Category: Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By John Babalola, Associate lecturer, University of Lincoln

West Africa has pursued one of the world’s most ambitious border liberalisation schemes in the past four decades. The Ecowas Free Movement Protocol, signed in 1979, enables citizens of 16 member states to cross international borders with minimal documentation. The intention was to promote economic integration and prosperity across the region.

For instance, Nigeria’s open borders promise trade. Yet at Nigeria’s border posts, a troubling reality emerges. The open border system has become a vehicle for systematic exploitation of travellers.

My research towards my PhD at the University of Lincoln under the supervision of Dr Joshua Skoczylis focuses on west African migration and border governance. Together, we have examined how the region’s free movement protocol operates in practice at Nigeria’s frontiers.

Using the examples of two contrasting Nigerian border crossings – Idi-Iroko on the Benin border and Chikanda on the Niger border – I sought to understand the protocol’s impact on border security in Nigeria. Through qualitative interviews with policymakers, frontline security staff and community leaders, the research reveals how information gaps between officials and citizens transform an integration policy into an instrument of corruption.

While these sites cannot claim to represent all of Nigeria’s 84 manned official border posts, they illustrate the institutional dynamics reported across major crossing points in the region.

My findings show that the Ecowas Free Movement Protocol is an example of what policy scholars call an implementation gap: the chasm between what policies promise on paper and what happens on the ground. This protocol establishes free movement principles without prescribing mechanisms or standard practices. But Nigeria has failed to develop its own ways to manage its borders.

The current chaotic system is crying out for changes: these should include standardised operating procedures, proper remuneration for border personnel, accountability mechanisms and intelligence sharing.

When nobody knows the rules

The protocol’s basic requirement is straightforward: travellers need a valid travel document (a passport) and an international health certificate. Yet interviews with dozens of border community members revealed that most had never seen these requirements written down, let alone understood them.

“I think the protocol is good for trade between countries,” one Idi-Iroko resident told me, “but I don’t really know what it says.” Another community member was more direct: “International passports? Those are a waste of time and money. You don’t need them to cross the borders.”

When citizens remain uncertain about requirements, officials can demand payments for unknown violations, charge fees for services that should be free, and accept bribes to overlook supposed irregularities. What looks like bureaucratic failure becomes a feature of the system for those who benefit from it.

Multiple residents confirmed they crossed regularly without documents, recognised by officials who “know them” as locals.

Border residents understand that in practice, rules matter less than relationships with officials. Documentation requirements are negotiable, and informal payment often smooths passage more effectively than proper papers.

The strategic information gap

Security agencies claim they regularly conduct community information programmes. Immigration officials described visiting market squares and motor parks to distribute flyers about trafficking dangers and documentation requirements. “We do enlightenment campaigns constantly,” one senior officer insisted. Yet my requests for programme documentation, schedules, attendance records, or evaluation reports yielded nothing.

None of the community members interviewed across two border zones recalled such programmes. Most had gleaned their understanding of border operations from informal conversations and personal experience.

The real implementation gap

Free movement doesn’t mean unregulated movement. Even within a borderless zone, states retain legitimate security interests: preventing trafficking, controlling smuggled goods, monitoring public health threats, and maintaining basic records of cross-border flows. The protocol acknowledges this by allowing member states to refuse entry on grounds of security, public health, or public order. Rules are needed to distinguish between these legitimate security functions and arbitrary restrictions that undermine the integration agenda.

The protocol assumes member states will create necessary institutional capacity: motivated, well-resourced security forces working collaboratively. But in reality there are ten competing agencies at major Nigerian posts, earning vastly different salaries, following separate mandates, jealously guarding information. As one military officer explained: “One organisation tries to be smarter, working individualistically instead of in cooperation.”

Frontline officers exercise enormous discretion in this under-regulated environment. They become de facto policymakers. They don’t simply implement policy poorly, they effectively create policy through their daily choices about whom to stop, what to inspect, and which violations to overlook.

A customs official candidly admitted to me:

Many people don’t go there for patriotism or duty. They go for survival. Even if you have the numbers, they’ll always try to see where the honey tastes better.

In this context, systematic corruption isn’t aberrant behaviour – it’s a strategy within deficient systems that national governments have failed to develop.

Why technology won’t fix this

Security officials often cite lack of technology as their main challenge. They argue that scanners, biometric systems and digital monitoring could help verify travellers’ identities, flag security threats, and create audit trails of border transactions. In theory, that could reduce opportunities for officials to demand arbitrary payments or wave through prohibited goods.

But technology won’t solve the fundamental problem my research uncovered.

The issue isn’t capacity for enforcement. It’s the incentive for exploitation. Sophisticated surveillance equipment won’t prevent officials from accepting bribes if their salaries are inadequate and accountability mechanisms are absent.

Anyway, most border posts lack electricity infrastructure to power such technology. And equipment placed in remote areas becomes vulnerable to theft or vandalism. Investment in hardware simply creates more expensive ways to fail.

What needs to change

Forty-six years after the protocol’s enactment, Ecowas needs to confront uncomfortable realities. Real reform requires several interconnected changes:

• Genuine transparency about requirements: sustained, accessible public information about what documentation is legally required, what fees are legitimate, and how to report violations.

• Standardised operating procedures across member states.

• Adequate compensation for security personnel.

• Accountability mechanisms with genuine consequences for exploitative behaviour.

• Coordination frameworks that reduce inter-agency competition and enable intelligence sharing.

Until Ecowas confronts this reality, the free movement protocol will continue delivering the opposite of its promise: not integration and prosperity, but fragmentation and exploitation.

