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Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South Africa

Speculation continues about why John Steenhuisen announced that he would not be available for re-election as the federal leader of South Africa’s Democratic Alliance (DA) at the party’s April federal congress.

The DA is the country’s main opposition party and, since elections in 2024 in which the African National Congress lost its majority, part of a government of national unity. Opinion polls show that the DA’s support has increased since the election – it’s now closer to 30% – while support for the ANC continues to fall.

The DA promotes a federal view of government, a “social market” economy and private-public cooperation.

Steenhuisen’s announcement only suggested that he wants to focus on his role as minister of agriculture.

He became the DA leader in 2019, a turbulent time in the party’s history. The party’s first black leader, Mmusi Maimane, had left. The party had suffered a decline in support in the 2019 elections, and was accused of being more concerned about losing white support to the conservative, white-focused Freedom Front Plus than about a non-racial national profile.

Steenhuisen’s decision is important for the DA, because two of the three most senior leadership positions will become vacant – the federal leader, and chair of the federal council, which Helen Zille currently occupies and which she is leaving. It is even more important in view of the national local government elections that will be held at the end of the year.

The DA is now the second biggest party in South Africa and therefore an important member of the Government of National Unity. A new DA leader will have implications for the party’s relationship with the president and other unity government members.

How he got here

Steenhuisen built his political career in KwaZulu-Natal. The province is not one of the powerhouses in the DA, but it has always been regarded as one of the potential growth points. Its advantage is that, within the DA, the province isn’t caught up in the internal power play between the Western Cape and Gauteng. That’s presumably made Steenhuisen attractive as the national leader.

His track record as a very assertive DA parliamentary chief whip also counted in his favour. But as leader of the opposition, he had to become a statesman. He inherited a failed attempt to transform the DA’s public profile into a party also attractive for black supporters. His task was therefore to lead a new strategy for the party.

The results of the 2024 elections are an indication that his leadership arrested the party’s electoral decline and introduced a period of growth among the broader South African population. Its support increased from 20.8% to 21.8%.

The DA became part of the Government of National Unity as a result of the ANC losing its majority for the first time since South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994. It also became part of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government of unity. In addition, it consolidated the party’s majority in the Western Cape.

But these successes also tested Steenhuisen’s leadership.

In her book on the coalition negotiations after the 2024 elections, the journalist Mandy Wiener explains that Steenhuisen played the role of the DA’s principal and therefore was not directly involved in the face-to-face negotiations. As principal he was often upstaged by two of the negotiation team members and former DA leaders – Helen Zille and Tony Leon.

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Read more: Helen Zille: will competence, courage and a dose of arrogance be enough to get her elected as Johannesburg’s mayor?

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More recently Steenhuisen has been accused of being too close to President Cyril Ramaphosa and of being “captured” by the ANC.

Behind Steenhuisen’s decision?

Neither Steenhuisen nor the DA has given an clear indication of why he decided not to stand again as candidate for the DA’s leadership, except that he wants to focus on his work as agriculture minister.

The reasons for his decision are therefore a matter of analysis or interpretation.

A party leader should never be uncertain about support from the main centres of power in the party. Factionalism or regionalism associated with a party leader will inevitably erode a party and its leader.

A DA leader cannot function without the unqualified support of the Western Cape and of Gauteng, because they are the two provinces that constitute the core of the DA’s support base.

Political analysts have pointed out that Steenhuisen does not enjoy the unqualified support of the Western Cape. The province is important to the party, because it controls the provincial government and Cape Town metro. Both are seen as prime examples of its success stories.

Steenhuisen’s KwaZulu-Natal did not built a powerbase for him within the party. Nor did the DA grow sufficiently in the province.

Steenhuisen’s authority as party leader was undermined last year over Ramaphosa’s dismissal of DA member Dion George as the minister of forestry, fisheries and the environment.

Steenhuisen had requested that Ramaphosa remove George for his “lack of performance” in his portfolio.

In the fallout that followed, George alleged that Steenhuisen had abused his party credit card. George also referred the matter to the Public Protector.

The events called into question Steenhuisen’s moral authority and ethics.

