MIL Africa Engine

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Benta A. Abuya, Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

The Kenyan government launched a big attempt in 2015 to promote gender equality in and through the education sector. This was guided by principles of equal participation and inclusion of women and men, and girls and boys in national development.

The Education and Training Sector Gender Policy aligned with national, regional and global commitments. This included the constitution, and Sustainable Development Goals 4 on quality education and 5 on gender equality.

Years later, however, it became clear that the government wasn’t achieving some policy’s objectives. Gaps remained in reducing gender inequalities in access, participation and achievement at all levels of education.

The government decided to review the causes of these challenges and what could be done differently.

This led to a two-year joint study in partnership with the African Population and Health Research Center. The study began in 2022. Its overall objective was to provide evidence for action on mainstreaming gender issues in basic education in Kenya. Gender mainstreaming generally refers to being sensitive to gender when developing policies and curricula, governing schools, teaching and using learning materials.

The study specifically aimed to:

1. examine how the teacher-training curriculum prepares teachers to implement gender mainstreaming strategies within the basic education sector

2. examine how gender mainstreaming is practised in classrooms during teaching and learning

3. assess the relationship between teaching practices and students’ attendance, choice of subjects and academic performance

4. evaluate the availability of institutional policies, practices and guidelines to mainstream gender issues and the extent to which they influence gender mainstreaming in education.

I’m a gender and education researcher and was part of the team from the African Population and Health Research Center that collected data for the policy review. This data came from 10 counties with high child poverty rates and urban informal settlements. These indicators highlight an inability to access one or more basic needs or services.

The study involved teacher trainers and trainees. We also spoke to education officials, and learners in primary and secondary schools. We carried out classroom observations, knowledge and attitude surveys, questionnaires, key informant interviews and focus group discussions.

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Read more: 6 priorities to get Kenya’s curriculum back on track – or risk excluding many children from education

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The data showed gaps in teacher training, as well as institutional and teaching practices at the basic education level. Policy wasn’t being carried through in practice.

The gaps

Our study found that Kenya needs to review its teacher education curriculum to make it more gender responsive.

Teachers also need more training to follow practices that are gender responsive. These practices include extending positive reinforcement to girls and boys, maintaining eye contact and allowing learners to speak without interruption.

Deliberate steps should be taken to ensure that schools and teacher training colleges are gender inclusive in their practices, guidelines and programmes.

More specifically, our study found:

• Teacher trainees had a relatively good understanding of gender-equitable teaching and learning practices. But there was a need to place greater importance on this in lesson planning and in supporting girls in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).

• Gender mainstreaming is not built into the teacher training curriculum. It isn’t taught as a standalone unit. Teacher trainees learnt about it mainly from general courses, such as child development and psychology, or private training. And teacher trainees were unaware that they were being tested on this.

• There were no significant gender differences in how teachers in pre-primary and primary school taught boys and girls. At the secondary level, however, teachers engaged boys more than girls during during literacy and STEM lessons.

• At both primary and secondary levels, gender-equitable practices positively influenced learning outcomes in English and STEM subjects. These practices improved academic performances in English at the primary level. They led to improvements in biology, English, mathematics and physics at the secondary level.

• The odds of school attendance increased if teachers treated boys and girls in equitable ways.

• The odds of boys selecting chemistry and physics at the secondary level increased if the teacher of the subject was approachable and if the subject was considered applicable to future careers.

• More than 40% of primary and secondary schools didn’t have guidelines on sexual harassment and gender-based violence for teachers and students. And most of the schools that said they had these guidelines couldn’t provide them to the research team. These guidelines help mainstream gender issues in schools and communities.

What next

To advance gender equality, Kenya must move beyond policy awareness. It must be more responsive to gender in teacher training, classroom practices and institutional leadership.

Our study recommends:

• creating a positive and inclusive learning environment where both boys and girls feel valued, capable, and motivated to learn

• teaching gender mainstreaming as a standalone unit, or integrating it into the teaching methodology

• coaching, mentorship and modelling of best practices to trainee teachers

• financial support for gender mainstreaming in all areas of teacher education

• encouraging girls to pursue STEM subjects and careers at an early age through formal mentorship programmes

• encouraging and empowering women teachers and parents to take up leadership positions in schools to provide role models for students.

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Read more: Kenya’s decision to make maths optional in high school is a bad idea – what should happen instead

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Our findings offer a critical evidence base for the education ministry and other stakeholders. They should put accountability mechanisms in place.

Only through sustained, data-driven action can Kenya achieve a truly inclusive and equitable education system.

– 10 years ago Kenya set out to fix gender gaps in education – what’s working and what still needs to be done
– https://theconversation.com/10-years-ago-kenya-set-out-to-fix-gender-gaps-in-education-whats-working-and-what-still-needs-to-be-done-255400

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sioux McKenna, Professor of Higher Education, Rhodes University, South Africa, Rhodes University

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) is trained on enormous bodies of text, video and images to identify patterns. It then creates new texts, videos and images on the basis of this pattern identification. Thanks to machine learning, it improves its ability to do so every time it is used.

As AI becomes embedded in academic life, a troubling reality has emerged: students are extremely vulnerable to its use. They don’t know enough about what AI is to be alert to its shortcomings. And they don’t know enough about their subject content to make judgements on this anyway. Most importantly, they don’t know what they don’t know.

As two academics involved in higher education teaching, we argue that there are four key dangers facing students in today’s world of AI. They are:

• blind trust in its abilities

• using it to side-step actual learning

• not knowing how it works

• perpetuating the gap between expertise and uncritical yet confident noise.

Given our experiences as academics who have developed curricula for students and who research generative AI, we think there are three things universities can do. They should teach critical AI literacy, emphasise why developing knowledge is important, and teach students why being an expert matters if they’re going to engage meaningfully with AI.

The four dangers

Blind trust in AI’s false confidence. A recent Microsoft report showed that those who know the least about a topic are the most likely to accept AI outputs as correct. Generative AI programs like ChatGPT and Claude produce text with remarkable confidence. Students lacking domain expertise can’t identify when these systems are completely wrong.

Headlines already demonstrate the consequences of this in the workplace: lawyers submitting fabricated case citations generated by AI, and hospitals using AI transcription tools that invent statements never actually made.

Generative AI can get it wrong because it doesn’t understand anything in the human sense of the word. But it can identify and replicate patterns with remarkable sophistication. These patterns include not only words and ideas but also tone and style.

