MIL Africa Engine

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sisanda Nkoala, Associate professor, University of the Western Cape

News media shape public understanding of artificial intelligence (AI) and influence how society interacts with these technologies. For many people, especially those who have not sought more knowledge about AI elsewhere, media platforms are a primary source of information.

This is particularly significant in Africa, where historical and socioeconomic contexts like colonial legacies and uneven technology transfer shape how AI is understood and adopted.

Consequently, the way African news media represent and frame AI carries weight in shaping broader public discourse.

To explore how African media report on AI, we, as media researchers, analysed 724 news articles about AI from 26 English-speaking African countries. These were published between 1 June 2022 and 31 December 2023. We looked at how these publications contributed to the hype about AI – exaggerated excitement, inflated expectations, and often sensationalised claims about what artificial intelligence can do.

Hype is often contrasted with the notion of something called an AI winter. This is a period of diminished interest and investment in AI technologies. It’s a cyclical trend that has been seen since AI’s inception in the 1950s. It manifests in exaggerated language, overly optimistic or pessimistic views and significant investments in AI.

Our study examined how AI was portrayed in African news media – whether it was exaggerated or overly optimistic. Media portrayal can influence policy, investment and public acceptance of new technologies. For example, in Germany it was found that positive media coverage of different fuels changed public perception in a positive way.

Our findings show a clear pattern in placement and authorship of articles. The most common placement of AI articles (36%) was in the technology section of publications, followed by general news (24%) and then the business section (19%). This shows that these publications mostly talk about AI as a practical tool that can solve problems and create economic opportunities. They highlight its usefulness and potential benefits, rather than exploring its social or ethical implications. Discussion of issues like employment, inequality and cultural values was largely missing.

African journalists, news entities and content creators contributed some 29% of the articles. But western-based news entities (21%) and journalists (5%) had a considerable influence. Global news agencies like AFP (15%) and Reuters (6%), along with tech news providers like Research Snipers (13%), frequently wrote these pieces.

Only a small proportion of articles (4%) were written by researchers. This suggests that the voices of those directly engaged in AI research and development in Africa were muted. But they are crucial for a locally informed understanding.

To sum up the patterns:

• practical benefits of AI are emphasised at the expense of social and ethical conversations

• African perspectives on how AI should be developed and used are often overlooked in favour of a western, business-focused viewpoint.

What words are used to describe AI?

We also analysed the words used most frequently. The frequent mention of Google, Microsoft and ChatGPT reflects the dominance of western tech giants in the AI landscape. Words like “he” and “his” appeared disturbingly frequently, while feminine pronouns weren’t among the top words. This indicates a bias towards male perspectives.

The scarcity of terms like Africa, African and African countries suggests that the coverage seldom regards specific African needs and challenges. This overlooks Africa’s growing AI ecosystem.

We found three main themes around AI in African news:

• AI’s transformative potential, for example for agriculture, administration, healthcare and economic growth

• concerns about AI’s potential negative effects, the unknown and disruptive nature of AI

• articles that offered a more balanced view and useful information, aiming to demystify AI tools and explain developments.

What this means for Africa

The dominance of technical and economic framing, often by western voices, might steer policy decisions towards uptake without adequate local consultation or ethical oversight. This might lead to policies that mirror global hype rather than community-specific needs.

The overemphasis on “tools” and “solutions” risks overlooking the broader effects of AI on employment, inequality and cultural values.

The lack of Afrocentric terms in the reporting contributes to a symbolic exclusion, where Africa’s specific needs and opportunities are marginalised.

Towards a more inclusive AI narrative

To encourage a more responsible and locally relevant AI journalism in Africa, African journalists and researchers should be empowered to report on and analyse this technology.

The range of voices should expand to include local researchers, policymakers and communities experiencing AI’s effects firsthand. This means balancing coverage of AI’s economic potential with sustained attention to its social, cultural and ethical implications. African media can resist one-dimensional hype and create a more inclusive and socially responsible conversation around AI.

– Hype and western values are shaping AI reporting in Africa: what needs to change
– https://theconversation.com/hype-and-western-values-are-shaping-ai-reporting-in-africa-what-needs-to-change-262551

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jacqui Cho, PhD Fellow, swisspeace Mediation Program, University of Basel

In central Africa, a violent conflict has been unfolding for nearly eight years. What began in 2016 as peaceful protests by lawyers and teachers against the increasing “francophonisation” of the legal and education systems in Cameroon’s anglophone regions quickly escalated into an armed conflict between separatist groups and government forces.

It has come at a devastating human cost. With both sides of the civil war using education as a weapon, over 700,000 children have been forced out of school since 2017. By October 2024, the conflict had resulted in more than 6,500 deaths and displaced over 584,000 people internally. More than 73,000 have been forced to seek refuge in neighbouring Nigeria.

