Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

South Africa has a new draft white paper on immigration, citizenship and refugees. This, the fourth in three decades, represents a step change from the previous efforts. It is a genuine attempt to develop an efficient but humane set of policies.

Based on my work on migration over two decades, I am convinced that the policies in this new paper are far more ambitious than previous reforms. They represent a genuine attempt to address a complex and sensitive set of challenges in a comprehensive way, using state-of-the-art technological tools. The key question is: are the reforms practically and politically feasible?

The first post-apartheid immigration white paper, published in 1997, led to the new Immigration Act of 2002. This was the second significant reform to immigration policy in the post-apartheid era. The first was the Refugee Act of 1998. The Refugee Act represented a bold realignment. In it South Africa acceded to global and African refugee treaties. It also placed human rights at the centre of the policy.

The 2002 Immigration Act was reformist rather than revolutionary. It was rightly criticised for not getting to grips with the legacy of migration patterns in southern Africa.

The white paper represents a far more coherent and systematic rethink than previous South African piecemeal reforms or similar attempts elsewhere in Africa.

The changes are being driven by Home Affairs minister Leon Schreiber. Schreiber is unusual among politicians. He is a real political scientist with real expertise in public policy. He is ambitious and seems determined to accomplish as much as he can in the current term of government. The impression I get is that his senior officials buy into the reforms – indeed, they devised many of them.

The generational change is essentially digitisation. All civil records about citizens, migrants, prospective migrants, visitors, asylum seekers and refugees will be digitised and integrated. If it works, it could result in a watertight management system for immigration, citizenship and refugee protection. This would be a huge step up from the current jumble of paper-based and incomplete datasets.

If completely successful it would eliminate both the massive inefficiency of the Department of Home Affairs, and the fraud and general confusion which still plague the governance of migrants and refugees in South Africa.

Fit for the 21st century

Digitisation and integration of information systems was recommended by the Lubisi enquiry into documentation fraud commissioned by the previous minister.

In my own work on South Africa’s migration policies, I made similar recommendations, with the benefit of the evidence in the Lubisi report and other sources.

At the heart of the system being proposed in the new white paper is an Intelligent Population Register. This is a modern, digitised system to manage and use comprehensive population data. Countries like Estonia and Denmark have pioneered such systems, and India has shown how a digital ID system can be extended to its massive population. Botswana already has an integrated civil registration system similar to the one South Africa is planning.

As the minister of Home Affairs put it, an intelligent population register

uses advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, biometrics, interoperability and real-time data integration, to improve governance, integrated service delivery, and national planning.

The new system will require mandatory birth and death registration, and biometric data not only for citizens but also for foreigners, regular and irregular, who reside in the country. This would provide data that enables far more effective social and economic policies than the current incomplete population register.

Irregular foreigners, including asylum seekers and others whose status is yet to be determined, will be:

• counted

• allowed to use the banking system irrespective of their status

• expected to pay tax.

Other improvements are that it will be:

• more difficult for unethical visa applicants to game the system

• easier to keep track of refugees and asylum seekers

• more difficult to carry out identity theft.

The other major change is that the new system will introduce a “merit-based path” to naturalisation, in contrast to the existing “mechanical and compliance-based” pathway.

Merit is preferred to years served. After five years of permanent residence, naturalisation will be acquired according to a set of accomplishments that are yet to be detailed. This will be available to immigrants who have come in through a points-based system as well as to current citizens of Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Angola holding exemption permits. The yet to be finalised points system will include assessments of educational qualifications, acquired skills, and some measure of social impact.

The points-based system for skilled immigrants will replace or, for now, complement the critical skills list.

Other immigration reforms include a new start-up visa for tech firms, a subset of an investment visa which replaces the business visa, and new age and income requirements for retiree immigrants. The recently introduced Trusted Employer Scheme, Trusted Tour Operator Scheme and the remote work visa are endorsed in the white paper.

Reforms are proposed to speed up the asylum applications process, including a dedicated immigration court. Even those who obtain refugee status may be returned to the “first safe country” that they passed through when exiting their perilous country.

Countries which are safe for returnees would be designated by government – those which do not have raging civil wars or extreme repression or similar hazards for their citizens. South Africa would have to get agreement from the designated safe countries that they would accept returnees without prejudice.

