Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Valentin Buffa, Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Palaeontology, University of Zurich

The origin of turtles has always been a bit of a puzzle for scientists who study the evolution of animals. To this day, where they fit in the tree of life remains a highly debated topic.

The evolutionary relationships of most vertebrate groups are well understood. Thanks to genetic and morphological (anatomical, body shape) data, even animals with highly specialised skeletons can be clearly placed on the animal family tree. Examples include whales or birds.

Turtles, however, have long remained an exception. Genetic studies identify them as relatives of the so-called archosaurs. This is a group that includes modern birds and crocodiles as well as extinct reptiles like dinosaurs and pterosaurs. But the fossil record seemed to tell a different story. Living turtles and their fossil relatives were so specialised that they offered few clues that would link even the oldest turtle fossils to other reptile groups. Or so scientists thought.

Our international team of palaeontologists has now provided a comprehensive reassessment of the turtle’s place in the animal world. Our analysis sheds new light on the relationships among primitive turtles. It confirms that Eunotosaurus africanus, a fossil from South Africa and Malawi, which was presumed to be a “proto-turtle”, is not a direct ancestor of modern turtles. Instead, this animal is very distantly related to modern reptiles, finding its deep root among much older reptilian ancestors that have no modern representatives.

Based on anatomy, the phylogenetic analysis also provides the first robust support from fossil studies for the close relationship between turtles and the archosaur (bird-crocodilian) lineage.

For more than 20 years, genetic data and anatomical data reached different conclusions about the relationships of turtles. Now they agree.

Comparing reptile anatomy

Fifteen researchers from South Africa, the US, UK, France and Germany participated in the study. Their combined expertise included:

• computed tomography (CT) technology (advanced x-rays)

• reptilian anatomy and phylogenetics

• Permo-Triassic stratigraphy (the study of rock layers where fossils are found).

The combination was critical to obtain these groundbreaking results. Collection staff from the Evolutionary Studies Institute, Iziko South African Museum, National Museum, Albany Museum and Council for Geoscience in South Africa were also instrumental in enabling access to the specimens.

The team painstakingly compiled anatomical comparisons across more than 200 fossil reptile species. We hoped to find previously overlooked similarities between early shelled turtles, their shell-less predecessors, and other early reptiles. Comparisons of the bones that frame the brain cavity were particularly important. These couldn’t previously be seen by scientists, but with powerful CT scanning methods their anatomy was laid bare.

Particularly surprising was what we learned about Eunotosaurus africanus, a 30cm-long burrowing reptile that lived in southern Africa some 260 million years ago. Previous studies considered it as the oldest known member of the turtle family, or a “proto-turtle”. Its broadened trunk and wide ribs looked something like a turtle shell. We studied almost all of the material of Eunotosaurus available in South African collections to address this idea once again.

Our working group at the Evolutionary Studies Institute studies some of the oldest rock layers from the Karoo Basin of South Africa, where Eunotosaurus is found. If Eunotosaurus was indeed a “proto-turtle”, we’d expect to find the forerunners of living lizards, crocodiles or birds (that is, reptiles) in these same layers. Paradoxically, we’ve found no other close relatives of modern reptiles at all. This made us suspect that even if turtles are ancient relatives of living birds and crocodilians, perhaps Eunotosaurus was no “proto-turtle” at all.

One breakthrough was reconstructing the bones of the braincase (housing the brain and ear) from high-resolution x-ray images of fossil and living reptiles. By peering inside the skull of Eunotosaurus, and comparing its bones with those of undisputed fossil turtles, we could see previously out-of-reach aspects of their anatomy for the first time.

These x-ray scans revealed the very primitive anatomy of Eunotosaurus. For example, it has bones in the back of the skull that were lost in turtles and all living reptiles. Features like a slender ear bone (the stapes) and the hooked fifth toe that are present in many living reptiles and other fossil turtles were completely lacking in Eunotosaurus. In contrast, the braincase of unambiguous fossil turtles, such as Proganochelys quenstedti, shared a suite of characteristics that are found in the ancestors of crocodilians and birds, but absent in Eunotosaurus.

These lines of evidence provides firm anatomical support that turtles are the closest living relatives of archosaurs. When Eunotosaurus was considered a “proto-turtle”, many of these features were considered to have evolved independently in the turtle lineage. Now, we show that turtles share these features with their archosaur relatives because they inherited them from a common ancestor.

These new results now place the origin of turtles where it fits better with both fossil and genetic data. When geneticists study living turtles, they compare their DNA to modern birds, crocodiles and lizards to infer evolutionary relationships. Our fossil findings now align with what those genetic comparisons have been suggesting all along: turtles branched off from the same ancestor that gave rise to crocodiles and birds.

Instead of being a living group of relics with ancestors present in the Middle Permian, turtles, like other modern reptiles, diversified and evolved their shell in the Triassic Period, approximately 20 million years after Eunotosaurus was already extinct.

With turtles now firmly placed among their closest living relatives, palaeontologists will need to reassess other long-standing questions about reptile evolution. Advanced imaging techniques like computed tomography should now be applied to other enigmatic fossil groups, potentially clarifying their evolutionary relationships.

Our work highlights the fact that overlooked early reptile fossils, particularly those found in the South African fossil record, may hold the key to understanding reptile relationships.

– Turtles finally have a place in the tree of life: X-ray study of South African fossils was a decider
– https://theconversation.com/turtles-finally-have-a-place-in-the-tree-of-life-x-ray-study-of-south-african-fossils-was-a-decider-282871

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rod Crompton, Visiting Adjunct Professor, African Energy Leadership Centre, Wits Business School, University of the Witwatersrand

The supply of crude oil to the world had been reduced by about 7.5% to 10.1% by March 2026 in what the World Bank described as the largest oil market disruption in history. The fall was a result of the attacks on Iran by Israel and the US and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

No country was spared the impact. For some the economic fallout has been dramatic. In the case of South Africa, which imports all its oil and 81% of its petrol, diesel and paraffin consumption, the effects have so far been felt mainly in the price. This has caused the government to subsidise petrol and diesel.

In this article we explore the problems with official data, the mismanagement of strategic stock and the possibility of developing domestic oil and gas supplies.

---

Read more: Iran war is exposing South Africa’s dependency on diesel: what went wrong

---

Both of us have been closely involved in the energy sector for some decades. Rod Crompton teaches and researches the topic. Prior to that he was responsible for fuel price regulation and strategic stocks at the Department of Minerals and Energy before serving 11 years on the board of the National Energy Regulator of South Africa. Bruce Young spent 30 years at the petrochemical giant Sasol before joining academia.

Our analysis of the current situation is that South Africans should be concerned about the fact that the quality of fuel data is very poor and the country only has a rough idea of where it stands in relation to fuel stocks. Based on our reading of the situation it appears that the government doesn’t have much idea of how much trouble it’s in.

As a small player in a large global market, not really knowing how much fuel your country needs is a problem. And not having adequate strategic stocks leaves the country vulnerable to global shortages caused by the Iran war.

