Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Craig Morris, Senior Researcher, Agricultural Research Council – Animal Production, University of KwaZulu-Natal

For 75 years, grasslands research conducted just outside Pietermaritzburg, South Africa has informed policy makers and farmers about sustainable management, while training generations of students.

Grasslands and savannas cover more than 60% of South Africa. They are vital not only for livestock and wildlife forage but also for providing key ecosystem services such as water regulation, carbon storage, biodiversity, cultural resources and recreation.

The Ukulinga Research Farm of the University of KwaZulu-Natal is a species-rich grassland with scattered trees. It hosts two long-term experiments that have provided crucial insights into how fire, grazing and soil nutrients shape ecosystems.

In 1950, Professor J.D. Scott, founder of the discipline of grassland science at the university, established two complex grassland experiments at Ukulinga: the Veld Burning and Mowing Trial and the Veld Fertilisation Trial. They are now internationally known as the Ukulinga Grassland Fire Experiment and the Ukulinga Grassland Nutrient Experiment. Initially designed to improve hay yield and forage quality, these experiments have run uninterrupted for 75 years. They have evolved into invaluable ecological laboratories.

They are respectively the longest-running fire experiment in the world and the longest-running nutrient addition experiment in Africa.

Scientific studies on these grassland experiments have spanned molecular, microbial, plant community, and ecosystem scales. They have covered fire effects, nutrient cycling, soil processes, biodiversity responses and remote sensing. Comparative and collaborative studies, often involving US and European teams, highlight the global relevance of these datasets. They connect local observations to international ones, revealing universal patterns while highlighting the unique characteristics of southern African grasslands.

I’m a grassland scientist who has been involved in this research. My colleagues and I looked back to assess the value of research done on the farm. We concluded that it has contributed to ecological theory, shaped local management practices, and supported a wide range of comparative studies, networking and education.

The core scientific value of these experiments lies in their duration and the consistent application of the same treatments over time. Decades of continuous treatments (like burning, or fertiliser) have generated data that reveals slow ecological processes, long-term interactions, and effects that short-term studies cannot detect.

The outdoor laboratories allow researchers to pursue new multidisciplinary investigations and examine interactions with emerging environmental pressures, including climate change.

Early grazing experiments

Valuable livestock grazing experiments were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s. One trial (1958-1974) examined three sheep grazing systems – continuous, rotational, and seasonal rest – at different stocking rates. Another 24-year study (1967-1991) tested nine combinations of rotational grazing periods to evaluate multi-paddock systems.

These early trials and several focused short-term studies provided insights into how grass species respond to grazing or mowing. The findings, many of them published in the African Journal of Range and Forage Science, revealed complex relationships between grazing intensity, plant resilience and grassland productivity. They continue to inform rangeland management today.

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Read more: Berg winds in South Africa: the winter weather pattern that increases wildfire risks

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Some key results of the long-term experiments

Over decades, excluding fire and mowing transformed some plots into dense, woody thickets, dramatically altering both plant composition and ecosystem function. Regularly burned or mown plots maintained productive, species-rich grasslands.

The nutrient experiment has shown that while nitrogen and phosphorus fertilisers can boost grassland productivity, they also alter the original grassland by promoting fast-growing grasses. Over time, added nutrients reduce plant diversity.

Together, the experiments demonstrate how natural disturbances versus artificial nutrient addition drive distinct ecological outcomes. They offer insights into the mechanisms that maintain grassland biodiversity and resilience.

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Read more: The long shadow of colonial forestry is a threat to savannas and grasslands

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Over the past 75 years, research output from the experiments has steadily grown, and has achieved a broad international reach. Fifty peer-reviewed papers have been produced and the top 10 cited papers from each experiment have collectively been cited in 458 journals by 1,172 principal authors from 78 countries outside South Africa.

The impact

The Ukulinga long-term grassland experiments have shaped sustainable management practices by providing empirical evidence for optimal burning frequencies and seasons in mesic (moderately wet) grasslands. They have highlighted the ecological risks of nutrient enrichment from industrial pollutants, showing how added nutrients can alter grassland composition and reduce diversity.

Beyond research, the experiments have had a profound educational and outreach impact, training generations of students and engaging visitors who carry these insights into policy, conservation and grassland management across South Africa.

Ukulinga now also hosts global-network experiments such as the Nutrient Network (NutNet), Drought Network (DroughtNet), and Disturbance and Recovery Across Global Grasslands Network (DragNet), linking local observations to international studies. Through these collaborations, researchers can compare Ukulinga’s results with similar experiments worldwide.

What next

Preserving these long-term studies is critical for understanding slow ecological responses, succession, and tipping points that only emerge over decades.

Ukulinga (isiZulu for “to test”) provides a platform for addressing pressing questions in grassland science. To safeguard its unique scientific value, the long-term burning, mowing and nutrient addition experiments should be maintained without alteration. Continued support and broader collaboration are essential to fully realise their potential for monitoring long-term ecological responses, testing new hypotheses, and guiding sustainable grassland management.

– Africa’s longest-running grassland research project offers up a wealth of knowledge
– https://theconversation.com/africas-longest-running-grassland-research-project-offers-up-a-wealth-of-knowledge-270121

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ashley Gunter, Professor, University of South Africa

Across Africa, distance education has become one of the most powerful forces for expanding access to higher learning. Open and distance learning institutions such as the Open University of Tanzania, the Zimbabwe Open University and the National Open University of Nigeria have joined long-standing providers like the University of South Africa in offering flexible study opportunities to millions of students who would otherwise be excluded from higher education.

These institutions are reimagining what it means to go to university in contexts where geography, cost and social responsibilities often keep young people out of the classroom.

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Read more: How place of birth shapes chances of going to university: evidence from 7 African countries

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The value of distance education is undeniable. It allows working adults to continue their studies without leaving employment, gives rural youth the chance to stay in their communities while earning qualifications, and provides people with opportunities to balance learning alongside family responsibilities. During crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, distance education proved to be a lifeline when face-to-face teaching was impossible.

Across the continent, it is not simply an alternative to traditional universities; for many, it is the only route into higher education.

The World Bank has reported that only 9% of the African population in the five years after secondary school is enrolled in tertiary education – the lowest rate in the world.

