Director of the Media and Communication Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Meets with the Director-General of the Paris Peace Forum

Source: Government of Qatar

Doha – 10 June 2026

Mr. Ibrahim bin Sultan Al Hashmi, Director of the Media and Communication Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met today with Mr. Justin Vaïsse, Director-General of the Paris Peace Forum, who is currently visiting the country.

During the meeting, the two sides reviewed aspects of media cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Paris Peace Forum and discussed ways to strengthen the partnership in highlighting humanitarian and diplomatic efforts, in a manner that reflects the close relations between the State of Qatar and the French Republic and contributes to supporting initiatives aimed at promoting dialogue and international cooperation.

Venezuela Energy Week 2026 to Define New Investment Pathways as Hydrocarbons and Power Sector Reforms Move into Implementation

Source: APO

Venezuela Energy Week (VEW) 2026 is set to become a focal point for how the country’s hydrocarbons reforms are translating from policy into practice, as government stakeholders, PDVSA and international operators work to define the practical routes for investment entry into the oil and gas sector. With reforms now moving into implementation, attention is shifting from regulatory design toward the mechanisms that will determine how participation is structured, financed and sustained.

Venezuela’s current framework is being operationalized through a limited set of established and negotiated channels, including participation in PDVSA joint ventures, crude-backed repayment structures and production-linked agreements tied to existing oilfields. International operators such as Chevron, for instance, remain active within existing joint venture structures, including Petropiar in the Orinoco Belt and Petroboscán in western Zulia, which continue to underpin production and export activity under PDVSA-led arrangements.

Alongside joint venture activity, crude-based repayment mechanisms are becoming an increasingly important financial pathway for foreign participation. These arrangements – including crude-for-debt structures and production-linked repayment agreements – allow international partners to recover value through physical oil cargoes or allocated output rather than conventional financial transfers.

Companies such as Repsol and Eni have operated within similar frameworks, where repayment structures effectively shape cash flow recovery, exposure management and the timing of capital return. However, these mechanisms continue to operate under constraints, including delayed settlements, non-standard payment schedules and ongoing uncertainty around contract enforcement, all of which continue to weigh on long-term reinvestment planning. VEW 2026 will help stakeholders assess how these frameworks can be refined to improve predictability, strengthen implementation and support more scalable and sustained investment participation.

Beyond hydrocarbons, Venezuela is beginning to open selective pathways in the power sector. Recent policy discussions and incremental reforms have pointed toward greater private participation in electricity generation, alongside early-stage efforts to improve operational efficiency across the grid and expand space for independent power producers. While still in a gradual phase of liberalization, these developments suggest an additional entry point for international and regional investors, particularly in generation, infrastructure rehabilitation and distributed energy solutions.

As reforms progress, VEW 2026 will serve as a key platform for aligning policy intent with operational realities, bringing together public and private stakeholders to assess how existing mechanisms are functioning in practice and where adjustments may be needed. Key issues such as payment timing, contractual enforcement and risk allocation remain central to the investment environment, shaping whether current frameworks can support scalable reinvestment or remain limited to sustaining baseline production. Beyond policy direction, the event will help clarify investment entry points and how capital can be deployed across both hydrocarbons and emerging power sector opportunities.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Energy Capital & Power.

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President Museveni Assures World Health Organization (WHO) of Uganda’s Readiness to Contain Ebola and Calls for Stronger Regional Collaboration

Source: APO


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President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has assured the World Health Organization (WHO) of Uganda’s continued commitment and preparedness to contain the ongoing Ebola outbreak, emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation and swift public health interventions to prevent the spread of the disease.

The President made the remarks today during a meeting with the Director-General of the World Health Organization, Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, at State House Entebbe. The meeting was also attended by senior officials from the Ministry of Health and the WHO Uganda Country Office. President Museveni informed the WHO delegation that Uganda remains vigilant and has put in place robust measures to contain the outbreak within its borders while also working closely with neighboring countries, particularly the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where some of the
cases have originated.

