City of Tshwane warns of potential flooding as rain pours
The City of Tshwane (CoT) has called on residents living in low lying areas to immediately move to higher ground as heavy rain continues to fall over most parts of Gauteng.
In a statement, the CoT said its emergency Services Department received an impact-based warning from the South African Weather Service (SAWS) indicating a Level 9 alert for disruptive rain.
“This severe weather is due to an intense cut-off low-pressure system is expected to take place between this Saturday midnight (15 November 2025) until Sunday midnight (16 November 2025). Cut-off low-pressure systems are known to produce widespread rainfall and severe thunderstorms, significantly increasing the risk of flooding, infrastructure damage, and other weather-related hazards. Rainfall accumulations of 100 – 150mm are predicted for City of Tshwane.
“Residents in…flood-prone areas are strongly advised to immediately relocate temporarily to higher ground, as rapid water accumulation will lead to sudden and dangerous flooding,” the statement read.
Residents in the following areas should immediately move to higher ground: • Low-lying areas, • Riverbanks, • Floodplains, • Wetlands are expected to experience the highest impact. • Motorists are also at high risk and should avoid driving during heavy downpours as several roads are expected to become flooded, creating life-threatening conditions. • Remain indoors and move to higher floors if in high rise buildings, • Flooded roads often result in vehicles being swept away, increased drowning incidents, and households becoming displaced.
“The City of Tshwane has identified high-risk areas across all regions, and the Emergency Services Department will remain on high alert, continuously monitoring known flooding hotspots throughout the warning period. Response teams will be ready to intervene where necessary to safeguard lives and property.
“Residents are encouraged to follow updates from the City of Tshwane and the South African Weather Service for timely alerts and safety information,” the statement continued.
Residents are urged to observe the following safety precautions: • Avoid metal objects that conduct electricity, such as barbed-wire fences or power lines. • When outdoors, immediately move away from lakes, ponds or any large bodies of water during lightning activity. • Do not seek shelter under isolated trees or tall objects during thunderstorms. • Avoid crossing flooded roads, bridges or swollen streams. • If trapped in a vehicle during flooding, abandon the vehicle and move to higher ground.
“Residents are encouraged to stay informed by monitoring short-term weather forecasts and any warnings or alerts issued by the South African Weather Service,” the statement said.
Report any flooding incidents to the Emergency Services Department toll free at 107 or 012 358 6300/6400. The SAWS announced the Orange Level 9 warning in a post on the social media platform X, on Saturday.
The warning speaks to a “medium likelihood of disruptive rainfall that may result in severe impacts of widespread flooding of roads, settlements, as well as danger to life due to fast flowing streams over Gauteng and extreme western parts of Mpumalanga.” – SAnews.gov.za
HE Minister of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dr. Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Saleh Al Khulaifi affirmed that the signing of the Doha Framework Agreement for Peace between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Congo River Alliance (March 23 Movement), which took place Saturday, represents an important step toward consolidating peace and stability in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
His Excellency emphasized the State of Qatar’s commitment to continuing support for this process until comprehensive peace is achieved for the Congolese people.
In a press conference on the signing of the agreement, His Excellency expressed Qatar’s appreciation to both parties for demonstrating genuine political will and responsible commitment, which contributed to the achievement of this agreement.
He also valued their trust in Qatar’s role in facilitating and advancing the peace process.
His Excellency praised the strong support provided by HE President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Felix Tshisekedi, and his commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
He also commended the efforts of the government’s negotiating delegation, the cooperation of the AFC/M23 Movement, and the contributions of partners, particularly the African Union, the Republic of Togo, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Rwanda, and the French Republic.
He noted that Qatar’s efforts in this regard began when HH the Amir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani hosted both HE President Tshisekedi and HE President Paul Kagame of the Republic of Rwanda in Doha, and when HE President Tshisekedi chose to open the door for dialogue with the AFC/M23 Movement.
Since March 2025, Doha hosted rounds of direct negotiations between the two parties, conducted in a spirit of positivity and high responsibility, leading to the agreement.
His Excellency stated that this progress was built on the momentum generated by the Declaration of Principles signed in Doha on July 19, 2025, which laid the foundation for a critical phase of confidence-building measures and opened the path for dialogue between the parties.
Over the past months, the parties achieved notable progress on key issues, including the signing of the ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism on October 14, 2025, and the detainee release mechanism on September 14, 2025.
