Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Vanessa McBride, Science Director, International Science Council; University of Cape Town

The Southern African Large Telescope (SALT) celebrates 20 years of observing the sky. SALT is the largest optical telescope in the southern hemisphere. It’s been steadily revealing new science knowledge, ranging from the discovery of planets outside our solar system to understanding the unusual physics around black holes. It’s also 20 years of doing science for society.

SALT is where I conducted much of my PhD research. I’d grown up in rural Eastern Cape, marvelling at the diamond night skies. My first fascination for astronomy was sparked when learning about the concept of SALT at a science fest in high school. Years later, I received the first SALT Stobie scholarship for PhD study. It was a dream opportunity to start a multi-year observing campaign.

My research sought to understand how mass moves from one star to another in a gravitationally bound pair. This contributed to the scientific understanding of how these stars evolve in different environments. So it’s with a sense of personal, professional and national pride that I look back on the last two decades of SALT’s achievements.

Africa’s giant eye in the sky

One of SALT’s most significant scientific achievements was based on its ability to respond rapidly to time-critical astronomical events. This allowed SALT to observe the immediate optical glow from a gravitational wave event in 2017, providing a crucial piece of evidence for the type of nuclear processes taking place in the gravitational wave event.

Gravitational waves are ripples in spacetime caused by moving masses, and have only been observable with special detectors since 2015. The plateau on which SALT is built, just outside the town of Sutherland in South Africa’s largest province the Northern Cape, is one of the darkest observing sites in the the world. This makes it an excellent site from which to observe very low brightness objects in the night sky.

In 2022, SALT observed a nearby but faint galaxy, which showed unusually low levels of elements heavier than hydrogen. This unexpected result challenged our understanding of how and when stars begin to form within galaxies. With a repertoire of over 600 scientific publications based on observations from the telescope, SALT has certainly made an impact on our knowledge of the cosmos.

Funded by a consortium of international partners which were led by South Africa’s National Research Foundation, SALT represented an increase of 30x in light gathering capacity compared to the Radcliffe telescope – the previous biggest in South Africa. At concept phase, even astronomers had to be encouraged to think big. The original plans were for a 4 metre class telescope, but it was not audacious enough for a government that wanted to showcase South Africa’s prowess and potential in science.

Engineers and scientists worked with the Hobby-Eberly Telescope in the US to replicate a unique and cost-effective design. Smaller mirror segments were easier and cheaper to manufacture to the required smoothness specifications, and these smaller hexagonal segments could fit together like a honeycomb to create a mirror of 11 metres in diameter. The telescope was designed to point at a fixed angle above the horizon. This meant less warping of the mirror, but a more complicated observing strategy, as astronomers would have to wait for sky to pass over SALT’s pointing direction.

A telescope with heart

SALT was conceived just as South Africa was coming out of the shadow of apartheid. Apartheid – a policy of institutionalised racism – was dismantled in 1994 through South Africa’s first democratic election. In 1996 the new government had written an ambitious white paper setting out a vision for science in a country reborn, where it felt like anything and everything was possible:

Scientific endeavour is not purely utilitarian in its objectives and has important associated cultural and social values. It is also important to maintain a basic competence in ‘flagship’ sciences such as physics and astronomy for cultural reasons. Not to offer them would be to take a negative view of our future – the view that we are a second class nation, chained forever to the treadmill of feeding and clothing ourselves.

SALT has always been more than just a science infrastructure project. It has heart too. Unemployment is a major issue in Sutherland. Fetal alcohol syndrome is also a challenge people battle with in the region, and, through the years of its construction, South Africa was deep into the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

Alongside the investment in engineering and science, was a plan to ensure benefit to previously disadvantaged South Africans, especially the rural community in the Northern Cape. Even today, 20 years after SALT was inaugurated, a fraction of the operation costs that are contributed by all SALT partners, local and international, go into this collateral benefits programme.

