Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University

The civil war in Sudan between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023, has had an impact on its neighbours. One of the most keenly affected countries is South Sudan, which became an independent state in 2011 and went on to endure its own civil war. This ended in 2018 with a tenuous peace agreement.

The impact of the Sudanese war on South Sudan, however, isn’t a straightforward spillover catastrophe. The picture is more nuanced, and this is most clearly seen in South Sudan’s oil economy. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan, explains.

What is the current status of oil exports from South Sudan through Sudan?

Landlocked South Sudan is reliant on its neighbour to the north to transport oil from its fields to the international market. Crude oil is transported via pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

However, recent drone strikes on Port Sudan carried out by the Rapid Support Forces targeted power plants that supply electricity to pumping stations along Sudan’s critical oil pipelines.

Soon after, the Sudanese army formally notified South Sudan that it would have to halt exports. Following hectic negotiations, the South Sudanese government released a statement that the stoppage could be prevented.

This back and forth has reopened the pressing question of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan’s economy and, in particular, the role of crude oil.

Assessments of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan suggest the worst: oil revenues would account for 80% of South Sudan’s budget and 90% of its fiscal revenue.

This informs the International Monetary Fund’s warnings of looming economic collapse in case of a breakdown of oil exports. The predominant view is that a shutdown of the oil pipeline through Sudan would lead to a collapse of dollar inflows to South Sudan, triggering a severe economic crisis.

However, South Sudan’s 2024-25 budget suggests a high reliance on non-oil revenue.

In fact, government oil revenues for 2024-25 are based on a volume of only around 16,000 barrels per day. This is the share of total production of about 130,000 barrels per day controlled by South Sudan. Attempts to increase production to pre-war levels of up to 400,000 barrels failed. The substantial drop in production is explained by a decline in the quality of South Sudan’s oil wells, especially in Paloch in the north-east’s Upper Nile State, and Unity State in the north-central region.

South Sudan additionally lacks the operational capacity to extract the oil it has in the ground.

The 2024-25 budget projects a hefty fiscal deficit. The revenues projected will cover only about half of total planned state spending. Oil and non-oil revenues – which mainly include tax income from international NGOs and businesses – each account for about half of the revenue that’s expected to come in.

Oil income has to account for debt (capital and interest) repayments on loans, as well as pipeline transport fees paid to Sudan. This means that even the optimistically assessed net contributions of oil revenue would only pay for 16% of planned government spending. South Sudan remains with a hefty deficit.

What are the challenges South Sudan is facing in growing oil revenues?

First, Petronas, a Malaysian multinational oil and gas company, withdrew from South Sudan in August 2024 after three decades.

It left behind substantial challenges, including an arbitration process worth more US$1 billion. This followed the government preventing Petronas from selling its shares to the British-Nigerian group Savannah Energy.

As a short-term solution, South Sudan de facto nationalised Petronas’ shares. It did this by transferring the shares to the state’s oil and gas company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (NilePet). This was perhaps in the hope of increasing revenue in the short term.

However, NilePet hasn’t been able to replace Petronas’ production logistics. This has resulted in huge challenges in restoring production to levels before the 2024 pipeline disruptions.

A second factor is the sale of oil forward. The then finance minister said in 2022 that most of the oil production had been sold in advance until 2027. He later retracted the statement, saying instead that some oil advances were merely “spread up to 2027”. While this walk-back attempted to soften the political fallout, it reinforced wider uncertainty about how much control NilePet actually retains over the revenues formally under its authority.

Given the limited relevance of oil revenues for the official South Sudanese budget, why the major concern about disruptions?

There are three reasons.

First, NilePet plays a structural role in South Sudan’s informal and often dubious hard currency circulation, which international observers would call large-scale corruption. NilePet’s accounts rarely appear in any official financial accounts and are often channelled off-budget. NilePet functions as a black box within the public finance system where real money flows can only rarely be traced. Recent intentions by the president to structurally reform the company might implicitly confirm this.

Second, there are indirect oil revenues that are important to the country’s security apparatus. This includes protection rents which come from protecting South Sudanese oil fields. This revenue never hits the budget. It pays the National Security Service either directly as salaries, or is reinvested in the considerable conglomerate of companies owned by the security service to multiply profits. Losing this revenue could destabilise the country because the funds are used to pay the salaries of the best-trained and best-equipped security service in the country.

Third, South Sudan’s ability to attract new loans depends on the repayment of existing ones. These repayments largely depend on oil production. As the 2024-24 budget shows, South Sudan desperately needs new loans to keep even core state functions operational. Yet, funding from multilateral agencies has dwindled to small-scale loans from the African Development Bank. The International Monetary Fund has currently ended all its funding programmes.

This is not a result of the war in Sudan. It is due to persistent concerns over insufficient financial governance in South Sudan and the state’s performance. Negotiations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for new loans appear to have stalled, not least because of a default in repayments to Qatar.

These factors show that the flow of oil to Port Sudan is significant to the availability of hard currency in South Sudan’s economy. But this is in more indirect ways than the outdated claim of an 80% budgetary dependency would suggest.

The war in Sudan has a significant yet multifaceted impact on South Sudan’s economic health. But Juba’s biggest challenges are internal.

South Sudan’s economy over the last six years has been mainly dependent on international loans coming in – a flow which has now dried up, resulting in a severe economic crisis unprecedented in the young country’s history.

– Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue
– https://theconversation.com/is-sudans-war-the-reason-for-south-sudans-economic-crisis-whats-really-going-on-with-oil-revenue-257375

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Egodi Uchendu, Professor (of History and International Studies), University of Nigeria

The west Africa–Sahel region has seen a proliferation of militant Islamist groups since the 1990s.

One of the most vicious groups operating in the region is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims). The militant group emerged in 2017 in Algeria and Mali, and has targeted civilian populations.

The UN listed the group as an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2018. Al-Qaeda is an Islamist organisation founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s.

The 2024 global terrorism index listed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organisations. Its influence has expanded in most parts of the Sahel. The group emerged to strengthen the jihadist insurgency under al-Qaeda. It combines violence with diplomacy to expand its influence and challenge state authorities.

Despite growing pressure from counter militancy campaigns spearheaded by local, regional and international militaries, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin continues to survive and adapt by regrouping and reorganising. This was demonstrated in its latest operation in Burkina Faso in 2024. The group exerted significant control by closing schools, setting up taxation checkpoints and abducting locals.

Its engagement in illicit economies has been key to the group’s successful expansion. This revenue is used to carry out devastating attacks.

We research jihadi-based insurgencies, and have found that this is a common tactic among terrorist groups in the west Africa-Sahel axis, including Boko Haram militants.

