Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ron Soonieus, Director in Residence, INSEAD

Serving on a non-profit board can be deeply fulfilling and beneficial to the cause – but only if you’re fully committed and prepared for the role.

It must be flattering to be offered a seat on the board of a non-profit organisation (NPO). After all, the non-profit sector has long valued for-profit executives for their business acumen, result-orientation and decision-making abilities.

Along with their expertise in areas such as finance, legal, human resources, marketing and management, the ability of for-profit executives to translate broad strategic goals into actionable decisions can help non-profit boards navigate complexity and ambiguity with greater confidence. They also often bring extensive networks that can open doors – be it for partnerships, fundraising or advocacy – which can significantly enhance an NPO’s ability to achieve its mission.

The appeal to serve on the board of an NPO may be an emotional one: service and meaning. As a bridge between the government, society and the business sector, NPOs play a vital role in addressing market and government failures. They advocate for accountability, counterbalance profit-driven motives, mediate between stakeholders, complement government services and even foster social innovation.

At the same time, non-profits have reached a transformation moment. As public donations shrink – a trend now accelerating with recent shifts in aid policies by the United States and Europe – non-profits must take a proactive approach by refining their priorities, strengthening operational resilience and preparing for future shocks.

But to achieve these, NPOs need strong leadership and effective governance. This is where the board comes in.

In an ideal world, the relationship can be mutually beneficial. But executives without prior board experience may struggle to transition from an “action-oriented” mindset to one of board oversight and, as a result, sometimes slip into micromanagement and undermine the delineation of roles between governance and management. Also, there is the question of fit.

Before embarking on the journey as a non-profit board member, it is critical for both the executive and NPO to assess their readiness and alignment. We’ve developed a set of questions to consider, drawing from our work in this field, as well as the insights gained from non-profit board members, executives, governance practitioners and academic experts whom we meet at Governance and Leadership Community of Practice meetings we’ve been organising regularly.

Assessing your motivation, capacity and commitment

Do I share a genuine passion for the non-profit’s mission and values? Would I feel fulfilled contributing to this cause, even if it didn’t yield professional benefits?

Do I have the time and energy to commit to this role? Am I truly prepared to attend meetings, participate in committees and provide support beyond the boardroom when required?

Can I balance this commitment with my professional and personal responsibilities? What impact might this role have on my other obligations? Can I really commit to the task, especially when it requires additional commitment in times of crisis?

Am I honest to myself and the organisation about my real motivation? Is it to give back, support a cause I’m passionate about, expand my network, for professional development, or a mix?

Evaluating your expertise

Can my skills and experience contribute to the non-profit’s success? Are there specific areas, such as strategy, fundraising or financial oversight, where I can add value?

Do I have a full appreciation of the specific complexities and challenges of non-profit governance? Am I prepared to navigate the differences between for-profit and non-profit operations, such as stakeholder dynamics, funding models and mission-driven objectives?

Understanding the role

Am I clear about the expectations and responsibilities of a board member in this organisation? Have I reviewed the organisation’s bylaws, financial status and strategic priorities to understand the role fully?

Do I understand (or am I willing to learn) the oversight role of a trustee or director? Can I maintain a strategic, supervisory perspective without micromanaging the management team?

Am I comfortable asking tough questions and holding the organisation accountable? Will I speak up when necessary to ensure transparency, ethical behaviour and good governance?

How can I align my expectations with the non-profit’s operating realities? Non-profits often lack the resources and support that for-profit organisations possess. Faced with a different operational reality, it can be challenging to understand whether what is being delivered is all that can be expected or if there is room to push for more.

Evaluating risks

Am I prepared to associate my personal reputation with this NPO? Have I researched the NPO’s reputation, leadership, financial health, bylaws and legal compliance, and am I willing to accept any potential risks that could impact my professional ambition?

Are there potential conflicts of interest? Could my professional role or personal interests lead to ethical challenges or perceived biases?

Am I prepared to use my network repeatedly? Engaging your network can be one of the most powerful ways to support a non-profit, whether for fundraising, partnerships or advocacy. However, you should consider whether you’re ready to tap your network repeatedly as the organisation’s needs arise.

Committing to learn and engage

Am I open to learning and adapting to the non-profit sector? Am I willing to invest time in understanding the mission, community and operational nuances of the non-profit world?

Can I work collaboratively with diverse stakeholders? Am I prepared to engage with and learn from individuals from varying professional, cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds?

Put mission at the core

Serving on a non-profit board can be rewarding, both personally and professionally. However, this role requires more than experience – it also demands knowledge of the NPO sector, self-awareness, intentionality and a genuine commitment to the organisation’s mission. A for-profit executive’s skills and experience can help shape the strategic direction and success, but only if approached with the focus, time and humility the role demands.

For non-profits, the inclusion of for-profit executives brings valuable expertise, networks and decision-making capabilities that can elevate their professionalism and impact. Yet, non-profits should not overestimate their added value and must ensure their boards are balanced, with diverse skills and perspectives that complement the organisation’s needs.

A final reflection for the passionate executive: If you truly care about the mission, periodically ask yourself (as well as your fellow board members and management): “Am I the best fit to help advance it?” Reflect on whether you are bringing your fullest value or if stepping aside might better serve the organisation and its purpose.

Ultimately, by prioritising the mission, both non-profits and for-profit executives can forge partnerships that build stronger, more effective organisations that drive meaningful and lasting change. Keeping the mission at the core ensures every decision contributes to lasting impact.

This article is published courtesy of INSEAD Knowledge, the portal to the latest business insights and views of INSEAD, The Business School for the World. Copyright 2025.

– Should private sector executives sit on the boards of non-profits? There are risks and benefits
– https://theconversation.com/should-private-sector-executives-sit-on-the-boards-of-non-profits-there-are-risks-and-benefits-261011

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs

The UN issued warnings of potential mass violence between the South Sudanese government and the White Army in January 2026. A peace agreement ended a five-year civil war in the country in 2018. This was followed by a period of relative calm that ended in 2025 in the wake of clashes between the government and White Army. Attempts to bring peace since have faltered. The government has charged and suspended first vice-president Riek Machar over claims he commanded the White Army during the violence in Nasir, Upper Nile State. Jan Pospisil, who has studied South Sudan’s conflict dynamics, explains the origins of the White Army and its political impact.

What is the White Army?

The White Army is best understood as a set of temporary, community-mandated self-defence mobilisations, organised along sectional and clan lines.