Missing the power of education. A core purpose of higher education is to give students a new way of understanding the world and their place in it. When students use AI in ways that sidestep intellectual challenges, they miss this essential transformation.

When students simply outsource their thinking to AI, they’re getting credentials without competence. They might graduate with degrees but without knowledge and expertise.

The false confidence trap. Even students who develop critical awareness about AI’s limitations face what Punya Mishra, a learning engineer professor at Arizona State University, calls “the false confidence trap”. They might recognise that AI can produce errors but lack sufficient subject knowledge to correct those errors.

As Mishra puts it:

It’s like having a generic BS detector but no way to separate truth from fiction.

This creates a dangerous half-measure where students recognise AI isn’t perfect but can’t effectively evaluate its outputs.

Perpetuating the knowledge gap. As AI becomes ubiquitous in workplaces, the gap between those with genuine expertise and those relying solely on AI will widen. Students who haven’t developed their own knowledge foundations will be increasingly marginalised in a world that paradoxically values human expertise more, not less, as AI advances.

Answers

There are three steps universities can take.

Integrate critical AI literacy. Students need to understand how generative AI works – how AI is trained on massive databases of human-created texts and images to identify patterns by which to craft new outputs.

It’s not enough to have an “Intro to AI” course. Every discipline needs to show students how AI intersects with their field and, most significantly, empower them to reflect on the ethical implications of its use. This includes engaging in questions around the use of copyrighted materials for the training of generative AI, the biases inherent in AI generated texts and images, and the enormous environmental cost of AI use.

Emphasise knowledge development. Higher education institutions must actively counter the view that university is merely about the provision of credentials. We need to help students see the value of acquiring domain expertise. This is not always self-evident to those students who understand higher education only as a means to a job, which encourages them to engage with knowledge in an instrumentalist way – and thus to use AI in ways that prevent engagement with complex ideas. It is a personal relationship with knowledge that will prepare them for a future where AI is everywhere. Advocating for the power of knowledge needs to be a central part of every academic’s job description.

Model dual expertise. Academics should model what Mishra calls “the dual expertise challenge” — combining domain knowledge with critical AI literacy. This means demonstrating to students how experts engage with AI: analysing its outputs against established knowledge, identifying biases or gaps, and using AI as a tool to enhance human expertise rather than replace it.

As AI becomes increasingly sophisticated, the value of human expertise only grows. Universities that prepare students to critically engage with AI while developing deep domain knowledge will graduate the experts that society needs in this rapidly evolving technological landscape.

We have our work cut out for us, but expertise remains highly valued.

– AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do
– https://theconversation.com/ai-can-be-a-danger-to-students-3-things-universities-must-do-255652

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Fridah Gatwiri Kiambati, Post Doctoral research scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

Literacy – being able to read, write and understand written or spoken language – is a cornerstone of educational achievement. Yet, for millions of children worldwide, acquiring basic literacy skills is a significant challenge.

This is a result of systemic inequalities, poverty, conflict, displacement and gender disparities. A Unicef report on global literacy levels in 2023 found that 89% of 10-year-olds in sub-Saharan Africa were unable to read or comprehend a basic story.

In Kenya, the gap in foundational literacy is stark. A nationwide evaluation of over 44,000 children across 1,973 primary schools in 2023 found that three in 10 grade 6 learners aged 11 struggled to read grade 3-level (age 8) texts.

These numbers highlight the critical need to address reading difficulties in early grades to ensure that learners do not fall behind irretrievably.

When learners aren’t able to read, they are likely to fall behind in literacy and other learning areas. This is because foundational learning skills – which include literacy (reading) and numeracy (basic maths) – are the building blocks for learning in later years of schooling and for lifelong learning.

I am an inclusive education researcher. I was involved in the Developing Readers Study. It set out to design and pilot an intervention to improve literacy skills among grade 2 and 3 learners who are furthest behind in reading.

The study, implemented by the African Population and Health Research Center, was aimed at providing policy-relevant evidence on how support for struggling readers can be formally and systematically incorporated into school timetables and education systems.

In 13 weeks, more than a third of the learners had become fluent readers.

The study

The Developing Readers Study was implemented in 15 schools in Kiambu County, which neighbours the Kenyan capital Nairobi. This was strategic to design, test and refine the intervention before scaling up.

The intervention started with the preparation of instruction materials. These included a teachers’ guide and assessment booklet, as well as homework packets for the learners. Teachers were trained on how to deliver the structured intervention while accommodating individual learner needs.

Learners were assessed to identify those with reading difficulties. Out of 2,805 learners from 15 schools screened, 920 (33%) learners had reading difficulties.

They were then categorised into three groups as per their reading levels at baseline:

• module 1 for non-readers, who numbered 410 (45%)

• module 2 for beginning readers, who could read 1-9 correct words per minute (212 learners, or 23%)

• module 3 for intermediate readers who could read 10-16 correct words per minute (298 learners, or 32%).

The learners were then taken through remedial lessons for English and Kiswahili for 13 weeks. Each lesson lasted 30 minutes. During the intervention period, teachers received support from curriculum support officers, and quality assurance and standards officers in Kiambu County.

In addition, these officers observed the lessons to identify the support needed. Cluster meetings were held to gather teacher feedback on the implementation process.

Parents were also engaged through homework packets. This encouraged a supportive home environment for learning.

The results

The study led to significant improvements in literacy outcomes among participating learners over the 13 weeks.

1. The proportion of non-readers who couldn’t read any correct word per minute reduced from 43.3% (following a few dropouts) to 18.9% at endline. This improvement highlights the power of targeted instruction to transform learning outcomes for struggling readers.

2. Both boys and girls benefited from the programme. However, girls consistently outperformed boys in tasks like syllable and oral passage reading. These insights highlight the importance of designing interventions that address gender-specific learning needs.

3. The programme equipped teachers with practical tools and strategies to give learners individual attention according to their needs. By the endline assessment, 92% of teachers were closely following the structured lesson guides, demonstrating increased confidence and competence.

4. Parents played a pivotal role in the programme’s success. Weekly homework packets provided opportunities for learners to practise reading at home.

5. Over a third of the learners (37%) advanced to emergent and fluent reading levels, meaning they no longer required remedial support. This progression was particularly notable among younger learners in grade 2, underscoring the value of early intervention.

