Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Claudia Christowitz, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Stellenbosch University

Cancer treatment is becoming more personalised. By considering a patient’s unique genetic and molecular profile, along with their lifestyle and environmental factors, doctors can make more accurate treatment decisions. This approach, known as personalised or precision medicine, has been increasingly used in South Africa and has expanded to other African countries in recent decades. It requires doctors to rely more on genetic tests to guide decisions. But these tests don’t always give clear answers. Functional genomics may offer a way to improve the interpretation of unclear genetic test results. We spoke to physiological scientist Claudia Christowitz about it.

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Is cancer a genetic disease and what is personalised medicine?

Cancer is fundamentally a genetic disease. It arises when changes in a person’s DNA (referred to as variants or mutations) disrupt normal cell functions such as cell growth and division. It eventually leads to tumour formation. These changes can be inherited from families or acquired during a person’s lifetime. This can be due to lifestyle and environmental risk factors such as smoking, ultraviolet radiation and infectious agents, among others.

Over the past few decades, we’ve entered the era of personalised medicine. As a result, the role of genetics in cancer treatment has become more prominent. Personalised medicine involves tailoring cancer treatment to each patient’s unique characteristics.

For example, even if two people are diagnosed with the same type and stage of cancer, their treatment outcomes may differ. This is because factors such as their genetic and molecular make-up, overall health status, age, body composition, lifestyle habits, and use of other medication can all influence how well a treatment works for them.

How have advances in genetic testing helped in treating cancer?

Advances in DNA sequencing technologies have made it possible to detect genetic variants more quickly and accurately. The tests can look for just a few genes linked to certain medical conditions, or they can describe the entire genome of an individual, or just the protein-coding regions of the genome (the exome).

DNA sequencing has revolutionised cancer care. Doctors can use it to improve prevention in people who are at risk of cancer, detect cancer early, and select the most appropriate treatment.

Africa’s first high-throughput Genomics Centre was launched in 2019 by the South African Medical Research Council. Cancer patients can now undergo whole exome sequencing and whole genome sequencing locally for around R10,000 (about US$566) to R20,000 (about US$1,132). This is sometimes covered by medical insurance. These services are also available at research facilities like the Centre for Proteomic and Genomic Research or the Centre for Epidemiological Research and Innovation at Stellenbosch University.

These facilities strengthen the capacity to sequence, analyse and store human genomes, particularly for the diverse gene pool in Africa. But routine genome sequencing, especially in the public health sector, remains limited due to high costs, limited awareness and the need for trained personnel.

What are the shortcomings of genetic testing?

Genetic testing doesn’t provide all the answers. Unfortunately, not all genetic results are clear-cut. In many cases, patients receive results showing changes in their DNA that cannot be confidently classified as either harmful (pathogenic variants or mutations) or harmless (benign variants). These unclassified variants are known as variants of uncertain significance. The uncertainty often leaves both patients and their oncologists (cancer doctors) unsure of the way forward.

With the advancement of sequencing technologies, rare or novel variants are more frequently detected. But without a clear understanding of whether the variant affects gene function, clinicians are often forced to wait – sometimes for years – until more information emerges.

When patients undergo genetic testing – often as part of a hereditary cancer screening or in response to early-onset or familial cancers – the hope is to find a variant that clearly explains their condition. But sequencing may yield variants of uncertain significance, raising questions about its usefulness in patient care and whether the tests are worth the cost.

What is functional genomics and how can it make genetic test results clearer?

Functional genomics is a growing field that could transform how we interpret these unresolved genetic results and make it possible to improve clinical care for cancer patients.

Functional genomics goes beyond simply reading the DNA code. It investigates how genetic variants behave in biological systems. By examining how a variant alters gene expression, protein function, cell behaviour, or response to treatments, scientists can determine whether it is likely to be benign or pathogenic.

This information is crucial for making timely medical decisions. Importantly, cells derived from patients can be used to mimic real biological conditions more accurately. By using cells carrying such a variant and comparing them to cells without the variant, scientists can determine whether the variant is influencing the response of cells to certain treatments or not.

In short: genetic testing is like reading the “instruction manual” of a cell. Functional genomics is like testing the effects of changes to these instructions.

My study, using patient-derived cells, investigated the effects of a rare TP53 variant that was identified for the first time in germline (inherited) DNA through whole exome sequencing in a South African family with multiple cancers. I found that this variant made cells resistant to the chemotherapy drug doxorubicin. Instead of undergoing cell death as expected, the cells went into a kind of “sleep mode” called senescence, where damaged cells stop dividing.

Although this prevents the growth of damaged cells, senescent cells can release signals that may inflame and harm nearby healthy cells. The variant also reduced how well immune cells can move, which may affect their ability to go to cancer cells and attack them. This study, supervised by Prof Anna-Mart Engelbrecht, Prof Maritha Kotze, and Dr Daniel Olivier from Stellenbosch University, highlighted how functional genomics can unravel the impact of a variant of uncertain significance, which may guide medical decisions.

In a world where personalised medicine is rapidly evolving, functional genomics represents a critical step forward, offering more clarity, better care, and renewed hope to those facing cancer.

