Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Yuezhou Yang, Research Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science

Media coverage of Chinese land investments in African agriculture often reinforces narratives of a “weak African state” and the “Chinese land grab”, highlighting power imbalances between the actors involved in these land deals.

Are Chinese actors grabbing land in Africa and jeopardising local people’s land rights and food security?

China’s “Agriculture Going Out” policy, launched in 2007 as part of its broader “Going Out” strategy, was reinforced by the Belt and Road Initiative from 2013. Backed by these policies, Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa rose from US$74.81 million in 2003 to US$4.99 billion in 2021. By 2020, US$1.67 billion was invested in African agriculture, with nearly two-thirds targeting cash crop cultivation. Zambia ranked among the top ten African countries receiving Chinese foreign direct investment and loans.

My research on Zambian agriculture finds that Chinese land grabbing is a myth. Instead, Chinese investors have preferred different investment models according to the specific rules of land access, transfer and control of three land tenure systems in Zambia.

What ties the three types of Chinese agricultural investments together is this: land institutions matter. Whether it’s central government rules or traditional authority, these systems shape how foreign investment happens and what impact it has.

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Read more: Foreign agriculture investments don’t always threaten food security: the case of Madagascar

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Each of the three models raises new opportunities and challenges for rural development and land governance. These findings matter because they offer insights into the future of land rights, livelihoods and state-building in African countries.

Not all land is the same

After independence, all land in Zambia was vested in the president, held in trust for the people. Today, the country still operates under a dual land system, as outlined in the 1995 Lands Act. State land, managed by the central government, includes both private and government leaseholds. Customary land, on the other hand, remains under the authority of traditional chiefs. The exact proportion of state and customary land in Zambia is contested, with estimates of customary land ranging widely from 94% to 54%.

This tenure distinction is significant because each type of land is governed by different rules regarding foreign access and ownership, which shape how foreign investors choose their investment models.

Over four months of fieldwork in Zambia, I gathered data on 50 Chinese agricultural projects (41 remained active) through 96 qualitative interviews. These projects were spread across three types of land tenure: private leasehold (37), government leasehold (1), and customary land (3).

Model 1: Commercial farm on private land

My fieldwork data showed that the majority of Chinese agricultural investments in Zambia are located on private leasehold land, typically following the commercial farm model. This type of land functions much like private property, held under 99-year leases that can be bought, sold or transferred. Investors use it for large-scale farming operations, such as maize, soybean and wheat production.

Even in these seemingly privatised spaces, however, state power remains influential. When Zambia proposed a draft National Land Policy in 2017 aimed at tightening rules for foreign land ownership, Chinese investors responded strategically. Many began aligning their projects with Zambia’s development priorities, emphasising contributions to local food security, donating to charities, and promoting themselves as responsible corporate actors.

Model 2: Farm block on government land

In northern Zambia, for example, a Chinese company partnered with the government to develop a farm block on state-owned land that had been converted from customary tenure for national development. Unlike the commercial farm model, the government played a central role, selecting the investor, managing the land and negotiating the deal. The project promised infrastructure and jobs, enhancing the political standing of local officials.

But this kind of state-led development works only when the promises are delivered. In other areas where farm blocks failed to materialise, traditional chiefs reclaimed the land. In the northern case, actual physical infrastructure investment helped reinforce state authority.

Model 3: Contract farming on customary land

The third model is very different. For instance, a Chinese agribusiness company arranged contract farming deals with over 50,000 smallholders in Zambia’s Eastern Province. Instead of buying or leasing land, the company provided seeds and bought cotton from farmers after harvest. This let the company access land informally, without triggering the legal and political risks of converting customary land to leasehold.

Operating on customary land posed challenges for investors. When farmers defaulted on loans or engaged in side-selling, companies had limited legal recourse and often had to negotiate with chiefs and local communities rather than the state. In such contexts, traditional authorities – not the central government – wielded the decisive power over land and its governance.

Why this matters

In a world where land deals are often controversial, understanding how local rules shape global investment is crucial. It’s not just about who buys the land, but under what terms, and how those terms are enforced. African governments are not just passive bystanders; they’re active players who use land institutions to negotiate power and development.

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Read more: China and Africa: Ethiopia case study debunks investment myths

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This research urges us to look beyond the headlines about “land grabs” and instead focus on the everyday politics of land. If African states want to steer rural development on their own terms, understanding and strengthening land institutions – both statutory and customary – is key.

– Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth
– https://theconversation.com/are-chinese-investors-grabbing-zambian-land-study-finds-thats-a-myth-257644

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sara Watson, Assistant Professor, Indiana State University

The Earth of the last Ice Age (about 26,000 to 19,000 years ago) was very different from today’s world.

In the northern hemisphere, ice sheets up to 8 kilometres tall covered much of Europe, Asia and North America, while much of the southern hemisphere became drier as water was drawn into the northern glaciers.

As more and more water was transformed into ice, global sea levels dropped as much as 125 metres from where they are now, exposing land that had been under the ocean.

In southernmost Africa, receding coastlines exposed an area of the continental shelf known as the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain. At its maximum extent, it covered an area of about 36,000km² along the south coast of what’s now South Africa.

This now – extinct ecosystem was a highly productive landscape with abundant grasslands, wetlands, permanent water drainage systems, and seasonal flood plains. The Palaeo-Agulhas Plain was likely most similar to the present day Serengeti in east Africa. It would likely have been able to support large herds of migratory animals and the people who hunted them.

We now know more about how these people lived thanks to data from a new archaeological site called Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1.

The site sits 23 metres above sea level on the southern coast of South Africa overlooking the Indian Ocean. You can watch whales from the site today, but during the Ice Age the ocean was nowhere to be seen. Instead, the site looked out over the vast grasslands; the coast was 75 kilometres away.

Archaeological investigation of the cave began in 2014, led by Naomi Cleghorn of the University of Texas. This work shows that humans have been using the site for much of the last 48,000 years or more. Occupations bridge the Middle to Later Stone Age transition, which occurred sometime between about 40,000 and 25,000 years ago in southern Africa.

That transition is a time period where we see dramatic changes in the technologies people were using, including changes in raw materials selected for making tools and a shift towards smaller tools. These changes are poorly understood due to a lack of sites with occupations dating to this time. Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1 is the first site on the southern coast that provides a continuous occupational record near the end of the Pleistocene (Ice Age) and documents how life changed for people living on the edge of the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain.