The term “White Army” refers to the ash traditionally used in Nuer cattle camps to repel mosquitoes. The ash is smeared on the bodies and faces of young men and gives them a whitish appearance. The Nuer are one of South Sudan’s largest ethnic groups. They primarily keep cattle and inhabit the greater Upper Nile region.

Authority in the White Army flows upward from communities, not downward from political leaders.

The White Army’s orientation is primarily defensive: protecting cattle, land and local autonomy in an environment where the state is experienced less as a provider of security than as a source of threat.

But this defensive logic coexists with raiding and inter-communal violence.

Its history explains its ambivalent role.

The White Army grew out of Nuer youth self-defence formations that had existed since the 1960s.

In 1991, the White Army started to pro-actively use this name and was drawn into national conflict around the so-called Nasir split. This is when suspended vice-president Riek Machar and other predominantly Nuer commanders broke with John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement. Garang, who died in 2005, was from another of South Sudan’s major ethnic groups, the Dinka.

White Army forces fought alongside the Nasir faction (led by, among others, Machar) and were central to a massive attack on Bor later in 1991. The Bor massacre led to the death of several thousand Bor Dinka, a sub-group of the Dinka people who primarily inhabit Jonglei State.

Attacks were carried out largely by White Army fighters pursuing revenge over cattle raids and local objectives that aligned only partially with Machar’s political aims. This is an episode Machar apologised for in 2011, saying he

was responsible for both the good things and the bad things that came as a result of the Nasir Declaration.

The apology was revealing. It acknowledged political responsibility without implying operational command.

The Bor massacre remains a dominant lens through which many Bor Dinka understand the White Army: as an organised anti-Dinka force opposing the ruling party. This is understandable, but is also a source of lasting misperception about how the group operates.

What’s the relationship between Riek Machar and the White Army?

Machar has benefited politically from White Army mobilisation. But he does not direct it.

His current prosecution is therefore deeply ironic. Machar is accused of commanding a force that has, time and again, demonstrated its structural resistance to sustained external control, including his own.

He is now being tried for exercising a form of command that he has long sought but never fully possessed.

From the 1991 Nasir split to the civil war between the government and the Machar-led opposition that erupted in December 2013 and the renewed violence of 2025, White Army forces have repeatedly fought alongside Machar’s forces.

However, the White Army exists as an amalgamation of community militias that are tied to particular areas rather than as one organised force. Their size depends on the capacity of regional leaders to mobilise the youth at a given time.

During the civil war, White Army mobilisations delivered some of the opposition’s most significant battlefield successes.

Yet these forces often withdraw once immediate objectives – such as the defeat of militias aligned with the government in a certain territory – are achieved. This leaves opposition units unable to hold territory.

The assumption that’s made is that these temporary alliances equate to control of the White Army. They don’t. Confusing the two has repeatedly distorted how South Sudan’s conflicts are understood – and mismanaged.

Conflating the White Army with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) serves a political purpose. It legitimises state counterinsurgency, including airstrikes over the course of 2025 that hit civilian areas. It recasts local resistance as elite manipulation.

But it also obscures deeper drivers of South Sudan’s violence: the collapse of civilian protection, the outsourcing of force to allied ethnic militias such as the Agwelek or the Abushok, and the ethnicisation of political belonging since 2013.

If the White Army continues to be misunderstood, the danger is further ethnicisation of South Sudan’s politics. This is where complex communal violence is reduced to criminal conspiracy and used to legitimise militarised state responses.

Treating political crises as matters for prosecution rather than compromise risks deepening the very dynamics that have fuelled South Sudan’s wars since 2013.

The state portrays the White Army as a terrorist group: why is this a problem?

In the case it has brought against Machar, the government is advancing a familiar claim: that the White Army is an armed wing of the SPLM/A-IO acting on Machar’s orders.

The charge matters. It underpins not only Machar’s prosecution, but also a wider narrative that treats community mobilisations as opposition conspiracy in South Sudan.

The claim rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what the White Army is, and has been for more than three decades.

Firstly, the group draws on long-standing Nuer community self-defence traditions, even if it became politically visible in national conflict in the early 1990s. It is neither purely protective nor purely predatory. This makes the White Army difficult to incorporate into elite peace agreements, and easy to mischaracterise as irrational or terrorist.

Secondly, the White Army is not a standing militia, nor an insurgent organisation with a central command. Authority flows from the community.

To understand why the White Army mobilises as it does, it is important to consider December 2013. The mass killing of Nuer civilians in Juba at the outbreak of civil war marked a decisive rupture in South Sudan’s political order. Violence that had previously been mediated through elite rivalry and fragmented local conflicts became overtly tribalised.

For many Nuer communities, December 2013 was experienced not as a power struggle within the ruling party, but as an existential attack marked by mass killings, displacement and the collapse of civilian protection.

This interpretation – whether accepted or rejected by external observers – has shaped mobilisation ever since. White Army fighters interviewed by journalists and researchers over the past decade have been consistent: they did not fight because Machar was removed from office, but because Nuer civilians were killed.

And since 2013, Nuer diaspora networks across North America, Europe and east Africa have played a role in supporting White Army mobilisations. This support has taken multiple forms: fundraising, advocacy and social media campaigning, logistical assistance, and political pressure on opposition leaders.

Diaspora involvement reinforces White Army mobilisation by amplifying narratives of collective victimhood and unfinished justice, often from a distance that strips away the everyday constraints faced by communities on the ground.

As a result, South Sudan’s 2013 war did not merely fragment the state; it reshaped political identities far beyond its territory.

– South Sudan’s White Army explained: what it is – and what it isn’t
– https://theconversation.com/south-sudans-white-army-explained-what-it-is-and-what-it-isnt-274656

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Charles Helm, Research Associate, African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience, Nelson Mandela University

Southern Africa is world renowned for its fossil record of creatures that lived in the very distant past, including dinosaurs. But, about 182 million years ago, a huge eruption of lava covered much of the landscape (the inland Karoo Basin) where most of the dinosaurs roamed. After that, the dinosaur fossil record in the region goes abruptly quiet for the Jurassic Period (which lasted from 201 million to 145 million years ago).

Two exciting recent discoveries confirm, however, that there is more to find of dinosaurs that lived in southern Africa a long time after those lava flows.

First, dinosaur tracks aged around 140 million years were reported in 2025 on a remote stretch of the coast in South Africa’s Western Cape province. These were the first to be found in the region from that geological time period (the Cretaceous, 145 million to 66 million years ago).

Now, we’ve found more.

Our work as a team of ichnologists (studying fossil tracks and traces) often takes us to the Knysna area of the Western Cape coast, where we investigate tracks in coastal aeolianites (cemented sand dunes) in the age range of 50,000 to 400,000 years old.

