Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christophe Premat, Professor, Canadian and Cultural Studies, Stockholm University

The term “Françafrique” describes the political, economic and military networks built to preserve French influence in Africa. It refers to a past era but many believe that it still shapes relations between France and its former colonies today.

The word was popularised by French economist, historian and activist François-Xavier Verschave in his 1998 book Françafrique: The Longest Scandal of the Republic. He used it to condemn a neocolonial system that created dependence and allowed for French interference. Originally, the idea meant a close cooperation between France and Francophone Africa.

As a researcher in political discourse and Franco-African relations, I am interested in how the idea of Françafrique still affects the way both sides see each other today.

How Françafrique got its name

The term Françafrique was first used in 1945 by Jean Piot, editor-in-chief of L’Aurore newspaper. He saw it as a way to unite France and Africa to renew the French Empire. Later, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first president of independent Côte d’Ivoire, gave the term a positive meaning. In 1955, he used it to describe a positive partnership. He wanted to celebrate the shared language, culture and economic ties between France and Africa.

Verschave completely redefined the meaning of the term. For him, Françafrique symbolised a shadowy system of corruption, patronage and political interference.

A key architect of this system was Jacques Foccart. He was the African affairs adviser to French presidents between 1958 and 1974 and then adviser to Prime Minister Jacques Chirac between 1986 and 1988. He also served as the secretary-general for the Community and African and Malagasy Affairs, a body designed by General Charles de Gaulle to manage France’s relations with its former colonies.

The pillars of Françafrique

Françafrique is based on three main pillars:

1. Political and military support

Since African independence in the 1960s, France has maintained close ties with leaders considered to be “friends of France”. Through specific defence agreements, Paris retained the right to conduct military interventions to stabilise or protect allied governments. Key examples include Operation Manta in Chad in 1983 and Operation Serval in Mali in 2013. This structure was upheld by a shadow network. It was made up of unofficial advisors, intelligence services and personal connections among the elite. It was best symolised by the so-called “African cell” within the Élysée Palace, which was long led by Foccart.

2. Economic ties

The economic pillar of Françafrique is defined by deep financial ties. The CFA franc currency, created in 1945, is a clear legacy of colonial-era monetary dependence. Major French corporations like Elf, Bolloré, Bouygues and Total gained privileged access to key sectors such as oil, infrastructure and telecommunications in Africa. In return, these companies often funded a hidden system of financial support for African political parties and regimes. This corrupt system was exposed in the 1990s when a judicial investigation revealed that the French state-owned oil giant, Elf-Aquitaine, operated a vast network of corruption that involved both French politicians and African leaders.

3. Personal and informal networks

Beyond official diplomacy, Françafrique thrived on personal and informal networks. It operated through a web of businessmen, diplomats and military figures. These intermediaries formed a powerful “parallel state”. Their networks mixed business deals, intelligence work and personal friendships. This system effectively bypassed standard diplomatic channels. The importance of these personal ties is confirmed in the 2024 memoirs of Robert Bourgi, a key insider. As a disciple of Foccart, he details his extensive relationships with numerous African political leaders.

Is Françafrique really over?

The Francafrique system was weakened by major global and regional shifts. The Soviet Union’s collapse, growing demands for democracy in Africa, and financial scandals in France all challenged its existence.

A key turning point was the 1990 La Baule speech by French president François Mitterrand. He declared that French aid would be tied to democratic reforms. Despite this, French influence persisted, simply changing its form through privatisation, new military partnerships and economic diplomacy.

In the 2000s, successive French presidents – Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande – all vowed to end the Françafrique era. However, continued French military action in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, Mali in 2013, and the wider Sahel region until 2023 demonstrated a lasting French security role on the continent.

A concept in crisis

Today, the concept of Françafrique is in crisis. Under President Emmanuel Macron, the term itself has become politically taboo. Since his 2017 speech in Ouagadougou, he has insisted on breaking with the old logic of paternalism. He advocates instead for a “partnership of equals”.

Symbolic initiatives aim to modernise the relationship. These include returning looted artworks to Benin, acknowledging France’s role in the Rwandan genocide, and creating a new Africa-France Summit format.