The developing readers intervention stands out because it goes beyond addressing literacy challenges at the classroom level. It also brought in education officials, rigorous teacher training and contextualised learning materials.

Its findings demonstrate that structured, targeted interventions can effectively address foundational literacy gaps. This same model can be used elsewhere.

What next

The study provides a roadmap for addressing Kenya’s literacy crisis. Its positive outcomes demonstrate that early, targeted interventions can put struggling readers on the path to success.

Scaling up this programme offers an opportunity to ensure no child is left behind in acquiring foundational literacy skills.

To achieve this, policymakers must make sure remedial interventions take place at schools. They must also provide resources for teacher training and promote home-school collaboration.

With sustained investment and a commitment to evidence-based strategies, Kenya can bridge its literacy gap and pave the way for a brighter future for its learners.

– We set out to improve literacy among struggling readers in Kenya – what we learnt
– https://theconversation.com/we-set-out-to-improve-literacy-among-struggling-readers-in-kenya-what-we-learnt-253252

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Frederik Wild, Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Heidelberg

Teenage pregnancy rates remain high across many parts of the developing world: In Africa, on average, about one in ten girls between the ages of 15 and 19 has already given birth. These early pregnancies often come with serious consequences for young mothers and their children. They are linked to lower education levels, poorer health outcomes, and reduced economic opportunities.

Scientists, development agencies and NGOs have long heralded education as a powerful tool to reduce early childbearing. Education may directly influence women’s reproductive behaviour, but it can also improve their employment and income-generating opportunities, leading them to postpone pregnancy.

But does access to basic education for young girls result in such successes uniformly across population groups?

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Read more: Ghana’s free high school policy is getting more girls to complete secondary education – study

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We are economists who conducted a study to explore the effect of primary school education on fertility and its related outcomes in Burundi. A bold education reform took place in that country in 2005: the government abolished formal school fees for primary education. As a result, many children who had been excluded from school by cost were able to get a basic education.

The free primary education policy displays a natural experiment for researchers interested in the effects of education. Because the reform applied only to children young enough to be in school, we could compare girls who were eligible for free schooling with those who were just too old to be eligible (but similar in other ways). This allowed us to track the policy’s direct and causal effects.

Indeed, we see that Burundi’s free primary education policy increased educational attainment of women by 1.22 years on average. Our findings also provide new, robust evidence that education can reduce downstream effects, as we see teenage childbearing reducing by as much as 6.9 percentage points. In other words, while about 37% of teenage women who did not benefit from free primary education had given birth before the age of 20, only 30% of those eligible for free primary education had done so.

Importantly, and new in our findings, education conferred the greatest benefit to girls from the poorest segment of society. Our study thereby underscores an important lesson for policymakers: education policies can be highly effective, but not necessarily for everyone in the same way.

A natural experiment in Burundi

We used nationally representative data from Burundi’s Demographic and Health Surveys to establish the effects of education. We compared women born between 1987 and 1991 to those born between 1992 and 1996 – aged 14-18 and 9-13 respectively when the free school policy took effect. We applied modern econometric techniques to identify the increase in years of schooling induced by the policy. We then examined the effect of this increase in schooling on girls’ outcomes, including teenage pregnancy, literacy, and the likelihood of working for cash income, among other outcomes.

The results were striking. Girls who had been young enough to benefit from free schooling gained, on average, 1.22 more years of education thanks to the programme. That corresponds to a 34% increase in the years of education compared to similar women who missed out on the policy. Crucially, this increase occurred across the board – both poor and wealthier women gained more education.

But there was a twist: only young women from poor backgrounds seemed to reap broader benefits from that extra schooling.

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Read more: Burundi at 60 is the poorest country on the planet: a look at what went wrong

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For girls from very low-income households, one additional year of schooling reduced the likelihood of becoming a teenage mother by nearly 7 percentage points.

It also decreased their desired number of children and boosted their literacy and chances of working for a cash income outside their own home. These are all powerful indicators of women gaining autonomy and making more informed reproductive choices.

While girls from wealthier households experienced an increase in education too, this additional schooling showed no measurable effect on fertility, literacy, or employment outcomes for them. Thus, we did not find any statistically significant impact of increased schooling for these girls.

In other words, the free primary education programme in Burundi increased the number of years of education for girls in general but the downstream effects of that education appear to have materialised only for the very poor.

Why does household wealth matter?

Why would women from the relatively wealthier families not benefit equally from more education?

One reason could be that somewhat wealthier households had already ensured higher levels of education for their daughters, even before school fees were abolished in Burundi. The education reform thus made less of a difference in their lives. Very poor families, on the other hand, were far more likely to be constrained by the costs of primary education. When that barrier was removed, their daughters could finally access schooling, and this had transformative effects also for sexual and reproductive health.

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Read more: Girls thrive with women teachers: a study in Francophone Africa

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For the most disadvantaged, education is more likely to open up new economic opportunities. We found that policy-induced education increased their likelihood of working outside of their own household for a cash income, which raises the opportunity cost of early childbearing. The classic economic theory by Nobel prize laureate Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer suggests that when women have better employment prospects, they are more likely to postpone childbirth. And they invest more in their children but tend to have fewer of them. This is precisely what we observed in our data.

Education also seems to empower women by increasing their knowledge and capacity to access information. We found that literacy rates among poor women rose significantly with each added year of schooling. Another prominent theory in the literature on education is that educated women are more likely to understand and use contraception, make informed reproductive decisions, and challenge traditional gender norms.

Rethinking one-size-fits-all policies

Our study underscores an important lesson for policymakers: education policies can be highly effective, but not necessarily for everyone in the same way.

When evaluating the success of reforms like free primary education, we must go beyond average effects. Aggregated data can mask substantial differences between population groups. If we had only looked at average outcomes, we might have concluded that free schooling had little effect on teenage childbearing. But by disaggregating our data by household wealth, we see a different and far more hopeful picture. Free schooling has powerful effects – if we know where to look.

– Does free schooling give girls a better chance in life? Burundi study shows the poorest benefited most
– https://theconversation.com/does-free-schooling-give-girls-a-better-chance-in-life-burundi-study-shows-the-poorest-benefited-most-253634

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Philip Harrison, Professor School of Architecture and Planning, University of the Witwatersrand

South African president Cyril Ramaphosa met senior leaders of Johannesburg and Gauteng, the province it’s located in, in March 2025 to discuss ways to arrest the steep decline in South Africa’s largest city.