Before the Ice Age, people there collected marine resources like shellfish when the coastline was close to the site. As the climate began to cool and sea levels dropped, they shifted their focus to land-based resources and game animals.

I am one of the archaeologists who have been working here. In a new study, my colleagues and I analysed stone tools from the cave that date to about 19,000 to 18,000 years ago, and discussed how the techniques used to make them hint at the ways that prehistoric people travelled, interacted, and shared their craft.

Based on this analysis, we think the cave may have been used as a temporary camp rather than a primary residence. And the similarity of the tools with those from other sites suggests people were connected over a huge region and shared ideas with each other, much like people do today.

Robberg technology of southern Africa

In human history, tools were invented in a succession of styles (“technologies” or “industries”), which can indicate the time and place where they were made and what they were used for.

The Robberg is one of southern Africa’s most distinctive and widespread stone tool technologies. Robberg tools – which we found at the Knysna site – are thought to be replaceable components in composite tools, perhaps as barbs set into arrow shafts, used to hunt the migratory herds on the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain.

We see the first appearance of Robberg technology in southern Africa near the peak of the last Ice Age around 26,000 years ago, and people continued producing these tools until around 12,000 years ago, when climate conditions were warmer.

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Read more: What stone tools found in southern tip of Africa tell us about the human story

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The particular methods and order of operations that people used to make their tools is something that is taught and learned. If we see specific methods of stone tool production at multiple sites, it indicates that people were sharing ideas with one another.

Robberg occupations at Knysna date to between 21,000 and 15,000 years ago, when sea levels were at their lowest and the coastline far away.

The Robberg tools we recovered were primarily made from rocks that were available close to the site. Most of the tools were made from quartz, which creates very sharp edges but can break unpredictably. Production focused on bladelets, or small elongated tools, which may have been replaceable components in hunting weapons.

Some of the tools were made from a raw material called silcrete. People in South Africa were heat treating this material to improve its quality for tool production as early as 164,000 years ago. The silcrete tools at Knysna were heat treated before being brought to the site. This is only the second documented instance of the use of heat treatment in Robberg technology.

Silcrete is not available near Knysna. Most of the accessible deposits in the area are in the Outeniqua mountains, at least 50 kilometres inland. We’re not sure yet whether people using the Knysna site were travelling to these raw material sources themselves or trading with other groups.

Archaeological sites containing Robberg tools are found in South Africa, Lesotho and Eswatini, indicating a widespread adoption by people across southern Africa. The tools from the Knysna site share many characteristics with those from other sites, which suggests people were sharing information through social networks that may have spanned the entire width of the continent.

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Read more: 65,000-year-old ‘stone Swiss Army knives’ show early humans had long-distance social networks

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Yet there are other aspects that are unique to the Knysna site. Fewer tools are found in the more recent layers than in deeper layers, suggesting that people were using the site less frequently than they had previously. This may suggest that during the Ice Age the cave was used as a temporary camp rather than as a primary residential site.

Left with questions

Stone tools can only tell us so much. Was Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1 a temporary camp? If so, what were they coming to the cave for? We need to combine what we learned from the stone tools with other data from the site to answer these questions.

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Read more: Ancient human DNA from a South African rock shelter sheds light on 10,000 years of history

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Something we can say with confidence is that we have a very long and rich history as a species, and our innovative and social natures go back a lot further in time than most people realise. Humans living during the last Ice Age had complex technologies to solve their problems, made art and music, connected with people in other communities, and in some places even had pet dogs.

Despite the dramatic differences in the world around us, these Ice Age people were not very different from people living today.

– Stone tools from a cave on South Africa’s coast speak of life at the end of the Ice Age
– https://theconversation.com/stone-tools-from-a-cave-on-south-africas-coast-speak-of-life-at-the-end-of-the-ice-age-258317

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

Kakuma refugee camp

Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

Consequences of aid cut

The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

Implications

The study carries two major policy implications.

First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

– What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture
– https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

The Nigerian economy grew at a robust rate of 3.4% in 2024, the highest it has been since 2019 (except 2021 when the COVID rebound occurred).

This should have been cheering news, worthy of firecrackers and champagne-popping. Rather it came with a catch: the country’s poverty profile worsened.

In its annual review of the country, the World Bank applauded Nigeria for its economic reforms. These include the removal of fuel subsidies, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and maintenance of a contractionary monetary policy. This is a policy of raising interest rates, reducing money supply and increasing borrowing costs to rein in inflation.

But the bank also drew attention to the fact that the country’s poverty profile has become grim. About 31% of Nigerians lived in poverty prior to the COVID-19 epidemic. Since then, an additional 42 million have become poor, increasing the poverty rate to about 46% in 2024.

Poverty is even worse in Nigeria’s rural communities: 75.5% live on US$2.15 or less per day (based on 2017 prices). The average poverty rate for sub-Saharan African countries was 36.5% in 2024 and 0.8% for East Asia and the Pacific.

Nigeria’s poverty rate would have been higher if the multidimensional poverty index had been used. In addition to income, the index considers access to education, health, decent housing, nutrition, sanitation, electricity and water. Access to these critical services has worsened for many Nigerians, despite improvements in macroeconomic stability.

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Read more: Poor rural infrastructure holds back food production by small Nigerian farmers

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A challenge for policy makers is how to translate impressive macroeconomic outcomes into high-paying jobs, lower poverty rates and access to health, good sanitation, education, electricity and affordable housing. The question is even more acute for people in rural areas.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades and lived in a rural community, I believe Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach.

One major step should be a change in the country’s growth drivers. Oil, information and communications technology and finance are the major drivers of growth in Nigeria.

These sectors are not employment-intensive, and they require skills that most Nigerians don’t have. Because of the lack of employment opportunities in these sectors, most Nigerians gravitate towards the informal sector, which accounts for about 90% of employment in the country.

By continuing to urge Nigerians to be patient for economic reforms to have a positive impact on their living conditions, the Tinubu administration appears to assume that improvements in macroeconomic performance will eventually manifest in lower unemployment and poverty rates. This notion of “trickle-down economics” is misconceived and illusory.

The government needs to intentionally create transmission mechanisms through which economic growth and macroeconomic stability can raise living standards.

Fostering growth with development

Concerted efforts will be needed to target poverty in general, and rural poverty in particular.

Five key policies could get Nigeria closer to this goal:

Building productive capacities: People who live in rural areas in Nigeria are eager to work and full of creative ideas and entrepreneurial spirit. But they lack the resources and opportunity to fully unleash their potential.

