MIL Africa Engine

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By MJ (Thinus) Booysen, Professor in Engineering, Stellenbosch University

Across much of Africa, motorcycles are not leisure vehicles. They are workhorses. They carry commuters, schoolchildren, goods, medicines and deliveries. For millions of people, they provide the most affordable and accessible form of transport, while also creating livelihoods for riders and small businesses.

In many places, they fill the gap left by limited public transport. Kenya alone has about 1.5 million riders.

Of the 27 million motorbikes in sub-Saharan Africa, only about 0.1% are electric, running on clean and low-cost energy.

As part of a team of electrical and industrial engineers at Stellenbosch University, I work (and go on adventures!) to see if that share can be increased.

When our team rode a locally manufactured electric motorbike from Kenya to South Africa in 2024, charging it with only solar power and battery storage along the way, we were not only testing a vehicle. We were testing whether Africa could build and power its own electric mobility future.

The journey covered roughly 6,000km via cities, rural roads and border posts, showing that electric two-wheelers are not a distant dream for sub-Saharan Africa. They are already practical, and they point to a much bigger opportunity.

Feasible transition

Electric motorcycles with battery swapping fit the realities of mobility demand in African countries: relatively short daily trips, constant use, tight operating margins and the need for low-cost transport. It’s already been estimated that electrifying this segment will reduce total cost of ownership for riders by 35%-40%, improve urban air quality, cut greenhouse gas emissions and lower dependence on imported fuel.

Our own research suggests this transition is both technically and economically feasible.

Together, these findings suggest that electric micromobility in Africa is not only technically viable, but can be paired with local solar systems in ways that improve affordability, resilience and access.

An industrial opportunity

Africa should not simply become a market for electric vehicles designed and manufactured elsewhere. It should become a place where they are built, adapted and improved for African conditions. The continent’s mobility needs are specific. Vehicles must cope with rough roads, heavier loads, long operating hours and uneven access to charging. A motorcycle designed for Europe or Asia is not always right for a boda-boda rider in Kenya or a delivery rider in South Africa.

In one study, we developed and validated a physics-based model twin of an electric motorcycle under African operating conditions, showing that energy use can be predicted with good accuracy from real trips, terrain and payload. This digital twin can be used in virtual assessments of electric fleet deployments.

Local production would also create local jobs. It can create opportunities in assembly, fabrication, battery integration, electronics, software, data analytics, servicing and charging infrastructure. It would give young engineers, technicians and entrepreneurs a foothold in an industry that is already growing quickly.

But that growth will not happen on its own. It needs policy support. Ethiopia banned imports of internal combustion engine vehicles in 2024. This rapidly accelerated EV adoption and altered the economics of vehicle imports. South Africa’s belated 150% tax incentive for local electric vehicle production is a step in the right direction.

Tapping into local resources

Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the best solar resources in the world. At the same time, many communities still face unreliable grid electricity or no access at all. That may sound like a barrier to electrified transport, but it is also an opportunity.

Compared with large cars or buses, small vehicle batteries are far easier to charge from decentralised solar systems. Solar-powered charging points, battery swap stations, mini-grids and storage systems can all support electric motorcycles where conventional infrastructure is weak.

Charging has already been demonstrated on solar-hybrid mini-grids, particularly for rural electric two-wheelers, with documented cases in Nigeria and operator-led deployments in Sierra Leone.

Our research has found that decentralised solar can help power this transition: a school-centred solar trading model serving households and electric motorbikes achieved payback periods of under five years in favourable cases and improved supply reliability for external users by about 60%.

This matters especially in rural and peri-urban areas, where mobility poverty is often most severe. A locally manufactured electric motorcycle charged with solar power is more than a cleaner vehicle. It is a tool for inclusion. It can improve access to jobs, education, healthcare and markets while reducing exposure to fuel price shocks.

That is why this transition should not be framed only as a climate issue. It is a development issue.