The results are a library, skills training centre and a high school mathematics and science teacher in Sutherland. Most recently, the SALT partners and South Africa’s Department of Science, Technology and Innovation, have contributed to a renovated trauma room, for victims of gender-based violence, in the Sutherland police station. In its early years, this programme also trained astronomers through the funding of graduate programmes.

Beyond the horizon

Now, this new generation of South African scientists and engineers is at the helm. For the first time in the 200-year history of the South African Astronomical Observatory, the director is South African. Almost 80% of the staff employed in all roles across SALT, from science and operations to software and mechanical, is South African. These individuals are deeply embedded in, and leading, international science partnerships and research infrastructure projects, and the connection between science and societal development is ingrained in the DNA of these projects and partnerships.

We are often focused on the differences between “us” and “them”, it’s worth remembering the power of science, both as a mechanism for development and as a partnership to unite. This World Science Day for Peace and Development, SALT shows the capabilities science has for both peace, and development.

– South Africa’s flagship telescope at 20: an eye on the sky and on the community
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-flagship-telescope-at-20-an-eye-on-the-sky-and-on-the-community-269234

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Brendon J. Cannon, Associate Professor, Khalifa University

In the last decade, armed drones have become one of the most visible symbols of modern warfare. Once the preserve of advanced militaries, armed drones are now widely available on the global arms market. Countries such as Turkey, China and Iran are producing lower-cost models and exporting them. In Sudan’s ongoing war, which began in 2023, drones have been used by the two major warring parties to gain ground – but have caused massive civilian casualties in the process.

A drone is essentially a remotely piloted aircraft that can observe, track and sometimes strike targets with missiles or bombs. The promise of armed drones is alluring: a lethal, precise and affordable weapon that can surveil and strike enemies without troops being exposed. But can these drones deliver on their promise in African battlespaces? Brendon J. Cannon shares insights from his study of drone use in Sub-Saharan African conflicts.

What’s driving up the use of drones in sub-Saharan Africa?

Drones offer tactical advantages. They are seen as a solution to pressing internal security problems, from jihadist incursions in the Sahel to armed insurgencies in Ethiopia and civil war in Sudan.

Since 2019, a growing number of African states – among them Niger, Ethiopia, Togo, Sudan and Somalia – have acquired medium-altitude long-endurance (Male) drones. Among these types of drones, Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 – along with its successors, the TB3 and Kızılelma (Red Apple) – has captured outsized attention. In the case of the Turkish TB2 model, for instance, some sources estimate 40 units have been sold to more than 10 African countries since 2019, but actual figures are not public.

The TB2 is cheap by military standards (roughly US$5 million a unit) and relatively easy to operate. It has been hailed as a “game-changer” for its reliability, cost and ready availability.

It has been combat-tested in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus, a natural border between Europe and Asia.

Its success in destroying tanks, artillery and air defence systems in these conflicts impressed African leaders. As Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan boasted

Everywhere I go in Africa, everyone talks to me about drones.

What has been the effectiveness of these drones in African conflicts?

Medium-altitude long-endurance drones like the TB2 are entering African conflicts, which are marked by vast geography, difficult terrain and complex insurgencies that frequently span borders.

While drones can deliver lethal force, their ability to shape battlefield outcomes is also contingent on variables like

• distance, terrain and weather

• the competence of operators

• the existence of supporting intelligence, logistics and command systems.

With these variables in mind, my recent research with my colleague, Ash Rossiter, found that drones are unlikely to significantly alter the course of conflicts in much of sub-Saharan Africa, for a couple of reasons.

First, there is a general absence of modern integrated air defences in the region. This is required to deploy drones as lethal precision weapons, particularly in targeting isolated groups.

Second, the success of these drones depends on competent operation, their employment in sufficient numbers, and adequate support infrastructure, such as fuel, communication masts and ground control stations. These are often lacking in remote places where insurgents operate in places like Somalia, Niger and northern Burkina Faso.

What factors limit the lethality of drones?