From our research, we find that Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin funds its activities by relying on

• artisanal mining

• kidnapping

• livestock theft

• money laundering.

Dismantling the group’s illicit economies and blocking its financial flows are key to countering its activities.

Financial resources

The group needs money for fighting, and to sustain political and social influence in its areas of operation.

Artisanal gold mining has proven to be a major factor in its expansion and resilience. In areas where the group exerts influence, illicit gold mining generates over US$30 billion annually. According to a report by Swissaid, a development group based in Switzerland, the main destinations for this gold are the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Switzerland.

The jihadists gain access to gold by controlling mining sites and transport routes to and from mines. They sometimes allow trusted allies, who include local armed groups, bandits and other criminal networks, to mine in exchange for a payout. The extent of gold mining funds is not exactly known, but the artisanal sites in areas controlled by the group have the capacity to produce 725 kilograms of gold per year, valued at US$34 million.

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Read more: West Africa could soon have a jihadist state – here’s why

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Another source of income – and political influence – is kidnapping for ransom. Kidnap victims include cattle owners, businessmen, state officials and foreigners. The group received a ₤30 million ransom in 2020 to release one French and two Italian hostages. Between 2017 and 2023, the group and its affiliated units were responsible for 845 out of approximately 1,100 recorded kidnappings in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali remain the epicentre of the group’s violent activities. In the first quarter of 2023, over 180 cases of kidnapping were recorded in these countries’ war-torn areas.

Livestock theft has also been a critical source of funds. The practice of livestock theft as economic warfare and a means to generate funds has led to livestock being forcibly taken from herders who fail to pay zakat (a religious fee among Muslims) or subscribe to the group’s ideology. The stolen livestock are sold in Mali, Mauritania or Senegal. The ability to monetise stolen livestock makes their theft a cornerstone of the Sahelian war economy and a source of cash for weapons and vehicles.

Money laundering is another illicit economy central to the militant group’s financing. It lends money to merchants, invests with banks and funds small shops with the aim of getting profits. This helps ensure a constant flow of money and provisions to support the group’s terrorist acts. It has attached much importance to this illicit economy, to the extent of assassinating those who interfere with its investments.

Way out

To cut down Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s financial base – and thereby weaken its capacity for militancy – counterinsurgency efforts need to take the following actions.

• Government security actors should collaborate with local self-defence militias to regulate artisanal mining and thwart kidnappings.

• Financial intelligence units need to identify merchants who receive money from the militant group to block the flow of illicit funds.

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Read more: Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship

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• Specialised courts that deal with money laundering and terrorism financing cases should be established and made operational in Burkina Faso and Mali, the epicentres of the group’s activities.

• Burkina Faso and Mali should increase security around civilians to minimise civilian casualties from terror operations.

Since finance is the basis of the militant group’s strength, regional security co-operation should be strengthened. This would help with systematically tracking illicit flows and stopping them.

– Funding terror: how west Africa’s deadly jihadists get the money they need to survive
– https://theconversation.com/funding-terror-how-west-africas-deadly-jihadists-get-the-money-they-need-to-survive-242306

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africans are wearily attuned to governments’ Orwellian misuse of language. After all, South Africa is a country where a one-time government passed a law (the Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952) which extended rather than abolishing the notorious pass system. This made it compulsory for black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a passbook. And the same government passed the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 which made it more, not less, difficult for black students to register at “open” (or white) universities.

So perhaps they should not be unduly surprised that the government of the US has imported 49 Afrikaners and labelled them as “refugees”. The claim is that they are escaping from the persecution of Afrikaners – and white people more broadly – in South Africa today.

The Trump administration knows perfectly well this claim is a complete fabrication. As President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government have pointed out, there is no evidence whatsoever that Afrikaners or white people more generally are subject to genocide.

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Read more: Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?

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True, South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. But it is poor black South Africans – not whites – who are principal victims of such deadly violence. Nor are Afrikaners/whites subject to persecution. Along with all other South Africans, their human rights are protected by a constitution. This is no mere piece of paper. Its provisions are (albeit imperfectly, and unlike in the US these days) largely enforced by the courts.

Furthermore, genocide implies the deliberate elimination of a people on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds. Therefore, if a genocide of whites and Afrikaners was taking place, we might assume that their numbers would be falling. In fact the reverse is true. The white population has continued to grow (albeit slowly) in absolute numbers since 1994.

Worse, the characterisation of Afrikaners as refugees at a moment in time when the people of Gaza are daily subject to a regime of death, terror, and murder inflicted on them by the Israeli government is not merely an absurdity but a downright insult to those genuinely subject to genocide.

So, what is really going on?

The drivers

Extensive commentary has correctly highlighted the motivations of the Trump administration.

First, the administration has launched an attack on what it terms the “tyranny” of “diversity, equity and inclusion” policies across the entire spectrum of public and private institutions in America. Critics argue this is driven by an appeal to Trump’s white Christian nationalist political base. Because post-apartheid South Africa, rightly or wrongly, has become the poster-country of diversity, equity and inclusion policies internationally, because of its constitutional commitment to non-racialism and diversity, it has been singled out for attack.

Secondly, labelling Afrikaners as refugees plays to the insecurities of Trump’s political base. This finds the idea of a white minority being ruled by a black majority government difficult to swallow.

Third, characterising Afrikaners as subject to genocide is a very deliberate response to South Africa’s charging of Israel as guilty of genocide against the Palestinian people before the International Court of Justice. But this is unacceptable to the US Christian nationalist right. For them the existence of Israel represents the realisation of Biblical truth – the return of Jews to the Holy Land.

Trump is saying that the US can and will play the same game, using it to clobber South Africa regardless of the groundlessness of the charge. But, being Trump, he will balance pandering to his support base against what economic benefits he can extract from South Africa.

The landscape

But what of the 49 Afrikaners themselves? Why have they chosen to accept the opportunity offered to them by the US government? After all, extensive attention in the South African media has been given to Afrikaners who have defiantly stated that they are committed to staying in South Africa. The reasons they give are that it’s their home. And they fully accept that, at least formally, South Africa has become a non-racial democracy.

Likewise, as I have detailed in my book on Whites and Democracy in South Africa, Afrikaners and whites have not only survived in democratic South Africa but, generally, have prospered economically. Furthermore, whites as a “population group” (to use outdated apartheid-era terminology) have participated fully in South African democracy. They are more highly disposed to voting in elections than other racial groupings, and de facto, they are well represented in parliament and local government by the Democratic Alliance, which is a vigorous defender of their interests.