My own research takes the University of South Africa (Unisa) as a case study to dig deeper into how geography and inequality shape students’ experiences of distance learning: their access, participation, and outcomes. With over 370,000 students in South Africa and other countries, Unisa is the continent’s largest provider. It’s an ideal lens through which to understand both the promise and the challenges of this educational model.

I’m a geographer with an interest in international education and economic development. For the Unisa case study, I took a qualitative research approach, interviewing 28 Unisa postgraduate students from different regions of Africa. I chose them to reflect the diversity of students enrolled at Unisa and because they already had experience of studying.

The study found that although distance education can meet educational needs where people can’t access face-to-face learning, it’s not a perfect solution. There are still challenges which make it hard for some people to study, like inadequate infrastructure (poor internet connectivity and electricity supply), financial constraints, and language and cultural barriers. There’s a need for interventions to improve the effectiveness and equity of distance education.

Experiences of distance education

My interviews with postgraduate students across Africa showed a complex picture. For the 18 students based in cities, distance education can be genuinely empowering. Internet connections, though costly, are usually accessible in cities. Electricity supply is more stable, and digital platforms are within reach. Students in urban areas spoke of the freedom and flexibility they gained, describing distance education as the only way to balance work, family life and study.

But geography matters. For students in rural or marginalised regions, participation in distance learning can become a daily struggle.

Downloading a file may take hours. Travelling long distances to internet cafés eats into scarce time and resources. A student in Zimbabwe explained how he missed deadlines simply because the university portal would not load in his village. Another said:

Some days I feel like I’m learning less and figuring out how to connect more.

Another, in Kenya, described travelling to Nairobi every two weeks to collect academic materials. She felt the sacrifice was worth it because she knew education could change her life. For others:

I begin to wonder if it’s really worth it.

These obstacles, however, underline rather than diminish the value of distance education. Students are willing to endure enormous effort and cost to access learning because they believe in its power to transform their futures. Their determination is itself evidence of the demand for and importance of this model of education.

Still, the barriers are real. High data prices, unstable internet, and unreliable electricity continue to limit access. Women in rural areas often face additional responsibilities that leave them with little time or energy to study.

It’s hard to keep up with my guy classmates who don’t face the same rules at home.

And the flexibility that makes distance education attractive can sometimes turn into a sense of isolation when students don’t have peer support.

I feel alone a lot. Even when I try to share, they don’t seem to understand what I’m facing.

Persistent inequities in distance education

Distance education can actually keep existing inequities in place, because students from wealthier, urban backgrounds are better positioned to succeed than rural students are.

My study also revealed how the realities of students’ lives not only affect their ability to use digital tools but also their sense of belonging to the academic community. There is a growing digital divide within distance education itself.

The task ahead is to make sure that these challenges do not undercut the progress distance education has already made. Over the past decade, distance education has expanded access, increased enrolment far beyond the capacity of traditional campuses, and improved the quality of digital teaching, learner support, and flexible study pathways.

Investment in affordable broadband and electricity is essential, particularly in rural and underserved regions. Financial aid needs to cover the hidden costs of learning, from devices to data. Outreach centres should be located closer to marginalised communities, and policies must explicitly address the gendered realities that shape women’s access to higher education.

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Read more: Hunger among South African students: study shows those studying remotely need financial aid for food

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Across Africa, open universities have already demonstrated how distance education can widen participation and build inclusive futures. Unisa’s story, and the experiences of its students, highlight both the opportunities and the work still to be done.

Geography continues to shape who can learn, but it does not have to decide who gets left behind. With the right investments and policies, distance education can move closer to fulfilling its full promise: to provide equitable, life-changing access to higher learning for all.

– Distance learning changes lives, but comes with its own challenges
– https://theconversation.com/distance-learning-changes-lives-but-comes-with-its-own-challenges-266431

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

The competition for global influence and control is shifting. One of the places where this dynamic is playing out is the Red Sea region, which encompasses Egypt, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Here, international rivalries, regional ambitions and local politics collide. Federico Donelli, who has studied these political dynamics and recently published Power Competition in the Red Sea, explains what’s driving the region’s geopolitical significance.

What defines the Red Sea as a region?

The region stretches from the Suez Canal to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, covering approximately 438,000km². The Red Sea borders some of the world’s most volatile regions: the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula and the western shore of the Indo-Pacific area.

The Red Sea region

The Red Sea is rapidly becoming a highly contested zone, where traditional and emerging global powers are vying for influence and control. The decline of western geopolitical centrality, the rise of alternative powers and the increasing assertiveness of regional actors converge in the Red Sea.

This has created a complex and dynamic arena in which to test future global power hierarchies. The Red Sea region is challenging the liberal international order that emerged at the end of the cold war in 1989. That order is based on:

• multilateralism – cooperation among multiple states

• a free market – limited state intervention in the economy

• liberal democracy – political pluralism and individual rights.

These tenets have been eroded by a combination of internal weaknesses and external challenges over the past 20 years.

While competition for global power between the United States and China tends to dominate the headlines, the true laboratories of the post-liberal world order are found in regions where international, regional and local dynamics collide.

The broader Red Sea region is one of them. Others are the Arctic, the South Indo-Pacific and the Balkans.

Why is the Red Sea region a stage for global power competition?

The region lacks a clear dominant power that is capable of imposing order. This makes it an open arena of competition among states with overlapping interests.

The Red Sea has great strategic value. It connects the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific, and is a maritime route for global trade and energy. It also borders several fragile states like Sudan, Eritrea and Yemen.

This combination – on the one hand, limited or contested authority that leaves the area exposed to external penetration, and on the other, its significant strategic value – has turned the region into a magnet for external involvement.

The United States and China both have military facilities in Djibouti. Russia has sought access to Port Sudan. Gulf powers, notably Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, have expanded their presence across the Horn of Africa. They’ve done this by investing in ports, infrastructure and military cooperation especially in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia.

Turkey, Iran and Israel have also established political, economic and security ties. This links the Red Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

However, external powers are not the only drivers of change in the region.

Local actors, from Ethiopia to Sudan, Eritrea, Egypt and Somalia, are exploiting global rivalries to advance their strategic objectives. They are courting competing external powers by trading military access for security guarantees, or seeking investment in strategic infrastructure. They are also using diplomatic alignment with the US, China, Gulf states or Turkey to strengthen domestic and regional positions.