During one of these visits, early in 2025, we decided to visit a small patch of rock that formed during the early Cretaceous Period. It’s the only place in the vicinity where rock of this age is exposed, and much of it is underwater at high tide. We thought we might be lucky enough to find a theropod (dinosaur) tooth like the one discovered in those rocks by a 13-year-old boy in 2017.

We were pleasantly surprised when instead Linda Helm, a member of our party, told us in a state of excitement that she had found dinosaur tracks. Further examination of the deposits revealed more than two dozen probable tracks.

This so-called Brenton Formation exposure is tiny, no more than 40 metres in length and five metres in width, with cliffs rising from the shore to a maximum of five metres. To find dozens of tracks in this small area suggests a considerable dinosaur presence in the region during the Cretaceous.

In our study we estimate that these tracks are 132 million years old, making them the youngest known dinosaur tracks in southern Africa (50 million years younger than the youngest tracks reported from the Karoo Basin). They form the second record of dinosaur tracks from the South African Cretaceous, and the second record from the Western Cape province. Some of them occur on rock surfaces, while others occur in the cliffs in profile.

Dinosaur fossil treasures

Southern Africa has a wealth of vertebrate tracks and traces from the Mesozoic Era (the “Age of Dinosaurs”, from 252 million to 66 million years ago, a time span that includes the Jurassic) in the Karoo Basin – a vast inland basin filled with thick piles of sedimentary deposits.

---

Read more: Why South Africa’s Karoo is a palaeontological wonderland

---

Dinosaur tracks from the Triassic and Jurassic periods are abundant in Lesotho and surrounding areas in South Africa’s Free State and Eastern Cape provinces.

But vast quantities of lava, now referred to as the Drakensberg Group, overlaid these track-bearing deposits as a result of large-scale eruptions. A few dinosaurs appear to have briefly survived the initial effects of the lava flows, and were probably among the last vertebrates to inhabit the Karoo Basin.

Then, as the supercontinent of Gondwana fragmented at the end of the Jurassic Period and in the early Cretaceous Period, limited Cretaceous terrestrial deposits formed in rift basins in what are now the Western Cape and Eastern Cape provinces of South Africa.

Dinosaur body fossils have been reported from those deposits, mostly from the Eastern Cape. They include the first dinosaur to be identified in the southern hemisphere, now identified as a stegosaur, as well as sauropods, a coelurosaurian and iguanodontid hatchlings and juveniles.

The only examples of dinosaur skeletal material from the Western Cape are a few isolated sauropod teeth, disarticulated bones of a probable sauropod, and two cases from the Knysna area: the theropod tooth mentioned above and a portion of a tibia.

But now we’re after their tracks.

Dinosaurs of Knysna

The tracks we found at Knysna are in the modern intertidal zone, where the high tide covers most of them twice a day.

It would be difficult to imagine a more different scene, 132 million years ago, than the spectacular coastline, magnificent estuary, and lots of development by humans that we encounter today. Back in the early Cretaceous, many dinosaurs would have been visible in the area, perhaps inhabiting tidal channels or point bars (river beaches). The vegetation would also have been very different from that of today.

The Brenton Formation tracks were made by theropods, possibly ornithopods (both these kinds of dinosaur were bipedal, walking on two legs), and possibly sauropods (huge dinosaurs with very long necks and very long tails that were quadrupedal, walking on four legs). Theropods were meat eaters, while ornithopods and sauropods were plant eaters.

It can be challenging at times to distinguish theropod tracks from ornithopod tracks. Sauropod tracks are larger and don’t always have clear digit impressions, also sometimes making them hard to identify with confidence.

---

Read more: Identifying dinosaurs from their footprints is difficult – but AI can help

---

In most cases, we have chosen not to “over-interpret” which types of dinosaurs made which tracks, as they just aren’t clear enough. Our research paper simply intends to document that dinosaur tracks of this age are relatively plentiful in the Brenton Formation.

The fact that early Cretaceous dinosaur tracks have now been identified in both the Robberg Formation and the Brenton Formation suggests that more may be found if a search is conducted in appropriate places. There are a number of other exposures of non-marine Cretaceous rocks in the Western Cape and Eastern Cape. Systematic exploration of these deposits is now indicated, in the hope that in addition to finding more dinosaur skeletal material, more dinosaur tracks (and potentially those of other vertebrates) will be identified.

Mark G. Dixon and Fred van Berkel of the African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience, Nelson Mandela University, contributed to this research.

– Fossil hunters find a new dinosaur track site on South Africa’s coast – the youngest so far
– https://theconversation.com/fossil-hunters-find-a-new-dinosaur-track-site-on-south-africas-coast-the-youngest-so-far-274337

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nadine Biehler, Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Images of rubber dinghies overcrowded with refugees heading for Europe and narratives about mistreatment and exploitation of migrants on unsafe migration routes have come to dominate how African migration is perceived in European public and policy debates.

They suggest a continent on the move, driven mainly by conflict and heading to the global north. These narratives are deeply misleading. Nevertheless, they shape public opinion and political decision-making.

Fears of large-scale migration from Africa to Europe are exaggerated. Data shows migration from Africa has been growing, but more slowly compared to growth rates of migration worldwide – and largely takes place on the continent.

Because migration from Africa is seen primarily as a looming crisis for Europe, policy responses tend to focus on border control and deterrence, rather than on cooperation, the development potential of migration or protection.

We are researchers working on migration, forced displacement and data analysis. We combined our expertise in a new working paper to analyse the latest data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) on global migration. We also looked at current data on forced displacement.

We found that:

• most African migration happens within Africa

• the majority of African migrants moving across borders are not fleeing violence

• the vast majority of those forced to flee never leave their own country or region, let alone the continent.

Understanding these mobility patterns is essential for more realistic and effective European migration policies.

The data

The UN DESA migration estimates that our paper is based on are the most comprehensive global data source available on migration. The estimates measure how many migrants live in a country at a given point in time (stock data). However, they don’t capture when they moved (flow data) or why. In addition, UN DESA figures exclude movements within countries.

Our paper complements these estimates with data provided by the UN Refugee Agency and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre on forced displacement. This includes internal displacement, which is particularly widespread in Africa.

This research found that most African migration takes place within Africa.

Globally, there were about 304 million international migrants in 2024. Africans made up around 15% of that total.

In other words, the majority of the world’s migrants are not from Africa.

Even more striking is where African migrants actually go.

In 2024, around 25 million Africans were living in an African country outside the one they were born in or held citizenship of. This exceeded the number of Africans living outside the continent (20.7 million) by around 21%.

