Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

The Congolese military court has accused former president Joseph Kabila of treason, corruption, war crimes and supporting the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group. During court proceedings that began in July 2025, arguments were made for utilising the death penalty against Kabila, who was in power from 2001 to 2019. The trial is going on in Kabila’s absence as the threat of arrest led him into exile. The former president had fought against the M23’s first iteration in 2012-2013, as well as its predecessor, the National Congress for the Defence of the People, which fought the DRC government between 2006 and 2009. Jonathan R. Beloff, who has studied the regional and internal political dynamics in the DRC for over a decade, examines the implications of the case.

What is Joseph Kabila’s political history?

Joseph Kabila took over as president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on 26 January 2001 after the assassination of his father, Laurent-Désiré. He was 29.

Before this, during the First Congo War (1996-1997), he served in the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, which aimed to overthrow the Zairean dictator Joseph Mobutu. This war has been labelled “Africa’s World War” by historians like Gérard Prunier because of the large number of foreign actors it involved. These include Angola, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda.

A significant number of soldiers and commanders in the alliance were Rwandan. Much of the war was conducted by Rwandan General James Kabarebe, who became a de facto father figure for Kabila, training him in military strategy, tactics and politics.

A breakdown in Rwanda’s relationship with the DRC in 1998 led to the bloody Second Congo War (1998-2003). It was between Uganda, Rwanda and to a lesser extent Burundi, who fought against the DRC and its allies like Angola and Zimbabwe. The war was mostly fought by rebels from these nations who had varying interests. During this period, Kabila became the deputy chief of staff for the Congolese military.

After he became president, he successfully applied pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to negotiate peace agreements in 2002.

Overall, his presidential term was marred by the persecution of political rivals, corruption and multiple active rebel forces in the volatile eastern region.

Further, despite the DRC’s constitution forbidding it, Kabila extended his presidency from two five-year terms, only stepping down in 2019. A political deal was struck that saw him relinquish power and hand over to Felix Tshisekedi.

What has happened to Kabila since then?

Kabila and his successor have not seen eye to eye.

Since departing from power, the former president has faced increased accusations of corruption during his presidency. Further, by 2021, many of Kabila’s supporters within the government and military had been removed.

The relationship between the two further soured in 2023 when Kabila spoke out against Tshisekedi’s handling of the M23’s violent campaign in eastern DRC. Kabila has also criticised Tshisekedi’s use of uncontrolled militias, Wazalendo, who have been unsuccessful in combating the M23.

Kabila went into self-exile, reportedly in South Africa and other African nations, that year. He returned to eastern DRC’s regional hub Goma in May 2025, when he met with M23 leaders.

The Congolese government used Kabila’s visit to M23-controlled Goma to justify the charges brought against him. Further, the government suspended Kabila’s political party, Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie. The party represented Kabila’s interest in Congo’s legislative branch.

Soon after the party’s suspension, the senate stripped Kabila of his immunity, allowing charges to be filed against the former president.

Why is the case against Kabila before a military court?

While Kabila doesn’t hold any political or military post – he last served as president and major-general in January 2019 – his past experience in the army led to a military rather than civilian process.

Additionally, the case is before a military court as Kabila is accused of committing treason by meeting with an opposing military force, the M23. The government seized his assets after he met and engaged with leaders of the rebel group.

While it’s not the most significant charge, Kabila also faces accusations of massive corruption during his 18-year presidency. Further, he’s being held accountable for past military decisions that led to war crimes, murder and rape during and after the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

What are the implications of the court case for DRC’s peace process?

In June 2025, Rwanda and the DRC signed a peace agreement following negotiations led by Qatar and the United States.

On the surface, the agreement could lead to regional stability and growth. However, for Tshisekedi, it is a landmine of political risks.

Since the M23’s resurgence in November 2021, Tshisekedi has blamed Rwanda, as well as the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge, who are historically Rwandan populations resident in eastern DRC, for the return of the rebel group.

The new peace deal significantly complicates Tshisekedi’s relationship with his key political allies and ministers. If they begin to believe he is caving in to Rwanda, Tshisekedi could lose the presidency ahead of next year’s election.

Thus, in my view, based on my research on Congolese instability, Tshisekedi needed to find a political distraction that his supporters could rally behind.

