Author: MIL-OSI Publisher

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bizuneh Yimenu, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen’s University Belfast

Ethiopia is preparing for a national election on 1 June amid deep political uncertainty and growing insecurity. Officially, the polls are expected to reinforce the country’s democratic transition and political stability. But the conditions suggest that the elections are unlikely to be genuinely competitive.

Elections are competitive when parties campaign openly, voters participate freely, and political actors engage without fear of violence or intimidation.

There are two main reasons why this will not be the case.

First, opposition actors remain fragmented, weakened or excluded from effective political participation. Second, there are armed conflicts and political tensions in several parts of the country. The most tense regions are Amhara, Oromia and Tigray. This has created an unstable environment for electoral competition.

Together, these conditions may make the upcoming elections among the least politically competitive Ethiopia has held since multiparty elections were introduced in the 1990s.

Ethiopia has held six national elections since adopting the federal constitution in 1995. Most took place under conditions of strong ruling-party dominance. The 2005 election was widely considered the country’s most competitive contest. But violence, mass arrests and a severe crackdown on opposition supporters followed, after disputed results and protests.

Elections in 2010 and 2015 took place in a more restrictive political environment dominated by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

The 2021 election happened under Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party during the Tigray war. It was marred by delays, insecurity and opposition boycotts. No voting took place in several constituencies. Unsurprisingly, the incumbent won in a landslide.

The current electoral environment appears even more challenging.

As a scholar of federalism and Ethiopian politics, I see the present conditions as particularly restrictive to meaningful political competition.

Opposition fragmentation and exclusion

Ethiopia’s opposition parties remain fragmented along ideological, ethnic and regional lines. Many lack strong national organisational structures or the capacity to mobilise voters effectively across the country.

Attempts to build durable opposition coalitions have faltered. This is due to political mistrust, leadership rivalries, and competing visions of the Ethiopian state. Some parties want stronger regional autonomy and ethnic self-determination. Others favour a more centralised national political framework.

These divisions prevent a unified electoral challenge. Even those in the same camp, such as parties advocating for ethnic self rule, are unable to a form united front.

Opposition actors continue to face political and institutional constraints too. Several have previously been arrested or detained. Civic actors have come under pressure.

During the 2021 elections, prominent Oromo opposition leaders were detained. This prompted the Oromo Liberation Front and Oromo Federalist Congress, the two main opposition groups in the region, to boycott the polls.

Ethiopia formally operates a multiparty system. But meaningful political competition depends also on parties’ ability to organise, campaign and compete on relatively equal terms. Genuine opposition actors have struggled to do so effectively.

Political tensions and armed conflict

The second major challenge is the country’s deteriorating security environment. Ethiopia is experiencing armed conflict and political instability in several regions. It is difficult to conduct competitive elections in these conditions.

In the Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has intensified over the past two years. Large areas have experienced insecurity, militarisation and disruptions to normal political activity.

Oromia continues to face violence linked to the conflict between the government and the Oromo Liberation Army. The conflict has contributed to displacement, insecurity and political tensions in Ethiopia’s largest, most populous and vital region.

Tigray also remains politically fragile. This is despite the 2022 Pretoria agreement. The pact formally ended the civil war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Important aspects of the agreement remain unresolved. These include:

• the return of internally displaced people

• the return of pre-war Tigray territories

• security arrangements

• relations between regional and federal authorities.

Recent tensions inside Tigray’s political leadership have raised fears of renewed instability.

Such conditions narrow political space and reduce the possibility of open electoral competition.

Elections without competitiveness?

The incumbent is running uncontested in 64 of Ethiopia’s 547 constituencies. Voting will not take place in Tigray. And voting will not happen in notable constituencies in Oromia and Amhara because of security concerns.

But it’s not enough for voting to take place. Political competitiveness depends on whether opposition parties can take full part, whether citizens can engage freely and whether the broader political environment allows genuine contestation for power.

Current conditions raise serious doubts about those requirements. Even compared with previous elections held under authoritarian conditions, today’s environment may prove more restrictive. Insecurity and conflict now intersect with longstanding political constraints.

