MIL Africa Engine

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anne Fitchett, Retired Honorary Associate Professor in the School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of the Witwatersrand

Every year, millions of tonnes of food end up in South Africa’s landfills. This is a wasted resource that deepens environmental damage, worsens food insecurity and costs the economy billions. But there are opportunities to turn what we throw away into value for people, the planet and local economies.

A new study investigates the true cost of current waste practices and the potential of alternative approaches. We spoke with one of the researchers, Anne Fitchett, about organic waste management and how the country can move towards a more sustainable, circular approach.

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What are the challenges facing waste management, particularly food waste?

Globally, waste management is a serious challenge as waste increases and systems of production and consumption become more complicated. In South Africa, the most common approach to the disposal of waste is simply to dump it on landfill sites. This currently amounts to a staggering ten million metric tons annually. The country is rapidly running out of space for landfill. Adding to the problem are inadequate planning, weak implementation of recycling policy (such as separation at source), and high transport costs that encourage illegal dumping.

In particular, food waste carries additional ethical and environmental concerns. Hunger and food insecurity is widespread in South Africa, affecting an estimated 15 million people. Organic waste, which includes garden waste, farming waste and food waste, is a major contributor of greenhouse gas emissions through decomposition. Food waste on a landfill also creates odours and pest infestations. Vulnerable people are affected most: waste pickers and low-income households who have no choice but to live near waste dump sites.

What interested us was the opportunities that food waste offers. Instead of being a costly problem, from the viewpoint of economic, social and ecological effects, how can this waste be managed differently, to provide benefits instead?

How is it currently done in South Africa and how did you work out the cost?

In South Africa, organic waste forms the largest single fraction of general waste going to landfill, making up around 27% of all disposed waste. Food waste contributes about one-third of this category.

We explored different ways of calculating the costs of managing food waste, so that we could compare landfill dumping with other approaches. We decided on a social cost-benefit analysis, as this includes economic, social and environmental costs into a single calculation. This makes it much easier for policy makers and municipalities to make informed choices.

We determined the direct costs from municipal and national data sets. The social and environmental costs had to be monetised to integrate into the calculation. To do this, we used what are called hedonic pricing models. This is the price people are willing to pay to avoid a negative environmental impact, which we derived from the local and international research. We also used life-cycle cost analysis for some of the values. Here, we factor in all the different costs that a particular method needs, such as capital cost, operating cost, maintenance, and final residual or salvage value at the end of its useful life.

Through this analysis method, we calculated that landfill practices impose an estimated R8.7 billion (US$0.5 billion) annual burden on the economy, environment and communities across South Africa. Because much of this is a hidden cost, the real “dis-amenity” (the combination of negative values) is often undervalued and these costs materialise in other ways, to the detriment of the economy, society and the environment.

What alternative methods did you test and what were the outcomes?

We explored various means:

• aerobic composting (decomposition with air circulation)

• anaerobic digestion (decomposition in a sealed container)

• processing through vermicomposting (harnessing the services of earthworms that eat the food waste and produce nutrient-rich deposits)

• black soldier flies (the larvae of which feed on the waste and produce animal feed and organic fertiliser).

We calculated that windrow composting, where organic waste is placed in long rows and turned periodically to maintain oxygen levels, generates some benefits through the sale of the compost. It also saves in greenhouse gas emissions by replacing more costly fertilisers for farming.

In-vessel composting was the one method we analysed that had higher costs than benefits, even though it produces better quality compost and almost no air pollutants. (But this was still a marked improvement over landfilling.) In this method, the waste is in a closed environment, where air-flow, moisture and temperature can be controlled to speed up the composting process.

We also evaluated anaerobic digestion with bio-gas capture, which takes place in an enclosed environment, but with air excluded. The biogas percolates to the top of the tank where it is extracted for cooking and other uses. This has a much higher capital and operational cost, but generates saleable methane and carbon dioxide gases, as well as a digestate that can be sold for soil enhancement.

Vermicomposting is a process where organic waste is broken down by earthworms and microbes into material that can add nutrients to soil. It also produces worm biomass as a high-protein animal feed. This produces a higher net benefit than any of the other methods described so far.

The best performer from the social cost-benefit analysis was black soldier fly processing. The flies’ eggs are hatched and the larvae are transferred to the food waste, which the larvae feed on. When the larvae reach maturity, they are harvested for protein-rich animal feed and their deposits (called frass) are collected for use as fertiliser.

Studies agree that anaerobic digestion offers the best performance from a purely environmental appraisal.

