Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jude Kagoro, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for Intercultural and International Studies, Universität Bremen
Uganda’s police have long faced criticism for politically charged interventions. These include episodes in which lethal force has been used in ways that observers describe as excessive or indiscriminate. The main targets of restrictive or coercive tactics are supporters of the political opposition.
For example, in November 2020, weeks before the 2021 elections, protests at the arrest of the main opposition candidate escalated into nationwide unrest. More than 100 people died.
Under President Yoweri Museveni – in power since 1986 – the police have become a central pillar of the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement. In the campaigns for the January 2026 general election, police are critical in containing demonstrations, mobilising political support and enforcing loyalty. They can be seen ferrying ruling-party supporters and guarding their processions.
They are also active against the opposition. Party activities of Museveni’s main rival Robert Kyagulanyi, alias Bobi Wine, face routine obstruction, teargas and street confrontations. In November and early December 2025, police violently dispersed or blocked Bobi Wine’s caravans. The UN Human Rights chief condemned this.
I have published widely on themes of militarisation, security and policing, including the relationship between the Uganda police and the ruling party. It’s my conclusion that the role of the police in Uganda cannot be meaningfully analysed through a western-centric expectation of institutional neutrality.
Rather, policing has developed together with Uganda’s broader political direction of personalised authority and an ideology of cadreship that continues to shape expectations within the ruling NRM party. This has fostered, in my view, an ethos in which officers see themselves as active custodians of the existing political order. I’ve concluded that they don’t see themselves as being a neutral institution. They believe their job is to maintain the status quo.
My previous research challenges the common assumption that the police act only on direct orders to protect the regime or target the opposition. In reality, many officers believe that being visibly pro-ruling party defines them as “good officers”.
Based on my research, it’s clear that elections due in 2026 are likely to repeat these old patterns.
History of partisan policing
My extensive engagement with officers over more than 15 years, as both a researcher and a consultant, has given me a nuanced understanding of the attitudes and shared mentalities that shape policing culture. These beliefs are reflected not only in what officers say but also in their everyday behaviour.
For example, several commanders prominently display ruling party symbols or images of the president as their WhatsApp profile photos – clear signs of how pro-NRM attitudes influence officers’ conduct and become woven into police identity.
As a result, officers often take actions that favour the incumbent even without being told to. They want to signal allegiance and do what they think is expected of them as police.
This behaviour is rooted in a long relationship between political power and control of the security forces. Society expects the police to serve ruling elites rather than operate as an impartial institution. Consequently, the force today functions less as a neutral body and more as an extension of the ruling party.
Police in formation
Uganda’s police force played active roles in political policing and in supporting Britain’s colonial administration when it was established in 1906.
It continued to play the same role under the post-independence governments of Milton Obote, Idi Amin, the Tito Okello junta, Obote II, and now under the National Resistance Movement since 1986.
There have been changes in nuance and emphasis. For example, the force was initially sidelined in favour of military and intelligence agencies in the early years of Museveni’s reign. The turning point came in the early 2000s, with the appointment of senior military officers as police chiefs. This signalled a strategic fusion of military command culture with domestic policing.
Read more: Why Uganda needs new laws to hold police in check, and accountable
Under General Kale Kayihura, appointed in 2005, the police expanded rapidly in size, budget and operational authority. He aligned the force with the ruling party by reshaping recruitment, sidelining older officers and elevating young and highly educated cadres loyal to the party.
By the mid-2010s, the police were firmly embedded within the political machinery and sustaining Museveni’s rule.
Going beyond the use of force and coercion is also credited to Kayihura’s legacy. Under the guise of community policing, he drafted millions of largely unemployed youth into a nationwide network of so-called crime preventers. Their presence at 2016 election rallies, in villages and on urban streets was decisive in boosting National Resistance Movement turnout.
Their presence also undercut opposition mobilisations.
By 2021, however, Kayihura’s apparatus had largely collapsed. Without his centralised coordination – and confronted by the rapid rise of Bobi Wine’s youth-driven movement – the state increasingly relied on coercion alone. The result was violent campaign scenes in the 2021 elections.
Heading into the 2026 elections, the National Resistance Movement appears to have rebuilt soft-power apparatus to go with strong-arm tactics. The police’s head of the Crime Intelligence department, Christopher Ddamulira, is now central to youth mobilisation. He is using outreach programmes and targeted incentives reminiscent of Kayihura’s tactics.
Read more: How the Ugandan state outsources the use of violence to stay in power
They include the temporary integration of ghetto youth into the police intelligence networks, and funding small-scale business ventures. While these have been effective in diluting opposition support, it is the open use of force that dominates public debate.
Equipped with armoured carriers, high-capacity tear-gas launchers, water cannons and fast-response vehicles, security forces use their mobility and intelligence networks to disrupt opposition mobilisation.
It’s part of police strategy to restrict the mobility of opposition candidates. The candidates are especially restricted from densely populated urban areas where they could draw large crowds. Opposition candidates are often pushed onto back roads or sparsely populated routes. There they are less visible and less able to engage voters.
Police are also frequently deployed to bar candidates from being hosted by radio stations.
These police operations are reinforced by the Resident District Commissioners representing the presidency and backed by the military, which intervenes whenever political stakes rise. Together, they form a tightly coordinated apparatus of political control nationwide.
The constitution of Uganda establishes the police force under Article 211, requiring it to be national, patriotic, professional, disciplined, and composed of citizens of good character – standards that are incompatible with partisanship or the oppression of political opponents. Under Article 212, the police are mandated to protect life and property, preserve law and order, prevent and detect crime, and work cooperatively with civilian authorities, other security organs, and the public.
A familiar contradiction
Uganda’s 2026 elections will not simply test the popularity of competing political actors. They will again expose the fusion of policing and politics that has shaped the country for more than a century.
Police have consistently served as instruments of political order rather than neutral guardians of public security. Today’s officers operate within this inherited logic, in a political culture that has never experienced a peaceful transfer of power.
Read more: Why Uganda needs new laws to hold police in check, and accountable
The campaign trail reveals a familiar contradiction: a security force constitutionally mandated to protect all citizens, yet increasingly functioning as a political arbiter – shaping who is heard in the public sphere.
– Political policing in Museveni’s Uganda: what it means for the 2026 elections
– https://theconversation.com/political-policing-in-musevenis-uganda-what-it-means-for-the-2026-elections-271316