This means that African migration is predominantly intracontinental, a long-standing trend that has become even more pronounced over time.

Several factors help explain this.

Travel within Africa is often cheaper and safer than journeys to other continents. Regional free movement agreements, such as those in west and east Africa, enable cross-border mobility. At the same time, legal pathways to Europe, North America or Asia remain limited and costly for most Africans, with high visa rejection rates and few opportunities for regular migration.

African migration is also gendered. Men are more likely to migrate than women, especially when moving beyond the continent. This gap is smaller for migration within Africa. This suggests that more accessible legal routes and less dangerous journeys help with overcoming migration barriers for women.

Forced displacement

War and conflict are forcing more people to leave their homes worldwide, and Africa is no exception.

By the end of 2024, more than 120 million people globally were forcibly displaced by war and violence. However, the majority of them (73.5 million, or 60% of the forcibly displaced globally) never left their own country to seek asylum elsewhere. They remained internally displaced in their countries of origin.

This is particularly true for the African continent, where almost half of all internally displaced people worldwide lived.

Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo account for almost 80% of internal displacement in Africa.

Even when Africans do cross borders to seek protection, they usually stay close to home.

In 2024, almost 87% of the 12.2 million African refugees and asylum seekers worldwide lived on the African continent. Only a small minority sought protection outside Africa.

This challenges the widespread idea that forced displacement in Africa automatically translates into large-scale migration to Europe.

In reality, neighbouring countries – often themselves affected by poverty or instability, and sometimes both countries of origin and destination for forcibly displaced people – carry most of the responsibility for hosting displaced populations.

Even when taking into account future displacement scenarios driven by the climate crisis, the World Bank estimates that affected people will remain within their regional neighbourhoods.

Still, globally, as well as in Africa, voluntary migration dominates: out of 45.8 million African migrants globally, refugees and asylum seekers make up 12.2 million.

This is also true for African migration to countries of the European Union, where residence permits for work, education or family reasons (2024: about 670,000) significantly exceed first-time asylum applications (2024: about 240,000).

Why these findings matter

First, the data shows clearly that African migration is not primarily about Europe. It is, above all, about Africa itself. For European and other global north policymakers, our findings suggest a need to rethink priorities. Supporting refugee-hosting countries in Africa, expanding legal migration pathways and investing in reliable migration data may ensure more effective migration management. Focusing narrowly on deterrence is misplaced.

Second, our findings highlight the importance of African countries and regions as migration destinations and refugee hosting states. Countries such as Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa or Nigeria host millions of migrants and refugees, often with far fewer resources for integration and protection than wealthier states. For African governments, this means continuing to strengthen regional and continental mobility frameworks. These would allow people to move safely and legally for work, education or family reasons. Intra-regional migration is already the backbone of African mobility. It is likely to remain so.

Third, the analysis demonstrates that UN DESA data is indispensable but incomplete. It excludes domestic migration, undocumented migration and many forms of temporary or circular mobility common in Africa. Funding cuts to international data-collection institutions risk further weakening evidence-based policymaking.

Understanding how people actually move – and why – is essential for designing fair and realistic migration policies.

– African migration: focusing on Europe misses the point – most people move within the continent
– https://theconversation.com/african-migration-focusing-on-europe-misses-the-point-most-people-move-within-the-continent-273679

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Martina van Heerden, Senior Lecturer in English for Educational Development, University of the Western Cape

Students’ well-being in higher education has been a growing concern globally since the coronavirus pandemic, which disrupted learning and lives generally.

Well-being has been described as “the combination of feeling good and functioning well; experiencing positive emotions such as happiness and contentment as well as the development of one’s potential, having some control over one’s life, having a sense of purpose, and experiencing positive relationships”.

Well-being is important for student engagement, achievement and belonging, which all make for a more positive learning and teaching experience.

We teach in an academic literacy module at a historically disadvantaged university in South Africa. Since the pandemic, we’ve continued to see that students’ well-being is often neglected, especially by students themselves. This neglect could potentially lead to lack of motivation, lack of interest and burnout.

In South Africa, first-year students’ well-being is often precariously placed, as they have to navigate socioeconomic and familial stresses, while adjusting to the demands of higher education. One of the many hurdles that students face is due to the “digital divide”, and it includes having to learn how to use unfamiliar technological resources. There are high dropout rates for first-year students.

That’s despite the efforts of universities to support them.

As academic literacy practitioners, we aim to help students to understand what’s required of them academically. In the last five years, since the pandemic, we’ve revised our module to foster a more caring, responsive and engaging environment. The idea is to smooth the way into university studies and to enhance student well-being.

We recently published a paper on what we’ve learnt so far. Our main finding is that creating a “care-full” environment for learning is not as simple as it sounds. Care has to be offered at various levels – and also received. Universities, lecturers and students still need to overcome some barriers to receiving care.

Getting to know students

Our academic literacy module is offered to first-year undergraduate students and runs for both semesters, with a different group of students each semester. In line with the university’s mandate, the module is concerned with student flourishing and success.

During the pandemic (2021-2022), we became aware of our students being in emotional distress, and so, to focus more deliberately on student well-being, we adopted a more “care-full” approach to learning and teaching. We embedded “care” into our module, by considering how we might equip students better to deal with the demands of higher education. We listened to our students’ experiences and needs and made the necessary adjustments to provide a more supportive, holistic, care-full classroom. This continued in our post-pandemic classroom.

---

Read more: During lockdown, South African students wrote a book about ‘a world gone mad’

---

The changes included adding assignment-specific guides, more resources, more focused discussions on time management and organisation, regular reminders of due dates, and links to work apps.

We also had regular conversations with the students as our way of getting to know them and finding out how they were coping. We wanted them to know that we were there to care for them, not just to impart knowledge.

---

Read more: Lecturers reflect on their efforts to ensure no student gets left behind

---

But we came to realise that by 2023 students were still struggling with the same issues as before, despite the changes we had made. This became clear from student questionnaires, end-of-semester feedback forms, and the informal conversations we had with them.

An analysis of our data showed that certain challenges acted as impediments to care and negatively affected students’ well-being. The three main impediments were:

• resources

• time management

• anxiety.

In other words, these problems prevented students from “receiving” and benefiting from the care we offered.

Resources

Resources present a dual impediment to students’ well-being. Firstly, students might not have access to resources like laptops and a stable internet connection. Secondly, they might not know how to use the available resources efficiently.

For example, many of our students indicated that they struggled to find lecture content or to submit assignments on the university’s Learning Management System. This was even though we had made “how-to” guides for students showing step-by-step instructions and the university scheduled workshops on how to navigate it. Resources became another hurdle instead of helping as intended.