The President revealed that he had already held productive discussions with the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo, H.E. Félix Tshisekedi, on strengthening collaboration between the two countries to limit the cross-border spread of Ebola. “We have been engaging our counterparts in the DRC to ensure that we work together in addressing this challenge” President Museveni noted.

The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health, Dr. Diana Atwine, briefed the meeting on the current status of the outbreak, stating that Uganda is presently managing nineteen confirmed Ebola cases. According to Dr. Atwine, fourteen of the nineteen cases involve members of the same family who entered Uganda from the Democratic Republic of Congo. She, however, reported encouraging progress in the containment efforts, noting that no new Ebola case had been registered in the previous three days.

“Our surveillance and response teams remain fully engaged. We continue to monitor contacts, strengthen screening measures, and ensure that all suspected cases are promptly identified and managed,” Dr. Atwine said. She further disclosed that the Ministry of Health had identified four strategic locations within the Democratic Republic of Congo, close to the Uganda-DRC border, where medical camps would be established to support local health authorities in managing Ebola cases.

The proposed treatment and response centers are intended to serve communities near the border and reduce the number of Ebola patients crossing into Uganda in search of treatment. Dr. Atwine explained that many Congolese patients have increasingly sought treatment in Uganda due to the confidence they have developed in Uganda’s ability to effectively manage epidemics and public health emergencies. The Minister of Health, Dr. Chris Baryomunsi, highlighted the significance of the initiative, saying it would strengthen cross-border disease control efforts and help address the outbreak closer to its source.

Dr. Baryomunsi noted that establishing treatment facilities within the DRC would significantly reduce cross-border movement of Ebola patients while supporting local response efforts. President Museveni welcomed the proposal and advised that the treatment centers be established as close to the border as possible to effectively serve vulnerable populations.

“It should be near the border, not far inside the DRC, because we are targeting those who are trying to escape and seek treatment elsewhere,” the President advised. The President also highlighted the difficult but necessary decision by the government to suspend this year’s Uganda Martyrs Day celebrations at Namugongo, one of the country’s largest annual religious gatherings.

The annual event typically attracts more than three million pilgrims and visitors from Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Kenya, West Africa, and other parts of the world. President Museveni said suspending the celebrations was an important public health measure aimed at preventing a possible surge in infections. Dr. Tedros commended Uganda for taking decisive action, describing the suspension of the Martyrs Day celebrations as a courageous and responsible decision.

“Thank you for stopping the Martyrs Day celebrations. It was going to be a super-spreader event,” Dr. Tedros told President Museveni.

The WHO Director-General praised Uganda’s leadership and the country’s proven capacity to respond effectively to public health emergencies, citing its experience in handling previous Ebola outbreaks and other infectious diseases.

He pledged the World Health Organization’s continued support through financial resources, logistics, technical expertise, and additional personnel to strengthen Uganda’s response efforts.

Dr. Tedros further welcomed Uganda’s innovative approach of extending support beyond its borders by establishing treatment facilities near affected communities in the DRC. He also encouraged President Museveni to continue engaging President Tshisekedi and other regional leaders in coordinated efforts to address the outbreak and prevent its spread across the region. The meeting underscored the strong partnership between Uganda and the World Health Organization in safeguarding public health and demonstrated a shared commitment to strengthening regional
preparedness, surveillance, and response mechanisms against Ebola.

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of The Republic of Uganda – Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Uganda: Ministers take oath as ex officio Members of Parliament

Source: APO

Nineteen ministers have taken Oaths of Allegiance and of Member of Parliament following their approval by the Appointments Committee. 
The 19 ministers are ex-officio Members of Parliament who do not represent any constituencies but were appointed as ministers by the President.

The ministers took oath on Wednesday, 10 June 2026 at a House sitting chaired by Speaker, Jacob Marksons Oboth.

The process of taking oath is governed in accordance with Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of Parliament, which provides that:
“No Member shall take his or her seat in Parliament before taking and subscribing to the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of a Member of Parliament specified in the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution”.

However, under Article 78(4) of the Constitution, ex officio members do not have the right to vote on any issue requiring a decision of Parliament.