– Genetic tests for cancer can give uncertain results: new science is making the picture clearer to guide treatment
– https://theconversation.com/genetic-tests-for-cancer-can-give-uncertain-results-new-science-is-making-the-picture-clearer-to-guide-treatment-262545

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kristof Titeca, Professor in International Development, University of Antwerp

A series of peace initiatives since 2021 have sought to address the escalation of conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) following a renewed offensive from the M23 rebel group.

The origins of this crisis go back to the First Congo War in 1996. Since then, the intensity of conflict in eastern DRC has ebbed and surged. The current M23 offensive represents one of its most violent phases.

Over nearly three decades, numerous peace efforts have been undertaken, yet neither local, regional nor international interventions have succeeded in bringing lasting stability. Crucially, they have failed to tackle the broader dynamics that perpetuate violence in the country’s mineral-rich east, where at least 120 armed groups are estimated to be active.

These recent efforts include the Nairobi process launched in April 2022 by the East African Community, and the Luanda process in June of the same year, launched by Angolan president João Lourenço.

The East African Community deployed its regional force to the DRC in November 2022. This was followed by the Southern African Development Community deploying troops in December 2023. These troops withdrew in 2023 and 2025, respectively.

More recently, there have been peace talks in Doha, which started after a meeting between the presidents of Congo and Rwanda in March 2025. The US mediated in Washington from April 2025.

The conflict has continued to escalate. More than 7.8 million people are now internally displaced in eastern DRC. Another 28 million people are facing food insecurity, including nearly four million at emergency levels.

Why have peace processes failed to deliver stability, and what could be done to strengthen them?

I have studied the dynamics of conflict in central Africa for decades, and in my view, the persistence of conflict in DRC’s eastern region isn’t due to a lack of peace initiatives. I argue that some initiatives suffer from flawed design, others from difficult implementation, and some from a combination of both.

Deep mistrust, stalled commitments, the exclusion of key actors, fragmented mediation efforts, an overemphasis on economic incentives, and weak domestic legitimacy have all undermined progress.

Ideally, peace processes would address these shortcomings comprehensively and lay the foundations for lasting stability.

But ideal conditions rarely exist.

The challenge, therefore, is to use sustained diplomacy to make the current imperfect frameworks work more effectively, while gradually building the trust and inclusivity needed for more durable peace.

What’s gone wrong

1. Deep mistrust between the parties

Peace processes since 2021 have focused on negotiating peace between the DRC government, M23 representatives (and their political wing Alliance Fleuve Congo) and the Rwandan government. The UN and many others have shown that Rwanda has been supporting the M23, a claim Kigali repeatedly denies.

At the heart of the failures of these processes lies a profound lack of trust. Relations between Kinshasa, M23 and Kigali are marked by hostility, mutual suspicion and broken promises.

Moreover, M23, Alliance Fleuve Congo and Rwanda cannot be treated as interchangeable actors. Among these actors, differences remain over the ultimate objectives of the rebellion – whether to march on Kinshasa, secure control over key territories in the east, or build influence through Congolese state structures versus a de facto separate administration.

Continued atrocities on the ground reinforce distrust. Recent reports from the UN, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International document continued killings and summary executions of Congolese civilians by M23 rebels with Rwandan backing, raising concerns of ethnic cleansing. These have happened alongside abuses by Congolese forces and allied militias (grouped as Wazalendo).

2. Poor implementation measures

Because of this mistrust, parties are reluctant to take the first step in implementing agreements. The 19 July 2025 Doha Declaration of Principles, for example, committed both sides to prisoner exchanges and the restoration of state authority in rebel-held zones. Yet, Kinshasa refused to exchange prisoners before a final settlement, a condition M23 saw as essential.

3. Failing to include all regional actors

The war in eastern DRC involves multiple neighbouring states. Uganda, in particular, has a significant military presence and shares Rwanda’s concerns and motivations: both see the area as a security threat and an economic opportunity, especially through gold exports and cross-border trade. Yet, Uganda has been excluded from some negotiations.

In early August 2025, African states announced they would merge mediation structures by the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union into one solidified process led by the African Union. This could potentially bring in these regional actors, particularly Uganda.

4. Duplication and fragmentation of initiatives

A recurring problem since the renewed outbreak of conflict in 2021 has been the proliferation of parallel and overlapping peace initiatives, involving different actors, and not necessarily bringing coherence.

5. The role and limits of external pressure

The success of negotiations to some extent depends on how much diplomatic bandwidth the mediating actors want to spend.

In the current context, US pressure is key. And indeed, in light of renewed fighting in mid-August 2025, the US has released a number of statements and sanctions against the parties involved – mostly M23. Yet, expectations of heavy-handed US intervention, including the unrealistic notion of American “boots on the ground”, have created disappointment among a number of actors, particularly in the DRC.

6. Economic incentives alone are insufficient

The Washington process placed heavy emphasis on promoting trade with the US, presenting economic growth as a pathway to stability. But peace requires more than economic deals. This approach risks reducing a multidimensional conflict – rooted in political, security and social grievances – to a question of markets. This risks prioritising US economic interests rather than addressing local realities.

