Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Herkulaas MvE Combrink, Senior lecturer/ Co-Director, University of the Free State

During a health crisis, the first instinct is often to give people information. Governments make announcements. Experts explain what is happening. Health departments share information on television, radio, social media and through communities. The idea seems simple: give people the right information, and they can make better decisions.

But does simply providing more information resolve uncertainty, misinformation or public concern?

My research focuses on infodemics: using artificial intelligence and machine learning to understand how misinformation spreads, identify information voids, and analyse the concerns and questions that emerge during a crisis.

In a recent paper, a group of researchers involved in studying infodemics and I examined the system South Africa put in place to understand public concerns and what responses were recommended to address them.

During the COVID pandemic, South Africa’s national Department of Health established a technical Risk Communication and Community Engagement working group that used a research approach called social listening to identify what people were saying, asking and worrying about in relation to the pandemic.

To do this, public conversations and feedback were tracked across social media, online news, public WhatsApp streams, call centres and community channels.

Regular social listening reports brought this information together to identify concerns, misinformation, rumours and gaps in understanding. These reports alerted health authorities and partners to emerging concerns, and provided recommended actions for addressing them.

The social listening system was structured as a circular process, described as: listen, understand the problem, recommend a response, and keep listening.

We wanted to understand two things:

We studied 91 reports produced between 2021 and 2023. What emerged was that similar concerns kept appearing, despite the existence of a system to address them.

What people were worried about

At least two researchers reviewed the information independently so that the findings did not depend on one person’s judgment. We grouped statements that were saying the same or very similar things. In total, we identified 964 instances of misinformation across 12 themes and 573 recommended actions across six themes.

More than half of the misinformation was directly about COVID. The rest was about vaccines and various health-related concerns.

The reports reflected recurring areas of uncertainty and misinformation around vaccine safety and side effects, trust, treatments and government communication.

The recommendations focused on improving how health information was communicated and managed, and on working more directly with communities.

This meant going beyond broadcasting the same national message to everyone. Recommendations included community information sessions using local media platforms, and engagement activities which included working with people within communities who could place complex health information into a locally relevant language and context.

Why did the concerns keep appearing?

Our study did not track what happened after recommendations were made. Furthermore, the study could not determine whether individual recommendations were implemented, how widely they reached communities, or whether they changed what people understood, believed or did.

It is possible that concerns recurred because information environments change. New questions emerge, information voids develop as circumstances change, and misinformation can reappear or take different forms. A concern appearing again at a later point therefore does not necessarily mean that exactly the same information problem has persisted.

This is why the gap between listening and outcome matters. Identifying a concern is only the first step. What also matters is how that concern is translated into a response, whether the response reaches the intended audience, whether it addresses the underlying question, uncertainty or information void, and whether anything changes afterwards.

Across the reports, five principles appeared repeatedly that can help health authorities and risk communication practitioners translate social listening insights into more responsive public health communication.

Firstly, understand the concern. Social listening can show health communicators what people are worried about, instead of assuming what people need to know.

Secondly, use that information to improve how health information is framed. If the concern is about vaccine side effects, for example, providing general information about COVID may not address the actual concern.

Thirdly, work with trusted people to communicate and engage with communities. The reports recommended community participation as well as involvement from public figures and other credible voices. The purpose is to communicate through relationships and voices that communities recognise.

Fourth, use appropriate communication channels. Something posted online does not necessarily require an online response. Communication can be through community radio, newspapers, faith based and community organisations, outreach programmes and community health workers.

Lastly, keep listening because concerns change. New rumours appear, old ones return, and people’s questions change as circumstances change.

The purpose of social listening is not simply to build another dashboard counting posts, likes and mentions. Its value lies in connecting what is being heard to decisions about what needs to be communicated, to whom, through whom and through which channels, and then listening again to determine whether the information environment has changed.

When we hear a concern, we should ask: Who is saying this? Why are they worried? Could this cause harm? Who do they trust? What language do they speak? Where do they get their information from? And, after we respond, has anything changed?

These findings matter beyond COVID-19, as it will not be the last time countries face uncertainty, fear and rapidly changing information. The next challenge may be another infectious disease, a vaccine, a new treatment or an entirely different public emergency.

The unanswered question is what happens between identifying a concern, recommending or implementing a response, and determining whether anything changes in what people understand, believe or do. Social listening gives us the ability to hear the problem. The next challenge is understanding what happens after we hear it.

– Listen, understand, repeat: the circular approach to good communication in a health crisis
– https://theconversation.com/listen-understand-repeat-the-circular-approach-to-good-communication-in-a-health-crisis-291739

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

The new Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) has already generated an important debate. Some analysts have portrayed it as a rival to the three established global rating agencies – Fitch, Moody’s and S&P Global. Others have questioned whether Africa needs another rating agency at all.

But, based on my expertise researching African financial markets and the role of credit rating agencies in particular, I would argue that this framing misses the bigger picture.

The Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) should not be viewed as a challenger attempting to compete head-on with the century old rating agencies. It is rather a new lever for expanding and deepening Africa’s capital markets, broadening credit intelligence and helping redirect capital towards productive investment in infrastructure, energy and manufacturing to create jobs, generate income and grow economic capacity.

The agency’s success should therefore be measured by whether it helps African countries make progress in these areas. In this sense, the Africa Credit Rating Agency is not simply another rating agency. It is a pioneer of a stronger, deeper and more efficient African financing ecosystem.

Africa has a remarkably large pool of domestic capital. These are savings held and controlled by African pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, banks, insurers and other investors.

But most of this capital remains concentrated in short-term 90-day treasury bills and bonds. It cannot generate nor sustain economic growth that way.

Meanwhile, productive sectors such as infrastructure, manufacturing and energy don’t get enough financing.

The problem is that the credit ratings industry in Africa remains very small. Yet its role is vital for two reasons. First, its decisions influence how investors allocate capital. The credit ratings industry provides investors with clearer information about the risks of lending, making them more confident about providing long-term financing to businesses and governments.

Secondly, it sets the price at which capital is deployed. This is because the industry judges the capacity of a borrower to repay in full and on time. A low assessment raises the cost. A higher one lowers it.

The number of entities that have a rating from any of the rating agencies is currently less than 5% of the total estimated capital in Africa.

Africa has an estimated US$4 trillion domestic capital base – the money already available that can be invested in businesses. Yet less than US$500 billion worth of these financial instruments and economic entities are subject to formal credit ratings. Across sovereigns, corporates, financial institutions, municipalities, government-related entities and other issuers, the rated entities and instruments remain tiny relative to the potential market.

