Grupo Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento financia iniciativa regional de resiliência sanitária na África Austral

Source: Africa Press Organisation – Portuguese –

O Conselho de Administração do Fundo Africano de Desenvolvimento (ADF) aprovou uma subvenção de 9,57 milhões de dólares para apoiar os países da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África Austral (SADC) no reforço da segurança sanitária regional e da preparação para emergências.

Aprovado a 3 de março de 2026, este financiamento da janela concessional do Grupo Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento irá financiar o Projeto de Sistemas de Saúde Resilientes para Preparação para Emergências. A iniciativa visa reforçar a resiliência e a capacidade dos sistemas de saúde em toda a região da SADC para responder de forma mais eficaz a emergências de saúde pública e nutrição.

O projeto inclui a formação de 449 técnicos de laboratório, profissionais de saúde comunitários e formadores, incluindo 269 mulheres, utilizando abordagens personalizadas que integram considerações de género, adaptação às alterações climáticas e a abordagem One Health. Além disso, cerca de 35 coordenadores de nutrição, incluindo 21 mulheres, de instituições de formação especializadas em nutrição e género em situações de emergência receberão certificação. Espera-se que os currículos revistos beneficiem aproximadamente 240 estudantes por ano, ajudando a criar um conjunto regional sustentável de conhecimentos especializados em nutrição e gestão de emergências sensível às questões de género.

Os laboratórios de diagnóstico e monitorização de águas residuais e vigilância ambiental em seis países beneficiários serão renovados e equipados como parte da componente central de modernização das infraestruturas. O projeto também modernizará o Instituto Nacional de Saúde em Moçambique para servir como laboratório de referência regional e reforçará o banco de sangue nacional no Lesoto. Será estabelecido um quadro regional para laboratórios transfronteiriços modelo, juntamente com um laboratório transfronteiriço móvel a ser implantado em dois pontos fronteiriços estratégicos em Moçambique e no Zimbabué.

“Esta operação visa abordar a fragilidade persistente dos sistemas de saúde na SADC, que continuam vulneráveis a surtos zoonóticos e epidemias de cólera, altas taxas de desnutrição e recursos humanos limitados, bem como preparação inadequada para emergências”, disse Kennedy Mbekeani, Diretor-Geral do Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento para a África Austral.

Distribuído pelo Grupo APO para African Development Bank Group (AfDB).

Contacto para os media:
Alexis Adélé 
Departamento de Comunicação e Relações Externas 
media@afdb.org

Sobre o Grupo Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento:
O Grupo Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento é a principal instituição financeira de desenvolvimento em África. Inclui três entidades distintas: o Banco Africano de Desenvolvimento (AfDB), o Fundo Africano de Desenvolvimento (ADF) e o Fundo Fiduciário da Nigéria (NTF). Presente no terreno em 41 países africanos, com uma representação externa no Japão, o Banco contribui para o desenvolvimento económico e o progresso social dos seus 54 Estados-membros. Mais informações em www.AfDB.org/pt

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African Development Bank Group funds regional health resilience drive in Southern Africa

Source: APO – Report:

The Board of Directors of the African Development Fund (ADF) has approved a $9.57 million grant to support countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in strengthening regional health security and emergency preparedness.

Approved on 3 March 2026, the financing from the concessional window of the African Development Bank Group, will fund the Resilient Health Systems for Emergency Preparedness Project. The initiative aims to strengthen the resilience and capacity of health systems across the SADC region to respond more effectively to public health and nutrition emergencies.

The project includes the training of 449 laboratory technicians, community health workers and trainers, including 269 women, using tailored approaches that mainstream gender considerations, climate change adaptation and the One Health approach. In addition, around 35 nutrition coordinators, including 21 women, from training institutions specialising in nutrition and gender in emergencies will receive certification. Revised curricula are expected to benefit approximately 240 students annually, helping to create a sustainable regional pool of expertise in nutrition and gender-responsive emergency management.

Diagnostic laboratories, wastewater and environmental surveillance laboratories in six beneficiary countries will be renovated and equipped as part of the central component on infrastructure upgrade. The project will also modernise the Instituto Nacional de Saúde in Mozambique to serve as a regional reference laboratory and strengthen the national blood bank in Lesotho. A regional framework for model cross-border laboratories will be established, alongside a mobile cross-border laboratory to be deployed at two strategic border points in Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

“This operation aims to address the persistent fragility of health systems in the SADC, which remain vulnerable to zoonotic outbreaks and cholera epidemics, high malnutrition rates and limited human resources, as well as inadequate emergency preparedness,” said Kennedy Mbekeani, African Development Bank’s Director General for Southern Africa.

– on behalf of African Development Bank Group (AfDB).

Media contact: 
Alexis Adélé
Communication and External Relations Department 
media@afdb.org

About the African Development Bank Group:
African Development Bank Group is the leading development finance institution in Africa. It comprises three distinct entities: the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Nigeria Special Fund (NSF). Represented in 41 African countries, with a field office in Japan, the Bank contributes to the economic development and social progress of its 54 regional member states. For more information: www.AfDB.org

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Speech by Deputy Minister in The Presidency Nonceba Mhlauli (MP) at the National Council of Provinces Debate on International Women’s Day

Source: President of South Africa –

Theme: “Recentering Social Justice and Human Rights for Women and Girls”

Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, Hon Refilwe Mtshweni-Tsipane
Deputy Chairperson of the NCOP, Hon Les Governder 
Chief Whip of the National Council of Provinces, Hon Kenneth Mmolemang
Presiding Officers
Honourable Members of the NCOP and provincial delegates present,

Let me start by passing our sincere condolences to the family, friends, comrades and former colleagues of our first chairperson of the NCOP, Mosiuoa lekota. We cannot speak of the South African democracy and the work of this multi-party Parliament without paying tribute to his selfless contribution. We thank him for his unwavering service to the people of South Africa. May his revolutionary soul rest in peace. 