7. Weak internal legitimacy

Finally, the legitimacy of the current peace deals within the DRC remains contested. The intensifying conflict has coincided with mounting domestic criticism of President Felix Tshisekedi, whose authority was undermined by his inability to resolve the violence. Agreements have been criticised by Congolese civil society as externally driven and insufficiently inclusive. They have not been ratified by parliament nor have they involved civil society or grassroots actors.

What needs to change?

Eastern DRC remains mired in conflict despite peace initiatives. Broken promises, weak implementation, and deep mistrust keep progress at bay. Economic incentives alone can’t solve a crisis rooted in politics, security and social grievances.

Outside powers can only apply leverage. Durable peace must be negotiated and owned by the parties themselves. And without broader buy-in, peace processes risk functioning merely as cooling-off mechanisms, not genuine pathways toward resolution.

– DRC’s latest peace deal is breaking down and it isn’t the first – what’s being done wrong
– https://theconversation.com/drcs-latest-peace-deal-is-breaking-down-and-it-isnt-the-first-whats-being-done-wrong-264064

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Francis Thackeray, Honorary Research Associate, Evolutionary Studies Institute, University of the Witwatersrand

What’s the link between an exploding star, climate change and human evolution? Francis Thackeray, who has researched ancient environments and fossils for many years, sets out his ideas about what happened in the distant past – with enormous consequences.

Global cooling that happened millions of years ago was thought to be the result of ocean currents. He suggests instead it could have been due to the impacts of remnants of supernovae. The timing of supernovae, climate changes and species evolution coincides.

What is your supernova hypothesis?

My hypothesis is that remnants of a supernova – an exploding star – had an impact on the Earth’s past climate, causing global cooling, between 3 million and 2.6 million years ago and that this indirectly affected the evolution of hominins (ancient relatives of humans).

How does this change assumptions held until now?

It has been considered by some that global cooling in the Plio-Pleistocene might have been due to changes in ocean currents. This may well be correct to some extent, but I think that the supernova hypothesis needs to be explored.

It’s super-exciting to think that our evolution may to some extent be associated with supernovae as part of our dynamic universe.

How did you come to your supernova hypothesis?

Supernovae include stars which are extremely massive (as much as five times the mass of our Sun) and have reached the end of their stellar evolution. These explosions are rare. On average, within our galaxy (the Milky Way), only one or two per century are visible from Earth as temporary bright stars.

As a result of such explosions, material is expelled into outer space at almost the speed of light. Chemical elements are formed, including a kind of iron (the element Fe) known as isotope Fe-60. It has 26 protons and as many as 34 neutrons.

Traces of Fe-60 iron isotopes from supernovae within the last ten million years have been discovered on Earth in marine deposits such as those drilled in cores in the east Indian Ocean.

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Read more: Our oceans give new insights on elements made in supernovae

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The deep-sea deposits with Fe-60 can be dated using radioactive elements which decay at a known rate. This is called radiometric dating.

There was a regular increase in extremely small traces of Fe-60 for the period between 3 million and 2.6 million years ago. We know this from data published by Anton Wallner and his colleagues. Since this is a linear trend I have been able to extrapolate back to 3.3 million years when initial cosmic rays may have first hit Earth. I have proposed in the Quest magazine that this initial cosmic impact correlates with a major glaciation (cooling) event called M2 in an otherwise warm period.

A “near earth” supernova could have produced cosmic rays (radiation from outer space) which might have caused a reduction in the earth’s ozone layer. Increased cloud cover associated with cosmic radiation could have been a factor related to changes in global climate. Specifically, the change would have been global cooling.

This cooling would have affected the distribution and abundance of plant species, in turn affecting that of animals dependent on such vegetation.

What potential new insights does the hypothesis give us into human evolution?

Populations of Australopithecus may have been indirectly affected by the decrease in temperature.

Australopithecus is the genus name for distant human relatives which lived in Africa in geological periods called the Pliocene and Pleistocene. The boundary between these time intervals is 2.58 million years ago. At that time, certain species went extinct. The period coincides closely with the maximum of Fe-60 in marine deposits and a change in Earth’s magnetic field.

The first fossil of Australopithecus to be described, 100 years ago, was placed by the palaeontologist Raymond Dart in a species called A. africanus. Dubbed the “Taung Child”, it was discovered in South Africa. Its biochronological age, recently based on mathematical analyses of tooth dimensions, is about 2.6 million years – at the Plio-Pleistocene boundary.

It cannot be concluded that the death of the Taung Child was directly caused by a supernova. This would be far-fetched. There is in fact evidence that this individual, about 3 years old, was killed by an eagle.

However, it is plausible to suggest that in Africa, in the Plio-Pleistocene, populations of Australopithecus were affected by a decrease in temperature affecting the distribution and abundance of vegetation and the animals dependent on it.

Recently, a new species of Australopithecus (as yet not named, from Ledi-Geraru) has been discovered in Ethiopia, in deposits dated at about 2.6 million years ago – also the time of the maximum in Fe-60 in deep-sea deposits.