But (there is always a but), if we want to guess the motivations of Trump’s 49 “refugees”, we need to bear in mind the following.

First, until we know more about the personal circumstances of the individuals involved, we cannot really know what has driven them to take the drastic step of leaving families and their personal history behind by moving to America.

Second, most whites have responded to the arrival of democracy pragmatically. They have their numerous complaints, notably about equity employment (affirmative action policies in favour of blacks) which they view as discriminatory against whites. But they have continued to enjoy high rates of employment. Indeed they continue to occupy the higher ranks of employment in the private sector in disproportionate numbers.

However, although many whites continue to live in a de facto overwhelmingly white world, both at work and at their homes in suburbia, there remains a minority which has remained wholly unreconciled to the changes which have taken place politically and economically since 1994. The armed opposers linked to the far-right have long been defeated. But we may presume the 49 belong to a broader category of passive resisters who have withdrawn into a white world as much as possible.

Third, although most whites continue to do well economically, the changes which have taken place since 1994 have led to the re-appearance of a small class of largely uneducated poor whites who feel excluded from employment by equity employment legislation. And who generally feel the loss of their racial status under democracy.

Opportunists, not refugees

Having said all that, some interesting questions remain.

Presumably the Afrikaner 49 belonged to that category of whites which, for one reason or another, is disposed to leave South Africa. However, emigrating requires jumping through numerous hoops; meeting educational and professional qualifications, getting a job offer, having sufficient financial resources to take with them to support themselves and their families before they can qualify for recipient countries’ social security systems, and so on. Apart from the emotional costs involved, emigration is not always the easiest of options, even for those who wish to “escape”.

The evidence suggests that the heads of household among the Afrikaner 49 are drawn not only from that minority of Afrikaners who are totally unreconciled to democracy, but who – quite simply – are opportunists who have availed themselves of a short cut to emigrate.

– Trump’s Afrikaners are South African opportunists, not refugees: what’s behind the US move
– https://theconversation.com/trumps-afrikaners-are-south-african-opportunists-not-refugees-whats-behind-the-us-move-257017

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ekta Patel, Scientist, International Livestock Research Institute

Pastoralist communities, their livestock and diverse wildlife species coexist within a biodiversity-rich landscape stretching along the Kenya–Tanzania border.

However, at this wildlife-livestock interface, local communities face mounting challenges. Shifts in land use, prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall patterns and increasing land degradation are placing growing pressure on the landscape. In addition, conflict between people and wildlife is on the rise, and many households rely on wild animals for food.

Communities in the region eat a wide range of wild animals, from rodents, elephant shrews and birds to small antelopes and larger ungulates like bushbuck. This meat (“bush meat” as it is also popularly known in Africa) provides a valuable source of animal protein and minerals, especially where alternative domestic protein sources are scarce.

Although hunting and consuming wild animals is illegal in Kenya, this is not the case in Tanzania, where certain forms of hunting for wild animals are permitted. Yet in both countries, many people eat wild meat regularly, often without awareness of the risks. These risks include zoonotic disease transmission and potential impacts on wildlife populations.

Wild meat is a known source of zoonotic infections and disease spillover to humans. In fact, as many as three-quarters of emerging infectious diseases originate from wildlife. Illnesses such as anthrax, mpox, Ebola, and HIV have all been linked to close interactions between humans and wild animals.

Despite these risks, wild meat consumption remains widespread, with some households eating it daily or weekly. Preventing future disease outbreaks requires a clear understanding of these health risks, as well as the underlying social, cultural and economic reasons that drive people to rely on wild meat.

We set out to understand why people were eating wild meat along the Kenya-Tanzania border and whether they understood the risks of zoonotic diseases. Cases of anthrax have already been reported in this area.

Our study involved interviews in border communities during the COVID pandemic – the most famous case of zoonotic disease transmission in recent times. We wanted to know whether communities understood the pandemic’s link to wild meat and if this affected their consumption of it.

What stood out was that people at the border settlements kept eating wild meat or even ate more of it. This shows that economic necessity, cultural preferences and limited alternatives remain key drivers even when the world is in crisis.

Though this research was done during COVID-19, it gives us insights into how people react when things get tough, especially when it comes to food and health.

What’s driving wild meat consumption

We found that several factors drove wild meat consumption, despite growing awareness of the health risks.

Poverty

Economic factors, particularly household income and limited financial means, strongly influenced wild meat consumption, particularly in communities with limited alternative protein sources. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic had a severe impact on local economies. Tourism, a key source of income for border communities, experienced sharp declines. As household revenues fell, reliance on wild meat as an affordable protein source increased.

Economic stability plays a crucial role in shaping consumption behaviours: 81% of those surveyed at the border settlements indicated they would stop eating wild meat if cheaper alternatives were available.

The type of animal

Perceptions of disease risks varied depending on the species consumed.

Approximately 79% of respondents believed that certain animals posed a higher risks of zoonotic disease transmission. Hyenas were perceived as the most dangerous, followed by primates and snakes. These findings suggest that while economic necessity influences wild meat consumption, risk perception also shapes dietary choices.

Gender plays a role

Men expressed more concern over conservation and health risks than women. Men were also more likely to advocate against selling wild meat. Women exhibited lower concern regarding zoonotic disease risks, including COVID-19. These insights highlight the need for gender-sensitive interventions to address wild meat consumption.

Education levels

Education levels also influenced risk perception. Respondents with formal education displayed a stronger awareness of zoonotic transmission pathways. They were also more receptive to conservation and public health messaging. This highlights the importance of education in promoting safer and more sustainable practices within communities.

National policies

Despite sharing ecosystems and wildlife populations, Kenya and Tanzania have adopted fundamentally different governance approaches to wild meat. This in turn shapes outcomes for conservation, biodiversity and public health.

Kenya follows a centralised and protectionist model. Hunting and consumption of wild animals are prohibited under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act. This zero-tolerance policy is rooted in strong conservation principles aimed at protecting biodiversity.

However, in practice, it has driven the activity underground, creating a thriving black market. This undermines conservation and enforcement efforts. It also increases the risk of zoonotic disease transmission due to unregulated handling and consumption of wild animals.

Tanzania, by contrast, uses a decentralised, regulated slaughterhouse model. Licensed wild meat hunting and consumption is legal under regulation, particularly through game-controlled areas and permits introduced in 2020. This approach is meant to enable communities to benefit economically from wildlife and reduce incentives for illegal hunting.

The existence of two divergent systems across a porous border creates challenges. These include illegal cross-border trade, conflicting conservation objectives, and uneven protection of biodiversity. There are also difficulties in implementing coordinated surveillance or public health interventions.