Honourable Members, 

International Women’s Day was first observed in the early twentieth century. It was not born in ceremony, but born in struggle. It emerged from the marches of garment workers, the defiance campaigns, and the collective refusal by women across the world to accept their own erasure.

Over a century later, we gather in Parliaments, in community halls and in the streets not only to celebrate how far women have come, but to confront, with honesty, how far the world still must go.

The theme before us today, “Recentering social justice and human rights for women and girls,” is not a slogan. It is a diagnosis. It is an acknowledgement that the centre shifted. That progress, where it came, was uneven. That rights, where they were won, were not always protected. And that justice remains, for too many women and girls, a promise still deferred.

To recenter is to return, but it is also to interrogate. We must ask what displaced women and girls from the centre of our social justice agenda in the first place. The answer demands honesty.

It was the persistence of patriarchal systems that treat women’s rights as a concession rather than a constitutional imperative. It was the normalisation of violence as a private matter rather than a public emergency. It was the quiet tolerance of economic exclusion, the unpaid care burden, and the glass ceilings that keep women on the margins of opportunity and power.

Honourable Members,

Yes, policy and legal frameworks exist. They are in place through the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, the Beijing Platform for Action, the AU Agenda 2063 and our own South African Constitution. What has wavered is not the law, but the political will to enforce it, to fund it, and to live by it. 

The real test is not how well we can recite these conventions but whether a woman can walk home safely. Whether a survivor can access justice without being retraumatised. Whether a girl child can learn without fear. Whether a woman-owned enterprise can access markets, finance, and procurement without being blocked by old networks and gatekeeping.

Thirty years on, as the world marks Beijing+30, we are compelled to take stock with honesty. Progress has been made: maternal mortality has declined, girls’ enrolment in schools has improved, and women’s representation in legislatures has grown. But the progress is fragile, uneven, and in many parts of the world, it is reversing.

In fact, it would be amiss of me not to mention what a devastating time it has been for women in Sudan, The Democratic Republic of Congo, in Palestine and most recently the Middle East as well as in other regions of the world plagued by conflict. 

In these theatres of war and political upheaval, it is women and girls who bear the heaviest burden. They are displaced from their homes, stripped of access to education and healthcare, subjected to violence, and denied even the most basic forms of dignity. Conflict does not only destroy infrastructure. It erodes the social fabric that protects women. It turns their bodies into battlegrounds and their rights into collateral damage.

We must be unequivocal in our call for peace. Peace is not an abstract diplomatic ideal. It is the foundation upon which women are able to live safely, to participate economically, to raise families without fear, and to contribute meaningfully to society. Where there is no peace, there can be no justice for women. Where there is no stability, empowerment becomes an empty promise.

We therefore reiterates its principled position in support of peaceful resolution of conflicts, dialogue over destruction, and the protection of civilians, particularly women and children. We affirm that the empowerment of women must extend to every sphere of life political, social, and economic. Women must not only survive conflict; they must be included in peacebuilding, reconstruction, and governance processes. Sustainable peace is only possible when women are present at negotiation tables and in leadership structures shaping the future.Honorable Members 

In South Africa, International Women’s Day carries a particular weight and a particular promise. We placed gender equality at the heart of our democratic project as a founding principle. Our Constitution guarantees equality without qualification. Yet we remain confronted by the brutal reality of gender-based violence and femicide, the feminisation of poverty, and structural barriers that still deny dignity and opportunity to millions of women, particularly in rural and peri-urban communities.

Deputy Chairperson,

If we are serious about recentring social justice, then we must be equally serious about re-centering implementation. That is why the work of the Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities which we are presenting here today is not peripheral. It is structural. Its mandate is to drive mainstreaming, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation across government, so that women’s rights are not treated as a side programme, but as a standard in every plan, every budget, and every delivery outcome. 

This is also why our focus must be practical and measurable: focusing on prevention, protection, justice, and economic power.

First, on safety and justice. South Africa has built key parts of the survivor-support ecosystem, but access remains uneven and the system remains too slow for the urgency of the crisis. The Department of Justice’s Gender-Based Violence page makes it plain that survivor support includes the Gender-Based Violence Command Centre, a 24-hour call centre that can refer cases directly to SAPS and deploy social workers, including accessible channels for persons with disabilities. 

What matters now is scale, coordination and consequence. In April 2025, the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster convened an urgent special sitting in response to escalating GBVF, and adopted a 90-day acceleration programme to fast-track implementation of the National Strategic Plan on GBVF. That intervention is not only a statement. It includes concrete measures: revitalising and reconstituting the Inter-Ministerial Committee on GBVF under the 7th Administration, establishing a dedicated GBVF Priority Committee within NATJOINTS, revitalising provincial JCPS structures, integrating GBVF statistics across the value chain from arrest to incarceration, and accelerating the rollout of Thuthuzela Care Centres across all provinces. 

Honourable Members, this is what “recentering justice” looks like in practice: a criminal justice value chain that is aligned, time-bound, measurable, and survivor-centred.

And in November 2025, the National Disaster Management Centre took a further step by classifying Gender-Based Violence and Femicide as a national disaster in terms of the Disaster Management Act. This classification is a profound acknowledgement that GBVF is not only a social crisis. It is a national emergency that demands coordinated response, mobilisation of resources, and accountability at every sphere of government.

Second, on economic justice. A society cannot claim to advance women’s rights while women remain locked out of productive assets, procurement, and finance. South Africa has placed a clear stake in the ground through policies and programmes that target women’s economic inclusion. The State of the Nation 2026 address reflects that government has put a national policy in place to ensure that 40% of public procurement goes to women-owned businesses, and that thousands of women-owned enterprises have been trained to participate in procurement opportunities. It further notes that the IDC has earmarked significant funding to invest in women-led businesses, alongside commitments by other entities to support women-owned enterprises.