Kabila’s return to Goma and relationship with the M23 provided that opportunity. The court case allows Tshisekedi to highlight his fight against the rebel group and its allies. The Congolese military has been unable to significantly halt the M23’s advances.

The case also allows the president to demonstrate his tough stance on opposition figures.

However, Tshisekedi will need to be careful of the potential implications of the case for himself. Kabila’s remaining loyalists could become even more daring in standing up against Tshisekedi. While a majority were removed, there are still some left.

– Joseph Kabila is on trial for treason in the DRC. What the case against the former president is all about
– https://theconversation.com/joseph-kabila-is-on-trial-for-treason-in-the-drc-what-the-case-against-the-former-president-is-all-about-264412

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Richard Atimniraye Nyelade, Lecturer, Sociological and Anthropological Studies, L’Université d’Ottawa/University of Ottawa

Fatima, a fisherwoman on Lake Chad, sets out at dawn not just to make a living from the shrinking waters, but to pay a “tax”. Before casting her net, she must hand over part of her meagre earnings to armed men claiming allegiance to Boko Haram. If she refuses, her catch, her boat, even her life, could be taken.

Boko Haram is an insurgent network that began in north-east Nigeria in 2002 and later fractured into two main factions: JAS (Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, the original Boko Haram faction) and ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province, the Islamic State affiliate in the region). Both operate across Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon.

Economic shakedowns like this are happening every day throughout the Lake Chad Basin. This is a vast, drought-stricken region spanning the borderlands around Lake Chad in north-eastern Nigeria, south-eastern Niger, western Chad and northern Cameroon. It is home to more than 30 million people whose livelihoods depend on fishing, farming and herding.

I am a researcher of climate-related insecurity and conflict. In a recent paper, I looked at how environmental degradation, regional instability and external geopolitical interests are exacerbating the conflict in the region. The study drew on qualitative analysis of security reports and academic literature. These include the United Nations Development Programme’s 2022 conflict analysis of the Lake Chad Basin and the World Food Programme’s 2024 climate and food-security report.

The paper sets out how Boko Haram has come to operate like a parallel government, imposing taxes on trade, farming and fishing. It offers harsh order in exchange for revenue.

I conclude from my findings that war is no longer driven only by belief. It’s driven by a collapsing economy, ecological ruin and the absence of viable alternatives.

Understanding these factors is crucial for developing comprehensive security strategies. Based on the findings I recommend five interventions: investment in the ecological recovery of the region; the strengthening of cross-border intelligence to choke the illicit trade in fish, cattle, arms and people; transparency from foreign players about their motives; the rebuilding of local economies and support for displaced communities; and lastly the rebuilding of trust with local communities.

Environmental degradation

Lake Chad’s open-water area fell from about 25,000 km² in the early 1960s to lows of a few hundred km² in the 1980s, and has generally remained under one-tenth of its 1960s extent with strong variability. This is documented in satellite analyses by Nasa and the United States Geological Survey.

This isn’t just an ecological crisis. As water recedes and fertile land disappears, fishing, farming and herding collapse. The basin hosts about 30 million people across 10 subnational regions or states.

In 2024, Niger’s floods affected about 1.5 million people nationwide, with Diffa recording around 50,000 affected and authorities on alert along the Komadougou Yobe river. The Red Cross also flagged basin-wide flood emergencies that month.

The basin’s ecological collapse has turned Lake Chad into a recruitment ground. The World Food Programme shows how droughts and erratic rainfall have crushed agricultural yields. The UN Development Programme links these environmental shocks to rising displacement, hunger and extremism.

Across the shared basin, Boko Haram has built a brutal, extractive shadow economy. In Nigeria, the group at one point controlled up to half of the fish trade around Baga. Fishermen were taxed at every stage, from lake to market. Refusal brought violence.

In Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, Boko Haram factions have orchestrated cattle rustling that has decimated pastoralist communities. My research details how armed raids strip herders of their livelihoods overnight. The stolen animals are sold through cross-border smuggling networks, feeding the insurgency. The group also taxes livestock traders at makeshift checkpoints, turning rustling and market levies into steady revenue.

Across the basin, kidnapping has become an industry. The UN reports that kidnapping for ransom remains a key revenue source for Boko Haram/ISWAP, and that a “large ransom” was paid in the 2018 Dapchi schoolgirls case. What began as ideological acts, like the abduction of schoolgirls, has turned into a ruthless business model. Ransoms pay for weapons, logistics and recruitment.