This article is based on doctoral fieldwork conducted in Nigeria between 5 June 2024 and 1 August 2024. Interview data and full findings will be available in the forthcoming PhD thesis at the University of Lincoln.

– Nigeria’s open borders promised more trade and free movement: but crossings are chaotic and corrupt
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-open-borders-promised-more-trade-and-free-movement-but-crossings-are-chaotic-and-corrupt-273670

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Daniel Tjarks, Resarch Associate in Human Geography, Saarland University

The Lobito Corridor is a massive infrastructure axis linking Angola’s shore on the west of Africa to the mineral-rich interior. Built in the first three decades of the 1900s to export cheap commodities to colonial Portugal, it later fell into disrepair. Its main railway was rebuilt during Angola’s post-war reconstruction. More recently it has attracted renewed and competing international interests.

Daniel Tjarks has researched Angola’s political and economic geography, the spatial development of colonial Angola and the current role of international actors in the country. Angola’s post-war spatial development and the government’s plans to promote more balanced and equitable growth also feature in his PhD dissertation. He questions some of the celebratory political claims made about efforts to revitalise the corridor. In particular, whether it will help Angola diversify its oil-dependent economy and benefit ordinary citizens.

---

What is the Lobito Corridor?

The Lobito Corridor is a logistics corridor. At its heart is a 1,300km rail line that connects the port of the Angolan city of Lobito to the mineral-rich parts of Zambia and Congo to the east.

Its most important component, the Benguela Railway, was constructed between 1903 and 1931 under Portuguese colonial rule by Scottish engineer Robert Williams.

At the time, it was one of three separate railways linking the colony’s ports to its hinterland. This way, colonial Angola could provide Portugal with cheap commodities.

During Angola’s post-independence civil war (1975-2002), the line was largely destroyed. As Angola entered the peace period, the country was able to rebuild its infrastructure thanks to its booming oil business.

Chinese capital and construction companies enabled the resurrection of the railway between 2006 and 2014.

In 2023, a western consortium outbid Chinese competitors for a 30-year concession for the line’s operation. The consortium consists of Swiss commodity trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction company Mota-Engil and Belgian rail operator Vecturis. It has committed to invest US$455 million in the corridor’s development in Angola alone. Trafigura CEO Jeremy Weir says it will not only “create a western route to market for goods and materials” but also “boost the development of sectors along the line”.

Why is the corridor attracting so much attention again?

A lot is at stake in the Lobito corridor. Much more than a regional infrastructure project, it has gained strategic importance in the global scramble for critical resources.

Cobalt and copper from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo are key to the clean energy transition and modern communication technology. The DRC and Zambia together account for about 14% of the global mine production of copper and the DRC for 73% of cobalt.

Control of access to these minerals is at the heart of growing US-China competition, at times referred to as a “second cold war”.

The Lobito corridor has therefore become a project of global importance.

For this reason, the railway line has attracted high-ranking visits in recent years. In 2024, then US president Joe Biden inspected the rail line, marking the first visit of a US president to the continent since 2015 and the first of a sitting US president to Angola. In 2025, German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier also made the trip – again, the first of a German president to the country.

Even the Trump administration seems to have decided it will not break with commitments to support development of the corridor.

In 2024, the US, Europe, the African Development Bank and the three host countries signed a memorandum of understanding to extend the line to the east and mobilise investment alongside it.

At the seventh AU-EU summit in November 2025, European commission president Ursula von der Leyen described these commitments as evidence of the “European model” of investment and the two continents’ “unique and strategic partnership”. The commission promised to mobilise loans and private investments for the corridor worth no less than US$2 billion.

As the US and EU are trying to counter Chinese capital investment in Angola and in the wider region, the Lobito Corridor will continue to play a key role.

Who will benefit from the Lobito corridor?

There are good reasons to remain sceptical about the corridor’s promised benefits.

First, recent background reports point to major challenges facing the development of the soft infrastructure of customs and regulations. Others have pointed to the corridor’s unclear commercial viability. Ships having to call at the secondary port of Lobito will incur higher costs. There’s also competition from other routes – mostly, the Chinese-built Tazara railway, connecting Zambia to Dar-es-Salaam.

Second, the economic model at the heart of the Lobito corridor is anything but a break with exploitative extractivism. Throughout Angolan history, primary commodities have left the country, while hopes for broad-based growth have repeatedly been frustrated.

The consortium that now operates the railway grounds its investment primarily in expectations of future demand for critical minerals. And while the political emphasis on complementary investments is laudable, the corridor does not, as one background report puts it,

immediately lend itself to linking minerals and wider development.

Moreover, the country has already seen decades of large-scale oil exports that have delivered few tangible results for the wider population. Instead they have propelled blatant corruption and growing discontent with a ruling party that has been in power since independence.

Angolan economists Alves da Rocha and Wilson Chimoco have argued that “expectations on the impact on economic diversification are very low”.

Angolan government critic and journalist Rafael Marques de Morais has even called the corridor

a mirror of everything negative the continent endures: Chinese debt, Western opportunism, Congolese blood, Angolan misrule.

For him

if hypocrisy needed a railway, it would look exactly like the Lobito Corridor.

If the project really is to benefit all, the government will have to live up to promises that fewer and fewer Angolans seem to believe it capable of delivering.

– Angola’s Lobito Corridor is being revived – but who stands to gain?
– https://theconversation.com/angolas-lobito-corridor-is-being-revived-but-who-stands-to-gain-274305