This matters because procurement is not a technical matter. It is a redistribution instrument. It is a lever for inclusion. It is the difference between women being beneficiaries and women being builders of the economy.

The Presidential Youth Employment Intervention (PYEI) which is multi-stakeholder programme dedicated at accelerating empowerment and development opportunities for young people. By the third quarter of the 2025/26 financial year, the PYEI facilitated nearly 295,000 earning opportunities for youth, most of which went to young women in particular. 

What we must do is upscale these efforts to ensure that women, particular young people are empowered in such a way that they do not fall prey to social ills which sets them up for a life of poverty and destitution. For us to do that honourable members, we must ALL be concerned with the status of women in our society. 

Deputy Chairperson,

This is where the National Council of Provinces has a decisive role. Recentring social justice is not achieved only through national declarations. It is achieved where people live. It is achieved through provincial implementation, local coordination, and budget alignment.

The NCOP must therefore use its constitutional mandate to ensure that provincial departments and municipalities do not treat women’s rights as an unfunded mandate. Oversight must ask direct questions: Are shelters funded and functional? Are police stations equipped to respond with dignity and speed? Are courts safe for survivors and witnesses, especially children? Are provinces participating in integrated GBVF reporting and case-flow management as required by the JCPS acceleration programme? Are procurement opportunities reaching women-owned enterprises outside major metros?

Honourable Members,

We must also speak plainly about the role of men and boys. We cannot build a future without confronting the socialisation that produces violence, entitlement and control. The justice system itself acknowledges programmes that focus on positively changing the attitudes of men and boys in areas with high levels of violence against women. This is not optional work. It is prevention.

To the boy child, we must say: your strength is not dominance. It is discipline. It is respect. It is accountability. It is the courage to reject peer pressure, to reject violence, and to protect the dignity of women and girls in your home, your school, your community, and online.

To fathers, brothers, coaches, faith leaders, traditional leaders and community leaders, we must say: silence is not neutrality. Silence is permission. If we are serious about ending GBVF, then positive masculinity must become a societal norm, not a campaign for 16 days.

Chairperson,

Our G20 Presidency last year provided an opportunity to elevate women’s empowerment in ways that are practical and globally relevant. The G20 Empowerment of Women Working Group Chairperson’s Statement of 31 October 2025 places the care economy and financial inclusion at the centre of women’s empowerment, and recognises the importance of shared social responsibility for caregiving, including encouraging the active engagement of men and boys in care work. It also frames women’s financial inclusion as a fundamental enabler of women’s economic empowerment and inclusive development. 

This is deeply aligned with our domestic reality: women carry disproportionate unpaid care burdens, and that burden is an economic constraint. If we want women to participate equally in the economy, we must invest in care infrastructure, remove barriers to women’s access to finance, and recognise that economic justice is a form of violence prevention.

Honourable Members,

This year also carries profound historical meaning. In 2026, we mark 70 years since the women’s march of 9 August 1956, when thousands of women, mothers, workers, organisers, and leaders marched to the Union Buildings to declare that they would not accept injustice. Their message is not only history. It is instruction. It tells us that courage is collective, and that rights are defended through action.

As we look to the year ahead, the call of this debate must be clear:
We must move from commemoration to implementation.
From promises to measurable outcomes.
From policy intent to lived reality.

We must strengthen access to justice, not only by improving laws, but by fixing the system: faster case processing, safer courts, better survivor support, integrated data, and accountable consequences for perpetrators. 

We must strengthen economic justice, not only by speaking about empowerment, but by opening procurement, expanding finance, building capability, and ensuring that women-owned enterprises can compete and win. 

We must strengthen prevention, not only by protecting women and girls, but by actively shaping the values of boys and men, and rebuilding communities that refuse violence as normal. 

And we must do so together: national government, provinces, municipalities, civil society, business, labour, communities and households.

When South Africa says we are “recentering social justice and human rights for women and girls,” we are making a declaration about the kind of country we choose to be. A country where safety is not luck. Where justice is not delayed. Where economic participation is not gatekept. Where dignity is not negotiable.

Let this House, and the society we represent, leave this debate with one shared commitment: that justice for women and girls will no longer be a deferred promise, but a lived reality.

I thank you.
 

Afreximbank domine le classement Bloomberg Africa Borrower Loans League Tables 2025, confirmant ainsi sa place de leader en Afrique en tant qu’arrangeur principal mandaté et teneur de livre

Source: Africa Press Organisation – French

La Banque Africaine d’Import-Export (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) a consolidé sa position dominante sur les marchés financiers africains, se classant au premier rang en tant qu’arrangeur principal mandaté et teneur de livre dans le classement Bloomberg Africa Borrower Loans League Tables 2025, ainsi qu’au troisième rang en tant qu’agent administratif.

Ces classements reconnaissent le leadership de la banque dans le déploiement de solutions de financement de la dette et la mobilisation de capitaux à grande échelle provenant d’investisseurs diversifiés, tant à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur de l’Afrique, afin de soutenir la croissance économique du continent. 

Ces résultats confirment la place d’Afreximbank parmi les leaders du marché africain, en tête des classements Bloomberg ces dernières années. En tant que teneur de livre, Afreximbank détenait 21,66 % de parts de marché, avec 14 transactions.

En tant qu’arrangeur principal mandaté, la Banque a représenté 65 % de part de marché, soit 20 transactions. Ces 20 opérations ont principalement consisté en des transactions syndiquées dans le secteur pétrolier et gazier, reflétant l’intervention stratégique de la Banque visant à combler l’important déficit de financement dans ce secteur sur le continent.  Classée à la troisième place parmi les agents administratifs, Afreximbank a réalisé une part de marché de 13,92 % avec 13 transactions, dépassant notamment l’indice dans le secteur pétrolier et gazier.