The appearance of the genus Homo is close to the Plio-Pleistocene boundary, reflected by fossils reported recently by Brian Villmoare and his colleagues and well dated at about 2.8 million years ago. The origin of Homo may relate to changes in temperature and associated changes in habitat, as recognised five decades ago by South African palaeontologists Elisabeth Vrba and Bob Brain, although they emphasised a date of 2.5 million years ago.

Is it possible that cosmic radiation stimulated genetic changes?

I have been told by my peers that I am inclined to think “out of the box”. Well, in this case I would like to propose a “hominoid mutation hypothesis”. The hypothesis states that the speciation of hominoids (including human ancestors and those of chimpanzees and gorillas) was to some extent associated with mutations and genetic variability caused by cosmic rays.

It is interesting to consider the possibility that the origin of our genus Homo relates in part to cosmic radiation. Going deeper back in time, Henrik Svensmark has demonstrated that there is a correlation between supernova frequency and speciation (increased biodiversity associated with the evolution of new species), for the last 500 million years (the Phanerozoic period). I think it’s entirely possible that one important cause behind this correlation was the mutagenic (mutation-causing) effect of cosmic rays on DNA, such that rates of speciation exceeded those of extinction.

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Read more: Exploding stars are rare but emit torrents of radiation − if one happened close enough to Earth, it could threaten life on the planet

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In hominoids, cosmic rays could have contributed not only to global cooling but also to genetic changes, with subsequent anatomical (morphological) changes related to speciation.

If we go back to about 7 million years ago (when Fe-60 again reflects supernova activity), we would expect to find fossils that are close to a common ancestor for chimpanzees and humans. In terms of the hominoid mutation hypothesis, the split could have been associated with cosmic radiation. One hominoid species about 7 million years old is Sahelanthropus (discovered by Michel Brunet in Chad). In my opinion this species is very close to the common ancestor for Homo sapiens (us) and chimps.

– Supernova theory links an exploding star to global cooling and human evolution
– https://theconversation.com/supernova-theory-links-an-exploding-star-to-global-cooling-and-human-evolution-263748

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mahtaab Hayat, Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

Breast cancer is the most common cancer in women worldwide. In sub-Saharan Africa, it is a leading cause of cancer-related deaths among women.

Risk factors for developing breast cancer include being female, increasing age, being overweight, alcohol consumption and genetic factors.

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Read more: Breast cancer is the most common cancer in the world. 5 reads that could save lives

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In this field, genome-wide association studies are a powerful tool. They can identify common genetic variants, or mutations, that can affect your likelihood of developing a trait or disease. These studies scan the whole genome (all of a person’s DNA) to find genetic differences present in people with a particular disease or traits.

Since their introduction in 2005, these studies have provided insights that can help in the diagnosis, screening and prediction of certain diseases, including breast cancer. Recent findings have been used to develop prediction tools that help identify individuals at high risk of developing diseases. Genetic risk scores (also known as polygenic risk scores) estimate disease predisposition based on the cumulative effect of multiple genetic variants or mutations.

But most research has been conducted on populations of European ancestry. This poses a problem, as genetic diversity and environmental variability differ across the world. In Africa, even greater genetic diversity is observed across populations.

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Read more: Major study unveils complexity and vast diversity of Africa’s genetic variation

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To fill this gap we – researchers from Wits University, Sydney Brenner Institute for Molecular Bioscience, and our collaborators, the South African National Cancer Registry – conducted the first genome-wide association study of breast cancer in a sub-Saharan African population.

We compared genetic variation between women with breast cancer and those without, looking for variants that occur more frequently in the cancer patients.

We identified two genomic variants close to the RAB27A and USP22 genes that contribute to the risk of breast cancer in South African black women. These genetic variants have not been previously found to be associated with breast cancer in non-African populations.

Our findings underscore the importance of identifying population-specific genetic variants, particularly in understudied populations. Different populations may carry unique variants that contribute differently to breast cancer risk. Risk variants found in other populations might not be found in African populations. This reinforces the idea that research efforts and risk scores must be done in different populations, including African ones.

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Read more: West Africans have a high risk of kidney disease – new study confirms genetic cause

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Comparing women’s DNA

DNA samples from 2,485 women with breast cancer were compared to 1,101 women without breast cancer. All the women were residents of Soweto in South Africa. The breast cancer cases were recruited to the Johannesburg Cancer Study over 20 years and the controls were from the Africa Wits-INDEPTH Partnership for Genomic Research study.

The analysis used technology (called a DNA chip) specially designed by the H3Africa consortium to capture the genetic variants within African populations.

By comparing genetic variation in women with breast cancer and in those without, we identified two genetic variants that contribute to the risk of breast cancer in South African black women. They occur around genes that are involved in the growth of breast cancer cells, in the ability of cancer cells to metastasise (spread), and in tumour growth in different cancers.

We also applied polygenic risk scores to our African dataset. This is a method that estimates the risk of breast cancer for an individual based on the presence of risk variants. These are derived from the results of genome-wide association studies. The risk score we used was based on risk variants from a European population. We used it to evaluate its ability to predict breast cancer in our African population.