Yet for many Africans, this new rhetoric does not match reality. French military presence in the Sahel, the ongoing use of the CFA franc (even as it is slowly rebranded), and the dominance of large French companies fuel a powerful feeling that French influence remains largely unchanged.

In countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger rejection of France is now expressed through pan-Africanist and sovereignty rhetoric, which has led to regime changes.

The rise of competing powers

A key feature of the current era is the diversification of Africa’s international partners. Countries like China, Turkey, Russia and Gulf states are now major players in both economic and security sectors. The era of France having an exclusive “backyard” in Africa is over. African states now enjoy significantly greater geopolitical leeway.

In this new competitive landscape, France is attempting to redefine its policy. It now emphasises targeted bilateral relations, support for civil society, and academic and cultural cooperation. However, this strategic shift is struggling to overcome decades of deep-seated mistrust.

The powerful and enduring image of Françafrique continues to shape perceptions, especially among a younger generations of Africans who view past relations with scepticism.

An unfinished break

Today, discussing Françafrique means confronting both a historical system and a powerful political idea. While the shadowy networks of the past have faded, the underlying structures of economic influence remain. So too do the powerful postcolonial emotions that shape relations between France and Africa.

Françafrique may no longer be an official policy. Yet it remains a powerful lens. It is the key to understanding how colonial legacies continue to shape the present day.

– What is Françafrique? The taboo word that reveals the shifting influence of France in Africa
– https://theconversation.com/what-is-francafrique-the-taboo-word-that-reveals-the-shifting-influence-of-france-in-africa-268129

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bedassa Tadesse, Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota Duluth

The US-Africa preferential trade deal – in place for a quarter century – expired on 30 September 2025. It’s far from certain if the trade deal will be renewed and, if so, how. Through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa), roughly 35 sub-Saharan African countries could export thousands of products to the American market duty-free.

First signed into law in 2000, it was designed to encourage African exports, create jobs, and deepen trade ties. Its usage varied widely: South Africa shipped cars and citrus; Kenya and Ethiopia focused on apparel; Lesotho and Eswatini relied heavily on garments; Mauritius sent textiles and seafood.

Those exports support hundreds of thousands of jobs. A sizeable proportion are held by women and young workers, particularly in areas where formal employment is scarce. For African exporters, a world without Agoa and with broader US tariffs is a double squeeze on competitiveness.

Will Agoa be revived at all or quickly enough? It rests with the US Congress rather than the White House, which has publicly supported a one-year extension. Transitional deals are being floated, but only an enacted law restores certainty. If the deal remains off – or remains uncertain – the sharpest pain falls on smaller, apparel-focused exporters that employ many low-income workers.

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Read more: US-Africa trade deal turns 25 next year: Agoa’s winners, losers and what should come next

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I am a scholar of international trade with an interest in the economic development problems of developing countries. My 2023 analysis of scholarly articles and policy reports examined the impact of Agoa on the economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa.

If Congress cannot agree quickly, the lapse continues. Even if a renewal arrives later, some damage, such as cancelled orders and lost shifts, will already have occurred, and any retroactive fix will be uneven across sectors and firms. Uncertainty is costly: ambiguity surrounding Agoa’s renewal dampens orders and investment, particularly in labour-intensive sectors such as apparel and automotive components.

Amid the present economic uncertainties, Agoa exporters should prioritise three key measures. First, take steps to redirect vulnerable orders to the EU preference schemes, and regional buyers under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). Second, invest in competitiveness through improved ports and predictable customs. Finally, lobby smartly in Washington to argue for a short, retroactive “bridge” renewal.

The high cost of uncertainty for Africa

The duty-free status matters for Africa. Take the case of a basic cotton T-shirt from a country like Kenya or Lesotho that qualifies under Agoa enters the US duty-free. Without Agoa, the standard most-favoured-nation duty is about 16.5% on cotton T-shirts. That swing alone can erase thin margins and redirect orders.

The US imported $791 billion worth of goods from 2001 to 2021 from Agoa eligible countries. The corresponding value of US economic assistance to these countries amounted to $145 billion from 2001 through 2019. The striking difference in magnitude indicates the significance of Agoa in the US-Africa economic relationship.

