Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nina Wilén, Associate Professor, Lund University

Several of Mali’s major cities experienced coordinated attacks in April by a new coalition of jihadists and separatist groups.

As the coalition took over the town of Kidal in the north of Mali, images of Russian troops being escorted out of the town after negotiations were cabled out across global media.

Russia, now in the shape of Africa Corps and previously the Wagner Group, has been the Malian military’s external security partner since the beginning of 2022. It replaced French and European troops from the counter-terrorism operation Barkhane and Taskforce Takuba. France had deployed a force of 5,000 troops from 2014 to 2022. European special forces numbered 1,000 between 2020 and 2022. Both missions were forced to leave as relations between France and the Malian junta grew tense.

The strategic realignment, from western and multilateral forces to Russian troops, expanded in the region. In Burkina Faso, which experienced two coups in 2022, the French troops were expelled at the start of 2023, as 200 Russian troops moved in.

In the summer of 2023, the Malian authorities also kicked out the decade-old 13,000-strong UN peacekeeping mission. Niger’s junta, which took power the same year, followed suit and expelled the EU’s operations in the country six months later, before accepting a few hundred Russian troops.

During the past decade I have researched external security interventions in the Sahel and analysed their justifications, development on the ground, and consequences for political and security environments.

I conclude from my research that the external interventions have not stabilised the region. More than a decade after the first major interventions, the Sahel is more fragmented, militarised and violent than before.

Yet the persistence of insecurity also serves political purposes.

For military juntas, the jihadist threat justifies continued rule and repression. For Russia, the region has become a showcase for anti-western influence and security partnerships in Africa. For western actors, jihadist expansion, migration concerns and fears of regional instability are used as reasons for security engagement despite repeated failures.

The complex interactions between these actors have resulted in a continuous, strategic circle of violence, where civilians are the first victims.

On the ground

On the ground, interventions have often evolved in unpredictable ways through ad hoc decisions and informal interactions between local and external actors.

For example, they have shared logistical and medical assistance and intelligence.

More broadly, the external interventions strengthened militaries as political actors, reinforcing an already biased civil-military balance across the region.

“Security in the Sahel” became the moniker that framed the western and multilateral interventions in the region from 2013 onwards. Improving the capacities, capabilities and professionalism of the national security forces became the official objectives of these interventions, closely linked to the broader aim of defeating the jihadist insurgencies.

Framing the intersecting crises in the Sahel as a security issue also meant that security actors had the task of resolving it. The importance, status and budgets of the national militaries thus increased as the security situation deteriorated. A heavily tilted civil-military imbalance was the result.

As military officers took over power through coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, a strategic realignment towards Russia began, to maintain military rule.

The Russian Wagner group allowed the newly installed juntas to entrench their power, while “deprofessionalising” the forces through harassment, attacks and massacres of civilians.

Research shows for example that civilian targeting accounted for 71% of the Wagner Group’s involvement in political violence in Mali between December 2021 and July 2022. This strategy of attacking civilians has made recruitment easier for jihadist groups. They could increase their ranks by exploiting grievances.

The latest attacks in Mali in April 2026 demonstrate the military junta’s failure, together with its Russian security partners, to contain the jihadist groups’ expansion.

They also reveal that Russia is in the country mainly to keep the military junta in power. Assimi Goïta, Mali’s military leader, reconfirmed the partnership with Russia after the attacks in spite of their failure on the battlefield.

The military leader needs regime maintenance more than ever, and the Russians need to be in the country for continued geopolitical influence on the African continent.

Conclusion

The result is that while all external actors claim to fight instability, the current regional order depends on continuing insecurity.

Stabilisation risks becoming less about resolving conflict than about managing insecurity in ways that sustain regimes, partnerships and geopolitical influence.

Foreign interventions, in combination with national actors’ ambitions, have helped to transform the region into a space of militarised regime survival, jihadist expansion and geopolitical competition between Russia and western democracies.

As military approaches have repeatedly proven insufficient to solve the intersecting crises in the Sahel, pressured military juntas may now be forced to negotiate with jihadist groups. That is likely to result in new, hybrid spaces of power and governance.

– The Sahel region is less secure than ever: foreign forces just add to the cycle of violence
– https://theconversation.com/the-sahel-region-is-less-secure-than-ever-foreign-forces-just-add-to-the-cycle-of-violence-282917

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lisette IJssel de Schepper, Chief Economist Bureau for Economic Research, Stellenbosch University

It is forgivable to think that an oil shock mainly hurts at the petrol pump. After all, that is where households feel it first. But when my colleagues and I at the Bureau for Economic Research started digging through South Africa’s fuel data, a different story emerged – one that says as much about the country’s infrastructure failures as it does about global geopolitics.

As we began modelling the likely impact on the South African economy, it quickly became clear that diesel would inflict even more pain on the economy than petrol. (Our insights are based on ongoing analysis that has not yet been published.)

There are two reasons for this.

Firstly, diesel underpins the South African economy’s cost structure. It powers the systems that keep the economy functioning: freight transport, food distribution, mining operations, agricultural machinery, generators and large parts of the country’s logistics network. Higher diesel prices therefore raise the cost of transporting goods, distributing food, operating mines and running backup generators during electricity disruptions.

This means the dominant economic impact of the Gulf war on South Africa is not simply that households are paying more at the pump. The impact is also being felt through higher logistics, freight and operating costs as they feed through supply chains into broader inflation.

Secondly, the price of diesel has spiked markedly more than the price for petrol. Relative to the first quarter of 2026, diesel prices in the second quarter increased by almost 60%, compared with about 25% for petrol.

Our calculations suggest that higher fuel prices could add roughly R45 billion (US$2.7billion) – just over 2% of quarterly GDP spend – in additional fuel costs to the South African economy in the second quarter of 2026 alone. Nearly 70% of that additional cost burden would come from diesel rather than petrol.

The main conclusion we draw from our insights is that South Africa needs to fix its fundamentals and shore up buffers so that it is better placed to withstand external shocks when they strike.

South Africa’s shift in fuel consumption

To understand why diesel matters so much today, it is important to recognise how fuel consumption has changed.

Over the past two decades, diesel consumption has steadily overtaken petrol consumption in the South African economy.

In 2005, petrol accounted for close to half of total fuel consumption, while diesel accounted for roughly a third (see figure below). Today, diesel accounts for almost half of all fuel consumed nationally, while petrol’s share has declined steadily.

Part of the explanation is relatively benign. Petrol vehicles have become significantly more fuel-efficient over time, allowing households to travel further on less fuel. Weak household income growth, higher fuel prices and expensive vehicle financing have also constrained discretionary driving and slowed petrol demand growth.