Regional instability

Ecological and economic desperation fuels regional instability. As communities fracture and compete over dwindling resources, the borders of the four Chad Basin countries become highways for insurgents, smugglers and arms.

Since 2014 Boko Haram has spilled from Nigeria into Cameroon, Chad and Niger, where security forces are stretched and coordination is uneven. Arms flow through the Sahel and abuses by security actors erode public trust, which in turn eases recruitment.

The paper details how national armies, often under-equipped and struggling with coordination, have been unable to secure this vast terrain. The Multinational Joint Task Force, a regional military coalition, has had successes but is hampered by these same challenges.

This security vacuum is the space in which Boko Haram’s parallel governance and illicit economy thrive, making the crisis a truly regional one that no single country can solve alone. The result is a conflict system that crosses borders, mixes ideology with profit, and outlasts purely military responses.

Bombs not the answer

Military force alone cannot fix this. It’s necessary to address the root causes, ecological collapse, broken livelihoods, and the economic lifelines that keep the insurgency going.

The Lake Chad Basin Commission is the intergovernmental body that manages the lake’s resources. Created in 1964 by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, and later joined by the Central African Republic and Libya, the commission and national governments must lead with urgency and courage. They must:

• invest in climate resilience, large-scale water management, drought-resistant crops, restored wetlands and sustainable fishing

• disrupt illicit trade and go after the money, not just the militants

• demand transparency from foreign actors about their agendas in the region

• rebuild local economies and trust.

Fatima’s daily struggle on Lake Chad is not just about fish. It is about the future of the region. The shrinking lake, the abandoned villages, the armed taxmen – these are not side effects. They are the story.

– Military force isn’t the solution for Lake Chad Basin conflict: the key is rebuilding local economies
– https://theconversation.com/military-force-isnt-the-solution-for-lake-chad-basin-conflict-the-key-is-rebuilding-local-economies-262640

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Wynberg, Professor and DSTI/NRF SARChI Bio-economy Research Chair, University of Cape Town

A ground-breaking benefit-sharing agreement was signed in 2019 between South Africa’s lucrative rooibos herbal tea industry and two organisations representing Indigenous San and Khoi people.

Indigenous San and Khoi – the oldest known populations of southern Africa – are traditionally hunter-gatherers and pastoralists. Their traditional knowledge also contributed towards the development of the rooibos tea industry.

Today, the commercial rooibos tea industry sells more than 22,000 tons of tea every year and has an annual export value of over US$50 million.

Although apartheid ended in 1994, the rooibos tea industry is still dominated by white-owned companies. These companies benefited from years of subsidies and protection by the apartheid government. Rooibos farmers who were classified as “Coloured” (an apartheid-era race term imposed on indigenous Khoi-San and other ethnically diverse oppressed people of colour) were excluded from the industry during this time.

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Read more: How justice can be brought to South Africa’s rooibos industry

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The 2019 access and benefit-sharing agreement was meant to change that. It is legally binding, and sets out how those who hold traditional knowledge about rooibos will benefit from the industry.

Access and benefit-sharing agreements like this one are governed by global conventions and protocols. The main aim is to stop genetic resources and traditional knowledge from being used in commercial products without consent or compensation for the traditional knowledge holders and resource owners. They also aim to prevent biopiracy. In other words, they aim to strengthen the rights of Indigenous peoples and local communities over their natural resources.

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Read more: Justice is still not being done in the exploitation of indigenous products

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Many national laws now require companies to set up these agreements. In this sense, the 2019 rooibos benefit-sharing agreement was historic because it formally recognised, for the first time, the role of San and Khoi traditional knowledge in the development of the rooibos industry.

We are anthropologists, sociologists, environmental scientists, indigenous heritage practitioners and policy researchers. We’ve carried out decades of participatory action research with small-scale rooibos farmers and other Indigenous groups.

Our research found that the 2019 rooibos agreement has not changed who owns and benefits most from rooibos. Control remains vested in an industry set up during colonialism and apartheid. This is because the white-dominated industry still owns most of the tea lands and cultivates about 93% of rooibos tea today. This allows the same commercial farmers and industry players to continue to dominate the market.