Building their productive capacities would entail giving them access to basic education, technical and managerial skills, and other productive resources such as tools, equipment, finance and land. The government should identify the comparative advantage of different rural communities, and put in place policies that encourage those communities to use their comparative advantage and distinctive competencies.

Opportunity to diversify incomes: In developed countries, many people hold multiple jobs. Most rural dwellers in Nigeria, however, rely on agriculture as their only source of livelihood.

Because of limited access to inputs and modern technology, and outdated agricultural practices, their productivity is often very low. Their low income makes it difficult to save and invest in education, health and housing.

Non-agricultural activities, especially manufacturing, need to be located in rural communities, to give rural dwellers the opportunity to diversify their income sources.

Agriculture-led industrial strategy: This would involve the location of manufacturing plants close to the sources of agricultural raw materials.

Nigerian manufacturers locate their factories in urban areas. The result of urban-biased development strategy in Nigeria has been the lack of employment opportunities in rural communities, and a decline in the rural population, from about 85% in 1960 to 46% in 2023.

Moving manufacturing to rural areas would require massive investment in infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads and health services.

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Read more: Nigeria’s new blue economy ministry could harness marine resources – moving the focus away from oil

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Ending patriarchy and male domination: Women disproportionately bear the burden of rural poverty in Nigeria. A study in rural south-east Nigeria found that the poverty rate among women was 98%, compared to 85% for men. Men are often given preference regarding access to land, education, skills acquisition and financial inclusion.

Women are also imbued with the responsibility of caring for children, the elderly and the sick, as well as household chores. This leaves them with little time for paid work or opportunities to acquire marketable skills.

Ability to absorb shocks and vulnerability: Rural poverty is often exacerbated by shocks and vulnerability such as extreme weather conditions, attacks by insurgents and other criminal groups, and illness. With no safety nets, and little or no saving, most rural dwellers are unable to withstand shocks.

The Tinubu administration plans to disburse N25,000 (about US$17) each to 60 million Nigerians. But these kinds of support are too small, non-pervasive, irregular and unpredictable.

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Read more: Nigeria needs to close the financial inclusion gap for women smallholder farmers

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What India and China have to teach

Nigeria could do well to borrow from the Indian model of an institutionalised safety net.

India issues “ration cards” to eligible households. The cards enable poor people to purchase essential food items such as grains, milk, eggs, cooking oil and bread at subsidised prices from designated stores.

Nigeria could finance this kind of programme with a special tax on oil companies and financial institutions, which frequently post huge after-tax profits.

China has had an impressive record of poverty reduction. Using the US$1.90 poverty line, China’s poverty rate decreased from 88.1% in 1981 to 0.3% in 2018.

The fall in rural poverty is even more dramatic, from 96% in 1980 to 1% in 2019.

This reduction was accomplished in stages, starting with an increase in agricultural productivity. It then shifted focus to the development of non-agricultural sectors of the economy, including manufacturing. These sectors were able to draw surplus labour from the agricultural sector, giving them skills that led to higher wages and poverty alleviation.

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Read more: Poor rural infrastructure holds back food production by small Nigerian farmers

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Next steps

The World Bank in its report noted that addressing pressing social and humanitarian challenges remains critical to ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth in Nigeria.

Cash transfers and social assistance programmes could provide temporary relief for the poor in rural communities. But a long-term solution is to build their productive capacities and transform rural communities in ways that provide opportunities for income diversification.

– Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-is-growing-but-rural-poverty-is-rising-5-key-policies-to-address-the-divide-257152

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah, Postdoctoral Fellow, Dublin City University

Mali, a landlocked Sahelian nation of 25 million people, has faced significant instability since 2012, marked by terrorism, state neglect and armed conflicts.

That year a Tuareg rebellion started in northern Mali and President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a military coup. Constitutional rule was suspended. Rebels in northern Mali went on to seize cities like Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, declaring an independent Islamic State of Azawad and imposing sharia law.

They also destroyed cultural heritage sites, including 14 of Timbuktu’s 16 Unesco-listed mausoleums. The crisis prompted international intervention, including a UN authorised mission, which retook northern cities within weeks. Islamist rebels retreated into civilian populations and remote areas.

Despite these efforts, violence against civilians by extremist groups and community militias has continued. By 2023, 8.8 million Malians needed humanitarian assistance. Over 375,500 were internally displaced, primarily women and children.

Meanwhile, the former French colony had turned to China for military assistance. Between 2012 and 2013, China provided €5 million (about US$5.8 million) in logistical equipment to improve the Malian army’s mobility.

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Read more: China’s interests in Africa are being shaped by the race for renewable energy

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In August 2013, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army gave the Malian army military supplies totalling 1.6 billion CFA francs (about US$2.8 million). China made similar donations between 2014 and 2023.

I am an international security and global governance researcher. My recent research explored the impact of China’s security sector assistance on Mali’s fragility.

China’s assistance to Mali aims to equip the country to address terrorism and insurgency. But I argue that it may have unintended consequences and cause further damage to the country.

The heavy reliance on Chinese supply exposes Mali to vulnerabilities, including supply disruptions, diminished bargaining power, and limited strategic flexibility. This could destabilise security even more should China face manufacturing issues or supply chain disruptions leading to delays or shortages in the production of weapons.

It also raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence policies and decision-making processes. In turn this could entrench the Malian military government’s position. China takes a hands-off approach to the governance structures of the countries it engages with. Hopes of democratisation in the country could be affected.

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Read more: US trade wars with China – and how they play out in Africa

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Rich in resources

Mali has significant natural resources, including 800 tons of gold reserves (it’s Africa’s fourth-largest producer), iron ore, manganese, lithium, and potential uranium and hydrocarbon deposits.

In 2019, gold production generated US$734 million, or 9.7% of Mali’s GDP, supporting over 10% of the population.

Chinese firms, such as Ganfeng Lithium and China National Nuclear Corporation, have invested heavily in Mali’s mining sector. They are involved in a US$130 million lithium project and uranium exploration in the Kidal and Falea regions.

Despite security risks, including attacks on Chinese personnel in 2015 and 2021, China remains committed due to Mali’s resource potential.

Beyond mining, China has invested in Mali’s infrastructure. A US$2.7 billion railway modernisation project connects Bamako to Dakar, facilitating resource exports like iron ore and bauxite.