Ramaphosa announced a two-year-long presidential intervention to tackle some of the city’s most pressing issues. It is to be led by the Presidential Johannesburg Working Group with eight cross-governmental and multi-stakeholder workstreams.

Johannesburg was established 130 years ago, where the world’s largest-ever gold deposits were discovered. It grew rapidly in the early 20th century and became the country’s economic heartland and largest population centre. Like all South African cities, it was deeply scarred by apartheid policies. People were divided by racially defined groups. Good services and a strong economy benefited a minority, and a black majority were pushed into impoverished ghettos.

But, for about the first two decades of post-apartheid rule from 1994, Johannesburg led the country with innovation and progressive change. It pioneered the new local government system, institutional reforms, new practice on city strategy and planning, pro-poor service delivery, and modern transport infrastructure.

Today, however, the city is in a dire state. Over the past decade, roughly coinciding with the arrival of messy coalition governance in 2016, sound political leadership, administrative stability and financial management have crumbled. Underinvestment in infrastructure maintenance has led to collapsing services. Public trust is deteriorating among increasingly frustrated communities. This was evident in local election results. It also shows up in recent data released by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory on public trust in local government.

The local economy has stagnated. The city’s official unemployment rate of 34.3% is higher than the national average of 32.9%. Mounting joblessness and dwindling incomes have intertwined with depleted trust to knock levels of payment for property rates and service charges. In turn this has deepened the financial and service maintenance crisis.

Corruption in many parts of the city is an endemic complicating factor.

The presidential intervention is designed to address this complex interplay between embedded legacies and failings post-apartheid. The workstreams involving city officials and concerned stakeholders are generating ideas for priority actions. There is also a new energy in the city government, with the executive mayor and members of his mayoral committee making turnaround promises.

This long overdue attention is heartening. But some caution is called for. While some “quick wins” are needed, there will be no easy turnaround. The best prospect is likely to be a process of recovery that will require patience and methodical attention over the long term. A city cannot be repaired in the way an automobile can. A city has a trillion moving parts and is in a constant state of makeover, as dynamics of economy, technology, demography, environment, society, politics, and more, interact and produce change.

The question is not whether a city is fixed – it can never finally be – but rather what trajectory it is on. For Johannesburg, the question is how to exit the downward spiral and begin the process of reconstruction.

We are a group who previously worked in the City of Johannesburg as officials, who are now academics with decades of experience observing local governance trends and dynamics, or scholars engaged in civil society coalitions or communities mobilising around the crisis. Some of us have been involved in the Presidential Johannesburg Working Group over the last few months.

Our view is that there are four areas needing urgent but sustained attention.

Focus areas

The first is the need for a joint effort across national, provincial and municipal government to resolve the crisis. We are pleased that this has begun. The political leadership in the city (and of the province) failed to grasp the opportunity provided by the post-2024 election national compromises to put together a broad-based government of local unity to lead reconstruction. There is no option now but to pursue an inter-governmental initiative led by national government with the committed involvement of the other spheres.

Only genuine collaboration will succeed.

In this respect, the Presidential Johannesburg Working Group holds promise. But what will be needed is careful, concerted work focused first on short-term priorities. Then, over years, on key structural challenges facing the city.

Second, the city needs civil society in all its forms to hold a careful balance between keeping up the pressure on municipal government, constantly holding it accountable to its residents, and working with government to help it solve problems. The Joburg Crisis Alliance, Jozi-my-Jozi, WaterCAN and similar initiatives are claiming well-recognised and respected voice in the affairs of the municipality.

Johannesburg needs a city government that is open to this scrutiny, accepting the need for transparency, and open to the help that civil society can offer.

To raise the level of accountability and collaboration, a clear programme of restoration has to be communicated openly to the public. Milestones and expenditure requirements need to be set that allow for constant monitoring. There must be open council meetings, and regular online and in-person briefings.

Also required are new mechanisms for citizen-based monitoring. These may include trained citizen monitors reporting on service delivery. Alternatively, the establishment of a sort of “Citizen’s Council” which meets regularly to receive reports from these monitors and the city administration.

International examples include the Bürgerrat model. This is now fully institutionalised in parts of Germany and Austria to strengthen local democracy and accountability. In this model, citizens are randomly selected to sit on a council which monitors performance of local government and provides new ideas.

Another approach could be for civil society organisations to be invited to a Citizen’s Council that would act in support of the oversight processes of the elected Municipal Council.

Third, there has to be a solution to unstable coalition governments. These seem to be structured to facilitate separate political fiefdoms where spoils can be divided in the allocation of portfolios. At minimum, the presidential intervention must provide for a check and balance on processes where bureaucratic appointments and budgetary allocations may serve the interests of cronyism. For example, there should be transparency and rigour in appointments to the boards of Johannesburg’s municipally owned companies.

Regulatory reforms are required in the political arena. This should include rules for the distribution of seats on the municipal executive and the election of mayors. Between January 2023 and August 2024 a tiny minority party held the mayoralty because the larger parties could not agree on a mayoral selection or, more cynically, to ensure that the executive mayor could not call large parties to account.

More importantly, though, there has to be a change in political culture. This is a longer-term process.

Fourth, the problems run far deeper than what bureaucratic reorganisation can achieve.

The longer-term project is to build a capable administration with clear political direction and oversight but insulated from personal agendas and factional battles. The administration became confused and demoralised because of the political instability over an extended period. There are, however, still many capable and committed public servants in the city bureaucracy. The focus should be on working with them to rebuild the administration, making it a place where talent and initiative are recognised and rewarded.

Restored political leadership and a rejuvenated administration is needed for a long term process, extending far beyond the quick wins. This process will involve refurbishing the decaying network infrastructure, restoring financial stability, reestablishing social trust and returning confidence to the city’s economy.

2025 marks 30 years since the first democratic local elections. National government is looking seriously at sweeping municipal reforms. And the next municipal election – likely to be held at the end of 2026 – is an opportunity to make a deep transformation effort. Citizens can ensure that parties contesting the election place Johannesburg’s recovery at the heart of their agenda.

