MIL Africa Engine

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sam Jones, Senior Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University

Mozambique is not in total crisis – but it is faltering. There has been no currency crash, no hyperinflation, no bank run. But over the past decade the main indicators of the country’s economic health have severely eroded.

An IMF assessment in early 2026 was remarkably blunt: public debt is unsustainably high, the external balance of payments is weak, and policy makers have limited options. Since then, tensions in the Middle East have further disrupted supply chains and dramatically raised global fuel prices. This is a major shock for small import-dependent economies, like Mozambique.

My analysis draws on over two decades of experience supporting economic research and policy analysis in the country. Currently, my work under the Inclusive Growth in Mozambique programme involves tracking the country’s economic performance through surveys of firms, students, and households.

The picture that emerges from this evidence is troubling. For ordinary Mozambicans, the deterioration in conditions over the past decade shows up in higher poverty, unreliable public services and a labour market that offers few decent opportunities – especially for the young.

My central argument is that muddling through is not a safe option. Without careful adjustments now and a deliberate shift toward growth and job creation outside extractives – the part of the economy that actually employs most Mozambicans – today’s pressures will keep building until a large economic correction becomes unavoidable and under far worse conditions.

A slow squeeze

The country’s present condition is one of vulnerable stagnation. Since the hidden debt crisis of 2016, real GDP growth outside the extractive sector has hovered around 2%, barely matching population growth. In per capita terms, the non-extractive economy has flatlined for a decade. Average real incomes outside mining and gas (or the public sector) have gone essentially nowhere.

Fiscal deficits of 4%-6% of GDP have been financed increasingly by domestic banks. But as both the IMF and World Bank have warned, that model is now reaching a breaking point. Banks can only absorb so much government debt before they run out of willingness – or capacity – to lend. When that happens, the government faces a choice between defaulting, printing money, or slashing spending abruptly. None is painless.

Evidence of these pressures is plain to see. Over a year ago, the global rating agency S&P classified local-currency debt as “selective default”. This is a formal determination that the government had failed to meet its obligations to domestic creditors on the original terms, even if it continued paying.

By late 2025, arrears had extended to short-term treasury bills – government IOUs that mature within months and are supposed to be the safest instruments in the domestic financial system. When a government struggles to repay even these, it signals serious fiscal distress.

On top of this, a decade of crisis management has displaced any serious thinking about growth. The government’s wage bill and debt service dominate spending, leaving chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Schools and health facilities lack supplies, roads deteriorate, and social protection has weakened sharply.

Payments under the basic social subsidy programme have become highly irregular. Many elderly beneficiaries receive only a fraction of what they are owed. Poverty has increased, with around two thirds of the population now below the poverty line.

Demographic pressures are intensifying. Mozambique needs to absorb roughly 500,000 new labour market entrants annually by 2030, yet the formal sector generates a small fraction of new jobs. Informal work dominates and without a step-change in growth, it will only expand. Each year of stagnation adds another youth cohort to an already strained labour market. Delay does not preserve stability – it makes eventual adjustment larger and more costly.

The exchange rate question

The metical has been held stable against the US dollar since 2021, but in real terms it has appreciated by over 20%, eroding export competitiveness. Foreign exchange shortages are now pervasive. The parallel market premium reached around 14% by late 2025. Firms report severe and lengthening delays in accessing foreign exchange through formal channels.

The policy response has been administrative: raising exporter surrender requirements, tightening banks’ foreign exchange position limits, restricting overseas card usage. These measures treat symptoms, but the underlying misalignment only deepens.

The overvalued exchange rate functions as a tax on the non-resource economy. Recent fuel shortages and panic buying – driven in part by importers’ inability to secure foreign exchange and price uncertainty – provide a visible demonstration of the mounting costs.

The politics of adjustment

In practice, public sector employment has come to serve as a form of social protection for the urban middle class. Our research shows roughly half of all university graduates find employment in the public sector, and having a public sector job is one of the best predictors of not being poor.

The public sector wage bill underpins political legitimacy, which is why attempts to cut discretionary 13th-month salary payments were quickly reversed once key workers threatened to strike.

Exchange rate adjustment poses a parallel dilemma. A depreciation would raise the cost of imported food and fuel, hitting urban households directly, and any price increase would spark calls to hike minimum wages. With the memory of popular violence from the 2024 elections still fresh, there is a strong bias toward the status quo.

But as pressures mount, there is a growing risk of compounding distortions. So far the temptation has been to respond with new administrative controls, including import restrictions, tighter capital controls, and preferential credit allocation.