Policy needs

African governments must make it easier to produce and sell electric vehicles locally. At present, many local manufacturers face the strange situation where importing a finished vehicle is cheaper and simpler than building one domestically. High duties on components, inconsistent regulations, costly certification, weak access to finance and uncertain policy signals all work against local industry.

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Read more: Ghana’s new vehicle tax aims to tackle pollution – expert unpacks how it’ll work and suggests reforms

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If governments are serious about industrial development, electric micromobility is a practical place to start. Support could include lower tariffs on components for local assembly, tax incentives for domestic manufacturing, development finance, clear technical standards and public procurement policies that create dependable demand. The aim should not be permanent protection, but smart support that helps African firms scale and compete.

Governments must support cross-border collaboration. Africa’s challenges are shared, but our responses are often fragmented. Countries create separate standards, separate pilot projects and separate industrial plans, even when their transport needs and energy constraints are remarkably similar. This duplication makes progress slower and more expensive.

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Read more: What’s stopping sunny South Africa’s solar industry? Court case sheds light on the wider problem

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Many African borders were imposed in colonial times. They do not reflect the deeper connections between economies, people or problems. Fuel insecurity, unemployment, poor public transport, congestion and unreliable electricity are not isolated national problems. They are regional realities. The response should therefore also be regional.

That means harmonised standards, easier trade in locally made vehicles and components, shared research platforms and coordinated industrial policy. A larger, more integrated African market would help manufacturers scale up, reduce costs and justify investment in skills and supply chains. It would also allow innovations developed in one country to spread more quickly across the continent.

Electric mobility policy must be linked to energy policy, especially solar energy.

From talk to action

Our journey from Nairobi to Stellenbosch, now told in our seven-episode documentary series, Recharging Hope, was not a publicity stunt. It was a practical demonstration that locally made electric motorbikes, powered by solar energy, can work across African roads and real African conditions. The question is no longer whether this future is possible. It is whether policy and investment will help Africa build it for itself.

With the right policies, partnerships and investment, electric micromobility can help the region move people more affordably, build local industry more confidently and use the power of the African sun more fully.

Africa’s mobility future should be built in Africa and powered by its own abundant renewable energy.

– Africa’s electric motorbike future can be built locally and powered by solar – our 6,000km ride shows what’s possible
– https://theconversation.com/africas-electric-motorbike-future-can-be-built-locally-and-powered-by-solar-our-6-000km-ride-shows-whats-possible-279008

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abeeb Babatunde Omotoso, Senior Lecturer at Oyo State College of Agriculture and Technology, Igboora, Nigeria and Senior Research Associate at North West University, North-West University

Agriculture is the backbone of Africa’s economy. It provides livelihoods for over 70% of the rural population and contributes to national food security and economic development.

For most rural households, farming is not just a source of income and sustenance. It also provides cultural identity and social stability. Over the past two decades, however, rural Africa has witnessed increasing levels of violent conflicts that undermine agricultural productivity, investment and long-term development.

Farmers facing insecurity often abandon productive crops, reduce land use and invest less in their farms. There are serious consequences for food security.

Conflict destroys lives and property. It also changes the decisions farmers make about investing in their land.

We are agricultural and applied economists with expertise in rural development,sustainable food system and climate-smart agriculture. We’ve studied the impact of conflict on food systems in the global south.

One of our studies examined how violent conflict influenced agricultural investment decisions among rural households in Nigeria. We combined nationally representative household data with detailed conflict records, to track how exposure to violence affects farming.

The findings showed that violent conflict altered agricultural investment decisions. It made farmers less likely to cultivate major crops.

The cultivation of yam, sweet potato, groundnut, cowpea, maize and cassava declined as conflict incidents increased. Sweet potato was the most affected, perhaps because it needs a lot of labour and a longer time to grow.

When conflict disrupts farming through abandoned fields, lost livestock, or altered investment decisions, it undermines food availability and long-term agricultural development.

