 to 28.9% in 2023. For their part, the Brics+ share rose from 10.7% (2000) to 23.3% (2023).

Figure 2

There are other indicators too:

• Over two-thirds of global foreign exchange reserves are held in Asia. In particular, in China (US$3 trillion), Japan, India and South Korea. Large reserves indicate that a nation earns more from exports, investment inflows and remittances than it spends on imports and debt payments.

• China has displaced western dominance in foreign direct investment in developing regions. Through its Belt and Road Initiative – involving over 150 countries – it has become the world’s largest source of outbound foreign direct investment.

• Asia now accounts for more than half of the global middle class, driving demand growth. Asia is projected to represent over 50% of global consumer spending. This compares with less than 20% in 1990.

• China, India, South Korea and Japan have become leaders in financial technology, artificial intelligence and 5G adoption. China now files more international patents annually than the US and European Union combined. Specifically, the tech rivalry between the US and China illustrates the change in technological leadership.

What does this shift tell us about economic co-operation?

Countries in both the east and the west need to make more intentional efforts. This is necessary, firstly, to address the growing geoeconomic tension. And secondly to move the world towards a shared vision for sustainable economic progress that benefits all countries.

Such co-operation needs to go beyond traditional trade and investment agreements. It should be deliberately structured to reduce inequalities, strengthen resilience and embed sustainability.

I identify five main areas for co-operative initiatives.

Co-ordinated policy frameworks: tax co-operation in the form of global minimum corporate taxes to ensure fair revenue for social investment. Harmonise labour and social protections through common standards to prevent exploitation. Align sustainable development by embedding the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement targets and human rights principles into trade and financial agreements.

Inclusive trade and investment: fair trade agreements to ensure that market access benefits small producers, women and marginalised communities. Establish regional value chains that support developing countries in upgrading within global value chains – so that they don’t just supply raw materials. Design co-operative frameworks for technology transfer, especially for sharing green and digital technologies at affordable costs.

Financial co-operation: innovative financing mechanisms, such as green and social bonds, blended finance and climate funds need to be made accessible to low-income countries. Implement co-operative mechanisms for debt relief and restructuring. This will help address unsustainable debt that crowds out social spending. Forge public-private partnerships for inclusion to co-finance social infrastructure. This includes education, health and digital access.

Knowledge and capacity building: joint research platforms are required to enable more collaborative work on climate adaptation, food security and inclusive digitalisation. South-south and triangular co-operation should be increased to share experiences and best practices among developing nations with support from multilateral institutions. Managed labour mobility schemes through skills partnerships will benefit both sending and receiving countries.

Governance and multilateral reform: reforming global institutions like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization is essential to give developing economies stronger voices in these institutions.

What should African countries be doing?

China, India and other leading eastern countries have proven themselves formidable rivals to the west – economically, militarily and in global governance. Africa occupies a central position. It has the opportunity to become a key player in shaping the future of the global economy.

A number of recommendations should serve as priority areas – particularly over the next decade.

The first would include building a digital backbone, and enhancing technology and AI capabilities. These have become core drivers of competitiveness. Without infrastructure and skills, countries are relegated to raw-material suppliers.

Countries need:

• a national broadband and data-centre strategy (public-private), and incentives to attract the building of regional data centres

• more training in science, technology, engineering, maths and artificial intelligence. Examples include fast-track bootcamps, ICT in secondary schools and support for local AI startups.

Secondly, governments should continue to secure investment in digital infrastructure, such as fibre optics, 5G networks and data centres. They could potentially use China’s Digital Silk Road, which promotes affordable tech alternatives.

Secondly, South Africa and other African countries need to prioritise economic inclusion and sustainable development to fast-track broad-based inclusive economic development. This should be the core driver of their development strategy.

Thirdly, African governments must strategically navigate geopolitical shifts and alliances. They are key spheres of influence in the digital competition between the US and China, and ought to use this position to their benefit. To do this, Africna governments should:

• use Brics+ membership in a co-ordinated way to advance national interests

• foster south-south co-operation by strengthening trade, technological transfer and financial alliances with other developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. More emphasis should be placed on initiatives like the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation.

• enhance trade diplomacy and diversify markets to be able to sell more goods and services in Asian, European and intra-African markets

• maximise external investment by securing investments, infrastructure and digital partnerships from both the US and China. This will position African countries to benefit from the global technology competition.

– Trade is shaping new global power relations: what this means for Africa
– https://theconversation.com/trade-is-shaping-new-global-power-relations-what-this-means-for-africa-266940

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

It remains too difficult for Africans to travel between African countries. Africa-wide reforms have failed. The keynote continental agreement, the African Union’s Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, adopted in 2018, still has only four country ratifications from 55 members.

A new report of the African Union bemoans the low (though slightly improved) level of human integration in Africa. It describes the main challenges as legal fragmentation, weak institutional frameworks, security concerns, and limited mutual recognition of documents and qualifications.