The trade preferences have particularly benefited apparel, textiles, agriculture and light manufacturing. However, the impact has been uneven. Some countries have used the opportunities more effectively than others, so the consequences of a lapse will likewise be uneven among exporters.

Apparel hubs hit hardest: Lesotho, Eswatini, Madagascar, Kenya and Mauritius built entire export bases around Agoa’s duty-free access for clothing. Without it, typical US most-favoured-nation tariffs (usually 10%-20%) apply immediately, razor-thin margins vanish, and orders get pulled. Factory closures and job losses follow quickly.

South Africa’s cars and fruit: South Africa’s shipments of vehicles, parts, wine, citrus and nuts also face new tariffs. These globally competitive sectors are highly cost-sensitive; the loss of preferences undercuts auto supply-chain investment and farm incomes.

Oil exporters are less exposed: Crude oil generally faces low US tariffs already, so countries like Nigeria and Angola are less affected than non-oil manufacturers and farmers.

Recent returnees are vulnerable: Countries that only recently regained eligibility – after earlier suspensions over concerns about human rights, governance (including coups), or labour rights – are likely to see investors hesitate again amid renewed uncertainty.

What African exporters can do

Given the mix of US statute and presidential practice, there are three realistic paths out of the trade limbo. Congress could pass a multi-year extension in the weeks ahead. That would restore certainty for buyers and factories. Another is a short “bridge” renewal in which lawmakers agree to a one- or two-year extension. This scenario averts a cliff but keeps investment on pause: buyers may place smaller, repeat orders, and postpone new lines until the long-term outlook is resolved. The last is a continued lapse.

While the uncertainty persists, African exporters can look to other measures to shore up business. I propose these three:

Plan for uncertainty: Redirect vulnerable orders to the European Union’s preference routes. Use the Generalised Scheme of Preferences and relevant Economic Partnership Agreements where rules of origin are met. Also pivot to regional buyers under the African Continental Free Trade Area. This can be paired with quick logistics wins such as:

• pre-clearance: allowing customs processing before goods reach port, cutting dwell times

• single-window customs: a digital portal where all trade documents are submitted once, reducing delays and paperwork

• scheduled sailings: fixed, reliable shipping timetables that shorten delivery cycles and improve buyer confidence.

Together, these steps can improve margins through faster lead times. Countries can also bridge working-capital gaps for exposed firms with trade guarantees or invoice discounting, so confirmed orders don’t collapse. They should also maintain a standing public–private task force ready to pivot as US decisions evolve.

Lobby smartly in Washington: Affected countries should coordinate with embassies and lead exporters. They should present hard evidence, including buyer letters, job counts and likely US price pass-through, to argue for a short, retroactive “bridge” renewal. They can also stress that predictable access supports US supply-chain diversification away from China and stabilises consumer prices.

These countries could also align their messages across affected sectors, ranging from apparel to autos and agro-processing. The goal is to show a broad economic impact rather than narrow special pleading. They should also time their outreach to coincide with congressional windows and committee calendars.

Invest in competitiveness: Trade officials should compete on reliability. This is because dependable power, faster ports and predictable customs often matter more to buyers than wages alone. Build regional inputs (yarn-to-garment, packaging, parts) so a shock in one market doesn’t halt production, and scale testing and certification so one run meets US, EU and UK standards.

They should aim to move up the value chain: from free-on-board/full-package (for example, in apparel, not just cut-make-trim but also sourcing fabric and trims and arranging logistics) to components, branded, and ready-to-eat lines, where margins are stickier. Tie investment incentives to verifiable outcomes: jobs, on-time-in-full delivery, and clean production.

For three decades, African governments were urged to liberalise and build export capacity on the promise of predictable rules. A sudden US pullback moves the goalposts—raising prices at home, cutting jobs abroad, and shrinking the space for rules-based trade. Exporters can buy time with EU routes, regional buyers and logistics fixes. But only Congress can restore certainty: pass a short, retroactive bridge renewal now, then set a clear timeline for a multi-year AGOA update.

– Africa’s trade deal with the US was left in limbo: what exporters can do about it
– https://theconversation.com/africas-trade-deal-with-the-us-was-left-in-limbo-what-exporters-can-do-about-it-268515