The gaps

There are huge challenges in the data about fuel stocks and needs. For example, the Fuels Industry Association of South Africa 2024 annual report data shows that net imports of petrol, diesel and kerosene were 81% of consumption, based on data claiming that diesel imports were 118% of consumption. According to this data set, LPG imports were a staggering 1,685% of consumption. These are obviously highly improbable numbers. The fuels industry data is based on official sources (South African Revenue Service and Department of Mineral Resources and Energy).

In addition, National Treasury is concerned about the discrepancies between actual and reported imports. It is also concerned about illegal “spiking” of diesel with paraffin, which carries a lower tax rate, with cases reaching 68%.

According to the South African Revenue Service, organised criminal networks smuggle and illegally adulterate fuel and many of the fuel-storage and distribution depots are involved in the adulteration of all fuel products. Fuel adulteration costs the fiscus approximately R3.6 billion (US$220.5 million) per year, according to the International Trade Administration Commission.

There are also concerns around stocks of crude oil.

Many countries hold strategic stocks of crude oil for events like the Iran war. The International Energy Agency mandates its member countries to hold 90 days of oil imports. South African policy requires “at least three months total consumption”, taking into account the production of synthetic fuels from coal by Sasol.

South Africa’s strategic crude oil storage capacity is substantial and could meet 88 days of consumption. But tank capacity is not the same as stock.

Strategic stock is kept secret. The country’s Strategic Fuel Fund accounts to Parliament through the portfolio committee on mineral and petroleum resources. Although the quantity of stocks was not disclosed, in its March 2025 report the committee raised concern about “insufficient” strategic fuel reserves.

It seems that South Africa currently holds only about 7.7 million to 8 million barrels. In May 2025 the international news agency Reuters reported that South Africa had strategic crude stocks of about 7.7 million barrels. Local reports have referred to approximately 8 million barrels.

The 8 million barrels would last only about 13 days against total liquid-fuels demand of about 600,000 barrels a day, or about 18 days if output from Sasol’s coal-based output of 150,000 barrels a day was taken into account. Sasol’s coal-to-liquids plants were built in the 1970s and 1980s by the apartheid regime in the face of anti-apartheid oil sanctions. Sasol was gradually privatised from 1979 with substantial state guarantees.

Beyond what’s actually being held in stock there’s an additional problem. Storage is concentrated on the west coast at Saldanha Bay and there’s no readily available means of transporting crude oil across the country to the oil refinery in Sasolburg, which is 1,400km away.

South Africa’s other weak spot when it comes to fuel is a lack of inland storage capacity for refined products. The country imports most of its refined products. Storage capacity is concentrated at the country’s major ports, far away from its industrial heartland.

The need for more strategically placed storage capacity was identified in the Moerane Investigation Panel into Fuel Supply Shortages more than 20 years ago. The panel was established in response to the 2005 fuel supply crisis. The panel recommended that South Africa review its strategic stock policy and strengthen refined product stockholding requirements.

It also noted that the country lacked strategic refined fuel inventories despite increasing dependence on imported petroleum products.

But these recommendations were never acted on.

What role, if any, can the private sector play?

There is provision in the fuel price regulations for oil companies to hold stocks. Producers and importers are paid through the pricing regulations to hold 25 days’ stock and wholesalers 14 days’ stock. But we don’t know if they actually do so as the commercial imperative is to hold as little as possible and the government seems to lack the capacity to police this.

Nor is private-sector storage a substitute. Oil companies and large fuel users do have tanks at refineries, import terminals, depots, airports, mines, farms, factories and logistics sites. But this is mostly operational storage. It is product-specific, commercially committed and designed to keep fuel moving through the supply chain. It is not designed to provide long-duration national cover.

Governance of strategic stocks

The governance of strategic stocks is a sore point.

South Africa has already experienced a major governance failure involving its strategic crude oil reserves. In 2015/16 the state-owned Strategic Fuel Fund sold about 10 million barrels of strategic crude oil to commodity traders including Vitol, Taleveras and Venus Rays. The Western Cape High Court later set the transaction aside, finding that it had been conducted unlawfully and without proper approval or oversight.

Critics argued that the transaction effectively depleted South Africa’s emergency reserves through a secretive and poorly governed process that primarily benefited oil traders and intermediaries.

The episode exposed serious weaknesses in the governance of South Africa’s strategic fuel stocks. These concerns have never fully disappeared. Parliamentary oversight processes in 2025 continued to raise concerns about reserve adequacy, underutilisation of storage infrastructure, fragmented governance arrangements, and unresolved oversight and accountability issues.

Funding strategic stocks involves difficult trade-offs. Given South Africa’s constrained fiscal position, it is not obvious that the state can simply fund a R78 billion (USS$4.7 billion) to R79 billion stock-rebuilding programme from the fiscus. But a purely private solution is also unrealistic. Private firms do not generally have spare strategic-scale storage and will not voluntarily hold large volumes of idle stock.

The likely solution is a hybrid model: better data, a credible state reserve, mandatory and incentivised industry stockholding and policing thereof, levy-funded procurement over time, clear emergency-access rules, transparent reporting and independent oversight.

New finds

The oil crisis makes exploration for oil and gas in the offshore Orange Basin more attractive for the country. The basin lies off South Africa’s west coast. Geologically, it extends into Namibian waters, where oil companies have recently made massive oil and gas finds. There are high hopes in the oil industry that oil will also be found in South African waters.

But it won’t be quick; it will take about 10 years, if successful. There is regulatory uncertainty, ultra-deepwater technical challenges, no existing oil infrastructure, and other countries which oil companies find more attractive.

Despite these difficulties, South Africa will need petrol and diesel for a long time to come. Those concerned about the security of supply of oil and gas should be giving serious thought to removing the obstacles to oil and gas exploration that are holding South Africa back. Namibia has shown that it can be done.

– South Africa’s fuel supply and the Iran war: data black holes and low strategic stock put the country at risk
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-fuel-supply-and-the-iran-war-data-black-holes-and-low-strategic-stock-put-the-country-at-risk-283913

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicole Goldin, Head of Equitable Development, United Nations University

A recent development in the credit rating space could signal important progress in one of the more intractable challenges in global development finance. The challenge is how countries can manage periods of acute debt stress without being pushed prematurely towards default.

The current system can discourage countries facing acute financial stress from seeking temporary liquidity relief, because doing so may trigger market reactions that worsen borrowing conditions. Delays in seeking support can, in turn, deepen financial instability.

But Fitch Ratings, one of the world’s three major credit rating agencies, has revised its sovereign rating criteria. This is the analytical framework for assessing country creditworthiness.

At first glance, the change concerns a narrow technical issue: when countries can temporarily pause bond repayments without being treated as being in “default”.

But the implications may be more significant. This is particularly true for emerging markets and developing economies that are highly exposed to external shocks, constrained fiscal space and heavy debt burdens.

At the heart of the revision is a longstanding problem in sovereign debt markets: the tendency of ratings frameworks to treat temporary payment difficulties as signs of deeper inability to repay debt over time.

In practice, this has often discouraged countries from seeking timely relief during periods of external disruption. This has been true even when the underlying problem is short-term financing pressure rather than an inability to repay debt over time.