Le classement Bloomberg Africa Borrower Loans est un sous-ensemble du classement Bloomberg Capital Markets, qui répertorie les principaux arrangeurs, teneurs de livre et conseillers pour un large éventail d’opérations, notamment les prêts, les obligations, les actions et les fusions-acquisitions, selon les normes Bloomberg. Il s’agit d’un outil essentiel pour les banquiers d’affaires et les analystes afin d’évaluer les parts de marché, d’analyser la concurrence et d’identifier les tendances du marché.

Haytham Elmaayergi, vice-président exécutif d’Afreximbank, en charge de Global Trade Bank, a commenté :

« Je suis ravi que les performances exceptionnelles de nos collègues aient été reflétées dans les prestigieux classements de Bloomberg, qui témoignent véritablement de leur détermination et de leurs capacités. Ce classement souligne l’engagement d’Afreximbank à faciliter les flux de capitaux afin de stimuler la croissance économique et la prospérité sur le continent.  Nous continuerons à tirer parti de notre position unique pour promouvoir des investissements à fort impact et combler le déficit de financement dans les secteurs les plus critiques d’Afrique ».

Distribué par APO Group pour Afreximbank.

Contact Presse :
Vincent Musumba
Responsable de la communication et de la gestion événementielle (Relations presse)
​Courriel : press@afreximbank.com

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À propos d’Afreximbank :
La Banque Africaine d’Import-Export (Afreximbank) est une institution financière multilatérale panafricaine dédiée au financement et à la promotion du commerce intra et extra-africain. Depuis 30 ans, Afreximbank déploie des structures innovantes pour fournir des solutions de financement qui facilitent la transformation de la structure du commerce africain et accélèrent l’industrialisation et le commerce intrarégional, soutenant ainsi l’expansion économique en Afrique. Fervente défenseur de l’Accord sur la Zone de Libre-Échange Continentale Africaine (ZLECAf), Afreximbank a lancé les le Système panafricain de paiement et de règlement (PAPSS) qui a été adopté par l’Union africaine (UA) comme la plateforme de paiement et de règlement devant appuyer la mise en œuvre de la ZLECAf. En collaboration avec le Secrétariat de la ZLECAf et l’UA, la Banque a mis en place un Fonds d’ajustement de 10 milliards de dollars US pour aider les pays à participer de manière effective à la ZLECAf. À la fin de décembre 2024, le total des actifs et des garanties de la Banque s’élevait à environ 40,1 milliards de dollars US et les fonds de ses actionnaires s’établissaient à 7,2 milliards de dollars US. Afreximbank est notée A par GCR International Scale, Baa2 par Moody’s, AAA par China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI), A- par Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR). Au fil des ans, Afreximbank est devenue un groupe constitué de la Banque, de sa filiale de financement à impact appelée Fonds de développement des exportations en Afrique (FEDA), et de sa filiale de gestion d’assurance, AfrexInsure, (les trois entités forment « le Groupe »). La Banque a son siège social au Caire, en Égypte.

Pour de plus amples informations, veuillez visiter www.Afreximbank.com

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Afreximbank lidera as Tabelas de Classificação de Empréstimos da Bloomberg Africa para 2025, confirmando a sua posição de destaque como Principal Intermediário e Coordenador de Emissão (Bookrunner) de África

Source: Africa Press Organisation – Portuguese –

O Banco Africano de Exportação e Importação (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) consolidou a sua posição dominante nos mercados de capitais africanos, conquistando o primeiro lugar como Principal Intermediário Mandatado e Coordenador de Emissões (Bookrunner) nas Tabelas de Classificação de Empréstimos a Mutuários Africanos da Bloomberg para 2025, bem como o terceiro lugar como Agente Administrativo.

Estas classificações reconhecem a liderança do Banco na organização de soluções de dívida e na mobilização de capital em grande escala, tanto dentro como fora de África, proveniente de uma gama diversificada de investidores, com o objectivo de consolidar o crescimento económico do continente. 

Os resultados marcam a classificação contínua do Afreximbank como um dos líderes de mercado africanos no topo das tabelas de classificação da Bloomberg nos últimos anos. Como Coordenador de Emissões (Bookrunner), o Afreximbank detinha 21,66% da quota de mercado, compreendendo 14 transacções.

Como Principal Intermediário Mandatado, o Banco representou 23,65% da quota de mercado, compreendendo 20 transacções. A actividade, que representou estas 20 transacções, consistiu principalmente em transacções sindicadas no sector do petróleo e gás, reflectindo a intervenção estratégica do Banco em colmatar o significativo défice de financiamento no sector no continente. A classificação no terceiro lugar entre as agências administrativas proporcionou uma quota de mercado de 13,92% com 13 transacções, que superaram igualmente o índice no sector do petróleo e gás.

As Tabelas de Classificação de Empréstimos a Mutuários da Bloomberg Africa são um subconjunto das Tabelas de Classificação dos Mercados de Capitais da Bloomberg, que representam os principais intermediários, Coordenadores de Emissões (Bookrunners) e consultores numa ampla gama de tipos de transacções, incluindo empréstimos, obrigações, acções e fusões e aquisições, de acordo com os padrões da Bloomberg. É uma ferramenta fundamental para os banqueiros de investimento e analistas avaliarem a quota de mercado, analisarem os concorrentes e identificarem as tendências do mercado.