Lastly, as agriculture minister, Steenhuisen is struggling to bring a dramatic rise in foot and mouth disease under control in the country. Though he is one of the ministers who has done most in trying to get the disease under control, he is under severe pressure from the organised agricultural sector for the private sector to play a bigger role in managing the outbreak.

There’s a deeper policy principle for the DA at play here too, namely the private-public roles in public issues. As minister, Steenhuisen represents the role of the government department in managing the disease. But many farmers want more scope for their private initiatives regarding vaccinations and related matters.

The impact on the Democratic Alliance

Steenhuisen’s announcement affects the DA in a wider context. It means that two of the three top positions in the party will become vacant at the congress.

Only the federal chair, Ivan Meyer (member of the executive council in the Western Cape) will remain. With Zille involved in the Johannesburg metro, it will be the end of her role as the chair of the federal council. It implies a total revamp of the DA’s top structure very close to the local government elections.

The potential implications of these changes one can only speculate about. It might see the younger generation move into key positions. It might see a comeback for the Western Cape if Meyer is re-elected and Cape Town mayor Geordin Hill-Lewis comes in as party leader. It has the potential for more black people in key positions, such as Ashor Sarupen, Solly Malatsi or Siviwe Gwarube.

Finally, it has the potential to create two centres of power in the top structure if Hill-Lewis is elected as party leader but continues as Cape Town mayor. Then a parliamentary leader will have to be identified.

Irrespective of who is elected in which position, the DA’s April congress might become a major milestone in its history.

Steenhuisen’s legacy

As far as Steenhuisen is concerned, he clearly sees his future as a minister and not as a DA leader anymore. If he can gain control over the foot and mouth epidemic, it will be a major achievement for him. And his lasting legacy.

In history, he will most possibly be regarded as a transitional leader of the DA, who stabilised the situation after 2019, exploited the decline in ANC support, saw the need for alliance-building between parties at an early stage and led the DA into national coalition politics.

– South Africa’s biggest opposition party will head to municipal elections with new leaders: what does it all mean?
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-biggest-opposition-party-will-head-to-municipal-elections-with-new-leaders-what-does-it-all-mean-275404

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Cynthia Kwakyewah, Course Director in Social Science, York University, Canada

Ghana has a long history of resource extraction that has caused socioeconomic and ecological harm. The mining of gold, stones, sand and salt has displaced people, polluted the environment and destroyed livelihoods. It’s commonly believed that this continues to happen, with impunity.

But recent developments reveal a more complex reality.

As a global sociologist who specialises in human rights, corporate social responsibility and sustainable development, I mapped out the patterns of corporate abuse in Ghana’s mining, oil and gas sectors. I also looked at the strategies that local actors are using to push the state to act against firms violating their rights.

My findings show that a subtle shift is taking place in Ghana. Civil society organisations, administrative bodies and courts are changing the accountability landscape. Between 2000 and 2020, 27 human rights-related lawsuits and complaints were filed against extractive sector companies in Ghana.

The Ghanaian experience offers insights for other African countries:

• there are remedies even in environments that have weak regulations

• social activism that combines accountability with moral persuasion and legal enforcement can yield results

• African actors are producers of innovative accountability practices.

Ways to address corporate impunity and give victims access to remedies don’t have to come from the global north alone.

Violations

The study involved creating a new database of recorded allegations of corporate abuses, where the victims were in mining, oil and gas communities. The material came from the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre digital archive, a repository of complaints reported by NGOs and government institutions globally, primarily through media coverage. I then added material drawn from reputable local organisations that process complaints, petitions or lawsuits about corporate violations. I also interviewed representatives of civil society organisations and public officials.

I found that 83% of the allegations of corporate abuses were the result of the (in)actions of extractive sector firms. This contradicts the perception that most corporate human rights violations, in terms of numbers and severity, involve multinationals enabling a host government to carry out abuses.

Global reports often emphasise corruption, lack of transparency, intimidation and labour abuse. But the Ghanaian data point to a different corporate abuse pattern. Many allegations (50%) in Ghana’s natural resource sectors pertain to economic, social, cultural and solidarity rights violations. Many involve inadequate compensation to subsistence farmers for the loss of land or crops. These losses tend to mean erosion of livelihoods. Members of mining-affected communities have also reported experiences of forceful displacement.