He noted that the declaration marked a pivotal step that paved the way for the framework and reinforced the shared commitment to peaceful solutions through dialogue and understanding, reflecting the genuine will of both parties to end the conflict and achieve lasting peace in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.
His Excellency emphasized that the signing of this framework does not represent the end of the road, but rather the beginning of a comprehensive peace process and rounds of negotiations to be held in the near future to discuss several core issues.
He stressed that peaceful solutions and political dialogue are the optimal path to ending conflicts and fulfilling the aspirations of the region’s peoples.
He reaffirmed Qatar’s steadfast commitment to preventive diplomacy and constructive dialogue as a strategic choice for conflict resolution, emphasizing that Qatar’s mediation experience is based on direct communication between parties and the creation of common ground that contributes to building trust and enhancing peace opportunities. His Excellency considered the signing of the Doha Framework Agreement for Peace today a historic opportunity that entails the responsibility of implementation by both parties.
He pointed out that Qatar’s role in this process is not aimed at resolving all disputes at once, but rather at establishing a framework containing a number of core protocols to be negotiated, which will form part of the comprehensive peace agreement.
These protocols include: restoring state authority, reforms, arrangements for inclusive national governance, issues of identity and citizenship, return and resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as economic recovery and enhancement of social services.
He explained that the comprehensive peace agreement will consist of the framework agreement and eight protocols, two of which have already been signed, while six protocols will be negotiated between the parties within two weeks from the date of signing the framework agreement.
The parties will also agree that the government will establish an independent commission to promote truth, reconciliation, and accountability for crimes, and to provide recommendations on appropriate reparations within a transitional justice process.
The organization and operation of this commission will be consistent with the constitution and international law.
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology
For the second time in five years, Nigeria has been designated a “country of particular concern” by the US government, in both cases by President Donald Trump. The first time was in 2020 but the designation was removed in 2021.
The November 2025 redesignation can be traced to, among other things, a campaign by US congressman Riley Moore, who alleged that there was an “alarming and ongoing persecution of Christians” in Nigeria.
Nigeria refuted this claim. President Bola Tinubu, in a statement, argued that the US characterisation of Nigeria did not reflect the country’s reality or values.
But what does the designation mean for Nigeria? And what should Nigeria’s response be? As a scholar who has studied Nigeria’s insecurity and identity crises, I have some suggestions.
Nigeria must prevent the diplomatic row with the US from progressing further, and act decisively against insecurity for all Nigerians.
To achieve this, the Nigerian government should look beyond military capability. The country needs governance and administrative restructuring that empowers sub-national and local authorities to address local issues. This bottom-up approach will address insecurity better than the current top-down approach.
What ‘country of particular concern’ means
The classification of a country as being of particular concern is outlined in the United States International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998. Under section 402 of the act, “country of particular concern” is a designation given to a foreign country whose government has engaged in or tolerated especially severe violations of the religious freedom of its citizens.
By this definition, a country may not be directly involved in violating its citizens’ religious freedom, but culpable for not acting decisively against those who do.
For a country to be classified as such, it is first placed on a special watch list. This allows for an assessment of whether there is a serious violation of religious freedom.
The designation is part of US foreign policy for promoting human rights globally.
Why Nigeria was given this status
Nigeria was designated a country of particular concern because of allegations of “genocide” against Christians there. Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, identity conflicts have become a common occurrence. But there’s a new dimension with the emergence of terror groups and intensifying farmer-herder disputes.
A study I conducted in early 2025 revealed that between 2010 and 2022, a total of 230 attacks specifically targeted Christians, 82 of which were between 2019 and 2022.
Several other attacks, such as the Runji killing in Kaduna State in April 2023, the Apata and Yelwata massacres in Benue State in March and June 2025, respectively, and the Mangu killings in Plateau State, have also taken place.
This shows that there are targeted attacks against Christians in parts of Nigeria. But they are a fraction of the attacks and killings carried out by non-state armed groups in the country.
As one study argued, Christians make up roughly half of Nigeria’s population, but attacks explicitly directed against them account for about 5% of total reported violent incidents.
Therefore, framing Nigeria’s insecurity in terms of anti-Christian violence alone oversimplifies the broader dynamics of the country’s national insecurity.
How this will affect Nigeria
The International Religious Freedom Act stipulates 15 required sanctions under section 405(a). Section 407 allows the president of the US to waive these sanctions based on national interest or to further the purpose of the act. For this reason, in most cases, the designation is seldom followed by sanctions.