O Sr. Haytham Elmaayergi, Vice-Presidente Executivo para o Comércio Global do Afreximbank, comentou:

“Estou bastante satisfeito pelo excelente desempenho dos nossos colegas ter sido reflectido nas prestigiadas tabelas de classificação da Bloomberg, o que é uma verdadeira prova da sua determinação e capacidade incessantes. As classificações sublinham o compromisso do Afreximbank em facilitar os fluxos de capital, a fim de impulsionar o crescimento económico e a prosperidade no continente. Continuaremos a concentrar-nos em alavancar a nossa posição única para promover investimentos de alto impacto e colmatar o défice de financiamento nos sectores mais críticos de África.”

Distribuído pelo Grupo APO para Afreximbank.

Contacto para a Imprensa:
Vincent Musumba
Gestor de Comunicações e Eventos (Relações com a Imprensa)
Correio Electrónico: press@afreximbank.com

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Sobre o Afreximbank:
O Banco Africano de Exportação e Importação (Afreximbank) é uma instituição financeira multilateral pan-africana com mandato para financiar e promover o comércio intra e extra-africano. Há mais de 30 anos que o Banco utiliza estruturas inovadoras para oferecer soluções de financiamento que apoiam a transformação da estrutura do comércio africano, acelerando a industrialização e o comércio intra-regional, impulsionando assim a expansão económica em África. Apoiante firme do Acordo de Comércio Livre Continental Africano (ACLCA), o Afreximbank lançou um Sistema Pan-Africano de Pagamento e Liquidação (PAPSS) que foi adoptado pela União Africana (UA) como plataforma de pagamento e liquidação para sustentar a implementação da ZCLCA. Em colaboração com o Secretariado da ZCLCA e a UA, o Banco criou um Fundo de Ajustamento de 10 mil milhões de dólares para apoiar os países que participam de forma efectiva na ZCLCA. No final de Dezembro de 2024, o total de activos e contingências do Afreximbank ascendia a mais de 40,1 mil milhões de dólares e os seus fundos de accionistas a 7,2 mil milhões de dólares. O Afreximbank tem notações de grau de investimento atribuídas pela GCR (escala internacional) (A), Moody’s (Baa2), China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) (AAA), Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) (A-). O Afreximbank evoluiu para uma entidade de grupo que inclui o Banco, a sua subsidiária de fundo de impacto de acções, denominada Fundo para o Desenvolvimento das Exportações em África (FEDA), e a sua subsidiária de gestão de seguros, AfrexInsure (em conjunto, “o Grupo”). O Banco tem a sua sede em Cairo, Egipto.

Para mais informações, visite: www.Afreximbank.com.

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Iran war fallout for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: political analyst weighs up the risks

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, in March 2026 marks the end of a political era in the Middle Eastern country. Khamenei was killed in US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran’s capital, Tehran. This has triggered a war drawing in numerous countries across the Middle East.

The Horn of Africa and Red Sea regions, which link Africa and the Middle East, share a dense web of military, political and economic interactions that enable crises on one shore to quickly affect the other. Here, Somalia, Eritrea, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti sit along one of the world’s most important trade and geopolitical corridors.

But the consequences of Khamenei’s death may be less dramatic than many expect. This is because power in Iran is dispersed across entrenched institutions and security elites who are capable of preserving regime continuity.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea

Iran is no stranger to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. During the 1990s and 2000s, Tehran established security and economic ties with several countries, notably Sudan, to gain a foothold along the Red Sea.

Iran’s influence waned, however, during the 2010s as Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, increased their diplomatic, financial and military presence.

As a political scientist studying Middle Eastern and African security, I have followed Iran’s regional engagement for years. From my perspective, events in Iran and the Gulf matter to African countries because conflicts, arms flows and rivalries can easily spill across shores in a single strategic region.

Three intertwined dynamics shape how Khamenei’s death affects the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

Firstly, Tehran’s influence here has declined over the past decade. This is with the exception of Yemen, where Iran supports the Houthi movement, which has previously attacked Israeli-linked vessels.


Read more: Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing


Secondly, the way this latest conflict was triggered and has escalated may be more important than a change in Iranian leadership. It could contribute to a broader erosion of moderation.

Thirdly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – Iran’s powerful military force – is set to play a pivotal role in the post-Khamenei transition.

This is significant for the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Iran’s engagement here has largely relied on unconventional methods. Naval manoeuvres are an example, such as the long-term deployment in the Red Sea of the Iranian vessel Saviz, which has served as a logistical and intelligence platform. The country has also deployed military advisers and established arms networks to transport Iranian weapons.

Any future leadership closely aligned with the IRGC is likely to keep using these low-cost tools.

In this sense, continuity will likely prevail over rupture. Iran’s ambitions are filtered through a sober assessment of constraints that the ongoing war may entrench.

Iran’s shifting priorities

Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has considered itself a middle power with legitimate claims to regional pre-eminence. The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa gradually became part of Iran’s expanded strategic geography.

Following the consolidation of the regime promoted by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Khamenei – who took over in 1989 after his predecessor’s death – progressively translated Iran’s ambition into strategic depth.

This aimed to extend Iran’s security perimeter beyond its borders through alliances, proxies and low-cost commitments.

In the 2000s, Iran cultivated close ties with Sudan and Eritrea.

It established naval access points in the two countries and used soft power tools, such as development aid and religious networks. It considered the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which is between Yemen and Djibouti, vital for countering Saudi and Israeli influence and maintaining alternative trade routes.

The limitations of this expansion became apparent, however.

Iran’s ambitions soon came up against reality. The country’s economy was weakened by sanctions linked to its nuclear programme and US withdrawal from a 2015 nuclear deal.


Read more: Iran will respond to US-Israeli strikes as existential threats to the regime – because they are


Meanwhile, political power remained fragmented across competing institutions. Domestic pressures, including economic hardship and periodic protest movements, were mounting. Instability in neighbouring states such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen made long-term regional power projection costly and uncertain.

After 2015, Saudi Arabia increased its engagement in the Horn of Africa through financial aid, diplomatic pressure and military cooperation linked to the war in Yemen.