These actions create a complex web of overlapping interests. These blur the line between regional and global politics. Governments and non-state actors now have multiple external patrons to choose from. They can play one power against another.

This “multi-alignment” gives regional players leverage. It also increases volatility and uncertainty. For example, rival factions in the ongoing Sudanese civil war have sought support from external players, ranging from Saudi Arabia to the UAE. This has transformed an internal conflict into a proxy battlefield.

In Somalia, local and clan authorities negotiate security and economic deals directly with foreign powers like Turkey and Gulf states, often bypassing weak local institutions.

Meanwhile, landlocked Ethiopia’s search for sea access has drawn it into new diplomatic and security entanglements with Somaliland, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt and Gulf countries.

These examples reveal how the Red Sea arena has become a microcosm of the post-liberal order: fragmented, transactional and deeply interconnected.

What are the main outcomes and lessons from this alignment?

The Red Sea region reflects the broader transformation of global politics.

Rather than producing a new balance, the decline of western influence has created a decentralised and competitive system.

In this environment, regional areas serve as testing grounds for new patterns of interaction between global and local powers, state and non-state actors, and formal alliances and informal partnerships.

While western-centric “universal” rules and institutions defined the liberal international order, the post-liberal order is characterised by selective engagement, bilateral bargains and flexible alignments.

The result is a world where order emerges from competition rather than consensus.

Competition among great powers now occurs less through international institutions and more through regional arenas. Military presence, infrastructure investment and political alliances now serve as instruments of influence.

What conclusions do you draw?

The Red Sea region is a reminder to scholars and policymakers that the future of international politics will not be defined solely in Washington, Beijing, Brussels or Moscow. It will also be defined in places like Port Sudan, Aden and Djibouti, where the new global order is being shaped.

Regions have become true laboratories of international change. They are places where global competition interacts with local conflicts, and new models of governance and influence emerge.

Local actors, state and non-state, are no longer passive recipients of external interference. They are active participants in shaping their own security environments.

– Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing
– https://theconversation.com/global-power-shifts-are-playing-out-in-the-red-sea-region-why-this-is-where-the-rules-are-changing-268895

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marelize Isabel Schoeman, Professor, University of South Africa

In a recent statement, South Africa’s minister of correctional services said more than 18,000 parolees had reoffended in the past three years. They included 209 committing murder and 330 rape during 2024-25. This is one of the country’s most pressing justice problems, yet it remains poorly understood. It’s called recidivism: a situation where an individual who has already served a sentence commits another crime and is arrested, convicted or sentenced again.

Academic and media reports suggest that many released prisoners commit another crime and are sentenced. However, South Africa lacks a standard definition for recidivism or a consistent way to measure it. This means that no one knows the true rate. Researcher Marelize Schoeman explains why tracking recidivism matters.

Why is the definition of recidivism so important?

Recidivism is not simply reoffending. The word comes from Latin. It means “to fall back”. It describes when an individual who has already served a sentence commits another crime and is arrested, convicted or sentenced again.

A high recidivism rate, therefore, reflects not only reoffending, but the criminal justice system’s failure to rehabilitate offenders and prevent further crime.

According to academic research, South Africa’s recidivism rate ranges from 55% to 95%. Media reports claim it to be as high as 80% to 97%.

These figures, however, can only be regarded as estimates. South Africa lacks a standard definition of recidivism. This has led to researchers and criminal justice institutions – including the Department of Correctional Services, the South African Police Service and the National Prosecuting Authority – using different definitions and measurement methods. This produces inconsistent data and inaccurate recidivism statistics.

The lack of a shared definition and common understanding has resulted in recidivism being used as a buzzword. This is done to create public sensation, score political points or claim programme success without any credible or generalisable evidence.

As a result, policymakers and service providers in the criminal justice sector don’t know whether:

• policing, sentencing and rehabilitation programmes are effective

• correctional centres are overcrowded due to repeat offenders

• parole and reintegration efforts are successful.

This absence of reliable information hampers the criminal justice system’s ability to deliver effective prevention services, support parolees after release, reduce reoffending and build safer communities.

How can South Africa better define and address the problem?

The first step is to have a uniform definition of recidivism across the criminal justice sector. Then the rate can be measured accurately. Without accurate data, resources can be wasted on crime prevention and rehabilitation programmes that do not work. Effective initiatives will remain unnoticed or underfunded. You can’t manage what you can’t measure.

The second step is to improve record-keeping and create a central digitised databank for sentenced offenders. This databank would hold key information, such as personal details, previous convictions, the nature of each offence, and other risk-related factors that could influence an offender’s rehabilitation prospects.

This information should be accessible to the prisons, police and prosecutors. The courts, parole boards and accredited rehabilitation service providers should also have access.

Currently, there is no central record system. The police service maintains all criminal record information. To obtain a person’s criminal record, a form and the individual’s fingerprints must be submitted. An official then checks the database for any previous convictions, offence details and sentencing information. This largely paper-based system is prone to delays, human error and inaccuracies.

Many offenders use aliases or do not have identity documents.

A uniform identification system, using digitally captured fingerprints or iris scans, would be a more effective way of identifying and keeping records of individuals with a criminal record.

Digitising this process has been planned since 1996, but hasn’t happened. Fragmented systems, weak accountability, outdated infrastructure, governance bottlenecks and late deliveries have delayed it.

What difference will the database make?

Making these improvements would change how South Africa measures, understands and manages recidivism. A uniform definition would replace guesswork and political rhetoric with a clear, evidence-based standard.

Policymakers, researchers and practitioners could use a common language to make comparisons and coordinate strategies.

The focus could shift from viewing recidivism merely as individuals reoffending, to the criminal justice system’s effectiveness in breaking the cycle of crime.

A centralised, digitised offender database would reduce human error and improve data reliability, making it possible to identify and do what works.

Public trust in the criminal justice sector might improve, enhancing rehabilitation outcomes and building safer communities.

What countries have cracked this?

Countries like the United Kingdom, Norway, Finland and Sweden, Canada, New Zealand and Singapore have adopted a uniform definition of recidivism. They use it to measure the performance of their criminal justice systems.