That disincentive became particularly visible during the pandemic. Although the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative offered temporary liquidity relief to eligible countries, few sought comparable treatment from private creditors. One reason was concern that doing so could have a number of negative consequences. These included:

• triggering sovereign downgrades, which can signal increased financial risk to investors

• increasing borrowing costs

• being excluded from some international lending and investment markets.

These fears overrode the intentions of the measures: to provide short-term breathing space.

Fitch’s revision signals a cautious shift in that logic. The agency now clarifies the circumstances under which bounded, rules-based payment deferrals may not be treated as defaults. The change reflects growing recognition that temporary liquidity relief, when tightly structured and transparently governed, need not automatically constitute a negative credit event.

What is changing remains modest. It nevertheless suggests that sovereign debt markets are beginning to develop ways to distinguish temporary financial stress from deeper solvency problems. This will allow countries to manage shocks before they escalate into full debt restructuring episodes.

This matters because disorderly defaults and prolonged restructurings can impose major economic and social costs. In turn these can hinder investment and halt development and growth, especially in emerging and developing economies.

Structured flexibility is key to temporary relief

Fitch’s revision was prompted in part by proposals advanced by the London Coalition. This is an informal group of private creditors and official actors convened by the UK government in 2025. It has advocated for broader adoption of debt pause clauses. The idea is to provide temporary relief during clearly defined external shocks such as climate disasters.

Crucially, the proposed architecture is heavily constrained. Creditor safeguards are embedded throughout the design.

The message from Fitch’s revision is therefore not that flexibility itself is a problem. But that unstructured flexibility is. The analytical barrier has been uncertainty, opaque triggers and broad borrower discretion.

Grenada’s experience during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the dilemma these mechanisms seek to address. In 2020, Grenada requested an eight-month suspension on payments due under a restructured sovereign bond from private creditors, despite the bond already containing a hurricane-linked debt pause clause. Because the clause was tied to a narrowly defined natural disaster trigger, it could not be activated for a pandemic shock.

The request was ultimately unsuccessful.

The episode showed that contractual mechanisms are often too narrow to address the range of shocks countries face. Climate events, commodity price volatility, pandemics and global financial tightening can all generate acute liquidity stress without necessarily implying insolvency.

Yet sovereign debt frameworks have not allowed countries to absorb shocks like these without setting off a default or restructuring.

Signalling a new direction

That challenge is becoming increasingly urgent, as more countries face the prospect of debt restructuring. This is a process governments go through to renegotiate debt repayments with creditors when debt repayments become unsustainable.

The International Monetary Fund’s recent stocktake of private sector sovereign debt restructuring noted that the number of restructurings since 2020 has been relatively limited. But, it noted, they were often more economically damaging and prolonged than in earlier debt cycles.

This is where Fitch’s revision may prove significant. It suggests that financial tools designed to help countries manage short-term crises may be able to operate within existing market rules, rather than automatically being treated as as signs of default or financial collapse.

This has broader relevance in the context of the UN Financing for Development agenda, including the Seville Commitment, agreed in July 2025. This calls for earlier, more orderly responses to sovereign financial stress. Such approaches depend on mechanisms that allow countries facing exogenous shocks to:

• pause payments temporarily

• stabilise their finances

• recover without automatically facing sharp increases in borrowing costs or loss of market access.

Fitch’s revision does not go as far as broader market reform ambitions reflected in the Seville Agenda. But it does signal that tightly governed, rules-based payment suspensions need not be automatically treated as credit negative.

Importantly, this shift is procedural rather than ideological. It does not rewrite the basic rules of sovereign debt markets. Instead, it clarifies the conditions under which temporary payment suspensions can be used without automatically being treated as signs of default.

That gives investors, governments, and credit rating agencies greater clarity about how such mechanisms operate and how they should be assessed.

Distinguishing stress from insolvency

The revision itself remains narrow. The proposed clauses are voluntary, largely untested at scale and do not address situations of fundamentally unsustainable debt. Nor does the change produce immediate rating adjustments.

Reform in sovereign debt governance rarely arrives through sweeping overhaul. More often, it proceeds through cautious accommodation: incremental changes that gradually become embedded within market practice. Fitch’s revision may prove to be one small but revealing step in that direction.

This is an edited version of the post first published by UNU-CPR, Fitch’s Recent Revision Signals a Notable Shift in Sovereign Debt Governance.

– Rating agency Fitch changes its criteria on pausing debt repayments: why it matters
– https://theconversation.com/rating-agency-fitch-changes-its-criteria-on-pausing-debt-repayments-why-it-matters-283098

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bizuneh Yimenu, Lecturer in Comparative Politics, Queen’s University Belfast

Ethiopia is preparing for a national election on 1 June amid deep political uncertainty and growing insecurity. Officially, the polls are expected to reinforce the country’s democratic transition and political stability. But the conditions suggest that the elections are unlikely to be genuinely competitive.

Elections are competitive when parties campaign openly, voters participate freely, and political actors engage without fear of violence or intimidation.

There are two main reasons why this will not be the case.

First, opposition actors remain fragmented, weakened or excluded from effective political participation. Second, there are armed conflicts and political tensions in several parts of the country. The most tense regions are Amhara, Oromia and Tigray. This has created an unstable environment for electoral competition.

Together, these conditions may make the upcoming elections among the least politically competitive Ethiopia has held since multiparty elections were introduced in the 1990s.

Ethiopia has held six national elections since adopting the federal constitution in 1995. Most took place under conditions of strong ruling-party dominance. The 2005 election was widely considered the country’s most competitive contest. But violence, mass arrests and a severe crackdown on opposition supporters followed, after disputed results and protests.

Elections in 2010 and 2015 took place in a more restrictive political environment dominated by the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front.

The 2021 election happened under Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party during the Tigray war. It was marred by delays, insecurity and opposition boycotts. No voting took place in several constituencies. Unsurprisingly, the incumbent won in a landslide.

The current electoral environment appears even more challenging.

As a scholar of federalism and Ethiopian politics, I see the present conditions as particularly restrictive to meaningful political competition.

Opposition fragmentation and exclusion

Ethiopia’s opposition parties remain fragmented along ideological, ethnic and regional lines. Many lack strong national organisational structures or the capacity to mobilise voters effectively across the country.

Attempts to build durable opposition coalitions have faltered. This is due to political mistrust, leadership rivalries, and competing visions of the Ethiopian state. Some parties want stronger regional autonomy and ethnic self-determination. Others favour a more centralised national political framework.

These divisions prevent a unified electoral challenge. Even those in the same camp, such as parties advocating for ethnic self rule, are unable to a form united front.

Opposition actors continue to face political and institutional constraints too. Several have previously been arrested or detained. Civic actors have come under pressure.

During the 2021 elections, prominent Oromo opposition leaders were detained. This prompted the Oromo Liberation Front and Oromo Federalist Congress, the two main opposition groups in the region, to boycott the polls.

Ethiopia formally operates a multiparty system. But meaningful political competition depends also on parties’ ability to organise, campaign and compete on relatively equal terms. Genuine opposition actors have struggled to do so effectively.

Political tensions and armed conflict

The second major challenge is the country’s deteriorating security environment. Ethiopia is experiencing armed conflict and political instability in several regions. It is difficult to conduct competitive elections in these conditions.