Caveats and concerns

None of these reforms will be easy. Some, like the various points-based systems for entry, permanent residence and citizenship, and the establishment of dedicated refugee courts, are complex proposals not yet fully explained.

Other concerns include the privacy implications of the intelligent population register and the willingness of other countries to agree to being designated first safe country. Both issues are vulnerable to court challenges. Prospective first safe countries may require some incentive to cooperate, and South Africa might have to offer to accept a considerable share of the refugees.

There are also some issues covered in previous white papers not addressed here. Whether and how to draw on the financial and networking resources of the South African diaspora is not discussed. Nor is the issue of proactive policies to promote the social integration of foreigners.

Also not covered is the issue of lower-skilled migrants. However, migrant labour, mostly low-skilled, is the focus of the White Paper on National Labour Migration Policy republished by the Department of Employment and Labour last year.

The ambition signalled in the new policy paper is impressive. Whether it is doable, and whether the project will be completed, depends on many things, political, technical and judicial.

– South Africa’s new immigration policy takes a digital direction – will it succeed?
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-immigration-policy-takes-a-digital-direction-will-it-succeed-274038

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Haruna Inuwa, DPhil Candidate, Energy Systems, University of Oxford

Energy systems are coming under attack globally because disrupting power or fuel supplies offers strategic, economic or political leverage. This can be in local conflicts or large-scale geopolitical confrontations.

Nigeria illustrates this clearly: militants in the Niger Delta sabotage pipelines to assert control and tap into oil revenues, while the extremist group Boko Haram and armed bandits in the north hit power lines to weaken state presence.

These incidents reveal how conflict actors weaponise energy systems.

We recently published a study assessing how militancy, insurgency and armed banditry undermine Nigeria’s energy systems by disrupting oil, gas and power infrastructure. We compiled novel datasets of energy related incidents, mapping their timing, location and cost from 2009 to 2025.

Our findings show that more than 2,300 separate attacks were recorded. We see a widening pattern of energy insecurity that drains national revenue, drives away investment, and worsens environmental injustice.

This explains why Nigeria’s energy insecurity has become one of its most serious development and security challenges.

We recommend investment in decentralised systems, community engagement in oil regions, and policies supporting industrial decarbonisation to strengthen resilience and advance climate goals.

The price

According to our estimates, between 2009 and 2024, approximately US$20 billion was lost as a result of attacks. During the 2013-2016 surge in militancy, losses peaked at roughly US$17 billion.

We found that the South-South (Niger Delta) region remains the epicentre of oil sabotage, with peak revenue losses of US$8.62 trillion (2009-2012) and sustained environmental damage.

Attacks and oil theft along the Trans-Niger Pipeline were particularly devastating. This pipeline moves 450,000 barrels of crude oil daily from oil-producing fields in Niger Delta region to export terminals. Each disruption not only shuts down production but also deprives the government of huge revenues.

Since 2021, tactics have shifted. Over 40 attacks have targeted transmission lines in the North-East and North-Central, largely linked to Boko Haram and armed bandits.

Case studies of the 2016 Shell Forcados terminal bombing and the 2024 Shiroro transmission line attack show reliance on backup generators increased electricity costs by 3.2-6.0 times.

Beyond the financial toll, communities suffer respiratory illnesses, unsafe drinking water and food insecurity.

Disruptions have made Nigeria’s grid more unstable and pose risks to critical infrastructure projects nearing completion, including gas pipelines.

Attacks threaten regional energy trade and integration projects, such as the West African Power Pool, West African Gas Pipeline, Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, and the proposed Nigeria-Algeria-Gas-Pipeline, which rely on secure cross-border energy infrastructure.

Foreign investors view these risks as prohibitive. Due to attacks on energy infrastructure, in 2020, Nigeria lost around US$40 billion in foreign direct investment.

Oil theft and sabotage have also left a toxic legacy in the Niger Delta. Each pipeline rupture spills crude into rivers and farmland, wiping out livelihoods.

We find that clean-up costs from oil spills on the Trans-Niger Pipeline alone ranged from US$150 million to US$290 million per period (2009-2012, 2013-2016, 2017-2020, 2021-2024), highlighting continuous environmental degradation in the Niger Delta area.