Seeking logistical support along the Red Sea and aiming to counter Iran’s influence near the Bab el-Mandeb strait, Saudi Arabia strengthened its ties with regional governments. This prompted Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea to sever or scale back their relations with Tehran. They effectively aligned themselves with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Iran redirected resources to higher-priority theatres of war, such as Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

For a decade, therefore, Tehran’s presence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea has become more selective and opportunistic. Iran has relied on indirect leverage there, such as Houthi operations, rather than direct expansion.

Khamenei’s death is likely to reinforce rather than reverse the trend. In fact, the outcome of the current war and the start of a delicate succession process could prompt an even more cautious approach abroad.

Worsening fragility

Although a change in Iranian leadership may not alter the approach to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, the dynamics that led to the recent conflict may have an impact on the region.

The scale and visibility of the Israeli-US attack – and Iran’s direct retaliation – signal something deeper: the erosion of thresholds in the use of force.

Iran is not buying time and avoiding direct confrontation while limiting the manoeuvre room of its rivals.

This could usher in a period of “anything goes”.

Regional actors, from Gulf states to local governments, are likely to feel increasingly justified in bypassing established security norms. The Red Sea has already become a crowded arena. External powers are projecting their strength. Local states are exploiting competition among them. The reshuffling of forces triggered by the war in Iran will have repercussions throughout the region.

In such a context, characterised by multiple hierarchies, even a reduction of Iranian capabilities could have knock-on effects.

The region’s fragility – as seen in civil war in Sudan, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, instability in Somalia and the heavy presence of military bases along maritime routes – amplifies these risks.

In other words, the question is not whether Iran will suddenly expand into east Africa. It is whether the regional climate will shift towards fewer restrictions and greater acceptance of coercive tools.

If escalation becomes normalised in the heart of the Middle East – the region’s most interconnected theatre – the fallout could be felt in places like the Horn of Africa.

Uncertainty in the short term

Khamenei’s death is likely to generate uncertainty in the short term at the regional level, but will lead to continuity in the long term.

Over time, Tehran has adopted what can be termed a “realist defence” doctrine – deterrence through a strong indirect presence, but at reduced cost and risk.

Iran’s view of international politics as a zero-sum game – where one actor’s gain is another’s loss – and its desire to reduce the influence of its rivals are not merely the result of personal legacies. Rather, they are deeply rooted in the country’s identity.

For the Horn of Africa, this means that Tehran is likely to remain a secondary but persistent player: active enough to hinder its rivals’ strategies, yet restrained enough to avoid major commitments.

– Iran war fallout for the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa: political analyst weighs up the risks
– https://theconversation.com/iran-war-fallout-for-the-red-sea-and-the-horn-of-africa-political-analyst-weighs-up-the-risks-277512

Teaching mathematical statistics: one lecturer’s way of testing what students understand

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Michael Johan von Maltitz, Associate Professor, Mathematical Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of the Free State

It’s getting tougher to assess how much university students have learnt. In his work as a Mathematical Statistics lecturer, Michael von Maltitz has tried a new way of getting students to learn, and of assessing what they’ve absorbed and retained. Students have to show and discuss how they arrived at their understanding of the subject. They can’t just rely on cramming, because he interviews them as if they were applying for a job.

What prompted you to try something new?

“We understand, but how will it be asked in the test?” This is the question that was posed to me time and again in 2019 when I started lecturing a module in mathematical statistics at second-year university level.

I knew I had to make a change. I already understood that students were stressed, prone to memorising content and cramming before tests and examinations, and using short cuts to attain a good grade, rather than to learn anything.

What did you then do differently?

The module was unfamiliar to me so I decided to allow the students to approach the course content in the same way as I was: gathering information from different sources and combining and collating it digitally, reflecting on how it helped to meet certain objectives or learning outcomes.

These portfolios of learning evidence would contain course and outcome information, content knowledge (including theorems and proofs), examples with solutions, showpiece assignments, links to and discussions on online tutorials or videos, and paragraphs of self-reflection. Readers might see these portfolios as “study notes on steroids”.

Assessing the portfolio would be an exercise in evaluating the learning process, rather than a memorised product.


Read more: The greatest risk of AI in higher education isn’t cheating – it’s the erosion of learning itself


The process was challenging but offered a reward for me and my students – that of discovery. Students seemed to be genuinely learning.

Besides checking their portfolios, I needed a way to assess progress that didn’t fall into the old habits of memorisation and “teaching to the test”. I needed to ensure that a student had created their own portfolio and could defend the content in it. And I needed an assessment method that would not take more time and effort than coming up with a unique written test or examination, formulating a typeset memorandum, and marking more than 100 answer scripts, giving feedback that the students might never look at.

I decided to test this form of deep learning using a workplace method – the interview. In a 30-minute online interview with each student, I asked questions about their understanding of the module content, as well as questions concerning their own portfolios. Each student had to defend the information collected and reflected upon.

The interview worked perfectly when paired with the portfolio. I assessed a set of portfolios in an evening, gave typed feedback, and then interviewed those portfolios’ creators the next day. Feedback was immediate, and the interview assessment became a learning experience, for me and the student.


Read more: South African university students use AI to help them understand – not to avoid work


They were able to defend their portfolios if I made any errors on the portfolio assessment, and I could give the correct answer immediately to any interview question they were stumped by.

Afterwards, the recording of the interview could be given to the student, and if they felt I was being unfair at all, they could compare their interview with another student’s. In doing so, the students themselves could moderate my assessment practice.

What results did you observe?

After a year or two of teaching and assessing like this, I noticed my students seemed to understand more of the content. They retained more into their final year, they were fluent in “statistics” communication and they had better time management and self-reflection skills.

Students told me that they were asked the same questions in their first job interviews as I had asked in my modules, and that they felt much more at ease in those first few job interviews.