The contrasting regulations in Kenya and Tanzania significantly influence wild meat consumption choices.

In Kenya, where wild meat is strictly prohibited, consumption appears to be through informal and unregulated channels. This increases health risks and limits consumer awareness. In contrast, Tanzania’s regulated licensing system provides a legal pathway for access. This makes wild meat consumption more visible and, in some cases, perceived as safer. These differing policies shape how communities access, justify and engage with wild meat, often driving cross-border trade and complicating enforcement and risk communication efforts.

What’s next?

Addressing the risks associated with wild meat trade requires a multifaceted strategy that balances health, equity and sustainability.

We suggest an intervention that prioritises economic stability and ensuring affordable alternative protein sources are accessible, especially in food-insecure settings.

Public health education is also essential. An increasing awareness of zoonotic disease risks can help shift consumption behaviour.

Because men and women perceived the dangers of wild meat consumption differently, gender-sensitive approaches should be integrated. It should also be noted that, although women are rarely the primary hunters, they are often prosecuted for possession or sale of wild meat. Gender disparities on how laws are applied must be addressed.

Legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms must be strengthened to address cross-border wildlife trade, particularly in regions with differing policies like Kenya and Tanzania. They should also reduce the risks faced by individuals who may unknowingly engage in illegal practices due to a lack of clarity.

We continue to work with national and regional stakeholders. This includes government bodies and technical partners who are actively engaging with us to co-develop One Health solutions. These solutions integrate public health, environmental sustainability and community well-being.

Finally, community engagement and participation should be at the core of any intervention. This will ensure that policies are locally relevant, culturally sensitive and supported by those directly affected to reduce the risks of zoonotic disease spillover.

– Eating wild meat carries serious health risks – why it still happens along the Kenya-Tanzania border
– https://theconversation.com/eating-wild-meat-carries-serious-health-risks-why-it-still-happens-along-the-kenya-tanzania-border-252947

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alex Ezeh, Dornsife Endowed Professor of Global Health, Drexel University

The Lancet has released its second global commission report on Adolescent Health and Wellbeing. Adolescents are defined as 10- to 24-year-olds. The report builds on the first one, done in 2016. The latest report presents substantial original research that supports actions it recommends to be taken across sectors as well as at global, regional, country and local level. The co-chairs of the commission, Sarah Baird, Alex Ezeh and Russell Viner, together with the youth commissioners lead, Shakira Choonara, give a guide to the report’s findings.

What were the key findings?

The report noted significant improvements in some aspects of adolescent health and wellbeing since the 2016 report. These include reductions in:

• communicable, maternal and nutritional diseases, particularly among female adolescents

• the burden of disease from injuries

• substance use, specifically tobacco and alcohol

• teenage pregnancy.

It also found that there had been an increase in age at first marriage and in education, especially for young women.

Despite this progress, adolescent health and wellbeing is said to be at a tipping point. Continued progress is being undermined by rapidly escalating rates of non-communicable diseases and mental disorders, accompanied by threats from compounding and intersecting megatrends. These include climate change and environmental degradation, the growing power of commercial influences on health, rising conflict and displacement, rapid urbanisation, and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic.

These megatrends are outpacing responses from national governments and the international community.

What’s unique about today’s cohort of adolescents?

Born between 2000 and 2014, this is the first cohort of humans who will live their entire life in a time when the average annual global temperature has consistently been 0.5°C or higher above pre-industrial levels.

At roughly 2 billion adolescents, they are the largest cohort of adolescents in the history of humanity. And this number will not be surpassed as populations age and fertility rates fall in even the poorest countries.

They are the first generation of global digital natives. They live in a world of immense resources and opportunities, with unprecedented connectedness made possible by the rapid expansion of digital technologies. This is true even in the hardest-to-reach places.

Growing participation in secondary and tertiary education is equipping adolescents of all genders with new economic opportunities and providing pathways out of poverty.

These opportunities, however, are not being realised for most adolescents. Increasing numbers continue to grow up in settings with limited opportunities. In addition, investments in adolescent health and wellbeing continue to lag relative to their population share or their share of the global burden of disease.

Investments in adolescents accounted for only 2.4% of the total development assistance for health in 2016-2021. This was despite the fact that adolescents accounted for 25.2% of the global population in that period and 9.1% of the total burden of disease. We use development assistance as a measure because, while governments also invest in adolescents, it’s difficult to account for how much this is. For example, when a government supports a health facility, it serves the entire population.

Yet, the report provides evidence to show that the return on investments in adolescent health and wellbeing is highly cost-effective and at par with investments in children.

What’s the news for adolescents in Africa?

The report recognises the special place of Africa in the global future of adolescents. It notes that, by the end of this century, nearly half of all adolescents will live in Africa.

Currently, adolescents in Africa experience higher burdens of communicable, maternal and nutritional diseases, at more than double the global average for both male and female adolescents. They also have a higher prevalence of anaemia, adolescent childbearing, early marriage and HIV infection. They are much less likely to complete 12 years of schooling and more likely to not be in education, employment, or training.

Female adolescents in sub-Saharan Africa have the highest adolescent fertility rate at 99.4 births per 1,000 female adolescents aged 15-19 (the global average is 41.8). They have also experienced the slowest decline between 2016 and 2022.

Globally, there was progress in reducing child marriage between 2016 and 2022. But in eight countries in 2022, at least one in three female adolescents aged 15–19 years was married. All but one of these eight countries were in sub-Saharan Africa. Niger (50.2%) and Mali (40.6%) had the highest proportion of married female adolescents.

The practice of child marriage is declining in south Asia and becoming more concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. As the report notes:

it continues because of cultural norms, fuelled by economic hardships, insurgency, conflict, ambiguous legal provisions, and lack of political will to enforce legal provisions.

What should be Africa’s focus areas?

Beyond adolescent sexual and reproductive health concerns in sub-Saharan Africa, obesity is increasing fastest in the region. This illustrates the vulnerability of adolescents to the power of commercial interests.

Since 1990, obesity and overweight has increased by 89% in prevalence among adolescents aged 15–19 years in sub-Saharan Africa. This is the largest regional increase.

The absence of data on adolescents is a problem. Adolescents in sub-Saharan Africa are absent in many data systems. For example, data on adolescent mental health in sub-Saharan Africa is virtually absent.

Stronger data systems are needed to understand and track progress on the complex set of determinants of adolescent health and wellbeing.

Another area of concern is the massive inequities within countries, often gendered or by geography. While female adolescents in Kenya are experiencing substantial declines in the burden of HIV and sexually transmitted infections, adolescent males are experiencing increasing burdens. In South Africa, years of healthy life lost to maternal disorders show more than 10-fold differences between the Western Cape and North West provinces.