In line with this, the United Nations Environment Programme estimated that a US$1 billion 30-year clean-up is needed in Ogoniland, while Reuters reported that addressing oil pollution in Bayelsa State alone might require US$12 billion over 12 years. When compared to Nigeria’s GDP of US$375 billion in 2024, these figures underscore the substantial financial strain that this attack-induced environmental crisis places on national resources.

Our analysis indicates that insurgents and bandits have shifted tactics since 2021. We see increased disruption and attacks on power infrastructure in the northern part of the country.

More than 40 incidents targeting high-voltage transmission lines have been recorded in just four years, a 20-fold increase from the previous decade. Two major examples show the consequences: the 2016 Forcados terminal bombing cut national power generation by 3,132MW, while the 2024 Shiroro transmission-line attack left the north-western part of the country in darkness for two weeks.

During attack-induced outages, businesses and households switch to diesel or petrol generators. We find that this backup electricity costs three to six times more than grid power, with the North-East and North-West experiencing the highest cost increase.

Each attack also carries an invisible environmental cost. Backup generators release far more carbon dioxide than grid electricity. During the 2016 and 2024 outages, we estimated sharp spikes in CO₂ across the South-West and South-South, Nigeria’s most energy-hungry regions.

This trend undermines Nigeria’s commitments under the National Climate Change Policy 2021-2030, which aims to cut emissions and expand energy access using renewable energy. Insecurity, therefore, is not just an economic or social problem – it is an obstacle to climate progress.

How Nigeria can respond

Our research points to several steps that could make the energy systems more resilient:

1. Invest in decentralised and modular power systems: Smaller, locally managed plants – such as the 52-megawatt Maiduguri Emergency Power Plant – are harder to sabotage and quicker to repair.

2. Rebuild trust with host communities: Environmental remediation and transparent benefit-sharing can reduce grievances that drive sabotage. Local participation in energy projects must move beyond tokenism.

3. Adopt technology for early warning and monitoring: Pressure sensors, drones and predictive analytics can detect tampering and leaks in real-time. Government contracts with former militants to guard pipelines must be coupled with strict accountability.

4. Accelerate innovative clean-energy deployment: In the light of Nigeria’s commitment to achieve climate goals, it is important to explore emerging decarbonisation pathways, including clean hydrogen.

Nigeria’s energy wealth has long promised prosperity, but persistent insecurity has made it a liability. The financial losses, pollution and emissions caused by repeated attacks erode resilience and deter investment. This challenge is not unique to Nigeria; it reflects a broader global reality in which energy transitions depend on secure infrastructure.

Achieving a stable, decentralised and low-carbon system will require protecting the assets that make it possible.

– Attacks on Nigeria’s energy systems weaken the country – research unpacks costs, risks and ways forward
– https://theconversation.com/attacks-on-nigerias-energy-systems-weaken-the-country-research-unpacks-costs-risks-and-ways-forward-271366

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Giorgio Miescher, Associate Researcher University of Basel and University of Namibia, University of Basel

Donkeys are an unassuming yet ubiquitous presence in northern Namibia. They traverse sandy village roads, pull carts stacked with firewood, and graze freely along the northern edge of the Etosha National Park.

The story of how they came to occupy such a central role in rural life – and in such large numbers – is a fascinating one that’s linked to the country’s colonial history, the management of wildlife versus domestic animals, and the role of migrant workers.

We are historians who specialise in Namibia and Southern Africa. Our research focuses on colonial legacies in nature conservation and land. In a research paper we retraced the routes of the domesticated donkey through a conservation landscape.

We found that donkeys occupy a contradictory status in communities in northern Namibia. They are indispensable, yet undervalued. For example, they remain central to tasks such as ploughing, hauling water and transporting logs. Yet their social status remains curiously low. They are rarely used in ceremonies, have little monetary value, and are strongly associated with those who cannot afford tractors or cars.

We conclude that this ambiguity has arisen from the long histories of colonial rule, labour migration, conservation and veterinary control that shaped northern Namibia.