Diesel, however, is different. Diesel is primarily an operational input into the economy rather than a form of discretionary consumption. As such, its increased use reflects deeper structural changes in the South African economy:

• More freight has shifted to roads and trucks as the state-owned transport monopoly Transnet’s rail capacity has deteriorated. These freight trucks run on diesel.

• Use of diesel accelerated sharply during the severe power-cut years between 2022 and 2024. This was particularly evident in businesses in the mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors as well as hospitals, shopping centres and data centres. All have increasingly come to rely on diesel generators to keep operating.

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Read more: Does South Africa have a future without power cuts? Ramaphosa intervenes, but the drama isn’t over

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During the worst periods of load-shedding in 2023, Eskom relied heavily on diesel-fired open-cycle gas turbines to help keep the lights on when the coal fleet failed. At times, Eskom’s diesel usage was estimated to account for 20%-30% of national diesel demand. Fortunately, that dependence has eased considerably as electricity supply stabilised and diesel-fired open-cycle gas turbines usage declined.

Still, diesel has quietly become South Africa’s shadow infrastructure system – the fuel that has compensated for failures elsewhere in the economy, from electricity generation to freight transport.

This means South Africa’s vulnerability to oil shocks cannot be easily remedied just by getting consumers to ditch their fossil fuel-guzzling SUVs in favour of electric vehicles. Vulnerability is embedded in the diesel-intensive systems that move goods, power operations, and keep the economy running.

The impact

South Africa has always been vulnerable to oil shocks because it imports virtually all of its crude oil. But the nature of that vulnerability has changed. As domestic refining capacity has declined as several domestic refineries closed between 2020 and 2023, fuel (rather than crude) imports have increased. This means South Africa has become exposed not only to higher oil prices, but also to disruptions in global fuel supply chains themselves.

This creates the risk that external and domestic shocks will begin to reinforce one another. A global fuel disruption on its own is painful but manageable. But fuel stress becomes considerably more destabilising.

The impact is likely to be felt in a number of ways.

Firstly, in the country’s agricultural sector. South Africa is unlikely to face an immediate food supply crisis as domestic agricultural production conditions remain relatively favourable. Nor is there an immediate risk of food inflation as consumer food inflation began moderating earlier this year, supported by ample supplies of grains, fruits and vegetables.

Nevertheless, the sector will be affected. Fuel accounts for a substantial share of food distribution costs in South Africa’s highly road-dependent transport system. Wandile Sihlobo, chief economist of the Agriculture Business Chamber of South Africa, notes that roughly 80% of South African grain is transported by road. Higher diesel prices, therefore, feed directly into the cost of moving food across the country.

Farming is also highly diesel intensive. In addition, fertiliser prices have spiked as a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. These price hikes will squeeze margins across farming and food distribution long before they fully appear in supermarket prices.

Farmers may also lose important export markets. The Gulf states, together with Iraq and Iran, are important destinations for South African fruit and meat exports, much of which moves through shipping routes linked to the Strait of Hormuz.

The second major impact will be on the government’s finances.

In April 2026, the government introduced temporary fuel levy relief of R3 per litre (or $0.18/litre), before extending and expanding the support specifically to diesel. By May, diesel levy relief had effectively increased to R3.93 per litre ($0.24/litre), temporarily reducing the general fuel levy on diesel to zero.

The total relief provided between April and June is expected to cost the fiscus roughly R17.2 billion in forgone tax revenue. Since this exceeds the roughly R10 billion contingency reserve available in the current budget, the fiscal cost will need to be absorbed either through stronger-than-expected revenue or expenditure adjustments elsewhere.

The third area of impact is inflation. The cost of fuel shapes inflation expectations because it is highly visible and purchased frequently. Even temporary fuel spikes therefore risk de-anchoring inflation expectations. This is particularly important in the South African economy, where the Reserve Bank has spent several years cementing its credibility to aid the move to a lower inflation target. This depends on inflation expectations continuing to fall towards 3%.

This helps explain why policymakers are concerned not only about fuel prices themselves, but also about the possibility that higher fuel costs may become embedded in broader pricing behaviour and wage expectations.

The bigger lesson: resilience matters

South Africa did not consciously choose to become more diesel dependent. It happened gradually, one workaround at a time. It spent years building diesel into its coping mechanisms. When rail failed, the country used trucks. When electricity failed, it used generators and open cycle gas turbines.

Those adaptations kept the economy moving, but they also quietly increased South Africa’s exposure to global fuel shocks.

The lesson from the current crisis is, therefore, not simply that oil prices are volatile. It is that resilience matters – just not the kind of home-grown resilience which depends on costly workarounds just to keep the lights on and the goods moving.

– Iran war is exposing South Africa’s dependency on diesel: what went wrong
– https://theconversation.com/iran-war-is-exposing-south-africas-dependency-on-diesel-what-went-wrong-283516

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marew Abebe Salemot, Researcher in Political Sciences and International Studies, Debark University

When conflicts break out, most people around the world rely on international media to understand what is happening. These reports do more than inform. They shape how crises are interpreted, which actors are seen as responsible and where global attention is directed.

In complex situations, what is left out can matter as much as what is included.

Ethiopia is a clear example of this problem. Since 2020, the country has experienced multiple, overlapping conflicts.

The war in Tigray (2020-2022) has been one of the most widely reported, drawing sustained global attention because of its scale and humanitarian impact. But at the same time, violence has broken out and continues in Ethiopia’s Amhara and Oromia regions, causing severe consequences for civilians and deepening regional instability.

Our research set out to understand how these conflicts, which targeted ethnic groups, have been reported by the international media, and how the media understand the country’s current complex crises. As a team of media scholars, we analysed news coverage from four major global outlets – BBC from Britain, CNN from the US, Al-Jazeera from Qatar, and CGTN from China – over a five-year period from January 2020 to March 2025. We collected 1,412 stories from the four outlets on Ethiopia’s complex conflict.

To further assess how they frame the conflict and the nature of their reporting, 60 stories were systematically selected from each media outlet, yielding a total sample of 240 conflict-related articles. This allowed us to track patterns in attention, framing and sourcing.

We found that the coverage tended to present Ethiopia’s crisis through a narrow lens, centred largely on one conflict: the Tigray war.

More than three-quarters (77.2%) of all the stories we analysed focused on the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Conflicts in Amhara (at 2.7%) and Oromia (at 0.4%) appeared only marginally in coverage.

This risks producing a partial understanding of a much more complex reality.

Ethiopia’s conflicts are not easily reduced to a single narrative. They involve multiple actors, regions and historical trajectories. Capturing this complexity is challenging, but it is essential. When global media coverage is too narrow, it risks shaping responses that address only part of the problem.

Based on our findings, we recommend that there needs to be a more balanced approach to reporting. Secondly, a greater emphasis must be placed on context, which would include explanations of the historical and political background of conflicts.