– Johannesburg’s problems can be solved – but it’s a long journey to fix South Africa’s economic powerhouse
– https://theconversation.com/johannesburgs-problems-can-be-solved-but-its-a-long-journey-to-fix-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-256013

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Over the past two decades, African countries have increasingly turned to international capital markets to meet their development financing needs. For example, Kenya and Benin raised a combined US$2.5 billion through bond issuances during the first half of 2025. Proceeds were used to repay maturing bonds. This means new bonds, with unfavourable terms, are being issued to pay previous lenders.

Yet African bonds are substantially mispriced, resulting in excessively high yields that are not justified by fundamentals – based on economic, fiscal and institutional strengths. Mispricing occurs when a country has high economic growth, stable institutions that support government policy implementation, rule of law and accountability, yet its bonds trade at higher yields than those of its peers. In other words, there will be every reason for investors to trust that the country will repay what it owes, but they still expect a higher return. This is happening because of lack of information and biases perpetuated by global entities that are facilitating bond sells in Africa.

Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal have strong growth (5% to 6.5%), yet they face high yields on their bonds (7.8% to 8.2%) compared to Namibia and Morocco with approximately 3% growth and bond interest of 6%.

This mispricing imposes a heavy debt servicing burden on already constrained public budgets.

At the same time African countries face a puzzling paradox: while they’re paying more for the debt they’re raising, the demand for these bonds is much higher (oversubscribed). All bond issuances in Africa are subscribed by as much as over five times. This has only been common in Africa. It is puzzling why governments are not leveraging on the high demand to bargain for lower interest rates.

In my view, based on my bond pricing modelling expertise, I believe that mispricing of Eurobonds in Africa – debt instruments issued by a country in a currency different from its own – is not a market anomaly. It shows internal capacity failures in African countries, structural market biases and insufficient understanding of the complex mechanics of global debt markets.

Oversubscription of Eurobonds should be a source of power for African governments, not a missed opportunity. African countries can move from being price takers to price negotiators. They should be able to reduce debt costs, freeing up resources for development.

But to get there African countries need to address the power imbalance in the markets.

Governments need to invest in bond pricing expertise to increase their negotiating power.

The false success signal of oversubscription

There are several reasons why African bonds remain mispriced at a higher interest despite the oversubscriptions.

Firstly, a lack of technical expertise in primary bond issuance in the debt management offices of the majority of African governments. Very few on the continent have intelligence systems for gathering information on financial markets and formal investor relations programmes. Neither do they have in-house quantitative analysts or pricing specialists capable of engaging investment banks on an equal footing during roadshows and negotiations.

The debt management offices are unable to engage confidently and critically with financial intermediaries to challenge assumptions, simulate pricing scenarios and conduct their own comparative market analysis.

After initial public offers, most governments don’t engage with holders of their bonds on the secondary market. Nor do they monitor bond post-issuance performance. The lack of interest in the secondary market has created a feedback loop where poor market intelligence has contributed to high coupons on new issuances.

Secondly, advanced economies engage investors regularly through briefings, roadshows and timely reports. Communication by African governments is often ad hoc and usually limited to the period around a new bond issuance.

This prevents investors from forming informed, long-term views. It leads to a default risk premium in pricing.

Thirdly, debt issuance by African governments is often politically driven rather than strategically timed. Often this leads to rushed or ill-prepared entries.

Sometimes it’s done when the cost of debt is rising globally, close to election cycles, or because governments are facing a financial crunch caused by falling reserves.

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Read more: African governments have developed a taste for Eurobonds: why it’s dangerous

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Fourth, African sovereigns often approach the Eurobond market with weak negotiating power. They are heavily reliant on a small pool of western investment banks as technical advisors to manage the bond issuance. These banks tend to be more inclined towards their own global investment client networks. Their incentives are not aligned with achieving the lowest possible yield for the issuers.

African issuers often accept the initial price guidance from advisors and agree to high yields even in oversubscribed situations. Even when demand could support a lower yield, African issuers fail to negotiate pricing downwards. Issuing syndicates have no incentive to push for optimal pricing for the issuer as they receive transaction-based fees.

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Read more: African countries aren’t borrowing too much: they’re paying too much for debt

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The role of bond issuing syndicates is a major factor in the mispricing. In bond issuance, a syndicate is a group of financial institutions that structures the bond, price and market (also known bookbuilding), underwrite the unsold portion of the bond, sell the bond to their investors, and ensure compliance and documentation. These syndicates set coupon rates higher than necessary as a conservative hedge against perceived investor scepticism.

African governments have become passive participants rather than active price-setters. African-based bond syndicates are systematically bypassed despite growing regional capacity and distribution networks. Bond issues are also allocated to offshore buyers, sidelining local institutional investors.

Breaking the cycle of mispricing

To correct the systemic Eurobond mispricing and reduce debt servicing costs, African countries must undertake reforms.

First, governments should invest in debt management capacity.

Second, they must actively monitor secondary market trading to identify opportunities such as bond buybacks and exchanges that could improve the debt profile. Real-time analytics on bond trading performance should inform future issuance terms and investor communication strategies.

Third, governments must build institutional routines for submitting data, and proactively engage investors and rating agencies. This will challenge and influence risk assumptions. Investors need consistent assurances, especially on the ability to easily exit positions.

Fourth, African countries need to maintain and monitor up-to-date benchmarks from peers with comparable pricing data. Without accurate comparisons, it is difficult to know whether the proposed bond pricing by syndicates is fair and accurate. They must stop solely relying on what investment banks recommends.

Lastly, African governments should involve at least one African-based syndicate member, prioritise allocation to African institutional investors and promote regional arrangements with international banks to ensure knowledge transfer and equitable participation.

– African countries are bad at issuing bonds, so debt costs more than it should: what needs to change
– https://theconversation.com/african-countries-are-bad-at-issuing-bonds-so-debt-costs-more-than-it-should-what-needs-to-change-257128

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Julie Zollmann, Digital Planet Fellow, The Fletcher School, Tufts University

Many argue that gig work involves exploitation, as research and media coverage have highlighted. But that doesn’t seem to deter ride hailing drivers on platforms like Uber and Bolt.

In Kenya, in fact, many new drivers continued to join platforms even as fares were slashed starting in 2016.

As a PhD student studying the role of digitalisation in development, I spent several years trying to understand how digital drivers experienced the quality of their work. My research found that in 2019, a typical digital driver in Nairobi worked about 58 hours a week and earned well below the minimum wage on an hourly basis. What made this work attractive? Why did drivers stay?