Compare this with mature financial markets. At the end of 2025, Africa had fewer than 4,000 ratings assigned by both international and domestic rating agencies. That year there were 823,000 in the European Union and over 2 million credit ratings in the US.

There are nine rating agencies operating in Africa. The US has 10 and the European Union 29 active credit rating agencies.

The aim

The anticipated role of the Africa Credit Rating Agency is fourfold.

Firstly, to provide ratings.

Secondly, to help expand Africa’s ratings industry and bring greater credit intelligence to more than US$3.5 trillion in capital currently invested without formal ratings. Much of this capital remains concentrated in treasury bills, money market funds and fixed-term deposits. These are highly liquid, short term and risk-averse instruments. Investors prefer these short-term investments that are easy to access and convert into cash.

Thirdly, the agency provides an opportunity to expand Africa’s financial markets by creating a larger and deeper information ecosystem. For investors, the value of a rating lies not simply in the rating category, but in the assumptions, evidence, rationale and context behind it. Credible ratings provide greater accuracy and precision in understanding risk.

The value of the Africa Credit Rating Agency will therefore be measured by how effectively its analysis helps investors distinguish genuine credit weaknesses from risks that may be amplified by limited information, inadequate data or insufficient contextual understanding.

This matters because one of Africa’s biggest financing challenge lies in mobilising the capital the continent already has. Pension funds, insurers, banks, sovereign wealth funds, asset managers that control substantial pool of African capital need reliable credit information to assess a wider range of investments beyond traditional short-term and highly liquid instruments.

Fourth, the broader objective is to break the cycle in which perceptions of risk currently keep capital on the sidelines, push it offshore or concentrate it in short-term assets while productive African businesses struggle to secure long-term financing.

The new agency helps narrow this information gap. Africa needs investors to become more informed and analytical about risk, while borrowers need a clearer understanding of what drives their creditworthiness and how it can be strengthened.

Market-building exercise

The ratings industry is evolving. The international rating agencies are recognising the value of contextual risk analysis. This requires having more locally based analysts who understand the economic, political and institutional realities of the markets they assess.

They have begun positioning themselves accordingly.

S&P Global’s acquisition of Nigeria-based Agusto & Co, which operates across several African markets, and Moody’s earlier acquisitions of Middle East Rating & Investors Services, West Africa Rating Agency (WARA) and GCR reflect the growing recognition of the importance of local expertise and context in assessing African risk.

Way forward

The Africa Credit Rating Agency deserves the opportunity to prove itself. Its success will depend on the institution itself, as well as on investors, policymakers, financial institutions and other rating agencies working together to build a more balanced financing architecture.

Criticism and scrutiny are necessary. But they should not become grounds to dismiss the new institution prematurely. The Africa Credit Rating Agency should be given the chance and space to demonstrate the value it can contribute.

– Africa’s new credit agency: why it’s about a lot more than just ratings
– https://theconversation.com/africas-new-credit-agency-why-its-about-a-lot-more-than-just-ratings-293227

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Daniel Cash, Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR), United Nations University; Aston University

The formal launch of the Africa Credit Rating Agency (AfCRA) has required considerable institutional commitment. It brings to fruition an effort that has been almost a decade in the making.

In 2017, the African Union gave the African Peer Review Mechanism a mandate to support member states in the field of credit rating agencies. By 2019, African institutions were examining the feasibility of creating an agency of their own. Feasibility and design work followed, then political endorsement of a private-sector-driven model, the selection of Mauritius as its home, and now the launch itself.

There is something worth recognising in that progression. The African Union has spent years examining the role that credit ratings play in its economies. It has committed to building an institution capable of producing creditworthiness assessments itself.

The African Peer Review Mechanism frames the new agency not as a challenger to the world’s big three – Moody’s, S&P Global Ratings or Fitch – but as complementary.

Its mandate is to produce

fair, independent and contextually accurate assessments of African economies.

Whether it succeeds in that mandate is a separate question. Whatever the rating agency eventually becomes, reaching the point of launch is already a significant act of African institution-building. As such it warrants examination, given how difficult it is for new bodies to be built, particularly by 55 nation states.

In this article I will set out the process that brought the countries on the continent to this point.

I will also examine what Africa’s decision to build a credit rating agency tells us about the growing importance of creditworthiness assessment to the financing of development.

African institution-building

The Africa Credit Rating Agency has not appeared from nowhere. Continental institutions have been created or expanded across several domains. In this time period two have moved from agreement into implementation:

The African Union has also secured a stronger formal voice within global economic governance, becoming a permanent member of the G20 in 2023.

The rating agency belongs to this same period, but its function differs. It does not lend money, as a development bank does, or facilitate payments and trade rules, as the continental trade architecture does. It is being built to evaluate creditworthiness, which raises the real question posed by its creation.

Why has that evaluation become important enough to warrant an institution of its own?

The why

Governments and businesses across Africa have ambitions for infrastructure, industrial capacity, human capital and resilience against shocks. These ambitions outrun what domestic revenue alone can finance. Meeting them typically requires external financing. African governments and businesses have increasingly turned to international capital markets, alongside other sources of finance.

Access to that market, and the price paid for it, depends heavily on how creditworthy a borrower is judged to be.

Sovereign credit ratings exist to supply that judgment. A rating is an opinion, issued by one of a small number of specialist agencies, about the likelihood that a borrower will repay its debts fully and on time. The ratings run on a scale from secure investment grade categories down through progressively riskier “speculative”-grade ones.

Speculative grade ratings are associated with markedly higher borrowing costs than investment grade ones.

The most consequential distinction in this system is the boundary between investment grade and speculative grade. It’s conventionally set at BBB-, or its equivalent Baa3 on Moody’s scale.

Economists at the International Monetary Fund – Laura Jaramillo and Catalina Tejada – examined 35 emerging market economies between 1997 and 2010. They found that crossing into investment grade status reduced borrowing spreads (extra interest a borrower has to pay above a benchmark interest rate) by 36% beyond what macroeconomic fundamentals alone would predict. This compared with only 5%-10% for upgrades within investment grade, and no measurable effect within speculative grade.

The threshold matters because many institutional investors operate under mandates forbidding speculative grade debt entirely or even partially. This means that crossing it can change the pool of buyers willing to lend as well as the price.