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Read more: How a South African community’s request for its genetic data raises questions about ethical and equitable research

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Less than 7% of rooibos tea lands are today controlled by Indigenous farmers. As a result, they’re only able to produce about 2% of South Africa’s rooibos tea.

Our research also found that the rooibos agreement does not grapple with local contexts and struggles over identity. While some small-scale farmers identify as Khoi-San and “first nation”, they do not always recognise the authority of the councils endorsed by the government to represent them. Other small-scale farmers do not feel a connection to a Khoi-San identity at all, instead identifying with a “Coloured” heritage.

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Read more: South Africa’s honeybush sector must transform from its unjust past: what needs to change

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These problems need to be solved now because other South African plant industries based on traditional use, such as buchu, an indigenous shrub used widely in the herbal, flavour and fragrance industries, and honeybush tea, have begun adopting the rooibos benefit-sharing model.

For biodiversity-based economies to transform, they must go beyond agreements about sharing access to plants and profits from their sale. Government must recognise local guardians of biodiversity and redistribute land, and along with industry, must embrace economic transformation. If they don’t, they run the risk of securing benefits only for the few who are politically connected and organised.

A flawed process

In 2010, the South African San Council claimed the right to benefit from rooibos and honeybush. They were later joined by the National Khoisan Council, a body initiated by former president Nelson Mandela in 1999 as a way of including Khoi-San historical leadership in post-apartheid South Africa.

Government-commissioned research at the time urged the commercial rooibos tea industry to negotiate benefit-sharing agreements with the two organisations or risk losing its licence to operate.

However, these two groups do not represent all Khoi-San groups. Many small-scale rooibos farmers, who have deep historical connections to the plant and its traditional knowledge, weren’t part of the negotiations for the agreement. Small-scale rooibos farmers are typically ethnically diverse descendants of San, Khoi, former slaves, and European settlers.

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Read more: South Africa’s traditional medicines should be used in modern health care

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They were eventually included in the final agreement as “rooibos indigenous farming communities”, but only through the National Khoisan Council and not in their own right.

The agreement offered some reparation for past injustices by establishing a “traditional knowledge levy” of 1.5% of the price that farmers receive. The levy – about US$700,000 per year – is paid to the South African San Council and National Khoisan Council.

What’s missing

The agreement has been cited as an example of best practice in equitable business. Yet small-scale rooibos farmers receive just 5% of the benefits. And they are also expected to pay towards the levy because they produce rooibos tea. Overall, they benefit little from access and benefit sharing.

The agreement doesn’t include everyone who holds traditional knowledge about rooibos, and therefore not every Indigenous rooibos grower benefits. It assumes that traditional knowledge is confined to specific groups. In contrast, research has found that Indigenous knowledge is shared across groups. It evolves and takes different forms over time.

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Read more: Archaeology is changing, slowly. But it’s still too tied up in colonial practices

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The effect of the rooibos agreement is that small-scale Indigenous farmers are less empowered. They need to find the resources to organise across large distances and find ways to get legal support if they are to benefit equally.

More widely, our research shows that the agreement has introduced a new, intervening role for the state. In this case, the state rewarded ethnically defined beneficiaries. This raises questions about the power of the state and how it controls who is entitled to receive information, knowledge and benefits.

What next?

The rooibos agreement has given recognition and economic benefits to some Indigenous groupings. It’s been hailed as a transformation milestone, but has not brought about the changes needed to address social and economic inequities. Real change would include equal access to land, a more inclusive industry, and the wider sharing of economic benefits.

Access and benefit sharing is due for radical rethink. It needs an inclusive, bold, caring and imaginative approach that should be co-designed with communities from the outset. It needs an approach that is rooted in local context. Only this will create new possibilities for inclusive economic power, sustainability and recognition.

– South Africa’s small-scale rooibos tea growers aren’t getting much from an industry deal – why it’s not fair
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-small-scale-rooibos-tea-growers-arent-getting-much-from-an-industry-deal-why-its-not-fair-261288

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By XN Iraki, Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of Nairobi

The Central Bank of Kenya has made two significant changes in the country’s banking sector. The first is to lift a decade-long moratorium on licensing new banks. Second is to raise capital requirements, the amount of money banks are required to keep readily available compared with the value of other assets they have. Bank capital is what shareholders have invested in the banking business. It’s a buffer against insolvency. Higher capital makes a bank stronger by reassuring depositors that their money is “safe” in case of a financial crisis. Economics professor XN Iraki answers some questions about Kenya’s banking sector and the importance of the two latest policy changes.