Among those sworn in was Hon. Sanjay Tanna, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives, who will head Trade Ministry. While administering the oaths,  Oboth noted that much was expected from Tanna in advancing Uganda’s trade and industrialisation agenda.

The other ministers who took oath were, Hon. Sam Mayanja (Attorney General), Hon. Kiryowa Kiwanuka who takes the Minister of Defence docket.

The others were Hon. Balaam Barugahara (Local Government), Hon. Cissy Mulondo (State Minister for Finance), Hon. Justine Kasule Lumumba (Information, Communication Technology and National Guidance), Hon. Monica Musenero (Energy and Mineral Development) and Hon. Tom Butime ( Tourism, Wildlife and Antiquities).
The ceremony formally enables the ministers to discharge their duties in Parliament, including presenting government business, responding to matters raised by Members and participating in debates.

In a related development, the Leader of the Opposition, Hon. Joel Ssenyonyi presented a 30-member Shadow Cabinet to oversee and scrutinise the work of the Cabinet.

The appointment of the Shadow Cabinet is provided for under Rule 15(2) of the Rules of Procedure of Parliament. 
“The Leader of the Opposition shall, in consultation with his or her party leadership, appoint a shadow cabinet from Members of the opposition in Parliament to provide alternative policy and administration,” the rule states.

The Shadow Cabinet includes among others, Hon. Harriet Nakwedde Deputy Opposition Whip and Minister for Presidency; Hon. Erias Nalukoola as Shadow Attorney General; Hon. Hassan Kaps Fungaroo as Shadow Minister for Security, Hon. Joseph Ssewungu, Shadow Minister for Defence and Veteran Affairs and Hon. Eugenia Nassolo (Shadow Minister for Cooperatives and Microfinance). 

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.

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Ministra da Justiça participa na Abertura da Sessão Técnica sobre o Sistema Nacional de Dados sobre Tráfico de Pessoas

Source: Africa Press Organisation – Portuguese –

Baixar .tipo

A Ministra da Justiça, Joana Rosa, participou, hoje, 9 de junho, na Abertura da Sessão Técnica sobre o Sistema Nacional de Dados sobre Tráfico de Pessoas.

A sessão de abertura contou com intervenções institucionais e culminou com a assinatura do Protocolo de Cooperação entre o Observatório Nacional do Tráfico de Pessoas (ONTP) e o Instituto Nacional de Estatística de Cabo Verde (INECV), um marco importante para o fortalecimento da cooperação interinstitucional na produção e gestão de dados sobre o tráfico de pessoas.

O objetivo da Sessão foi apresentar e discutir os fundamentos, a estrutura e o funcionamento de um Sistema Nacional de Informação sobre Tráfico de Pessoas, promovendo o envolvimento e compromisso das instituições relevantes.

Na sua intervenção, Joana Rosa, salientou “a importância dos dados estatísticos para a definição de políticas públicas. Impunha-se a assinatura desse protocolo para que o INE trabalhasse esses dados. Agora com a base de dados que se vai criar e a plataforma que estamos a desenvolver dentro do Ministério, entre o Observatório e o Instituto de Modernização da Inovação e Justiça, vamos cruzar as informações, fazer interagir a sociedade civil e as instituições judiciárias, para que no futuro possamos trabalhar melhor essa matéria”.

A Ministra destacou ainda a criação do Observatório que tem vindo a desenvolver um grande trabalho em matéria de sensibilização e de criação de uma consciência nacional sobre esta matéria, fazendo com que as pessoas passassem a distinguir outras tipologias de crime de tráfico humano, como por exemplo a prostituição infantil e o trabalho forçado, além de fomentar uma visão pública sobre a importância da articulação entre instituições.

Por fim, Joana Rosa garante “os dados mundiais demonstram que mulheres e crianças são as maiores vítimas desse tipo de tráfico e estamos a reforçar os mecanismos de prevenção e de repressão, levando informações e a sensibilização a essas camadas

Distribuído pelo Grupo APO para Governo de Cabo Verde.