A more comprehensive approach would not only improve understanding. It would also contribute to more informed and balanced international engagement with one of the most important and complex regions in Africa today. This matters because Ethiopia is a key player in the Horn of Africa. Instability here has implications for regional security and international diplomacy.

Our findings

Our analysis revealed three major trends in the media coverage of conflict in Ethiopia.

The first was that the Tigray conflict received significantly more media attention than other conflicts in the country. The war, which began in November 2020 between Ethiopian federal forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, drew widespread international attention because of its scale. The conflict was marked by mass atrocities, civilian displacement and famine conditions. An estimated 800,000 civilians were killed.

Although violence persists across several regions – particularly Amhara and Oromia – the war in Tigray dominated reporting, accounting for 77.2% of total news coverage. This means conflicts were not subjected to the same level of scrutiny or narrative. Humanitarian suffering in Amhara and Oromia was far less visible in our dataset. This does not mean it was absent on the ground. Rather, it suggests that some forms of suffering were more likely to be reported than others.

Second was a lack of context. We identified what we term “episodic reporting”. Around two-thirds of the stories we analysed focused on immediate events – including military clashes, political statements or humanitarian emergencies – without providing much background or context. This meant that complex political dynamics were often reduced to simplified narratives. Long-standing tensions related to governance, federalism, identity and power were rarely explored in detail. Instead, the focus remained on visible crises and urgent developments.

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Read more: Ethiopia’s national dialogue was meant to heal the nation, but divisions are deepening

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Third, that coverage was predominantly negative towards the Ethiopian government. Sources critical of the government were used far more frequently than those offering alternative perspectives. While critical reporting is an essential part of journalism, the imbalance in sourcing suggests that some voices were amplified more than others.

The implications

This imbalance in the reporting has broader implications. Media coverage plays a significant role in shaping international agendas.

Media reports could assist policymakers, humanitarian organisations and international institutions to assess crises and determine priorities. In this regard, the Tigray war alone was discussed over 10 times at the UN Security Council.

In this sense, visibility can translate into political and humanitarian action. Conversely, conflicts that receive limited coverage may not attract the same level of concern.

What needs to be done

Improving this situation requires a number of steps.

Firstly, a more balanced approach to reporting is needed. International media need to widen their scope and pay closer attention to underreported conflicts. This does not mean reducing coverage of major crises, but rather ensuring that other significant developments are not overlooked.

Secondly, context needs to be given. Explaining the historical and political background of conflicts can help audiences understand not just what is happening, but why. Without this context, reporting risks reinforcing simplified narratives that do not capture the full picture.

Thirdly, audiences themselves play a role. Recognising that media coverage is selective can encourage more critical engagement with news. Seeking out multiple sources and perspectives can help build a more nuanced understanding of complex situations.

– Global media networks simplify Ethiopia’s conflicts: insights from 5 years of data
– https://theconversation.com/global-media-networks-simplify-ethiopias-conflicts-insights-from-5-years-of-data-282776

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

Mali and Nigeria, two of the countries in the Sahel region of west Africa, are separated by approximately 1,000 kilometres, with the Niger Republic between them. They differ in population size and government, but they face some of the same threats.

Mali has a population of about 22.4 million, while Nigeria has about 223.8 million. While Nigeria has been a democracy since 1999, Mali has had a military government since 2020.

The two are similar in that they are threatened by multiple armed groups operating in their territories.

Three armed groups – Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP/ISGS), Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) – are shaping the conflict in Mali.

This reached a new high in April 2026 when Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and the Azawad Liberation Front carried out coordinated attacks across Mali.

The northern cities of Kidal and Mopti, as well as military bases in Sevare and Gao, were captured. The heart of Bamako, the capital city of Mali, was also struck, leading to the death of the defence minister, Sadio Camara.

Nigeria too has been threatened by jihadist insurgence and banditry in the north as well as secessionists and militancy in the south. Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) are active in the north.

Nigeria lost two brigadier generals fighting the insurgents in the north-east between November 2025 and April 2026.

The weakness of the state plays a significant role in the vulnerability of both countries to attacks. As a scholar who has followed the unfolding events in the Sahel, I draw lessons for Nigeria from the April attacks in Mali.

Those lessons include the possibility of alignment among armed groups, the danger of the jihadists advancing to other Sahelian countries, the audacity of the groups, and the possibility that gains of JNIM in Mali could incite rival groups in Nigeria.

Key lessons for Nigeria

The first lesson concerns armed groups teaming up to fight the state. The April attackers were a combined force of FLA and JNIM. These groups share a common aim: securing enclaves within Mali. They joined efforts to carry out the attacks, each focusing on the areas they wished to control.

In the same vein, Nigeria has battled many armed groups. Competition, rather than cooperation, has defined the relationship between these groups, especially in northern Nigeria. This has always been to the advantage of the Nigerian state. The erstwhile charismatic leader of terror group Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, survived for more than a decade but died during clashes between his group, JAS and ISWAP members.

This led to a decline in Boko Haram’s activities, although they are now gradually resurging.

However, there is evidence of an unfolding alliance between terrorists in the north-east and bandits in the north-central and north-west areas of Nigeria. Such alliance have often been in terms of tactical cooperation as well as exchange of members and arms.

There is also a possibility of closing ranks and joining forces between Boko Haram and ISWAP, especially if leaders who favour working together with ISWAP take over Boko Haram from Bakura Doro, the current leader of JAS, after the death of Abukakar Shekau. If this happens, it may escalate terrorist activities that may be difficult for Nigeria to manage.

The second lesson is that the audacity of the JNIM/FLA coalition and the results achieved can motivate related groups to act in other parts of the Sahel. The al-Qaeda-linked and ISIS-linked terrorist groups have been involved in a competition for control of the Sahel for a long period.

This comes in the form of direct armed attacks against each other, competition over territory and recruiting, and attempting to demonstrate the ability to cause more violence than the other. This has led to an increase in jihadist attacks.

JNIM’s takeover of some cities in Mali may encourage its ISIS-affiliated rivals in the Greater Sahara and Lake Chad to also increase their violence.

In the Lake Chad Region, ISWAP has intensified attacks against military formations while also building parallel states in many areas of the Lake Chad basin, with Nigeria being the most affected.

Lastly, with the capture of Kidal and attacks near Bamako, JNIM may be close to capturing Mali. If Mali falls, it could be a training ground for terrorists in the Sahel. This fear was the reason Nigeria mobilised its forces for a peacekeeping mission in Mali in 2012. And if Mali falls, Burkina Faso and Niger will be threatened.

The threat to Niger is a significant problem because it is a buffer zone for Nigeria. Meanwhile Nigeria is a major target of the jihadist insurgents in their move to extend towards coastal west Africa.

What should Nigeria do?

Mali’s experience could turn the lens on Nigeria. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have opted out of the Economic Community of West African States, Ecowas. But Nigeria and other countries in the region should not abandon the breakaway states at this stage. Necessary regional support should be galvanised and Nigeria can still play a leading role in this.