Sovereign creditworthiness can also influence financing conditions beyond government itself. Banks, state-owned enterprises and private companies can find their own borrowing conditions affected by changes in sovereign risk. This is particularly true when their credit profiles are closely tied to the state or the domestic financial system. Access to capital markets for entities within a country can be shaped by a judgment made about their government.

A downgrade, in this sense, does not stay contained within sovereign debt markets. It tends to reach into the financing conditions facing the wider economy, often at the moments when governments and businesses most need room to respond – such as external shocks or a pandemic.

Ratings have also become embedded in the rules of finance itself. In the US, financial regulators began formally recognising the ratings of designated agencies in 1975 to help set capital requirements for regulated institutions. That recognition has since multiplied across securities, banking and insurance regulation.

Once ratings are written into rules determining what standard of debt regulated institutions may hold, a rating becomes part of the machinery governing market access, not simply an opinion offered to it.

Taken together, this evidence places creditworthiness assessment at an important junction in development finance. Ratings interact with the availability, eligibility and price of capital, and those financing conditions in turn shape the resources available to governments and businesses for investment.

UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) finds that developing countries paid, on average, around 200 basis points more than developed countries for internationally sourced capital between the start of 2012 and May 2023.

Years of discussion about African development finance, borrowing costs, capital market access, and reform of the international financial architecture have often treated creditworthiness assessment as one input among many, acknowledged and debated but rarely built around directly.

The Africa Credit Rating Agency converts that discussion into an institution with a headquarters, a regulatory process and a launch date.

The real questions

Will it succeed? Will it challenge the big three? What happens if it fails? Is it really needed?

They are all valid questions, but having witnessed the development of the new agency over the years, I see the real questions slightly differently at this point in time.

I am eager to see what this act of institution-building can contribute to African agency within the global financial architecture. I am excited to see African leaders organise around an issue that directly affects their citizens. I am personally humbled by the commitment of those working behind the scenes to build an institution for which there is no obvious blueprint. The answers to the original questions above will be answered in due time.

Reaching the point of launch deserves to be recognised as an important milestone for the credit rating field, and above all for African institution-building.

– Africa’s new credit agency: why it’s needed
– https://theconversation.com/africas-new-credit-agency-why-its-needed-291947

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Patrick Ngassa Piotie, Chairperson, Diabetes Alliance; Co-founder, Diabetes Research Centre, University of Pretoria

Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) recently released its report on deaths that occurred in 2024. The headline findings contain a sobering, recurring truth: diabetes was once again the country’s leading underlying natural cause of death.

In 2024 alone, 28,767 people died from complications caused by diabetes, accounting for 6.1% of all deaths nationwide. That is an average of nearly 79 deaths every day.

Diabetes also claimed the top spot in 2022 and 2023. These numbers cannot be accepted as South Africa’s new normal. Behind every data point is a human life, a grieving family and, all too often, years of encounters with a health system that missed opportunities to diagnose, treat and support people in time.

As a public health specialist and chairperson of the non-profit organisation Diabetes Alliance, I view this three-year trend as an unacceptable tragedy. Diabetes is manageable. With timely support, people can lead long, healthy lives free from preventable complications. Acknowledging this crisis is the start, but recognition must give way to political action. The Department of Health must establish a national diabetes strategy with clear targets for prevention and care. The finance minister must resource it. And the Presidency must lead a coordinated, whole-of-government response.

The broader health landscape is equally stark. Noncommunicable diseases accounted for 60.7% of all recorded deaths in 2024. The top three causes of natural death – diabetes, hypertensive diseases and cerebrovascular diseases – frequently overlap in the same individuals. Managing these interconnected conditions through isolated disease programmes makes little sense for primary care clinics or the patients navigating them.

Reading beyond the numbers

At first glance, the 2024 total is 800 deaths higher than the revised 2023 figure of 27,967 (5.8% of recorded deaths). Stats SA compiles these mortality figures from death notification forms filed through the Department of Home Affairs. Medical practitioners record the cause of death, which Stats SA then classifies using international coding standards. Late death registrations and administrative backlogs are processed retroactively; this leads to revision or updating of prior years’ totals.

The updated count for 2022 stood at 33,126, higher than diabetes deaths recorded in 2023 and 2024. Diabetes has remained South Africa’s single largest natural killer for three consecutive years.

The diabetes burden is also deeply unequal:

• Women bear the heaviest loss: diabetes was the leading recorded natural cause among women, claiming 17,429 lives (7.9% of all female deaths) and 11,334 or 4.5% of all male deaths.

• Working-age adults are hard hit: it ranked first among people aged 45-64, accounting for 9,364 deaths (7.9% of deaths in this group).

• Geographic split: diabetes ranked as the top natural cause in five provinces, Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo, Eastern Cape and Gauteng, while hypertensive diseases led in the remaining four provinces. These provincial rankings are not a measure of individual care quality or residency. They are a starting point for region-specific questions about access and system performance.

The geographic split shows the need to investigate whether access to diagnosis, treatment and good quality care differs between and within provinces.

A death certificate is only the final chapter

Mortality statistics record the primary cause listed on a death notification, but remain blind to what happened along the way.

They cannot tell us how many South Africans live with undiagnosed diabetes. They cannot show whether a patient had consistent access to insulin and testing supplies, whether their blood sugar was adequately controlled, or whether a simple follow-up could have prevented a fatal complication. Nor do they capture the full toll of diabetes when another condition is listed as the underlying cause.

Those are the questions we must answer while patients are still alive.

In my work on strengthening diabetes care, including the Tshwane Insulin Project – a nurse-led programme that helped people with type 2 diabetes start and adjust insulin treatment in primary care, with follow-up support at home – I have seen where care pathways break down, and where they succeed. Survival rarely hinges on high-tech interventions. It depends on the links in primary healthcare:

• a trained clinic nurse with the time to act

• a reliable supply chain for medicines and diagnostics

• routine follow-up mechanisms when a patient misses an appointment

• regular screening for kidney, eye and vascular (blood vessel) complications

• support systems that respect the economic reality of a person’s daily life.

We need real-time clinical data that helps a facility respond today, not a national death tally published two years later.

Turning policy into frontline care

South Africa already has a framework: the National Strategic Plan for Non-Communicable Diseases and its 90-60-50 targets. This cascade aims to ensure that 90% of adults know their blood pressure and blood glucose status, 60% of those with elevated levels receive treatment, and 50% of those receiving care achieve clinical control.

The challenge is making policy work in practice.