Where there’s been strong political leadership, remarkable changes have been seen. Take the case of Benin Republic. The adolescent fertility rate in the country declined from 26% in 1996 to 20% in 2018 and child marriage from 39% to 31% over the same period. Strong political leadership has also led to substantial reductions in female genital mutilation or cutting. This fell from 12% of girls in Benin in 2001 to 2% in 2011–12 among 15–19-year-old girls in Benin Republic. Political leadership also facilitated the expansion, by the national parliament in 2021, of the grounds under which women, girls, and their families could access safe and legal abortion.

But for every country that takes positive steps to protect the health and wellbeing of adolescents, several others regress.

The last decade has witnessed regression in several countries. In 2024, The Gambia attempted to repeal a 2015 law criminalising all acts of female genital mutilation or cutting. In 2022, Nigeria’s federal government ordered the removal of sex education from the basic education curriculum.

What are the recommended courses of action?

The report calls for a multisectoral approach across multiple national ministries and agencies, including the office of the head of state, and within the UN system.

Coordination and accountability mechanisms for adolescent health and wellbeing also need to be strengthened.

Laws and policies are needed to protect the health and rights of adolescents, reduce the impact of the commercial determinants of health, and promote healthy use of digital and social media spaces and platforms.

Strong political leadership at local, national, and global levels is essential.

The report also calls for prioritised investments, the creation of enabling environments to transform adolescent health and wellbeing, and the development of innovative approaches to address complex and emerging health threats.

It calls for meaningful engagement of adolescents in policy, research, interventions and accountability mechanisms that affect them.

Without these concerted actions, we risk failing our young people and losing out on the investments being made in childhood at this second critical period in their development.

The current adverse international aid climate is particularly affecting adolescents as much development assistance relates to gender and sexual and reproductive health. Concerted action in addressing adolescent health and wellbeing is an urgent imperative for sub-Saharan Africa.

– A quarter of the world’s population are adolescents: major report sets out health and wellbeing trends
– https://theconversation.com/a-quarter-of-the-worlds-population-are-adolescents-major-report-sets-out-health-and-wellbeing-trends-257282

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hung Nguyen-Viet, Program Leader (ai), HEALTH at ILRI / CGIAR, International Livestock Research Institute

The world is facing daunting health challenges with the rise of zoonotic diseases – infections that are transmissible from animals to humans. These diseases – which include Ebola, avian flu, COVID-19 and HIV – show how the health and wellbeing of humans, animals and ecosystems are closely connected.

Zoonotic diseases have become more and more common due to factors such as urbanisation, deforestation, climate change and wildlife exploitation. These dangers are not limited by borders: they are global and demand a coordinated response.

By looking at health holistically, countries can address the full spectrum of disease control – from prevention to detection, preparedness, response and management – and contribute to global health security.

The World Health Organization has a basis for such an approach: One Health. This recognises the interdependence of the health of people, animals and the environment and integrates these fields, rather than keeping them separate.

I lead the health programme at the International Livestock Research Institute, where we are looking for ways to effectively manage or eliminate livestock-related diseases, zoonotic infections and foodborne illnesses that disproportionately affect impoverished communities.

My work focuses on the link between health and agriculture, food safety, and infectious and zoonotic diseases.

For example in Kenya we are part of an initiative of the One Health Centre in Africa to roll out canine vaccination and have so far vaccinated 146,000 animals in Machakos county.

In Ethiopia and Vietnam we worked in a programme to improve the hygiene practices of butchers in traditional markets.

In another project we work in 11 countries to strengthen One Health curricula in universities.

The lessons from the One Health projects implemented with partners across Asia and Africa are that there’s an urgent need for action on three fronts. These are: stronger cross-sectoral collaboration; greater engagement with policymakers to translate research findings into actionable strategies; and the development of adaptable and context-specific interventions.

But, having been active in this area for the last decade, I am impatient with the slow pace of investment. We know that prevention is better than cure. The cost of prevention is significantly lower than that of managing pandemics once they occur. Urgent steps, including much higher levels of investment, need to be taken.

What’s in place

In 2022 the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Organisation for Animal Health developed a joint One Health plan of action. They identified key areas to respond more efficiently to health threats. These included:

• Reducing risks from emerging and re-emerging zoonotic epidemics. Actions include, for example, tightening regulations around farming and trade in wildlife and wild animal products.

• Controlling and eliminating endemic, zoonotic, neglected tropical and vector-borne diseases by understanding the attitudes and knowledge of communities bearing the greatest burdens of these diseases. And boosting their capacity to fight them.

• Strengthening action against food safety risks by monitoring new and emerging foodborne infections.

• Curbing the silent pandemic of antimicrobial resistance, one of the top 10 global public health threats facing humanity.

Other collaborations include the Prezode (Preventing Zoonotic Disease Emergence) initiative to research all aspects of diseases of animal origin. This was launched in 2021 by French president Emmanuel Macron.

The Africa One Health University Network operates in ten African countries to address One Health workforce strengthening in Africa.

One Health has gained traction globally. But there’s still a great deal to be done.

The cost of inaction

According to a 2022 World Bank estimate, preventing a pandemic would cost approximately US$11 billion per year, while managing a pandemic can run up to US$31 billion annually. So the investment return of 3:1 is an important reason to call for investment in One Health.

The Pandemic Fund was launched in November 2022 by leaders of the Group of 20 nations and hosted by the World Bank Group to help low- and middle-income countries prepare better for emerging pandemic threats. US$885 million has been awarded to 47 projects to date through the two rounds in the last three years.

However, relative to the US$11 billion per year required for prevention, this investment is modest. Urgent investment in One Health needs to be made by countries themselves, in particular low- and middle-income countries.

The last two World One Health congresses (in Singapore in 2022, and in Cape Town in 2024) called for investment in One Health. There were also calls for investment in One Health at regional level to prevent zoonotic diseases and the next pandemic.

At the 78th World Health Assembly in Geneva, member states of the World Health Organization (WHO) formally adopted by consensus the world’s first Pandemic Agreement. The landmark decision culminates more than three years of intensive negotiations launched by governments in response to the devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This is major global progress in One Health and disease prevention.

But the lessons of COVID-19 have shown us that the cost of inaction is incalculable in terms of lives lost, economic turmoil and societal disruption. To date, there have been over 777 million cases of COVID-19, including more than 7 million deaths worldwide.

According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, COVID will have caused a cumulative production loss of US$13.8 trillion by 2024.

