Category: Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Clement Sefa-Nyarko, Lecturer in Security, Development and Leadership in Africa, King’s College London

Clean technologies depend on critical minerals such as lithium and cobalt. Over 65% of the world’s cobalt is mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nearly 40% of the world’s manganese is mined in South Africa. Substantial deposits of lithium are found in Zimbabwe. Ghana is emerging as a miner of that mineral of lithium too.

What’s less well understood is how the supply chains of these minerals are assessed and managed. The dominant view is that only three players matter: the mineral-mining industry, the host state where the minerals are found, and the wider geopolitical equation.

But there’s a fourth piece of the puzzle: the role of communities.

I am an academic researching justice and equity in critical minerals governance and energy transitions. In a recent paper, I examined the role of communities and the presence or absence of a social licence to operate. In other words, community “approval” that allows a project to proceed.

I focused on Ghana’s emerging lithium sector. Communities here are already feeling livelihood and social pressures following the commercial discovery. My research shows that weak and opaque governance around critical-mineral projects create early friction between communities, companies and the state. I found that delays in legal and regulatory processes, exclusion from decision making, and inadequate compensation routinely disrupt livelihoods in lithium rich communities.

These governance failures heighten local tensions. When communities feel sidelined or harmed, the risk of social conflict rises sharply. It can result in project delays, shutdowns and higher costs for both states and companies. These pressures are not incidental. They directly affect the stability of global supply chains.

I argue that effective risk governance must move beyond geopolitics. It must embed the fundamentals of social legitimacy. These include:

• free, prior and informed consent

• fair and transparent benefit-sharing

• sustained, meaningful engagement with affected communities.

Without these basics, no amount of technological innovation or diplomatic negotiation can secure the minerals needed for the energy transition.

As global competition intensifies over access to strategic minerals, the governance of mining sites in the global south becomes important for supply chain assurance.

Why local participation matters

My argument is that local participation is one of the strongest predictors of whether mining projects gain or lose legitimacy, and therefore whether supply chains remain stable or face disruption.

When communities are involved early and meaningfully in decisions about land access, water use, environmental safeguards and compensation, they are more likely to see mining not as an imposed threat but as a negotiated partnership. This reduces uncertainty, builds trust and lowers the likelihood of conflict. Those conditions are essential for predictable mineral flows.

Research in sustainable mining consistently shows that communities are not passive recipients of mining impacts. They are active agents whose consent, cooperation or resistance can determine the lifespan of entire supply chains. Participation creates the space for communities to articulate their needs. It shapes benefit‑sharing mechanisms and ensures that mining does not undermine local livelihoods. When people have no voice in decisions that affect their land, water or social well-being, grievances accumulate and protests, legal challenges or operational blockages become far more likely.

Findings from my research further demonstrate that participation is a practical risk-management tool. It is not a symbolic gesture. In mining communities, weak engagement and unclear communication about land restrictions and compensation create perceptions of dispossession. They intensify tensions that threaten project timelines. Conversely, when engagement is consistent and meaningful, concerns are addressed early. This reduces the likelihood of costly shutdowns and strengthens the long‑term security of mineral supply chains.

Participation anchors mining projects in social legitimacy. It shifts extraction from something done to communities towards something negotiated with them. It turns potential flashpoints into points of cooperation. In a world where a single protest can disrupt global supply chains, community participation is no longer optional. It is a fundamental safeguard for the energy transition.

Way forward

Reducing the risk of supply-chain disruptions is not easy, but there is a clear path to it.

First, future global meetings like the COP climate summits and UN processes should explicitly include critical minerals, sustainable mining and community protections as formal agenda items. This will close the long-standing governance gap that leaves mineral supply chains exposed.

Second, international bodies should develop shared indicators for meaningful participation, benefit-sharing and community legitimacy. Social licence must be treated as a material risk factor that can halt mines and disrupt global markets.