The effectiveness of these steps is clear in Norway and Singapore. The two countries have some of the lowest recidivism rates in the world at 20% and 21%, respectively. The UK’s recidivism rates have declined from 31.6% in 2010 to 26.5% in 2023. In New Zealand, performance data is used to target high-risk groups and strengthen rehabilitation efforts.

These countries use biometric databases in law enforcement and correctional facilities. The databases help to identify offenders, track parolees and manage prisons. Authorities can identify ex-offenders who commit new crimes.

Recidivism statistics are also used as key performance indicators across the criminal justice system. They guide funding and programme development.

In South Africa, a review of the parole board system which began in September 2025 offers the Department of Correctional Services an opportunity to define what recidivism means.

This step could create the basis for developing a central record system for both incarcerated offenders and those under community corrections. The system could later be expanded across the entire criminal justice network.

– Thousands of criminals reoffend in South Africa – better data would show where the justice system is failing
– https://theconversation.com/thousands-of-criminals-reoffend-in-south-africa-better-data-would-show-where-the-justice-system-is-failing-268413

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Leonard Mensah, PhD Candidate, University of Memphis

Wetlands are vital ecological resources that provide several benefits in urban and peri-urban areas. They slow down flood waters, and act as a source of fishing and farming livelihoods. They also provide socio-cultural benefits for local communities. But some of these valuable ecosystems, due to their presence in prime locations, are at the centre of competing cultural, ecological and economic interests. Property development, especially, is a threat to wetlands.

The 2025 Global Wetland Outlook emphasises that the protection of wetlands is key to sustainable development. However, since 1970, about 411 million hectares of wetlands have been lost. In Africa, degradation is widespread and many are in poor condition.

We are a multidisciplinary team of researchers working in the area of resilience, sustainability and justice in urban transitions.

Our research highlights some of the local-level issues and conflicting interests that are shaping the rapid destruction of the Sakumono Ramsar Site in Tema, Ghana. Under the Ramsar Convention, a Ramsar site is a designated wetland with special natural significance.

We found institutional complicity and the lack of engagement with communities to be key drivers shaping current wetland conditions. Our study proposes a model for enforcing regulations and asserting the community’s right to nature for socio-cultural purposes.

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Read more: A root cause of flooding in Accra: developers clogging up the city’s wetlands

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Tema: wetlands in an industrial city

Tema was developed from a small fishing community into an industrialised port city by independent Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah. Its purpose was to facilitate international trade and vibrant economic development. It is one of Ghana’s most important cities and has been experiencing urban expansion and land use changes. This has led to encroachment in environmentally sensitive areas, including the Ramsar site.

The Sakumono wetland was officially designated a Ramsar site in 1992 to protect its rich biodiversity. It covers about 1,400 hectares and is protected by several regulations, including the Wetland Management Regulations Act, 1999.

But the site has, over the years, witnessed rapid depletion and intense encroachment from property development. Approximately 80% of the Sakumono Ramsar Site has been encroached on, leaving only about 20% of the wetland intact.

Population in the wetland’s catchment area had grown from about 114,600 in 1984 to over 500,000 by 2000, indicating that large numbers of people live around and rely on the wetland. Although the exact number of people currently affected by the wetlands encroachment is unknown, the dense surrounding population suggests that many households, especially those engaged in farming and fishing, have likely experienced reduced access and livelihood displacement. Like other wetlands in Ghana, the Sakumomo Ramsar site risks eventual destruction if nothing is done to reverse current trends.

The president of Ghana has called for heavy punishment for individuals who encroach on Ramsar sites. Both community and institutional respondents in our research claimed, however, that it was the political elites who were behind unbridled property development in the first place.

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Read more: Flooding incidents in Ghana’s capital are on the rise. Researchers chase the cause

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Multiple and conflicting interests in wetlands management

The main objective of our study was to analyse stakeholders’ perspectives on the use, value and management of wetlands. We evaluated the impact of these views on the sustainable management of ecologically sensitive areas. We conducted in-depth interviews with community residents, community leaders and opinion leaders. We also interviewed officials from metropolitan and municipal assemblies. The research was conducted in the Sakumono community, where the Sakumono Ramsar site is located.

Conflicting views on wetlands value: while the value of the site lies in its economic and ecological benefits, community residents were more interested in its economic value. That is, how it provides livelihood opportunities through farming and fishing activities.

Residents wondered why developers were allowed to exploit portions of the wetlands for building purposes, while they were prevented from fishing and farming. One of the residents said:

See rich and influential people buying land in the wetland area and using it for building properties. But we are not permitted to fish there.

For state institutions, protecting the wetland meant restricting access for community members. They encouraged activities such as tree planting and periodic desilting.

Conflicting views on wetlands use: the views of stakeholders also showed the changing understanding of the use of wetlands. An official from the forestry commission revealed that the wetland was acquired by the state during the 1980s for conservation. But other institutional officials, such as those of the lands commission, revealed that it had become a prime area for property development. Powerful developers bypass the land registration process and build without a permit.

The size of the Ramsar site has reduced because people are acquiring the wetland, including the buffer area, for residential development. Even though the wetland area is demarcated as a protected area, many of the politically connected developers go behind us and build without a permit.

Conflicting views on wetlands management: our research revealed contradictions between state institutions and community stakeholders. For instance, traditional authorities were of the view that:

Since the management of the wetland is not under our control, we are not responsible for the current developments taking place in and around the demarcated area.

The traditional authorities said they were not consulted and did not benefit from the wetland. This perhaps explains why they watched on as destruction continued. A member of the traditional council said:

As leaders of the community, we are not consulted about how the wetland is managed. You always hear the forestry commission accusing community leaders that we are selling the land. We can’t sell land that does not belong to us.

Towards a community-based stewardship model

Communities should be at the centre of wetlands management. We propose a stewardship-based co-management model that enforces environmental and conservation regulations. It emphasises working with a range of stakeholders. This includes government agencies, traditional authorities and environmentally conscious community members. We call for an updated wetlands management plan that reflects recent changes, but that is also fair, responsible and protective for present and future generations. This is essential for building sustainable communities in Ghana and beyond.