In a new paper, I draw on a 2019 survey of 450 drivers in Nairobi and 38 subsequent qualitative interviews in Nairobi and Kenya’s second largest ride hailing market, Mombasa, in 2021 that explored drivers’ experiences in detail.

In addition to measuring working hours and incomes, my survey team asked drivers if they considered their work “dignified”. Nearly eight in ten (78%) of our survey participants said yes. While that specific share of drivers may have changed since then, the underlying reasons drivers found the work dignified remain unchanged.

In the global north, scholars have rung alarm bells about what “gig work” means for the erosion of standard jobs with legal protections around working hours, minimum wage and other benefits. But the drivers my team and I spoke with in Kenya felt that digital driving was a step towards formalisation rather than a drift away from an ideal formal job. Driving had diginity in contrast to the indignities of low-wage work and the vast informal sector, which was their realistic alternative for making a living.

My findings highlight that workers’ experiences on global platforms like Uber are not universal and that digitisation may deliver some improvements in work quality relative to informal work in African contexts.

How did digital work deliver dignity?

Drivers explained that app companies imposed rules and structure that provided “discipline” in a transport sector more broadly associated with rudeness, unruliness, and disrespect towards passengers. Requirements for things like driving licences, proof of insurance, and ratings seemed to make drivers feel more professional and make passengers see them as such.

Drivers felt proud to be part of a driver community that behaved professionally under these conditions. A 38-year-old male driver in Nairobi who had been working on the platforms for three years told us:

We are very respected … Everyone trusts you to carry them. It’s not like the old days, when the taxi driver might rob you and dump you or even kill you. We are getting attraction from the society, even in the slums. They know you are an app driver, and they trust you because app drivers are good people. They know you can deliver, that you will be honest.

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Read more: Zimbabwe’s economy crashed — so how do citizens still cling to myths of urban and economic success?

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On platforms, drivers were matched digitally with riders. Respondents said this brought dignity by ensuring drivers would receive a fairly steady stream of clients. This meant that a driver could rest assured he would earn money every day.

The alternative was to “hustle” in the informal economy to shake loose opportunities and constantly solicit those who might use their labour and beg for payment after a job was done. Constant solicitation and bargaining were exhausting and degrading.

One driver explained:

Most of us are poor. I have never walked out every morning sure that I would do a job. But now I know that if my car has been serviced and my phone is charged and working, I am going to work and not to some charity job. I used to wait at the base all day without getting a customer. Now, ….. at least two, three days are going to be good for you.

Digital matchmaking also meant that drivers were not limited to serving the few clients they already knew or who happened to pass them at a fixed base. They found themselves serving new parts of the city and carrying important people, including business people, celebrities and local politicians. Serving these high-end customers made them feel proud and important. Wealthy neighbourhoods, luxury hotels and high-end restaurants felt more open to them in otherwise exclusionary and segregated cities.

Some drivers felt that digitalisation had removed barriers to entry for taxi driving, like paying to join a parking base and building a client list.

The app did away with parking bases, and about half of drivers joined the system through a “partner”, paying a fixed weekly fee to rent their car instead of buying it themselves.

In efforts to make rides cheaper, in 2018 app companies in Kenya allowed smaller, less expensive cars on their platforms, lowering costs of ownership. Drivers in our survey showed that both formal and informal financiers were willing to offer loans to digital drivers, knowing they would have regular revenue to service their debt.

Buying a car was seen as a huge, dignifying accomplishment. One driver in the survey told us:

Growing up, I thought vehicles were owned only by the rich, but now digital driving has provided a means for me to own one and earn the respect of society.

David Muteru, then chairman of the Digital Taxi Association of Kenya, echoed this sentiment: “Owning a vehicle, that’s an asset”.

Dignity not always guaranteed

The dignifying value of order was only possible when app companies enforced their own rules and did so fairly. Drivers preferred the stringent rule enforcement of one major app over the lax enforcement of another, which made for more stressful and undignified interactions with riders.

When the rules were enforced, drivers could be sure that the app company would help if a rider refused to pay or if there was a dispute with the client. Drivers felt the stricter environment kept bad actors out.

Over time, though, app companies slashed prices, competing for market share. Drivers felt less respected by riders who saw them as desperate for money. Low fares pressed drivers to negotiate with riders for offline trips and higher rates, reintroducing the indignity of haggling.

Lessons for the future

Digitally mediated work raises many questions about labour standards.

This research shows how important it is to keep local context in mind. Digital driving is not the same experience for drivers in every context. Where people suffer indignities and deprivations in the informal sector, digitalisation may offer gains. But this potential depends on rule enforcement and pay. Material and subjective dignity are intertwined.

– Kenya’s ride-hailing drivers say their jobs offer dignity despite the challenges
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-ride-hailing-drivers-say-their-jobs-offer-dignity-despite-the-challenges-257845

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Richard Calland, Emeritus Associate Professor in Public Law, UCT. Visiting Adjunct Professor, WITS School of Governance; Director, Africa Programme, University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership, University of Cambridge

With the Trump administration slashing US Agency for International Development budgets and European nations shifting overseas development aid budgets to bolster defence spending, the world has entered a “post-aid era”.

But there is an opportunity to recast development finance as strategic investment: “country platforms”.

Country platforms are government-led, nationally owned mechanisms that bring together a country’s climate priorities, investment needs and reform agenda, and align them with the interests of development partners, private investors and implementing agencies. They function as a strategic hub: convening actors, coordinating funding, and curating pipelines of projects for investment.

Think of them as the opposite of donor-driven fragmentation. Instead of dozens of disconnected projects driven by external priorities, a country platform enables governments to set the agenda and direct finance to where it is needed most. That could be renewable energy, climate-smart agriculture, resilient infrastructure, or nature-based solutions.

Country platforms are a current fad. They were the talk of the town at the 2025 Spring meetings of multilateral development banks in Washington DC. Will they quickly fade as the next big new idea comes into view? Or can they escape the limitations and failings of the finance and development aid ecosystem?

The Independent High Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, on which I serve, is striving to find new ways to ramp up finance – both public and private – in quality and quantity. I agree with those who argue that country platforms could be the innovation that unlocks the capital urgently needed to tackle climate overshoot and buttress economic development.