Several countries have been exempted from sanctions even when designated as countries of particular concern. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been repeatedly designated but the US has never sanctioned them.
Even Nigeria’s designation in 2020 was not followed by sanctions. The US continued to provide security assistance, military cooperation and development aid to Nigeria. The US only used the period of designation to call for improved protection of religious communities and accountability for perpetrators.
For the recent designation, however, Trump has threatened to cut aid to Nigeria and take military action against terrorists in Nigeria.
The US, through the US Agency for International Development, provided development assistance worth US$7.89 billion between 2015 and 2024 to support health, education, economic and humanitarian development. But all of that has reduced since the scrapping of the agency and a drop in foreign aid.
The US could end that deal, but that would undermine Nigeria’s ability to address terrorism and general security challenges. It would counter the purpose of the International Religious Freedom Act. Therefore, I believe the US may waive this.
Direct military intervention in Nigeria is becoming a possibility and Trump is most likely going to do it without respect for Nigeria’s sovereignty. He has ordered the US Department of War to draw up plans, and they have come up with options. But I do not see this solving the problem of insecurity in Nigeria. It may instead lead to the dispersal of terrorists, complicating Nigeria’s insecurity. Or terrorists might increase mass kidnappings and hostage-taking for shields.
How Nigeria should respond
Nigeria must prevent diplomatic rows with the US because they are partners in the fight against terrorism. A discussion about how the US can improve Nigeria’s capacity to address its security challenges would be a good step.
Furthermore, Nigeria’s limited capacity to safeguard lives and property points to deeper structural and governance challenges. The country’s security architecture is too centralised and works top-down. This makes it harder for sub-national and local authorities to provide security and address the drivers of violence at the local level.
Nigeria should go beyond improving its military response. To enhance security, it also needs to reform its governance and administrative structures.
– US-Nigeria relations: what it means to be a ‘country of particular concern’ and why it matters – https://theconversation.com/us-nigeria-relations-what-it-means-to-be-a-country-of-particular-concern-and-why-it-matters-269044
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Powell, Visiting assistant professor, University of Kentucky
Guinea-Bissau heads into its November elections against the backdrop of a deepening crisis of electoral legitimacy across Africa. In recent months, a string of elections has reinforced the perception that incumbency, not competition, remains the standard.
In Cameroon, 92-year-old Paul Biya claimed an eighth consecutive term after officially winning 53.7% of a vote widely denounced as fraudulent and met with protests.
In Tanzania, President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the victor with an implausible 98% of ballots cast in her favour following a poll marred by numerous irregularities and followed by protests and a crackdown unprecedented in the country’s history.
And in Côte d’Ivoire, President Alassane Ouattara comfortably secured a fourth term with nearly 90% of the vote, extending his hold on power despite the constitution’s two-term limit.
Across the continent, including west Africa, these outcomes have fuelled public cynicism and highlighted a worrying erosion of democratic norms, as leaders manipulate constitutions, neutralise opponents, and hollow out institutions meant to safeguard accountability.
It is within this climate of regional disillusionment that Bissau-Guineans will head to the polls on 23 November.
The west African country’s upcoming election once offered the potential to demonstrate a growing electoral resilience, a deepening of institutional strength that would help the country break from past legacies of instability. Instead, the process has been repeatedly undermined by President Umar Sissoco Embaló.
As social scientists who have written extensively on political instability in Africa, we believe that such dynamics all but guarantee another entry to the roster of failed elections across the region.
At stake is more than Guinea-Bissau’s democratic credibility. Its unravelling speaks to a wider regional crisis in which incumbents erode legitimacy not by abolishing elections, but by emptying them of real competition.
A legacy of instability
In contrast to long-tenured leaders like Biya or Ouattara, or enduring parties such as Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Guinea-Bissau’s voters navigate an electoral system defined by unpredictability and instability, especially during election season.
His rule was marred by conflict, including an 11-month civil war triggered by a rebellion from former army chief of staff Ansumane Mané. Vieira’s long first tenure ended in a second coup in May 1999, and his second term was cut short in 2009 when he was murdered by members of the armed forces.
The 2012 upheaval halted a runoff election between Carlos Domingos Gomes Júnior and Kumba Ialá.