Do aid cuts fuel violent conflict in Africa? How to promote peace

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Dominic Rohner, Professor of Economics and André Hoffman Chair in Political Economics and Governance, Geneva Graduate Institute, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)

The last 18 months have seen a historic decline in development aid budgets from various donor countries, in a period where many of them are earmarking more funds for rearmament. The biggest waves have been made by the abrupt and massive reduction in American aid.

Less than a week after President Donald Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, his administration ordered the immediate suspension of all programmes run by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) – historically the world’s largest national humanitarian donor. Officers had hours to vacate their posts, local contracts were terminated, and medical and food supply chains ground to a halt.

Researchers have already issued warnings of the severe health toll. A study published in Lancet Global Health estimates that USAID helped prevent nearly 92 million deaths between 2001 and 2021. It also projects more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030 if the cuts continue.

The rapid and massive decline in foreign aid experienced by various recipient countries can have very substantial consequences, ranging from health outcomes to armed conflict. Recent evidence suggests what types of international support could allow countries to build back better and foster peace and prosperity for coming generations.

Development aid also matters for various socio-economic outcomes. Hence one would expect aid cuts to have wide-ranging societal consequences as well. Drawing on our past work on political economic topics and development economics, we have decided to investigate this question.

Our new study finds that the sudden cuts to USAID programmes are associated with surging armed conflict in various regions across Africa.

We cross-referenced geolocated data on historical USAID disbursements with violent incidents recorded by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project across 870 African regions and over nearly two years. The project monitors conflicts.

The data paint a clear picture: in areas that had received the most American aid, the probability of conflict increased by 3.1 percentage points after January 2025 relative to the control group of places not benefiting from USAID. To account for the fact that places with US aid and others may be different from each other, we filter out the time-invariant conflict risk of particular places and focus solely on changes over time.

This amounts to a relative rise in conflict risk of 6.5%. Battles increased by nearly 7%, protests and riots by more than 5%, and conflict-related deaths by roughly 9%. These effects appear within the first few weeks and intensify over time.

International aid has always divided opinion. Some economists see it as a lever for stability; others, as fertile ground for corruption and conflict, by creating resources worth fighting over. Academic work has indeed found evidence pointing in both peace-promoting and conflict-fuelling directions when it comes to gradual aid flows. But a massive, sudden withdrawal follows a different logic – and our results confirm this.

When aid vanishes abruptly, economic opportunities contract very quickly. The cost of rebellion mechanically decreases, as participants have less to lose, yet many of the underlying reasons for conflict – economic rents, territorial disputes, ethnic tensions, political grievances – remain intact.

This mechanism may explain why violence flares up precisely where aid had been most present. Our data also show that institutions play a buffering role: where governance is stronger, the destabilising effects are markedly weaker.

We find no evidence, however, that the presence of Chinese aid projects softens the impact of USAID’s withdrawal.

What to do next?

Sub-Saharan Africa, where USAID primarily funded health, food security and basic services, is also the continent where state fragility is most widespread. Our estimates likely represent a lower bound: other European donors (including France) have begun reducing their own contributions. If these cuts accumulate, the effects could exceed what we are measuring so far.


Read more: Where do cuts to USAID leave the future of foreign aid in Africa? Podcast


Since today’s conflicts are the best predictor of tomorrow’s, a spike in violence can quickly become a trap that is very hard to escape.

Hence, the policy implications of these results are manifold. As far as other major donors are concerned, one interpretation of our findings is that at present they may want to act slowly and cautiously. After having witnessed a very significant drop in global aid and a surge in armed fighting, a rapid and massive disengagement of other major donor countries may very well accentuate the serious effects that we have documented.

Rethinking development aid

In the wake of USAID’s dismantlement there is an urgent need to rethink development aid. It is the right moment to ask difficult questions and reassess the type of international support that is best suited to promote peace and prosperity. Many questions arise: how can aid be made more resilient, less dependent on a single donor, more firmly rooted in local institutions?