Tools like the National Health Laboratory Service diabetes dashboard offer valuable insights into blood sugar levels control across districts. But to close the loop, South Africa urgently needs a national diabetes registry and integrated digital tracking to understand who enters care, who remains in care, and who is being left behind.

From declaration to delivery

After the 2025 Diabetes Summit, the Diabetes Alliance launched the Johannesburg Declaration for Accelerated Action on Diabetes. The declaration calls for coordinated national leadership, sustainable financing, decentralised primary care, and direct participation by people living with diabetes. It asks the Presidency to lead a multisectoral response and calls on the National Treasury and health sector to match policy commitments with financial resources.

The latest mortality report gives this agenda even more urgency. There are three practical priorities:

1. Connect early diagnosis to sustained care. Screening is only useful if a positive result leads to uninterrupted treatment, reliable medicines, blood glucose monitoring and clinical review.

2. Measure quality of care: publish a picture of diagnosis, treatment, retention and complication rates by district and province.

3. Address the conditions in which health choices are made. Food prices, transport barriers and economic hardship shape health outcomes.

People living with diabetes must help define what quality care looks like. Their experience should guide national policy and daily clinic operations alike.

– 79 deaths a day: South Africa’s diabetes crisis needs a new strategy
– https://theconversation.com/79-deaths-a-day-south-africas-diabetes-crisis-needs-a-new-strategy-293063

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Maame Efua Addadzi-Koom, Senior Lecturer, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)

The Ecowas Court is a west African regional body located in Abuja, Nigeria, serving the now 12-nation Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas). The court, originally set up to handle economic matters related to the Ecowas Treaty, was given a human rights mandate in 2005. Since then, of the hundreds of cases the court has heard, nearly 90% have been human rights-related. In a recent book, international law and human rights scholar Maame Efua Addadzi-Koom argues that the shift in the court’s mandate has made it an accessible forum for advancing women’s rights. Some of its landmark decisions have challenged discrimination and violence against women.

Why is the court so important for women’s rights in west Africa?

The court has become the preferred destination for west Africans litigating human rights issues against their governments. As I set out in my book, this has begun to happen since it was given its human rights mandate in 2005.

A key attraction of the Ecowas Court is its accessibility: plaintiffs do not have to go through all the judicial avenues available in their country before they can bring their action to the court. This is the case with other regional tribunals on the continent.

This accessibility has been enhanced by electronic filing and case management systems.

What key decisions has it made about the rights of women?

It’s made key decisions in areas like marriage, widowhood, domestic violence, employment, school, culture and conflict situations. An example is the 2019 decision of Women Against Violence and Exploitation in Society (WAVES) and Child Welfare Society, Sierra Leone (CWS-SL) v. The Republic of Sierra Leone (the “Waves” case).

This was a public interest litigation case against Sierra Leone, where a non-governmental organisation filed the action on behalf of an estimated 3,000 pregnant schoolgirls. Sierra Leone had banned pregnant schoolgirls from attending mainstream schools and offered them substandard education in “alternative” schools.

Waves argued that the arrangement denied the girls equal access to education on the basis of their pregnancy status. The court ordered Sierra Leone to revoke the ban and close down the alternative schools.

How enforceable are its decisions?

The court is working to improve the enforcement of its decisions. It has an enforcement plan – member states are to set up a national authority to receive and enforce the court’s decisions. Not all member states have done so. Eight out of the 12 Ecowas member states have not complied with the arrangement.

Even among those that have set up a national authority, records show that some are among the countries with the highest number of unenforced judgments. Nigeria, home of the Ecowas Court, is one example.

That said, there are instances of decisions being enforced in part. For example, the Waves case. I attribute Sierra Leone’s partial compliance to the public-interest nature of the case, which led to systemic remedies (fixing the broken system in the country) rather than monetary remedies (compensation for individual victims), and the publicity such litigation generates.

What weaknesses still need to be addressed?

A gap I note in the book is the uncertainty surrounding the monetary compensation the court awards in women’s rights cases. It is one thing for women to receive a favourable judicial declaration that their rights have been violated, and another to be unsure of the “price tag” the court will place on those rights.

The “price tag” is equally important, and the lack of uniformity diminishes predictability, a determining factor in effective compensation.

I also observe that there is minimal mention of the Maputo Protocol by the Ecowas Court in most of its women’s rights decisions, the 2025 case of Forum Against Harmful Practices and Others v. Republic of Sierra Leone being an exception. The Maputo Protocol is the African Bill of Rights for Women, adopted in 2003. It is the first regional human rights treaty specifically designed for women.

In most of the decisions analysed in the book, the court mentions the Maputo Protocol only briefly and does not rely on it heavily. This is troubling because, among international human rights instruments for women, the Maputo Protocol is best suited to African women and girls because of its comprehensive scope and distinctive nature.

If it’s not used, its impact is diminished.

How can the court transform women’s rights in the region?

The Ecowas Court is already doing a great job advancing women’s rights in the region, but its work would be even more transformative if it developed a uniform monetary compensation framework and became more intentional about increasing its reliance on the Maputo Protocol.

Public interest litigation is another route to getting the Ecowas Court to deliver systemic, transformative decisions. But the initiative will come from the lawyers submitting cases, not from the court itself.

What does the future hold for women’s rights in the region?

Ecowas has established itself as a fair and receptive regional court where women can trust they will receive justice, even if their own states do not provide it.

The range of women’s rights issues that the court addresses continues to grow. I eagerly anticipate the court’s future handling of a technology-facilitated gender-based violence case when it is eventually presented with one. This is an emerging form of gender-based violence that is partly or fully committed, assisted, aggravated or amplified using technological platforms and other digital media or tools.

Women are particularly affected by this type of violence. As of 2026, it’s estimated that 75% of women globally have experienced it. Therefore, a decision by the Ecowas Court on this matter would help shape the rights of women to be free from violence online.

– Ecowas Court and women’s rights in west Africa: what’s working – and what isn’t
– https://theconversation.com/ecowas-court-and-womens-rights-in-west-africa-whats-working-and-what-isnt-291919

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Fridah Gatwiri Kiambati, Associate Research Scientist, African Population and Health Research Center

Kenya introduced a competency-based approach to education in 2017. It was meant to give learners a range of skills, from basic reading, writing and arithmetic to critical thinking, creativity, digital literacy and social-emotional skills.

Competency-based education puts learners at the centre while the teacher guides and enables learning. But learners in Kenya are still not achieving their basic literacy and numeracy skills. In grade 3, six out of 10 learners can’t read and understand a story in English, and eight in 10 can’t solve a basic numeracy problem for their grade.