The choice is clear: invest today to prevent tomorrow’s pandemics, or pay a heavy price in the future.

– Preventing the next pandemic: One Health researcher calls for urgent action
– https://theconversation.com/preventing-the-next-pandemic-one-health-researcher-calls-for-urgent-action-255229

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christa Kuljian, Research Associate, WiSER, University of the Witwatersrand

Seven women were part of a trailblazing network of feminist scientists in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s in the Boston area in the US. Christa Kuljian is a science writer and historian of science who focuses much of her research on issues of science and society, gender and race. She is the author of two previous books of narrative nonfiction – Sanctuary and Darwin’s Hunch. In her new book Our Science, Ourselves she focuses on the life stories of the seven women. We asked her about her book.

How did you choose the scientists you focused on in the book?

I grew up in the Boston area in the 1970s, and in high school, my parents gave me a copy of the revolutionary guide to women’s health, Our Bodies, Ourselves, which was published by the Boston Women’s Health Book Collective. In the early 1980s, I studied the history of science at Harvard and took a course with Ruth Hubbard called Bio 109: Biology and Women’s Issues.

Hubbard, in 1974, was the first woman to achieve tenure in biology at Harvard, and she features in the book. Her course taught about how scientists, including Charles Darwin, promoted stereotypes and myths about women’s biology. The idea for Our Science, Ourselves grew from that formative experience in Hubbard’s course.

But it also had roots in another, more recent experience. In 2016, I published Darwin’s Hunch: Science, Race and the Search for Human Origins, about the history of palaeoanthropology in South Africa. The book explores questions that some of my history of science professors might have asked. What influence did the social and political context of colonialism and apartheid have on the search for human origins?

After it was published, I was struck by several stories that brought science and sexism into the popular media. In July 2017, James Damore at Google wrote that “the gender gap in tech” likely existed because of biological differences between men and women, and he received support from popular psychologist Jordan Peterson.

In September 2018, an Italian physicist, Alessandro Strumia, said that the low number of women in physics was proof that women were innately less capable than men. He suggested that male scientists were being discriminated against to give opportunities to women.

These statements reminded me of what former Harvard president Larry Summers had said back in 2005. Drawing on the work of psychologist and popular writer Steven Pinker, Summers spoke of women having a “different availability of aptitude” in science and math.

Why were these myths about women’s biology still having an impact in the 21st century? I decided to go back to my class notes and look more closely at Hubbard’s research. Who had she worked with at the time? What were other scientists with a feminist awareness saying in the 1970s and 1980s?

As a result of many interviews, and research in the archives, I discovered a fascinating network of women, all of whom contributed to feminist critiques of science, and ultimately to the field of feminist science studies.

Our Science, Ourselves follows the lives of Ruth Hubbard, Rita Arditti, Evelyn Fox Keller, Evelynn Hammonds, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Banu Subramaniam and Nancy Hopkins.

None of these women scientists were born in Boston, but they all moved there to study, take a job, conduct research, or network with other scientists. Part of what made Boston interesting to me was the critical mass of colleges, universities and scientists, but also the presence of social movements that influenced these women, including Science for the People, the Combahee River Collective and others.

Could you tell us about one or two of these women’s stories?

One of them is Rita Arditti. An Argentinian geneticist at Harvard Medical School, she led a protest in December 1969 at the annual conference of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in Boston. Along with 12 colleagues carrying posters and pamphlets, she arrived unannounced at a special luncheon for women scientists, calling for an end to discrimination against women in science. Most of the women ignored Arditti, but Hubbard was in the audience and paid attention. The protest did have a ripple effect on the association.

Over time, Arditti and Hubbard became friends, became active in a new organisation called Science for the People, and began to write not only about discrimination against women scientists, but also about how science portrayed women’s biology in stereotypical ways.

Another is Evelynn Hammonds, who studied physics at Spelman College, a historically Black women’s college in Atlanta. In 1976, she read an important report, The Double Bind: The Price of Being a Minority Woman in Science, co-authored by Shirley Malcom and published by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

With Malcom’s encouragement, Hammonds applied to and was accepted at MIT in the Boston area. Over time, she joined a growing network of women who were critiquing their science. She became a teaching assistant for Hubbard and rented an apartment from Arditti, and became a foundational influence in gender, race and the history of science.

Hammonds emphasised that when speaking out against scientific sexism it was important to speak out against scientific racism as well, and that it was critical to address both.

How do the current US administration policies on science and diversity relate to your book?

Sudip Parikh, the CEO of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, said in testimony before the US Senate appropriations committee on 30 April 2025:

The scientific community is in paralysis right now.

The current attack on science has had a major impact, ending funding for important scientific research. Young scientists and science students are concerned for their future. The US administration’s policy of cutting funds to any programmes related to diversity or equity is an onslaught on decades of progress in this area, and will have a grave impact on the scientific research agenda.

There is a growing list of words that have been scrubbed from US government websites and documents, including “women”, “race”, “racism”, “feminism”, “activist” and “bias”. The use of any of these words in scientific research proposals can result in federal funding being cut. For example, the US Food and Drug Administration published an announcement in mid-2024 that discussed the importance of diversity in clinical trials. That document is no longer available on the website.

The women in Our Science, Ourselves made important contributions by highlighting how scientific institutions historically have been exclusionary. They also shone a light on how scientific research questions and analysis can be biased (rather than always neutral or objective), thereby affecting the knowledge they produce.

The tools that feminist science studies has developed are critical to the sciences because they ask new questions, and develop new methodologies that help science account for gender and racial bias. Who is doing science? Who decides on the research questions? Who offers analysis and who benefits?

The US administration’s actions are a major setback for science and scientific research, as well as gender, race and sexuality studies, which have made vital contributions to science, medicine and technology. The history of these fields and the life stories of some of the dynamic women in them, can offer readers inspiration for the present moment.

Our Science, Ourselves is available from University of Massachusetts Press and Amazon in the US, on Kindle, and from Love Books in Johannesburg, South Africa.

– Sexism in science: 7 women whose trailblazing work shattered stereotypes
– https://theconversation.com/sexism-in-science-7-women-whose-trailblazing-work-shattered-stereotypes-257265

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Oluwaseyi Dolapo Somefun, Research associate, University of the Western Cape

Vaccines have proved to be one of the most effective tools in fighting infectious diseases, but convincing people to get vaccinated can be tough. Especially young people.

During the global COVID-19 pandemic, declared by the World Health Organization on 11 March 2020, many countries reported high levels of vaccine hesitancy among younger population groups. Negative healthcare experiences and general distrust of government have cultivated vaccine hesitancy across Africa. Misleading information about vaccine side-effects on social media adds to this challenge.