Where adversaries lack modern, integrated air defences – as is currently common among insurgent and militia forces in much of sub-Saharan Africa – drones can loiter with minimal risk. They can collect actionable intelligence, and conduct precise strikes against vehicles, small groups and supply lines.

This lethality, however, is limited by a number of factors.

Distance: Africa’s size and scale blunt drone range – and therefore efficacy. The TB2’s circa 300km range, for instance, means it worked well in the Caucasus. However, 300km will not get you far in Ethiopia or the Sahel. In Ethiopia, for example, the TB2s had to be repositioned by the government in 2022 from bases near Addis Ababa to Bahir Dar. This was a distance of about 300km, to reach targets in Tigray. This shows how drone bases, security architecture and forward infrastructure, such as communications masts and logistics support closer to conflict areas, are needed. This increases range and, therefore, outcomes.

Terrain and weather: Dust and sandstorms in the Sahel can impair the drones’ visible-light sensors. Sandstorms occur frequently in the region, particularly during the dry season. Dense forest canopies in central Africa can conceal movement from drones. Persistent cloud cover over Ethiopia’s highlands or along the Gulf of Guinea may limit efficacy. Electro-optical and infrared payloads, which provide high-definition and thermal imaging, give drones like the TB2 a 360-degree view. This allows them to operate in diverse weather conditions. But they may need to fly under the weather to see targets in these African terrains. This brings its own risks, as it exposes the drones to potential small-arms fire. This has happened in Sudan, where paramilitary troops reported shooting down army drones in August 2025.

Operator capabilities: Effectively operating a drone requires trained operators, disciplined targeting procedures and dependable maintenance. Failures can be costly. A Burkinabè TB2 crash in 2023 exposed maintenance and operational fragilities, destroying one of five TB2 drones from the Burkinabè arsenal. A Nigerian drone strike in 2023 that was reportedly aimed at terrorists instead killed about 85 civilians. This was after an incorrect grid reference. It underscored how weak operator capabilities can transform precision weapons into harbingers of tragedy.

Fit to conflict: Drones are most useful for hitting supply convoys, eliminating specific targets and targeting loose militant networks. These are missions typical of low-intensity, irregular warfare. They are far less decisive in conflicts against massed troop formations or for holding territory, which has characterised recent wars in Ethiopia and Sudan. These tasks still rely on fighter-bombers or attack aircraft, and ground forces.

What does all this mean for the use of drones in sub-Saharan African conflicts?

First, medium-altitude long-endurance drones can deliver tactical gains but rarely provide a silver bullet.

The initial impression of the TB2 has unfortunately obscured some of its limitations, such as operations across extreme distance, in inclement weather, and the importance of operator proficiency.

Second, in conflicts like Ethiopia and the Sahel, geography and logistics play a critical role. Basing, relay links and forward-deployed maintenance determine a drone strike’s coverage, persistence and power.

Third, a drone’s overall effect depends on trained crews, reliable maintenance, and disciplined targeting and command review. Weakness in any of these can result in tragedy, such as civilian deaths.

Finally, as non-state armed groups increasingly adopt drones and some African states like Rwanda and Kenya begin to field better air defences, the advantage currently held by national governments that own drones will narrow.

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Read more: US military is leaving Niger even less secure: why it didn’t succeed in combating terrorism

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Lasting utility, therefore, requires three things.

First, counter-drone defences, which means countries need to develop strategies and acquire sensors, jammers and systems to detect, track and neutralise hostile drones.

Second, better protection of the locations and networks from which drones are controlled so that these are not disrupted, sabotaged or targeted.

Third, sustained investment, not just in drone acquisition but also in maintenance, operator training and basing infrastructure to support continuous flight operations and extend drone reach deeper into battlespaces.