I’m a researcher with a special interest in inclusive education, and was part of a team at the African Population and Health Research Centre in Nairobi that looked at how the new approach was going. We examined how teachers actually teach, and why. This included their use of teaching and learning materials, and integration of information and communication technology in classrooms.

We found a gap in foundational learning classrooms between the expected learner-centred approaches (as set out in the competency-based education framework) and what happened in the classroom. Teachers were not following the framework, partly because of large classes and shortages of materials.

How teachers teach has a great influence on how learners learn. This is particularly true in the early years of learning, when literacy and numeracy foundations are built. The framework is designed to ensure that every learner’s potential is nurtured regardless of their abilities, interests or backgrounds. Therefore it’s important to understand and correct any problems with teaching practice.

How teachers teach

We collected data from 200 schools across 11 counties, and we observed 398 grade 1 and 3 teachers teaching literacy or numeracy. After the first analysis of classroom observation data, we interviewed teachers to get deeper insights into why they teach the way they do.

Research has shown that use of teaching and learning materials enhances understanding of content being taught. Learners need to see and handle things, not just memorise words and numbers. This is why the competency-based education framework calls for teachers to deliberately and creatively use instructional materials, such as textbooks, real-life (everyday) objects and teacher-made materials, to enhance understanding.

But what we saw in classrooms was an over-reliance on the use of the blackboard and print materials. Not enough creative use was being made of other objects and materials.

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Read more: Chalk and talk vs. active learning: what’s holding South African teachers back from using proven methods? 

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The competency approach also says teachers should not instruct the class as a whole all the time. They should attend to children’s different needs. Otherwise they could leave behind learners who struggle, and fail to challenge those who are gifted.

The findings showed that teachers appreciated learner-centered instruction approaches. For example, one said:

If I am only using the lecture method, it becomes difficult for them to remember what I am teaching because they cannot see the actual thing.

But they faced school-level and system-level constraints (class size, resource gaps and curriculum pressure). These made it more convenient to use traditional methods such as whole-class instruction.

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Read more: Ghana wants learner-centred classrooms – but many teachers still favour old methods

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In literacy, teachers focused on the whole class 84.5% of the time. In numeracy it was 62.8% of the time. Small-group instruction and individual learner support was minimal (less than 10%).

In literacy lessons, teachers spent 22.5% of the time asking questions, 15% of the time explaining things and 14% monitoring. In numeracy lessons, monitoring learners was the dominant teacher action (it took 39.1% of their time).

Learner actions were largely passive or repetitive. In literacy, learners spent a lot of the lesson time listening to or watching the teacher (28.7%) and responding to oral questions (24.1%). In numeracy, learners spent much of the lesson time writing exercises (36.4%), followed by listening to or watching the teacher (24.9%).

Why they teach the way they do

Instructional choices made by teachers were mainly shaped by classroom realities such as large class sizes, resource constraints, curriculum pressure, mental health and limited support systems.

One teacher in our study said:

even handling the 75 learners before the end of the day, I am really tired. Honestly very tired. Overworking because of the learners, marking the books, the noise, you feel as if your head is going to burst.

Large class size was found to influence the low use of teaching and learning materials.

Available resources also made a difference. Overall, access to approved textbooks was generally adequate, with most schools reporting fewer than two learners per textbook. But there were county-level disparities. For instance, Marsabit county had three learners for every textbook.

Where ICT fits in

Rather than replacing physical teaching and learning materials, technology is an extra resource to use in the classroom.

Information and communications technology integration helps build digital literacy skills, boosts learner engagement, supports use of different learning styles, encourages teamwork, enhances problem solving skills, and makes concepts simpler through use of interactive apps and simple educational tools.

As one teacher in our study put it:

When you use those ICT in class, the lesson becomes more enjoyable and also the learners are able also to upload their own work.

The competency-based framework emphasises digital literacy as a core competency. But our research found a disconnect between the framework and classroom practice. ICT is scarcely being used during lessons.

Five issues limited ICT integration in classrooms:

• infrastructural and technical barriers

• inadequate or non-functional ICT resources

• high cost of digital pedagogy

• time management and instructional efficiency

• teacher capacity and training gaps.

One teacher said:

You find only two or three functional tablets in an institution.

What needs to be done

Based on our findings we have a number of recommendations.

Firstly, strengthen teacher mentorship, coaching and supervision to support the use of recommended teaching practices.

Secondly, encourage peer learning and peer support among teachers. Teachers could observe one another using materials and ICT in large classes with children of mixed ability.

Thirdly, build teachers’ capacity to give special attention to learners whose achievement is below learning expectations, within the lesson time.

Fourth, make sure every learner has their own textbook. That means an investment by the Ministry of Education.

Fifth, improve ICT integration by providing the proper infrastructure and making sure teachers have the skills they need to use it.

Research assistant and PhD candidate Nelson Muhia worked with the author on this article.

– Kenya’s large class sizes make it harder for teachers to help children learn
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-large-class-sizes-make-it-harder-for-teachers-to-help-children-learn-291680

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gudani Goodman Mukoma, Lecturer, University of Venda

Noncommunicable diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, chronic respiratory diseases and cancers account for about 75% of deaths globally. Early detection is key to managing the scale of the problem. But that’s not always possible in rural communities, where there are often shortages of healthcare workers, long travel distances and financial barriers. Fragmented referral systems can also delay diagnosis and follow-up.

This gap in prevention and early detection is one we see often in rural South Africa. As a health researcher and biokineticist working in the country’s public sector, I’m interested in whether biokineticists could play a greater role in closing this gap.

Biokineticists are regulated health professionals who use exercise scientifically to promote health, prevent disease and support people living with chronic conditions. South Africa has an estimated 1,831 registered biokineticists, mostly in the private sector. They are scarce in public primary healthcare, particularly in rural communities.

In our recent research, my co-authors and I wanted to understand what biokineticists thought about their role in preventing diseases and identifying health risks early. We also wanted to explore what was preventing them from contributing more effectively to rural primary healthcare.

To this end, we conducted in-depth interviews with 10 biokineticists. All had experience in rural outreach or public-sector healthcare, including community wellness screening. But most were based in or around cities. Six worked in the public sector and four in private practice.

We were not trying to represent the views of all biokineticists in South Africa or test a particular intervention. Instead, we wanted to understand the experiences of these professionals.