Yet Cameroon’s government has refused meaningful negotiations. Though a key party to a conflict that remains unquestionably unresolved, Yaoundé insists that the situation is under control. In practice, it has pursued a dual strategy of military repression paired with a façade of dialogue. Behind the scenes, it has quietly stalled and derailed authentic efforts for peace.

Why has Yaoundé been able to avoid a peace settlement with so little international backlash? I sought answers as part of my PhD research in mediation, focused on the conflict in Cameroon.

In an era of revived rivalry between great powers, Cameroon has learned to navigate and exploit the interests of competing global actors. Western governments, eager to keep Cameroon within their sphere of influence and fearful of growing Russian and Chinese engagement, have not applied pressure for peace. Pushing hard for negotiations would risk jeopardising relations with Yaoundé – an outcome western capitals are keen to avoid.

Cameroon’s case reveals a broader trend. Across Africa and beyond, the post-cold war norm of resolving political conflicts through negotiation is losing ground. In its place, a militarised approach is becoming increasingly common. Global powers are tolerating, even encouraging, forceful approaches. This is particularly true when the regimes in question serve, or help protect, their respective strategic interests. This shift is quietly reshaping the rules of conflict resolution, with serious implications for peace and democracy.

Calculated defiance of dialogue

Between 2019 and 2022, Switzerland attempted to facilitate peace talks between the Cameroonian state and various separatist groups. The process failed, largely due to the Cameroonian government’s aloofness and lack of commitment. When the Swiss initiative was quietly shelved, there was little international backlash.

Cameroon’s ability to walk away from the facilitation effort, while escalating military operations, was a result of its diplomatic manoeuvring within the Franco-Russian rivalry. By signing a military deal with Russia in April 2022, Cameroon signalled to France and others that it had diplomatic options. This move reportedly shifted France’s stance to one of allowing Yaoundé to do as it pleased, as long as it remained within the French sphere of influence. The French president’s visit to Cameroon just months afterwards reinforced the idea that strategic relationships would take precedence over conflict resolution or democratic norms.

Cameroon has also cultivated a circle of “quiet enablers” over decades. Its strong relations with states as diverse as the US, China, Israel and Japan have similarly provided tacit support as Yaoundé took a more militarised approach and have shielded it diplomatically.

Global drift towards force

The anglophone crisis in Cameroon illustrates a troubling global development. While negotiated settlements were the dominant, or preferred, model for resolving conflicts in the post-cold war era, today that model is under threat.

This challenge to the norm of negotiated settlements stems from various sources. On the one hand, changes within so-called liberal western states, particularly since the “global war on terror”, have led to a renewed emphasis on security, sometimes at the expense of liberal democratic principles. This has generated greater tolerance for authoritarian regimes and tacit acceptance of the use of force.

On the other hand, rising powers like Russia and China are promoting alternative models of conflict management. They favour approaches that empower strong states to maintain peace, even through the use of force. Russia, for example, views its military engagements in Syria as a form of “peacemaking”. It prioritises order over justice. China’s model for peace similarly focuses on building a strong central state.

African states are far from passive observers in this evolving landscape. Drawing on experiences from the eras of empire and the cold war, African states are looking to further their own interests both domestically and internationally.

It’s not just global powers objectifying Africa. It is also about African actors strategically playing the game because they benefit.

Elections and the stakes for democracy and governance

With a presidential election looming in October 2025, the stakes for Cameroon’s democracy, governance and peace could not be clearer. At the age of 92, President Paul Biya has formally announced his candidacy for an eighth term.

Opposition parties describe a system already rigged against them, with reported incidents of harassment and intimidation. The ongoing conflict in the anglophone areas is expected to make voting harder, if not impossible. This is a situation that will likely favour Biya.

The regime’s ability to defy calls for dialogue is emboldened by geopolitical cover and a fragmented opposition. It raises the risk of a militarised status quo being mistaken for stability. Everyday violence, kidnappings, and killings – especially in rural areas – have become normalised, with little international outcry. The regime continues to pursue its strong-arm tactics without concerns about international repercussions.

Dangerous precedent

The case of Cameroon’s anglophone crisis is emblematic of a broader, worldwide struggle between a negotiations-oriented model and a militarised approach to ending violent political conflicts. The erosion of the norm of negotiated settlement, coupled with the increased agency of African states to withstand external pressure, brings an additional challenge to an already difficult process of encouraging conflict parties to come to the table.

Cameroon shows how global silence and strategic use of the geopolitical environment can give rise to and legitimise conflict resolution through brute force. Without a renewed commitment to inclusive dialogue and political settlements, the precedent being set today may shape the conflict management of tomorrow across Africa and beyond.

– Cameroon’s conflict is part of a bigger trend: negotiations are losing ground to military solutions
– https://theconversation.com/cameroons-conflict-is-part-of-a-bigger-trend-negotiations-are-losing-ground-to-military-solutions-261697

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Dirk Kotze, Professor in Political Science, University of South Africa

South Africa is due to hold local government elections in 2026. In the last election in 2021, only 15% of the eligible voters aged 18 to 21 registered for the election. In view of this, it’s worth considering whether the minimum voting age of 18 years should be reduced to increase participation.