The results showed that the risk score was less able to predict breast cancer in our sub-Saharan African population compared to a European population.

What next?

This is the first large-scale genome-wide association analysis in sub-Saharan Africa to find genetic factors that affect an individual’s risk of developing breast cancer.

Our study included fewer than 4,000 samples. Larger breast cancer genetic studies have involved over 200,000 cases and controls, but without representation from sub-Saharan African populations. This highlights the urgent need for greater research efforts and increased participation from the continent.

The results from this and future studies will help doctors screen patients and pinpoint those with a high risk. Once we know who is at high risk, they can be offered more frequent check-ups and preventive measures. This allows us to catch breast cancer early – or even prevent it – before it has a chance to develop or spread.

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Read more: How we found the gene for a rare heart disease and why it matters

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Further research will be needed to understand how these genes increase the risk of developing breast cancer and improve breast cancer prediction. Notably, applying European-derived polygenic risk scores did not accurately predict breast cancer in the African dataset. And they performed worse than in non-African datasets. These results are consistent with findings reported previously for other diseases.

We are involved in a global study of the genetics of breast cancer called Confluence which is looking at genetic risk factors in many populations, including African ones.

Professor Christopher Mathew and Beth Amato helped in the writing of this article.

– Breast cancer: new study finds genetic risk in African women
– https://theconversation.com/breast-cancer-new-study-finds-genetic-risk-in-african-women-263227

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Selma Uugwanga, Clinical Psychologist (Namibia) and PhD Researcher on Emerging Adulthood in sub-Saharan Africa, University of Zurich

Around the world, people become adults in different ways. In some places, it’s when you get a job, get married, or move out of your parents’ house. In others it might include an initiation ritual, or taking leadership in your family or community.

These milestones may differ, but they all point to the same question: what does it mean to “become an adult”? Understanding this matters – not only for psychologists who study human development and behaviour, but also for society, because adulthood is more than just getting older. It shapes our motivations and identity, how we relate to others, and our mental health and well-being.

Local views on adulthood set the stage for how young people learn to take responsibility and find their place in the world.

We are cross-cultural personality and developmental psychology researchers who study emerging adulthood, identity development, personality, and mental health. We were interested in what the transition to adulthood looks like in sub-Saharan Africa – specifically, among the Ovawambo people of Namibia. One of us (Selma Uugwanga) is Omuwambo, offering an important insider perspective.

We interviewed 50 young Ovawambo adults, aged 18 to 25, living in both rural and urban areas of Namibia. We wanted to understand how they defined adulthood: what signals its beginning? What responsibilities and challenges come with it?

Our goal was to centre African perspectives, which are underrepresented in global psychology, and to understand how traditional values and modern realities shape the experience of growing up.

We identified five key themes, relating to gender roles, birth order, becoming a parent, community responsibility, and psychological maturity. A common thread was how participants connected personal aims and achievements with the capacity and duty to help others. An adult is someone who can care for both themself and for others.

Our findings are a reminder that there is no single pathway to adulthood. Recognising cultural differences is essential if we want to build a truly inclusive understanding of human development across the globe.

Why Namibia and the Ovawambo?

Namibia, a country in the south-western part of Africa with a population of about 3 million, is home to many ethnic groups. Nearly half of the population are Ovawambo. Traditionally, Ovawambo communities included formal rites of passage to adulthood, such as ceremonies and new roles in the household or community. For example, the Olufuko ceremony prepared girls around age 14 for womanhood, allowing them to become sexually active, have children and marry. These practices changed during colonialism and later with the rise of Christianity.

Today, things are shifting even more with globalisation. Many young Namibians now stay in school longer, with higher education enrolment rising from just 3% in the 1990s to nearly 29% in 2022. Young people also often wait longer to marry or have children. Yet, unlike their peers in many western countries, daily life is still strongly shaped by family obligations and community ties. For example, one young participant explained that he supported his grandmother and took on responsibilities for other relatives because his parents had limited resources.

Since Namibia’s independence in 1990, rural-to-urban migration has surged. The country’s urban population has risen from about 28% in 1990 to approximately 54% by 2025. Young people are often navigating between rural traditions and urban change.

While our focus was on Ovawambo youth, this group shares many cultural and social dynamics with other young people in sub-Saharan Africa, and we believe the patterns we observe here may reflect broader regional trends.

Perceptions of adulthood

We collected in-depth interviews, then generated overarching themes from close attention to meaning in participants’ stories.

We spoke with 50 young adults – half of them women – equally split between urban and rural areas in Windhoek and northern Namibia. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 25 years; most had finished secondary school and were enrolled in higher education, with only a few in steady jobs. Almost half lived with parents, and others with siblings, cousins, or extended relatives, showing how family households remain central at this stage of life.

We asked open-ended questions like:

• Do you feel like you’re an adult?

• What are the most important signs of adulthood?

• Is adulthood different for men and women?

• Do your parents consider you as an adult?

These conversations gave us deep insights into how young Namibians view themselves and their roles in society.