The total of Mali’s external debt to China is not explicitly stated. But the 2014 loan agreement of US$11 billion and the 2016 loan of US$2.7 billion alone suggest Mali’s debt to China could be at least US$13 billion. This is without including loans for projects like the Bamako-Ségou expressway, and bridges in Bamako.

This has often been criticised as “debt trap diplomacy”, increasing recipient countries’ dependence on Beijing. In Mali, I believe this risks entrenching economic vulnerability and giving China geopolitical leverage.

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Read more: China reaps most of the benefits of its relationship with Africa: what’s behind the imbalance

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China’s security sector assistance to Mali

Historically, Mali relied on France. More recently, it’s used Russia’s expeditionary corps, formerly known as Wagner Group, for security support.

In 2011, China provided US$11.4 million in grants, US$8.1 million in zero-interest loans, and a US$100.8 million concessional loan to foster bilateral cooperation.

China’s participation in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali, starting in 2013 with 395 personnel, marked a shift in its security engagement.

Chinese peacekeepers, including engineers, medical personnel and security guards, repaired infrastructure, provided medical aid and supported Mali’s 2013 elections.

Their professionalism earned praise from the UN special envoy Albert Gerard Koenders for helping to ensure a smooth election.

China’s involvement in Mali challenged traditional European approaches to peacekeeping, particularly France’s military-heavy strategy.

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Read more: China-Africa relations: new priorities have driven major shifts over the last 24 years – 5 essential reads

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How China’s assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility

In spite of the positives, China’s security sector assistance contributes to Mali’s fragility in several ways.

First, its no-strings-attached nature allows Mali’s military junta to consolidate power without making democratic or governance reforms.

This lack of accountability enables corrupt military factions to operate unchecked. Governance weaknesses and authoritarianism can continue.

Second, the heavy reliance on Chinese supply raises concerns about the potential influence of China on Mali’s defence decisions.

This over-reliance on military solutions risks escalating conflicts and could lead to human rights abuses by security forces, as seen in increased violence against civilians. It doesn’t address root causes of conflict like social cohesion or local governance.

Third, Mali’s growing dependence on Chinese aid — both military and economic — makes it vulnerable to disruptions from geopolitical tensions, supply chain issues, or changes in China’s foreign policy. This limits Mali’s ability to diversify its military capabilities or respond to evolving threats.

Finally, China’s infrastructure investments, such as the US$1.48 billion (750 billion CFA francs) Bamako-Dakar railway loan, creates “debt trap diplomacy”.

This pattern deepens economic dependence and reduces policy autonomy, further weakening state resilience.

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Read more: Maps showing China’s growing influence in Africa distort reality – but some risks are real

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The way forward

To mitigate the risks of Chinese security sector assistance and promote sustainable stability, Mali must adopt a multifaceted strategy.

First, it should collaborate with China to align security sector assistance with civilian-led security approaches.

Second, Mali should diversify security and economic partnerships with donors like the US, the UK, and the EU.

Third, transparent guidelines, developed through consultation with stakeholders, should assess the impacts of assistance to avoid deepening dependence.

Fourth, engaging civil society and publishing regular reports on security sector assistance use and outcomes will foster public trust.

Finally, promoting regional economic integration and ties with global powers will bolster Mali’s economic resilience.

– China’s support for Mali’s military carries risks: researcher outlines what they are
– https://theconversation.com/chinas-support-for-malis-military-carries-risks-researcher-outlines-what-they-are-257738

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Walther, Associate Professor in Geography, University of Florida

What’s the connection between roads and conflict in west Africa? This may seem like an odd question. But a study we conducted shows a close relationship between the two.

We are researchers of transnational political violence. We analysed 58,000 violent events in west Africa between 2000 to 2024. Our focus was on identifying patterns of violence in relation to transport infrastructure.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that roads, bridges, pipelines and other transport systems are increasingly attacked across west Africa, but little is known about the factors that explain when, where and by whom.

Violence in west Africa involves a complex mix of political, economic and social factors. Weak governance, corruption, urban-rural inequalities and marginalised populations have been exploited by numerous armed groups, including transnational criminal networks and religious extremists.

West Africa has been one of the world’s most violent regions since the mid 2010s. In 2024 alone, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data initiative recorded over 10,600 events of political violence in the region. These ranged from battles between armed groups, explosions and other forms of remote violence, to attacks on unarmed civilians. An estimated 25,600 people were killed. This has been the status quo in the region for nearly a decade.

The results of our study show that 65% of all the attacks, explosions, and violence against civilians recorded between 2000 and 2024 were located within one kilometre of a road.

Only 4% of all events were located further than 10km from a road. This pattern was consistent across all road types but most pronounced near highways and primary roads.

We think the reason for this pattern is that there is fierce competition between state and non-state actors for access to and use of roads.

Governments need well-developed road networks for a host of reasons, including the ability to govern, enabling economic activity, and security. Roads enable military mobility and reduce potential safe havens for insurgents in remote regions.

Insurgent groups also see transport networks as prime targets. They create opportunities to blockade cities, ambush convoys, kidnap travellers, employ landmines, and destroy key infrastructure.

Our research is part of a long line of work that explored the role of infrastructure in relation to security in west Africa. Our latest research reinforces earlier findings linking the two. Transport networks have become battlegrounds for extremist groups seeking to destabilise states, isolate communities and expand their influence.

The network

The west African road network is vast, estimated at over 709,000km of roads by the Global Roads Inventory Project. It compares unfavourably with other African regions. For example, paved roads remain relatively scarce in west Africa (17% of the regional network) when compared with north Africa (83%).

Poorly maintained roads impose costs on west African countries. They increase transport time of perishable goods, shorten the operational life of trucks, cause more accidents, and reduce social interactions between communities.

Still, significant variations in road quality are found across the region. The percentage of paved roads ranges from a high of 37% in Senegal to just over 7% in Mali. Nigeria has the largest road network in west Africa with an estimated 195,000km, but much of it has deteriorated because of poor maintenance.

Road-related violence is on the rise

We found that road-related attacks have been on the rise since jihadist groups emerged in the mid-2010s. Only 31 ambushes against convoys were reported in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger from 2000-2015, against 497 from 2016-2023.

Attacks frequently occur along the same road segments, such as around Boni in the Gourma Mounts, where Jama’at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) conducted nine attacks against Malian forces and Wagner mercenaries between 2019 and 2024.