In the Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has intensified over the past two years. Large areas have experienced insecurity, militarisation and disruptions to normal political activity.

Oromia continues to face violence linked to the conflict between the government and the Oromo Liberation Army. The conflict has contributed to displacement, insecurity and political tensions in Ethiopia’s largest, most populous and vital region.

Tigray also remains politically fragile. This is despite the 2022 Pretoria agreement. The pact formally ended the civil war between federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

Important aspects of the agreement remain unresolved. These include:

• the return of internally displaced people

• the return of pre-war Tigray territories

• security arrangements

• relations between regional and federal authorities.

Recent tensions inside Tigray’s political leadership have raised fears of renewed instability.

Such conditions narrow political space and reduce the possibility of open electoral competition.

Elections without competitiveness?

The incumbent is running uncontested in 64 of Ethiopia’s 547 constituencies. Voting will not take place in Tigray. And voting will not happen in notable constituencies in Oromia and Amhara because of security concerns.

But it’s not enough for voting to take place. Political competitiveness depends on whether opposition parties can take full part, whether citizens can engage freely and whether the broader political environment allows genuine contestation for power.

Current conditions raise serious doubts about those requirements. Even compared with previous elections held under authoritarian conditions, today’s environment may prove more restrictive. Insecurity and conflict now intersect with longstanding political constraints.

This does not necessarily mean the elections will lack administrative significance or political consequences. For example, the Oromo Liberation Front is running for the first time since 1992. This is symbolically meaningful.

But elections alone will not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper political crisis. The country continues to face unresolved disputes over political representation, federalism, security and state authority. Without broader political inclusion and a reduction in armed conflict, the elections are unlikely to provide the level of political competition associated with genuinely open democratic contests.

– Ethiopia’s elections will not be politically competitive: two reasons why
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-elections-will-not-be-politically-competitive-two-reasons-why-283896

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for Constitutional Democracy, Indiana University

Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed has revived debate over whether the country should impose term limits on its head of government. Speaking before the National Dialogue Commission in May 2026 – just weeks before national elections – he said executive power should be “limited by law”. He suggested the issue could form part of wider constitutional reform that many Ethiopians have been calling for since 1995.

At first glance, the proposal seems straightforward. But Ethiopia operates under a parliamentary system, not a presidential one. Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, who has studied Ethiopia’s constitutional design and law, explains why the real issue isn’t term limits, but the failure of the parliamentary mechanisms meant to constrain executive power.

Why don’t parliamentary systems usually impose term limits on prime ministers?

In parliamentary systems, prime ministers derive their authority from parliament. They remain in office for as long as a majority in parliament is willing to support them. There are no fixed term limits.

In presidential systems, leaders get their authority directly from voters and serve fixed terms set by the constitution.

Prime ministers may be removed at any time through a vote of no confidence, internal party revolt or electoral defeat. In contrast with presidential systems, the removal of a prime minister doesn’t always trigger a national election.

When a prime minister loses office, a new leader may be selected within the governing party. The underlying parliament still has democratic legitimacy, so there is no need to return to voters – or to cap tenure.

Margaret Thatcher served for 11 years in the UK. Angela Merkel governed Germany for 16 years. Their longevity was evidence that parliamentary accountability and electoral competition were functioning as intended. They remained in office because they continued to command confidence within competitive parliamentary democracies. Thatcher’s premiership ended when Conservative MPs withdrew support through a leadership challenge. Merkel stepped down after choosing not to seek another term.

By contrast, in presidential systems, the executive and legislature derive their mandates independently. Removing a president interrupts a fixed term chosen directly by voters, and a successor cannot be appointed simply through parliament.

In Ethiopia, executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by the prime minister. The difficulty is that the formal parliamentary logic has often failed to operate in practice.

---

Read more: African countries are adopting two houses of parliament to boost democracy – but that’s not always what happens

---

First, the House of People’s Representatives has rarely functioned as an independent body capable of holding the prime minister politically accountable. This has made a no-confidence vote against the prime minister politically unrealistic.

Second, leadership transitions have taken place through ruling-party decisions rather than genuine parliamentary contestation. The replacement of Hailemariam Desalegn by Abiy Ahmed in 2018, for example, occurred through internal party politics. Parliament then formalised it.

How has Ethiopia’s system produced concentrated executive power?

Parliamentary systems don’t operate the same way in every political context. They function differently in:

• a dominant-party state: this is a political system in which several parties may legally exist and elections may be held, but one party monopolises political power over an extended period.

• transitional democracies: these are political systems moving from authoritarian rule toward democratic governance. The transition is often fragile, especially if political instability, economic hardship or legacies of conflict continue to shape public life.

• politically fragmented countries: here, political authority and party competition are divided among rival groups, making stable governance and national consensus difficult.

When ruling parties dominate parliament, opposition parties are weak and lawmakers rely heavily on party leaders. Parliament may stop acting as a real check on executive power. In such situations, a prime minister can begin to resemble an elected monarch. He or she is technically accountable to parliament, but in practice holds highly concentrated power.

This is what makes Ethiopia’s constitutional experience complex.

The constitution adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1995 follows the formal logic of a parliamentary government. Article 70(4) limits the president – a largely ceremonial head of state – to two six-year terms. Articles 73 and 74 impose no limit on the prime minister.

On paper, this is orthodox parliamentarism.

In practice, Ethiopia has the formal structure of a parliamentary system without the political conditions needed for real parliamentary accountability. These conditions are strong opposition parties, meaningful intra-party competition, independent committees and the real possibility that parliament could withdraw support from the executive.

The result is that political power is concentrated in the executive and the dominant ruling coalition.

What role does Ethiopia’s electoral system play in this?

Electoral systems shape how votes are translated into political power and legislative representation.

Ethiopia uses a first-past-the-post electoral system. This means the candidate with the most votes wins the seat. By contrast, proportional representation systems allocate seats roughly in proportion to each party’s share of the national or regional vote.

First-past-the-post systems mean that modest electoral victories can be transformed into overwhelming legislative dominance.

Article 54 of Ethiopia’s constitution adopts this system. Ethiopia, therefore, combines parliamentary government with an electoral model that magnifies majorities into monopolies.

What does Ethiopia’s political history show?

Ethiopia’s post-1995 political record illustrates this pattern clearly.

Meles Zenawi served three full parliamentary terms as prime minister. He was two years into his fourth term when he died in 2012.

Meles was replaced by Hailemariam Desalegn. His premiership ended in 2018 after three years of mass protests and political upheaval. His resignation was extraordinary in Ethiopia’s political history.

Abiy Ahmed took office in April 2018 to complete Hailemariam’s parliamentary cycle. He dissolved the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front – in power since 1991 – and consolidated authority under his Prosperity Party. Abiy began his first full five-year term after the 2021 elections. His party won 410 out of 436 parliamentary seats, giving him the premiership.

---

Read more: What is federalism? Why Ethiopia uses this system of government and why it’s not perfect

---

The issue is that a prime minister can be repeatedly reappointed because the electoral and party systems limit meaningful contestation from the outset.

Would term limits solve the problem?

Only partially.

A constitutional term limit could encourage leadership circulation, reduce the personalisation of executive office and create incentives for succession planning.