This does not necessarily mean the elections will lack administrative significance or political consequences. For example, the Oromo Liberation Front is running for the first time since 1992. This is symbolically meaningful.

But elections alone will not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper political crisis. The country continues to face unresolved disputes over political representation, federalism, security and state authority. Without broader political inclusion and a reduction in armed conflict, the elections are unlikely to provide the level of political competition associated with genuinely open democratic contests.

– Ethiopia’s elections will not be politically competitive: two reasons why
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-elections-will-not-be-politically-competitive-two-reasons-why-283896

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for Constitutional Democracy, Indiana University

Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed has revived debate over whether the country should impose term limits on its head of government. Speaking before the National Dialogue Commission in May 2026 – just weeks before national elections – he said executive power should be “limited by law”. He suggested the issue could form part of wider constitutional reform that many Ethiopians have been calling for since 1995.

At first glance, the proposal seems straightforward. But Ethiopia operates under a parliamentary system, not a presidential one. Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, who has studied Ethiopia’s constitutional design and law, explains why the real issue isn’t term limits, but the failure of the parliamentary mechanisms meant to constrain executive power.

Why don’t parliamentary systems usually impose term limits on prime ministers?

In parliamentary systems, prime ministers derive their authority from parliament. They remain in office for as long as a majority in parliament is willing to support them. There are no fixed term limits.

In presidential systems, leaders get their authority directly from voters and serve fixed terms set by the constitution.

Prime ministers may be removed at any time through a vote of no confidence, internal party revolt or electoral defeat. In contrast with presidential systems, the removal of a prime minister doesn’t always trigger a national election.

When a prime minister loses office, a new leader may be selected within the governing party. The underlying parliament still has democratic legitimacy, so there is no need to return to voters – or to cap tenure.

Margaret Thatcher served for 11 years in the UK. Angela Merkel governed Germany for 16 years. Their longevity was evidence that parliamentary accountability and electoral competition were functioning as intended. They remained in office because they continued to command confidence within competitive parliamentary democracies. Thatcher’s premiership ended when Conservative MPs withdrew support through a leadership challenge. Merkel stepped down after choosing not to seek another term.

By contrast, in presidential systems, the executive and legislature derive their mandates independently. Removing a president interrupts a fixed term chosen directly by voters, and a successor cannot be appointed simply through parliament.

In Ethiopia, executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister. The difficulty is that the formal parliamentary logic has often failed to operate in practice.

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Read more: African countries are adopting two houses of parliament to boost democracy – but that’s not always what happens

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First, the House of People’s Representatives has rarely functioned as an independent body capable of holding the prime minister politically accountable. This has made a no-confidence vote against the prime minister politically unrealistic.

Second, leadership transitions have taken place through ruling-party decisions rather than genuine parliamentary contestation. The replacement of Hailemariam Desalegn by Abiy Ahmed in 2018, for example, occurred through internal party politics. Parliament then formalised it.

How has Ethiopia’s system produced concentrated executive power?

Parliamentary systems don’t operate the same way in every political context. They function differently in:

• a dominant-party state: this is a political system in which several parties may legally exist and elections may be held, but one party monopolises political power over an extended period.

• transitional democracies: these are political systems moving from authoritarian rule toward democratic governance. The transition is often fragile, especially if political instability, economic hardship or legacies of conflict continue to shape public life.

• politically fragmented countries: here, political authority and party competition are divided among rival groups, making stable governance and national consensus difficult.

When ruling parties dominate parliament, opposition parties are weak and lawmakers rely heavily on party leaders. Parliament may stop acting as a real check on executive power. In such situations, a prime minister can begin to resemble an elected monarch. He or she is technically accountable to parliament, but in practice holds highly concentrated power.

This is what makes Ethiopia’s constitutional experience complex.

The constitution adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1995 follows the formal logic of a parliamentary government. Article 70(4) limits the president – a largely ceremonial head of state – to two six-year terms. Articles 73 and 74 impose no limit on the prime minister.

On paper, this is orthodox parliamentarism.

In practice, Ethiopia has the formal structure of a parliamentary system without the political conditions needed for real parliamentary accountability. These conditions are strong opposition parties, meaningful intra-party competition, independent committees and the real possibility that parliament could withdraw support from the executive.