Violence was the most clustered near roads in 2011, with 87% of all violent events located within 1km of a road. Our analysis shows that, though still high, there’s been a decline post-2000: 59% in 2022 and 60% in 2024. This evolution reflects the ruralisation of conflict in west Africa. As jihadist insurgents target rural areas and small towns more and more, an increasing share of violent events also occurs far away from roads.

We’ve studied the root causes of west Africa’s violence for nearly a decade, documenting the ever-intensifying costs paid by its people. In the process, we’ve uncovered overlooked aspects of the turmoil, including the centrality of the road networks to an understanding of where the violence is happening.

The most dangerous roads of west Africa

Our findings show that violence against transport infrastructure is very unevenly distributed in west Africa and that specific road segments have been repeatedly targeted. This was particularly the case in the Central Sahel, Lake Chad basin, and western Cameroon.

For example, the 350km ring road linking Bamenda to Kumbo and Wum in Cameroon is the most violent road in west Africa, with 757 events since 2018, due to the conflict between the government and the Ambazonian separatists.

The longest segments of dangerous roads are in Nigeria, particularly those connecting Maiduguri in Borno State to Damaturu, Potiskum, Biu and Bama.

In the central Sahel, the road between Mopti/Sévaré and Gao is by far the most violent transport axis, with 433 events since the beginning of the civil war in Mali in 2012. South of Gao, National Road 17 leading to the Nigerien border, and National Road 20 heading east toward Ménaka have experienced 177 and 139 events respectively since the Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP) intensified its activities in the region in 2017.

In Burkina Faso, all the roads leading to Djibo near the border with Mali have experienced high levels of violence since the early 2020s.

Building transport infrastructure to promote peace

Roads are an important part of state counterinsurgency strategies and a strategic target for local militants. Yes, as our work highlights, transport infrastructure is largely ignored in debates that emphasise more state interventions as a means of combating insecurity. Sixty years after the independence of many west African countries, road accessibility remains elusive in the region.

Peripheral cities such as Bardaï, Bilma, Kidal and Timbuktu, where rebel movements have historically developed, are still not connected to the national network by tarmac roads.

The duality of the transport infrastructure, as both a facilitator and target of violence, has put government forces at a disadvantage. Regular forces are heavily constrained by the sparsity and poor conditions of the road network, which makes them vulnerable to attacks without necessarily allowing them to project their military power over long distances.

Rather than building transport infrastructure, states have focused on strengthening security by investing in military bases. The military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have further reinforced this trend, with the creation of a joint force by the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States.

Strengthening security has taken precedence over developmental support for peripheral communities, who experience the worst of the violence.

– Highways to hell: west Africa’s road networks are the preferred battleground for terror groups
– https://theconversation.com/highways-to-hell-west-africas-road-networks-are-the-preferred-battleground-for-terror-groups-258517

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Leonor Oliveira Toscano, PhD Candidate in Political Science, University of Oslo

Kenya has been praised as a “model for the world” when it comes to peacebuilding efforts to manage outbreaks of violence within its borders. The country has systematically put in place a peacebuilding architecture rooted in a history of local peace initiatives. These date back to the early 1990s.

Over this period, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee emerged in the country’s north-eastern region. The committee successfully addressed decades of inter-clan violence in Wajir, an arid county bordering Somalia. It also inspired the emergence of numerous local peace committees across the country.

These committees have been set up in some other African countries – like Ghana, South Africa, Sierra Leone and Burundi – and continue to contribute informally to local peacebuilding in these states.

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Read more: Training local leaders in mediation can reduce violence: positive results in Nigeria

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In Kenya, the committees became institutionalised after post-election violence in 2007-08 and a mediation process led by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan. They now form part of the national peacebuilding architecture.

Violence triggered by the contested 2007 presidential election outcome resulted in the killing of more than 1,000 people. The mediation process led to a power-sharing agreement signed by the presidential contenders Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga.

The country’s peacebuilding architecture is now supported by several policies and frameworks. These include the constitution of 2010. The system that’s been built has the capacity to connect a wide variety of peacebuilding actors – both state and non-state, formal and informal – at all levels of society. This helps resolve conflict and build resilience.

The Kenyan government initiated a review of the peacebuilding architecture in 2023. It involved a lengthy consultation process and high levels of participation among Kenyans. The National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management led the way, assisted by an independent panel of 13 peacebuilding experts.

Released at the end of 2024, the review looked at the strengths and weaknesses of the architecture.

It offers a vision for building a robust peacebuilding system, along with an actionable roadmap. One lesson is that Kenya can use the capacities and unique approaches of different peacebuilding actors. At the local level, peace committees showed that they made contributions to early warning systems and building confidence in communities.

However, insufficient resources and a consistent focus on electoral violence prevent the system from addressing other drivers of conflict.

The strengths

Local peace committees, with membership typically drawn from ordinary citizens, religious groups or local civil society organisations, play a crucial role. They support dialogue around conflict issues. They promote trust and understanding, and can build a constructive environment for conflict resolution.

Their information gathering feeds into the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s Conflict Early Warning and Response System (CEWARN) to prevent election violence. Local peace committees have contributed to negotiating local disputes. They have also helped de-polarise ethnic identities and facilitated local peace agreements. One example was the Modogashe Declaration. It sets ground rules to solve conflict and local disputes over pasture, water access and cattle rustling.

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Read more: Kenya violence: 5 key drivers of the decades-long conflict in the north and what to do about them

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We are researchers in Norway on a project focusing on civilian agency, local peace and resilience building. Our own interviews with committee members in Nakuru – a county greatly affected by the violence in 2007-08 – found that peace committee members continued to work together and share conflict-sensitive information with local stakeholders. These include administration officers and religious leaders, and covered periods during and after the 2022 elections.

Further, local peace committees can offer women valuable opportunities for participation in conflict management. This contributes to their protection, for example from sexual violence.

The weaknesses

Despite these successes, Kenya’s peacebuilding architecture faces pressing challenges.

First, local peace committees aren’t perfect. They can be manipulated by politicians seeking to build local support. They can also compete with traditional actors such as elders in conflict resolution.

Kenya’s institutionalisation of local peacebuilding strengthened information flow across all levels. But it also threatens to undermine local peacebuilding agency and autonomy. Formalising local peace committees can spur an unhealthy monetisation of peacebuilding, with some members joining for financial gain. This threatens to erode the voluntary character of peacebuilding as a common good and undermine genuine priorities for peace.