Organisation and time management skills

Many students struggle with meeting deadlines and balancing their social and university lives. During the pandemic, the online environment provided little structure to their days, so some of them struggled with managing their workload. This continued when classes were back on campus. It is not a problem that is unique to South Africa, but time management is important for well-being (and thus student success).

Feelings of inadequacy and anxiety

The last impediment we identified related to feelings of inadequacy and anxiety. These feelings may be a result of struggles with resources and time management skills, but they might also be related to students’ own perceived competence in their studies. Anxiety has become a challenge for many students in university, not just in South Africa, but globally. These feelings may stop students from reaching out for help.

---

Read more: Mental health: almost half of Johannesburg students in new study screened positive for probable depression

---

Getting past the impediments

We’ve realised these challenges act as impediments to care. That is, despite the efforts educators may put into creating a “care-full” environment, certain challenges can hamper their effectiveness. In our context, we weren’t able to make all our students feel cared for. This realisation could negatively affect the well-being of students and educators alike. Academics are at risk of burnout too.

We still think academics have to be “care-full” with students, but they can’t do it alone, and their care has to be reciprocated if it’s to result in academic success and well-being. Care requires input from both the educators (the carers) and the cared-for (the students). When it works both ways, a “care-full” approach might improve students’ well-being.

Both parties need to take responsibility. Students must be willing to receive care by taking care (that is, asking for advice, accepting the advice and resources that have been made available, doing what they can).

We understand that they might feel uncomfortable or anxious; we are not blaming them. Educators must take care in interactions with students, in pedagogical choices, and in content. University structures and processes are also involved in care. And the issue extends beyond the confines of the university into the national health, welfare and safety landscape. Care requires buy-in from all parties. Otherwise there may be limits to how care is received.

– Student well-being comes from care, but is caring enough? Academics reflect on 3 stumbling blocks
– https://theconversation.com/student-well-being-comes-from-care-but-is-caring-enough-academics-reflect-on-3-stumbling-blocks-274066

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caroline Southey, Founding Editor, Africa, The Conversation

How much we pay for the debt that we incur determines a great deal in our lives. This is true of countries too. In the world of sovereign debt – money raised or borrowed by governments – the cost of debt is dependent on, among other factors, how rating agencies “grade” a country.

It’s a sensitive issue. Three agencies dominate the rating business. A criticism often meted out is that they judge African countries more harshly than others, which pushes up borrowing rates. These tensions lie behind the acrimonious fall-out between one of the big three – Fitch – and the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

On 28 January 2026 Fitch announced it had downgraded the bank’s credit rating to junk status, and that it was ending its relationship with the bank.

Fitch’s decision was preceded by Afreximbank announcing that it was severing all ties with the rating agency. A few days later the African Union weighed in, issuing a statement from its watchdog, the African Peer Review Mechanism, backing the bank’s decision, and warning Fitch not to issue any credit assessments of the bank. The rating agency clearly chose to ignore the warning.

Below you can find articles from our archives that examine various dimensions of Africa’s debt challenges.

---

Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

African countries need strong development banks: how they can push back against narratives to weaken them

Africa’s new credit rating agency could change the rules of the game. Here’s how

Eurobonds issued by African countries are popular with investors: why this isn’t good news

African countries are bad at issuing bonds, so debt costs more than it should: what needs to change

African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts

Senegal’s rating downgrade: credit agencies are punishing countries that don’t check their numbers

South Africa’s debt has skyrocketed – new rules are needed to manage it

– Africa, rating agencies and the cost of debt
– https://theconversation.com/africa-rating-agencies-and-the-cost-of-debt-274676

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maarten Wynants, Marie Curie Global Postdoctoral Fellow, Ghent University

Across large parts of northern Tanzania, gully erosion – soil erosion caused by flowing water – is cutting deep scars through fertile farmland, grazing areas, roads and even villages. These gullies grow faster every year and what was once a slow environmental process has accelerated into a humanitarian threat. It has serious consequences for food and livelihood security, infrastructure and biodiversity.

Soil erosion is a natural process. Rainfall breaks soil into particles, and flowing water transports them downslope into rivers and lakes. In Tanzania, however, erosion has intensified dramatically over the past 120 years.

The region’s steep terrain, highly variable rainfall and fragile volcanic soils make it naturally vulnerable. What has turned this into a crisis is the change in how people interact with the land.

The Jali Ardhi (Swahili for “Care for the Land”) programme is an international collaboration of scientists from several universities. We use interdisciplinary tools to investigate what’s causing increased soil erosion and how communities can restore the land. Results from multiple projects over a decade point to runaway gully erosion as a key driver of land degradation in Tanzania. Urgent and widespread restoration programmes are needed.

---

Read more: Soil erosion is tearing DRC cities apart: what’s causing urban gullies, and how to prevent them

---

From fertile volcanic soils to runaway gully erosion

The Tanzanian highlands are blanketed by soils formed from volcanic basalt erupted over millions of years as the East African Rift opened. These volcanic soils are rich in fine clay minerals with high levels of exchangeable sodium and calcium. Contact with water after a dry period can cause them to rapidly disperse into fine particles in the water.

Normally, these soils are covered by a stable topsoil layer protected by plant cover, roots and soil organic carbon. But land clearing – the removal of natural vegetation for agricultural purposes – and overgrazing remove the natural protection of these soils and increase runoff. When intense rainfall follows, water rapidly flows downhill, concentrating in valleys and carving out gullies.

Indigenous land conservation practices such as seasonal grazing and shifting cultivation recognised this vulnerability by allowing the vegetation and soil to recover. However, these were gradually eroded by colonial and postcolonial governance, which prioritised formal land tenure and permanent settlement but paid little attention to soil productivity and protection from erosion. In the meantime, Tanzania’s population has been growing fast, doubling roughly every 25 years for the past century, and is now exceeding 70 million.

Large areas of natural forests and savannahs have been cleared for agriculture. Pastoralist groups, such as the Maasai, were forced into permanent settlements, replacing their traditional practice of moving livestock seasonally to follow rainfall and fresh pasture. Livestock densities have tripled over the past half century and areas that were once allowed to recover are now farmed and grazed year-round, leaving soils permanently exposed to the elements.

Rainfall in these regions is naturally erratic, alternating between dry spells and wet years. We have not observed a long-term change in rainfall but wet conditions following drought can trigger massive erosion events.

