Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alexander M. Laskaris, Visiting Scholar, University of Florida
Kidnapping for ransom has a long history in the west African Sahel. In 1979, a rebel group led by Chad’s future president Hissène Habré kidnapped a French archaeologist and a German medical doctor in the north of the country. The kidnappers asked for the release of political prisoners, among other demands.
Over the decades kidnapping became an industry in the Sahel. Governments were willing to pay financial and political ransoms even if they denied it publicly. This industry fuelled the expansion of jihadist groups from Algeria to the Sahel (south of the Sahara) between the early 2000s and mid-2010s. The most spectacular of these kidnappings was the abduction of 32 European tourists in 2003. It was carried out by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in the Algerian Sahara. A €5 million ransom was reportedly paid for the hostages.
Using conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, we examined the evolution of abductions and forced disappearances in 17 west African countries over the last 24 years. We are scholars with personal experience as a former ambassador to Chad and Guinea and a geographer.
We analysed nearly 58,000 violent events. These events have caused the death of more than 201,000 people from January 2000 through June 2024.
Our findings suggest that the kidnapping industry has experienced a major shift. We discovered that most of the victims of kidnappings for ransom were westerners until the end of the 2010s. Since then violent extremist organisations have turned to local civilians. Both western and local hostages represent lucrative resources that ultimately fuel insurgencies in the west African Sahel.
A lucrative industry
Armed groups have learned that seizing a western hostage is a low-risk and high-reward proposition. It leads to financial gain and political accommodation. The exact amount of money paid is difficult to assess due to the opacity of the negotiations and the number of intermediaries involved. An estimated US$125 million was paid by European countries to liberate hostages captured by al-Qaida and its affiliates in this region from 2008 to 2014.
These resources have fuelled the international development, training and arms purchases of armed groups. For example, in October 2025, the United Arab Emirates allegedly paid a US$50 million ransom. They also allegedly delivered military hardware to al-Qaida-affiliated militants for the release of Emirati hostages in Mali.
The revenues generated from ransom payments have facilitated the development of alliances between militant groups and local leaders. They have also made the recruitment of young combatants from Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso easier for extremist organisations, by offering significant financial incentives.
As security expert Wolfram Lacher explains, kidnapping for ransom was the most important factor behind the growth of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in northern Mali.
The common perception is that when a westerner is taken hostage in the Sahel, a mighty military apparatus is deployed to rescue them. However, there is little to suggest that western military pressure on terrorist or criminal networks contributes to hostage recovery. Indeed, the most likely outcome of an armed rescue operation has proven to be the death of the hostage. Most of the time, the reason for their release has been ransom and concessions negotiated by local partners.
Local civilians increasingly targeted
In the last decade, the number of foreigners living or travelling in the Sahel has plummeted. Due to terrorism and political unrest, travel to the region is strongly discouraged by western countries.
Jihadist militants have therefore turned to local targets and started abducting a growing number of civilians from the region. Our report reveals that abductions and forced disappearances have experienced a twenty-fold increase since Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed in 2017.
Kidnappings tend to occur both along major transport corridors and in rural areas. There, jihadist groups have implemented a predatory economy based on looting and ransoming civilians. In the central Sahel, this kidnapping economy has spread to most rural areas. This includes the south of the Wagadou forest in Mali to the W National Park at the border between Burkina Faso, Benin and Niger.
The brutal local economics of kidnap for ransom is also vibrant in the Lake Chad region. Although the kidnapping of westerners is, on a per capita basis, far more lucrative in the Sahel, these groups are doing a brisk business of kidnapping civilians, as shown on the map below.
In late November 2025, for example, more than 300 children were kidnapped by unidentified gunmen in a Catholic school in western Nigeria. Our analysis shows that about a third of these events involve abductions of girls and women.
Civilians are usually released unharmed shortly after their motorbikes, food items, phones and animals have been taken, or ransom has been paid.
Should ransoms be paid?
The question of whether hostage situations should be resolved by paying a ransom depends on the parties involved.
For Sahelian governments, acceding to ransom demands weakens their political position and provides material support for those who threaten them. The same applies to foreigners in the Sahel – relief workers, missionaries, business people, tourists – for whom every ransom paid makes their position more precarious.
For western governments responsive to family, media and political pressure, however, bringing hostages home via ransom is always the easiest solution. Media coverage focuses on joyful reunions, not moral hazard.
In the United States, the 2020 Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act reorganised the internal hostage response capacity of the government. By streamlining the process by which accommodations are made to the kidnappers, the act established clear lines of authority, while giving families both better support and access to decision-makers.
Left unresolved is the tension between the prohibition on paying ransom to terrorist organisations and the reality that, for kidnapping victims and their families, the best response is to pay. Given the vastness of the Sahel and the lack of any effective security response, caving to ransom demands is the best hope for a successful resolution.
We should not criticise families for demanding action from their governments, for acceding to terrorist organisations’ ransom demands, or for rejoicing when hostages are liberated. At the same time, however, one should also not be afraid to state the obvious: their joy leads inevitably to another westerner’s or African’s trauma.
– Kidnapping for ransom in the Sahel: analysis of 24 years of data shows a new trend
– https://theconversation.com/kidnapping-for-ransom-in-the-sahel-analysis-of-24-years-of-data-shows-a-new-trend-270714