Understanding these impacts is useful when designing ways to help farmers and sustain food systems in conflict-affected areas.

The reality

Our study used panel data from Nigeria’s Living Standards Measurement Study covering the periods 2012/2013, 2015/2016 and 2018/2019.

The national study provides detailed household-level information. This covers demographic characteristics, agricultural production, crop choice, land allocation, input use, production costs and market participation.

We combined the household coordinates with geocoded conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure exposure to violent conflict. The ACLED database provides detailed information on battles, violence against civilians, remote violence, protests and riots.

Our study focused on three indicators of violent conflict exposure:

• total number of conflict incidents

• number of violent incidents affecting civilians (including Boko Haram-related violence)

• number of battles, including protests, riots and farmer–herder clashes.

To capture local exposure to violence, we measured conflict incidents within a radius of 10km of each surveyed household in a given year.

By linking spatial conflict data with household-level agricultural information across multiple survey waves, the study analysed how exposure to violent conflict influenced farmers’ production decisions, land allocation and agricultural outcomes over time.

The findings

The results indicate that insecurity discourages farmers from engaging in production activities that involve greater risk or long-term investment. Conflict exposure also affects land allocation decisions.

The analysis showed a reduction in the total cultivated land area and a decline in the share of land allocated to key staple crops.

This pattern suggests that farmers respond to insecurity by scaling down farming activities, avoiding distant plots, and concentrating on smaller or safer areas of land. Reducing the land cultivated may result in less food produced.

We found that conflict led to less spending on agricultural production. Farmers invested less in inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides and hired labour.

The effects varied across management types. Plots managed by men showed relatively stable investment levels. Production costs increased on plots managed by men and women. This could be due to reliance on external labour during periods of insecurity.

The findings demonstrate that violent conflict affects crop choices, reduces land use and discourages agricultural investment.

Disruptions also increase the cost of agricultural production and marketing, making farming less profitable. Government efforts to support agriculture, such as input subsidies and rural development programmes, don’t work so well in conflict zones.

The adverse effects are more severe for households in highly conflict-prone areas. Disputes have long-term economic impacts.

Recommendation and policy implications

The findings highlight the need for conflict-sensitive agricultural policies and targeted rural development interventions.

First, strong rural security and community conflict resolution mechanisms are essential. Government and local authorities should monitor security in major agricultural zones and help communities to build peace.

Policies should encourage farmers to plant climate-smart and low-risk crops that need fewer inputs and have shorter production cycles. This would make agricultural systems more resilient to conflict.

Extension services should advise farmers on which crops to plant, improved seed varieties, and farming strategies suitable for insecure environments.

Policymakers should invest in rural infrastructure and early-warning systems, including market access, transport networks and conflict monitoring systems.

– Violent conflicts are reshaping what Nigerian farmers grow: what this means for food security
– https://theconversation.com/violent-conflicts-are-reshaping-what-nigerian-farmers-grow-what-this-means-for-food-security-278719

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ding Fei, Assistant Professor, Cornell University

As African cities experience some of the fastest urban growth rates in the world, China has become a major bilateral financier for urban infrastructure.

From Nairobi’s elevated expressways to Lagos’s airport upgrades and Addis Ababa’s new riverside developments, Chinese-backed projects are transforming skylines and daily life across the continent.

I study China’s economic engagements in Africa, focusing on how development is enacted, negotiated, and contested across sites of production, governance, and everyday life.

My recent analysis of 267 Chinese‑financed projects in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo), Lagos (Nigeria), Luanda (Angola), Lusaka (Zambia) and Nairobi (Kenya) shows that while China delivers an impressive volume of infrastructure, it risks reinforcing Africa’s national government dominance in decision-making on urban infrastructure development.

The completion rate, and the speed at which most projects are finished, is impressive. But that’s only part of the equation. Cities – their governments and residents – are excluded from the project planning and negotiation process.