Our study suggests that a combination of anaerobic digestion and black soldier fly processing could be the optimal solution, taking into account social and economic aspects.

How can these findings be used to shape policy?

Our study offers a number of pointers. It is essential to look at gate fees to landfill sites. Some of the sites are not charging at all, and the closest to charging an economic rate is the Western Cape province. This should be weighed against the possible avoidance of formal waste disposal altogether, inadvertently promoting illegal dumping. Linked to this is the lack of compliance with waste legislation that was identified at many of the sites across the country.

Municipalities should be encouraged, through government policies, to invest in alternative technologies, like vermicomposting and black soldier fly processing. A strategic combination of economic incentives, regulatory compliance and sustainable practices is essential to achieve long-term national waste management objectives.

The results of our study highlight the urgent need for an integrated strategy that incorporates economic, ecological, social and governance dimensions to transform food waste into a resource. The current default to landfill is simply not a sustainable option. With targeted policies and investments, food waste could shift from being a costly liability to serving as a cornerstone of South Africa’s circular economy and sustainable development agenda.

Gabriel Pereira, a master’s student, was a co-author on the research and article.

– Food waste in South Africa is dumped in landfills – study weighs up healthier and more sustainable options
– https://theconversation.com/food-waste-in-south-africa-is-dumped-in-landfills-study-weighs-up-healthier-and-more-sustainable-options-268715

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

Nigerians have been waiting anxiously for the economy to “turn a corner”, following economic reform initiatives undertaken by President Bola Tinubu in 2023. These included removing the country’s fuel subsidy and freeing up its foreign exchange market.

There have been signs of improvement. Key among these are stronger economic growth, and a rise in capital inflows and diaspora remittances. Foreign reserves have risen to the highest level in seven years. Core inflation has declined and the foreign exchange market is less volatile.

But ordinary Nigerians aren’t feeling the benefits. There’s anger and resentment, as evident in the nationwide protest in June 2025 against hunger and insecurity.

How might one explain this mismatch?

The answer lies in living conditions, which have not improved and may well have deteriorated since the economic reforms.

Many Nigerians are still without jobs – the unemployment rate has been estimated at about 30%. But this is an underestimate, considering that millions of under-employed Nigerians in the informal sector are counted as employed.

Because of the lack of jobs, about 93% are engaged in low-income informal sector activities. Public spaces and highways in the country have been taken over by roadside hawkers and other informal sector workers.

Nigerians are also chronically poor and food insecure. According to the World Bank, the number of poor people in Nigeria rose from 81 million in 2019 to 139 million in October 2025. Most have no safety net or means of protection from unforeseen events like illness, natural disasters or loss of jobs.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades, I argue that Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach. Macroeconomic stability can’t be expected to automatically create jobs and alleviate poverty. Time and again, trickle-down economics has been shown to be a flawed economic philosophy.

It is time for the Tinubu administration to take decisive and unprecedented steps to translate macroeconomic improvements into better living conditions for Nigerians.

Why reforms aren’t feeding through

Most Nigerians have not felt the impact of improvements in macroeconomic performance because of the following:

Economic growth is not robust enough: Growth needs to be 6%-8% a year for at least five years, for most Nigerians to feel the impact of an improved economy. Much of that growth must come from labour-intensive sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing and agro-processing.

Jobless growth: Employment-intensive sectors of the economy haven’t been affected by the reforms. The manufacturing sector, for instance, remains weak due to the high cost of imported raw materials, poor infrastructure, competition from cheap imported goods, and the high cost of borrowing.

Income stagnation and declines in real purchasing power: The few Nigerians with jobs have found that their income lags behind the rate of inflation. The fact that Nigeria’s inflation rate has fallen does not mean that prices have decreased. It simply means that prices are rising more slowly than they did before. And the minimum wage in Nigeria is one of the lowest in the world.

Non-inclusivity of growth: The gains from macroeconomic stability in Nigeria have not been broadly shared. There are two reasons. First, the main drivers of growth are sectors that are not labour-intensive: oil and gas, financial services, digital services, hospitality, music, art and design. Second, many Nigerians don’t have the skills and competencies to be employed in these sectors.

Perverse sectoral distribution of capital inflows: Although foreign capital has increased, much of it is portfolio investment in bonds, government treasury bills, and the stocks of financial institutions. The opportunities for employment generation are therefore very limited.

Economic challenges that need to be addressed

To translate recent policy reforms into better living standards, more needs to be done.

Job creation: The government should work with the private sector to resuscitate the manufacturing sector and agro-processing. Incentives should be given to foreign and domestic investors to invest in manufacturing and agro-processing. A rejuvenated manufacturing sector will integrate the Nigerian economy into global value chains.