In my view, Nigeria also needs to rejig its counter-terrorism to be more responsive. Rather than its current defensive posture, which gives jihadists the opportunity to plan, Nigeria ought to adopt sophisticated and strategic offensive counter-terrorism that takes the war to the jihadists.

– Mali’s security crisis holds warnings for Nigeria: here’s why
– https://theconversation.com/malis-security-crisis-holds-warnings-for-nigeria-heres-why-282180

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Herkulaas MvE Combrink, Senior lecturer/ Co-Director, University of the Free State

Misleading information online is often treated as a technical glitch, something that better algorithms or stricter moderation can fix. But research points to a more complex reality. That is, the rise of “misfluencers”, individuals who shape how information is interpreted, shared and trusted across digital platforms.

Whether acting deliberately or not, they tap into emotion, identity and community to amplify misleading claims in ways that feel credible and relatable. This human layer makes misinformation harder to detect and regulate. It’s a danger when it comes to everyday decisions about important topics like health, finance and technology. Understanding how misfluencers operate is key to navigating an information environment where trust is increasingly contested.

Herkulaas MvE Combrink is a co-director at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Digital Futures, senior lecturer in Economics and Management Sciences at the UFS, and the head of the Knowledge Mapping Lab, a research group to manage infodemics and human language technology innovation.

Phelokazi Mkungeka is an interdisciplinary researcher with a background in sociology, specialising in artificial intelligence and health misinformation in digital environments.

They’ve explored the interplay between AI, misfluencers and health communication.

What exactly is a ‘misfluencer’, and how do they differ from traditional influencers?

A misfluencer is an individual who shapes how information is interpreted, trusted, and acted upon within a network. Misfluencers fuel the spread of misinformation by being perceived as a trustworthy source of information that people within their social network latch onto.

Traditional influencers typically aim to promote products, lifestyles, or ideas with clear intent. Often, these are within commercial or branding frameworks marketing a specific product, for example.

Sources of misinformation, on the other hand, are usually defined by the content itself. They are people who share false or misleading information.

During the COVID-19 health crisis, for example, some people on social media without any scientific or medical training unintentionally endorsed medications that were not approved.

Their relatability also makes their content feel credible, even when it is not accurate.

Misfluencers often speak from a point of perceived authenticity, shared identity, or community belonging, rather than formal expertise. They may have a strong opinion about something that is either sensational or topical at that point in time – a new discovery, a crisis, a political campaign, even a new technology.

Misfluencers amplify misinformed ideas or constructs, which become part of the dialogue within digital domains. It is not always on purpose.

Why are misfluencers so influential?

In an age where online influence shapes reality, the question is no longer what is true, but whether truth can still compete. Complex ideas (like a new vaccine) are full of terminology and concepts that the everyday person may not understand.

Misfluencers often take complex ideas and distil them into an understandable narrative for most people. They are effective because they operate on the level of meaning, not just information. They create a sense of coherence, even when the underlying content is misleading. In many cases, the narrative “feels right” before it is evaluated as true or false. People then tend to latch onto these ideas. Another example is the social media conspiracy theories that emerged during the 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns.

Information shared within networks is more likely to be accepted and repeated, reinforcing its perceived validity.

Do misfluencers act intentionally?

While some individuals may deliberately spread misleading information for ideological, financial or social gain, many others do so unintentionally.

You can think of it as a type of intellectual broken telephone. The way the initial message is comprehended changes over time as it is told and reframed, leaving out key details that distort the intellectual meaning just enough to be misinformed. Algorithmic systems further complicate this. Content that generates engagement is more likely to be promoted by online algorithms, regardless of its accuracy.

This can elevate individuals into influential positions without deliberate intent. Understanding misfluencers therefore requires moving beyond the idea of “bad actors” and recognising the systemic and social processes that enable ordinary users to participate in the spread of misleading information.

What can be done about it?

Addressing misfluencers requires a shift from content control to context awareness. Simply removing or flagging harmful information is often insufficient, as it does not address why the information is persuasive. Individuals should be critical rather than passively consuming “information”.

One idea is to place a Social Stress Indicator and a Credibility score on online conversations, specifically in public chatrooms and social media platforms. A Social Stress Indicator is a type of digital thermometer that can flag conversations once the social stress reaches a certain threshold. Social stress is an indicator that can measure potential statements or conversations that may escalate into online arguments, typically centred around sensitive conversations or around topics that may be considered provocative. These conversations may then in turn trigger negative sentiment, which can then be tracked online.

Another important societal call to action is to improve digital literacy. Digital literacy needs to move beyond fact-checking towards interpretive awareness. In other words, people need to become more critical about the information they consider correct because information is being generated faster than it can be verified. When this happens, we have an infodemic – the perfect environment for misinformation to arise and for misfluencing to happen. Interventions should focus on slowing down the spread of potentially harmful narratives rather than censoring them outright. The reason is that there may be legitimate concerns within conversations that contain misinformation, and it is important to address these concerns, otherwise the misinformation will continue.

For policymakers, the challenge is to find a balance between protecting freedom of expression and ensuring accountability when harmful or misleading information spreads online. This does not necessarily mean stricter censorship. Instead, it can involve practical measures such as requiring greater transparency around sponsored content, supporting independent fact checking, improving digital literacy, and creating clear rules for how social media platforms respond to harmful misinformation.

For example, governments can encourage platforms to label manipulated content, provide context on health claims, or make data available to researchers studying how information spreads. During public health crises, partnerships between universities, health departments and technology companies can also help identify harmful narratives early and improve public communication.

Better tools are needed to measure influence and harm. Policymakers need reliable indicators that can show when online conversations begin to shape risky behaviour, distrust, or confusion at scale. Building these measures will require much more research and collaboration between scientists, public health experts, and technology sectors.

The goal is not to silence people or eliminate misfluencers. It is to create healthier information environments where influence is balanced by trustworthy information, context and accountability. In a world where online voices increasingly shape what people believe, the future may depend not only on who speaks the loudest, but on how society helps people make sense of what they hear.

– What are misfluencers and what can be done about false information online?
– https://theconversation.com/what-are-misfluencers-and-what-can-be-done-about-false-information-online-282072

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Catriona Macleod, Professor of Psychology, Rhodes University

A series of conferences held in Entebbe, Uganda, between 2023 and 2025 have resulted in a draft African Charter on Family, Sovereignty and Values. The meetings were organised by the Inter-parliamentary Network on African Sovereignty and Values, which organises continental conferences for African legislators and faith-based advocates. Supported by international conservative groups like Family Watch International and heavily promoted by Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, the aim of the drafters of the charter is to convince African governments to sign on to it.