Nevertheless, some consolation can be drawn from the fact that African migration governance systems have been moving in the right direction.

We are migration researchers and, as we show in our recent report, there has been some progress. This is evident in improving scores in the annual African Visa Openness Index, which is published by the African Development Bank.

The visa openness index shows that for 28% of country‑to-country travel scenarios within Africa, African citizens do not need a visa to cross the border. This is an improvement from 20% in 2016.

But the pace of change is slow. Given this, and the fact that progress has been driven at bilateral and regional levels, is there still a role for continental initiatives?

Based on our research over the last decade, we argue that incremental reforms at all levels – unilateral, bilateral, regional and continental – can combine to move Africa forward towards free regular movement.

We recognise that the implementation of the African Union Protocol on Free Movement of Persons is still some way off. But there are opportunities to support its aims and intentions through incremental initiatives and reforms. This could include pilot programmes run under the auspices of the African Union and regional bodies that provide for categories of people to travel freely. These categories could include, for example, traders at borders or those with professional skills.

What’s standing in the way

There are many reasons a continental process to reform and align migration governance shouldn’t work.

Firstly, the African Union has an extraordinary number of members (55). The European Union has 27. The large number of countries makes any wholesale continental institutional intervention difficult.

Secondly, there are huge levels of inequality both within and between African countries. The richest country in Africa has an income per person on average – taking costs into account – around 53 times higher than the poorest. Large income differences between countries, sometimes coinciding with better judicial systems and social services, make it likely that, whatever the reality, vulnerable residents in the richer country are likely to fear an uncontrolled influx.

Thirdly, the level of institutional development varies hugely between countries. Population registration is very weak in many African countries. Unicef estimated that in 2022, more than half of the unregistered children in the world were African. The Lancet medical journal estimated that in 2021 only one in three deaths in Africa were registered. Systems for issuing identification documents and passports are imperfect. Confidence in other countries keeping good records of citizens and monitoring criminal and terrorist activity are key ingredients of a good migration partnership.

But Africans cannot afford to allow these and other obstacles to diminish the effort towards a fully integrated continent.

In a world of large, competing power blocs, Africa’s fragmentation puts it at a huge disadvantage. In any case, compared with much of the rest of the world, at least Africa is moving in the right direction. It is mostly opening borders, rather than closing them.

The efforts so far

African initiatives to facilitate easier border crossings have a long history.

In 1991, the Abuja Treaty committed Organisation of African Union member states to

establish a common market and gradually remove obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital and the right of residence and establishment.

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights guarantees the right to free movement of persons. The Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2030) is a detailed plan for implementing the Free Movement of Persons Protocol.

The 2018 protocol itself explained why freer movement would be beneficial for Africa’s social and economic development. It set up a programme of three phases, from visa-free visits to (eventually) rights to settle, work and start a business.

We noted some evidence that citizens of African countries are often more open to freer movement than their governments are.

Unlike the Free Movement of Persons Protocol, the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) has been widely ratified and is in the process of implementation. It provides for specific categories of travellers to be allowed free movement in the course of service delivery.

The free movement protocol is, in practice, driven by a few busy staffers in the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, with some kind external assistance. The AfCFTA is driven by a relatively large, dedicated secretariat with wide support within and beyond Africa.

A more practical way forward

One of the conclusions we have drawn from our research is that a varied approach might work better.

For example, migration expert Amanda Bisong has pointed out that the AfCFTA services protocol makes provision for the visa-free movement of certain categories of professional and business persons. If implemented, this would be a significant continental step towards broader reforms.

We noted previously that such “neo-liberal” or “elitist” reforms could pave the way to broader multilateral reforms, as was the case in South America. The term “neo-liberal migration reform” was coined in South America to refer to visa-free travel for elites, but not for lower-skilled people.

Secondly, informal cross-border traders could be included into the ambit of formality within a specific agreement. Or as an extension of the services protocol of the free trade agreement.

Thirdly, such initiatives could be initiated as pilot programmes under the auspices of the AU and some regional blocs. Their purpose would be to support the free trade agreement services protocol commitment and to formalise informal traders.

Such pilot programmes could include:

• the implementation of regional agreements on mutual recognition of skills

• special economic zones with freer movement provisions, or

• harmonised visa policies for specific categories of persons.

If successful, these models could be scaled up to encourage broader adoption of the AU Free Movement of Persons Protocol.

Countries with weaker institutional capacities should not be left behind in integrating mobility into the implementation of the free trade agreement. Capacity-building programmes, including financial and technical assistance, should be provided to states that struggle with border management, migration governance or digital infrastructure.

We also noted that continental and regional forums to exchange views and experiences in migration policy and practice are important. We recommend more frequent and more focused forums to monitor the implementation of migration reform policies and discuss the systematic deepening of reforms.

– Travel between African countries is still hard: fresh ideas to get movement flowing
– https://theconversation.com/travel-between-african-countries-is-still-hard-fresh-ideas-to-get-movement-flowing-266837