Only about 2% of capital inflows this year is foreign direct investment. The rest is portfolio investment in government bonds and securities, as well as corporate stocks – especially in banking. Portfolio investment does not create jobs. Equity investment in manufacturing, agro-processing and even agriculture is preferable for job creation.

Cash transfers: Reduce the huge cost of running the country and use the savings for cash transfers for vulnerable Nigerians. Only about 8.4 million households (out of a population of 238 million) have received cash transfers of between N25,000 and N75,000. This is grossly inadequate. Giving more people cash would represent a big change for many Nigerians, no matter how small the transfer. Cash transfers that are paid for by a reduction in governance cost will not create inflation but enable Nigerians to invest in economic activities and be productive.

Public works: The government should accelerate the rate of job creation by using direct labour for targeted public works projects. Nigeria has many bad roads and dilapidated public buildings.

Streamline the foreign exchange market: There is still a gap between the official and parallel rates of exchange. There are many black-market foreign currency traders. In a well-functioning foreign exchange market, a sprawling black market should not exist.

Reduce the size of the informal sector: This can be done through the development of the manufacturing sector, which will draw surplus labour from the informal sector.

Economic development should be about people, their well-being and their economic dignity. While stabilising the economy, the government should intentionally put in place mechanisms to ensure that macroeconomic improvements result in better living conditions.

– Nigeria’s economy has improved but ordinary people still feel the pinch: economist offers some solutions
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-has-improved-but-ordinary-people-still-feel-the-pinch-economist-offers-some-solutions-271496

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alessandro De Cola, Univertsity Assistant (Postdoc), Universität Wien; Università di Bologna

A dynamic new “consumer class” emerging from Africa is attracting international attention. With the prospect of rising incomes and a young population, international consulting firms see the continent as the next frontier for consumer goods. Global entrepreneurs even warn of the increasing savviness of African buyers.

But the influence of African consumers on global markets is far from a new thing. In the 1800s, the continent’s consumer demand called the tune for European factories.

We’re a team of economic and social historians, anthropologists, and African studies specialists. Our research project investigates the roots of these dynamics.

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Read more: Africa is the world’s largest market for Guinness beer – how its ad campaigns exploit men

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Focusing on the African demand for goods like arms, beads and cloth, our research calls into question the Eurocentric idea that Africa was just a supplier of cheap labour and raw materials before the “Scramble for Africa” by colonial powers.

Instead, in the 1800s, the continent was a key driver of industrial production, compelling manufacturers to tailor their goods to African preferences.

This challenges the conventional view of globalisation as a flow of goods and ideas from dominant economies to so-called peripheral regions. In fact globalisation has always been a connected process – one in which African consumers, though often overlooked, played a decisive role in shaping global markets.

Arms

Analysis of the arms trade takes us to the Congo River estuary in the late precolonial era. Before the late 1800s and colonialism, this region was free of direct European political control.

The illegal slave trade lasted at least until the mid-1850s, when the export of legitimate goods finally began to gather momentum. From roughly the 1850s, one of the products most consistently favoured by consumers in the Congo estuary was the so-called “trade gun”.

These rugged, muzzle-loading muskets were deemed outdated by European manufacturers and traders. In the Congo estuary these firearms remained in high demand.

Trade guns could be flintlocks (using a flint to ignite gunpowder) or percussion guns (using a small, explosive cap to ignite it). Flintlocks were more popular because flintstones were more readily available in Africa.

Moreover, smoothbore muzzle-loaders, commonly made from “soft” wrought iron rather than “hard” steel, were not only cheaper but also a more accessible technology than rifles for African consumers. Although flintlocks were sometimes not effective for big-game hunting, they had substantial military value.

Understanding the role of these weapons in African history, however, requires looking beyond just their function. Imported firearms were also commonly given symbolic meanings shaped by local norms and power structures.

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Read more: The incredible journey of two princes from Mozambique whose lives were upended by the slave trade

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For example, among Kikongo speakers in the lower Congo, gunfire was used as a sign of rejoicing during celebrations and funerals. Noise was believed to drive away bad spirits and aid passage into the spirit world.

Although the gun trade in the lower Congo is not always easy to quantify, it is documented, for example, that the Nieuwe Afrikaansche Handels Vennootschap imported an annual average of about 24,000 guns between 1884 and 1888. The majority of these were discarded French percussion guns that had been modified into flintlocks in Liège.

The development of the arms trade in the lower Congo also mirrors broader changes within the European firearms industry. African consumer demand was not just driven by European industrial output, but was rather an active force that shaped and sustained global economic integration throughout the 1800s.