The draft charter is situated within the current global movement to the right, which prioritises nationalism, tougher immigration policies and an erosion of social values like gender equity. Framed as an effort to “protect” the family, it urges governments to adopt a series of regressive measures.

These include:

• opposing comprehensive sexuality education

• rejecting the sexual and reproductive health and rights agenda, especially abortion (under any circumstance)

• establishing African “sovereignty” over health, food, education and economic development

• preserving African cultural values, traditions and the role of elders.

Several legal responses have been set out by African rights institutions, such as Afya Na Haki. These show the clash of many of the draft charter’s proposals with continental legal provisions.

We are researchers with extensive experience in sexual and reproductive health and rights. Here, we address the inaccuracies contained in the charter. We are particularly concerned about the implications if it is adopted.

Decades of scientific evidence produced on the African continent and elsewhere suggest that the measures, if adopted, will cause significant harm.

Reproductive health and rights

The draft charter declares, among other things, that African countries shouldn’t ratify any agreements that reference sexual and reproductive health and rights. It also calls for eliminating comprehensive sexuality education and any form of abortion service provision.

At a very basic level, disregarding sexual and reproductive health undermines obstetric and gynaecological care, childbirth and fertility treatments. It also affects the prevention and treatment of HIV and sexually transmitted infections. It harms access to contraceptive services and family planning, as well as reproductive cancer care. No African country would sensibly contemplate this.

Additionally, the draft falsely claims that the sexual and reproductive health rights “agenda” promotes abortion on demand. Yet, the UN’s definition of “reproductive health” encompasses comprehensive abortion care within countries’ legal frameworks.

The draft charter encourages states to define all related terms to clearly exclude any rights to abortion. No exceptions are specified. This would include cases where the pregnant person’s life is at risk, as well as pregnancies resulting from rape or incest.

This stance contradicts understandings of abortion within African countries. A 2025 survey conducted across 38 African countries found that nearly two-thirds (63%) of citizens say abortion is justified if the woman’s health or life is at risk. Nearly half (48%) justified abortion in the case of rape or incest.

The draft also flies in the face of recent changes in African law. Globally, Africa, compared with other regions, has had the largest number of countries liberalising abortion laws since 1994.

Implementing the draft charter would additionally lead to a significant increase in maternal mortality from unsafe abortions. It’s important to note that the proportion of unwanted and unsupportable pregnancies that end in abortion is consistently similar across countries with liberal or restrictive abortion laws. This means that restrictive laws don’t reduce abortion rates. They merely drive abortion underground, rendering it unsafe.

Already, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 29% of the global unsafe abortions and 62% of abortion-related deaths. Further restrictions on comprehensive abortion care (including post-abortion care) would drive up maternal morbidity and mortality.

Comprehensive sexuality education

The draft charter argues for abstinence-focused sexuality education. It falsely claims that comprehensive education would sexualise African children, undermine their innocence and violate parental rights.

Comprehensive sexuality education is a curriculum-based, scientifically accurate process of teaching and learning about the cognitive, emotional, physical and social aspects of sexuality. It encourages abstinence but also provides teaching, in an age-appropriate manner, on contraception and ways to avoid sexual risks. These risks include infections and unplanned pregnancies.

Research conducted over three decades indicates that comprehensive sexuality education provides more positive outcomes than abstinence-based sexuality education. These outcomes include reducing early and unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV). It also helps delay early initiation of sexual activity and reduces intimate partner violence.

In claiming that comprehensive sexuality education undermines children’s innocence, the draft charter conflates “innocence” with ignorance. Children have a natural curiosity regarding sexual issues once they reach puberty. They will seek out information where they can (including social media). One of the ways of protecting them from sex-related harms is to empower them with age-appropriate knowledge about sexual issues. And the skills to avoid sexual risks.

Comprehensive sexuality education also recognises that parents often struggle with talking to their children about sexual matters. It therefore offers an important source of trustworthy information for children and adolescents. Further, while the family is of pre-eminent importance in society, it can also be the site of child abuse, child neglect and intimate partner violence.

Definition of family

Finally, the draft charter defines the family as based on marriage between a man and a woman. This definition of family as nuclear and heterosexual is not an originally African one.

In precolonial Africa, the practice of polygyny/polyandry was prevalent. This presented a clear contrast to the nuclear, monogamous model. In reality, family structures are highly diverse in Africa. They include many multigenerational, single-parent, re-constituted and same-sex parent families.

The draft charter dresses up its provisions in the language of ubuntu. This is a relational, inclusive and dynamic ethical philosophy. In doing so, it distorts the essence of ubuntu by converting this philosophy into a rigid, exclusionary and state-focused ideology.

What next

The draft charter threatens to undermine the rule of law and the shared legal principles that underpin the international treaty system. It claims to defend African sovereignty.

But true sovereignty means honouring the treaties governments have freely adopted. These include the Maputo Protocol, which guarantees women extensive rights, including reproductive health choices and protection from violence. The African Children’s Charter similarly enshrines children’s rights to protection, development and well-being.

The draft charter is not defence of African values. It’s a legal coup against them. It should be dismissed outright by all African governments.

– A draft African charter on ‘family values’ is on the cards: why it’s flawed and dangerous
– https://theconversation.com/a-draft-african-charter-on-family-values-is-on-the-cards-why-its-flawed-and-dangerous-282423

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abeer Elshater, Professor of Urban Morphology, Ain Shams University

Generative AI (GenAI) is a type of artificial intelligence that creates new content – like text, images, or ideas – by learning patterns from existing data. GenAI, particularly through large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT and DeepSeek, is rapidly becoming part of everyday urban design research and practice.

The models can summarise literature in seconds, generate policy scenarios, and help draft complex narratives.

For urban designers and researchers working under pressure, this feels like a breakthrough. But beneath this efficiency lies a deeper question: are we enhancing urban design knowledge, or quietly reshaping it in ways we do not fully understand?

Urban design is an academic and professional field concerned with shaping the physical form and experience of cities. It looks at the relationships between buildings, spaces, people and activities within broader urban systems.

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Read more: AI could make cities autonomous, but that doesn’t mean we should let it happen

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The field has evolved differently across regions, reflecting diverse historical, political and spatial contexts. For example, in Europe, urban design has often been shaped by post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation of the destroyed urban forms, while in the United States it has been influenced by urban renewal policies and large-scale redevelopment. Urban design is not a fixed set of principles, but a context-dependent theory and practice that responds to specific local challenges and conditions.

GenAI is now widely used in urban design to help with analysis and decision-making. For instance, researchers use machine learning to study pedestrian movement and traffic patterns from video data, which helps planners create safer and more efficient streets.

Some studies use GenAI to create and test different urban design options, such as changing land use, building density, or access to green spaces, so designers can quickly compare choices. In environmental planning, GenAI models can simulate urban heat or air quality, helping with climate-sensitive decisions. These examples show that GenAI provides ways to test ideas and handle complex challenges, rather than replacing designers.