This hesitancy continues today. A 2024 study on adolescents and young adults (aged 10 to 35) in sub-Saharan Africa found a vaccine acceptance rate of just 38.7%.

These concerns were echoed in a recent study we carried out among 165 young adults in Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia, looking at attitudes towards the COVID-19 vaccine. We wanted to know what could be done to help improve future vaccine acceptance, inform campaigns and prepare for future public health responses.

Participants were hesitant to be vaccinated, for various reasons, and suggested what policymakers could do to improve vaccine uptake.

Understanding young people’s perspectives on vaccine hesitancy and what can be done to address this is crucial for improving vaccine acceptance in the future.

What young adults told us

Our research gathered data through focus groups and interviews.

The participants described a fear of injections, uncertainty about side effects, distrust in healthcare systems and rude healthcare workers.

Some participants were worried about the safety of the COVID-19 vaccine, particularly how it might affect those with pre-existing health conditions.

Many believed that the vaccine was developed too quickly without sufficient testing and a lack of accessible information.

Many expressed a strong fear of needles. A young South African woman aged 19 commented:

I am afraid of injections, so for me, it would be better if there was something that could be taken orally, something you can drink.

Getting over the hurdle

We found young people often felt left out of vaccine conversations. They wanted to be part of the solution and make informed choices but needed the right tools and support to do so.

Participants suggested practical ideas to help boost vaccine acceptance among their peers.

Several highlighted the importance of assessing individual health status before administering vaccines, to avoid adverse interactions with existing medical conditions and treatments. They believed that situations where vaccines were mistakenly blamed for pre-existing illnesses or ongoing treatments could be avoided.

Participants suggested innovative strategies to make vaccines more accessibile. Mobile vaccination sites and community-based outreach programmes were some of the suggestions.

They must introduce mobile clinics, so that people don’t find themselves having to travel long distances to vaccinate. – 18-year-old male, South Africa

Young people also suggested household visits to people who were immobile because of age, illness or disability.

Many advocated for non-injectable vaccine options, such as oral medications or microneedle patches, which could improve accessibility and reduce anxiety.

The oral polio vaccine, which has been widely used in global polio eradication efforts, is an example of a non-injectable vaccine.

COVID-19 microneedle patch prototypes are being explored for clinical testing.

The youth urged public figures, including politicians, celebrities and influencers, to publicly endorse the vaccine.

It would be nice if the president could be shown on television receiving a vaccine so that we can see for ourselves whether he is given the same thing that everyone else receives. – 20-year-old male, South Africa

More engaging videos, interactive interviews and testimonials from vaccinated individuals could be shared across social media platforms.

The young people also emphasised the importance of comprehensive training for healthcare providers. They highlighted the need for healthcare professionals to provide respectful and empathetic care. They suggested that, by fostering respectful communication, healthcare providers could create a more welcoming and comfortable environment for their clients.

In addition, providing vaccine education in schools could educate pupils so that they could make decisions on their own.

Way forward

Engaging young people as active participants in shaping public health strategies can help increase vaccine acceptance and ensure a healthier future for all.

We believe that our findings can be applied in two ways.

First, to inform the design of tailored interventions that better resonate with young people’s desires and needs, paving the way for increased vaccine uptake and acceptability.

Second, to highlight areas where young people may need further information and engagement, to better understand some of the broader issues and why some of their recommendations might not be feasible in the short or longer term.

– Vaccines: why these young Africans are hesitant about them and what might change their minds
– https://theconversation.com/vaccines-why-these-young-africans-are-hesitant-about-them-and-what-might-change-their-minds-249629

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Charles MacRobert, Associate Professor, Stellenbosch University

Mining is essential to modern lifestyles. Copper, iron and other mined products are vital to the products many people take for granted, like electronic devices. Being able to buy these goods quite easily may give a person a false sense of how difficult it is to extract the elements they’re made of.

Mining involves the removal of mineral-rich rock from the ground and processing it to extract the high-value minerals. Depending on the mineral, this quantity can be as low as a few grams in a tonne of rock.

For example, removing a tiny quantity of platinum from rock requires finely grinding the rock. The fine material that remains once the platinum is removed is known as tailings.

Every mining operation produces tailings. This can be coarse, like instant coffee granules, or fine, like cocoa powder. Tailings are typically mixed with water to form a liquid slurry that can be pumped and transported easily.

Slurry is kept in specially designed tailings dams. The designs are unique and depend on what is being mined and the local area.

Unfortunately, the history of mining is stained with examples of poorly managed dams that collapse, spilling the slurry, which is sometimes toxic. This can cause serious environmental, social and economic damage.

One such mine disaster happened in February 2025 in Zambia at the Sino-Metals Leach Zambia copper mine. Over 50 million litres of toxic waste flowed over the dam’s wall into the Mwambashi River. From there it flowed into one of the largest and longest Zambian rivers, the Kafue.

The pollution travelled further than 100km from the dam, contaminating the river, and killing fish and livestock on nearby farms. The Zambian government had to shut down municipal water to the city of Kitwe to protect residents from consuming the polluted water.

This should not have happened, because steps have been taken to ensure proactive management of dams. In 2020, the Global Industry Standard on Tailings Management introduced a new set of safety measures and standards.

Many mines are proactively embracing these standards. This enhances community trust in tailings dams. But other mines are not engaging with communities that might be affected by dams. Or communities may feel unsure what to ask the mines.

We are geotechnical engineers who have studied tailings dam collapses. Here, we outline six questions people living near mines should ask mine management to ensure they understand the key hazards and risks in their communities.

1. How far will the slurry flow?

Each tailings dam has a zone of influence. This is determined by analysing what would happen if the slurry breached the dam walls and started to flow out. It is an estimate of the area which would be swamped by tailings if the dam failed.

Generally, tailings disasters have caused significant damage up to a distance of 5km from the dam. If the tailings slurry gets into a river, it can flow hundreds of kilometres downstream.

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Read more: Burst mining dam in South Africa: what must be done to prevent another disaster

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Zones of influence are often determined for extreme events, like once in a lifetime storms or large earthquakes. But zones of influence could also include places affected by dust or water pollution from the mine.

If you can see a tailings dam from where you live or work you should consider yourself within the zone of influence.

2. Who is responsible for the dam?

Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for day-to-day operation should be in place in every mine. There should be suitably qualified engineers appointed to carry out monitoring and maintenance of the dam. There need to be enough qualified people to cope with the size of the dam.