Across my project dataset, none of the infrastructure deals were financed directly through municipal governments. Instead, the agreements were mostly negotiated and funded through national ministries or state agencies. This happens partly because many cities are legally restricted from taking on external debt, and partly because lenders prefer working with sovereign governments.

This national-level dominance has far-reaching consequences for how African cities develop. When cities are not involved in financing negotiations, they lose the opportunity to align major infrastructure projects with long-term urban development plans.

China’s expanding footprint

African cities face massive infrastructure shortfalls. The African Union estimates that urban areas require about US$142 billion every year to build and maintain essential systems. In this context of urgent need, China has become one of the most important bilateral financiers helping to fill the gap.

The six cities examined in my study are the biggest urban centres in their respective countries. Together they house only about 13% of national populations. Yet they receive nearly 30% of all Chinese infrastructure financing flows into those countries.

Between 2000 and 2021, Chinese lenders committed about US$37 billion to urban infrastructure in these six cities. Transport projects account for the largest share, over US$17 billion. This is followed by social projects such as housing, schools and hospitals, which drew more than US$8 billion. Digital networks, electricity systems, water infrastructure and government buildings made up the remainder.

These investment patterns mirror the continent’s biggest infrastructure gaps, especially in transport and education, as identified in a 2022 UN-Habitat report.

Most of this financing is in the form of loans rather than grants. Loans represent nearly 68% of all projects and almost 89% of the total money committed to the six cities. The terms vary widely. Some loans are offered at very low interest rates. Others are closer to commercial rates, sometimes approaching 7%, with repayment periods stretching up to two decades.

Digital infrastructure projects often come with more favourable terms, though they are often tied to Chinese technology suppliers. Two large Chinese development banks, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, provide nearly 94% of project lending.

One notable feature of Chinese finance is the speed at which many projects are completed. Of the projects with available information, about 74% were completed. Many were completed within two to three years.

This is a relatively high rate compared with typical attrition levels in infrastructure projects across the continent.

The overall completion rate shows a capacity to deliver infrastructure projects at speed.

Still, speed and scale tell only part of the story. Equally significant is who negotiates the terms of lending.

Bypassing city authorities

Local governments are often mandated to implement projects and operate new infrastructure. Yet they lack the power or resources to do so.

In 2020, subnational governments across Africa received only 24% of total public spending, well below the global average of 39.5%. Weak property tax systems, heavy reliance on transfers from central government, and restrictions on borrowing leave most cities with limited fiscal autonomy.

Chinese financing, while substantial, has not altered this structural imbalance.

It’s not that cities don’t get funding at all. As urban hubs in their respective countries, the six cities under study often attract high-profile, foreign-funded projects. The projects elevate a city’s skyline. But they often don’t address neighbourhood-level gaps in water supply, transit access, or environmental services.

My other research indicates that large, showcase projects funded by China often take precedence over localised, community-level improvements. Thus infrastructure is unevenly provided in urban areas.

Cities need fiscal power

If African cities are to manage the rapid urbanisation and meet the needs of the roughly 1.5 billion people expected to live in urban areas by mid-century, they need more than new bridges and roads.

They need the fiscal power and planning capacity to plan, finance and govern infrastructure on their own terms.

Based on my research findings, these steps would be useful:

• rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed

• strengthen municipal revenue and financial capacity

• improve planning coordination across governments.

Firstly, it is crucial to rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed in policy and the media. For years, the conversation has revolved around the idea that African cities simply lack enough roads, pipes, grids and public facilities.

While the shortfalls are real, this framing can reinforce the belief that only large, externally financed megaprojects can solve urban problems. It also risks sidelining the diverse and often creative ways communities already provide services when formal systems fall short.

Instead of viewing cities solely through the lens of what they lack, policymakers should also recognise the hybrid networks that public, private or community actors establish to keep daily services running. Examples of these include housing collectives in Harare and smart water meters in Nairobi.