The 2014 election brought José Mário Vaz to the presidency, defeating a candidate with close ties to the military. When Vaz completed his term in 2020, he became Guinea-Bissau’s first president to finish a constitutionally defined tenure.
Questions arose even before Vaz’s exit. After Umar Sissoco Embaló was declared the winner over Pereira in the 29 December runoff, Pereira challenged the results. Ignoring the ongoing legal process, Embaló arranged an inauguration ceremony for himself in February 2020.
Embaló then ordered the deployment of the military to state institutions, including the National Assembly. Cassamá stepped down on his second day, citing death threats.
The supreme court ultimately declined to rule on the dispute after its chief judge fled the country, also citing death threats. The crisis was effectively resolved by the Economic Community of West African States’ (Ecowas) recognition of the Embaló government. Uncertainty, however, would continue to plague the new government.
The main opposition party, the PAIGC, formally regained parliamentary control in the June 2023 elections, setting the stage for continued confrontation between the presidency and the legislative majority. Embaló again pursued the dissolution of parliament in December 2023.
Although Embaló’s term officially expired in February 2025, the supreme court later ruled he could remain in office until 4 September.
Even after that date, Embaló remained in office. These manoeuvres have heightened concerns about the erosion of constitutional norms.
Concerns over the broader electoral environment have also come to the fore. Legislative elections initially scheduled for late November 2024 were indefinitely postponed due to alleged funding and logistical challenges. Earlier, Embaló had declared he would not seek reelection, only to reverse course in March 2025.
More recently, the PAIGC’s chosen presidential candidate, Domingos Simões Pereira, was barred from contesting the November election after the supreme court rejected his candidacy over the late submission of documents.
For the first time in Guinea-Bissau’s history, the country’s oldest and most influential party will be excluded from the presidential race.
The country has fallen in the Electoral Democracy Index, provided by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). As shown in the graph below, the decline even outpaces the drop witnessed after military coups in 2003, 2012, and the assassination of Vieira in 2009.
The V-Dem data end in 2024, and thus do not yet capture the 2025 election cycle.
Above: Electoral Democracy (V-Dem) in Guinea-Bissau, 1975-2024.Author
Performative elections, entrenched power
What is unfolding in Guinea-Bissau is not an isolated crisis. It is part of a wider regional pattern in which leaders recognise that elections can be held, even celebrated, while hollowing out nearly everything that once made them meaningful. Critically, the recent coups in the region have been linked, in part, to popular frustration with flawed electoral processes.
Embaló has not entrenched himself with the personal longevity of Cameroon’s Biya or the institutional dominance of Tanzania’s CCM, but the mechanisms he has used to tilt the field look strikingly similar.
The removal of viable opponents, the manipulation of constitutional timelines, the coercive use of the security sector, and the corrosion of judicial independence all signal a shift away from accountability.
Guinea-Bissau was for the first time in decades poised to demonstrate that democratic resilience could be strengthened. Instead, the 2025 election cycle risks becoming another example of how fragile gains can be reversed with impunity.
– Guinea-Bissau’s presidential poll has already failed the credibility test – https://theconversation.com/guinea-bissaus-presidential-poll-has-already-failed-the-credibility-test-269461
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kirsten A Donald, Professor of Paediatric Neurology and Development, University of Cape Town
Children in many countries are growing up surrounded by violence. It may happen at home, in their neighbourhoods, or both. Some children are directly harmed, while others witness violence between caregivers or in their communities. Either way, the impact can be profound.
Evidence shows that the relationship between violence exposure and poor mental health can be seen even before a child is old enough to go to school. Researchers are learning that early adversities can have lifelong consequences.
We are researchers in paediatric neuroscience and psychology who set out to understand how early experiences of violence are shaping young children’s cognitive and emotional health in low- and middle-income countries. Here we discuss our findings from a review of studies from 20 countries and new data from a large cohort of children in South Africa.
We found that violence exposure is extremely common in all the countries we looked at and that its effects on mental health are already visible in childhood.
The response will require action at all levels – families, communities, health systems and governments.
Gaps in the research
Early childhood (birth to 8 years) is a critical period for emotional, social and cognitive development. Mental health or cognitive difficulties that begin in the preschool years can shape children’s relationships, learning and wellbeing well into adolescence and adulthood. Yet, little is known about how violence affects children in the early years in low – and middle-income countries, where violence rates can be high. Most research focuses on school-age children or adolescents, missing the window when prevention may be most effective, in early childhood.