The ongoing handling of the fuel price shock illustrates the pattern. Rather than adjust pump prices promptly, the government has held prices fixed, leaving distributors to manage a mounting shortfall through supply rationing.

Each temporary fix may ease immediate pressures, but tends to deepen the underlying misalignment, push activity into informal channels, and narrow future options.

Feasible pathways

Path 1: Muddle through and wait for the gas. This is the current trajectory. Fiscal adjustment occurs passively, driven by financing constraints rather than strategy. The hope is that LNG revenues could materialise from the early 2030s. Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin holds an estimated 100 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas – among the largest discoveries globally in the past two decades. But only one offshore platform (Coral South) is currently producing. Even if the 2030 timeline holds, continued stagnation would further erode public services, weaken institutions, and deepen social frustration – and another general election must be managed. By the time resource revenues arrive, the state may lack the capacity and public trust to deploy them effectively.

Path 2: Gradual, growth-first adjustment. The most economically coherent path, though politically demanding. The central premise: restoring non-extractive growth must take priority, even at the cost of short-term macroeconomic discomfort. Key elements would include:

• a phased depreciation of the metical to restore competitiveness, supported by clear communication and strengthened social protection

• acceptance of temporarily higher inflation, with policy focused on preventing second-round effects rather than suppressing the initial price shift

• a fiscal framework centred on spending quality and revenue efficiency

• wage bill containment through hiring restraint, attrition, and systematic payroll audits to eliminate ghost workers and improper payments

• re-engagement with external partners under a credible IMF programme framework; and

• an evidence-based and financially viable medium-term growth strategy targeting agricultural productivity, labour-intensive exports and a predictable regulatory and macroeconomic environment.

Path 3: Forced correction. If external shocks bite deeper, a large adjustment may be imposed suddenly – involving disorderly exchange rate movement, abrupt fiscal contraction, and potential banking sector stress. The longer gradual adjustment is postponed, the higher this probability.

The narrow path

There is no easy option. Every adjustment has visible losers, while the benefits remain uncertain, delayed, and diffuse.

But one priority stands out: boosting growth beyond extractive sectors. Without it, fiscal consolidation is self-defeating, job creation will remain grossly inadequate, and social pressures will only intensify. Stabilisation pursued in isolation, or at the expense of growth, could be bad medicine.

This growth strategy must be grounded in data, evidence and honest debate. Mozambique has not lacked for projects or initiatives, but it has lacked consistent use of rigorous data to identify what drives productivity and job creation.

The window for a controlled, policy-driven adjustment is narrowing fast. The alternative is not stability. It is adjustment under far worse conditions, at higher cost.

– Mozambique’s economy is failing: the tough policy choices that need to be made urgently
– https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-economy-is-failing-the-tough-policy-choices-that-need-to-be-made-urgently-281679

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

The precarious security situation in Mali took a turn for the worse in late April 2026. Well coordinated attacks targeted several cities and claimed the lives of the defence minister, Sadio Camara, and several Malian soldiers.

The events are a culmination of increased attacks over the past few years on the military and state institutions in Mali.

We have been researching insecurity and politics in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. We believe the recent attacks trace back to grievances expressed by Tuaregs that the current military regime has not addressed. The Tuaregs are nomadic Berber communities in northern Mali.

First is the inability or unwillingness to address Tuareg discontent. Their grievances centre on political autonomy, marginalisation, cultural recognition, resource control, security and perceived state neglect.

Second, the continuous use of force by the military against rebels in the northern regions without regard for the collateral damage. The Tuaregs have long contested the militarisation policies of successive Malian governments.

Third, the uneven distribution of resources, which keeps the northern region marginalised. These include northern Mali’s resources such as gold deposits, salt mines, grazing lands, and strategic trade corridors. Revenues from these sources remain controlled by the state’s centre based in the south.

Addressing resource marginalisation could have a number of benefits. It could temper Tuareg grievances, restore trust in the Malian state, and shift conflict incentives away from rebellion towards political inclusion, stability, and sustainable peace in northern Mali.

The breakdown

In April 2026 the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) joined forces with ethnic Tuareg rebels from the northern Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) to attack several cities in the country recently.

This mirrors a similar attack in 2012 when the Tuareg and al-Qaeda-affiliated militants launched an offensive against the state. The Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) attempted to secede and initiated a rebellion.

The MNLA is a Tuareg‑dominated separatist movement. Founded in 2011, it is mainly composed of ex-Libyan war returnees and northern Malian Tuaregs. The organisation had about 10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012.