From the interviews, we identified five key themes:

1. Gender shapes the path to adulthood

Almost all participants said adulthood looks different for men and women. Ovawambo women are often seen as becoming adults earlier in their teenage years than men, because they take on caregiving roles like cooking and caring for siblings. Men are expected to be independent and financially responsible earlier, but often face more pressure. Both currently contend with high youth unemployment and carry different but significant burdens.

2. Birth order matters

Your position in the family shapes your adult responsibilities. Firstborns, especially in large families, are often expected to help care for siblings or even support the household. This can lead to earlier maturity. By contrast, youngest children are often protected longer, even if they are legally adults.

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Read more: Eldest daughters often carry the heaviest burdens – insights from Madagascar

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3. Parenthood signals change, but not always adulthood

Having a child, especially for women, is often a major turning point. Yet, because parenting is commonly supported by extended family, being a parent doesn’t automatically mean being seen as an adult. Maturity and independence remain essential markers.

4. Family and community responsibility is central

Adulthood in Namibia does not primarily centre on personal independence, but instead on caring for the wider community. An adult is someone who can support family members, neighbours, and others in need – emotionally, financially and socially.

5. Maturity means more than age

Participants emphasised that true adulthood is about behaviour and mindset – thinking carefully, learning from mistakes, showing resilience, and knowing when to seek advice from elders.

Difference in emphasis

Most psychological research on young adulthood focuses on the US and Europe, where this life stage is often framed as a time of freedom, self-focus and exploration. But our study shows a different picture: in Namibia, young adults are embedded in strong social networks and often assume serious responsibilities early in life, with their independence serving as a key resource for doing so.

Despite facing challenges like high unemployment and limited resources, many participants expressed pride in their ability to care for others. They saw responsibility as a source of meaning.

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Read more: Young men on South Africa’s urban margins: new book follows their lives over 10 years

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Some findings mirror patterns seen in other contexts. For example, in East Asia or among immigrant youth in North America, researchers have also found that adulthood is closely linked to family responsibility.

What seems more distinct in Namibia is the emphasis on “agentic communalism”: the idea that personal agency (making your own decisions) and communal values (helping others) are not in conflict. Instead, they are interwoven. Being an adult means both acting independently and contributing to others’ well-being.

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Read more: Survey of young people in east Africa shows their values mirror those of adults

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Becoming an adult in Namibia isn’t just about age or personal milestones. It’s about growing into a role that combines independence with care for others. It means taking responsibility – not only for yourself, but for your family and community – and earning respect through your actions.

– What does it mean to become an adult? In Namibia, it’s caring for others
– https://theconversation.com/what-does-it-mean-to-become-an-adult-in-namibia-its-caring-for-others-263223

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi, Research fellow, University of Birmingham

Across Africa, democracy is being tested – by rising authoritarianism and military coups as well as a growing disconnect between citizens and the institutions meant to represent them.

The latest flagship report from Afrobarometer, a pan African research network, delivers a powerful warning. Citizen Engagement, Citizen Power, released in July 2025, reports that over 60% of Africans are dissatisfied with how democracy works in their countries. Support for democracy remains high, but belief in its effectiveness is fading, especially when citizens feel excluded from meaningful participation in decisions that affect them.

Put simply: the crisis of participation results from people being absent from the room when decisions that affect them are made. This article sets out practical ways parliaments can bring citizens in.

I am a political scientist whose work in comparative politics focuses on political institutions and democratic engagement in Africa. My broader research builds on my PhD on institutional development and legislative public engagement in Nigeria.

This research has shown that democratic fatigue has many roots, including insecurity and unmet socio-economic needs. But the deeper issue is a crisis of participation where decisions that affect people are made without consultation. Too often, Africans feel that decisions are made for them, not with them. Power remains concentrated in elite circles, while public engagement is reduced to symbolic gestures.

Democracy, in this view, is something performed in capitals rather than lived in communities.

If that is to change, parliaments must take the lead. As the institutions most visibly linked to representation, they can reconnect citizens with the democratic process. When parliaments get people to take part, they help restore public confidence. When they fail to do so, the entire democratic project is weakened.

Encouragingly, many African constitutions, including those of Kenya, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, now call for public participation in making laws.

Parliaments are increasingly referring to citizen engagement in their strategic plans, and standout models like South Africa’s Public Participation Model offer practical frameworks.

South Africa’s efforts have contributed to a 27% increase in public understanding of the parliament’s mandates. Evidence from civil society and independent research corroborates this.

But in many countries implementation remains patchy, and most parliaments fall short on including citizens.

According to Afrobarometer’s October 2024 data, trust in parliaments has declined by 19 percentage points since 2011. Only 37% of Africans now express confidence in these critical policy-making and representative bodies.

There’s a sense that public participation is often tokenistic — and that parliaments engage with citizens only when politically convenient.

Two recent examples illustrate the cost of disengagement. In Kenya, mass protests over the 2024 Finance Bill erupted after parliament passed controversial tax measures without adequate public consultation. The backlash, including the storming of parliament, reflected widespread anger not just at the bill’s content, but at the lack of citizen involvement in shaping it.

