Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

A military coup d’état is the ouster of an elected president or head of state, usually through the use or threat of force. Putschists (those who participate in a coup) often justify their actions by accusing the government of mismanaging the economy and lowering living standards. Political instability is another reason coup makers give for their actions.

A coup is not necessarily the most effective way to cure economic and political ills, however. Positive change comes instead through institutional reform, structural economic changes and engagement with civil society – including the people who create wealth and economic growth.

Military regimes are usually unable or unwilling to provide the necessary regulatory reforms. They don’t provide the legal and institutional stability needed to fight poverty and improve living standards.

I’m an economist and legal scholar who studies political economy and human rights in Africa. My research includes military coups and how they affect states.

In my studies of military and constitutional takeovers in Egypt, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Sudan, I have identified four major consequences of coups:

• they worsen intergroup conflict and threaten peaceful coexistence

• they undermine entrepreneurship and the creation of wealth needed to confront poverty and inequality

• they encourage the abuse of vulnerable groups, such as women and children, and ethnic or religious minorities

• they destroy efforts to deepen democracy and the rule of law.

1. Coups worsen intergroup conflict

Most African countries are diverse in ethnic and religious terms. Unfortunately, most post-independence governments have failed to provide an institutional environment that helps people to live together in peace.

This failure has enabled the majority faction to tyrannise minorities.

In most African countries, ethnicity influences political mobilisation, patronage and coalition building. Ruling elites use ethnic identity as a tool to build voting blocs and secure power.

Military elites fill top military and security positions with officers from their own ethnic group. This is known as ethnic stacking. It’s happened in Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria.

When there is a coup, the concentration of power within a specific military faction can trigger intense security crises. Marginalised minorities may engage in violence to protect themselves, their resources and their political representation.

Coups can dismantle power-sharing arrangements or democratic frameworks that previously allowed people to live in peace and gave them a voice in governance.

2. Coups undermine wealth creation

A military coup tends to destabilise the legal system and make life less predictable. The uncertainty can discourage investment and entrepreneurship.

Investors want to know that tax rules, environmental standards and laws governing operations won’t change overnight. Courts must be reliable, accessible and able to settle disputes. Clear, predictable and reliable legal frameworks mean long-term trade contracts can be enforced.

A 2026 International Monetary Fund report estimates that coups “can reduce GDP growth by around 2.3 percentage points in the same year”. The report says coups in Africa reduce investment by 14.3%. These economic effects can persist in the years that follow.

3. Coups spark human rights abuses

Recognising and protecting human rights is a foundation for economic and human development. Human rights enable peaceful coexistence, long-term economic growth and sustainable development.

Constitutional democracies protect human rights, respect the rule of law and put limits on government power.

A military coup usually creates an environment in which human rights are routinely violated. Leaders no longer account to either the constitution or the people. In 2023, Freedom House, an American non-governmental organisation that advocates for democracy, warned that a surge of coups in Africa was threatening human rights and the rule of law.

Coup leaders often suspend or discard the constitution and its bill of rights. Military regimes are also known for committing serious human rights abuses like arbitrary detentions and torture.

4. Coups weaken the rule of law

One of the first things coup leaders do is destroy constitutional order. They put executive, legislative and judiciary powers in military hands. This deprives the people of the right to choose their leaders through elections.

Coup leaders typically ban peaceful protests, censor media, and jail critics of the regime without trial. Post-coup military elites usually rule by decree and not through an elected legislature or independent judiciary.

Forceful regime changes often invite counter-coups, civil conflict, and more political violence and instability.

This has been seen in Egypt, Sudan and several Sahelian states.

Stopping the coup wave

African states need to develop a democratic culture, which is undergirded by the control of the military by elected civilian authorities. Citizens who believe a government has failed can have their say through regularly scheduled elections.

Armed forces should be professional. Troops should be accountable to the constitution and elected civilian leaders. Military education should include human rights law and the duty to defend the constitution.

Coup leaders should not be allowed to take part in elections held to restore democratic order. Neither should they hold positions of responsibility in the state’s political institutions. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance provides for this, but the African Union has not made sure it happens.

In Egypt, for instance, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew the democratically elected president Mohamed Morsi in 2013. A year later, el-Sisi became the country’s president. Similarly, Gen. Brice Oligui Nguema led the 2023 coup in Gabon. He then won the April 2025 presidential election and was then installed as Gabon’s new president.

African states must also ban military coups and make it a crime to change the government unconstitutionally. There must be mechanisms for prosecuting perpetrators. Several African countries have developed strong democratic norms that reject military rule. Afrobarometer surveys, for example, show that respondents in Zambia (90%), Uganda (87%), Eswatini (85%) and Seychelles (85%) are highly opposed to military coups.

Countries that have avoided military coups have generally developed strong constitutions and institutions. They have credible elections and professional armed forces accountable to civilian authority.

In South Africa and Namibia, new governments brought armed forces together under civilian oversight. Botswana and Mauritius have combined good governance with economic development.