The management structure should set out how day-to-day issues related to the tailings dam are discussed between workers on the ground in mines and top management, and how solutions are found. Mines should also keep audit and inspection reports on their tailings dams, and records should be kept over the long term (because tailings dams are often operational for several decades).

3. What about the environment?

Mines should have plans to reduce the impact that tailings dams have on the environment. These would have been informed by public participation. The plans must state what monitoring is in place to measure the impacts of dust and water (groundwater and surface water).

The true extent of impacts only becomes apparent once the mine starts operating. So, the public should hold mines accountable for commitments made. Mines should satisfy communities that monitoring is continuing to identify and track the dam’s environmental impacts.

Closure plans should also be continuously communicated to mining-affected communities. This will assure the community that when the miners leave, they won’t be left with a dangerous dam near their homes, with no one to look after it.

4. Will the tailings dam be safe when it rains?

A common way that tailings dams fail is when water or slurry washes over the dam sidewalls. This washes away the support. It is known as overtopping, and can happen in storms or if too much tailing is pumped into the dam.

Overtopping is best managed by keeping the water a certain distance below the dam wall. Mine management must measure this regularly and control how much tailing they pump to the dam. Their task is to make sure that even in a severe storm the level will stay well below the top of the dam wall.

5. Has the dam always behaved as expected?

Small failure incidents such as sloughs, slides and bulges where dam walls move but no slurry is released can occur. Mines should investigate and report these, detailing likely causes and mitigation measures implemented.

Publicly available satellite imagery can easily show where mine tailings dams are becoming unstable. Mines should be transparent and provide explanations for these to avoid any speculation over whether the dam is stable or not.

6. What alterations have been made?

Sometimes dams must be changed to accommodate changes in mining or the extraction process. These changes could include how fast the dam is being built, moving the position of the dam wall, or placing material at the base of the wall to stabilise it.

The unexpected consequences of alterations to a tailings dam could be water seeping out and creating damp spots, leading to dam walls sagging or cracking. If left unchecked this can lead to structural failure.

When substantial changes are made to a dam’s design, mines need to demonstrate that sufficient consideration has gone into making these changes.

– Do you live near a dam holding mine waste? 6 questions to ask
– https://theconversation.com/do-you-live-near-a-dam-holding-mine-waste-6-questions-to-ask-256517

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Appiah Takyi, Senior Lecturer, Department of Planning, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

Urban flooding is a major problem in the global south. In west and central Africa, more than 4 million people were affected by flooding in 2024. In Ghana, cities suffer damage from flooding every year.

Ghana’s president, John Dramani Mahama, has established a task force to find ways of improving flood resilience in the country. This is partly driven by an increase in flooding incidents in cities such as Accra and Kumasi in the last decade.

We are urban planning and sustainability scholars. In a recent paper we analysed whether flooding in Accra, Ghana’s capital, was caused by climate change or poor land use planning.

We conclude from our analysis that flooding is caused by poor and uncoordinated land use planning rather than climate change. We recommend that the physical planning department and other regulatory agencies are equipped to ensure the effective enforcement the relevant land use regulations.

Mixed push factors

The Accra metropolitan area is one of the 29 administrative units of Ghana’s Greater Accra region. It is the most populous region in Ghana, with over five million residents, according to the 2021 Housing and Population Census.

We interviewed 100 households living in areas such as Kaneshie, Adabraka and Kwame Nkrumah Circle. These areas experience a high incidence of floods. Representatives of agencies such as the Physical Planning Department of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, the National Disaster Management Organisation and the Environmental Protection Agency were interviewed too, about:

• the nature and areas most prone to flooding in the study area

• the frequency of flooding

• land use planning and regulations and their influence on flooding.

About 40% of the people we interviewed attributed flooding to both weak enforcement of land use regulation and changes in rainfall patterns. Most of the households (52%) said floods in Accra were the result of weak enforcement of land use regulations, while 8% blamed changes in land use regulations.

We also analysed recorded data on flood incidence and rainfall. We found no correlation between increased rainfall and flooding. For example in 2017 there was a decrease in rainfall, but an increase in flooding.

This finding points to the fact that rainfall isn’t the only factor contributing to flooding in the city.

The agencies and city residents reported that between 2008 and 2018, they could see that more people were encroaching on the city’s wetlands by building homes and commercial infrastructure. This has changed the natural flow of water bodies. The Greater Accra Metropolitan and its environs has major wetlands such as Densu Delta, Sakumo Lagoon and Songor Lagoon.

Interview respondents noted that the siting of unauthorised buildings and the encroachment on buffer zones of water bodies in the city could have been averted. They blamed political interference in the enforcement of land use regulation. The government makes the situation worse in two ways, they said:

• planning standards and regulations are neglected in the development process. The processes involved in acquiring development permits are cumbersome and expensive, so people go ahead and develop without permits.

• regulatory institutions and authorities are ineffective. This is clear from the fact that planning happens chaotically. No attention is given to the ecological infrastructure that’s needed.

The way forward

We conclude that land use malpractices remain the dominant causes of flooding in Accra. They include:

• poor disposal of solid waste, which eventually blocks drains and results in water overflow during heavy rains

• building on wetlands as a result of non-compliance or non-enforcement of land use regulations.

There is an urgent need for Ghana’s cities to adopt best practices in waste management. These include recycling of plastic waste and composting for urban agriculture. An environmental excise tax was introduced in 2011 to fund plastic waste recycling and support waste management agencies.

The increasing encroachment on wetlands should be addressed through the strict enforcement of buffer regulations. Planning authorities and the judiciary can collaborate on this. The city must also encourage green infrastructure, like rain gardens, green roofs, permeable pavement, street trees and rain harvesting systems. Research has shown these to be environmentally sustainable and cost-effective approaches to managing storm water.

Another suggested approach is the introduction of the polluter pays principle in city management. This is a system where city residents who are involved in the pollution of the environment are made to pay for the cost of mitigating the impact. Residents who dispose of waste indiscriminately and encroach on wetlands would be made to pay for the cost of the environmental degradation. Cities such as Barcelona and Helsinki have applied this principle in the management of their industrial discharge and contaminated waste.

Finally, there should be incentives for city residents to promote environmental sustainability. For example, a deposit refund system has been introduced in several states in the US and Australia. In this system, consumers are made to pay a deposit after purchasing items that can be recycled, such as plastic bottles, and the deposit is reimbursed to the consumer after the return of the empty bottles to a retail store.

– Flooding incidents in Ghana’s capital are on the rise. Researchers chase the cause
– https://theconversation.com/flooding-incidents-in-ghanas-capital-are-on-the-rise-researchers-chase-the-cause-254000