Read more: Why Donald Trump’s decision to slash USAID is hurting American soft power and making the world less safe


A growing academic literature on optimal policies for peace can serve as a useful guide. A synthesis of recent research highlights the role of sound institutions, security guarantees and productivity-promoting policies. While institution building is often home-grown, international cooperation is key for the other two aspects. In particular, a series of recent studies documents the paramount importance of UN blue helmets for guaranteeing security. The presence of United Nations troops prevents the worst atrocities, suggesting that what the international community should do is to increase the blue helmets budget rather than cutting it.

Relatedly, financial aid can play a key role when it comes to investments into the economy, with wide-ranging consequences. When people have opportunities and perspective in life, they are much less likely to engage in armed conflict as leaving legal employment would entail much larger opportunity costs. Hence, it is not surprising that policies such as school construction, better health treatments and labour-market access have been found to promote peace.

Sound public policies and safety nets are crucial. As shown in a recent article, public employment programmes can provide insurance in the face of adverse shocks, leading to lower conflict levels.

Build back better

Now that the previous foreign aid system has been largely broken, the international community should not aim to restore much of the same. Rather we should aim to “build back better”. This starts with favouring types of investments that cannot be easily appropriated – physical capital can be stolen while human capital cannot. We need to make sure that money gets invested in ways that boost productivity and economic perspectives for everybody.

Together with domestic pushes for the strengthening of institutions and of inclusive governance, such international financial aid can bear fruits for generations to come.

– Do aid cuts fuel violent conflict in Africa? How to promote peace
– https://theconversation.com/do-aid-cuts-fuel-violent-conflict-in-africa-how-to-promote-peace-284158

Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo): Rwanda, M23 Forcibly Recruit, Detain Thousands

Source: APO – Report:

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Rwandan military forces and the M23 armed group carried out a campaign of forced recruitment and abusive detention of thousands of captured combatants and civilians in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today.

The 78-page report, “‘Death Was Everywhere’: Arbitrary Detention, Killings, and Forced Recruitment by the M23 and the Rwanda Defence Force,” documents large-scale roundups and arrests in North and South Kivu provinces in eastern Congo, as well as grave abuses against detainees at the Rumangabo and Tshanzu training camps in North Kivu, between mid-2024 and December 2025. M23 fighters, backed by Rwandan military personnel, have committed murder, torture, corporal punishment, and used forced labor and child soldiers, researchers found. These abuses are war crimes and should be investigated as possible crimes against humanity.

“The Rwandan-backed M23 is running so-called training camps in eastern Congo, where recruits have suffered abuse and torture, at times with deadly consequences,” said Clémentine de Montjoye, senior Great Lakes researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Regional bodies and partner governments should press Rwanda’s authorities to stop these grave abuses and support accountability for those responsible.”

Human Rights Watch interviewed 102 former detainees who escaped the Rumangabo and Tshanzu camps, were deployed with the M23, or later surrendered to the Congolese army, witnesses to abuses, as well as United Nations, M23, military, intelligence, media, and diplomatic sources. Human Rights Watch interviewed former detainees in person in Uganda and several towns in Congo and by phone in M23-controlled areas. The report also draws on verified, geolocated videos and photographs, satellite imagery of Rumangabo and Tshanzu camps, and 3D reconstruction to estimate the number of people loaded onto trucks.

Since 2024, the M23 has carried out forced recruitment drives among both civilians and captured combatants, Human Rights Watch found. After the armed group captured large swaths of territory and key eastern cities in 2025, these efforts increased in areas under their control. Thousands of Congolese soldiers, Wazalendo militia allied with national forces, police, and civilians—including children as young as 12—were recruited, sometimes voluntarily, although often forcibly.

M23 fighters set up ambushes and checkpoints on roads, apprehended people at hospitals, churches, and schools, and summoned residents under false pretenses or with threats before transporting them in trucks to the two camps.