Strengthening these systems requires a broader, more inclusive vision of what urban infrastructure can be.

Secondly, municipal revenue and financial capacity needs to be strengthened.

For cities to gain real decision-making power, they need stronger and more reliable sources of revenue. That means improving property tax systems, developing transparent land-based financing tools, and ensuring residents have equitable access to productive sector employment.

Some cities, such as Lagos, have already built robust tax bases and even issued municipal bonds to finance major projects.

But reforms cannot just happen at the city level. National governments must give municipalities clearer legal authority to raise revenues and borrow responsibly.

And when countries do rely on external finance, they need strong safeguards in terms of transparent bidding processes, rigorous project evaluations, and clear rules for how risks and costs are shared. Without oversight, long-term contracts can saddle cities with high user fees or hidden financial liabilities that become burdens on future budgets and residents.

Thirdly, planning coordination across governments and sectors must be improved.

Urban infrastructure does not function in silos. Transport depends on land use, water systems depend on energy, and digital networks depend on both. Yet planning is often fragmented across ministries, sectors and international partners.

A more coordinated approach is essential. National and local governments should work together through joint planning committees, shared databases and consultation processes that ensure new projects fit into long-term city strategies. Giving city governments and community groups a seat at the table, especially in the early stages of feasibility studies and project design, will help prevent mismatches between high-profile investments and everyday needs.

Reliable information is central to this effort. Many African countries still lack systems to track external financial flows, project progress, evaluation and management. Building comprehensive data systems is a cornerstone of transparent and responsible governance.

China’s involvement across multiple sectors offers an opportunity to pursue more integrated planning. The recent summits of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have pledged efforts to institutionalise subnational cooperation. But these will only be effective if African governments actively and strategically shape the agenda.

The challenge for African cities is not simply attracting more finance but gaining the authority and capacity to guide urban development. China will likely remain an important financier. But no external partner can substitute for strong city institutions, transparent financial systems, and coordinated planning.

– China is helping build Africa’s cities, but its approach sidelines local urban planners and residents
– https://theconversation.com/china-is-helping-build-africas-cities-but-its-approach-sidelines-local-urban-planners-and-residents-278209

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Campbell Francis, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The informal economy is responsible for a large share of economic output across the continent. Yet economic policy is almost always designed for the formal economy and overlooks the informal economy.

We are labour-market economists interested in the informal economy and informal work. We have spent the last two years investigating the concept of an economic policy for informal workers. We spent several months interviewing informal traders, traders’ associations and key stakeholders. Our aim was to better understand their challenges, and to inform the development of an economic policy for informal trading.

Drawing on our research partnership with Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organising, we argue that rethinking economic policy from the perspective of the informal economy is essential.

We begin from the premise that economic policy must actively support the everyday economy. Recognising informal traders as economic agents, and investing in systems that support them, allows local economies to become more resilient, inclusive and sustainable. Traders need a supportive ecosystem so they can move beyond survival, and contribute to local growth and development.

Our findings highlight five areas that should support a policy ecosystem: macroeconomic stability; efficient administration; regulation of competition; participation in policy and governance; and inclusive infrastructure.

On the ground

Our research focused on informal traders in Gauteng, South Africa’s economic hub. The sector provides vital income for marginalised communities and brings essential goods and services closer to where people live. Yet traders remain on the periphery of policy attention. Urban management often treats them as a problem to control rather than as economic actors to engage.

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Read more: Johannesburg has failed its informal traders: policies are in place, but action is needed

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Most informal traders are own-account workers, operating on survivalist incomes that often fall below the poverty line. They face unpredictable markets, limited access to infrastructure, and constant regulatory uncertainty. This makes it difficult to grow their businesses or improve earnings.

These difficulties reflect the fact that informal traders operate in environments that have multiple layers. These include:

• local factors: municipal regulations, permits, policing, infrastructure, competition, community networks

• broader national forces: macroeconomic trends, regulatory frameworks, structural inequalities, formal-sector dominance.