How did you confirm these results?

To formally test the developments I had noticed in my students, I conducted research on the class in 2022, which was published in conference proceedings and an article.

This study showed that students experienced significant learning in every facet of an educational framework known as Fink’s taxonomy:

  • foundational knowledge

  • application and communication

  • integration of content into other areas

  • self-reflection

  • interest

  • learning how to learn.

Thus, the method of learning and assessment could formally be called a success within Statistics.

Can this approach be used in other courses?

Yes. One might argue that if this method can be employed for a mathematical module, it can be utilised anywhere. Mathematical modules contain theorems, proofs, definitions, theoretical and practical problem solving – items that might seem difficult to assess through verbal communication. But it is the understanding of the ideas behind the theorems, the stories of and the tricks used within the proofs, the application of the theoretical problems, that are so important in an age where your favourite AI can provide content knowledge.


Read more: Three South African universities have new approaches to assessing students: why this is a good thing


Mathematical proofs and worked calculations, both of which take time in practice, can be assessed by looking at a portfolio containing these items with the student’s annotations and reflections. The understandings of these concepts are assessed in the interview.

Likewise, in other subjects, a portfolio could be used for assessing knowledge-based content, while the interview could be used to gauge a student’s understanding of what was put into the portfolio, why they chose that content, why the content is important, and how that content is used in practice.

– Teaching mathematical statistics: one lecturer’s way of testing what students understand
– https://theconversation.com/teaching-mathematical-statistics-one-lecturers-way-of-testing-what-students-understand-275501

Colonialism in Africa: archaeology offers a deeper view

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Timothy Clack, Chingiz Gutseriev Fellow, University of Oxford

Colonialism has been a central part of history around the world, differing only in form over time and space. After all, whenever people have moved from one place to another, they have colonised spaces and other people or forms of life.

In Africa, colonialism has mostly been studied as something imposed from outside, for example from Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries. A recent special issue of the journal Azania sought to address this. Scholars looked at the topic from an angle that’s so far been neglected – the archaeology and history of colonialism from within Africa.

We introduced the journal issue with an essay revisiting basic ideas, reviewing literature and presenting new case studies.

We note, for example, that colonialism has a deep and complex history. There have been different kinds and degrees of colonialism. These range from expansion, trade, exchange and sharing cultural practices to settlement, domination, exploitation, control and imperialism.

These developments have taken place in a myriad of different settings. From Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, Phoenicia, Classical Greece and Rome, and China, to multiple locations in the Americas, including the Inka and the Aztecs, and Europeans, especially after 1492.

Global and local factors shape distinctive patterns of power, subjugation, consumption, extraction, exploitation and cultural exchange through time.

Important questions emerge when this is recognised. Examples include:

  • what historical justice looks like

  • which episodes get remembered and forgotten

  • which victims are ignored or compensated

  • which colonisers face consequence.

Colonialism from outside

In the 19th and 20th centuries, during the the so-called “Scramble for Africa”, seven European countries colonised almost the whole of the continent. The signatures left behind by Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain were wide and varied. They included:

  • drawing national boundaries

  • infrastructure geared towards extraction (like megaports, railways and roads)

  • administration (like bicameral governments, courts and churches)

  • defence (military structures and installations).

European colonialism even shaped the way most of us perceive the world via the instruments used to map time and space.

Earlier, large parts of Africa were colonised by Ottoman and Arab empires. Oman, for example, colonised the Swahili coast in the 18th and 19th centuries across a territory extending from areas of Somalia through to Madagascar.

Parts of Africa which had previously been under Islamic rule, in turn, experienced European colonialism differently. This had long-term implications for education, health and economic growth.

Taken together, these legacies, over time, developed into global organising principles for imagining Africa.

But this formulation ignores African agency and political processes. It is often forgotten, for example, that the Almoravids, a dynasty which rose to power in southern Morocco during the 11th century, exerted control over European soil. Africans have been colonisers too.

Colonialism from within

Africa has also experienced diverse colonial episodes from within. Examples include empires such as Egypt and Kush in north Africa, and Dahomey and Songhai in west Africa.

Rulers of these empires sought to annex territories, establish settlements, subjugate others, control resources and impose laws and customs. The archaeological indications of these can be seen in a number of ways. They include new settlement types, changes in material culture and the adoption of new languages and religions, particularly Islam and Christianity.

Resistance to colonialism is also visible in the historical record and expressed in many ways. This included insurgencies, protests and propaganda as well as myth, art, music, literature and non-cooperation.

In the 19th century, Shaka, for example, transformed a small Zulu chieftainship in southern Africa into an aggressive and successful state that absorbed neighbouring groups. The aftershock of the Zulu expansion was the Mfecane. This was a process that saw leaders establish their own polities. Soshangane, for instance, was a Ndwandwe general defeated by Shaka who established the Gaza state in contemporary Mozambique. It incorporated in it both Shona and Tsonga people.

Another example comes from the Mursi of south-western Ethiopia. They undertook several large-scale migrations over the past 200-300 years. This movement became part of their group identity. They displaced, assimilated and dominated other populations. The material traces they left have been explored by archaeological research. This has helped to interpret their activities, and also challenges their oral histories.

Cultural exchange and innovation

Colonialism is a generative process, with innovation emerging from cultural contact, relationships between colonisers and colonised, and material exchange.

Colonial processes have multi-directional influence. European colonialism, for example, shaped how Europeans dealt with the rest of the world. And, in turn, it contributed to how the western world was constructed. Ideas and materials flowed into the metropolitan centres of Europe as much as from them. In certain respects, Britain was colonised through contact with, for example, Africa, Australasia and North America, as much as those areas were colonial creations.

Colonialism often creates victims and oppressors. But it is also about consumption, innovation and exchange.