– An important wetland in Ghana is under siege. Researchers investigate the real issues
– https://theconversation.com/an-important-wetland-in-ghana-is-under-siege-researchers-investigate-the-real-issues-269016

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jesper Bjarnesen, Senior researcher, The Nordic Africa Institute

Ivorians went to the polls on 25 October 2025 to choose between incumbent president Alassane Ouattara – seeking a fourth five-year term – and one of four candidates who didn’t have the backing of the largest opposition parties.

There was not much of a choice, as the three main opposition candidates were banned from standing. Ouattara claimed another first-round landslide victory with 89.77% of votes cast.

As a researcher, I have followed political developments in Côte d’Ivoire over the past 15 years, and I’m currently involved in a project on boycott movements which uses Côte d’Ivoire as a country case.

This informs my view of the 2025 presidential elections and the democratic outlook for Côte d’Ivoire.

While the country tends to be seen as a regional front runner in terms of its economic performance, the 2025 elections continue a worrying trend of democratic backsliding and political polarisation.

The 27 December legislative elections will be a test of the country’s democratic resilience.

The build-up

In the months leading up to the presidential elections, major opposition candidates were excluded and political apathy took hold in a shrinking space for democratic expression.

Ouattara announced his candidacy in August, despite the widespread objections to his third-term candidacy in 2020 at home and abroad.

As in 2020, critics insisted that Ouattara was overstepping his constitutional mandate of one presidential term, renewable once. He has argued that a 2016 revision gave him the right to run twice.

As election day approached, Côte d’Ivoire’s political landscape was marked by polarisation, repression and uncertainty.

Tensions deepened in early September when the Constitutional Council disqualified five prominent opposition candidates from the race. Former president Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé and Guillaume Soro were excluded due to prior criminal convictions. The two main challengers, Tidjane Thiam and Pascal Affi N’Guessan, were barred on procedural grounds.

Their exclusion more or less handed victory to Ouattara, and his campaign comfortably turned towards ensuring an absolute majority.

In early October, the National Security Council banned public gatherings, except those organised by official candidates, on the grounds of “maintaining public order”. It also imposed additional restrictions on civic mobilisation. It used the letter of the law to serve Ouattara’s interests in limiting protests against his candidacy.

Going against the ban, opposition parties called for daily protests, but the gatherings were generally small and promptly broken up by security forces.

Three days before the elections, Gbagbo denounced what he called a “civil coup” and expressed his support for those “protesting against this electoral robbery”.

On 11 October, protesters in Abidjan took to the streets. These acts of defiance led to some 700 arrests and 80 prison sentences for disturbing public order. Eleven people were killed in clashes between security forces and protesters.

Along with other domestic and international observers, Amnesty International denounced the repression of demonstrations. At the same time, the government deployed 40,000 security personnel across the country.

France, the regional grouping Ecowas and the EU have remained largely silent. They have generally prioritised stability and strategic relations with the Ivorian government over democratic accountability. This passivity risks further eroding the credibility of these international actors while reinforcing narratives of western double standards in the region.

While the excluded opposition parties tried, and largely failed, to mobilise their supporters in the streets, the remaining candidates (all representing small and newly formed political parties and coalitions) chose a different strategy.

Capable Generations Movement leader Simone Ehivet Gbagbo (the former first lady, who was divorced from ex-president Gbagbo in 2023) deplored the elimination of her ex-husband. But in the final weeks of campaigning she insisted that it was too late to call people to the streets. She called for people to vote instead.

Election day

Election day was mostly peaceful across the country, but violent clashes did break out in several towns. The president of the Independent Electoral Commission, Ibrahim Kuibiert Coulibaly, described these incidents as “marginal” and “quickly contained”.

While the election result was never in doubt, the participation rate was less predictable. The confirmed participation rate of 50.1% shows that many voters stayed at home; many out of apathy but also out of concerns over the risk of violent clashes around polling stations.

Provisional results announced on 27 October gave Outtara 89.77% of the votes. Along with other opposition members, Thiam lamented a rigged and divisive electoral process with inadequate participation, and urged nonviolent resistance. He called for the government to engage in dialogue towards reconciliation.

The ruling party and media supportive of Ouattara described the result as a “landslide victory”, particularly celebrating Ouattara’s victories in historical opposition strongholds.

Three days after election day, several leaders of the main opposition parties were summoned by police on the grounds that military-grade weapons had been found in the homes of individuals linked to the 11 October march.

So, while the elections may be said to have unfolded without major incidents, the lack of a genuine contest and the measures taken to restrict opposition cast a shadow over the poll, and over Outtara’s legacy.

What’s next, and what are the prospects for democracy?

In the short to medium term, the major opposition parties could salvage some of their influence in the parliamentary elections on 27 December. Or they may reignite protests.

In the long term, Ouattara would have to step towards outright authoritarianism to justify a fifth candidacy in 2030. It seems more likely that he will finally hand over to a successor from his inner circle.

Even if that happens, serious questions remain regarding the electoral framework. The opposition has long claimed that the independent electoral commission is biased in favour of the incumbent.

The Ouattara presidency is tainted by its record of one-sided electoral competitions, political violence and insecurity, and a shrinking space for public expression.

Given Côte d’Ivoire’s strategic importance to the global north, as a rare ally in the subregion, international actors won’t have much to say about its democratic performance.

Any prospects for reconciliation, political reform and a peaceful transition in 2030 will mainly be in the hands of the ruling party. It will have to encourage dialogue and political inclusion at municipal, provincial and regional levels.

The 27 December legislative elections will offer a better chance to understand the actual distribution of political leverage than the flawed presidential elections.

Amelie Stelter of the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden contributed to this article

– Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic backslide: elections leave even less space for freedom
– https://theconversation.com/cote-divoires-democratic-backslide-elections-leave-even-less-space-for-freedom-269469

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Gift Khumalo, Lecturer, Durban University of Technology

School violence is a global public health phenomenon. This is when learners and teachers are the victims of physical and psychological abuse, cyber threats and bullying, fights, gangsterism, and the use of weapons at school.

The consequences of school violence are dire. There are implications for learners, teachers, the school and the community. Violence undermines the learners’ and teachers’ safety. It causes stress, academic decline and behavioural problems. It can contribute to a broader cycle of violence in communities.

School violence is a problem across southern Africa. This includes South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Namibia.

In 2008 the regional body, the Southern African Development Community adopted Care and Support for Teaching and Learning framework. It was to prevent violence, create safer schools and foster a positive school ethos.