We aimed to fill that gap by collating existing knowledge and generating new evidence from South African children. This formed the basis of co-author Lucinda’s PhD thesis.
First, we reviewed 17 published studies from 20 low- and middle-income countries, examining how violence exposure affects children’s cognitive functioning. Second, we used data from almost 1,000 children in the Drakenstein Child Health Study, a long-running birth cohort in a peri-urban community outside Cape Town. We examined these children’s exposure to different types of violence by age four-and-a-half and assessed their mental health at age five.
What we found
Sadly, our findings revealed that violence exposure is extremely common.
The review found that over 70% of the studies drawing from 27,643 children from 20 countries, aged up to 11, across four continents, reported poor cognitive outcomes associated with experiencing maltreatment, intimate partner violence and war.
In our South African cohort, by age 4.5 years, 83% of children were exposed to some form of violence. This included witnessing community violence (74%), witnessing domestic violence (32%), and being direct victims in the community (13%) or at home (31%). Nearly half (45%) experienced more than one type of violence.
In many countries, early exposure to violence is not exceptional. It is a normal part of growing up for many children.
Regarding how violence affects mental health in early childhood, the South African data showed that preschool children exposed to more violence displayed more internalising symptoms, such as anxiety, fear, or sadness, and externalising symptoms, such as aggression, hyperactivity, and rule-breaking. Experiencing violence at home and witnessing violence in the community were particularly linked with these difficulties.
One of the clearest findings was that multiple exposures compounded the risk. Children who experienced both domestic and community violence were at particularly high risk of mental health difficulties, especially experiencing externalising symptoms.
Public health challenge
These results highlight a major public health challenge, which starts early. These patterns appear before school entry, suggesting that violence exposure can alter developmental pathways well before formal education begins.
Since the risks from mental health difficulties linked to violence were visible by age five, waiting to intervene until school-age misses a crucial opportunity.
Impacts to wellbeing in early childhood can cause some children to internalise distress and others to act out, but both can disrupt learning, relationships and future mental health.
It is a stark reality that in some communities, most children are affected by violence. Individual therapy alone cannot fix a problem this widespread. It is a population-level issue. Broader community and policy responses are needed, such as the INSPIRE strategies developed by the World Health Organization.
Where to from here
The reality is grim and calls for quick and informed action at all levels: families, communities, health systems, and governments. A successful response will include:
Early identification: Health and community services should routinely ask about violence exposure, including witnessing violence, during early childhood visits.
Support for families: Interventions that reduce domestic violence, strengthen parenting skills, and provide mental health and social support can protect both children and adults.
Addressing community violence: Safer neighbourhoods, violence prevention efforts and policing reforms should be implemented and also clearly linked with child mental health strategies in policy wording.
Policy that prioritises early childhood: Governments and NGOs should embed early violence prevention and child mental health promotion into national health and education strategies.
Monitoring and revising strategies: Improving data collection and data quality will help track progress and inform improvements to further interventions.
Violence exposure in early childhood is widespread in low- and middle-income countries and has clear impacts on young children’s mental health. These effects emerge early, grow with multiple exposures, and require early intervention at every level. Protection and support are essential to build healthier and safer communities for the future.
There is hope as some organisations in South Africa are working to prevent violence against women and children, and intervening for those affected.
– Violence is a normal part of life for many young children: study traces the mental health impacts – https://theconversation.com/violence-is-a-normal-part-of-life-for-many-young-children-study-traces-the-mental-health-impacts-268512
Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria
The end of South Africa’s G20 presidency does not mean the end of its ability or responsibility to promote the issues it prioritised during 2025. It can still advocate for action on some of these issues through its further participation in the G20 and in other international and regional forums.
In this article, I argue that going forward South Africa should prioritise the financial challenges confronting Africa that it championed in 2025.
South Africa established four overarching priorities for its G20 presidency. Two of them dealt with finance. One sought to “ensure debt sustainability for low-income countries”. The other was to mobilise finance for a just energy transition.
The importance of debt, development finance and climate to Africa’s future is clear. Over half of African countries are either in debt distress or at risk of being in distress. More than half of Africa’s population live in countries that are spending more on servicing their debt than on health and/or education.
In addition, 17 African countries experienced net debt outflows in 2023. This means that they were using more foreign exchange to pay their external creditors than they received in new debts that could be used to finance their development. The continent is also experiencing extreme weather events that are adversely affecting food security and human wellbeing.