In Nigeria, lawmakers reinstated a colonial-era national anthem in a single day, bypassing public input.

One of the reasons trust in parliaments is falling is that there are gaps in how the institution listens and acts.

As the Afrobarometer data shows, citizens consistently believed that parliaments hold the key to making laws and holding leaders to account. So the challenge is not what the institution does or is expected to do, it is how it does it. Thus, producing visible actions is one way for parliament to restore public faith.

What Afrobarometer tells us about participation

The message of Citizen Engagement, Citizen Power is clear: citizens want more than just the right to vote. They want to shape decisions, hold leaders accountable, and co-create solutions to the challenges they face. Participation is not a luxury; it is central to the legitimacy and effectiveness of democratic institutions.

For parliaments, this starts with communication. Many citizens are simply unaware of what their parliament does, or how to influence it. Parliamentary websites are often out of date, social media channels underused, and legislative documents filled with inaccessible jargon.

Parliaments must use plain-language summaries, infographics and citizen-focused materials to explain key issues. This is urgent in an era of misinformation and deep fakes.

Radio remains one of the most powerful and accessible tools for democratic outreach. Legislatures already using radio programmes to explain bills and gather feedback should expand these initiatives, especially in local languages. Podcasts, public dialogues and community events can also spark engagement.

But engagement is not only about information – it is about presence. Many parliaments remain physically and culturally distant from the people they serve. Members of parliament are increasingly drawn from wealthy, business-oriented elites, creating a growing perception that parliament serves its own interests.

In earlier periods, teachers, civil servants and community leaders were more common in legislatures.

To close this gap, parliaments must invest in decentralised engagement. That includes hosting hearings outside capitals, organising outreach in rural areas, and partnering with schools, universities and faith-based institutions.

Crucially, consultation must be genuine. All too often, participation is limited to elite NGOs in urban centres. They play an important role, but are not a substitute for broad-based engagement. South Africa’s Parliamentary Democracy Office offers one model: a dedicated outreach unit working to include rural voices and translate public input into policy. Similar efforts across the continent should ensure that participation becomes routine, and that citizens can trace how their contributions affect outcomes.

Existing community structures can host citizens’ assemblies and forums. Technology can also help, but must be used inclusively. With nearly half the population living in rural areas and one-third lacking formal education, digital engagement risks excluding the very groups that most need a voice.

Participation as a democratic lifeline

The Afrobarometer report shows that citizens are not turning away from democracy itself. They are turning away from democratic institutions that don’t include them. Participation can reconnect citizens to democracy and restore trust in governance. But only if it is meaningful, sustained and inclusive.

The events in Kenya and Nigeria demonstrate the risks of exclusion. If parliaments legislate without the people, citizens will seek a voice elsewhere – through protests, populist movements, or authoritarian alternatives.

– 60% of Africans don’t believe democracy is working in their interests – how parliaments can fix the problem
– https://theconversation.com/60-of-africans-dont-believe-democracy-is-working-in-their-interests-how-parliaments-can-fix-the-problem-262581

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Manu Lekunze, Lecturer, University of Aberdeen

Cameroonians will vote in presidential elections on 12 October 2025. The incumbent, Paul Biya, who has been in office for nearly 43 years, will be a candidate.

In 2025, as in the last election in 2018, and in all presidential elections since 1992, it is reasonable to expect that the ruling party will win. And opposition parties will want to protest.

If Biya wins, by the end of the new term in 2032, he will have been in power for half a century. It will be a feat no other executive head of state has ever achieved in modern history.

Moreover, in 1968, Biya concurrently occupied the roles of director of the civil cabinet of the president and secretary general of the presidency (the most important government position after the president). In 1979, he became the prime minister, and in November 1982, he succeeded Ahmadou Ahidjo to become president.

Therefore, considering Ahidjo’s limited education and health problems in the later stages of his time in office, in effect, Biya has been in charge of Cameroon since 1968 – about 57 years.

As an international security scholar, for over a decade, I have researched security in Cameroon, including the separatist insurgency in the North West and South West regions, Boko Haram in the Far North region, and the security implications of Biya’s stay in power.

In my view, regardless of the many criticisms of Biya’s rule, he has provided regulatory and political stability. In the past 42 years, foreign investors and external security partners didn’t have to worry about radical policy changes in Cameroon.

This election – whether it brings a new term or a transition – risks the stability Cameroon’s external partners have become accustomed to. It could increase ethnic or regional tensions arising from prolonged marginalisation. It could also begin a transition process that could take time to consolidate, allowing space for instability, including more armed conflict.

Threats of insurgency

Among the most cited grievances of separatists are the abolition of the federal system and the change of Cameroon’s official name in 1984 from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon (the name adopted by the former French colony of Cameroun in 1960).

The separatists argue that the word “united” made it clear that present day Cameroon was formed of two equal parts. Removing the word means one has subsumed the other.

They are also aggrieved about the under-representation of English-speakers in senior government positions.

As the secretary general of the presidency, Biya was no bystander in the 1972 referendum that ended the country’s federal system of government. He has also been in charge of appointing senior government officials since 1982.