– Africa’s drone wars are growing – but they rarely deliver victory
– https://theconversation.com/africas-drone-wars-are-growing-but-they-rarely-deliver-victory-265904

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Wandile Sihlobo, Senior Fellow, Department of Agricultural Economics, Stellenbosch University

The Sustainable Food and Agricultural Systems work stream of the Business 20, a G20 engagement group, has endorsed three principles that it argues will contribute to the building of sustainable food systems and agriculture. The principles are increased trade, resilient supply chains, and sustainable agricultural practices.

Agricultural economist Wandile Sihlobo explains these three principles and how African countries can put them to good use.

What is global food security? How does it differ from food poverty?

Global food security is more comprehensive, seeking to address the challenges of access to food, nutrition, sustainability and affordability. The broad ambition of global food security is to ensure that countries, especially the G20 members, work collaboratively on initiatives that reduce global poverty levels. This reduction of poverty must be material at both national and at household level.

Achieving this goal will demand that each country’s domestic agricultural policy enables increases in food production, prioritises environmentally friendly production approaches, and eases trade friction. This will enable countries that cannot produce enough food to import it, and most importantly, do so affordably. Also, countries should ease the global logistics friction, removing tariffs and ensuring that a flow of agricultural products is smooth. This also includes the removal of export bans in certain cases. For example, in 2023, India banned the exports of rice and that caused a surge in global food prices.

It is for this reason that I have championed the approach of “achieving food security through trade”. Such an approach is essential in an environment characterised by trade friction, which generally increases transaction costs for all. Ultimately, the goal of improving global food security seeks to improve the living standards for all, with the focus on the poor regions of the world, mainly Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

How can increased trade, resilient supply chains and sustainable agricultural practices enhance food security?

These interventions are at the heart of easing costs. If trade friction (tariffs, non-tariff barriers and export bans) are eased, we are able to lower the transaction costs of getting the goods from the production areas to the consumption points affordably.

Resilient supply chains also mean that food can be produced, processed and transferred to consumption points with less friction even in times of natural disasters and conflicts.

Sustainable agricultural practices are at the core of the food system. Still, this does not mean a move away from improved seed cultivars and genetics, and elimination of agro-chemicals and other inputs. It mainly refers to using them better.

I have noted a troubling trend of activism that seeks to eliminate agricultural inputs, a path that would lead to lower agricultural productivity and output, and eventually worsen hunger. The key should be safe and optimal use of these inputs.

In the recent farm protests in the European Union, the EU’s regulatory approach to sustainable farming practices was one of the issues farmers raised as the major risk. They cited the EU’s Green Deal, which aimed to accelerate the reduction of the use of inputs, such as pesticides, fertilisers and certain other chemicals, that are critical for increased production.

In my view, the G20 should guard against activist moves that are dangerous to global food security.

What specific policies should countries, especially African nations, put in place to ensure the success of these principles?

South Africa and the African Union, which are both G20 members, should push for three broad interventions in agriculture to achieve the three G20 principles and boost food production that could benefit the African continent.

1. Climate-smart farming

First, there should be a strong call for sharing knowledge on climate-smart agricultural practices. These are new innovations and ways of farming that minimise the damage to crops caused by climate-related disasters like drought and heatwaves. This is important because Africa is very vulnerable to natural disasters.

For African agriculture to take off, governments must set up co-ordinated policies on how to respond to disasters. These responses must include everything African countries need to mitigate climate-related disasters, adapt to climate change, and recover quickly when disasters hit.

2. Trade reform

Second, Africa must push for a reform of the global trading system, and to improve food security in Africa through trade. South Africa already enjoys deeper access to agricultural trade with several G20 economies through lower tariffs and some tariff free access.

It is in the interests of all G20 members to ensure open trade among the nations of the world. Open agricultural trade enables countries to buy and sell agricultural produce at lower prices. This is vital in the current environment where some nations are taking a more confrontational approach to trade.

African countries whose agriculture is less productive, with generally lower or poor crop yields, may not benefit as much in the short term from open trade. They will, however, benefit in the long run.