Beads

Venetian glass bead producers were well aware that their specialised industry depended on demand from Africa and Asia. It is almost impossible to find out exactly how many glass beads were poured into the African continent in the 19th century. Glass beads went through many different hands (in many different ports) before they reached the shores of Africa, and the available information on Venetian production is not consistent.

Historians have shown that, during the 1800s, beads produced in Venice were a key commodity exchanged for ivory along the east African caravan routes connecting the Swahili coast to the Great Lakes. These routes were established by Arab traders and Nyamwezi traders (from today’s Tanzania) on expeditions financed by Gujarati merchants from India.

As demand for ivory grew in European and American markets, these traders began penetrating deeper into the continent to discover new sources of elephant tusks and rhino horns. They established new market centres in the process.

Glass beads were portable and relatively cheap. This made them especially suitable as a form of money in everyday transactions. Beads had a major importance in securing food for caravan porters. Bringing the wrong type of beads could spell disaster for an expedition. This required an updated knowledge of the kinds of beads that were more in demand along specific routes.

Through the caravan leaders, information was gathered by European agents in major commercial hubs such as Zanzibar. This was mailed or telegraphed to their companies’ headquarters, allowing producers to respond to demand as promptly as possible.

Today, sample cards displaying the most requested kinds of glass beads, preserved in European and American museums, are the most tangible product of this information chain.

Cloth

African demand also influenced technological innovation. On the coast of east Africa and in Sudan, people eagerly imported millions of yards of American unbleached cotton cloth. This helped build the fortunes of US industries – so much so that “merikani” (from “American”) became a general term for this product – and, later, of Indian manufacturers.

Its spread, however, was limited by transport costs. Ethiopian markets were supplied mainly by local production, with a robust tradition of cotton spinning and weaving. The cloth was distinctively white and soft – praised by travellers as comparable to the finest European textiles. In Ethiopia, the only clear technological advantage enjoyed by western producers was dyes, especially after the introduction of synthetic colours in the 1870s.

Ethiopian weavers eagerly sought coloured yarn from Europe and India to pair with their own white cloth. This demand stimulated the spread of new dying technology abroad. The situation changed significantly after the unification of Ethiopia under Menelik II, whose reign brought stability and infrastructure development.

Coarse, unbleached cotton became widely available even in the interior, offering a cheap and easily washable option for ordinary people: 12 million square yards from the US were imported in 1905-1906 alone. Meanwhile, Ethiopian elites continued to favour local cotton but complemented it with imported accessories like felt hats and umbrellas. Coloured cloth, once a luxury, became a popular consumer good.

The big picture

The story of how arms, glass beads and cloth were commercialised in Africa and how production and distribution had to adapt to the continent’s needs provides a more nuanced picture of how global trade as we know it took shape.

Our research emphasises that globalisation was not ignited in the global north, but depended on consumers located far from the centres of production.

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We discussed these topics in an online seminar series now available on YouTube.

– Early shoppers: how African consumers set global trade trends in the 1800s
– https://theconversation.com/early-shoppers-how-african-consumers-set-global-trade-trends-in-the-1800s-266794

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Malyn Newitt, Emeritus Professor in History, King’s College London

The Zambezi is Africa’s fourth longest river, flowing through six countries: Angola, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, where it becomes the largest river to flow into the Indian Ocean.

The entire length of the river is referred to as the Zambezi Valley region and it carries with it a rich history of movement, conquest and commerce.

Great Britain colonised Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe; Germany colonised Namibia. The beginning and the end of the Zambezi, in Angola and Mozambique, were Portuguese colonies.

Malyn Newitt is a historian of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and has written numerous books on the subject, and one on the Zambezi in particular. We asked him about this history.

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When and how did the Portuguese encounter the Zambezi?

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to establish permanent relations with the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa. After the explorer Vasco da Gama’s successful return voyage from Europe to India (1497-1499) the Portuguese heard about the gold trade being carried on in the ports of the Zambezi River. By the middle of the 1500s they were trading there, from their bases on the coast of modern Mozambique. From Sofala and Mozambique Island, they sent agents to the gold trading fairs inland.

Between 1569 and 1575 a Portuguese military expedition tried to conquer the gold producing regions of what became known as Mashonaland (today part of Zimbabwe). This failed, but permanent settlements were made in the Zambezi valley from which Portuguese control was gradually extended over the river up to the Cahora Bassa gorge in modern Mozambique.