When political, military and economic institutions provide effective peaceful ways to resolve grievances, it’s harder to stage a coup.

– Military coups promise change – 4 ways they can leave African countries worse off
– https://theconversation.com/military-coups-promise-change-4-ways-they-can-leave-african-countries-worse-off-292469

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Herkulaas MvE Combrink, Senior lecturer/ Co-Director, University of the Free State

During a health crisis, the first instinct is often to give people information. Governments make announcements. Experts explain what is happening. Health departments share information on television, radio, social media and through communities. The idea seems simple: give people the right information, and they can make better decisions.

But does simply providing more information resolve uncertainty, misinformation or public concern?

My research focuses on infodemics: using artificial intelligence and machine learning to understand how misinformation spreads, identify information voids, and analyse the concerns and questions that emerge during a crisis.

In a recent paper, a group of researchers involved in studying infodemics and I examined the system South Africa put in place to understand public concerns and what responses were recommended to address them.

During the COVID pandemic, South Africa’s national Department of Health established a technical Risk Communication and Community Engagement working group that used a research approach called social listening to identify what people were saying, asking and worrying about in relation to the pandemic.

To do this, public conversations and feedback were tracked across social media, online news, public WhatsApp streams, call centres and community channels.

Regular social listening reports brought this information together to identify concerns, misinformation, rumours and gaps in understanding. These reports alerted health authorities and partners to emerging concerns, and provided recommended actions for addressing them.

The social listening system was structured as a circular process, described as: listen, understand the problem, recommend a response, and keep listening.

We wanted to understand two things:

We studied 91 reports produced between 2021 and 2023. What emerged was that similar concerns kept appearing, despite the existence of a system to address them.

What people were worried about

At least two researchers reviewed the information independently so that the findings did not depend on one person’s judgment. We grouped statements that were saying the same or very similar things. In total, we identified 964 instances of misinformation across 12 themes and 573 recommended actions across six themes.

More than half of the misinformation was directly about COVID. The rest was about vaccines and various health-related concerns.

The reports reflected recurring areas of uncertainty and misinformation around vaccine safety and side effects, trust, treatments and government communication.

The recommendations focused on improving how health information was communicated and managed, and on working more directly with communities.

This meant going beyond broadcasting the same national message to everyone. Recommendations included community information sessions using local media platforms, and engagement activities which included working with people within communities who could place complex health information into a locally relevant language and context.

Why did the concerns keep appearing?

Our study did not track what happened after recommendations were made. Furthermore, the study could not determine whether individual recommendations were implemented, how widely they reached communities, or whether they changed what people understood, believed or did.

It is possible that concerns recurred because information environments change. New questions emerge, information voids develop as circumstances change, and misinformation can reappear or take different forms. A concern appearing again at a later point therefore does not necessarily mean that exactly the same information problem has persisted.

This is why the gap between listening and outcome matters. Identifying a concern is only the first step. What also matters is how that concern is translated into a response, whether the response reaches the intended audience, whether it addresses the underlying question, uncertainty or information void, and whether anything changes afterwards.

Across the reports, five principles appeared repeatedly that can help health authorities and risk communication practitioners translate social listening insights into more responsive public health communication.

Firstly, understand the concern. Social listening can show health communicators what people are worried about, instead of assuming what people need to know.

Secondly, use that information to improve how health information is framed. If the concern is about vaccine side effects, for example, providing general information about COVID may not address the actual concern.

Thirdly, work with trusted people to communicate and engage with communities. The reports recommended community participation as well as involvement from public figures and other credible voices. The purpose is to communicate through relationships and voices that communities recognise.

Fourth, use appropriate communication channels. Something posted online does not necessarily require an online response. Communication can be through community radio, newspapers, faith based and community organisations, outreach programmes and community health workers.

Lastly, keep listening because concerns change. New rumours appear, old ones return, and people’s questions change as circumstances change.

The purpose of social listening is not simply to build another dashboard counting posts, likes and mentions. Its value lies in connecting what is being heard to decisions about what needs to be communicated, to whom, through whom and through which channels, and then listening again to determine whether the information environment has changed.

When we hear a concern, we should ask: Who is saying this? Why are they worried? Could this cause harm? Who do they trust? What language do they speak? Where do they get their information from? And, after we respond, has anything changed?

These findings matter beyond COVID-19, as it will not be the last time countries face uncertainty, fear and rapidly changing information. The next challenge may be another infectious disease, a vaccine, a new treatment or an entirely different public emergency.

The unanswered question is what happens between identifying a concern, recommending or implementing a response, and determining whether anything changes in what people understand, believe or do. Social listening gives us the ability to hear the problem. The next challenge is understanding what happens after we hear it.

– Listen, understand, repeat: the circular approach to good communication in a health crisis
– https://theconversation.com/listen-understand-repeat-the-circular-approach-to-good-communication-in-a-health-crisis-291739