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Read more: How women in Kenya mobilised for peace after surviving violence

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Second, elite-level politics in Kenya creates the persistent risk of electoral violence. This diverts attention and resources away from other long-standing causes of conflict. The drivers of violence in Kenya are varied and region specific. They include disputes over access to land, and marginalisation of ethnic and religious communities. Climate change threatens to worsen competition and conflict between pastoralists and farming communities.

Our analysis of event data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data shows that communal violence is the deadliest form of political violence in Kenya. For their part, fatalities related to election violence have decreased. This underscores the urgent need to consistently invest in prevention and local peacebuilding beyond narrow electoral periods.

Fatalities in Kenya by type of armed violence: 2010-2023

Electoral competition can escalate violence between pastoralists and farmers, but it’s the persistence of communal conflicts that represents a serious threat. Communal violence particularly affects Kenya’s arid and semi-arid areas in the Rift Valley, eastern and north-eastern regions.

What next

Our interviews with local peace committee members show that funding for their activities diminishes outside election years. This hampers their capacity to address conflict outside these periods.

Yet research has shown that local peacebuilding can build social resilience against recurrent communal violence. Peacebuilding interventions grounded in local realities are also vital for countering insurgent violence. This is especially important as counterterrorism operations by state forces often trigger cycles of violence rather than resolving underlying issues.

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Read more: Drivers of electoral violence in Kenya: red flags to watch out for

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Our research finds that Kenyans place significant trust in local peacebuilders, such as community leaders, elders and women. The review of the country’s peacebuilding architecture proposes a 40% quota for women, youth and people with disabilities in local peace committees.

However, quotas alone may not be sufficient to address the political and cultural challenges that entrench inequality.

Ultimately, political elites need to transform Kenya’s “win at all costs” politics. This way, the country’s mediators and peacebuilders can address the deep social and economic grievances that underpin cycles of violence.

– Kenya’s peacebuilding efforts hold valuable lessons for the rest of the world, but gaps remain
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-peacebuilding-efforts-hold-valuable-lessons-for-the-rest-of-the-world-but-gaps-remain-257761

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kim Gurney, Senior Researcher, Centre for Humanities Research — Platform: SA-UK Bilateral Digital Humanities Chair in Culture & Technics, University of the Western Cape

Independent art spaces are collectives of artists (and others) who club together to set up a communal space – often in former industrial sites and more affordable parts of the city – to further their practice. These spaces are DIY art institutions, if you like, that operate largely under the radar. In art world lingo, “offspaces”.

Designed for purpose over profit, they encourage experimental work and creative risk-taking. They also favour art in public space, which provides an intriguing lens on the city.

My Africa-wide research took me to five such spaces, each at least 10 years old, so that I could learn their secret sauce of sustainability. I found it’s largely about shapeshifting, a capacity for constant reinvention. The key ingredient is artistic thinking, made up of five key principles highlighted in the examples below.

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Read more: Koyo Kouoh – tribute to a curator who fiercely promoted African art

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Offspaces are found everywhere but have notably grown across Africa over the past couple of decades, along with fast-changing cities and a resurgent art scene. One big picture point is crucial, and that’s about urbanisation. Globally, more and more people are moving to cities and most of them are young – by 2050, one in three young people in the world will be of African origin and the continent will be largely urban.

There can be a lack of imagination about what all this means and that’s where artists come in. They offer new ideas to help build the world we want to live in, rather than reinforce the one we already have.

Offspaces in Africa have to navigate prevailing uncertainty, which is a daily reality for most people living in cities. In response, artists band together to build their own pseudo institutions, bit by bit. These self-made pathways offer useful navigational tactics for others – or “panya routes”, as Kenyans call the trails that motorbike taxis invent.

The spaces I visited were all moving away from reliance on foreign donor funding (given little or no state support) towards a hybrid model that blends with local philanthropy, collaborative economies and self-generated income schemes. They also want to own their own land and hold assets so that they can think about the future.

1. The GoDown Arts Centre – Nairobi, Kenya

The GoDown Arts Centre was established in 2003. Previously a large compound of repurposed warehouses (“godowns”) in Nairobi’s industrial area, right now it’s a construction site as it morphs into an iconic cultural hub. GoDown 2.0 is a multipurpose vision that works at different scales, like a fractal. There will be a large, welcoming facade leading into a semi-public section for music and dance, with artist studios at the heart. Plus galleries, library, museum, auditorium, offices, hotel, a restaurant, conference facilities and parking.

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Read more: Kenyan artists reflect Gen Z hopes and frustrations in new exhibition

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Its rebuild is a great example of how artists create public space: in phases. It follows a radical “design-with-people” approach, starting with years of input from all directions to reconsider the building and its relationship to the city.

This ground-up ethos of horizontality, the first key principle, also shapes its signature event, an annual public arts festival called Nai Ni Who? (Who is Nairobi?). Local residents are the curators, and the everyday city is the artwork. Participants are taken around neighbourhoods on foot to experience the good, the bad, and the possibilities. These grounded insights also inform ongoing engagements GoDown has with policymakers about the shape of a future Nairobi.

2. ANO Institute – Accra, Ghana

ANO, established in 2002, repurposed a former workshop for car repairs into a gallery, after starting life in a public park. On the other side of the road, opposite the gallery, stood its office, residency space and growing library.

Most intriguingly, a striking rectilinear structure was positioned alongside. This Mobile Museum mimics the trading kiosks that line every street. Many are also shapeshifters: kindergarten by day, church by night, for example.

ANO’s empty museum, collapsible and see-through, went on a countrywide adventure in 2018 and 2019, asking people to imagine its contents, and later revisited with the results. It signalled a larger and ongoing effort, Future Museum, to find a more relevant exhibition form that’s alive to the fluid way culture is threaded here into everyday life.

ANO demonstrates the second principle of performativity – that is, not only saying things with art but doing things too. More recently, it rebuilt on a new site in central Accra, designed by 87-year-old Ophelia Akiwumi, entirely from raffia palm in a focus on indigenous knowledge systems.

3. Townhouse Gallery – Cairo, Egypt

I visited Townhouse just after it reclaimed its inner-city premises following a partial physical collapse. But this turned out to be a false restart. It closed for good not long after, citing a complex brew of factors that ended 21 years of various battles and resurrections. That it survived so long – from 1998 until 2019 – is remarkable for an offspace.

Part of the reason was its solidarity networks, including with neighbourhood communities – mostly mechanic shops and other artisanal trades who even helped Townhouse rebuild. In its heyday, Townhouse comprised an art gallery, library, theatre and performance venue, and notably hatched other spaces.