But there has been limited research unpacking factors that contribute to school violence. We recently undertook a review project to identify and understand those contextual factors.

Our research stems from our shared scholarly interest in issues of violence in educational settings. Our professional backgrounds include school social work, health promotion, social services with children and adolescents, and teaching general education modules at a South African university.

The review of studies of violence suggests that a range of factors contribute to school violence. These include: exposure to domestic violence, socio-economic status, poor family communication, lack of appropriate disciplinary processes at school, intolerance of individual and social differences, and exposure to alcohol and substance use in the community.

What’s needed are clear school policies, teacher training and deployment of school social workers.

The scope

Our project reviewed 24 studies of violence in Southern African Development Community schools. Most of the studies were done in South Africa but some were in Eswatini, Zambia, Malawi and Angola.

We focused on this region for the following reasons.

• The region comprises low- and low-middle-income countries. Learners experience various socio-economic challenges and structural disparities within their communities and schools.

• Previous research suggests that communities in the region face crime and violence, gangsterism, high unemployment rates and poverty.

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Read more: Blunting the impact of poor social conditions in South Africa will have big health benefits

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• The Care and Support for Teaching and Learning framework, which is intended to support learners’ enrolment, retention, performance and progression, has not prevented school violence. The limited evidence suggests a need to better understand the specific contextual factors that contribute to this violence.

Our findings from the papers we reviewed indicate that factors contributing to school violence are present in learners’ home environments, communities and schools.

Family environment

Disrespect towards teachers and physical fights are linked to witnessing domestic violence. The family unit’s socio-economic standing is significant. Compared to better-off learners, those from less privileged environments are more likely to violate school rules, steal other learners’ belongings, and bully others for their lunch meals. Learners from food-insecure families enter into transactional relationships with teachers for financial support and “free” groceries.

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Read more: Violence is a normal part of life for many young children: study traces the mental health impacts

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Research shows that the inability of parents to support and talk to their children results in children succumbing to peer pressure and becoming involved in gangs and fights. Parents sometimes incite school violence by defending their children’s misconduct and blaming teachers for their children’s behaviour.

We also observed that in schools with children who have disabilities, some parents arrange intimate relationships for their children with other learners, to shield them from exploitation by community members. However, this exposes them to unintended sexual violence in those relationships, as sexual boundaries and consent are not adequately explained to the young couples.

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Read more: Bullies in South African schools were often bullied themselves – insights from an expert

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Community environment

The studies we reviewed indicate that the surrounding community has a role in school violence. Learners’ exposure to alcohol and substance use can lead to violence. Specifically, community members sell substances to learners, who then return to school intoxicated, disrupting teaching and learning. In some instances, fights among the boys that start outside school continue in the school premises.

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Read more: After school clubs aren’t always safe spaces: what should be done about it

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School environment

Different types of bullying occur among learners. Research shows that most of the perpetrators are boys, ridiculing girls for their achievements and using violence to “prove masculinity” and gain popularity. Boys are ridiculed for not having romantic partners, which often leads to aggression. Peer pressure also causes boys to verbally abuse girls who refuse their advances, and resort to behaviours such as taking pictures of their underwear in class or through toilet windows. Gangs are common and contribute to violence, serving as venues for violent interactions among boys.

Another factor fuelling school violence is lack of understanding and intolerance of demographic and individual diverse identities – like nationality, gender and sexual orientation, physical appearance, culture and religion. Migrant learners are subjected to xenophobic attitudes where they are body shamed and insulted. Learners are the target of homophobic statements because of their gender and sexual identities. Dark-skinned and slender learners are often targeted, with teasing guised as humour.

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Read more: Taunts and bullying drive children with albinism from Tanzanian schools

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Way forward

The purpose of this review project was to map the literature on factors contributing to school violence in the Southern African Development Community region. It could be useful in other similar regions too.

We suggest education ministries and schools countries could consider:

• implementing clear school policies on how to report and respond to incidents of school violence

• training teachers and school administrators on national and school policies for addressing school violence and promoting professionalism

• documenting incidents of school violence and developing strategies to create safe environments

• collaboration among schools, parents and psychosocial support personnel, such as school social workers, to reduce violence in schools.

We argue that different intervention programmes and services need to be adopted to address the root causes of violence. Deploying more school social workers would be part of this effort.

– School violence doesn’t happen in isolation: what research from southern Africa is telling us
– https://theconversation.com/school-violence-doesnt-happen-in-isolation-what-research-from-southern-africa-is-telling-us-269288

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

US president Donald Trump’s efforts to derail a successful wrap-up of the G20 summit in Johannesburg failed. Trump boycotted the meeting and the US told other countries through diplomatic channels not to sign a communiqué. Nevertheless, the 19 remaining countries and regional organisations signed a 30-page declaration. This called for, among other things, increased funding for renewable energy projects, more equitable critical mineral supply chains and debt relief for poorer countries. Senior research fellow Danny Bradlow explains what was, and wasn’t, achieved.

In what ways was South Africa’s G20 presidency a success?

The G20 has been a great diplomatic success for South Africa in at least three ways.

First, it succeeded in leading all the other G20 countries and organisations to adopt by consensus a leaders’ declaration despite a boycott and bullying tactics by Washington.

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Read more: G20 in a changing world: is it still useful? Four scholars weigh in

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The 120 paragraph Leaders’ Declaration covered all the issues embodied in the “Solidarity, Equality and Sustainability” theme that South Africa chose for the G20. They included:

• debt and access to affordable, sustainable finance

• financing for a just energy transition

• critical minerals

• inequality

• a second phase for the Compact with Africa The first phase was launched in 2017 during Germany’s G20 presidency and provided a framework for Africa’s engagement with its development partners.

• illicit financial flows

• inclusive growth.

Second, South Africa succeeded in launching a number of initiatives over the course of the year.

Firstly, the G20 acknowledged South Africa’s five years of support for the establishment of an African Engagement Framework within the G20’s finance track. It is intended to support enhanced cooperation between Africa and the G20.

Secondly, leaders expressed support, in various ways, for the G20 working group initiatives on illicit financial flows, infrastructure, air quality, artificial intelligence, sustainable development and public health. The ministerial declaration on debt was also supported. This includes reforms around initiatives supporting low and middle income countries facing debt challenges.