People in the camps were beaten and lacked adequate food, water, medicine, and health care. Former detainees described summary executions and beatings of people who tried to escape the training centers or who drank water, ate food, or relieved themselves without permission. “If we were caught trying to drink from puddles on the ground, the guards beat us violently,” said a civilian held for five months. The M23 held children at Tshanzu camp for training and forced labor and selected some for guard duty and to beat other detainees.

The total number of camp deaths could only be determined if all mass graves were found and excavated, but former detainees indicated that hundreds, perhaps more, died from the harsh conditions, beatings, and executions in both camps throughout 2025.

A former detainee who was held at Tshanzu said: “I was just a student, I had never seen a dead body before. They made me bury bodies seven times, we put them in a big grave.”

Former detainees identified Rwandan soldiers during roundups and among the trainers and commanders in the camps because of their uniforms, equipment, accents, and inability to speak French or Kiswahili—which are not widely spoken in Rwanda—in conversations with detainees. Military, intelligence, and UN sources confirmed the involvement of Rwandan forces.

Rwanda’s extensive military presence and impact on M23 operations in eastern Congo show that Rwandan forces exercise effective control over the area, meeting the legal threshold for belligerent occupation under international humanitarian law. Rwandan officials could be held criminally liable for the actions of M23 forces at the training centers.

Rwandan government and M23 officials have long denied, but failed to investigate, allegations of abuse. Other armed groups in Congo, including some supported by Rwanda, have engaged in forced recruitment and the use of child soldiers in eastern Congo. Over the years, neither Congo nor Rwanda has taken serious action regarding these grave crimes, Human Rights Watch said.

In May 2026, Human Rights Watch conducted phone interviews and visited Makala prison in Kinshasa, the capital, where scores of civilians forcibly recruited by the M23 and later surrendered to Congolese forces are detained. Thirty-four detainees, including fourteen children, said Congolese military intelligence held and interrogated them for several days to a month after they surrendered before transferring them to Makala.

On June 9, Human Rights Watch wrote to Congo’s justice and defense ministers seeking information about the legal basis for their detention and other issues.

Rwanda’s international partners, including the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and its member states, and the United States, should publicly address Rwanda’s longstanding cycles of abuse and impunity in eastern Congo and review military assistance and cooperation programs with Rwanda to ensure they are not fueling further serious violations. They should promote accountability, including by imposing further targeted sanctions against M23 and Rwandan commanders and officials responsible for abuses and supporting domestic and international justice efforts.

Congolese judicial authorities should seek to preserve evidence of crimes committed in Rumangabo and Tshanzu and bring appropriate prosecutions. As part of its ongoing inquiry in eastern Congo, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) should investigate alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Rwandan and M23 forces in the context of forced recruitment campaigns and the detention of recruits in their training camps.

“The forced recruitment of civilians, including children, is part of a decades-long cycle of abuse in eastern Congo,” de Montjoye said. “Concerned governments need to show that the atrocities being committed by Rwanda and the M23 in their training camps require urgent action to stop them and show no one is beyond the reach of justice.”

– on behalf of Human Rights Watch (HRW).

Uganda: Government (Gov’t) to review policy on payment of medical interns

Source: APO – Report:

The Vice-President, H.E. Jessica Alupo, has said government will review the decision to stop payment of medical interns adding that the policies of government and their purpose, are for the people.

The Vice President made this revelation following concerns by the Leader of the Opposition, Hon. Joel Ssenyonyi who reiterated what has been in the media that medical interns will not be paid going forward.

Ssenyonyi raised the concerns during the plenary sitting chaired by Speaker Jacob Marksons Oboth on Wednesday, 10 June 2026.

Alupo said that Cabinet will hold discussions on the proposed Medical Education and Internship Policy and that the Minister of Health will later present a statement to the House.

“We are talking about the positive impact of the deliberate channeling of resources to the human resource development of our country. We can definitely review this policy” Alupo said.

Ssenyonyi said that medical interns support the medical infrastructure and ran government hospitals and health centres.

“Sometimes they work 36 hours, other times they work 48 hours, non-stop, to take care of the people of Uganda. Government has historically facilitated them to do this work,” he said.