In short, African countries are caught in a vicious cycle. The impacts of climate and their struggle to meet their debt obligations are interacting in ways that undermine their ability to meet their sustainable development goals.
South Africa’s priorities
South Africa’s priorities for its G20 presidency were ambitious. Success required meaningful action at three levels:
Awareness. South Africa would need to bring the international community to a better understanding of the nature of the debt and development finance challenges confronting African countries and of the consequences of failing to address them.
Process. South Africa would need to convince the G20 to correct the shortcomings in the Common Framework it had devised to deal with low-income countries seeking debt relief.
The examples of Zambia and Ghana showed that the Common Framework was cumbersome, slow and unduly favourable to creditors. For example the framework requires the debtor to engage separately with each group of its creditors in a sequential process. This means that it should not negotiate with its commercial creditors until it has successfully negotiated with its official creditors.
Commercial creditors can’t give debt relief until the official creditors are satisfied with their deal and are confident that the commercial creditors will not receive more favourable treatment from the debtor than they have received.
Another complication is the IMF’s multiple roles in debt restructurings as an advisor to and a creditor of the debtor countries. In addition, it does the debt sustainability analysis that determines the amount of debt relief that all other creditors are expected to provide to the debtor country in order for it to regain debt sustainability. The more optimistic its assessment, the smaller the contributions the various creditors, including the IMF, are expected to provide. These contributions can either be in the form of new funding or new debt terms.
Substance. The current debt restructuring process treats debt as a technical financial and legal problem rather than as the complex multifaceted problem that is experienced by debtor countries. The former perspective limits the scope of debtor-creditor negotiations to the terms of the financial contracts.
The negotiations focus on the adjustments that must be made to these terms because the debtor cannot comply with its originally accepted obligations. They treat as largely outside the scope of the discussions the adverse impact the debt situation has on the sovereign debtor’s other legal obligations and on the social, political, environmental and cultural situation in the debtor country.
This approach in effect leaves the debtor to deal with these other issues on its own. This artificial distinction between the debtors’ other legal obligations and those it owes to its creditors makes it very difficult for the debtor to escape the vicious debt, development and climate cycle in which it is trapped. It forces it to choose between its commitments to its creditors and its development obligations.
Over the course of 2025, South Africa has been very effective in raising awareness of the African debt crisis and its dire impact on African countries. South Africa persuaded the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors to issue a declaration on debt sustainability at the end of their October meeting.
The declaration is the G20’s eloquent acknowledgement of the problem and of the need for more discussion of how these debt issues are managed by both debtors and creditors. Unfortunately, it does not contain any firm G20 commitments on what it will do to remedy the situation.
There has not been substantial progress at the process and substance levels. This is unlikely to change in the remaining weeks of South Africa’s G20 presidency.
But there are three actions that South Africa can take beyond the end of its term to ensure that the African debt crisis continues receiving attention.
Three actions
First, it should ask a group like the African Expert Panel that it established to advise the president to prepare a technical report that identifies and analyses all the barriers to Africa accessing affordable, sustainable and predictable flows of external development finance.
This report should be submitted to the South African president in the first half of 2026. Next year, South Africa will still be a member of the G20 Troika, which consists of the current, immediate past and the incoming G20 presidents. Consequently, next year, it will still be able to table the report at the G20. South Africa can also use the report to promote action in other appropriate regional and global forums.
Second, South Africa and the African Union should create an African Borrower’s Club that is independent of the G20. This club should be a forum in which African sovereign debtors can share information and lessons learned about negotiating sovereign debt transactions and about responsible debt management. When appropriate, the club can work with regional African financial institutions.
The club, working with regional organisations like the African Legal Support Facility, can also sponsor workshops in which interested African sovereign debtors can share information and more critically assess their financing options. They can also work to improve their bargaining capacity in sovereign debt transactions.
The African Borrower’s Club should also be mandated to establish an African Sovereign Debt Roundtable that is modelled on the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. This entity should be an informal forum, based on the Chatham House Rule in which the various categories of stakeholders in African debt can meet to discuss the design of a sovereign debt restructuring process that is effective, efficient and fair and that adopts an holistic approach to a sovereign debt crisis.