Physical abuse allegations made up 28% of the cases; environment-related allegations comprised 15%. Health (5%) and labour (3%) related allegations were the smallest share.

Social activism

My analysis showed that Ghanaian civil society organisations have taken on roles almost like regulators. Examples include the Centre for Public Interest Law (Cepil), a human rights and environmental mining advocacy NGO called Wacam, the Centre for Environmental Impact Analysis and Third World Network-Africa.

In the absence of robust state regulations, these organisations have stepped in to fill a governance void. They document corporate misbehaviour, mobilise communities, and pursue redress through administrative and judicial channels.

Through “naming and shaming”, coalition-building, and selective litigation, they push corporations and regulatory institutions to act. For instance, following cyanide spill incidents, Wacam and Cepil combined community mobilisations with legal petitions that prompted sanctions.

Tangible outcomes

The strategic combination of activism and institutional engagement has produced tangible outcomes. Community petitions have led to company-funded remediation and fines for environmental damage. Successful court cases have compelled companies to compensate households for pollution. These outcomes illustrate how local actors are carrying out the state duty to protect and the corporate responsibility to respect human rights in pragmatic, context-driven ways.

Administrative mechanisms

Courts remain crucial in settling disputes. But administrative bodies are becoming more important. The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, which has the power to investigate human-rights violations and recommend remedies, has emerged as a trusted intermediary between communities and corporations. Its inquiries into mining-related abuses have resulted in negotiated settlements. Companies have also agreed to restore contaminated lands or water sources. These mechanisms provide redress without long legal battles.

The Environmental Protection Agency enforcement role has also expanded. In several cases, it imposed monetary penalties and temporary suspensions on companies that breached environmental permits. Such administrative measures show what can be done without going through the courts.

Judicial recognition of rights

When administrative engagement fails, civil society organisations escalate cases to the judiciary. Ghanaian courts have begun to recognise socioeconomic and environmental rights claims. These are grounded in the constitution and the Environmental Protection Agency Act.

In a notable case, a citizen urged Cepil to take legal action against a state-owned refinery for its oil spillage in a lake called Chemu Lagoon. Because environmental damage affects the public, Cepil had enough legal grounds to file a lawsuit. The ruling was in the organisation’s favour, preventing the company from legally causing further environmental pollution. Cases like this help victims and strengthen the foundations for future claims.

Strategic alliances

Grassroots activism, civil society alliances and state responsiveness can together achieve “accountability from below”. Even less powerful people can create and sustain accountability by engaging with both formal and informal institutions.

In Ghana, alliances across sectors force corporations and regulators to act, even where there isn’t strong top-down enforcement. These alliances demonstrate that local agency, not merely external pressure, can influence corporate behaviour.

– Activists in Ghana are forcing extractive firms to account for the harm they cause – corporate abuse study
– https://theconversation.com/activists-in-ghana-are-forcing-extractive-firms-to-account-for-the-harm-they-cause-corporate-abuse-study-274648

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abel Gwaindepi, Senior Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies

Changes in the development finance world – especially the sharp drop in foreign aid and fewer cheap loans for low-income countries – have pushed taxation back into the spotlight.

Africa has entered a new “tax era of development”. As external funding dries up, many African countries are now relying more on their own ability to raise money through taxes. But large parts of African economies are informal, and that’s widely seen as an obstacle to collecting tax revenue.

My recent work, too, shows that countries with high levels of informality tend to collect less tax revenue and face other related challenges.

Governments struggling to pay wages and deliver public services have two main choices:

• raise more taxes from the formal sector by increasing rates, introducing new taxes, or reducing tax incentives (not popular among businesses that already pay)

• extend taxation into the informal sector, where most people work and most businesses operate, though they are already partly burdened by tax-like fees and other informal payments.

Achieving the second faces many obstacles.

Roughly 85% of working age people in sub-Saharan Africa are informally employed. That makes it extremely difficult for tax authorities to track economic activity or enforce compliance. Informality makes it harder for governments to build the three capacities needed for effective taxation: identification, detection and collection.

Technology provides an answer to all three challenges. But, as my research shows, it isn’t a complete solution. Poorly designed tools can amplify existing challenges or create new unfairness, weaken trust and drive people back to cash.