Instead of resisting regulation, mineral-producing countries should help shape global environmental, social and governance expectations. They should reflect local priorities, environmental conditions and value-addition goals, while ensuring stable, responsible mineral flows.

Governments and companies should establish shared governance arrangements covering water use, land access, benefit-sharing and grievance processes. This will build trust early and prevent local conflict.

Also, mineral-rich countries should align on minimum social and environmental standards, free, prior and informed consent requirements, and value-addition policies. These will ensure diversification does not encourage weak oversight or exploitation.

– Critical mineral mining faces risks if local communities aren’t consulted enough: the case of lithium in Ghana
– https://theconversation.com/critical-mineral-mining-faces-risks-if-local-communities-arent-consulted-enough-the-case-of-lithium-in-ghana-275723

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Amanda Bisong, Policy Leader Fellow, School of Transnational Governance, European University Institute

New governments in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso formally left the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) a year ago, having created the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The move happened as a consequence of diplomatic tensions related to military coups in the three countries, after which the regional body suspended them and imposed harsh sanctions.

The repercussions of the breakup of Ecowas are still unfolding, but one area that will likely be affected is migration and free movement in the region.

Ecowas has several free movement protocols that allow visa-free travel and, in theory, give citizens in the region the rights of residence and establishment.

Our work on migration governance in west Africa, at the regional level and in particular contexts like Niger, informs our views on the impact of the breakaway.

We argue that though free movement is still technically possible at the moment, it is rapidly changing. Considering the recent changes from the vantage point of mobility also reveals the wider institutional fragility of Ecowas, which was established to enhance cooperation between the states in the region.

Ecowas without the Sahel alliance states

At a regional level, leaders have shown continued commitment to safeguarding free movement. According to the president of the Ecowas Commission, Omar Touray, speaking on the day that the AES withdrawal came into force, “We remain a community, a family.”

National IDs and passports with the Ecowas logo from citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger will continue to be recognised. Until further notice, so will all the protocol rights related to the right of movement, residence and establishment. The Sahel alliance states, for their part, have offered visa-free access to Ecowas for the time being. But this is just a temporary fix.

In December 2025, Burkina Faso’s military leader Ibrahim Traoré launched the first AES biometric ID card in Burkina Faso. It is set to replace Ecowas documents within five years.

Movement on the ground is already changing. From stricter entry requirements to new passport designs and identity systems, citizens crossing borders face growing uncertainty and rising costs. At the same time, cross border movements remain a necessity for livelihoods and survival.

Despite the changes induced by AES countries leaving Ecowas, the threat to free movement caused by the European Union’s (EU) externalisation interests also continue to affect Ecowas.

Within the wider region, EU funding for border externalisation continues, with a detrimental effect on free movement. Efforts include the EU funding top-ups for migration and border control infrastructure, in Senegal for instance, and various ongoing border capacity building projects.

Notably, this trend has partially been reversed by AES states. One striking example is the repeal of the infamous law 2015-36 on migrant smuggling in Niger. Though a Nigerien law, its implementation was strongly supported by the EU capacity building projects, and effectively criminalised a longstanding mobility industry. Through repeal of the law, the new Nigerien government effectively stopped the law’s detrimental effects on the economy, migrant rights and free movement in the region.

Overall, the Sahel alliance withdrawal already affects regional mobility. Beyond the rights to free movement, the Sahel alliance withdrawal also has very real effects on the Ecowas institutional framework, in terms of its legitimacy, institutional strength and migrant rights protection.

Legitimacy and funding challenges

Ecowas struggles with a growing legitimacy crisis. The withdrawal of the Alliance of Sahel States countries exposed Ecowas’ weakness in responding to unconstitutional changes in government. Responses were often delayed and selective, and sanctions, when they were imposed, had detrimental effects for local populations. The exit of these countries, which all had coups, confirmed the widespread perception of selective enforcement of norms by the organisation, contributing to public scepticism.

