Category: MIL-OSI

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

Djibouti’s president, Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, pushed through constitutional changes removing presidential age limits in October 2025. The changes enable him to remain in power beyond 2026. He has already ruled for 26 years and is a shoo-in at elections in April 2026. Guelleh leads a country on the Horn of Africa where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean – one of the world’s most strategically important locations. Federico Donelli, who has studied Djibouti’s political landscape, unpacks the dynamics that have kept him in power.

Who is Ismaïl Omar Guelleh and what is his governance style?

Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, commonly known as IOG, has been the president of Djibouti since 1999. He succeeded the country’s first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, whom he served as chief of staff for more than two decades.

Now aged 77, Guelleh is one of the longest-serving leaders in east Africa.

He belongs to the majority Issa-Somali ethnic group, which has monopolised power since the country gained independence from France in 1977. Djibouti’s population is largely composed of two main groups – the Issa-Somali and the Afar. This demographic mirrors the context in Afar regional state of neighbouring Ethiopia. It’s mirrored even more closely in the de facto state of Somaliland due to clan and family ties.

Consequently, political dynamics in Djibouti frequently intertwine with developments in these neighbouring states. This is particularly true when it comes to security, cross-border mobility and clan-based networks.

In theory, Djibouti is a presidential republic with a multiparty system. In practice, however, political authority remains highly centralised, leaving little room for genuine political competition.

The ruling Popular Rally for Progress (RPP) party dominates parliament, holding 45 of the 65 seats. The broader pro-presidential coalition, the Union for the Presidential Majority (UPM), controls 58 seats in total, consolidating the executive’s influence over the legislative arena.

Opposition coalitions such as the Union for Democratic Change (UAD) and the Union for Democratic Movements (UMD) face significant constraints. They have occasionally boycotted elections. There have been five presidential elections and five legislative elections since 1999.

International organisations frequently highlight restrictions on the media and public dissent, with the majority of outlets being state-controlled.

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Read more: Media freedom and democracy: Africans in four countries weigh up thorny questions about state control

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Guelleh also owes his longevity to a close-knit network of officials, family members and political allies who occupy key roles in government and business. The coalition around him is not always entirely harmonious. Subtle rivalries have emerged among political figures and members of his inner circle from time to time. But these dynamics do not pose a political threat.

What accounts for his longevity?

Guelleh’s tenure can be attributed to a combination of institutional changes, geopolitical factors and elite dynamics.

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One such element is constitutional reform. Over the years, Djibouti’s parliament has eroded key democratic safeguards of the 1992 constitution.

First came the removal of presidential term limits in 2010. These changes enabled Guelleh to stand for re-election and reduced presidential terms from six to five years.

The November 2025 parliamentary vote to abolish the presidential age limit followed this pattern. This eliminated the last formal restriction on his eligibility for office come April 2026.

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A second factor is Djibouti’s strategic importance. Located at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital shipping lane connecting the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the country is home to several foreign military bases. Represented here are the US, France, China, Japan and Italy. For many international partners, the stability of the Djibouti government has been viewed as a source of predictability in a volatile region.

Consequently, there has been limited external pressure for political reform. In turn this has reinforced the stability of the current leadership.

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Read more: Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing

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Thirdly, the cohesion of the ruling elite has played a central role in domestic politics. A network of influential figures, including members of the president’s family, long-standing advisers, and economic figures, has formed around Guelleh’s leadership. This group controls key state institutions and sectors of the economy, providing strong incentives to maintain leadership continuity.

Djibouti’s economy relies primarily on port and logistics services, particularly its international port which serves regional trade, as well as on the revenues generated from hosting multiple foreign military bases.

At the same time, the absence of an openly designated successor has sparked quiet competition within this circle. The prospect of a post-Guelleh era has, in recent years, encouraged various individuals to seek to increase their influence. This has ranged from family members to senior advisers and political figures.

Emerging rivalries do not openly challenge the president’s authority. Nevertheless, they do illustrate the complex internal dynamics that underpin the current political order.

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What has he achieved; what does he promise?

Over more than two decades in office, Guelleh has presided over a period of relative stability in Djibouti. While neighbouring Somalia and Ethiopia have experienced ongoing insecurity and internal conflict, Djibouti has remained comparatively insulated.