Our work as urban designers and researchers has always depended on interpretation, context and ethical judgment. Cities are not just datasets; they are lived environments shaped by history, culture and power. When LLMs enter this space, they influence how problems are framed and how solutions are imagined. Their use therefore should not be just technical, but should be managed critically. Each theory developed for a particular city or place evolved to address the needs of specific groups of people within a distinct context and for a particular purpose. LLMs need to be developed faster to have this sensitivity about people and place history.

Our recent research was motivated by the rapid and often uncritical integration of LLMs into planning research and practice. The work asks a central question: how do these tools reshape the way urban knowledge is produced, interpreted and validated in a discipline that depends heavily on context, judgment and field-based understanding?

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Read more: Debate: How to stop our cities from being turned into AI jungles

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Our key finding is that LLMs can be very helpful; they can speed up writing, support analysis and help explore ideas. However, they also carry important risks, especially when their outputs are treated as fully correct or used without considering context.

We propose some cornerstones for responsible use. These are not strict rules, but practical guides to keep human judgment central, ensure ideas stay grounded in context, and maintain responsibility in planning research and practice.

10 cornerstones

1. Research sovereignty should remain with the human. The direction of inquiry must always come from the researcher. If planners begin by asking the model what to study or how to frame a problem, they risk producing inconsistency and generic outputs.

2. Engagement with GenAI is critical, not passive. LLMs generate plausible text based on patterns, not verified truth. This means every output should be tested and refined. Accepting it at face value risks embedding hidden biases and weak assumptions.

3. Knowledge should be grounded in context. Cities are deeply specific. A recommendation that works in one place may fail in another due to social, political, or cultural differences. LLMs tend to produce generalised solutions without understanding local realities. Planners must anchor these suggestions in field knowledge and community insight.

4. Everyone should be careful. They should not trust GenAI too quickly. In planning debates such as zoning or rent control, LLMs can sound very confident, even when they are wrong. Sometimes they may even give references that do not exist. This can spread incorrect information and weaken trust in research.

5. While any of the LLMs can assist in identifying and organising sources, they cannot replace the critical judgment required to assess accuracy, context and fit. The responsibility for validating references remains with the researcher.

6. Planners must recognise that LLMs do not “remember” in the way humans do. They lack continuity across conversations and can lose track of earlier assumptions. AI forgets things. Maintaining coherence in long-term research, therefore, depends on the researcher, not the tool.

7. A subtler issue is rigidity. LLMs often repeat dominant ideas or default solutions, even when the context differs. For example, when asked how to improve a congested street, an LLM may suggest widening roads or adding car lanes, even where such interventions could harm walkability and heritage value. Breaking out of these patterns requires active intervention.

8. We can understand GenAI as a partner in thinking, but not an equal one. The planner must decide what matters, whose voices are included, and what ethical priorities guide the work.

9. Effective use of GenAI requires strategic manoeuvring. This means combining AI-generated insights with collected data, community engagement and professional judgment. The value of LLMs lies not in replacing urban design processes, but in enriching them, if used carefully.

10. Academic integrity is non-negotiable. Urban design research is not just about producing text; it is about engaging intellectually with people, places and consequences.

Why this matters

GenAI in urban design is like fire – powerful, but dangerous without human control.

Used well, GenAI can help urban designers think more broadly and act more effectively. Used poorly, it risks reducing urban design to automated generalisation, detached from the lived experience of cities.

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Read more: AI-powered assistive technologies are changing how we experience and imagine public space

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The future of urban design is not about choosing between humans and machines, but about designing thoughtful collaboration between them. The challenge is not whether machines can think, but how we think with them.

– AI can design cities, but can it understand what matters to people? 10 ways to keep humans in control
– https://theconversation.com/ai-can-design-cities-but-can-it-understand-what-matters-to-people-10-ways-to-keep-humans-in-control-281471

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kyra Pazan, Assistant Professor of Anthropology, California State University, Stanislaus

When imagining our early human ancestors in prehistoric Africa hundreds of thousands of years ago, one might envision trekkers plodding across a savanna, baking under an equatorial sun.

Research, however, suggests that our species’ unique strengths – creativity, cooperation and adaptability – may have been honed in a very different environment. Our team of archaeologists has uncovered a story in which mountainous landscapes played a central role in making us human.

Today, those of us who like to explore mountains have technical gear and conveniences like GPS safety beacons, water filters and raincoats that pack down small. Without this, we’d be lucky to last one night in some places. How did early humans not only survive, but thrive in these landscapes?

This question inspires my archaeological research in Lesotho’s Maloti-Drakensberg Mountains. Since 2023, I have led an international team of excavators at Likonong, a collapsed rock shelter in a remote area of eastern Lesotho.

Our findings reveal that Likonong is the oldest known archaeological site in these mountains and an incredible case study in human adaptation.

Likonong was first discovered in 1995. I visited the site as a graduate student in 2015 and returned in 2023 with my PhD to begin excavations. I hoped that Likonong would be older than Melikane, which, at 83,000 years old, was Lesotho’s earliest known site at the time. When my team started finding stone tools that looked 100,000 years older, I realised this site was more important than I’d imagined.

Our excavations have found evidence of people visiting Likonong beginning at 242,000 years ago, and making regular, longer visits by 144,000 years ago. Previously, archaeologists suspected that sustained occupation in highland Lesotho was unlikely before the climate warmed during the Last Interglacial, 130,000 years ago. Instead, our research shows that early humans thrived here during an ice age, possibly by relying on one another.

The setting

We’re no longer in an ice age, but living in Lesotho still requires teamwork. At Likonong, we’re hours away from the nearest paved road or medical clinic, excavating on a precarious, erosive slope above a ravine. We sleep in tents, filter water, and cook for ourselves. The sun sets at 5pm, giving way to unbearably cold and windy nights. Tinder is scarce on the barren, treeless landscape. At an elevation of 1,800 metres, an oncoming storm inevitably means snow.

Making the excavation work requires cooperation from each member of the team. While some of us dig, others sieve excavated sediment in search of artefacts. Someone heats up the tea kettle when the late afternoon chill sets in, and someone else knocks down the metre-long icicles that collect on the shelter roof.

It simply isn’t possible to survive in this environment without help, which might be why earlier hominins – members of the human lineage – didn’t stand a chance. While a few isolated hand axes suggest that a few brave individuals attempted to survive here, we haven’t discovered their bones or their campsites.

In contrast, 50km north-west of Johannesburg (about 600km from our site), an underground labyrinth of limestone caves known as the “Cradle of Humankind” traces human evolution back nearly 4 million years, to a time before the first stone tools or manmade fire. Hominins thrived in these lowlands and the equatorial highlands of east Africa, but the earliest occupations at Likonong didn’t occur until after the emergence of our species.