We found a referral vacuum: a point where a disease risk had been identified, but the public healthcare system did not provide a dependable bridge to further assessment, treatment and follow-up.

Identifying disease risk

All participants reported routinely conducting physiological screenings. These included measuring people’s blood pressure, glucose, cholesterol, body mass index and waist circumference. These measures are important because they can indicate major risk factors for diseases. The signs can be hypertension, abnormal blood glucose, dyslipidaemia (abnormal or unbalanced levels of fats in your blood) and excess or central body fat. They help to identify people who may need further assessment, prevention or referral. Community and rural outreach are particularly valuable as they are an opportunity to identify disease risk among people who can’t easily get routine preventive healthcare.

Several participants had also developed simple ways of communicating the risk to patients. Some used a traffic-light approach. It classifies screening results as green, yellow or red. This helped patients understand their results and recognise when a finding might need further attention or referral.

But identifying a problem was only the first step.

Participants described different experiences of follow-up depending on the setting. Within the South African Military Health Service, they said there were more structured and multidisciplinary referral systems. In contrast, during community and rural outreach, screening could identify potential problems, but there was no consistent mechanism for follow-up, especially where public health services were far from where patients lived.

One participant put it simply:

We give them a report, but there’s no guarantee they’ll go to the clinic.

Rural barriers

For people living in rural communities, the journey from screening to care can involve long distances and transport costs. Participants told us that some people could not afford the taxi fare to the nearest clinic. Others stopped attending exercise or health programmes because the services were too far away.

Telling people to exercise more or visit a clinic is not always enough. Prevention has to take account of the environment people live in.

Participants also identified cultural barriers. One explained that traditional dress could make some women uncomfortable during exercise sessions. Participants acknowledged that cultural and religious considerations were not always incorporated into the programmes they delivered.

This was important. A technically sound intervention can still fail if it does not fit people’s everyday lives and social context.

The main challenge was not a lack of professional capacity among biokineticists. It was the limited integration of their services into the public primary healthcare system. Biokineticists were already identifying disease risk factors and providing exercise-based prevention. But fragmented referral pathways, limited public-sector posts and financial and geographic barriers made it difficult to connect early risk identification with ongoing care.

What needs to change?

South Africa’s National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs 2022–2027 prioritises prevention, early detection and integrated chronic disease management. The country’s National Health Insurance (NHI) framework also aims to improve equitable access to comprehensive healthcare.

Our findings suggest that prevention-oriented allied health professionals should be part of this conversation. Biokineticists could join primary healthcare teams, particularly in underserved communities.

This could include:

• publicly funded posts

• formal referral pathways between clinics and biokineticists

• collaboration with community health workers

• sustainable financing for preventive services under the NHI.

The lesson extends beyond biokinetics. Having trained health professionals available does not automatically strengthen a health system. Their skills must be connected to financing, referral pathways, transport, community structures and other health professionals. This would help build a health system that can identify risks earlier and has the structures in place to act.

– Biokineticists fight disease using exercise science: how to bring their skills to rural patients
– https://theconversation.com/biokineticists-fight-disease-using-exercise-science-how-to-bring-their-skills-to-rural-patients-291173

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Busani Ngcaweni, Director: Center for Public Policy and African Studies, University of Johannesburg

South Africa has been on a decades-long journey of reforming its public service. But serious problems persist.

In September 2026 the urgency for change was again underscored during the Madlanga Commission of inquiry into corruption in the police and security forces. In his testimony, the chairperson of the Public Service Commission, Somadoda Fikeni, lamented the state of governance and accountability. He said it sustained a culture of impunity in which officials directly benefited from the inconvenience suffered by members of the public. He called it the “political economy of inefficiency”.

His testimony coincided with the signing of the Public Service Commission Act into law by President Cyril Ramaphosa. The hope is that this will close gaps in accountability.

The new legislation completes a trio of public sector reforms. The other two pieces are the Public Service Amendment Act 9 of 2025 and the Public Administration Management Amendment Act 7 of 2025.

I am a researcher who also served as head the National School of Government, where I led the development of a national framework for the professionalisation of the public sector.

How significant is this moment for governance?

The three laws make important changes to the rules governing South Africa’s public administration system. These include:

• who exercises administrative authority

• how senior administrators are held accountable

• how public servants are developed.

They also set out how to manage conflicts of interest and how to protect the constitutional values governing public administration.

New laws do not, by themselves, produce a capable and developmental state. South Africa has enough experience to know the distance that can exist between law and practice.

The real test is whether these changes alter how authority is exercised, how appointments are made, how public servants are developed and how breaches of constitutional standards are dealt with.

The foundation

The foundation for the new laws is section 195 of the country’s constitution.

It requires the promotion and maintenance of “a high standard of professional ethics”, and that public resources be used efficiently, economically and effectively. It says public administration must be development-oriented and people’s needs must be addressed.

It also requires accountability, transparency, fair and impartial service, good human resource management and a public administration broadly representative of the South African people.

Section 196 gives the Public Service Commission the power to promote the section 195 values and principles throughout the public service. They apply to all organs of state, not just public administration (national and provincial departments).

This is where the work of the late Stan Sangweni becomes relevant to the new laws. He chaired the Public Service Commission from 1999 to 2009.

The history

Much of what the new legislation does responds to the work of the commission under Sangweni’s leadership. The commission was concerned with how to protect merit in appointments, hold senior administrators accountable, manage the boundary between political authority and administration, make ethical conduct routine and ensure public administration was answerable to citizens.

There was no legal certainty on its mandate in these areas until now, however.

This I appreciated in 2020 when I was asked to develop the framework to make the civil service professional.

Going back through the Public Service Commission archives, I found evidence that many of the questions confronting the drafting team had been examined during Sangweni’s tenure. This reinforced the fact that institutional memory is a form of state capability. A state that keeps starting again condemns each generation of public servants to rediscover problems that others have already studied.

There is a longer history connecting this work of Sangweni to the present reforms. The National Development Plan: Vision 2030 chapter on building a capable and developmental state called for a professional public service, stronger technical and specialist skills, and clearer delegation, accountability and oversight.

The Professionalisation Framework, published in 2022, also addressed how:

• people enter the public sector

• senior appointments should become more merit-based and technically rigorous

• public servants should be inducted, developed, assessed and supported throughout their careers.

The framework set the policy basis for the legislative process. The result is the three laws that have now been passed.