In fragile democracies, such limits may serve as a safeguard against indefinite incumbency.

But term limits alone would not resolve Ethiopia’s deeper constitutional problem. A dominant party can rotate prime ministers while preserving the same electoral advantages, patronage systems and concentration of power.

The deeper reform question is whether Ethiopia can achieve:

• stronger opposition rights

• more independent parliamentary committees

• greater transparency in legislative voting

• more credible intra-party competition.

Formally, Ethiopia isn’t a one-party state. As of 2026, the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia has accredited 24 national political parties and 45 regional parties. A total of 48 parties are confirmed to participate in the seventh general election scheduled for 1 June 2026.

The absence of prime ministerial term limits in Ethiopia is not the problem. A lack of parliamentary competition and independence is.

– Should Ethiopia limit how long its prime minister can serve? Why this won’t fix a deeper democracy problem
– https://theconversation.com/should-ethiopia-limit-how-long-its-prime-minister-can-serve-why-this-wont-fix-a-deeper-democracy-problem-283405

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Redie Bereketeab, Associate Professor of Sociology and Senior Researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Ethiopia’s general election on 1 June 2026 will take place amid armed conflicts and political fragmentation. This has raised questions over voter participation and legitimacy and the future of the country’s multi-ethnic federal system. Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous country and a key regional actor in the Horn of Africa. Redie Bereketeab, who researches state- and nation-building, identity and nationalism in the Horn of Africa, unpacks the 2026 election.

Who is on the ballot, and what is at stake?

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Prosperity Party remains by far the strongest political force nationally. The party controls most federal and regional state institutions. The incumbent faces more than 45 opposition parties that are contesting the election. These include the Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice, the National Movement of Amhara, Enat Party, the Freedom and Equality Party and the Oromo Federalist Congress.

But the result will not necessarily indicate broad political inclusion. This partly stems from widespread restrictions on opposition parties, such as arbitrary arrests and preventing meetings. This has been documented by rights groups, including the US-based Freedom House.

Most of the parties face organisational, financial and security constraints too. Others have limited regional reach.

---

Read more: Ethiopia’s national dialogue was meant to heal the nation, but divisions are deepening

---

Some of the country’s most influential political actors are either weakened, fragmented or excluded altogether. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, long the dominant political force in Tigray and previously central to Ethiopian politics for nearly three decades, has been banned from the election by the National Election Board. As it now controls the region, an election there is highly unlikely.

So, there is little uncertainty over who will govern after the votes have been counted. Instead, the key election issue is whether the process itself will be regarded as sufficiently inclusive and legitimate across Ethiopia’s highly diverse regions and political constituencies.

How significant is the shadow of conflict on the election?

The elections will take place against the backdrop of multiple overlapping conflicts. These have displaced millions and weakened state authority in several parts of the country. Insecurity is expected to limit voting in large areas. Among constituencies reportedly considered too unstable for normal polling operations are Humera, Raya Alamata and Tselemti in northern Ethiopia.

The central question will be how much of the population can realistically participate.

In the north-western Amhara region, fighting between federal forces and Fano militias has continued since 2023. Armed conflict persists in parts of Oromia to the south, involving the Oromo Liberation Army. In both regions, insecurity, displacement and communications restrictions have complicated political organising and voter mobilisation. Elections are therefore unlikely to be organised across large areas.

In the northern region of Tigray, large-scale fighting formally ended in 2022. Nevertheless, unresolved disputes over territory, political representation and the return of displaced populations continue to fuel tensions. The fragile post-war environment is further complicated by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front being barred from contesting the election. The party’s legal status was cancelled by the National Election Board of Ethiopia in May 2025 for failure to hold a national assembly within the legally mandated period.

In addition, tensions within the movement have produced rival factions. In early May, Tigray People’s Liberation Front chairman Debretsion Gebremichael assumed full control of the region, pushing out Addis Ababa-backed Tadesse Werede. These developments raised tensions with the federal government.

The government needs to hold elections to demonstrate its legitimacy. But with Tigray not participating, as well as major parts of Amhara and Oromia, that legitimacy will be in doubt.

What are the other factors shaping the election?

The economy is one main factor.

Ethiopia has high rural poverty, a mounting public debt burden and the economic, social and humanitarian consequences of years of conflict and displacement.

The last general election was held in 2021. This was before the economic impact of the Tigray war hit the country. Since then, the currency has been devalued, contributing to rising inflation and living costs. Higher prices of imported goods and fuel placed additional pressure on households already affected by conflict and economic hardship.

Deteriorating economic conditions could fuel further internal unrest and strengthen the position of armed movements in parts of the country.

Regional tensions could also influence the political atmosphere and security environment surrounding the election. Relations with Eritrea have deteriorated sharply in recent months amid disputes over Red Sea access and growing fears of renewed confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara.

---

Read more: Ethiopia’s 2026 elections: without reforms, the vote may not be free or fair

---

Ethiopia’s involvement in the wider Sudan conflict is another source of tension. An escalation with Eritrea or further spillover from Sudan could intensify nationalist rhetoric and divert political attention away from domestic reform. It could further complicate already fragile security conditions during the electoral period.

Civic and political space has also narrowed in recent years. Journalists, activists and opposition figures have faced arrests, harassment, travel restrictions and pressure from security forces, particularly under emergency measures introduced during the conflicts in Amhara and Oromia.

Several opposition parties have accused the government of using state institutions and security structures to tilt the political playing field in favour of the ruling party. This further undermines faith in the electoral system.

How does the election shape Ethiopia’s federal project?

Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic federal system was introduced in 1991. It was designed to accommodate diversity and grant significant autonomy to regional states. But in practice it has also sharpened struggles over territory, autonomy and access to political power.

Today those unresolved tensions are visible in the insurgency in Amhara, the conflict in Oromia and the fragile post-war order in Tigray. If voting cannot take place across those three major regions and ethnic groups, then the elections lose legitimacy.

Rather than resolving competing claims, the federal system has in many cases institutionalised them by linking territory, political representation and state power to ethnic identity. For some the system has failed as power was never fully devolved to the states. For others it could never succeed as it fuels ethno-nationalism at the expense of national identity.

The result is that identity has been turned into a central axis of political competition.

What conclusions do you draw?

Without broader political dialogue and efforts to address the underlying conflicts, the election risks reinforcing divisions.

A better approach would be to resolve the conflicts and then convene an election where the entire population can participate.

There is scope for the European Union and the US to play a constructive role. They have the capacity to exert pressure on the Ethiopian government given their strong economic, military and diplomatic ties, and their weight in international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

There may be little appetite in Brussels or Washington for such moves.

– Ethiopia votes: dominant ruling party seeks a new mandate in a deeply fragmented nation
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopia-votes-dominant-ruling-party-seeks-a-new-mandate-in-a-deeply-fragmented-nation-283783

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mattia Bessone, Post Doc, Department for the Ecology of Animal Societies, Max Planck Institute of Animal Behavior

Millions of people in central Africa rely on wild meat for their nutrition, especially in rural areas around the Congo rainforest, the second largest tropical rainforest in the world. Here, meat from domestic animals is scarce due to poor national transport infrastructure, livestock diseases and lack of forage. As a result, wild meat and freshwater fish are the main animal foods and provide the proteins and micro-nutrients needed for a healthy diet.