Technology as a double-edged tool

Identification capacity is the ability to know who should be paying tax – whether individuals, businesses, or properties – through reliable registries and databases. Detection capacity involves verifying whether people and firms are reporting the right amounts. This is often done by using information from third parties such as electronic receipts and mobile-money records. Collection capacity is the ability to ensure that taxes are paid smoothly and securely.

Technology can strengthen all three:

• digital ID systems make it easier to match taxpayers to their obligations

• electronic transaction data help uncover under-reported income

• online filing or automated withholding systems make payments easier for taxpayers while reducing face-to-face interaction, which is inefficient and can lead to fraud.

Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and machine learning are now used to score taxpayer risk, flag suspicious filing patterns, detect possible fraud, and prioritise audit cases far more accurately and efficiently than manual selection. Basic hardware, digital infrastructure, and reliable data systems need to be in place before meaningful progress can be achieved in this area for low‑income countries.

One way that governments try to tax the informal sector is through “simplified tax regimes”. Technology is playing an important role.

For example, Rwanda’s experience shows how powerful digital invoicing can be. When big companies need valid electronic invoices to claim expenses, they push this requirement down to the smaller suppliers they buy from, increasing tax compliance. Rwanda’s electronic billing machines have also shown that voluntary VAT compliance is possible when technology simplifies the process, cuts down paperwork and closes the information gap.

In Kenya, the government has introduced eTIMS, a paperless digital system that stores receipts electronically. It works through electronic tax registers that validate, sign, encrypt and then send sales data directly to the Kenya Revenue Authority.

Digital financial services taxation

Digital financial services are now part of everyday life across the continent, especially mobile money and digital wallets. In recent years, governments have also started using the services as a tax base. The idea is that even if informal traders don’t pay formal taxes, many still make electronic payments through systems like mobile money or e-wallets.

In Ghana, the government introduced an e-levy on electronic transactions at 1.75%, with a 100-cedi (US$10) exemption. After public pushback and a big shift back to cash, the rate was first reduced and then removed completely in 2025. It was deemed to be reducing formalisation efforts and reversing financial inclusion.

The art of the possible

Taxation in low-income countries is often the “art of the possible”. Evidence shows mobile-money taxes can sharply reduce the use of digital financial services – up to 39% in some settings. The burden is especially heavy where bank penetration is low. Rural and unbanked users have no real alternatives to mobile money. They must either pay the levy or resort to inefficient and often costlier options.

Governments are balancing competing priorities. They want to promote digitalisation and support digital financial services markets, while also expanding financial inclusion by keeping formal financial services affordable and accessible. At the same time, they need to raise sustainable revenue.

Technology has to be part of the answer, but it requires strong foundations.

There is a more fundamental issue beyond tech helping digitise paperwork or enabling instant filing. As wealth moves onto digital rails – apps, platforms, e-wallets, blockchain and even crypto – tax systems must evolve with it. Countries cannot keep up unless they invest in 21st-century tax skills and the digital infrastructure to move beyond the analogue tax systems.

In countries with high informality, technology can support tax modernisation, but it also faces major limitations. These are linked to weak infrastructure, human behaviour, and institutional or legal constraints.

Digital tools simply cannot function where electricity or internet access is unreliable.

The human factor matters too: even when systems work, many taxpayers lack the skills, awareness or financial capacity to use them. And tax officials may resist or misuse new tools if incentives are not aligned. The legal framework matters too since digital audits can be done at speed only for the process to slow down if courts are inefficient.

What’s needed

The basic challenge in taxation remains: no tax system can maximise revenue, fairness and simplicity at the same time. Good policy means choosing the right balance, rather than falling into trade-offs that place the biggest burden on the poorest. And people are more willing to pay when they see government giving something back in terms of essential services.

In the end, tax is political. It involves decisions about who pays, and how, which reflect a country’s priorities as much as its technical capacity.

As income and business activity shift to digital platforms, governments need modern systems that can keep up, understand how informal businesses are shifting to digital rails fully or partially and apply tax rules effectively.

– Taxing Africa’s informal economies: technology’s promise and pitfalls
– https://theconversation.com/taxing-africas-informal-economies-technologys-promise-and-pitfalls-275324