The great trek north

We traced donkeys’ ability to move across one of the country’s most significant borders: the veterinary cordon fence known as the Red Line. The Red Line is an inner-Namibian border, over 1,000 kilometres long, running from west to east and separating the country into two distinct parts. It originated under German colonial rule (1884-1915) and was fully implemented under South African rule (1915-1990).

It still exists today.

The Red Line separated the more densely populated northern parts of the country from the settler-colonial heartland, the so-called Police Zone in central and southern Namibia. The Etosha Game Reserve served as a buffer zone between the Police Zone and the Owambo region in the central north, conceptualised as a migrant labour reservoir.

Donkeys entered Namibia’s central north relatively late, and only became common in the 1920s and 1930s. Their presence across the region was driven largely by migrant labourers working on contract. As thousands of men travelled between the Police Zone and Owambo, many returned home with equines – especially donkeys – purchased in the south.

Cheap, hardy, and resistant to many diseases, donkeys became essential companions on the workers’ long journeys. Donkeys carried heavy loads of clothes, tools and other goods, including gramophones and radios, earned through contract labour.

Since they were associated with commodities, donkeys also became a symbol of modernity expanding from the thriving settler economy in the south.

Today, people still recount how returning labour migrants used donkeys to haul luggage through predator-rich landscapes within Etosha, or how villagers took their carts to meet these men halfway. Donkeys also served as ambulances during emergencies in the Namibian Liberation War (1966-1989).

Their presence has also been entangled with colonial border regimes and conservation policies.

The tensions

During the rinderpest epidemic of 1896-97, in a failed attempt to stop the disease from entering the colony, German colonial authorities established a cordon of military outposts along the southern edge of the Etosha Pan. Although intended to control the movement of cattle, this cordon would later become the Red Line.

The devastation of rinderpest prompted German forces to import donkeys and mules as disease-resistant alternatives to oxen. These animals gradually filtered into civilian hands in the Police Zone, the heartland of settler colonialism in central and southern Namibia, and became increasingly common by the 1910s.

The establishment of Game Reserve 2, comprising today’s Etosha National Park and the areas north-west of the Etosha Pan, was part of a policy to seal off Owambo from the Police Zone. Hunting and human movement in the reserve became highly regulated.

In 1915 South Africa defeated the German forces and took over Namibia. The new colonial power maintained the inner border and formalised it as the Red Line in the 1920s and 1930s. They banned cattle movement across the Red Line but allowed equines, provided they carried veterinary certificates.

Donkeys thus became one of the few domestic animals permitted to cross the border legally.

As migrant labour expanded, so too did the flow of donkeys northward. By the late 1920s and 1930s, hundreds of donkeys passed through Etosha each year. In Owambo, they were quickly adopted for local agriculture and transport. Even as motorised lorries and buses began to dominate long-distance travel from the 1930s onward, many migrant workers still preferred to buy donkeys as durable companions.

By the 1940s, however, administrators in Owambo began to worry about the donkeys’ impact on grazing. Restrictions were introduced, but donkeys continued to slip into the north through unofficial routes.

From the 1950s onward, the situation changed dramatically as the Etosha National Park was transformed into a fenced conservation area. Residents and livestock were expelled, and by 1961 the southern boundary was fully fenced. Donkey traffic through Etosha came to an end.

Meanwhile, the northern boundary of Etosha became a flashpoint. The government of the pseudo-independent new Ovamboland homeland resisted efforts to fence this border and insisted on continued movement of wildlife out of Etosha – especially zebra, an important local food source. Conservation officials accused communities of using donkeys to disguise poaching tracks and allowing their animals to stray into the park.

New rules

With Namibia’s independence in 1990, new animal-movement regulations emerged, but donkeys retained their special status. Unlike cattle, they were still permitted to cross the Red Line.

Their symbolic and practical importance has changed. Migrant workers no longer return with donkeys from the south, and motorised transport dominates even in rural areas.

But donkeys remain deeply woven into the fabric of northern Namibian life. They continue to support poorer households, endure harsh environments, and live in proximity to wildlife. Their presence evokes conflicting memories – of difficult journeys and colonial border regimes, but also of development and modernity.

– Donkeys are a common sight in northern Namibia – what colonial history has to do with it
– https://theconversation.com/donkeys-are-a-common-sight-in-northern-namibia-what-colonial-history-has-to-do-with-it-273058