Despite their numbers, they lacked the military power to hold the territory. As a result they aligned with Islamists Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Shortly after pushing back Malian forces in late 2012, the alliance disintegrated.

The Islamist groups were better armed and funded. They forced the secular separatists out of major towns like Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The intervention of French forces in 2013 helped the Malian government regain most of the lost territories.

AQIM and its allies then moved into the mountains and surrounding desert areas. They shifted to guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings and landmines.

The withdrawal of French forces in 2022 seems to have emboldened the Islamist militants. It removed counter‑terrorism pressure, disrupted intelligence and logistics and created a security vacuum amid weak Malian state capacity. This allowed Islamist groups to expand operations, recruit locally and regain territorial influence.

Lessons unlearnt

The largely popular military regime of Assimi Goita has failed to address the demands of Tuareg separatists. The Tuaregs have historically complained about exclusion from power by the southern dominated Malian state. Since the country’s independence in 1960, Tuareg leaders have argued that the structure of the Malian state does not reflect their political identity, economic interests and governance traditions. The demand for self-rule or autonomy has been suppressed, often by force.

More recently, increased drought, desertification and climate variability has devastated Tuareg pastoral livelihoods. These grievances pre-date Islamic insurgency and are fundamental in understanding the approach of the group.

The second unaddressed issue is that counterterrorism operations use force which creates collateral damage. Recent analysis shows that counterterrorism operations in northern and central Mali have resulted in large scale civilian harm, displacement and collective punishments. These have included arbitrary arrests and mass killings.

These factors have created conditions which Islamist groups have exploited for recruitment, territorial control and legitimacy.

The blame for this has been put on successive Malian regimes and previous French operations. This has been a key reason for France’s interventions being labelled as failures.

The third major driver of violence in Mali relates to the uneven distribution of resources. Since independence, public investment, infrastructure, social services and political attention have been heavily concentrated in the southern parts of the country.

Previous peace agreements have promised decentralisation, funding and integration of northern elites and ex-combatants. But implementation have been slow or nonexistent.

Is there a way forward?

The Tuareg question must be answered to reduce the tension between the regions of the country. It can be argued that Tuareg actors have twice miscalculated by entering arrangements with jihadist groups. But this does not diminish the need to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances underpinning Tuareg demands.

To achieve this, the Malian regime can copy the blueprint of former president Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger. Prior to his presidency, the Nigerien Tuaregs were similarly aggrieved. When he became president in 2011, he:

• integrated Tuareg elites and former rebels into state institutions

• decentralised state authority by allowing administrative and budgetary control at the regional level

• introduced disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Issoufou also invested in infrastructural development in the areas that directly affected the Tuaregs. This included pastoralism, education and livelihood support. Water access in arid pastoral areas was improved. And connectivity and road safety was expanded.

Addressing the Tuareg agitations would reduce tensions in Mali.

– Mali attacks: Tuareg grievances hold the key to peace
– https://theconversation.com/mali-attacks-tuareg-grievances-hold-the-key-to-peace-281832

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Irene Appeaning Addo, Associate Professor of African Architecture, University of Ghana

The call to prayer echoes across the neighbourhood as people congregate under the sweeping domes and tall minarets of Ghana’s National Mosque in Accra. For many, it is a place of faith, community and national pride. Yet, few pause to consider that this landmark – now firmly part of Accra’s skyline – was funded and built by Turkey.

This detail points to a bigger story. Some of Ghana’s most important public buildings are shaped by global relationships as much as local needs. And those relationships are not just economic; they are deeply political.

Therefore buildings are not just functional. They are powerful expressions of political power, used to describe and project ideas about hierarchy, state authority, solidarity and modernity.

As a result, architecture can be used to explore the identity and ideology of African states and international partners who choose to finance or donate new buildings to Africa featuring western architectural aesthetics.

I am a scholar of African architecture. I collaborated with scholars from different areas of expertise, including political scientists, on a project that studied the connection between architecture and power in Africa. From Ghana, two projects were used to illustrate international relations in architecture, highlighting the interplay of power and agency. One was the National Mosque and the other was the seat of Ghana’s government, Jubilee House, an edifice funded by the government of India.

Ghana and India’s ties can be traced to their co-founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. These were a group of states not formally aligned with major power blocs during the cold war. Ghana and Turkey’s relationship goes as far back as 1957. Turkey is one of the leading investors in Ghana’s economy.