Together, these pressures pushed the landscape past a critical threshold. Once gullies form in these volcanic soils, they are difficult to stop. Like a boulder pushed downhill, erosion accelerates once it starts. Gullies can continue growing even if the original trigger, such as deforestation or overgrazing, has ended. They form highly connected channels that quickly remove rainfall, nutrient-rich topsoil, and seeds away from the land. This makes it difficult for vegetation to recover and the landscape to stabilise.

The cost of losing land

We calculated that the erosion rates in Tanzania are about 20 times higher than they were a century ago. Over 50% of the total area of Tanzania is experiencing rapid land degradation. It is one of the fastest degrading areas in the world.

When land is lost to erosion, so too is food and income. Since roughly 70% of Tanzanians are smallholder farmers and they produce most of the country’s food intake, over 50% of the population has already experienced moderate to severe food insecurity. The consequences are potentially disastrous.

To make matters worse, we saw from repeat visits and photographs that these mega gullies undercut roads and bridges as quickly as a decade after construction. This is an enormous loss in a country working to develop basic services. Farmers tell us that they are cut off from market access and are forced to grow less-perishable or subsistence crops such as maize and beans, instead of higher-value agricultural production. This reinforces low-income and low-investment cycles.

The effects do not stop here, though.

Eroded sediments fill reservoirs and lakes, threatening water availability, fisheries, biodiversity and tourism. We found that Lake Manyara National Park, a Unesco Man and Biosphere Reserve, is filling up due to the enormous amounts of sediment coming from its catchment. This places pressure on an ecosystem that supports more than 350 bird species as well as iconic wildlife such as elephants and lions.

Working together to join the cracks

Despite the scale of the problem, solutions do exist. Across east Africa, communities have long used indigenous techniques such as earth bunds (banks), stepwise terraces, leaky dams, and re-establishment of grasses and trees. These work with natural processes and materials to slow water flow and capture soil.

NGOs such as the LEAD foundation and Justdiggit are revitalising these community-led approaches. We set up a soil and gully monitoring network combining scientific sampling and sensor technology with citizen science approaches to evaluate the evolution of gullies and success of restoration approaches.

In some cases, collective community action has successfully stabilised small gullies and improved soil quality. But many mega gullies are now too large for resource-poor communities to address alone. While the Tanzanian government has committed to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification’s Land Degradation Neutrality initiative, long‑term investment and action plans are lacking. This is partly due to the mismatch between national politics and local action needs.

---

Read more: Key insights into land degradation from seven African countries

---

Ultimately, erosion control cannot be treated as a solely environmental problem. Halting this crisis will require coordinated and large-scale land restoration investment, while simultaneously addressing socio-economic issues linked to poverty, corruption, education and economic development. More than half of Tanzanians are under 18, growing up on landscapes already under strain. Whether these systems can continue to support a growing population will require action before the cracks in the earth widen any further.

– Tanzania is losing fertile land to soil erosion: what’s happening and what can be done
– https://theconversation.com/tanzania-is-losing-fertile-land-to-soil-erosion-whats-happening-and-what-can-be-done-273283

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Timothy G. Bromage, Professor, New York University

Blood tests are useful tools for doctors and scientific researchers: they can reveal a lot about a body’s health. Usually, a blood sample is taken to get a picture of the large molecules that are present, such as cholesterols, lipids and proteins. This is called a metabolic profile.

For more specific information, another kind of blood test looks at the tiny traces of chemical processes taking place at tissue, organ, and even cellular levels. This fine-scale kind of test, metabolomics, studies metabolites – the by-products of metabolism (the body’s way of producing energy and recycling chemicals).

You’d never think this kind of test could be done for animals that lived millions of years ago. But what was very recently science fiction is now reality: it’s called “palaeometabolomics”.

Why would anyone want to know about the metabolites of long-dead creatures?

Metabolites are a way for scientists like me (a biological anthropologist) to learn more about the health, diet, environment and evolution of those creatures – including early humans.

What makes this possible is the way bones are formed: by special cells secreting a soft matrix – mainly collagen – that later crystallises and hardens into a porous material.

Metabolites in the blood that leak from blood vessels during bone formation are so tiny that they become trapped inside the bone matrix (the material that makes up bone) as it hardens. The spaces where they are trapped are so small (nanometre in scale) that bacteria and fungi, which are much bigger, can’t always get in there. Not even in a million years. And because bone mineral structures at these fine scales contain minute traces of water, metabolites are preserved there in fossils.

Studying the metabolites in animal fossils has given us a new way to discover more about the environment at sites where early humans evolved.

My colleagues and I looked at rodent fossils from Olduvai Gorge in Tanzania (about 1.8 million to 1.7 million years old); elephant tooth fossil material from the Chiwondo Beds in Malawi (2.4 million years old); and an antelope bone fossil from Makapansgat in South Africa (about 3 million years old). Fossils of ancient relatives of humans (species of Australopithecus, Paranthropus, and early Homo) have also been found at these sites.

For 100 years, scientists have devised methods for reconstructing the environment that early humans lived in and adapted to. Until now, these methods depended mainly upon geological clues and the kinds of animal and plant fossils found at a site. Now, by performing palaeometabolomics – especially by analysing the chemical traces left in animal bones by the plants that the animals ate – we have established a “molecular ecological” approach for describing ancient habitats.

This new method can add very specific information to other kinds of reconstructions. The metabolites allow us to describe soil pH, minimum and maximum rainfall and temperature, the type of tree cover, and elevations above sea level of plants.

We also made a surprising finding about the relationship between soil and living things.

How to give a fossil a blood test

To perform palaeometabolomics, we established a method to dissolve bits of bone no larger than a pea in a tube containing weak acid. The acid is strong enough to slowly pass the mineral into a solution, but weak enough not to degrade the metabolites. This take several days. We then let the large proteins sink to the bottom of the tube and spin it at high speed in a centrifuge, which leaves the smallest and lightest molecules at the top. We inject the metabolite “soup” into a mass spectrometer, a piece of equipment designed to measure the weights of all small molecule compounds, and refer these to a library of known masses. That’s how we identify the metabolites.

The ones generated within the body – “endogenous” metabolites – offer clues about the health and well-being of an animal. That’s interesting enough, but it’s not the full picture.

All living organisms produce metabolites, including plants. Plants also have metabolisms reflecting their physiological adaptations to the environment. If an animal eats a plant, metabolites of that plant circulate through the animal’s bloodstream and are also trapped at developing bone surfaces. These are called “exogenous” metabolites, and they tell us about the diet of the animal.

What was just interesting now becomes remarkable, because if we can identify the plant that a metabolite came from, we should also be able to reconstruct the environment the plant was adapted to.