Archaeology offers a useful way to study colonialism because it leaves material and intangible indicators which the discipline has methods to interpret.

There is a need for more work on the processes and character of colonialism within Africa. This will enable comparisons and understanding, and correct a skewed picture of world history. A richer understanding of colonialism, including neocolonialism, may also inform debates about its legacy, and about decolonisation and restitution.

– Colonialism in Africa: archaeology offers a deeper view
– https://theconversation.com/colonialism-in-africa-archaeology-offers-a-deeper-view-275495

Afreximbank Sweeps 2025 Bloomberg Africa Borrower Loans League Tables; Affirming Top Spot as Africa’s Leading Arranger and Bookrunner

Source: APO

African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) has solidified its dominance in African capital markets, clinching the Number 1 ranking as both Mandated Lead Arranger and Bookrunner in the 2025 Bloomberg Africa Borrower Loans League Tables, as well as the Number 3 ranking for Administrative Agent.

These rankings recognise the Bank’s leadership in arranging debt solutions and mobilising large-scale capital from both within and outside Africa from a diverse range of investors to anchor the continent’s economic growth. 

The results mark a continued ranking of Afreximbank as one of Africa’s market leaders at the top of the Bloomberg league tables over the past years. As Bookrunner, Afreximbank held 21.66% market share comprising 14 deals.

As Mandated Lead Arranger, the Bank accounted for 23.65% market share comprising 20 transactions. The activity, which accounted for these 20 deals, consisted primarily of syndicated transactions in the oil and gas sector, reflecting the Bank’s strategic intervention in closing the significant financing gap in the sector on the continent. The Number 3 Administrative Agency ranking delivered a market share of 13.92% with 13 deals, which also over-indexed in the oil and gas sector.

The Bloomberg Africa Borrower Loans League Tables are a subset of the Bloomberg Capital Markets League Tables, which represent the top arrangers, bookrunners and advisors across a broad array of deal types including loans, bonds, equity and M&A transactions, according to Bloomberg standards. It is a critical tool for investment bankers and analysts to evaluate market share, analyse competitors and identify market trends.

Haytham Elmaayergi, Executive Vice President, Global Trade Bank at Afreximbank, commented:

“I am delighted that the stellar performance of our colleagues has been reflected in Bloomberg’s prestigious league tables, which is a real testament to their assiduous determination and capability. The rankings underscore Afreximbank’s commitment to facilitating capital flows in order to drive economic growth and prosperity in the continent. We will continue to focus on leveraging our unique position to promote high-impact investments and bridge the financing gap across Africa’s most critical sectors.”

Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Afreximbank.

Media Contact:
Vincent Musumba
Communications and Events Manager (Media Relations)
Email: press@afreximbank.com

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About Afreximbank:
African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) is a Pan-African multilateral financial institution mandated to finance and promote intra- and extra-African trade. For over 30 years, the Bank has been deploying innovative structures to deliver financing solutions that support the transformation of the structure of Africa’s trade, accelerating industrialisation and intra-regional trade, thereby boosting economic expansion in Africa. A stalwart supporter of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), Afreximbank has launched a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) that was adopted by the African Union (AU) as the payment and settlement platform to underpin the implementation of the AfCFTA. Working with the AfCFTA Secretariat and the AU, the Bank has set up a US$10 billion Adjustment Fund to support countries effectively participating in the AfCFTA. At the end of December 2024, Afreximbank’s total assets and contingencies stood at over US$40.1 billion, and its shareholder funds amounted to US$7.2 billion. Afreximbank has investment grade ratings assigned by GCR (international scale) (A), Moody’s (Baa2), China Chengxin International Credit Rating Co., Ltd (CCXI) (AAA), and Japan Credit Rating Agency (JCR) (A-). Afreximbank has evolved into a group entity comprising the Bank, its equity impact fund subsidiary called the Fund for Export Development Africa (FEDA), and its insurance management subsidiary, AfrexInsure (together, “the Group”). The Bank is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt.

For more information, visit: www.Afreximbank.com

Media files

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Deputy President Mashatile to brief the NCOP on efforts to combat acts of corruption in the SAPS and illegal mining in Gauteng's East and West Rand

Source: President of South Africa –

Deputy President Shipokosa Paulus Mashatile will on Thursday, 05 March 2026, respond to Questions for Oral Reply in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) in Parliament, Cape Town.

In his capacity as Chairperson of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cabinet Committee and Leader of Government Business in Parliament, the Deputy President will address a range of critical governance and service delivery matters affecting provinces and municipalities across the country.

Among the key matters to be addressed, the Deputy President will update Members on Government strategies to prevent corruption in the South African Police Service (SAPS) and outline corrective measures implemented by the JCPS Cluster to detect and prevent corruption within SAPS and the criminal justice system as a whole.

Deputy President Mashatile will reaffirm Government’s commitment to safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system and ensuring that corruption within law enforcement agencies is decisively rooted out.

The Deputy President will also respond to questions regarding the escalation of illegal mining activities in Gauteng’s East and West Rand areas, including in the underlying informal settlements.

Government remains resolute in restoring order, protecting communities, and dismantling organised criminal networks that undermine economic stability and public safety.

Other matters for Oral Reply by Deputy President Mashatile include the decline and restoration of the national rail transport system; the state of distressed and dysfunctional municipalities; as well as measures to address the national water crisis and incomplete infrastructure projects.

Details of the sitting are as follows:

Date: Thursday, 05 March 2026
Time: 14h00
Venue: NCOP Chamber, Parliament, Cape Town

The Q&A Session will be streamed live on the Parliamentary Channel 408 and Parliamentary YouTube channel.

For more information please contact Sam Bopape on 082 318 5251.

Media enquiries: Mr Keith Khoza, Acting Spokesperson to the Deputy President, on 066 195 8840

Issued by: The Presidency
Pretoria