At the same time the growing demand for wild meat coming from a growing urban population provides an economic opportunity for rural hunters. In the past 20 years, the proportion of wild meat sold on average by subsistence hunters in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 34% to 72% of their catches. In essence, hunters used to sell about a third of their catches, but today they sell almost three quarters of their catches.

As a conservation biologist, I am interested in understanding the factors influencing the viability of wildlife populations, finding a balance between wildlife conservation and people’s livelihood. In a recent paper, I examined the extent of wild meat consumption in central Africa together with 45 colleagues from 33 institutions from 12 countries. Using data from over 12,000 households from 252 locations, we found that for rural people, wild meat accounts for 20% of the recommended daily protein intake. This compared with 13% and 6% for those living in towns and cities, though our modelling suggests this is growing.

One major cause of concern about these consumption patterns is the threat of animal transmitted epidemics, as the recent Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda has underscored. The Bundibugyo virus, which is the cause of the disease, can be contracted through the handling and consumption of infected wild animals.

These outbreaks invariably lead to calls to stop the trade and consumption of wild animals. But our study suggests that heeding those calls could result in a humanitarian catastrophe in most of rural central Africa. As our study shows, wild meat remains an important component of people’s diets there.

Instead of banning the consumption of wildlife, we propose the legal and sustainable use of non-protected wild animals in rural areas. Clear national laws co-designed with people who hunt and eat wild meat could enable the sustainable management of these remaining species. It would improve the sustainability of the wild meat sector in rural settings while providing a regulatory framework for early warning of wildlife transmitted diseases.

A search for wild meat

Our research was based on data collected over the past 15 years and stored in WILDMEAT, an open-access evidence base for wild meat researchers and practitioners. It was launched to collate and standardise data from all available site-specific studies.

My colleagues used this data to publish the first regional assessment of hunting trends in sub-Saharan Africa. Using 83 studies carried out around African tropical forests, they confirmed that hunting had increased in the region since 1991. They found this could be linked to an increase in the use of guns and to the proportion of the harvested meat being sold, rather than consumed locally.

What was missing was an overview of where the sold meat was consumed.

We thus set out to compile the largest database of wild meat consumption ever assembled for central Africa. We made use of WILDMEAT and its large web of collaborators to gather data from 30 studies covering 252 locations in six central African countries. Overall, the database represented 12,453 individual households and 163,896 “recall events”, defined as occasions when the households reported the food they consumed in a given period between one and 365 days.

What we found

Our analysis showed that the highest consumption rates were in rural communities living in villages. These were followed by towns located in semi-rural areas not far from forest patches.

In contrast, we found lower rates of consumption in cities, and the lowest in major urban centres, particularly the countries’ capital cities.

We also obtained predictions of wild meat consumption across the region based on detailed information about forest intactness, remoteness, human population density and human development. This allowed us to identify hotspots of wild meat consumption across the entire region. By calculating what the estimated rates meant in nutritional terms we found that, on average, wild meat (the amount that a person here typically eats) contributes around 18% of the daily protein intake recommended by the World Health Organization. This percentage increased to about 20% in rural areas and it was close to 100% in remote regions of the Republic of Congo and Central African Republic.

These results underscored the major nutritional importance of wild meat for millions of Africans, many living in some of the most food-insecure regions of the continent.

Expanding demand

Another key issue shown by our analysis is the growing demand for wild meat coming from expanding provincial urban areas. In most of central Africa, these provincial cities and towns are not easy to access, so it’s difficult to get other protein sources such as chicken and fish there.

Because wild areas are nearby, though, wild meat is generally available at low prices. And law enforcement may be weaker than in larger cities. Our study identified these provincial towns as potential hotspots of wild meat consumption.

We also found that people living in major cities in central Africa still consume wild meat. This is for two main reasons.

First, it is perceived as healthier than imported domesticated frozen meats, characterised by the extensive use of antibiotics and unreliable maintenance of the cold chain during transport.

Second, consuming wild meat is seen as a way to maintain cultural traditions and sometimes acts as a status symbol. In a time of growing urbanisation we expect the demand for wild meat from urban areas to further increase, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the wildlife in the surrounding areas.

Solutions

We conclude from our findings that the role of wild meat in the current urban food systems should be reduced. But this is not an easy task under current socio-economic circumstances. We make the following recommendations.

• Increase the regional production, importation and distribution of healthy, safe and culturally appropriate alternatives (like poultry and fish).

• In peri-urban areas, encourage sustainable alternatives to wild meat avoiding environmental degradation.

• In cities, develop tailored campaigns to reduce demand, for example via social networks and other mainstream media, like Yoka Pimbo, a behavioural change campaign launched in Kinshasa, DRC, in 2022.

• Target areas currently lacking consumption data. Focusing on these areas would allow our model to be validated, improving our understanding of wild meat consumption to assess where interventions may be most needed.

Lastly, our study calls on central African governments, international and national institutions and non-governmental organisations to operate towards the sustainable management of wildlife hunting and trade for the conservation of natural heritage and for the livelihoods of rural communities.

– Central Africa’s wild meat dilemma: why outright bans threaten food security for millions
– https://theconversation.com/central-africas-wild-meat-dilemma-why-outright-bans-threaten-food-security-for-millions-283389

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mélissa Morel, Chercheure en métallurgie et en archéologie, University of Cambridge

How was iron produced 2,000 years ago in Senegal? A recent study at the Didé West 1 archaeological site, in the Falémé Valley in eastern Senegal, sheds light on an ancient iron production technique.

Passed down from generation to generation for nearly eight centuries, this technology appears to have been developed to meet local needs. African archaeology specialists Anne Mayor, Mélissa Morel and Ladji Dianifaba explain the significance of this discovery and what it reveals about the transmission of technical knowledge over the long term.

---

What did you find?

For over 2,000 years, metalworkers produced iron in what is now Senegal. By studying the remains they left behind, we have been able to reconstruct their technical choices, the natural resources they used, and, to some extent, aspects of their way of life. Beyond their scientific value, these studies also highlight the expertise of ancient blacksmiths, since iron production represented a major technical and social transformation, particularly for agriculture.

In eastern Senegal, in the Falémé Valley, within the Boundou Community Nature Reserve, many ancient iron production sites have been identified in recent years. Archaeological surveys and excavations carried out by an international research team involving scholars from the universities of Geneva and Fribourg in Switzerland, as well as the Institut Fondamental d’Afrique Noire at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar, revealed at least five distinct technical iron traditions.

---

Read more: Why did Tutankhamun have a dagger made from a meteorite?

---

The new study focused on one of these iron production techniques (named FAL02) identified in the region, which is represented at around 100 sites.

The site of Didé West 1 (DDW1), the largest and best-preserved of these sites, stands out for two major reasons. First, it provides one of the earliest known dates for iron-smelting furnaces in Senegal. Second, it documents a long sequence of metallurgical activity spanning nearly 800 years, from 400 BCE to 400 CE. These radiocarbon dates were obtained from charcoal directly associated with the furnaces.