What the body says about the bigger picture

The endogenous metabolites we identified from our fossils depict a variety of normal mammalian biological functions and disease states. The exogenous metabolites provide evidence of the environment in the distant past.

For instance, some of our fossil samples had a metabolite derived from the parasite that causes sleeping sickness in humans after a bite from an infected tsetse fly. Wild animals are tsetse fly reservoirs for the parasite. Tsetse flies have very specific environmental conditions, so that helped our reconstructions.

---

Read more: Tooth enamel provides clues on tsetse flies and the spread of herding in ancient Africa

---

We also identified plant metabolites which implied that the Tanzanian and South African sites were wetter than they are now. Minimum temperatures were warmer, and the landscape contained more forest shade. It seems to have been a mixed, seasonally dry and wet tropical habitat. The reconstructed conditions of the Malawi site indicate a wetter environment, also with wet and dry seasons.

Reading the soil

There was one particularly interesting surprise.

Going into this study, we assumed that metabolites from ancient soils surrounding the fossils – known as palaeosols – should be considered contaminants and be disregarded from our analyses. But when we analysed metabolites of modern animals of the same fossil species living near the sites, whose bones never touched the soil, we found that both the modern and fossil animals shared large percentages of the palaeosol metabolites.

This means that the palaeosol reflects the lives of all the organisms living there. Once plants and animals live on that soil, their metabolites become a part of the soil matrix. The animals and the soil are completely connected by shared metabolites, which represent the flow of materials that sustain the habitat. They are not contaminants to be disregarded.

Our biomolecular approach – using metabolites from fossil bones and teeth as a way to reconstruct ancient environments – is a new one. It might one day make it possible to describe past habitats as precisely as we can describe modern ones.

– Life in fossil bones: what we can learn from tiny traces of ancient blood chemicals
– https://theconversation.com/life-in-fossil-bones-what-we-can-learn-from-tiny-traces-of-ancient-blood-chemicals-273906

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

South Africa has a new draft white paper on immigration, citizenship and refugees. This, the fourth in three decades, represents a step change from the previous efforts. It is a genuine attempt to develop an efficient but humane set of policies.

Based on my work on migration over two decades, I am convinced that the policies in this new paper are far more ambitious than previous reforms. They represent a genuine attempt to address a complex and sensitive set of challenges in a comprehensive way, using state-of-the-art technological tools. The key question is: are the reforms practically and politically feasible?

The first post-apartheid immigration white paper, published in 1997, led to the new Immigration Act of 2002. This was the second significant reform to immigration policy in the post-apartheid era. The first was the Refugee Act of 1998. The Refugee Act represented a bold realignment. In it South Africa acceded to global and African refugee treaties. It also placed human rights at the centre of the policy.

The 2002 Immigration Act was reformist rather than revolutionary. It was rightly criticised for not getting to grips with the legacy of migration patterns in southern Africa.

The white paper represents a far more coherent and systematic rethink than previous South African piecemeal reforms or similar attempts elsewhere in Africa.

The changes are being driven by Home Affairs minister Leon Schreiber. Schreiber is unusual among politicians. He is a real political scientist with real expertise in public policy. He is ambitious and seems determined to accomplish as much as he can in the current term of government. The impression I get is that his senior officials buy into the reforms – indeed, they devised many of them.

The generational change is essentially digitisation. All civil records about citizens, migrants, prospective migrants, visitors, asylum seekers and refugees will be digitised and integrated. If it works, it could result in a watertight management system for immigration, citizenship and refugee protection. This would be a huge step up from the current jumble of paper-based and incomplete datasets.

If completely successful it would eliminate both the massive inefficiency of the Department of Home Affairs, and the fraud and general confusion which still plague the governance of migrants and refugees in South Africa.

Fit for the 21st century

Digitisation and integration of information systems was recommended by the Lubisi enquiry into documentation fraud commissioned by the previous minister.

In my own work on South Africa’s migration policies, I made similar recommendations, with the benefit of the evidence in the Lubisi report and other sources.

At the heart of the system being proposed in the new white paper is an Intelligent Population Register. This is a modern, digitised system to manage and use comprehensive population data. Countries like Estonia and Denmark have pioneered such systems, and India has shown how a digital ID system can be extended to its massive population. Botswana already has an integrated civil registration system similar to the one South Africa is planning.

As the minister of Home Affairs put it, an intelligent population register

uses advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence, machine learning, biometrics, interoperability and real-time data integration, to improve governance, integrated service delivery, and national planning.

The new system will require mandatory birth and death registration, and biometric data not only for citizens but also for foreigners, regular and irregular, who reside in the country. This would provide data that enables far more effective social and economic policies than the current incomplete population register.

Irregular foreigners, including asylum seekers and others whose status is yet to be determined, will be:

• counted

• allowed to use the banking system irrespective of their status

• expected to pay tax.

Other improvements are that it will be:

• more difficult for unethical visa applicants to game the system

• easier to keep track of refugees and asylum seekers

• more difficult to carry out identity theft.

The other major change is that the new system will introduce a “merit-based path” to naturalisation, in contrast to the existing “mechanical and compliance-based” pathway.

Merit is preferred to years served. After five years of permanent residence, naturalisation will be acquired according to a set of accomplishments that are yet to be detailed. This will be available to immigrants who have come in through a points-based system as well as to current citizens of Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Angola holding exemption permits. The yet to be finalised points system will include assessments of educational qualifications, acquired skills, and some measure of social impact.

The points-based system for skilled immigrants will replace or, for now, complement the critical skills list.

Other immigration reforms include a new start-up visa for tech firms, a subset of an investment visa which replaces the business visa, and new age and income requirements for retiree immigrants. The recently introduced Trusted Employer Scheme, Trusted Tour Operator Scheme and the remote work visa are endorsed in the white paper.

Reforms are proposed to speed up the asylum applications process, including a dedicated immigration court. Even those who obtain refugee status may be returned to the “first safe country” that they passed through when exiting their perilous country.

Countries which are safe for returnees would be designated by government – those which do not have raging civil wars or extreme repression or similar hazards for their citizens. South Africa would have to get agreement from the designated safe countries that they would accept returnees without prejudice.

Caveats and concerns

None of these reforms will be easy. Some, like the various points-based systems for entry, permanent residence and citizenship, and the establishment of dedicated refugee courts, are complex proposals not yet fully explained.

Other concerns include the privacy implications of the intelligent population register and the willingness of other countries to agree to being designated first safe country. Both issues are vulnerable to court challenges. Prospective first safe countries may require some incentive to cooperate, and South Africa might have to offer to accept a considerable share of the refugees.