Further, inefficient processes, weak utilisation of existing capacities and poor communication of outcomes have resulted in low implementation rates for Ecowas projects and programmes since the beginning. For example, several member states have not abolished the 90 day stay requirement as agreed in 2014.

Consequently, citizens don’t see tangible benefits of regional integration. Many west Africans continue to view it as little more than a “club of heads of state”.

The disconnect between the organisation and its citizens is also driven by Ecowas’ heavy dependence on external donors. Reduced contributions from member states, often due to non-payment of the Ecowas levy, have left the commission facing shortages of basic resources. It’s forced to cut back on meetings and engagements essential for policy implementation. As a result, regional priorities are frequently shaped by donor interests rather than by the needs of citizens.

Although there have been recent improvements, including increased payments from countries such as Nigeria, the levy collection system remains weak and easily exploited by member states. This has always affected the implementation of free movement protocols in the past, but is set to further weaken their position.

Lastly, the breakup of Ecowas also affects access to justice, including migrant rights. A group of migrant rights groups brought a collective case to the Ecowas Court of Justice in 2022, claiming that, among other issues, migrant rights to free movement were being violated in Niger. In March 2025, the court dismissed all cases pertaining to Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.

What does the future hold?

Movement within the region will continue as an economic necessity. As we have shown in our previous research, no matter what the law says, people will continue to migrate, and policymakers accept this.

But at what cost to ordinary migrants and citizens if these institutional weaknesses persist? Ecowas needs to confront its legitimacy crisis, implement meaningful reforms and reconnect with the realities of everyday life in west Africa. It can then provide a strong framework for protection of migrants and people on the move in the region.

Without decisive change, the gap between the organisation’s rhetoric of an “Ecowas of the peoples: peace and prosperity for all” and its impact will continue to widen.

– Ecowas without the Sahel states: how the split is testing free movement and regional legitimacy
– https://theconversation.com/ecowas-without-the-sahel-states-how-the-split-is-testing-free-movement-and-regional-legitimacy-274501

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Genevieve Sekumbo, PhD Candidate- Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)

When young Tanzanians poured into the streets on 29 October 2025, most observers saw an election protest. Protests in Dar es Salaam, Arusha, Mwanza and other cities were met with live ammunition and internet blackouts. There were hundreds of casualties, according to human rights organisations.

My research suggests a deeper dynamic: a generation asserting their right to become adults.

As a PhD candidate, I set out in 2020 to understand how Tanzania’s natural gas industry was shaping young people’s transitions to adulthood. My research examined two interconnected questions. How does the gas industry shape youth transitions and experiences in Mtwara, a resource rich region, particularly in the context of unmet development promises? And how do young people themselves navigate and shape development narratives tied to natural gas extraction?

I found that youth transitions to adulthood are closely tied to commodity cycles: while the gas boom of 2010 briefly expanded pathways to employment, independence and social recognition, the subsequent downturn left many young people in prolonged “waithood”.

This broader pattern of blocked transitions helps explain why youth-led protests such as those on 29 October resonate so deeply.

Blocked transitions to adulthood

My research lasted 15 months between 2020 and 2022. I conducted ethnographic fieldwork focused on young people aged 20-35. I began fieldwork in Mtwara region just as the gas sector entered a “gas bust”. This was a dramatic reversal from the earlier “gas rush” of 2010-2015. The 2010 discovery of offshore natural gas had generated enormous expectations. Then president Jakaya Kikwete promised “Mtwara will be the new Dubai”.

Young people saw prospects for industrialisation, jobs and economic independence. These were necessary to marry, build homes and establish themselves as adults. But by 2015, contractual disputes between the Tanzanian government and international oil companies, combined with falling global commodity prices, halted exploration. The promised transformation never materialised.

I documented how the gas sector’s boom-bust cycle shaped young people’s economic strategies and life trajectories.