What is the state of Kenya’s banking sector?

Kenya has 39 licensed banks. Of these, 17 are classified as foreign-owned with 50% or more shareholding held by foreign interests. All the top commercial banks are listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Three are majority government-owned while the rest are privately owned.

Kenya’s banking sector is known for its dynamism. This is reflected in the adoption of innovations, new product offerings and technology. It is also seen in the growth in assets, deposits and profitability. Finally, it is also evidenced in the mergers, buyouts and growth across borders into the neighbouring countries.

KCB Group – a publicly owned bank that is also the country’s largest – as well as privately owned Equity Bank have established foreign subsidiaries or acquisitions in Uganda, Tanzania, South Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The use of technology, for instance linking bank accounts with the popular M-pesa mobile payment platform, has made banking easier and more accessible. This has made banking popular with the younger generation, including Generation Z, who are astute at using technology.

The Kenyan banking sector is dominated by nine large banks that accounted for about 90% of the profit in 2024.

Nonetheless, the sector has been stable in recent years. It’s a far cry from the 1980s, when bank failures were constantly in the headlines. Up until 1998, 37 bank failures had been recorded. More followed in 2003 and in 2015.

Why did the government ban new banks 10 years ago? What was the impact?

The moratorium on licensing new banks was instituted in 2015. This followed the failure of Dubai Bank on 14 August 2015 and Imperial Bank on 13 October 2015.

At about the same time, another institution – Chase Bank – was in trouble. It was placed under management on 7 April 2016.

The banks were closed to protect depositors and ensure stability of the sector. But banning new banks was not the best solution. It stifled competition and could have led to the current situation where a few banks dominate the market.

Though the failures were not the first, they were a big blot on Kenya’s financial sector. They could have slowed the growth of the sector in at least two ways. First is the restriction on new players. Second, the perceptions of higher risk would have led to more cautious investment and lending decisions.

What are the limits placed on banks wanting to set up in Kenya?

Banks are subject to regulation and rules set out in the Banking Act. These rules relate to licensing, capital requirements, who may be a shareholder or director, and protection of customer deposits, among other aspects. For this reason, shareholders and key employees are subject to vetting by regulators.

These regulations can be enhanced from time to time. It’s the basis on which the Central Bank of Kenya has increased bank core capital requirements to 5 billion shillings (US$38 million) by 2026. This will double to 10 billion shillings (US$76 million) by 2029. Core capital as defined by Central Bank of Kenya is “shareholders equity in the form of issued and fully paid-up shares of common stock, plus all disclosed reserves, less goodwill or any other intangible assets.”

Higher core capital is expected to strengthen banks and possibly reduce the number of players as some banks merge or are absorbed by stronger players.

This can only be counterbalanced if more banks enter the market after the moratorium was lifted. That would be the ideal case. More competition would lead to lower interest rates, which act as an economic stimulus. It would be easier to borrow money for more consumption or investment.

Higher core capital is a double edged sword. Lifting the moratorium will lead to greater competition if more banks enter the market. But higher core capital might deter new entrants. One speculation is that lifting the moratorium could usher in global brands with more capital and a competitive edge.

Investors who can overcome the higher core capital and join this sector are likely to reap big. Kenyan banks are a popular choice for investors in the security markets and are generally profitable.

What opportunities or pitfalls will the Central Bank be watching out for?

The lifting of the moratorium on new banks and raising capital requirements could be the start of more changes in the Kenyan banking sector.

It’s expected that with new capital requirements Kenyan banks will become bigger and more resilient and serve as the lubricant of economic growth. Bigger and fewer banks are likely to be more stable and easier to supervise.

Will bigger banks adequately respond to the needs of small and microenterprises (SMEs) and individuals? Will they keep the focus on local communities? Could new licences be granted to the politically connected as happened in the past? Here could lie a pitfall. The true test of such policy decisions is achieving faster economic growth and higher standards of living for all.

– Kenya has introduced new banking policies. An economist weighs them up
– https://theconversation.com/kenya-has-introduced-new-banking-policies-an-economist-weighs-them-up-261590