He wondered how the medical interns will facilitate themselves and be expected to show up for work.  He called on government to urgently look into the matter, emphasising that money can be got to pay them.
“Government recently suspended public holiday functions to save money. We had already past that entire budget. Government, let us find this money, so that we can pay medical interest”, he added.

Recently, government announced that effective August 2026, medical interns will no longer receive their monthly allowance. 

According to the new policy, internship will be integrated into the formal university education system.

– on behalf of Parliament of the Republic of Uganda.

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DPWI reforms aimed at better life for all

Source: Government of South Africa

DPWI reforms aimed at better life for all

Public Works and Infrastructure Minister Dean Macpherson says his department is taking the public into its confidence as wrongdoing is investigated while also strengthening accountability, protecting public money and ensuring that it works for all South Africans.

“In the Budget Vote I will deliver this afternoon, I will speak about the broader work of this department, the work to unlock infrastructure investment, reform public employment, stabilise entities, unblock delayed projects, use public assets for public good, and turn Public Works and Infrastructure into the economic delivery unit of South Africa,” Macpherson said.

Addressing the media in Cape Town on ongoing investigations and progress in the department, Macpherson said his department cannot speak honestly about delivery without also speaking about accountability.

“We cannot build a capable department on top of broken systems. We cannot ask the public to trust us with billions of rands in assets, leases, projects and grants if we are not prepared to confront the failures, irregularities and abuses that have weakened this department over many years.”

He added that the department cannot turn South Africa into a construction site if the very department that must help lead that effort is still being held back by dysfunction, weak consequence management and those who believe that public money exists to serve private interests.

“When we ask hard questions about leases, contracts, ghost employees, lifestyle audits, underused buildings, failed projects and irregular procurement, we are not doing so to create headlines. We are doing so because we want this department to work and to serve the country. 

“Every irregular lease weakens the state’s ability to provide proper accommodation to client departments. Every failed infrastructure project delays services to communities. Every ghost employee steals from unemployed South Africans who need real opportunities. 

“Every act of gatekeeping in public employment undermines the dignity of the very people EPWP was created to serve. And every attempt to avoid accountability makes it harder to rebuild the public trust,” the Minister explained.

He added that the most urgent area of reform in this portfolio remains the Property Management Trading Entity, or PMTE which is responsible for managing one of South Africa’s largest public property portfolios. 

“It should be helping the state reduce wasteful leasing, unlock value from state assets, provide quality accommodation to client departments, and use public land and buildings for the public good.

“Instead, PMTE has too often become associated with weak systems, inflated leases, underutilised buildings, poor contract management and serious financial pressure. Its overdraft has doubled to nearly R4 billion in the last 20 months. It has not achieved a clean audit since it was established in 2014,” the minister said.

Macpherson said despite the state owning thousands of buildings and large portions of land, government continues to spend approximately R6 billion a year on private leases, many of which have raised serious concerns about value for money, market-related pricing and proper legal compliance.

“We have seen proposed leases with costs above market value. We have seen leases allowed to lapse without proper contingency plans, often deliberately so. We have seen submissions returned with detailed concerns, only for those concerns to be ignored or not properly processed. 

“And we have seen what our own investigators have described as “self-created emergencies” – where normal planning fails, delays are allowed to build up, and then urgency is used to justify bypassing proper scrutiny,” he said. – SAnews.gov.za

 

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AI regulation in Africa: why copying the European model won’t work

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kinfe Yilma, Senior Lecturer, University of Leeds

Mauritius set out its national AI strategy in 2018, the first by an African country. Since then over a dozen African states have adopted national AI policies of some sort or another.

As a national policy plan, an AI strategy typically sets out the priorities and aspirations in achieving certain policy objectives.

At the continental level, the African Union has adopted an AI strategy.

Kenya and Ethiopia have tabled draft AI laws that set out how the countries want AI governed. Morocco, Egypt and Nigeria are already mulling the idea of AI legislation. The trend shows that policymakers are slowly turning their attention from unchecked enthusiasm about AI to reckoning with governing AI risks.