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Read more: Tanzania’s gas boom that never was – when local hopes are dashed by global realities

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Understanding what adulthood means in Tanzania requires recognising it as more than just age. It requires overcoming structural barriers to employment, housing and family formation, and being able to marry, start a family, and establish an independent household. Achieving these milestones enables the social and cultural responsibilities of adulthood. These include gaining respect, supporting extended family and participating meaningfully in community life. Tanzania’s National Youth Development Policy defines youth as those up to age 35. That is over one-third of the population and nearly two-thirds of the labour force. For many young Tanzanians, the markers of adulthood remain perpetually out of reach.

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Read more: What does it mean to become an adult? In Namibia, it’s caring for others

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My fieldwork revealed three interconnected dynamics that help explain both the everyday crisis young people face and the mobilisation on 29 October.

First, the crisis is not only about unemployment. It is about blocked adulthood. Young people I worked with understood clearly that Tanzania is not a poor country. They see natural resources extracted, infrastructure projects announced, and political elites displaying wealth on social media. From their perspective, their stalled transitions are not the result of national scarcity. They are born from a system in which political and social connections shape who benefits from public investment.

The economic reality reinforces this perception. Street vending, casual labour, motorcycle taxi driving and short-term contracts provide survival income. This is rarely enough to save, secure housing, or plan for family life. In Mtwara, young people watched offshore gas extraction generate capital flows with minimal local employment. Beyond the initial construction phase, the highly technical nature of operations excluded many from core jobs and from ancillary sectors operating in their own region.

Second, educational credentials have proved insufficient to overcome structural barriers. Many young people in their late twenties and thirties held secondary diplomas or tertiary certificates. They were unable to secure stable employment that would enable them to attain recognised markers of adulthood. What emerged was a prolonged phase of waithood: a social limbo in which young people cannot fully claim adult status or access the respect and authority associated with it.

Thirdly, prolonged exclusion generates political consciousness, not only frustration. When young people cannot meet the economic and social criteria for adulthood, their claims to full citizenship are weakened. Their voices carry less weight, their grievances are dismissed, and their participation is treated as peripheral. Economic precarity, in this sense, translates into civic marginalisation.

During my study young people frequently referred to the 2013 and 2014 gas protests. These followed the government’s decision to pipe newly discovered gas to Dar es Salaam rather than process it locally. The demonstrations became a defining political moment in the region. In conversations, they were described as about more than employment. They were framed as claims to recognition and inclusion in national development.

The 29 October protests follow a similar pattern: blocked economic futures translating into collective mobilisation for political recognition.

Why October 2025 became a breaking point

October 2025 brought together the structural conditions I documented between 2020 and 2022 with a tightening of political controls. In the months preceding the election, opposition leaders were jailed or barred from contesting, and reports of abductions and targeted violence circulated widely. President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner with 97.66% of the vote.

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Read more: Tanzania’s ruling party has crushed the opposition – the elections are a mere formality

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In my fieldwork, economic and political exclusion were consistently discussed as intertwined. Conversations about employment and income were frequently accompanied by concerns about voice and representation – perceptions of not being heard by authorities. These discussions reflected a broader sense that both economic mobility and political participation were constrained.

Seen in this context, the October protests reflected longer-term frustrations rooted in stalled transitions to adulthood and limited access to stable employment. They were linked not only to electoral developments but to perceptions of unequal access to opportunity and national resources.

The state’s response followed patterns observed in earlier episodes of unrest in Mtwara. Security operations were concentrated in neighbourhoods where protests had taken place. Reports suggested an uneven use of force, with young men disproportionately affected. When further demonstrations were called for 9 December, they did not materialise.

The structural conditions shaping prolonged waithood and youth disillusionment, however, remain in place.

From this perspective, youth protest is tied to how young people attempt to secure economic independence, social recognition and meaningful inclusion under constrained conditions. Where pathways to adulthood remain uncertain, mobilisation becomes one of the few visible ways to assert presence and claim belonging.

– Young Tanzanians are fed up with not getting a slice of the economic action – research
– https://theconversation.com/young-tanzanians-are-fed-up-with-not-getting-a-slice-of-the-economic-action-research-273818