Third, South Africa should capitalise on the fact that the impacts of climate, inequality, unemployment and poverty on Africa’s development prospects are now acknowledged to be macro-critical, and so within the IMF’s macro-economic and financial mandate. South Africa should call for a review of the IMF’s operating principles and practices and its governance arrangements.
This call should note that the multilateral development banks have been the object of G20 review for a number of years and that this has resulted in important enhancements in their capital frameworks and operating practices. On the other hand the IMF has not been subject to a similar review despite the fact that its operations have had to undergo possibility even more extensive revisions.
– Africa has a debt crisis: momentum from G20 in South Africa can help find solutions – https://theconversation.com/africa-has-a-debt-crisis-momentum-from-g20-in-south-africa-can-help-find-solutions-269004
President Cyril Ramaphosa has expressed his deep sadness at the passing of educator, diplomat and business leader Dr Franklin Sonn who contributed significantly to different sectors of society and the economy.
Dr Sonn, an Esteemed Member of the National Order of the Baobab and recipient of numerous international honours, has passed away at the age of 86.
President Ramaphosa offers his condolences to Mrs Joan Sonn and children Crispin and Heather, as well the extended families and Dr Sonn’s associates nationally and internationally.
Dr Sonn, who served as the democratic South Africa’s first Ambassador to the United States, distinguished himself in leadership roles in education, politics, and business.
He began his career as a teacher and became principal of Spes Bona High School in Athlone, Cape Town.
He was President of the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association before his appointment as Rector of the then Peninsula Technikon in Cape Town, a post he held until his diplomatic posting.
Dr Sonn was an anti-apartheid campaigner and pioneering champion of broad-based economic empowerment, who exercised his vision for a just South Africa as a board member in significant corporate businesses and as a co-founder of large black-owned enterprises.
President Ramaphosa said: “I join the Sonns and Franklin’s diverse friends and associates in mourning the loss of a leader whose life exemplified the essence of the Order of the Baobab.
Franklin Sonn inspired the young lives entrusted to him in his early career as a teacher. He provided similar inspiration to the teachers he mobilised in the Cape Teachers’ Professional Association at a time when all sectors were mobilised against apartheid.
We remember him as an advocate and activist for the accelerated transformation of our country after the end of apartheid and the upliftment of historically marginalised communities.
He fought for equality and development in all his endeavours, which included philanthropic work alongside Joan Sonn. Together, they endowed Crispin and Heather with leadership abilities that have created an intergenerational legacy.
Franklin Sonn played a great part in our history that lives on in our present and we owe him our commitment to keep building the society he envisioned.
May his soul rest in peace.”
Media enquiries: Vincent Magwenya, Spokesperson to the President – media@presidency.gov.za
The Regional Project Coordination Committee (RPCC) of the Western Africa Regional Digital Integration Program (WARDIP) held its inaugural meeting on 11th November 2025, in Conakry, Guinea, marking a major milestone for the region’s digital transformation agenda.
WARDIP is a World Bank-funded initiative to boost broadband access and promote the establishment of a single digital market across West Africa. The first Series of Projects (SOP1) will run from 2024 to 2028 and is being implemented by The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, the ECOWAS Commission, the African Union, and Smart Africa.
The RPCC serves as a coordination mechanism within the project by providing strategic guidance and policy insight to ensure annual work plans of the respective beneficiaries reflect regional and cross-country priorities. The Committee also has the mandate to advise on potential synergies across the national and regional components in order to maximize the impact of investments, conduct annual reviews of the project progress, and facilitate knowledge sharing between the ECOWAS Commission and implementing countries.
The meeting was attended by representatives of the implementing agencies in the Participating Countries, ECOWAS Commission, the World Banks as well as officials from the respective Project Implementation Units.
The meeting provided an opportunity to discuss the roadmap for a sustained collaboration among project implementing partners for knowledge sharing and learning. The implementing countries also committed to leveraging the coordination mechanisms established within the program to support the effective follow-up at the national level of those outputs and actions adopted during the implementation of regional-level activities.
This successful inaugural meeting sets the stage for synchronized efforts to accelerate the implementation of WARDIP, ensuring that the project delivers its mandate of increasing broadband access and advancing the integration of digital markets across Western Africa.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) acknowledges the confirmation by the Federal Ministry of Health of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) of an outbreak of Marburg virus disease (MVD) in Jinka, Southern Region.
As of 14 November 2025, Marburg virus disease (MVD) has been confirmed by the National Reference Laboratory.Further epidemiological investigations and laboratory analyses are underway, and the virus strain detected shows similarities to those previously identified in East Africa.