The government frequently cites this stability as one of the defining features of his tenure.

Djibouti has also developed its position as a strategic hub. The presence of multiple foreign military bases, alongside port and logistics facilities, has generated significant state revenue.

Since 2016, Chinese investment and management have increasingly shaped the country’s main port infrastructure, further integrating Djibouti into global commercial networks. These factors have raised the country’s profile in international trade and security arrangements.

In addition, Djibouti has played a part in regional diplomacy. It is an important member of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). This is the regional organisation mandated to address conflicts rooted in resources, political competition and identity. Djibouti’s most recent engagement includes participation in the attempts to mediate the conflict in Sudan.

The government has also highlighted certain institutional reforms as markers of progress. An example is the abolition of the death penalty in 2010.

However, structural challenges remain significant. Djibouti has a very young population. Issues such as unemployment, high living costs and limited political participation persist.

What does the age-limit vote tell us about Djibouti’s politics?

The decision was adopted without public debate and with no dissenting votes among the 65 lawmakers present. This reflects the extent to which the National Assembly aligns with the executive.

The vote also highlights the central role of elite consensus in Djibouti’s political system. Key figures within the ruling coalition, including representatives from the Issa and co-opted Afar elites, supported the reform. For these groups, maintaining leadership continuity is often seen as a means of preserving access to economic and political resources. This is preferred to uncertainties associated with a change in leadership.

Bypassing a popular vote on the constitutional provision limits the opportunity to see the true levels of support or opposition. This has the effect of particularly excluding younger citizens who have only ever known one president.

Overall, the vote shows that constitutional provisions can be modified when they hinder leadership continuity. This reinforces a model in which formal rules adapt to political needs rather than constrain them. It also highlights the importance of elite cohesion in maintaining the current political order.

As the 2026 presidential election approaches, the government’s dominant narrative remains one of continuity, supported by those who view stability as essential to protecting national and regional interests.

However, socio-economic pressures and underlying concerns about the inevitable succession continue to influence public expectations, particularly among younger citizens.

– Djibouti’s democracy takes another knock as ageing president engineers yet another term
– https://theconversation.com/djiboutis-democracy-takes-another-knock-as-ageing-president-engineers-yet-another-term-271009

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Onyedikachi Madueke, Teaching Assistant, University of Aberdeen

The terrorism conviction and life sentence handed down by the Federal High Court in Abuja on Nnamdi Kanu, leader of the Indigenous People of Biafra, brings an end to a ten-year legal battle. But it opens up a larger political and security question for Nigeria.

Kanu has long championed the secession of Nigeria’s south-east region, a demand the Nigerian constitution forbids. The last major attempt at secession, in 1967, triggered a 30-month civil war that killed over one million people, mostly Igbo civilians.

Kanu’s campaign for Biafra as an independent Igbo state is rooted in decades of perceived political marginalisation and unresolved historical grievances of the Igbo.

The Igbo are one of Nigeria’s three largest ethnic groups – the other two are the Hausa and the Yoruba. Yet no Igbo person has held the presidency or vice presidency since 1999.

Additionally, Igbos feel marginalised because of the way in which Nigeria has organised its regional political groups. The south-east geopolitical zone that the Igbo live in encompasses only five states. The Hausa and the Yoruba have geopolitical zones that are made up of at least six states each. This structural imbalance is widely seen to weaken the south-east region’s political influence and reduce its share of federal resources and representation.

Such perceived marginalisation is what has driven the Biafra separatist movement.

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Read more: What drives the Indigenous People of Biafra’s relentless efforts for secession

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In protest against Kanu’s arrest in 2021, armed groups linked to the movement have imposed and violently enforced “sit-at-home” orders. A report shows that between 2021 and 2025 over 770 lives, including civilians and security personnel, have died in the subsequent violence.

This has contributed to the region’s transformation from one of Nigeria’s most peaceful zones into a centre of insecurity.

As a scholar researching security and separatist conflicts in Nigeria, I argue that a court judgement cannot resolve the political, economic and psychological grievances that underpin the Biafra separatist sentiment in Nigeria.

The region’s demands extend beyond any single personality. They include calls for greater political inclusion, equitable federal representation, improved infrastructure, economic revitalisation, and a national reckoning with the legacy of the civil war.