The latest rose like a phoenix from its ashes – Access Art Space, which reanimates the same physical space with visual art exhibitions. The legacy of Townhouse is the third principle of elasticity – responding nimbly to constant flux but also being able to refuse impossible conditions with “the right no” (a necessary response in certain situations).

4. ZOMA Museum – Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

ZOMA Museum has also lived many lives. Starting small, its roots were in a three-day public arts festival called Giziawi #1 (Temporary). It comprised performances and exhibitions across the city but focused on Meskel Square, a key public space.

Zoma Contemporary Art Centre grew out of that in 2002, followed in 2019 by Zoma Museum when its co-founders bought a plot of polluted land. Its rehabilitation into an ecological haven has become a case study in sustainable architecture.

Zoma is built by local artisans from mud and straw using indigenous technologies going back centuries. Yet its elegant buildings look futuristic. Zoma is all about the fourth principle of convergence – the past, present and future all happening at once. It’s also about doing multiple things, like running Zoma School, an inherited kindergarten. The land is part of the curriculum.

Just a year after it opened, Zoma spawned yet another life, an offshoot in a newly opened park blending nature with culture and recreation.

5. Nafasi Art Space – Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Nafasi is Swahili for opportunity or chance, which fittingly describes the workings of Nafasi Art Space, established in 2008 – that is, second chance. This fifth and final principle of artistic thinking means giving materials, people and situations another go.

A good example of this is Nafasi’s new art school, built using repurposed shipping containers, like the rest of its premises – artist studios, a spacious gallery and performance arena. In the 2022 academy cohort, a general practice lawyer and an accountant were learning alongside artists, with a biologist at the helm.

Nafasi Art Academy cites the city’s biggest local market, Kariakoo, as design reference, particularly its distinctive elevated canopy and swirling stairwell. The curriculum also takes local context as a starting point, structured in themes to answer community-led questions. Its key function, like all the other offspaces, is storytelling. And the story it tells best is about institution-building as art.

– 5 indie art spaces in African cities worth knowing more about
– https://theconversation.com/5-indie-art-spaces-in-african-cities-worth-knowing-more-about-258009

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Seth Asare Okyere, Visiting lecturer, University of Pittsburg and Adjunct Associate Professor, Osaka University, University of Pittsburgh

Africa’s urban future will be shaped not only by large cities and capitals but also by its many small and medium-sized towns.

Large capital cities are no longer the hotspots of rapid urban growth. According to the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat), small and medium-sized towns are growing faster than large cities. These smaller towns often start as rural settlements.

Despite their rapid growth, many small towns lack infrastructure and planning capacity, leaving them vulnerable to environmental risks.

Ghana offers a telling example. While the spotlight is often on the rapid growth of the two major cities, Accra or Kumasi, dozens of smaller towns across the country are booming. At the same time, they are struggling with environmental problems such as decline in green spaces, flooding and pollution, usually associated with much larger cities.

Our research examined this issue, arguing that overlooking small towns has put them on an unsustainable path. In Ghana, small towns often “rest in the shadows” of bigger cities when it comes to resource distribution and development priorities. They receive less funding, fewer services, and scant regulatory oversight compared to major urban centres.

We conducted research in Somanya, Ghana. It lies in the eastern region, about 70km from Accra, the national capital. Our aim was to establish whether emerging sites of urbanisation like Somanya were developing in ways that made them sustainable, or replicating environmental problems seen in large cities.

To identify the drivers of environmental risks in the town, we used geographic information data and interviewed residents, institutional representatives and local assembly members.

We found that the urban growth of Somanya was linked with a decline in vegetation cover and loss of biodiversity. The main factors at play were: pollution from mining, political neglect, and lack of infrastructure facilities and services.

We concluded that current realities pointed towards unsustainable futures where environmental problems will become pronounced and the impacts on everyday life will be destructive. Based on our findings we recommend that Ghana’s national urban sustainable development policies and international development programmes must not fixate solely on big cities. Small towns require attention and investment commensurate with their growth.

Environmental risks in a rapidly growing small town

Somanya’s population grew from 88,000 people in 2010 to over 122,000 by 2021. The proportion of the municipality’s population living in urban areas jumped from 31% to 47% in that period.

Local leaders and officials we interviewed painted a worrying picture of a town rapidly growing without proactive environmental planning, grappling with multiple hazards at once.

Declining ecological resources: Rapid expansion has led to the loss of green spaces and forests around Somanya. Hillsides that used to be covered with vegetation have been cleared for large mango plantations or speculative estate development. This situation has made the area more prone to erosion and flash floods. One community elder observed:

The trees on the hills are almost all gone now. Without those natural buffers, flooding has become more frequent and severe, threatening homes built in low-lying areas.

Pollution and toxicity from industry: Somanya’s growth has attracted extractive industries, notably stone quarries and small-scale mining. These bring jobs, but also environmental hazards. Residents described clouds of dust hanging over communities near a quarry. There are also reports of chemical runoff polluting local streams and soil. Heavy dust and particulate pollution have become part of daily life, and people worry about the health effects. One resident said:

The dusty conditions are not only an infrastructure problem, but also an environmental risk for us, especially if you have underlying health conditions.

Strained and inadequate infrastructure: Basic environmental infrastructure in Somanya has not kept pace with its growth. The town’s drains and gutters are few and often clogged, so even moderate rainstorms result in street flooding. Proper sewage and waste treatment facilities are non-existent. Piles of uncollected refuse are commonly seen, sometimes burnt in the open, posing health risks. One community leader remarked that:

It is only when there’s a major flood or disaster outbreak that they pay us attention.

These infrastructure deficits mean that as the town grows, so do the environmental health risks – from water-borne diseases to flooding and pollution.

Governance lapses and political indifference: Underlying many of these problems is a sense of neglect and weak institutional capacity. Local authorities in Somanya operate with limited funding and fragmented responsibilities, and higher-level support from the central government is minimal. As an Assembly member put it:

We live in a constant state of perpetual waiting for the crumbs after big cities have taken their lion’s share of available funding. If you are not connected to the ruling party, it’s hard to get the support you need.

All these factors put small towns on a path to unsustainable futures.

Steering towards sustainable urban futures

Our research highlights the need to adopt a cross-sector, integrated approach to environmental planning at the local level. In practice, that means urban planners, environmental agencies, and community leaders all working together on development plans. For example, in Koa Hill settlement, Solomon Islands, a community-led development team with support from local groups and university experts led to the successful pilot of nature-inspired disaster risk reduction programmes.