What are the main driving forces for such a consideration? Based on international comparisons, how advisable would it be? What would be some of the implications of such a change for elections in South Africa?

The South African constitution does not state explicitly that the voting age is 18 years, but it is implied. Section 1(d) entrenches the constitutional principle of universal adult suffrage. Section 19(3) says “every adult citizen has the right (a) to vote in elections of any legislative body and (b) to stand for public office”.

The legal description of an adult is found in South African common law. At the age of 18 years, a person becomes legally an adult or reaches the age of majority.

The South African Electoral Act, as amended in 2003, provides that a person can register as a voter at the age of 16 years but the name can be placed on the voters’ roll only once the applicant becomes 18 years old.

South Africa’s current dispensation is currently the same as those of most countries in the world.

The United Arab Emirates is the state with the oldest minimum voting age: 25 years. In the following states it is 21 years: Singapore, Lebanon, Oman, Kuwait, Samoa and Tonga. Three of them (plus the UAE) are in the Middle East. All seven of these are very small states and the majority of them are not democratic.

By far the majority of state entities (202 in total) use 18 years as the minimum voting age. Indonesia, North Korea and Greece, on the other hand, decided on 17 years as the voting age, while in Brazil, Argentina and Ecuador it is 16 years.

Lowering of the voting age is not an uncontested idea. A number of considerations can be presented as its pros and cons. The general contention is that if a larger proportion of the population elects their public representatives, it would enhance public trust in elections. But, in South Africa at least, that is offset by young people’s lack of enthusiasm in elections.

For the moment, a change in the voting age would most possibly not add major advantages to South Africa’s electoral dynamics, because it would not necessarily increase the number of voters or change the outcome of elections.

Main considerations

Voting for a political candidate is one of the most important decisions a citizen of a state can make. What determines sound decision-making?

A person should understand what the decision is about: what the issues are and what the options and their implications are. The question therefore is: at what age would a person make rational voting decisions?

In the era of populism, fake news and manipulation, a voter should be a person who can think independently, who can distinguish between reliable and misleading information and be strong enough not to be manipulated.

A voter should also have a vested interest in the future of their country and therefore participate in voting to determine what is in the best interest of that country. An illustration of this point is the 26th amendment of the American constitution in 1971 when the voting age was reduced from 21 to 18 years. The decision was influenced by the apparent contradiction that 18-year-old American citizens were drafted to fight in the Vietnam war while they were still excluded from voting.

But how well a person is informed about politics or the issues in a country isn’t determined by age. Especially in the era of easily accessible internet information and the different forms of social media. This implies that knowledge of the issues or politics in general is not a sufficient motivation for lowering the voting age.

The critical factor is how that information is used to take an informed and rational decision.

The rationale of why minors need guardians who must assist them in decision-making is that they do not have yet the life experience and judgement abilities to take the responsibility for a decision on their own. Voting is an individual and independent action and therefore no assistance in the decision-making process can be allowed.

Implications

Do 16- or 17-year-old people have a different attitude towards elections or politics in general than 18-year-olds?

In the absence of survey data, an informed guess is: no.

Adding them would not necessarily change the outcomes of elections. The minority Economic Freedom Fighters party in South Africa is the only one that has a strong appeal to young voters. But it has been losing support.

How many new registered voters could be added by 16- and 17-year-old newcomers? Statistics SA provides figures only for the age bracket 15-19, which is slightly more than 9% of the total population. The age group 16-17 years therefore might be around 3%-4% of the population. Given the trends of low voter registration among the young eligible voters, the percentage it would add to the total might therefore be quite small.

If the 16-17-year bracket were to be added to the electorate, the total number of eligible voters would increase but because the rate of registration as voters is in decline, the total percentage of registered voters would most possibly decrease. Young eligible voters are proportionally less likely to register than their older counterparts.

With a decline in the voting age, voter turnout based on the number of registered voters might not decrease dramatically. The main difference would be seen in the voter turnout as a percentage of the eligible voters, because of the low level of young eligible voters who are willing to register as voters.

Probably an unintended consequence of a 16-year voting age is that school pupils would be eligible voters during the last two or three years of their school studies. This has the potential to politicise schools, especially during election times. Political parties might insist on campaigning at schools.

At the same time, it would be an opportunity for more concentrated civic and voter education of a captured audience. Following this argument, a registered voter who complies with the constitution’s section 47 could stand as a candidate and be elected as a public representative in a legislature.

For now, the chances are slim that the voting age will change at a time when several other electoral reform processes are in the pipeline affecting the electoral system, party funding and even electronic voting.

– Young South Africans don’t bother with elections: would lowering the voting age make a difference?
– https://theconversation.com/young-south-africans-dont-bother-with-elections-would-lowering-the-voting-age-make-a-difference-262818