3. Improve access to fertilisers

Third, Africa should continue prioritising discussions about improving fertiliser manufacturing and trade. Sub-Saharan African countries have poor fertiliser access and usage. Yet, greater fertiliser adoption is a key input to increased food production and therefore a reduction in food insecurity. Access to affordable finance is also a challenge for African agriculture.

Therefore, linking discussions on fertiliser with investments in network industries such as roads and ports is key. It is one thing to have fertilisers available, but moving them to areas of farming is difficult in some countries, and increases the costs for farmers. As part of this, the G20 should drive localised production.

Producing fertiliser on the continent would lessen the negative impact of global price shocks. It would also make it affordable for even the most vulnerable African countries to buy and distribute fertiliser.

Where do you suggest the balance is between more efficient agricultural production and reducing agriculture’s contribution to climate change?

We must use technology to adapt to climate change rather than demonising the use of agrochemicals and seed breeding, which certainly is a rising trend in some areas in South Africa. If we use high yielding seed cultivars, fertilisers and agrochemicals to control diseases, we can then farm a relatively smaller area, and rely on ample output.

But if we reduce these inputs substantially, we rely more on expansion of the area we plant. Tilling more land means hurting the environment. The main focus should be the optimal and safe use of agricultural inputs to improving increase food production. This is key to achieving global food security.

The G20 has a role to play in ensuring that we are moving towards a better world. These agricultural principles we outline above are some of the approaches that could help us move towards a more food secure and better world.

– What will it take to make Africa food secure? G20 group points to trade, resilient supply chains and sustainable farming
– https://theconversation.com/what-will-it-take-to-make-africa-food-secure-g20-group-points-to-trade-resilient-supply-chains-and-sustainable-farming-267653

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Elmond Bandauko, Assistant Professor of Human Geography, University of Alberta

The informal sector has become a dominant source of livelihoods for urban residents in African cities. Within this sector, street trading is one of the most visible and vital components of urban economies.

In Zimbabwe’s capital city, too, street traders, selling clothing, snacks, fruits and vegetables, household goods, electronics and many other products, are a dominant feature in the economy. As in most African cities, the majority of Harare’s traders operate without licences, and they are often victims of municipal raids and displacements. Yet, despite this hostile environment, street trading continues to flourish.

How do traders organise themselves in such a difficult setting? Who decides who sells where? And how is order maintained in a space where the state’s control is weak or repressive?

I am an urban geographer whose work focuses on urban informality and governance in African cities. These questions are at the heart of a study that was part of my doctoral research on urban governance and the spatial politics of street traders in Harare. I am especially interested in how the urban poor wield their individual and collective agency to challenge urban exclusion.

Drawing on interviews and focus groups with traders in Harare’s central business district, the research explores the invisible systems of informal governance that regulate access to trading spaces. The study shows that street trading is structured by its own internal rules, norms and power relations.

Informality is not the absence of order. It is a different kind of order, rooted in everyday negotiation, social trust, and the shared struggle to survive in an unequal city.

I concluded that city authorities and others should recognise that these informal governance systems are legitimate, and can even be useful when it comes to formalising activities in the city. Ignoring them could lead to conflict and deeper inequalities.

Systems of organisation

Zimbabwe’s economy as a whole has been unstable over the past four decades. As a result, the informal economy has become very important. The relationship between urban authorities and street traders has always been antagonistic, however. That conflict has been the focus of most of the research on street trading. Harare’s city officials, like those in many other African cities, often treat traders as illegal, criminal, or a threat to “modern” urban order.

My research takes a different view: I shift attention away from state repression to the everyday systems of organisation and control that traders themselves have developed.

I conducted 19 semi-structured interviews and three focus groups with traders, to learn about their individual strategies and shared social mechanisms for keeping order on the streets.

Traders in Harare use informal governance mechanisms – unwritten rules, social norms and personal relationships – to decide who can occupy which space, for how long, and under what conditions. These community-based systems are built on mutual recognition and trust, but also shaped by hierarchy, gender and seniority.