When were people there, and what were they doing?

In our excavations at Likonong we used several methods to get a clearer idea of how humans learned to adapt and survive at the site. One, called magnetic susceptibility, measures how easily sediment can be magnetised. We use it as an indirect measure of fire use, which we expect to have been frequent for anyone using Likonong as a home base. Fire is critical not only for warmth, but also for cooking, making tools, and advanced technologies like adhesives. The earliest occupations dating to around 242,000 and 214,000 years ago have relatively low magnetic susceptibility values, implying limited burning and that humans were not staying at the site for very long.

Evidence for human occupation between 214,000 and 144,000 years ago is minimal. But then something changed. Signs of human activity increased so much that we named this layer “Lower Crazy Town” because of the stone tools and charred bone gushing from its layers. We believe that this is the point at which humans started using Likonong as a more permanent home base. Families built hearths on top of hearths, cooked food, made tools, and slept in the shelter. Not long after, burning was so frequent that the earth itself turned red. Instead of building the occasional fire, humans structured their lives around this technology.

Crucially, surviving in the highlands at this time (144,000 years ago) would have been even more challenging than at 242,000 years ago. Between 190,000 and 130,000 years ago, a period of time known as the Penultimate Glacial Period, the world was plunged into an ice age. Temperatures dropped more than 6ºC, lush forests disintegrated into windswept grasslands, and glaciers capped the mountains’ highest peaks.

So why couldn’t Likonong’s first visitors figure out how to survive at the site for longer periods of time? We don’t believe they were any less intelligent than the later occupants.

We think they left because they didn’t share information, collaborate, or cooperate with one another. Innovations don’t happen in a vacuum. Cultural knowledge relies on mechanisms for both preserving and spreading information, such as far-ranging social networks and oral tradition. One small change – for example, more frequent fire use – could have led to profound technological advances by creating an environment for information sharing and group cohesion.

The humans who ventured into the highlands 144,000 years ago would have been under extreme environmental pressures. If they chose to rely on one another, sharing their skills and experiences around a fire, they may have jump-started a cascade of changes that shaped us into the adaptable species we are today.

During my first season as a principal investigator at Likonong, I was constantly texting my colleagues for help and advice. Which sieve should we use? What kind of stone was that? How do I resolve personal conflicts with team members? I’m lucky they picked up the phone. Without their help, I probably would have quickly left the site, too – just like the first humans to venture into the highlands, 242,000 years ago.

– Lesotho’s mountain life was harsh for early humans: fire made all the difference
– https://theconversation.com/lesothos-mountain-life-was-harsh-for-early-humans-fire-made-all-the-difference-281168

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Africa is providing cheap liquidity to wealthy nations. In return it is paying huge interest rates to external institutional investors at the cost of its own development.

For instance, African central banks export their reserve funds for safekeeping. Sovereign wealth funds and pension fund managers invest only in investment-grade European and United States institutions. The most popular one is risk-free US treasuries, where they earn 3.5% annually on average. These are perceived as the safest instruments, easily convertible to cash without losing value.

The same European and US institutions then reinvest the same capital back to Africa at a high return for themselves. They purchase high-yielding bonds issued by African governments. Cumulatively, Africa has raised more than US$200 billion through sovereign Eurobonds since 2003. African countries are paying between 9% and 15% through Eurobond issuances.

Based on my expertise researching African financial markets, I argue that African countries can close their financing gap if they change regulations and investment policies.

Channelling a portion of Africa’s domestic funds to the continent’s development finance institutions would create a huge pool of domestic resources. This will make a significant impact on development. It would not jeopardise the central banks and asset managers’ need for safety of their funds. This would be a practical step towards a self-sustaining African financial ecosystem.

Africa’s capital strength

African central banks hold an estimated US$530 billion in reserves offshore. This is an international financial practice promoted by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and credit rating agencies. Central banks are required to maintain enough US dollar reserves to pay for four to six months of imports.

The sovereign wealth funds of 20 African countries now have approximately US$109.8 billion in total assets under management. Adding other assets of African origin, the amount climbs up to an estimated US$1.2 trillion.

The latest report by Africa Finance Corporation estimates Africa’s domestic capital base at US$4 trillion. These are funds owned by African institutions and individual citizens in the form of reserves, collected deposits, premiums and savings.

Other countries such as China, South Korea and Japan used domestic resources and state-directed finance to aggressively drive their own industrial transformation.

This hasn’t been the case for African countries. The continent’s financing gap is estimated at US$280 billion annually for infrastructure and trade. That’s the amount African countries need every year to build roads, electricity capacity, ports, railways, manufacturing industries and trade connections necessary for African economies to grow and compete globally.

In addition, despite a huge domestic capital stock, African countries pay high interest rates when they borrow abroad.

A system designed for capital flight

The reason for Africa’s capital flight is systemic. Africa’s financial institutions, including central banks, are required by national regulations and investment policies to invest in investment-grade rated instruments. The only investment-grade ratings recognised by the IMF and World Bank are those issued by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch. This means the majority of African assets are excluded from the safe asset category.

The result is that African capital exits the continent. This has left African financial markets with fewer participants and investment instruments. Shallow financial markets make it difficult to finance industrialisation, infrastructure and job creation.

The absence of deep and liquid domestic financial markets becomes the justification for continuing to invest abroad. This is why African countries have remained heavily dependent on foreign capital and external debt despite growing domestic savings.

African central banks reserves

Three African leaders – the presidents of Ghana, Kenya and Zambia – have called for the continent’s foreign reserves invested overseas to be reinvested in African institutions.

At the 2025 Africa Financial Summit, central bankers agreed that it was time for African governments to place a portion of their foreign exchange reserves with domestic institutions.

Channelling a portion of these funds to African development institutions would be a practical step towards a self-sustaining African financial ecosystem. It would not compromise the effectiveness of central banks and other financial institutions. Instead, it would:

• deepen domestic financial markets

• bolster sovereignty

• reduce dependence on foreign financial centres

• strengthen local capital markets.

The Central Bank Deposit Programme by Afreximbank is a good example. Launched in September 2014, it invests in trade and development finance. The programme has mobilised over US$44 billion – about 9% of central bank reserves. Participating central banks have earned 6% to 6.5% – much higher than what investments in Europe and the US offer.

The programme’s performance demonstrates that African reserves can be safely and productively invested within the continent.

AU investment policy shift

It is for this reason that in February 2024 the African Union called on member states to redirect all their reserves back into the continent.

This was a landmark but long-overdue correction in the stewardship of Africa’s financial resources. It was more than an investment policy shift. It was a bold declaration of confidence in Africa’s own institutions and financial markets.

Since then, the AU’s own portfolio of resources has been fully reinvested in African-owned financial institutions. This declaration did not require ratification by AU member states.