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Read more: Johannesburg’s produce market has supplied the informal sector for decades: a refresh is due

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Understanding these interlocking layers is essential when creating policies that support sustainable livelihoods and growth.

Five policy pillars

(1) Macroeconomic stability

This needs to be the first pillar of the economic policy. The informal sector is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions for a number of reasons.

Firstly, informal traders earn low and unstable incomes. This means that rising living costs quickly erode their ability to sustain livelihoods. This is particularly true when it comes to food, transport and energy prices.

Secondly, the sector is vulnerable to poor growth and unemployment. The informal economy functions as a safety net during economic downturns by absorbing workers displaced from the formal sector. This was well illustrated during the COVID pandemic. But there’s a downside. A flood of new entrants into a constrained sector leads to overcrowding. In turn this:

• leads to intensified competition for limited trading spaces

• disrupts existing organisational systems

• weakens trader networks

• reduces earnings.

Macroeconomic instability, therefore, expands informality. It also threatens informal livelihoods.

Revisiting macroeconomic policy should also include a tax policy that doesn’t prejudice informal workers.

(2) Efficient administration

Administrative inefficiencies and exclusionary practices create barriers for informal traders. For example, delays in issuing permits and other documentation leave traders vulnerable to harassment, bribery and eviction.

Inconsistent enforcement of bylaws creates an uneven playing field. Compliant traders are disadvantaged while irregular practices persist.

These burdens are not solely the result of local government shortcomings. They also reflect national-level failures such as delays in processing asylum-seeker applications. This disadvantages traders who rely on formal documentation to operate legally.

Together, these administrative challenges have a number of knock-on effects. They:

• intensify competition over limited spaces

• erode trust in authorities

• constrain the stability and growth of the informal sector.

(3) Regulation of competition

The South African informal sector faces competition on multiple fronts.

Traders compete among themselves for a limited number of customers and trading spaces. They also face intense competition from the formal sector. Examples include supermarkets, retail chains and shopping malls. Informal traders are pushed into less profitable or precarious locations.

It’s often assumed that there’s perfect competition in the sector – that market players can trade freely.

But they do face structural disadvantages such as regulatory barriers, formal-sector dominance and uneven access to prime trading spaces.

Formal-sector expansion is framed as economic “development”. But it frequently displaces long-standing informal systems.

Intense and unfair competition in the informal sector has another consequence: it forces traders to compete primarily on price rather than quality or service. This is because they can’t match the economies of scale, marketing power, or infrastructure advantages of formal retailers and better-resourced informal traders.

(4) Participation in policy and governance

An economic policy for informal traders needs to emerge from their involvement in policy and governance discussions.

Informal traders are often excluded from the planning and decision-making processes around things that affect them. This includes bylaw enforcement, market design and permit systems.

The result is policies that fail to reflect the realities of informal trade. In turn this:

• creates unnecessary obstacles

• increases uncertainty

• limits traders’ ability to plan, invest and grow.

(5) Inclusive infrastructure

Many traders operate in spaces without electricity, water, sanitation or safe storage facilities. Poor infrastructure limits the types of goods traders can sell and increases operational. It also exposes both traders and customers to health and safety risks.

Too often, cities treat infrastructure provision for informal traders as optional. Or it’s not designed with the needs of informal traders in mind.

This neglect produces unsafe and precarious work environments, undermining both livelihoods and local economic activity.

Infrastructure that is designed to meet traders’ needs will translate investment into higher productivity, improved earnings, safer working conditions and more vibrant local markets. This will benefit both traders and the communities they serve.

– Economic policy in South Africa neglects informal traders: 5 focus areas to support the sector 
– https://theconversation.com/economic-policy-in-south-africa-neglects-informal-traders-5-focus-areas-to-support-the-sector-278323