Claiming and defending space

The interviews reveal that the most important rule for maintaining order is consistency. Traders often stay in the same spot for years – sometimes decades – to build customer loyalty and to assert their informal claim.

As one vendor explained:

I stay in the same spot so that people always know where to find me … When everyone sticks to their usual place, it reduces disputes.

This practice, described by another scholar, Asef Bayat, as “quiet encroachment”, involves small, everyday acts of claiming space without formal permission. Over time, these acts become socially recognised by other traders and even by local residents or shopkeepers. If a new vendor tries to take over someone’s space, existing traders usually intervene before conflict escalates.

As one woman put it:

No one can just occupy the space without our permission.

This peer-enforced control system maintains order but also reinforces informal hierarchies.

Leadership and street apprenticeship

Although there are no official leaders, senior traders – those with long experience or strong social influence – often act as custodians of space. They mediate disputes, mentor newcomers and enforce unspoken rules.

New entrants typically undergo an informal “street apprenticeship”, during which they learn how to operate, when to display goods, how to evade municipal police, and whom to approach for protection. Newcomers cannot simply choose a spot and start selling. They must seek the approval of those already established. This process reflects an internalised authority system rooted in social norms rather than written law.

Social networks and inheritance

The study also uncovers how social capital – networks of trust, kinship and friendship – plays a central role in accessing space.

Many traders gain their first selling spot through relatives or friends who are already part of the informal economy. In this way, street trading becomes an intergenerational practice, often “inherited” from parents or grandparents.

One participant explained that her grandmother had traded in the same area for decades, and when she lost her formal job, she joined the family business. Others said they felt morally obliged to reserve a deceased vendor’s spot for their children or relatives.

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Read more: Ethiopian quarter: how migrants have shaped a thriving shopping district in South Africa’s city of gold

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Competition and exclusion

However, these systems are not equal or fair. Power among traders is unevenly distributed. Long-term vendors and those with strong social connections often dominate lucrative areas, while newcomers (especially young people, women and persons with disabilities) struggle to gain a foothold.

For example, male traders often control spots near busy transport hubs, which are more profitable but also riskier. Women, who are concerned about safety or need to balance caregiving duties, tend to occupy less visible areas. One visually impaired trader said he relied on others to protect his spot, showing how trust and vulnerability shape spatial access.

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Read more: Why do identical informal businesses set up side by side? It’s a survival tactic – Kenya study

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There are also reports of traders using aggressive tactics to defend their territory. Some long-time vendors admitted to “chasing away” new sellers or even tipping off municipal officers to get competitors arrested. These practices reveal how informal governance can both protect livelihoods and reproduce exclusion.

Everyday politics and quiet power

My study shows that power in Harare’s informal economy is not only top-down, from the state to the traders, but also horizontal, negotiated among the traders themselves.

Those with seniority or strong networks act as gatekeepers, deciding who can sell where. Women traders often face verbal or physical harassment from male counterparts but also develop their own strategies of resistance: confronting aggressors, forming alliances, or using moral arguments about fairness to defend their right to trade. These acts of quiet defiance demonstrate that informal governance is a site of both control and agency.

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Read more: How the informal economy solves some urban challenges in a Zimbabwean town

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Beyond stereotypes of chaos

What emerges from this research is a more nuanced picture of Harare’s informal economy. Street traders are not simply victims of a repressive state or chaotic actors in an unregulated market. They are also self-organising agents who build complex systems of order, reciprocity and social regulation in the absence of formal protection.

At the same time, these systems are not utopian. They involve competition, hierarchy and exclusion. Informal governance is both a survival mechanism and a structure of power.

Understanding this duality is crucial for policymakers who wish to design fairer urban policies.

– Harare’s street traders create their own system to survive in the city
– https://theconversation.com/harares-street-traders-create-their-own-system-to-survive-in-the-city-268996