As technology law and policy scholars, our research explores the dynamics of and approaches to the governance of emerging technologies like AI. Our recent work explores the origins, nature and scope of AI governance initiatives in Africa. We found a number of common threads in recent policy and legislative exercises. One such trend is for African states to adopt the European Union’s approach to AI regulation. But this needs to be called into question.

No doubt, Africa needs AI legislation. It will be vital to regulate the development and use of AI systems that pose risks to individual rights, social cohesion or even national security. Legislation can also create new regulatory bodies that oversee AI rules or other relevant laws such as data protection.

Kenya’s AI Bill, for instance, institutes the AI Commissioner as well as the AI Advisory Committee as regulators of AI systems in the country.

But the effort to turn AI policies into legislation requires reckoning for two reasons.

More laws, less implementation

One concern is whether the continent really needs a new layer of digital laws while preceding pieces of tech legislation remain largely unenforced. AI policies were meant to coordinate AI development at the national level. While some countries committed to responsible AI development, others have yet to set up or fund institutions that were to give the strategies meaning.

This points to an endemic problem in Africa: lack of implementation. Data protection is a case in point. Many African countries have enacted data protection legislation but are yet to install oversight bodies, or those established lack the resources to enforce laws.

Legislating for AI in this environment risks producing laws that will largely be aspirational in the same way as the strategies before them: they are there but aren’t implemented.

Europeanisation of African law

The second concern relates to the heavy reliance on European standards in fashioning emergent AI laws. Both Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s AI bills adopt the European Union’s risk-based approach. This involves regulating AI systems based on the nature of risk they pose. Those posing “unacceptable risks” are banned altogether and those with lower risks have to meet requirements.

Transplanting European standards is not new in African states’ attempt to regulate new and emerging technologies. The first generation of data protection and cybercrime laws in Africa drew directly from formative legal instruments in Europe. But rarely have such legal transplanting exercises been informed by or taken into account local contexts, interests and concerns. Perhaps this is why data protection standards aren’t implemented effectively.

The concern is not that the EU’s approach is inherently problematic. It’s why African states fail to envision an approach informed by local realities. AI regulation in Africa should not emerge from a compulsion to signal regulatory modernity. Laws calibrated for mature digital markets, well-resourced regulators, and rights aware consumer populations do not translate cleanly into contexts defined by thin institutional capacity, informal data flows, and populations with limited ability to exercise the rights those laws nominally protect.

Grounding regulation in reality

African states need AI laws based on a concrete and honest reckoning with what AI is actually doing or could do to the continent. Fashioning AI regulation should be preceded by critical reflection on the following key questions:

  • How is it being deployed by technology companies? How is information and misinformation spread on the continent?

  • How is it being used in public services? Who benefits when governments deploy AI in social protection, policing, or public administration?

  • Who controls the data? Large technology companies, many of them headquartered in the United States, China, or Europe, are able to collect and process vast amounts of data generated by African users. This is often done under terms of service that most users neither read nor meaningfully consent to, and with little accountability to African regulators.

  • Who bears the harms? Who bears the risk when those systems get it wrong?

  • Whose interests are unprotected? AI-powered content moderation systems, for example, perform poorly in African languages and local contexts.

Imperatives of moratorium

As the AI hype continues, African states are already deploying AI in different sectors, including healthcare. Ethiopia and Rwanda, for example, used AI in TB and cervical cancer screening. But it’s happening in a regulatory vacuum. In the absence of a robust regulatory regime, AI is likely to cause considerable harm to individuals and societies.

While AI legislation might be a promising step forward in filling the regulatory void, this effort appears to be restricted only to a few countries whose approach is yet to move past European parameters. Policymakers should rather prioritise pursuing a more considered and contextualised approach to address AI risks meaningfully.

Until then, a moratorium on the use of high-risk AI systems in sensitive domains such as healthcare should be seriously considered.

– AI regulation in Africa: why copying the European model won’t work
– https://theconversation.com/ai-regulation-in-africa-why-copying-the-european-model-wont-work-283524