The result is that political power is concentrated in the executive and the dominant ruling coalition.

What role does Ethiopia’s electoral system play in this?

Electoral systems shape how votes are translated into political power and legislative representation.

Ethiopia uses a first-past-the-post electoral system. This means the candidate with the most votes wins the seat. By contrast, proportional representation systems allocate seats roughly in proportion to each party’s share of the national or regional vote.

First-past-the-post systems mean that modest electoral victories can be transformed into overwhelming legislative dominance.

Article 54 of Ethiopia’s constitution adopts this system. Ethiopia, therefore, combines parliamentary government with an electoral model that magnifies majorities into monopolies.

What does Ethiopia’s political history show?

Ethiopia’s post-1995 political record illustrates this pattern clearly.

Meles Zenawi served three full parliamentary terms as prime minister. He was two years into his fourth term when he died in 2012.

Meles was replaced by Hailemariam Desalegn. His premiership ended in 2018 after three years of mass protests and political upheaval. His resignation was extraordinary in Ethiopia’s political history.

Abiy Ahmed took office in April 2018 to complete Hailemariam’s parliamentary cycle. He dissolved the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front – in power since 1991 – and consolidated authority under his Prosperity Party. Abiy began his first full five-year term after the 2021 elections. His party won 410 out of 436 parliamentary seats, giving him the premiership.

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Read more: What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect

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The issue is that a prime minister can be repeatedly reappointed because the electoral and party systems limit meaningful contestation from the outset.

Would term limits solve the problem?

Only partially.

A constitutional term limit could encourage leadership circulation, reduce the personalisation of executive office and create incentives for succession planning.

In fragile democracies, such limits may serve as a safeguard against indefinite incumbency.

But term limits alone would not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper constitutional problem. A dominant party can rotate prime ministers while preserving the same electoral advantages, patronage systems and concentration of power.

The deeper reform question is whether Ethiopia can achieve:

• stronger opposition rights

• more independent parliamentary committees

• greater transparency in legislative voting

• more credible intra-party competition.

Formally, Ethiopia isn’t a one-party state. As of 2026, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia has accredited 24 national political parties and 45 regional parties. A total of 48 parties are confirmed to participate in the seventh general election scheduled for 1 June 2026.

The absence of prime ministerial term limits in Ethiopia is not the problem. A lack of parliamentary competition and independence is.

– Should Ethiopia limit how long its prime minister can serve? Why this won’t fix a deeper democracy problem
– https://theconversation.com/should-ethiopia-limit-how-long-its-prime-minister-can-serve-why-this-wont-fix-a-deeper-democracy-problem-283405

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Redie Bereketeab, Associate Professor of Sociology and Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Ethiopia’s general election on 1 June 2026 will take place amid armed conflicts and political fragmentation. This has raised questions over voter participation and legitimacy and the future of the country’s multi-ethnic federal system. Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country and a key regional actor in the Horn of Africa. Redie Bereketeab, who researches state- and nation-building, identity and nationalism in the Horn of Africa, unpacks the 2026 election.

Who is on the ballot, and what is at stake?

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party remains by far the strongest political force nationally. The party controls most federal and regional state institutions. The incumbent faces more than 45 opposition parties that are contesting the election. These include the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, the National Movement of Amhara, Enat Party, the Freedom and Equality Party and the Oromo Federalist Congress.

But the result will not necessarily indicate broad political inclusion. This partly stems from widespread restrictions on opposition parties, such as arbitrary arrests and preventing meetings. This has been documented by rights groups, including the US-based Freedom House.

Most of the parties face organisational, financial and security constraints too. Others have limited regional reach.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s national dialogue was meant to heal the nation, but divisions are deepening

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Some of the country’s most influential political actors are either weakened, fragmented or excluded altogether. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, long the dominant political force in Tigray and previously central to Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades, has been banned from the election by the National Election Board. As it now controls the region, an election there is highly unlikely.

So, there is little uncertainty over who will govern after the votes have been counted. Instead, the key election issue is whether the process itself will be regarded as sufficiently inclusive and legitimate across Ethiopia’s highly diverse regions and political constituencies.