The exceptional preservation of this site allowed us to document this technique in detail, trace its transformations over time, and better understand the choices made by the metallurgists.

How were you able to prove it?

The main evidence of ancient iron metallurgy comes from slag, which is the waste produced when ore is transformed into metal. During the smelting process, this slag flows like molten lava within the furnace before solidifying into rocky masses. Once the operation was completed, the slag was discarded and gradually piled up into large heaps.

Our study of the Didé West 1 slag heap revealed 35 furnace bases, attesting to repeated activity over several dozen generations. Certain technical features define this tradition, including multi-perforated tuyères (clay pipes pierced with holes to allow air to circulate within the furnace), as well as the use of African palm nuts as packing material at the bottom of the furnace. This system appears to have facilitated the separation of metal from slag.

By combining these observations, we were able to reconstruct how this technique worked. The metalworkers used small circular furnaces equipped with a removable chimneys rather than permanent shafts. The iron ore likely consisted of laterites (a type of soil) collected from the immediate surroundings. Taken together, these elements reflect a high level of technical expertise.

Who were the people behind this technology?

Research on African societies during the first millennium BCE and the first millennium CE comes with several challenges. Written sources are scarce, and organic materials that could provide information about housing or diet are poorly preserved. Even iron artefacts are usually too degraded to survive.

On many sites, only pottery fragments remain. It is therefore still difficult to identify precisely the populations behind the FAL02 technique. This specific technical tradition was recognised through the shapes of the furnaces, tuyères, and slag found at the sites. Iron production techniques are not merely technical processes. They reflect traditions, choices and know-how specific to each cultural group.

Analysis of the slag volumes also helps estimate how much iron was produced. At Didé West 1, the data point to modest and irregular production, likely seasonal. These elements suggest that the activity was intended to meet local needs, rather than large-scale production for export.

Why this matters

The origins of iron metallurgy in west Africa are still debated. Two major hypotheses continue to be discussed. One argues that ironworking spread from the Hittite world in Anatolia (in present-day Turkey) via the Maghreb or the Nile Valley. The other suggests an independent invention in sub-Saharan Africa. To date, the available evidence does not allow a definitive conclusion.

However, several ancient iron production sites dating from the first millennium BCE have been identified in sub-Saharan Africa, including in Nigeria, Niger, Togo, and Burkina Faso, and now in Senegal. These discoveries tend to strenghten the case of local development.

Within this context, the dates obtained at Didé West 1, reaching at least the 4th century BCE, make it one of the earliest known ironworking techniques in Senegal. The site therefore contributes important new data to a still limited body of evidence and helps document the early development of metallurgy in the region.

What happens next?

This study marks an important milestone, but several questions remain unanswered. The next challenge is to better understand the other iron production techniques identified in the Falémé Valley. At least four other traditions have been recognised.

Some of these techniques were in use at the same time, revealing a complex metallurgical landscape where very different traditions coexisted. This diversity raises several questions: which groups of metallurgists were behind them? How can we explain their transformations? Why do certain techniques disappear? Were some techniques more efficient than others?

---

Read more: Traditional wrestling in Senegal – much more than a sport, it keeps culture alive

---

The study of the FAL02 technique over nearly 800 years demonstrates that these practices evolved, with phases of continuity and transformation. By cross-referencing this data with findings from the study of ceramics and settlements, it becomes possible to better understand the societies that produced this iron and how they changed over time.

These remains allow us to move beyond the purely technical question: they offer insight into settlement dynamics, the circulation of knowledge and expertise, and long-term societal transformations, even before the emergence of medieval kingdoms and the expansion of trans-Saharan trade.

We hope that future research will help to answer some of these questions.

– In Senegal, a 2,000-year-old iron workshop sheds new light on the past
– https://theconversation.com/in-senegal-a-2-000-year-old-iron-workshop-sheds-new-light-on-the-past-283236

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Toumani Traoré, Doctorant en Science Politique, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar

Power struggles often play out in Senegal’s political arena, both within a party and between rival parties. To summarise British foreign minister Lord Palmerston’s argument in 1848:

In politics, there are no permanent enemies, no permanent friends, only permanent interests.

The situation at the top of Senegal’s executive branch is no exception.

The Sonko-Diomaye duo, formed by president Bassirou Diomaye Faye and his prime minister Ousmane Sonko, used to speak with one voice. Today, the alliance that oversaw the fall of former president Macky Sall is plagued by deep internal divisions. These disagreements culminated on 22 May 2026 with the president’s announcement that he’d dismissed the prime minister and dissolved the government.

A political rally held by Sonko in November 2025 already showed signs of a fracture. In an interview six months later Faye removed all doubt. The president confirmed there were disagreements with his prime minister. He denounced the “excessive personalisation” of power around Sonko.

I am a political scientist whose doctoral research focuses on the recent transformations of Senegal’s political system. It examines the rise of the ruling party, Pastef, and the sociopolitical realignments observed between 2021 and 2024, in a period of political instability. I analyse how this anti-establishment party succeeded in upending the traditional sociopolitical order.

In my view, their split is a worrying sign of potential political turmoil ahead for the country, which is also battling an economic crisis.

The myth of unity

This unprecedented duo was forged when opposition leader Sonko’s candidacy to run for president against Sall was invalidated in January 2024. Sonko, the founder of Pastef, backed the party’s less well-known secretary-general, Faye, in securing the elections. In turn Faye backed Sonko to become prime minister.

Initially their relationship was built on political alignment. One handled the management of the state apparatus, the other ensured strong political legitimacy during the first months of their rule.

However, Pastef’s 2025 rally revealed the limits of the two-headed illusion championed by Sonko. As he predicted at the time, the event marked the beginning of a “post-November 8 era”, a turning point for the future of the partnership.

---

Read more: Bassirou Diomaye Faye: from prison runner-up to president of Senegal

---

But the relationship between the two men soon led to deadlock. First, they disagreed over who should head the ruling coalition. Then came clashes over differing visions of power. Finally, disputes emerged over political alliances.

The once unifying Wolof slogan “Sonko mooy Diomaye” (Sonko is Diomaye) was Pastef’s survival strategy under Sall. That slogan has faded and is giving way to the likes of “Sonko is Sonko” and “Ousmane is Sonko”. The work of Senegalese journalist Sidy Diop supports this view. Diop shows that:

The proclaimed unity is over. It is giving way to a duality that is now visible, almost accepted, where roles are being redefined and ambitions are becoming clearer.

However, from the perspective of the theory of domination and symbolic reproduction, Sonko built what could be called a “proxy capital” (borrowed influence). Their symbolic fusion created a unique shared identity – “partisan habitus” – in which Pastef supporters no longer perceived two distinct figures, but a single political force.

Rivalry between the two leaders was inevitable, despite the “complementarity” that initially defined their entry into executive power. Senegal’s political system demands a clear hierarchy. The president’s authority is not shared.

The powers of the president of the republic and the prime minister are defined by Senegal’s constitution, in articles 42 through 52. This already created a kind of “soft rivalry”.

Faye tends to adopt a restrained posture, acting as a guarantor of proper functioning of institutions. Sonko, on the other hand, maintains a style of mobilisation and disruption. As French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues, institutional structures dictate individual actions, language, and posture. Not the other way round.