Thirdly, the Ubuntu Legacy Initiative was launched. This is designed to fund cross-border infrastructure in Africa. It was also agreed that an Ubuntu Commission will be set up to encourage research and dialogue on dealing cooperatively with global challenges. Ubuntu can be explained with reference to the isiZulu saying ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ which means ‘a person is a person through other people.’ It entails an ethics of care, compassion and cooperation.

Lastly, South Africa succeeded in delivering an effective, efficient and constructive G20 year. This is no small feat. It required the country to organise more than 130 meetings of G20 working groups, task forces and ministerial meetings, in addition to the leaders’ summit.

Is this only a good news story?

It is inevitable that any complex, multifaceted and voluntary process involving participants with strong and contrasting views will not be an unqualified success.

This, without doubt, is the case with South Africa’s G20 year. The environment was complicated by a number of factors:

• the wars in Gaza, Ukraine and Sudan

• the actions of the US and some of its allies to undermine the international community’s efforts to address the intertwined challenges of climate, biodiversity, energy, poverty, inequality, food insecurity, debt, technology and development, and

• trade wars initiated by Trump imposing tariffs on trading partners.

These factors meant that getting the diverse membership of the G20 to reach agreement on a broad range of complex issues would be extremely difficult. In fact, it would only be possible to do so at a high level of abstraction.

Unfortunately, this proved to be the case. The result is that the G20 Leaders’ Declaration largely boils down to a set of general statements that are almost totally devoid of commitments for which states can be held accountable. Such general statements are not uncommon in the diplomatic statements issued at the end of high-level multilateral meetings. However, this is an extreme example.

The leaders expressed their support for a number of voluntary principles on issues such as disaster relief, artificial intelligence, critical minerals and debt. They also expressed support for the work of organisations like the multilateral development banks and the International Monetary Fund, and for some specific South African led initiatives like the review of the G20 itself.

However, there are no time frames or deliverables attached to these expressions of support.

What needs to be done to make the declaration effective?

The G20 is a voluntary association with no binding authority. The declaration’s efficacy therefore ultimately depends on all the G20’s stakeholders both taking – and advocating – for action on the issues raised in it.

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Read more: The G20: how it works, why it matters and what would be lost if it failed

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These stakeholders include states and non-state actors like international organisations, businesses and civil society organisations.

The value of the declaration is how both the state and non-state actors use it to advocate for action. That can be in future G20 meetings as well as other regional and international forums.

How can the declaration be used to lead to action?

One of the biggest challenges facing African countries is debt. Over 20 are either in debt distress or at high risk of debt distress. Many African countries are being forced to choose between servicing their debts and investing in the development and climate resilience of their own populations.

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Read more: Africa has a debt crisis: momentum from G20 in South Africa can help find solutions

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The challenge that this creates for African states is exacerbated by their limited access to affordable, predictable and sustainable sources of development finance.

This means that African countries are unlikely to gain a sustainable path to reaching their development and climate goals without substantial action on debt and development finance. The Leaders’ Declaration, in paragraphs 14-22, clearly recognises the challenge. Key elements include:

• the endorsement of the statement their finance minister and central bank governors made on debt sustainability

• a reiteration of the support for the Common Framework for dealing with low-income countries in debt distress. The framework establishes a process for dealing with the official and commercial debt. But the process has proven to be too slow and cumbersome.

• a commitment to working with the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable to explore better ways to meet the needs of debtor countries in distress and their creditors. This roundtable establishes an informal mechanism that brings together creditors and debtors and other stakeholders in sovereign debt to discuss ways to improve restructuring processes.

But these will be just empty words unless the endorsements are turned into action.

There are three actions that stakeholders can take.

First, African leaders can form a regional borrowers’ forum to discuss the debt issue and share information on their experiences dealing with creditors and on developing common African positions on development finance and debt. This would build on the work done by:

• the African Expert Panel appointed by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, and

• the African finance ministers under the auspices of the African Union and the UN Economic Commission on Africa.

They can also use this forum to engage in open discussions with African non-state actors.

Second, African non-state actors can develop strategies for holding the leaders accountable if they fail to follow up on the declaration. And they can hold creditors accountable for their actions in their negotiations with African debtors in distress.

Third, African non-state actors should initiate a review of how the IMF needs to reform its operational policies and practices. Africa has eloquently advocated for greater African voice and vote in IMF governance. The next step should be to explore how the substantial changes that have taken place in the scope of IMF operations can be translated into operational practices. These include the macroeconomic impacts of climate, gender and inequality –

– South Africa’s G20 presidency: diplomatic victory, but a weak final declaration
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-g20-presidency-diplomatic-victory-but-a-weak-final-declaration-270476

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Joseph E. Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia Business School, Columbia University

Given the escalating scale of inequality in the world, shouldn’t countries be banding together to set up an international panel on the issue, along the same lines as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations body set up to assess the science related to climate change? The idea of setting up an international panel on inequality has been recommended by the G20 Extraordinary Committee of Independent Experts on Global Inequality.

The thinking behind the panel is set out in a report delivered to the G20 by the experts on the inequality committee. They argue that the proposed inequality panel would “support governments and multilateral agencies with authoritative assessments and analyses of inequality”. It wouldn’t make any recommendations for countries. Rather it would offer a menu of policies that could be used to address inequality. Panel leader and Nobel laureaute Joseph E. Stiglitz explains what’s behind the idea.

What are the report’s main findings on inequality?

Our report looked at the research on the state of inequality – and the conclusion should alarm us all. Wealth inequality is far worse than income inequality and has intensified in most countries over the last 40 years.

The global increase in income and wealth at the upper end of the scale is particularly worrying. The very richest people are amassing fortunes while ordinary people’s lives stagnate. For every dollar of wealth created since the year 2000, 41 cents have gone to the richest 1% of people, while just one cent has gone to the bottom 50%.

This wealth brings huge influence over economies and politics, threatening economic performance and the very foundations of democracy.

What does the report recommend the G20 countries do to deal with inequality?

Inequality is a choice. There are policies that can reduce it. These include more progressive taxation, debt relief, rewriting global trade rules and curbing monopolies.