Until these issues are addressed, the ideology of Biafra will continue to resonate.

In fact, Kanu’s life sentence is more likely to escalate than de-escalate the Biafra agitation, for three reasons. Firstly, by providing an opening for more extremist leaders to emerge. Secondly, by turning Kanu into a martyr for the Biafran cause; and lastly, by potentially opening the door to greater violence.

Leadership removal rarely ends insurgencies

The expectation that harsh punishment will end the Biafra agitation misunderstands how separatist or insurgent movements behave. Decades of global research show that removing a charismatic leader, whether through imprisonment, exile or execution, does not necessarily weaken a movement. In many cases, it produces the opposite effect.

Nigeria’s own history with Boko Haram is an example. After the group’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, was killed extra-judicially in police custody in 2009, Boko Haram did not collapse. Instead, it radicalised under Abubakar Shekau, who adopted a more extreme ideology and militarised the group’s structure.

The same pattern can be seen elsewhere. Research by Jenna Jordan and Ulaş Erdoğdu shows that Islamic State (ISIS) survived multiple leadership losses. Other terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab, the Taliban and the PKK have all endured and adapted despite strikes to remove leaders.

These cases demonstrate that leadership removal often fragments the organisation, empowers hardline commanders and intensifies violence.

Kanu’s life sentence risks producing similar dynamics. The Indigenous People of Biafra has already splintered into factions, some captured by criminal networks.

A life sentence may remove the last figure capable of restraining extremist or opportunistic actors. Before Kanu’s arrest, his organisation had no major factions, and south-east political leaders engaged directly with him to calm tensions.

Kanu alleged that he had set out conditions for ending the agitation, which the Nigerian government did not honour. His imprisonment removed this central point of contact. Meaningful engagement by the Nigerian government could become more difficult.

In addition, when movements lose central authority, they tend to fracture into smaller, less accountable groups, each pursuing its own agenda.

Elevation to martyrdom

Kanu is not the first leader of the Biafra agitation. Before the Indigenous People of Biafra emerged, Ralph Uwazuruike’s Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra, founded in 1999, had mobilised thousands using largely non-violent methods. In 2010, the Biafra Zionist Front was formed by Benjamin Onwuka.

The sentiment that fuels these movements has persisted for more than five decades. Leaders emerge, are repressed, and are replaced by new voices.

What Kanu’s sentencing may do, especially if he dies in prison, is to elevate him to the status of martyr, a symbolic role far more powerful than that of an active leader. Martyrdom transforms political grievances into moral ones. When a community perceives a leader as unjustly punished, that figure becomes a rallying point for collective identity and resistance.

For example, the Niger Delta environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa was extrajudicially executed by Nigeria’s military junta in 1995, and became a lasting symbol of regional marginalisation and injustice.

Many political stakeholders in the south-east now perceive Kanu’s sentencing as unjust, reinforcing existing grievances.

The ruling may worsen insecurity

The south-east is already experiencing its worst instability in decades. Armed groups, some ideological, others purely criminal, have used the emotive appeal of Biafra to justify assassinations, kidnappings, extortion and attacks on state institutions.

Kanu’s sentencing could intensify these trends.

Factions seeking to avenge him may escalate attacks on security forces or political figures.

Splinter groups may interpret the verdict as proof that peaceful agitation is futile.

Confusion surrounding Kanu’s future may weaken the few actors still capable of influencing extremists.

Criminals will likely expand operations under the guise of political resistance.

Pathways towards de-escalation

The conclusion of Kanu’s trial should have opened a window for political reflection. Instead, it risks deepening the mistrust between the south-east region and federal authorities.

Nigeria must consider three steps.

First, federal authorities should open structured political dialogue with south-east stakeholders.

Second, the government should develop a plan for the region that combines security and development. Development, not coercion, weakens separatist sentiment.

Third, Nigeria must confront the trauma of the civil war through a national truth-telling and reconciliation process. Without acknowledging past injustices, nation-building remains impossible.

– Nigeria has jailed Biafra separatist leader Nnamdi Kanu: why it risks backfiring
– https://theconversation.com/nigeria-has-jailed-biafra-separatist-leader-nnamdi-kanu-why-it-risks-backfiring-270643