Portuguese adventurers, with their locally recruited private armies, began to control large semi-feudal land holdings known as prazos. These reached their greatest extent in the mid-1600s.

During the 1700s and early 1800s the area of Portuguese control was limited to the Zambezi valley. Here the elite of Afro-Portuguese prazo holders traded gold and slaves.

The first half of the 1800s saw drought, the migrations of the Nguni (spurred by Zulu-led wars in southern Africa) and the continuing slave trade. During these disturbed conditions, Afro-Portuguese warlords raised private armies and extended their control up the river. They went as far as Kariba (on the border between modern Zambia and Zimbabwe) and through much of the escarpment country north and south of the river.

This eventually brought them into conflict with Britain, whose agents were expanding their activities from South Africa. It resulted in an 1891 agreement which drew the frontiers in and around the Zambezi valley which still exist today.

Who are the people who live along the river?

The people who have inhabited the length of the Zambezi valley have often been generically referred to as Tonga. For the most part they’ve organised their lives in small, lineage-based settlements. Their economy is based on crop growing and occupations relating to trade and navigation on the river.

Because of the lack of any centralised political organisation, the valley communities were often dominated by the powerful kingdoms on the north and south of the river. This might involve raiding and enslavement or simply paying tribute to the kings. On the upper reaches of the river in Zambia, populations became subject to the large Barotse kingdom in the 1800s.

On the lower river many of the people came under the overlordship of prazos. They worked as carriers, artisans, boatmen and soldiers. Because of the extensive gold and ivory trade, a fine tradition of goldsmith work developed and men became skilled elephant hunters.

Throughout history, valley communities have often been loosely organised around spirit shrines with mediums. These are very influential in providing stability and direction for people’s lives.

How did the Portuguese understand these cultures?

For 400 years the Portuguese controlled the lower reaches of the Zambezi, in Mozambique. They wrote many accounts of the people of the region which show a complex interaction. Portugal’s administration and system of land law controlled matters at the apex of society, but could not control African culture.

The Portuguese were few in number and intermarried to some extent with the local population. This produced a hybrid Afro-Portuguese society in which everyday life was carried on according to African traditional practice. Agriculture, transport, artisan crafts, mining and warfare reflected local traditions.

Although the Portuguese tried to introduce Christianity, it failed to attract many people away from the spirit cults. It became diluted with local religious ideas.

The Portuguese built square, European-style houses in the river ports and on the estates along the river. But most of the population retained the traditional African hut design. Afro-Portuguese were often literate but literacy did not penetrate far and the Portuguese language never replaced the local languages.

How did silver play a role in all this?

Late in the 1500s the Portuguese became obsessed with the idea that there were silver mines in Africa comparable to those discovered by the Spanish in the New World. Considerable effort was made to locate these mines in Angola and in the Zambezi valley.

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Read more: The incredible journey of two princes from Mozambique whose lives were upended by the slave trade

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Military expeditions were dispatched and skilled miners were sent from Europe to test the ores that had allegedly been discovered. Attempts to find the mines throughout the 1600s helped to sustain Portuguese interest in the Zambezi settlements. No silver was ever discovered – not surprisingly, as there is no silver in southern Africa.

Can you bring us up to today? What impact has development had on the river?

Until the 1900s the Zambezi defied most attempts at development. The river was difficult to navigate – too shallow in the dry season, too dangerous during the floods. These fluctuations determine the pattern of migrations and agricultural production.

Moreover, as the river passed through a series of gorges which blocked navigation it was only on its upper reaches, beyond the Victoria Falls, on the borders of Zimbabwe and Zambia, that it was able to act as a major highway.

And the river constituted a major obstacle to any contact between people north and south of it. The first bridge was only built in 1905, to carry the railway from South Africa to the copper belt. In the 1930s, British engineers built a second rail bridge across the lower Zambezi. But the first road bridge was only built in 1934, at Chirundu at the border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. This at last linked the areas north and south of the river.

Meanwhile the floods of the Zambezi came to be contained by the building of the Kariba Dam (opened in 1959) and the Cahora Bassa Dam (1974). As a result much of the Zambezi below the Victoria Falls has altered drastically and been turned into a succession of large inland seas.

Large sectors of the population have been forcibly removed and the floods no longer keep sea water from invading the delta. Meanwhile water extraction for irrigation, and increasingly frequent droughts, have endangered the river’s very existence.

The Zambezi has become an example of what happens when the natural resources of a great river have been thoughtlessly over-exploited.

– The history of the Zambezi River is a tale of culture, conquest and commerce
– https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-zambezi-river-is-a-tale-of-culture-conquest-and-commerce-269217