Therefore, communities should be involved in co-designing solutions, from problem identification to experimenting strategies and evaluating outcomes. After all, residents know the local risks and resources best.

– Small towns are growing fast across Ghana – but environmental planning isn’t keeping up
– https://theconversation.com/small-towns-are-growing-fast-across-ghana-but-environmental-planning-isnt-keeping-up-257766

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Douglas Lucas Kivoi, Principal Policy Analyst, Governance Department, The Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)

The recent killing in Kenya of a young man in police detention highlights a string of systemic failures to hold the country’s security officers accountable for their actions. Despite public outrage and protests, Kenyan police officers continue to use inhumane, brutal and sometimes fatal methods with little consequence. Douglas Lucas Kivoi, who has studied policing and police reform in Kenya, unpacks the situation.

Why is the Kenyan police service given to brutality?

First, Kenya’s police institution was established as a colonial instrument of oppression. Police reforms since independence in 1963 have had little impact in changing this. Instead, successive governments have used the police to suppress dissent. This has cemented a culture of violence and police impunity. This was seen during former president Daniel arap Moi’s repressive regime, the post-2007 election violence and recent crackdowns on public protests protected under the constitution.

The reaction to mass mobilisation in June 2024 was violent. This was because the state sees public demonstrations as a threat to its authority.

Second, police brutality thrives in environments where wrongdoing goes unpunished. Kenya’s police force lacks good internal control mechanisms. A culture of silence and solidarity – the “blue code” – deters whistleblowing. Advancements and rewards are sometimes determined by political allegiances rather than professionalism.

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Read more: Kenyan police use excessive force because they’re serving political elites, not the public – policy analyst

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Third, many police officers work in toxic conditions marked by poor pay, limited resources and long shifts. These contribute to feelings of frustration and aggression. The situation is worsened by institutionalised corruption where police officers extort money from citizens and demand bribes. This has contributed to diminished ethical standards.

What’s in place to punish police excesses?

Kenya has several formal avenues for holding police accountable. But all are deeply flawed.

Independent Policing Oversight Authority: This was established in 2011 in light of the post-election violence of 2007-08. Its job was to independently investigate police misconduct. However, underfunding and understaffing has led to delayed investigations.

There has also been a lack of cooperation from the police. They often fail to provide evidence or deliberately provide misleading information to impede investigations.

The authority also has limited enforcement power. It has recommended thousands of prosecutions of rogue officers. However, it has seen low conviction rates given the slow processes at the judiciary and Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

Internal Affairs Unit: This is a critical oversight body. It’s mandated to provide accountability and professional discipline within the police service. It’s tasked with investigating public complaints and complaints from within the police service against police officers.

The unit can recommend to the National Police Service Commission disciplinary action – such as prosecution or dismissal – against officers it finds guilty. It also monitors police officers to ensure that ethical conduct and professional standards are maintained.

However, the unit faces perceptions of a lack of independence and as an internal cover-up tool. In many instances, cases of police misconduct are simply punished by a transfer to another station.

Judiciary and Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions: Cases take years to move through the judicial system. Convictions are rare. The public prosecutions office has faced accusations of bias, which it exhibits through its reluctance to prosecute high-profile police killings.

The time it takes to conclude police misconduct cases allows impunity to thrive. Deliberately poor investigations carried out by the police (who are also suspects) have led to collapsed cases.

National Police Service Commission: This was established by the 2010 Kenyan constitution. The commission recruits and appoints police officers (except the inspector-general of police, who is appointed by the president with parliamentary approval). It also promotes, transfers and disciplines police officers.

However, the commission has faced claims of being unduly influenced by the inspector-general’s office in recruitment and promotions. This undermines its independence.

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Read more: How Nairobi police failures let people get away with murder

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Civil society and the media: Organisations like Amnesty International Kenya and the Kenya Human Rights Commission document police abuses. But their reports rarely, if ever, lead to any real action being taken. The media’s attention and reporting of cases may exert temporary pressure but this doesn’t seem to have any long-term impact.

Why haven’t these mechanisms worked?

Firstly, there’s an institutional resistance to reform. Powerful factions in the police and government benefit from the current system. Whenever there is an attempt at enforcing accountability, these senior officials take advantage of bureaucratic delays, and harass investigators and whistleblowers.

In extreme cases, they enforce the disappearance of witnesses.

Secondly, a lack of political will creates a favourable environment to circumvent constitutional frameworks. This ultimately weakens any chances of accountability. At best, police in Kenya are used to defend political interests and suppress dissent.

This emboldens powerful political players who want the police to be controllable. This dissuades them from instituting actual reforms and establishing a humane policing service.

What will change things?

Until those in leadership positions genuinely prioritise independent institutions and justice over transient political gains, significant police reform is unlikely to be realised.

Elements of such reform would include steps to:

Strengthen police oversight and guarantee independence

The Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act needs to be amended to enhance autonomy. The current system is easy for the president to manipulate because he gets to appoint the authority’s commissioners.

There’s also a need to provide the authority with equipment. This includes ballistics analysis, digital forensics and crime scene reconstruction capabilities to combat police cover-ups.

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions must also be required to respond to the authority’s recommendations within 30 days. Currently, cases can take years to complete. There have been instances when rogue police have used this window to eliminate witnesses or tamper with evidence.

Overhaul police training and culture

There must be a move away from paramilitary-style drills and procedures in training. Instead, officers need to practise de-escalation, communication and problem-solving tactics with the public. What exists within Kenya now is a paramilitary service not a police service.

Additionally, the police service commission needs to reward professionalism and not cronyism.

Judicial and prosecutorial reforms

Ending police impunity in Kenya requires a multi-pronged approach. This involves judicial independence, vigorous prosecution, meaningful oversight, legislative changes and public engagement.

But this requires meaningful political will.

Political accountability

Continued police impunity has eroded public confidence in Kenya’s policing and justice systems. The policing oversight authority needs sufficient funding – free of political interference – to investigate and prosecute police misconduct. Senior officers should be held accountable for not disciplining rogue officers under their charge. The presidency and interior ministry must have a zero-tolerance policy toward police brutality.

If Kenya doesn’t grapple with police impunity, then the anniversary of the June 2024 protests will be just another date in history when the state brutally attacked, maimed and killed its own citizenry. And still managed to silence them.

– Kenya’s brutal police have been exposed again – why the system fails people
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-brutal-police-have-been-exposed-again-why-the-system-fails-people-258843