The model is already being tested. More than ten countries have launched their platforms, and more are in the pipeline.

For African countries, the opportunity could not be more timely. African governments are racing to deliver their Nationally Determined Contributions. These are the commitments they’ve made to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions as part of climate change mitigation targets set out in the Paris Agreement. Implementing these plans is often being done under severe fiscal constraints.

At the same time global capital is looking for investment opportunities. But it needs to be convinced that the rewards will outweigh the risks.

Where it’s being tested

In Africa, South Africa’s Just Energy Transition Partnership has demonstrated both the potential and the complexity of a country platform. Egypt and Senegal also have country platforms at different stages of implementation. Kenya and Nigeria are exploring similar mechanisms. The African Union’s Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy calls for country platforms across the continent.

New entrants can learn from countries that started first.

But country platforms come in different shapes and sizes according to the context.

Another promising example is emerging through Mission 300, an initiative of the World Bank and African Development Bank, working with partners like The Rockefeller Foundation, Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet, and Sustainable Energy for All. It aims to connect 300 million people to clean electricity by 2030.

Central to this initiative are Compact Delivery and Monitoring Units. These are essentially country platforms anchored in electrification. They reflect how a well-structured country platform can make an impact. Twelve African countries are already moving in this direction. All announced their Mission 300 compacts at the Africa Heads of State Summit in Tanzania.

This growing cohort reflects a continental commitment to putting energy-driven country platforms at the heart of Africa’s development architecture.

Why now – and why Africa?

A well-functioning country platform can help in a number of ways.

Firstly, it can give the political and economic leadership a clear goal. The platform can survive elections and show stability, certainty and transparency to the investment world.

Secondly, national ownership and strategic alignment can reduce risk and build confidence. That would encourage investment.

Thirdly, it builds trust among development partners and investors through clear priorities, transparency, and national ownership.

Fourthly, it moves beyond isolated pilot projects to system-level transformation – meaning structural change. The transition in one sector, energy for example, creates new value chains that create more, better and safer jobs. Country platforms put African governments in charge of their own economic development, not as passive recipients of climate finance.

The country sets its investment priorities and then the match-making with international climate finance can begin.

Making it work: what’s needed

Developing the data on which a country bases its investment and development plans, and blending those with the fiscal, climate and nature data, is complex. For this reason country platforms require investment in institutional capacity, cross-ministerial collaboration, and strong coordination between finance ministries, environment agencies and economic planners. And especially, in leadership capability.

African countries must take charge of this capacity and capability acceleration.

Second, development partners can respond by providing money as well as supporting African leadership, aligning with national strategies, and being willing to co-design mechanisms that meet both investor expectations and local realities.

Capacity is especially crucial given the scale of Africa’s needs. According to the African Development Bank, Africa will require over US$200 billion annually by 2030 to meet its climate goals. Donor aid will provide only a fraction of this. It will require smart, coordinated investment and careful debt management. Country platforms provide the structure to govern the process.

Seizing the opportunity

Country platforms represent one of the most promising innovations in climate and development finance architecture. Properly designed and led, they offer African countries the opportunity to take ownership of their climate and development futures – on their own terms.

Country platforms could be the “buckle” that finally enables the supply and demand sides of climate finance to come together. It will require commitment, strategic and technical capability, and, above all, smart leadership.

– Development finance in a post-aid world: the case for country platforms
– https://theconversation.com/development-finance-in-a-post-aid-world-the-case-for-country-platforms-257994

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Daniel Cash, Reader in Law, Aston University

For governments, a credit rating is more than a financial signal. It is a verdict that can influence the cost of borrowing, access to markets and, ultimately, the ability to provide for their citizens.

Rating decisions are made behind closed doors in a private process that isn’t open to assessment or scrutiny.

For African countries, this opacity can be especially damaging. When rating decisions lack transparency, it’s impossible to challenge potential biases or inconsistencies in methodology that put developing economies at a disadvantage. The result is higher borrowing costs that drain resources from healthcare, education and infrastructure investment.

Africa’s new credit rating agency has the chance to change this. The African Credit Rating Agency is an initiative under development by the African Union and its partners. It is more than a new entrant; it is an attempt to rethink how financial authority is earned, exercised and scrutinised. The new agency plans to introduce transparent governance structures that could revolutionise rating methodology.

As a researcher who has looked closely at the working of rating agencies, I believe this opportunity to bring transparency to financial governance isn’t just about better ratings. It’s a step towards economic sovereignty.

Success for the African Credit Rating Agency shouldn’t be measured by whether it displaces the “big three” rating agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch). The real question isn’t whether an African agency can compete, but rather whether it can show the world how to rate credit differently.

A flawed process

The three big agencies do publish their methodologies – their criteria and risk models. This creates an illusion of transparency. Yet the final judgments emerge from committee meetings that produce no public record, no accountability, and no right of meaningful appeal.

These rating committees typically comprise five to 10 analysts who meet in closed sessions to make each sovereign rating decision. S&P, Moody’s and Fitch each operate internal rating committees for every sovereign rating decision. The deliberations, dissenting views, and specific reasoning behind final votes remain confidential. Only a brief summary is provided with a rating decision.

Research has shown that credit rating agencies are more accurate at assessing the creditworthiness of advanced economies than developing economies. There have also been studies on the discrepancy between what is expected when the public methodologies are applied and what the agencies actually rate. These studies have been done for economies like Hong Kong and China, but no equivalent research has yet been undertaken for African sovereigns.

This discrepancy exposes an accountability void. When methodology-based predictions miss the mark, we must question what happens in those committee rooms. Especially when African nations are being assessed by analysts stationed continents away, with limited understanding of local economic and political realities.

The African Credit Rating Agency could make three changes to the way ratings are done:

• through public deliberations

• by forming hybrid committees

• with technological intervention.

First, it could release committee transcripts within 30 days of each decision. This would give markets and governments unprecedented insight into rating rationales. This isn’t radical – central banks already publish meeting minutes, and courts publish opinions with dissenting views.

Second, it could pioneer panels that include not only rating analysts, but regional economists, sectoral specialists, and even civil society observers. All with recorded votes. This diversified expertise would disrupt “group think” while capturing nuances of African economies that traditional agencies overlook.

I have examined this idea from the perspective of injecting climate and sustainability-related expertise into credit rating committees. I believe this is a crucial step to take to evolve the concept of the credit rating committee.