Our work established that when a country finances and constructs a major building abroad, it leaves a visible and lasting imprint on another nation’s landscape. The building becomes part of everyday life while reflecting the influence of its external sponsor. These buildings normalise the presence of the sponsoring nation and are a constant reminder of its political interests.

---

Read more: Ghana and India: Narendra Modi’s visit rekindles historical ties

---

History written in buildings

Foreigners have been shaping Ghana’s built environment for centuries, from colonial forts along the coast to post-independence modernist projects designed by international architects.

Ghana’s architecture tells a layered story of power and exchange. During the colonial era, Europeans constructed forts and castles that dominated coastal landscapes. These were not just military structures; they were symbols of control and gateways to global trade networks, including the transatlantic slave trade. Sections of these buildings were later repurposed as schools, embedding education within spaces marked by violence and coercion.

This dual legacy highlights how architecture can carry multiple, often conflicting meanings over time.

After independence, Ghana sought to project a new national identity through modern architecture.

Foreign architects were commissioned to design housing, universities and civic buildings that would signal progress and global relevance. This moment reflected both aspiration and dependence: a desire to appear modern on the world stage, combined with reliance on external expertise and resources.

‘Soft power’

Today, Ghana continues to engage with global partners through architecture and infrastructure development. The National Mosque is one example. Backed by Turkey with the active involvement of Ghanaian Muslims, it represents both religious solidarity and diplomatic outreach underpinned by local agency.

Its scale, design and prominence make it a visible marker of Turkey’s presence in Ghana. The National Mosque Complex is modelled after the Ottoman-era Sultan Ahmed Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey. The national mosque in Accra features domes, semi-domes and arcaded porticos. These are the characteristics of Ottoman architecture, a predominant classical style for mosques in Turkey and the Islamic world.

Another example of political “gift” is Jubilee House, the seat of government. While financed and constructed with support from India, it incorporates the form of the Akan stool, a deeply significant symbol of authority in Ghanaian culture. This blending of external funding with local agency and symbolism shows that these projects are not simply imposed. They are shaped through negotiation.

Across the continent, similar patterns can be seen. China has funded major government buildings, including the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and the Zimbabwe parliamentary complex. These projects are often described as “gifts”, but they also reflect strategic relationships and long-term influence. Political scientist Innocent Batsani-Ncube has illustrated how China’s large-scale investment in the Zimbabwe parliament is used as a proxy for its sustained activities in and around African parliamentary institutions.

Ghana’s case

It is easy to view foreign-funded infrastructure as purely beneficial, especially given Ghana’s development needs. But architecture is never neutral. Buildings embody power relationships in terms of the scale, materiality, the architectural features and the location in urban areas.

They reflect who has the resources to design, finance and construct, and whose ideas are ultimately realised in physical form. A mosque, a parliament or a presidential palace is not just a functional space; it is a statement about identity, legitimacy and global belonging of both the sponsor and the recipient country. In this sense, architecture becomes part of diplomacy. It is a way of making relationships visible – and durable.

Describing these projects simply as soft power, however, does not capture the full picture. Soft power theory often assumes that influence flows smoothly from powerful countries to less powerful ones.

Ghana’s experience suggests something more complex. Buildings cannot simply be “exported” like films or fashion. They are rooted in specific places, histories and communities. This creates friction.

For example, Ghana’s engagement with foreign-built projects often involves negotiation over design, symbolism and use. Local government officials, religious leaders and communities play a role in shaping outcomes.

In the case of the National Mosque, Ghanaian Muslim communities were not passive recipients. Their advocacy and social influence were crucial to the project’s realisation. Similarly, the incorporation of the Akan stool in Jubilee House reflects an effort to assert cultural identity. These examples show that foreign influence is most often mediated by local contexts.

Ghanaian actors’ agency in these processes has limits, however. Many decisions about large-scale projects are made by political elites. As a result, the interests reflected in these buildings may not represent the broader population.

These examples point to broader questions. Do foreign-funded buildings contribute to long-term development, or are they primarily symbolic? How can Ghana ensure that such projects reflect local priorities and needs? And what does it mean to build a national identity in a world shaped by global partnerships?

The links among soft power, public and cultural diplomacy, and development across the continent will continue to be subjects of research.

International relations scholars Joanne Tomkinson and Julia Gallagher contributed to the research that this article is derived from.

– What Ghana’s foreign-built landmarks tell us about its global relationships
– https://theconversation.com/what-ghanas-foreign-built-landmarks-tell-us-about-its-global-relationships-279603