The initial alert of a suspected viral haemorrhagic fever was shared with Africa CDC on 12 November 2025.
The Federal Ministry of Health, EPHI, and regional health authorities have activated response measures, including enhanced surveillance, field investigations, strengthened infection prevention and control, and community engagement efforts. Africa CDC commends their swift action and transparent communication, which have enabled early confirmation and containment efforts.
Africa CDC has been a long-standing partner of EPHI in strengthening Ethiopia’s molecular diagnostic and genomic surveillance capacity — critical capabilities that were immediately deployed in response to this outbreak. Through this collaboration, Africa CDC has provided genome-sequencing equipment, sequencing reagents, PCR detection kits (including Marburg-specific assays), and extensive training for laboratory personnel in genome sequencing, bioinformatics, biosafety, PPE use, and safe sample handling.
The core genomics facility at EPHI has been strengthened by Africa CDC, together with partners such as the Global Fund, WHO and the UK Health Security Agency, supporting rapid laboratory confirmation and enhancing Ethiopia’s overall outbreak readiness.
As a leading Ethiopian research institution, the Armauer Hansen Research Institute (AHRI) has also seen its research and genomics capacity significantly strengthened through Africa CDC’s support, including the provision of equipment, reagents and targeted training. AHRI is therefore well positioned to play a central role during this Marburg outbreak. This response presents a unique opportunity not only to improve care for affected communities but also to generate critical innovations in Marburg prevention, diagnostics and treatment.
To further strengthen coordination, Africa CDC and the Ministry of Health will integrate Marburg virus response efforts with ongoing mpox preparedness and surveillance. This joint approach is designed to optimise resources, accelerate early detection and reduce the risk of regional spread.
Africa CDC Director-General, H.E. Dr Jean Kaseya, will meet with the Minister of Health of Ethiopia to assess additional support needs and reinforce cross-border readiness with neighbouring countries. Africa CDC will continue to work closely with the Government of Ethiopia and partners to ensure a rapid, coordinated and effective response.
Further updates will be provided as more information becomes available.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC).
Today, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi met with Prime Minister Dr. Mostafa Madbouly, and Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Eng. Karim Badawi.
Spokesman for the Presidency Ambassador Mohamed El-Shennawy, stated that the meeting discussed the strategic plan and the main axes of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources’ work during the current phase. The meeting focused on the Ministry’s work related to production and exploration activities, and efforts to enhance the mining sector and increase its added value. In this context, Eng. Karim Badawi offered a presentation of the Ministry’s plan for exploration drilling activities during the period from 2026 until 2030.
The Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources reviewed the developments in the mining sector in Egypt. He highlighted the sector’s success components, the size of the geological reserve, and investment indicators, as well as the challenges facing the sector and the measures taken to overcome them in line with the development strategy. This includes the issuance of a law to convert the Mineral Resources Authority into an economic public authority, building a competitive model to attract investors from major and emerging companies, and addressing related financial and investment challenges.
The meeting also touched on efforts to expand the onshore and offshore oil and gas exploration operations, including incentives directed at exploration companies, with the aim of making Egypt one of the most attractive countries for investments in this field.
The President gave directives to intensify efforts to expand exploration activities and benefit from successful experiences. The Minister of Petroleum reviewed the exploratory drilling activities in the Mediterranean Sea during 2026, including the expected number of wells to be drilled, the investment cost, the size of the expected oil and gas reserves, production rates, in addition to the expected annual savings in the import bill. The Minister also evaluated the developments in seismic survey activities for 2025 and those planned for 2026, along with natural gas production rates from July 2024 to October 2025, including the plan to diversify gas supply sources.
During the meeting, the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources offered a report on his recent participation in the Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference (ADIPEC). This participation is part of the framework of strengthening Egypt’s active presence in global energy forums and promoting available investment opportunities in the Egyptian market to major international companies. He pointed out that his meetings and interventions during the conference underscored the priorities and key pillars of the energy sector in Egypt, while emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation as a key to ensuring energy security.
President El-Sisi reiterated the necessity to provide more incentives and facilitations for investors in the oil, gas, and mining sectors. This would contribute to boosting the volume of investments and increasing production to meet the growing consumption and development needs, while continuing efforts to localize the industries associated with these vital sectors.
Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Presidency of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