The office of the presidency imposes a “sovereign habitus” that naturally differs from the habitus or mindset of the prime minister and party leader. In line with the principle of separation between the functions of head of state and party politics, Faye resigned from all leadership positions in Pastef, including secretary-general. By law, however, Sonko was allowed to retain his leadership positions in the party. This further fuelled their stand-off.

The boundary between the two men is mostly invisible but very real. It lies in the transition from the street-level slogan “Diomaye is Sonko” to institutional communication where the image of the president comes first, as protocol demands.

Sonko brought Faye to power. But Faye now holds discretionary authority, including the power to appoint officials. This has created a political polarisation between factions of the party that support Faye or Sonko.

The limits of dual leadership

In physics, when two bodies of unequal weight occupy the same space, the heavier one compresses the lighter. Power is not static, just as human nature is not.

Through upward influence, Sonko draws his strength from his charisma, and strong grip on the party. He has given Faye popular legitimacy. In return, the president’s executive orders and state decisions have translated the party’s “vision” into Senegalese law.

It soon became a tricky situation: if Sonko took up too much space, his influence would spill over into Faye’s institutional territory. The president may appear to be under his tutelage. If Faye isolated himself too much, he would lose his source of legitimacy, which is Sonko. They became locked in a system of mutual dependence and self-destruction as power shifted between the president’s office and the prime minister’s.

By mimicking each other’s desires, they become mirror image antagonists. The more they resembled each other, the deeper their divergence grew. Each saw in the other a mirror of his own ambition. Ultimately both actors want the same things: power, the presidency, leadership. After being sacked by Diomaye, Sonko quickly became speaker of parliament, rejoining the opposition battle.

The myth of a gentleman’s agreement

What has unfolded at the top of Senegal’s leadership is a stark reminder that in politics, a “gentlemen’s agreement” is a myth that best serves idealists. It is the return of the “number two” syndrome. The presumptive heir apparent, initially loyal and competent, climbs the ranks and turns against his leader when the latter takes all the limelight.

---

Read more: Senegal’s crisis: why debt restructuring may be the least bad option

---

The dominant player, meanwhile, in his quest to secure future elections, turns a loyal ally into an enemy. This creates a further cycle of mutual paranoia that looks set to signal a renewed period of social and political turmoil.

– Senegal’s ruling alliance has split: will political turmoil follow?
– https://theconversation.com/senegals-ruling-alliance-has-split-will-political-turmoil-follow-283710

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Moeniera Moosa, Teacher Education, University of the Witwatersrand

Bullying is a widespread global problem, with extensive research across countries showing that no school is immune. In South Africa, the scale is particularly concerning, with studies indicating that between a fifth and over half of learners have experienced or witnessed school violence.

This means many pre-service teachers will enter training having experienced bullying at school themselves.

Studies elsewhere have shown that experiences of bullying can foster empathy and intervention, but may also result in avoidance, helplessness or even aggression. That’s why it’s important to understand teachers’ beliefs and coping styles in addressing bullying.

One theory about learning, Social Learning Theory, posits that behaviour is learned through observation and imitation. This would suggest that bullying and aggression are shaped by experiences at home, school and society.

Pre-service teachers therefore start their training with pre-formed beliefs about how bullying is managed, based on what they have witnessed. However, behaviour is not determined by observation alone. The Theory of Planned Behaviour argues that individuals act when they feel motivated and confident. This implies that a person can do something to reduce bullying if they are supported by others.

Researchers have noted that bullying involves three key actors, namely the perpetrator, victim and bystander. It’s been suggested that teachers can be “key agents of change”. But studies have found that although teachers recognise the need to act, they frequently underestimate the prevalence of the problem. And learners may avoid reporting incidents because they think that no action will be taken.

As a teacher educator I’m interested in what they bring from their past to their profession, and how to prepare them for their role. A few years ago I carried out a study which investigated how the past experiences of first year pre-service teachers in a South African School of Education shaped their perceptions about bullying and their responses to it, and how these experiences might influence their roles as future teachers.

More than half the teachers in the study had witnessed bullying at school at some point, but had done nothing about it. I found that they seemed ill prepared to deal with bullying. I am not aware of this being a routine part of teacher training in South Africa. Their training ought to prepare them better so as to break the cycle of learning to be bystanders (or worse).

The pre-service teachers in the study have not been followed up in subsequent years.

Experiences of bullying at school

My study used a mixed-methods, longitudinal design to examine pre-service teachers’ experiences and understandings of bullying. Data from 305 multiple-choice questionnaires established the frequency of their exposure to bullying at school when they were learners themselves. A group of 56 respondents completed open-ended questionnaires about how they thought their experiences might affect them as teachers.

The results revealed that most had experienced bullying as bystanders (66%). They said they had been “afraid of being bullied”, choosing to “just sit and watch”. Some (18%) identified as victims and noted that they had been “bullied most of the time” and “constantly physically attacked by fellow learners”. Twelve percent (12%) of participants said they had assumed a combination of roles (bystander, victim, bully).

One participant stated that he “was a victim at some stage of (his) schooling, but when (he) got smarter (he) started being a bully”. A minority (3%) admitted to bullying, which was often linked to power. One said he had been able to act freely as the “teacher’s favourite”. Another participant noted that he “would use (his) power as class representative and tease others knowing that they won’t say anything back”.

These patterns suggest that the participants had learned through observation, and that they might not act against bullying when they became teachers.

---

Read more: Student teachers in South Africa choose comfort over challenge in practical placements: but there’s a hidden cost

---

Still, 79% said they believed their experiences would make them “better teachers”, even though they were “never sure what exactly to do”. These participants expressed strong intentions to act by “reporting every bullying incident”, yet also highlighted systemic gaps, noting when they were learners at school their teachers at school “did not take the matter any further”.

A dominant (64%) perception was that “there is no avoiding bullying … (it’s) a growing pandemic”. Participants emphasised emotional impact: one comment was that bullying “makes you feel absolutely terrible and destroyed”. These experiences fostered empathy but also vulnerability, as some felt it could “test (their) anger levels” or make teaching “a burden”.

Future teachers

These findings matter because they show that teachers are not neutral actors; their past experiences of bullying shape how they might interpret, ignore or respond to learner behaviour. When a majority enter the profession as former bystanders or victims, there is a real risk of inaction, misjudgement or overcorrection in classrooms.

---

Read more: What student teachers learn when putting theory into classroom practice

---

This has direct implications for school climate, learner safety and the reproduction of harmful power dynamics. Without intervention, cycles of silence and normalisation may persist despite good intentions.

The study participants did not receive training after the study to help them manage bullying.

Teacher education programmes must integrate structured, critical reflection on personal schooling histories, particularly around bullying and authority. This should be coupled with explicit training in evidence-based anti-bullying strategies, not just awareness. Mentorship during teaching practice must intentionally surface and guide these reflections. Finally, schools must not put all the responsibility on novice teachers.

– How will teachers handle bullying? South African study finds they’re ill-prepared
– https://theconversation.com/how-will-teachers-handle-bullying-south-african-study-finds-theyre-ill-prepared-282498