What’s been put in place

The Public Service Amendment Act changes the balance of authority inside departments. Heads of department will now have some powers that used to belong to ministers, including power to make appointments.

Political executives are still responsible for political leadership, policy and strategic direction. Heads of department have clearer administrative responsibilities.

This raises the stakes around who becomes a head of department. If they have more authority, there must be greater confidence in the integrity and professional rigour of their appointment.

The Public Administration Management Amendment Act addresses another part of the problem. It strengthens the statutory position of the National School of Government and the basis for education, training, assessment and professional development across public administration.

The new law also strengthens integrity provisions, like restrictions on employees doing business with the state.

The Public Service Commission Act strengthens the commission itself, through a secretariat. It also extends its mandate to municipalities and public entities. This is closer to the idea of a single public administration system.

Seen as a whole

The significance of these reforms becomes clearer when they are considered together.

Administrative authority is being moved closer to those who must account for what departments do. Senior appointments are to be more professional. The machinery for professional education and development is being strengthened. Integrity provisions are being tightened. Most importantly, the constitutional institution charged with promoting the values of section 195 is being strengthened and given wider reach.

South Africa will hold local government elections on 4 November. The South African Local Government Association, the National School of Government, provincial governments and other institutions preparing the induction of incoming councillors and municipal executives will have to incorporate the new legal framework into those programmes.

– South Africa’s public service: new laws aim to put competent people in charge and hold them to account
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-public-service-new-laws-aim-to-put-competent-people-in-charge-and-hold-them-to-account-292376

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

Following the mass abduction of 46 pupils and teachers in Oyo State, south-west Nigeria in 2026, the authorities attributed the attack to the Ansaru terrorist group. Key suspects were prosecuted and handed prison terms. But this was not the first time terrorist groups had engaged in mass abduction of school pupils in Nigeria. Peace and security researcher Saheed Babajide Owonikoko explains what factors could have motivated the Ansaru terror group to stage that attack and what lessons Nigeria should take away from the incident, which lasted 56 days.

What can Nigeria learn from the mass kidnap of school children in Oyo State?

The lessons can be deduced from the differences between the incident and others that have taken place in Nigeria.

The first striking difference is that northern Nigeria was previously the centre of kidnapping incidents in Nigeria. As of 1 June 2026, there had been 31 mass school kidnapping incidents involving over 2,530 people in Nigeria since the 2014 Chibok incidents.

Terrorists had struck before in south-western Nigeria. Also, criminal kidnappings on the highway had taken place, but not a mass school kidnapping. The Oyo State school kidnapping is the first in the southern parts of Nigeria. The lesson is that terrorism is expanding beyond the traditional areas known for activities of terrorist groups.

Another difference is that the victims included children as young as two years. Most previous Nigerian mass school abductions targeted older students.

The third is that it involved multiple schools. My contact in Ogbomosho said three schools were attacked.

This suggests the vulnerability of civilian populations and institutions in areas previously regarded as less exposed to terrorist kidnapping. The targeting of particular groups, especially schoolchildren and other populations whose abduction is likely to generate public pressure, also provides terrorists with a strategic advantage. Such attacks will be easy to execute by the group and can trigger public outrage, protests and demands for government action. They could put pressure on authorities to negotiate or make concessions.

Victims have now been “released” or “rescued”, most probably without concession to any of their demands, and some people linked to the incidents have been put on trial. But the ease with which the group carried out the attack exposes the vulnerability of the south-west and other non-traditional theatres of terrorist kidnapping to sudden attacks, particularly where security presence and response capacity remain limited.

Concentrating security in volatile areas may not be the solution, as terrorist groups will always take advantage of vulnerable areas.

What factors motivated this kidnap?

Criminal bandits and terrorists are responsible for most of the high-profile kidnapping incidents in Nigeria. However, while bandits kidnap mostly for money, terrorists mostly kidnap for more strategic reasons.

The 15 May 2026 armed attack against schools in Oriire Local Government of Oyo State, leading to the abduction of over 40 people, most of whom were pupils and teachers, was carried out by The Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa, popularly known as Ansaru. Since its breakaway from Boko Haram in 2013, Ansaru has acquired the trademark of being involved in high-profile kidnapping and hostage-taking, sometimes with the support of bandits.

Ansaru’s involvement in the Oyo State kidnapping was confirmed by the group’s demands. The group listed its demands as follows:

• 1 billion naira to be paid to one account in the Benin Republic

• the Oyo state government should release their members from prison

• Toyota Hiluxes

• concession of some Oyo state laws in favour of the bandits (land and sharia law).

The second item is particularly informative. In August 2025, Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s national security adviser, announced the arrest of two key Ansaru leaders – Mahmud Muhammad Usman, the amir (leader) and Mahmud al-Nigeri, the deputy and chief of staff.

They are currently standing trial on terrorism charges. For a long time, Ansaru remained silent due to the leadership vacuum left as a result. Their strategic importance made the group stage the Oyo kidnapping incidents.

In one of my previous articles, I warned that, given the importance of these two leaders, they might attempt to secure their release through a prison break or resort to a high-profile kidnapping or hostage-taking operation, either in retaliation for their detention or as leverage to demand their release.

What makes the south-west vulnerable to these kinds of attacks?

The choice of Oyo State and the kidnapping of pupils are also strategic. Oyo State is vulnerable because of its proximity to the North Central and North East through savannah woodlands, wildlife reserves and riparian vegetation.

Movement from North Central and North West to the south may also be caused by low security expectations and reduced military pressure there.

A reduction in expertise due to the arrest of Mahmud Muhammad Usman and Mahmud al-Nigeri also affected Ansaru’s operational effectiveness in high-intensity security terrain, making the south more attractive.

Ansaru usually targets high-value civilians, including expatriates, well-to-do individuals and humanitarian workers. They kidnapped schoolchildren because of their vulnerability and also because it can spark public outrage that may force the government to give concessions.

Does this incident have any implications for the ongoing debate on state policing in Nigeria?

According to the government account, the rescue of the schoolchildren and their teachers was achieved through a prolonged, intelligence-led, multi-agency operation. Although the outcome shows state security institutions can mount a coordinated response, it raises questions about whether such resource-intensive operations can be sustained and replicated in similar incidents.

More fundamentally, the operation illustrates the reactive character of the response. Security agencies mobilised resources after the abduction rather than preventing the attack or detecting the threat earlier. This is where the debate over the state police is very important. One of the major problems with Nigeria’s security landscape is the centralisation of the security apparatus, leaving the federating units at the mercy of the federal government to deploy security forces.