There are also some issues covered in previous white papers not addressed here. Whether and how to draw on the financial and networking resources of the South African diaspora is not discussed. Nor is the issue of proactive policies to promote the social integration of foreigners.

Also not covered is the issue of lower-skilled migrants. However, migrant labour, mostly low-skilled, is the focus of the White Paper on National Labour Migration Policy republished by the Department of Employment and Labour last year.

The ambition signalled in the new policy paper is impressive. Whether it is doable, and whether the project will be completed, depends on many things, political, technical and judicial.

– South Africa’s new immigration policy takes a digital direction – will it succeed?
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-new-immigration-policy-takes-a-digital-direction-will-it-succeed-274038

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Haruna Inuwa, DPhil Candidate, Energy Systems, University of Oxford

Energy systems are coming under attack globally because disrupting power or fuel supplies offers strategic, economic or political leverage. This can be in local conflicts or large-scale geopolitical confrontations.

Nigeria illustrates this clearly: militants in the Niger Delta sabotage pipelines to assert control and tap into oil revenues, while the extremist group Boko Haram and armed bandits in the north hit power lines to weaken state presence.

These incidents reveal how conflict actors weaponise energy systems.

We recently published a study assessing how militancy, insurgency and armed banditry undermine Nigeria’s energy systems by disrupting oil, gas and power infrastructure. We compiled novel datasets of energy related incidents, mapping their timing, location and cost from 2009 to 2025.

Our findings show that more than 2,300 separate attacks were recorded. We see a widening pattern of energy insecurity that drains national revenue, drives away investment, and worsens environmental injustice.

This explains why Nigeria’s energy insecurity has become one of its most serious development and security challenges.

We recommend investment in decentralised systems, community engagement in oil regions, and policies supporting industrial decarbonisation to strengthen resilience and advance climate goals.

The price

According to our estimates, between 2009 and 2024, approximately US$20 billion was lost as a result of attacks. During the 2013-2016 surge in militancy, losses peaked at roughly US$17 billion.

We found that the South-South (Niger Delta) region remains the epicentre of oil sabotage, with peak revenue losses of US$8.62 trillion (2009-2012) and sustained environmental damage.

Attacks and oil theft along the Trans-Niger Pipeline were particularly devastating. This pipeline moves 450,000 barrels of crude oil daily from oil-producing fields in Niger Delta region to export terminals. Each disruption not only shuts down production but also deprives the government of huge revenues.

Since 2021, tactics have shifted. Over 40 attacks have targeted transmission lines in the North-East and North-Central, largely linked to Boko Haram and armed bandits.

Case studies of the 2016 Shell Forcados terminal bombing and the 2024 Shiroro transmission line attack show reliance on backup generators increased electricity costs by 3.2-6.0 times.

Beyond the financial toll, communities suffer respiratory illnesses, unsafe drinking water and food insecurity.

Disruptions have made Nigeria’s grid more unstable and pose risks to critical infrastructure projects nearing completion, including gas pipelines.

Attacks threaten regional energy trade and integration projects, such as the West African Power Pool, West African Gas Pipeline, Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, and the proposed Nigeria-Algeria-Gas-Pipeline, which rely on secure cross-border energy infrastructure.

Foreign investors view these risks as prohibitive. Due to attacks on energy infrastructure, in 2020, Nigeria lost around US$40 billion in foreign direct investment.

Oil theft and sabotage have also left a toxic legacy in the Niger Delta. Each pipeline rupture spills crude into rivers and farmland, wiping out livelihoods.

We find that clean-up costs from oil spills on the Trans-Niger Pipeline alone ranged from US$150 million to US$290 million per period (2009-2012, 2013-2016, 2017-2020, 2021-2024), highlighting continuous environmental degradation in the Niger Delta area.

In line with this, the United Nations Environment Programme estimated that a US$1 billion 30-year clean-up is needed in Ogoniland, while Reuters reported that addressing oil pollution in Bayelsa State alone might require US$12 billion over 12 years. When compared to Nigeria’s GDP of US$375 billion in 2024, these figures underscore the substantial financial strain that this attack-induced environmental crisis places on national resources.

Our analysis indicates that insurgents and bandits have shifted tactics since 2021. We see increased disruption and attacks on power infrastructure in the northern part of the country.

More than 40 incidents targeting high-voltage transmission lines have been recorded in just four years, a 20-fold increase from the previous decade. Two major examples show the consequences: the 2016 Forcados terminal bombing cut national power generation by 3,132MW, while the 2024 Shiroro transmission-line attack left the north-western part of the country in darkness for two weeks.

During attack-induced outages, businesses and households switch to diesel or petrol generators. We find that this backup electricity costs three to six times more than grid power, with the North-East and North-West experiencing the highest cost increase.

Each attack also carries an invisible environmental cost. Backup generators release far more carbon dioxide than grid electricity. During the 2016 and 2024 outages, we estimated sharp spikes in CO₂ across the South-West and South-South, Nigeria’s most energy-hungry regions.

This trend undermines Nigeria’s commitments under the National Climate Change Policy 2021-2030, which aims to cut emissions and expand energy access using renewable energy. Insecurity, therefore, is not just an economic or social problem – it is an obstacle to climate progress.

How Nigeria can respond

Our research points to several steps that could make the energy systems more resilient:

1. Invest in decentralised and modular power systems: Smaller, locally managed plants – such as the 52-megawatt Maiduguri Emergency Power Plant – are harder to sabotage and quicker to repair.

2. Rebuild trust with host communities: Environmental remediation and transparent benefit-sharing can reduce grievances that drive sabotage. Local participation in energy projects must move beyond tokenism.

3. Adopt technology for early warning and monitoring: Pressure sensors, drones and predictive analytics can detect tampering and leaks in real-time. Government contracts with former militants to guard pipelines must be coupled with strict accountability.

4. Accelerate innovative clean-energy deployment: In the light of Nigeria’s commitment to achieve climate goals, it is important to explore emerging decarbonisation pathways, including clean hydrogen.

Nigeria’s energy wealth has long promised prosperity, but persistent insecurity has made it a liability. The financial losses, pollution and emissions caused by repeated attacks erode resilience and deter investment. This challenge is not unique to Nigeria; it reflects a broader global reality in which energy transitions depend on secure infrastructure.

Achieving a stable, decentralised and low-carbon system will require protecting the assets that make it possible.

– Attacks on Nigeria’s energy systems weaken the country – research unpacks costs, risks and ways forward
– https://theconversation.com/attacks-on-nigerias-energy-systems-weaken-the-country-research-unpacks-costs-risks-and-ways-forward-271366