Third, the agency could use artificial intelligence to analyse patterns across committee discussions, flagging potential regional biases or inconsistent methodology application. It might be able to use secure digital ledgers to create unchangeable records of decisions.

Why the big three keep it closed

The industry thrives on privacy – protecting proprietary methodologies and shielding decisions from external challenge. And the natural oligopoly (a market dominated by a few large players due to high entry barriers, reinforced by market preference for predictability) helps it stay that way.

The sovereign credit ratings of the three big agencies are built on quantitative and qualitative factors. But research shows that sovereign ratings are subjected to qualitative understandings. This puts developing economies at a disadvantage when agencies demonstrate pro-western biases because they lack data or knowledge.

The impact of a credit rating downgrade for a sovereign borrower is usually multifaceted. Research shows that a single-notch downgrade can raise borrowing costs by more than 100 basis points, equivalent to an extra US$100 million annually on a US$10 billion bond.

Investors prefer fewer, stronger signals rather than many competing views. So there’s little incentive for established players to change. The African Credit Rating Agency, as a new entrant, can offer something the incumbents won’t: governance innovation that serves both markets and nations.

Radical openness will shake markets, at least at first. Committee members might face political pressure. Transparency alone doesn’t guarantee fair outcomes.

But the world already demands transparency from central banks and constitutional courts. Why accept anything less from institutions that shape sovereign destiny?

Next steps

By 2050, one in four people on Earth will be African. The financial architecture serving them must evolve towards systems that recognise the continent’s unique strengths.

Opening the rating committee to view represents more than technical reform – it’s about shifting who holds power in global finance. If it does this, the African agency won’t just deliver better ratings; it will model how global finance can be governed more justly.

– Africa’s new credit rating agency could change the rules of the game. Here’s how
– https://theconversation.com/africas-new-credit-rating-agency-could-change-the-rules-of-the-game-heres-how-257138

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Eric Y Tenkorang, Professor of Sociology,, Memorial University of Newfoundland

Intimate partner violence is controlling behaviour that results in harm to victims. This can be physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, economic or spiritual harm. Women are overwhelmingly the victims and survivors of intimate partner violence.

Globally, about one third of women have experienced some type of intimate partner violence. In Ghana too, one third of women have experienced physical and sexual abuse.

Research has linked women’s experiences of intimate partner violence to their socio-economic marginalisation, although it can happen to wealthy women too. Beyond the socio-economic reasons, some also make cultural arguments.

One such factor is lineage: lines of ancestry. Lineage is a major source of wealth, privileges and responsibilities in Ghana and more broadly in sub-Saharan Africa.

Some people trace their ancestry through maternal kin members. Women in these matrilineal societies wield socio-economic and cultural power because inheritance goes through the female line. As carriers of the lineage, women have some cultural value.

In a patrilineage, people trace their ancestry through men. Inheritance goes through the male line. Women cannot source wealth from the lineage. There is noticeable gender ordering and hierarchies in patrilineal societies. Male children are considered the carriers of the lineage.

Despite these two predominant lineage systems, there is also bilateral descent. In bilateral systems, kinship is traced to both maternal and paternal sides of the family.

Recent studies have suggested a link exists between lineage and intimate partner violence. But there is limited evidence as to why this might be the case.

One of my research interests is violence against women in African cultures and I have published extensively on this subject. For a recent study, my team collected survey data, including in-depth interviews, from the three ecological areas of Ghana – coastal, middle and northern. These reflect differences in ecology, culture and modernity.

About 1,700 women responded to our survey questions on lineage and intimate partner violence. Of these, about 30 women were followed up for an in-depth interview.

We found differences in experiences of violence between women depending on the lineage system they were part of. Awareness of this pattern could inform efforts to prevent violence and empower women.

What we found

A major finding was that women in matrilineal communities experienced lower levels of intimate partner violence than women in patrilineal communities or bilateral ones. Part of the reason is women’s access to resources.

We also found that bride price payments elevated patrilineal women’s risks of experiencing intimate partner violence. Bride price payment is an exchange of resources from the groom to the family of the bride. This is in acknowledgement that marriage has taken place. Women in patrilineal systems were more likely to experience physical, sexual and emotional violence when bride price was fully paid than when it was partially paid.

Unlike patrilineal women, matrilineal and bilateral women only experienced emotional and physical violence when bride price was fully paid.

The backdrop

Ghana passed its landmark Domestic Violence Act in 2007. It criminalises acts that are likely to result in intimate partner violence. This opened the door to the establishment of a Domestic Violence and Victim Support Unit to prosecute perpetrators. Structures are also in place to provide support for victims of abuse.

But criminalising intimate partner violence offers only a partial remedy to the problem. This is particularly true when behaviours that lead to such acts of violence are deeply rooted in inequality, culture and patriarchy.

Despite recent efforts to bridge gender inequality, Ghana continues to lag behind other societies in this area. Ghanaian women are discriminated against socially and culturally. They are excluded from participating in major decisions related to their households and communities. They are also marginalised economically, creating less opportunity for upward mobility.

The patriarchal nature of Ghanaian society has not helped. It has worked in tandem with existing social arrangements to deepen inequality and further render women powerless.

In my view, part of matrilineal women’s reduced risk of experiencing intimate partner violence may be explained by access to maternal resources, where they benefit more than their patrilineal and bilateral counterparts.

This background also helps explain why bride price arrangements make a difference. Contemporary feminist analysis of the payment of bride price suggests it may be interpreted as “wife ownership and purchase”. This can be a tool for oppressing and controlling women.

These findings support the argument that bride price payment may have negative consequences for Ghanaian women. This is especially so for those in patrilineal cultures where the norms and expectations associated with these payments are stronger.

A path to safety

Establishing cultural reasons why some women are at greater risk than others of experiencing intimate partner violence is important for policy in Ghana and has implications for sub-Saharan Africa.

Our research findings point to the need to empower women by providing them with the resources they need to flourish and fight abuse. It shows lineage can be a conduit for resource exchange and distribution.

Also, public education can help correct narratives of ownership and purchase which are linked to intimate partner violence. Bride price payments should have symbolic, not commercial, significance.

– Violence against women in Ghana is deeply rooted in culture and family ties – study
– https://theconversation.com/violence-against-women-in-ghana-is-deeply-rooted-in-culture-and-family-ties-study-257947