To reduce the vulnerability of civilians everywhere in Nigeria, the police institution should be federalised. This will ensure that a minimum level of protection exists for everyone, wherever they live in Nigeria.

– Nigeria’s school kidnapping threat is changing: 4 lessons from the 56-day Oyo attack
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-school-kidnapping-threat-is-changing-4-lessons-from-the-56-day-oyo-attack-289363

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alemayehu Fentaw Weldemariam, Ph.D. Fellow, Center for Constitutional Democracy, Indiana University

The Pretoria peace deal in Ethiopia was an agreement to cease hostilities. It wasn’t a comprehensive political settlement. A political settlement is an enduring agreement among powerful groups that delivers some benefits to avert conflict.

The Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front signed the Pretoria agreement in 2022. It stopped large-scale fighting in Tigray and created a framework for disarmament and other immediate measures. But it was also meant to pave the way for political dialogue addressing underlying disputes.

This political settlement would have restored Tigray’s self-rule through an elected regional government. It would have restored the region’s representation in Ethiopia’s two houses of parliament, and the federal executive and judiciary. Instead, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front was deregistered and Tigray was excluded from the June 2026 elections.

The Pretoria deal also required the withdrawal of Eritrean and other non-federal forces from Tigrayan territories. It called for accountability for alleged war crimes and other violations.

This broader settlement was never reached. The consequences are now becoming clear.

Fighting has resumed between government troops and Tigrayan forces, with air and drone strikes hitting the region. Seven armed organisations – including groups that fought one another during the 2020-2022 Tigray war – have formed an alliance seeking to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government.

Much of the international response to the escalation in conflict has focused on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. In late September 2026, for instance, US ambassador Ervin Massinga accused the front of making the

poor decision to launch a large-scale offensive.

He described the campaign as an “unwinnable fight”, and threatened further sanctions against the front and leaders of the newly formed armed alliance.

But focusing on who launched the latest offensive risks obscuring a more important question: why the peace process that ended the Tigray war in 2022 failed to prevent a return to conflict.

I am a constitutional scholar and country expert on Ethiopia, whose focus includes peacemaking and peacebuilding. In my view, the failure to move from the Pretoria agreement to a broader political settlement has had three major consequences:

• the emergence of an armed alliance connecting conflicts across several regions

• renewed attacks that risk further civilian casualties and mass displacement

• growing tensions with Eritrea that could draw Ethiopia’s conflicts into a wider regional confrontation.

Preventing a broader war in Ethiopia will, therefore, require more than a return to the Pretoria agreement. The country needs a comprehensive political settlement. This should be negotiated between Abiy’s leadership and anti-government forces – not just another bilateral agreement with Tigray.

The transition

The Pretoria agreement imposed military and political obligations on both the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan forces.

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front was to disarm. The federal government was to help remove the front’s terrorist designation, restore essential services in Tigray and enable humanitarian access. Federal authority was to return to Tigray.

Subsequent peace talks in Nairobi linked the handover of Tigray’s heavy weapons to the withdrawal of foreign and non-federal forces from Tigray.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s troubled history provides clues to why an all-out civil war is possible

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Tigrayan forces began surrendering heavy weapons in January 2023. An African Union monitoring team witnessed and confirmed this process. But the federal government did not secure the corresponding withdrawal of forces.

These failures don’t absolve Tigray’s leadership of some responsibility for the escalation in conflict. Its restoration of the pre-war regional administration went against the Pretoria agreement, which provided for an interim administration established through dialogue. It would govern until elections could be held under the supervision of the National Election Board. Further, reports of forced military mobilisation are serious.

But these actions occurred within a peace process already weakened by incomplete implementation.

The consequences

The formation of an anti-government coalition changes the environment. The Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival includes the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, the Oromo Liberation Army, Amhara Fano elements and organisations from other regions. Some of these groups previously fought one another.

The alliance doesn’t mean Abiy’s government is about to collapse. The federal state retains the army, air power, drones, federal revenues and the machinery of government.

But the alliance doesn’t need a common ideology or unified battlefield command to create problems for the federal government. Coordination of operations across regions could be enough.

Escalation in Tigray could draw federal forces northward. Fighting in Amhara might absorb forces and obstruct access to the north. Pressure in Oromia might require the government to defend approaches to the capital and major transport corridors.

Each front can, therefore, affect the others even if the alliance’s forces never fight side by side.

The immediate challenge for the federal government is the dispersion of forces across distant conflicts with different terrain, supply lines and political dynamics.

Renewed air and drone attacks raise the danger of another humanitarian crisis, too. Tigray is still recovering from the 2020-2022 war. Escalation risks civilian casualties, displacement and disruption to humanitarian assistance.

The Eritrea and Sudan question

Eritrea’s role in the latest escalation in conflict remains disputed. Ethiopia accuses Asmara of supporting armed groups. Eritrea denies it.

Abiy and other senior Ethiopian officials have also repeatedly said they must have access to the Red Sea. Talk of the Eritrean port of Assab has been understood in Eritrea as a threat. Assab is part of Eritrea’s internationally recognised territory. Any attempt to acquire it by force would violate Eritrean sovereignty.

The conflict could also become entangled with Sudan’s war. According to a Reuters report, Ethiopia hosts a camp used to train paramilitary fighters for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. Ethiopia has denied involvement. It instead accuses Sudan’s armed forces of supporting the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Sudan denies this.

If these alignments harden, the Ethiopian and Sudanese conflicts could provide one another with weapons supply routes. They could also supply recruits, rear bases and external support. This raises the risk of conflict extending from Sudan through northern Ethiopia towards Eritrea and the Red Sea.

What next?

The immediate priorities are ending attacks on populated areas and protecting humanitarian corridors. Independent monitoring must also be restored and outstanding security obligations completed.

Another bilateral bargain between Addis Ababa and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front would be inadequate. The conflict now connects armed movements and political grievances across several regions.

Preventing a wider war requires a comprehensive agreement that involves the federal government, the alliance of armed groups, non-armed political actors and civil society. It must address territorial disputes, political representation, elections, accountability, regional autonomy, constitutional reform and the distribution of power.

Pretoria stopped one phase of one war. Its incomplete implementation left unresolved disputes that are now colliding.

– Ethiopia’s peace deal is unravelling – what went wrong with the Tigray agreement
– https://theconversation.com/ethiopias-peace-deal-is-unravelling-what-went-wrong-with-the-tigray-agreement-293005