How significant is the shadow of conflict on the election?

The elections will take place against the backdrop of multiple overlapping conflicts. These have displaced millions and weakened state authority in several parts of the country. Insecurity is expected to limit voting in large areas. Among constituencies reportedly considered too unstable for normal polling operations are Humera, Raya Alamata and Tselemti in northern Ethiopia.

The central question will be how much of the population can realistically participate.

In the north-western Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has continued since 2023. Armed conflict persists in parts of Oromia to the south, involving the Oromo Liberation Army. In both regions, insecurity, displacement and communications restrictions have complicated political organising and voter mobilisation. Elections are therefore unlikely to be organised across large areas.

In the northern region of Tigray, large-scale fighting formally ended in 2022. Nevertheless, unresolved disputes over territory, political representation and the return of displaced populations continue to fuel tensions. The fragile post-war environment is further complicated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front being barred from contesting the election. The party’s legal status was cancelled by the National Election Board of Ethiopia in May 2025 for failure to hold a national assembly within the legally mandated period.

In addition, tensions within the movement have produced rival factions. In early May, Tigray People’s Liberation Front chairman Debretsion Gebremichael assumed full control of the region, pushing out Addis Ababa-backed Tadesse Werede. These developments raised tensions with the federal government.

The government needs to hold elections to demonstrate its legitimacy. But with Tigray not participating, as well as major parts of Amhara and Oromia, that legitimacy will be in doubt.

What are the other factors shaping the election?

The economy is one main factor.

Ethiopia has high rural poverty, a mounting public debt burden and the economic, social and humanitarian consequences of years of conflict and displacement.

The last general election was held in 2021. This was before the economic impact of the Tigray war hit the country. Since then, the currency has been devalued, contributing to rising inflation and living costs. Higher prices of imported goods and fuel placed additional pressure on households already affected by conflict and economic hardship.

Deteriorating economic conditions could fuel further internal unrest and strengthen the position of armed movements in parts of the country.

Regional tensions could also influence the political atmosphere and security environment surrounding the election. Relations with Eritrea have deteriorated sharply in recent months amid disputes over Red Sea access and growing fears of renewed confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s 2026 elections: without reforms, the vote may not be free or fair

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Ethiopia’s involvement in the wider Sudan conflict is another source of tension. An escalation with Eritrea or further spillover from Sudan could intensify nationalist rhetoric and divert political attention away from domestic reform. It could further complicate already fragile security conditions during the electoral period.

Civic and political space has also narrowed in recent years. Journalists, activists and opposition figures have faced arrests, harassment, travel restrictions and pressure from security forces, particularly under emergency measures introduced during the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia.

Several opposition parties have accused the government of using state institutions and security structures to tilt the political playing field in favour of the ruling party. This further undermines faith in the electoral system.

How does the election shape Ethiopia’s federal project?

Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic federal system was introduced in 1991. It was designed to accommodate diversity and grant significant autonomy to regional states. But in practice it has also sharpened struggles over territory, autonomy and access to political power.

Today those unresolved tensions are visible in the insurgency in Amhara, the conflict in Oromia and the fragile post-war order in Tigray. If voting cannot take place across those three major regions and ethnic groups, then the elections lose legitimacy.

Rather than resolving competing claims, the federal system has in many cases institutionalised them by linking territory, political representation and state power to ethnic identity. For some the system has failed as power was never fully devolved to the states. For others it could never succeed as it fuels ethno-nationalism at the expense of national identity.

The result is that identity has been turned into a central axis of political competition.

What conclusions do you draw?

Without broader political dialogue and efforts to address the underlying conflicts, the election risks reinforcing divisions.

A better approach would be to resolve the conflicts and then convene an election where the entire population can participate.

There is scope for the European Union and the US to play a constructive role. They have the capacity to exert pressure on the Ethiopian government given their strong economic, military and diplomatic ties, and their weight in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

There may be little appetite in Brussels or Washington for such moves.

– Ethiopia votes: dominant ruling party seeks a new mandate in a deeply fragmented nation
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-votes-dominant-ruling-party-seeks-a-new-mandate-in-a-deeply-fragmented-nation-283783