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Read more: Inequality in Africa: what drives it, how to end it and what some countries are getting right

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Our committee found that there has been significant progress in tracking inequality’s scale, drivers and policy solutions. Nevertheless, policymakers still lack sufficient, dependable or accessible information on inequality.

There is a great institutional need for strong inequality analysis.

In 1988, governments set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the data and provide rigorous analyses to help governments tackle the climate emergency. Today, we are in an inequality emergency and need a similar global effort.

That is why our primary recommendation is to establish an International Panel on Inequality.

Drawing from the report, what do you recommend South Africa should do to reduce inequality?

South Africa has shown extraordinary leadership in focusing its G20 presidency on solidarity, equality and sustainability. This report is testament to that. We hope that South Africa will continue to champion our recommendations, particularly the establishment of an International Panel on Inequality.

Our committee chose not to comment on specific policies in specific countries. But our report contains a menu of policies which can tackle inequality. These include national measures like stronger competition laws, pro-worker regulation, investing in public services, and more progressive tax and expenditure policies.

– Global inequality is as urgent as climate change: the world needs a panel of experts to steer solutions
– https://theconversation.com/global-inequality-is-as-urgent-as-climate-change-the-world-needs-a-panel-of-experts-to-steer-solutions-270102

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mary Kinney, Senior Lecturer with the Global Surgery Division, University of Cape Town

Nearly one million babies are stillborn in Africa every year. Behind every stillbirth is a mother, a family and a story left untold. Most of these are preventable, many unrecorded, and too often invisible. Each number hides a moment of heartbreak, and every uncounted loss represents a missed opportunity to learn and to act.

As a public health researcher specialising in maternal and newborn health, I have spent the past two decades working on strengthening health systems and quality of care across Africa. My research has focused on understanding how health systems can prevent stillbirths and provide respectful, people-centred care for women and newborns. Most recently, I was part of the team that led a new report called Improving Stillbirth Data Recording, Collection and Reporting in Africa. It is the first continent-wide assessment of how African countries record and use stillbirth data.

The study, conducted jointly by the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, the University of Cape Town, the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine and the United Nations Children’s Fund, surveyed all 55 African Union member states between 2022 and 2024, with 33 countries responding.

The burden of stillbirths in Africa is staggering. Africa accounts for half of all stillbirths globally, with nearly eight times higher rates than in Europe. Even stillbirths that happen in health facilities may never make it into official statistics despite every maternity registry documenting this birth outcome.

Part of the challenge is that there are multiple data systems for capturing births and deaths, including stillbirths, like routine health information systems, civil registration and other surveillance systems. But these systems often don’t speak to each other either within countries or between countries. This data gap hides both the true burden and the preventable causes.

Despite advances in several countries to prevent stillbirths, large gaps remain, especially on data systems. Only a handful of African countries routinely report stillbirth data to the UN, and many rely on outdated or incomplete records. Without reliable, comparable data, countries cannot fully understand where and why stillbirths occur or which interventions save lives.

Strengthening stillbirth data is not just about numbers; it is about visibility, accountability and change. When countries count every stillbirth and use the data for health system improvement, they can strengthen care at birth for mothers and newborns and give every child a fair start in life.

Findings

The report was based on a regional survey of ministries of health. This was followed by document reviews and expert consultations to assess national systems, policies and practices for stillbirth reporting and review.

The report reveals that 60% of African countries have national and sub-national committees responsible for collecting and using stillbirth data, which produce national reports to respective health ministries. But data use remains limited. Capacity gaps, fragmented systems and insufficient funding prevents many countries from translating information into action.

To guide investment and accountability, the report categorises countries into three readiness levels:

1. Mature systems needing strengthening, such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. These countries have consistent data flows but need more analysis and use.

2. Partial systems requiring support, where reporting mechanisms exist but are not systematically implemented, like Ghana, Malawi and Tanzania.

3. Foundational systems still being built, including fragile or conflict-affected countries like South Sudan and Somalia. Here, policies and structures for data collection and use remain absent.

The findings show both progress and persistent gaps. Two-thirds of African countries now include stillbirths in their national health strategies, and more than half have set reduction targets. Nearly all countries report that they routinely record stillbirths through their health sectors using standard forms and definitions, yet these definitions vary widely. Most systems depend on data reported from health facilities. But the lack of integration between health, civil registration and other data systems means that countless losses never enter national statistics.

For example, if a woman delivers at home alone in Mozambique and the baby is stillborn, the loss is only known to the family and community. Without a facility register entry or civil registration notification, the death never reaches district or national statistics. Even when a stillbirth occurs in a health centre, the health worker may log it in a facility register but not report it to the civil registration system. This means the loss of the baby remains invisible in official data.

What this means

Stillbirths are a sensitive measure of how health systems are performing. They reflect whether women can access timely, quality care during pregnancy and at birth. But unlike maternal deaths, which are often a benchmark for health system strength, stillbirths remain largely absent from accountability frameworks.

Their causes, like untreated infections, complications during labour, or delays in accessing emergency caesarean sections, are often preventable. The same interventions that prevent a stillbirth also reduce maternal deaths. These improve newborn survival, and lay the foundation for better health and development outcomes in early childhood.

Accurate data on stillbirths can guide clinical care and direct scarce resources to where they are needed most. When data systems are strong, leaders can identify where and why stillbirths occur, track progress and make informed decisions to prevent future tragedies.

The analysis also highlights promising signs of momentum. Over two-thirds of countries now reference stillbirths in national health plans, an important marker of growing political attention. Several countries are moving from isolated data collection to more coordinated, system-wide approaches. This progress shows that change is possible when stillbirths are integrated into national health information systems and supported by investment in workforce capacity, supervision and data quality.

What’s needed

Africa has the knowledge, evidence and experience to make change happen.

The report calls for harmonised definitions, national targets and stronger connections and data use between the different data sources within and across African countries. Above all, it calls for collective leadership and investment to turn information into impact, so that every stillbirth is counted, every death review leads to learning and no parent grieves alone.

The author acknowledges and appreciates the partners involved in developing the report and the support from the Global Surgery Division at UCT.

– Africa’s hidden stillbirth crisis: new report exposes major policy and data gaps
– https://theconversation.com/africas-hidden-stillbirth-crisis-new-report-exposes-major-policy-and-data-gaps-268901