What more needs to change

Building an African financing architecture demands a fundamental shift in how African assets are valued, regulated and invested. It means redefining risk for African markets. It also means developing regional investment-grade benchmarks and modernising prudential rules so that African capital can work and grow on the continent.

African capital markets remain shallow not because capital is scarce, but because risk perceptions are distorted. The rising discontent from African policymakers on the cost of capital makes the case even more compelling.

This is why a transformative project such as the Africa Credit Rating Agency has gained support in its pre-establishment phase.

African regulators and reserve managers must act decisively in the following ways:

• change reserve management frameworks to allow more investment in African assets and regional financial institutions

• formally recognise domestic credit ratings that offer contextually sensitive and empirically grounded assessments

• reform IMF-driven constraints that exclude reserves placed in African institutions from being accounted as official reserves

• allow rapid liquidity across borders when needed. This can be done while maintaining global standards to prevent illicit flows and regulatory breaches.

Africa cannot build credible domestic markets if its own capital is absent from the story. Investment is ultimately an act of confidence in the institutions behind the assets. The continent needs to invest in itself.

– Africa’s capital must stay home to plug its financing gap: how it could be done
– https://theconversation.com/africas-capital-must-stay-home-to-plug-its-financing-gap-how-it-could-be-done-281060

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Harith Omar Morgadinho Farooq, Lecturer, Lúrio University

Africa is one of the most biodiverse regions on Earth. But much of its biodiversity remains poorly studied. Research from the continent contributes to less than 1% to global scientific output.

This pattern is often explained by limited investment in research. Governments in sub-Saharan Africa allocate, on average, only about 0.4% of their gross domestic product (GDP) to research and development. By comparison, European countries invest on average more than 2% of GDP, while the global average is around 2.6%. India invests close to 0.7% of GDP, and the US nearly 3.5%. Additional constraints include the lack of infrastructure, and political instability.

But there is a more direct and often overlooked constraint: the salaries of the scientists.

Salary disparities are measurable, policy relevant and a direct economic constraint on researchers’ ability to conduct fieldwork. They play a role in shaping who is able to conduct scientific research, a disparity that becomes especially visible during fieldwork.

We are researchers who have been working on biodiversity conservation in Africa for more than a decade. Through collaboration with and experience in European research institutions, we have observed firsthand how financial limitations affect fieldwork, research continuity and scientific careers. We investigated whether differences in researchers’ incomes are associated with biodiversity research output across African countries.

Our study showed a clear pattern: countries where researchers earn less produce less scientific output and rely more heavily on studies led by foreign institutions. This has implications beyond output alone, because scientific leadership influences which questions are asked, which ecosystems are studied, and how conservation priorities are defined.

Strengthening local research capacity will require greater investment in science and higher education.

Salary disparaties

In our study, we compared salary differences between locally based and foreign-affiliated researchers using publicly available salary data. We linked these to biodiversity research output across 54 African countries using data from the Scopus database.

We found that researchers based at African institutions often earn only a fraction of what their collaborators from higher-income countries receive. This disparity was particularly prominent in Malawi, the Republic of the Congo, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Here, foreign-affiliated salaries were approximately 34, 32, and 25 times higher than local salaries, respectively.

Because of these low salaries, it can take years to save for basic research tools such as field clothing, cameras or computers. For researchers from higher-income countries, these costs can often be covered by a single monthly salary.

This financial constraint may help explain why much of the continent’s biodiversity research is conducted in collaboration with institutions based outside Africa, rather than being led by local organisations, which are few and often underfunded.

Although local researchers often possess critical knowledge of biodiversity, languages, logistics and environmental challenges, they may have limited opportunities to lead projects or secure senior authorship positions in international collaborations.

The hidden cost of doing fieldwork

Biodiversity research is inherently expensive. It requires travel, equipment, permits, and the support of local guides or assistants. Even short expeditions can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars. In many parts of the world, these costs are covered by research grants or institutional funding.

But in Africa, especially for exploratory research, funding is generally limited or unavailable. Consequently, scientists often have to rely on their own income to conduct fieldwork, a pattern also reported by researchers in other lower-income countries.

We found that across countries, foreign-affiliated researchers typically earned between four and 30 times more than locally based scientists conducting research in the same country. Researchers based outside the continent also retain substantially higher disposable income, even after accounting for travel costs, allowing them to contribute to or fully fund fieldwork. By contrast, in half of the African countries analysed, locally based researchers could not cover even a conservative fieldwork budget of US$1,000 using their entire monthly salary.

These differences create an uneven playing field. Success depends not only on the merit of ideas or quality of training, but also on who can afford to be in the field.

As a result, scientists with greater financial security may be better positioned to sustain fieldwork, revisit sites and maintain long-term research programmes.

For students, these realities become clear early on. Even those with a strong interest in biodiversity may decide not to pursue careers in biology, or reduce their involvement over time, once they understand the financial constraints. Consequently, fewer local specialists are trained.

The shortage of local specialists is part of a broader research capacity gap. Africa has approximately 236 researchers per million people. This is far below the global average of around 1,516, and substantially lower than Europe’s 4,240 researchers per million people or the more than 4,800 per million in the US.

Many African countries have few locally based scientists available to conduct biodiversity surveys, supervise students, lead long-term monitoring programmes, or build specialised expertise, particularly in poorly studied taxonomic groups.

When research becomes difficult to prioritise

Low salaries have broader consequences.

Scientists may rely on consultancies or teaching across multiple institutions. This leaves limited time for research. Over time it reduces both their development as researchers and the relevance of the knowledge they bring into the classroom.

Research capacity in African institutions remains limited. Most biodiversity studies are led by researchers from foreign institutions. Though international collaborations are essential, they can lead to local scientists being limited in their ability to lead projects or even participate.

In such cases, local knowledge and priorities can be overlooked. Large parts of these countries, and many taxonomic groups, may remain poorly studied.

In Mozambique, for example, some of the country’s most important areas for threatened and endemic plants and animals lie outside the current protected area network.

Conservation funding and research have historically concentrated in large protected areas known for charismatic megafauna such as elephants and lions.

Solutions are hard to come by

Increasing researchers’ salaries is not straightforward. In many countries, salaries at public universities are tied to national government salary scales and broader public sector budgets. This means there is no single institution that can solve the problem alone. Still, universities and funding agencies can create mechanisms to better support research activity.

These may include productivity-based incentives, research stipends, fieldwork allowances, reduced teaching loads for active researchers, and grant schemes that directly fund local scientists. Governments can also invest in research as part of long-term national development strategies.

– Poor pay is holding back Africa’s biodiversity research and reducing its contribution to global science
– https://theconversation.com/poor-pay-is-holding-back-africas-biodiversity-research-and-reducing-its-contribution-to-global-science-282447