Some separatists think that if his government had addressed the protests in 2016, it would not have escalated to an insurgency.

Protests by English-speaking lawyers and teachers in 2016 against perceived francophone dominance sparked a violent crackdown by security forces. This led to the formation of armed separatist groups who declared an independent state called “Ambazonia” and initiated an armed conflict with the government.

Similarly, it could be said that Biya’s approach to foreign policy contributed to the growth and strength of Boko Haram, a regional terror group, in Cameroon. The group exploited lapses in Cameroon’s security architecture and Biya’s strategy of keeping a low profile in international politics.

The International Crisis Group and several analysts believe that had Cameroon’s government cracked down on the activities of Boko Haram, the insurgency would have struggled to gain the momentum it did in 2014 and 2015.

In my view, Biya’s reluctance to draw international attention to Cameroon made him hesitant to act against Boko Haram.

To sum up: more of the same is unlikely to address the threat of persistent insurgency.

The election can deepen fractures

Maurice Kamto was the leading opposition candidate in the last presidential election. His protest against the results caused a degree of post-election crisis. His candidacy in the 2025 election was rejected.

Kamto is of the Bamiléké ethnic group, with its homeland in the West region, where a feeling of political exclusion already exists.

Issa Tchiroma, an opposition figure who has served as government minister for extended periods since 1992, resigned in 2025 to become a candidate for the elections in October. Tchiroma is from the north (Adamawa, North and Far North regions). There is a degree of expectation that the presidency should rotate between the north and the south. It is the turn of the north because Biya, the second president, is a southerner, while the first president, Ahidjo, was from the north.

Tchiroma is likely to claim unfair treatment if he does not win. He has already protested publicly against being prevented from travelling out of the country.

Violence in Kamto’s Bamiléké homeland or Tchiroma’s north could expand sections of Cameroon’s territory affected by insurgency. There are parts of the North West (where separatists operate) and West regions that connect to Adamawa, then to the North and Far North regions (where Boko Haram operates). A coalition between the Bamiléké and the north against the core south (Biya’s support base) could seriously challenge Cameroon’s security. The divide could create more than a peripheral insurgency.

If Cameroon is destabilised because of Biya overstaying in power or a botched transition, it threatens security in the central Africa region.

Way forward

My research on the separatist insurgency clearly shows that Cameroonian officials and their international backers must address feelings of marginalisation or political exclusion.

Biya’s age and longevity in office, and the prospect of another seven year term, raise questions about eventual transition, and which ethnic group the next president should come from.

Careful consensus building would be necessary to ensure that a politically significant group like the Fulani, Bamiléké or anglophones do not feel seriously marginalised or excluded from politics.

– Cameroon’s election risks instability, no matter who wins
– https://theconversation.com/cameroons-election-risks-instability-no-matter-who-wins-262582

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stig Jarle Hansen, Professor of International Relations, Norwegian University of Life Sciences

More than 100 civilians have perished in a spate of attacks by Islamic State-backed rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo in mid-2025. The Islamic State’s Central African Province – known locally as Allied Democratic Forces – claimed an attack on Christian worshippers in late July which killed at least 49. Other attacks in August killed 52 villagers. By mid-2025 the group had been more active than during any previous year. Stig Jarle Hansen, a researcher and author of several books on jihadism in Africa, answers questions on what’s behind the cycle of attacks.

What is the Islamic State’s Central African Province today?

I have written before on the evolution of the Islamic State’s Central African Province from its beginnings as the Allied Democratic Forces on the border between Uganda and eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. It was at the time sponsored by both Zaire (now DRC) and Sudan and even contained Christian members. However, this changed over time, and the organisation increasingly used Islamic rules and symbols in its indoctrination and propaganda.

In 2017, a video emerged showing a small group of its fighters declaring loyalty to the Islamic State, the Sunni jihadist terrorist organisation that, at its peak, controlled vast territory in Iraq and Syria and claimed to be a worldwide Islamic caliphate. In April 2019, the only remaining Islamic State periodical, Al-Naba, published its first pictures from Congo. Allied Democratic Forces allegiance to the Islamic State was declared later the same year.

The declaration was not embraced by all. Several of the old guard of leaders of the Allied Democratic Forces, such as Benjamin Kisokeranio, refused an oath of allegiance to the Islamic State and were severely punished by the organisation for that (page 57).

As a result, the group bears little resemblance to the original rebel group. There is a new and younger generation in the top leadership of Islamic State Central African Province. A prominent example is camp leader Ahmed Mahmood Hassan “Abwakasi”, a Tanzanian foreign fighter born three years before the original Allied Democratic Forces was created.

The group also frequently features in the Islamic State’s global media network. This makes the interchangeable references to Allied Democratic Forces and Islamic State Central African Province problematic in the present context.

Yet, there are some similarities between the old and new. First is that the organisation remains organised into “camps”. These can evacuate quickly in the face of strong enemy attacks and re-establish themselves in new areas. However, they also are more than mere military units; they are mobile villages, where the wives and children follow the fighters in their movement.

A second similarity is the propensity to attack civilians. In this respect they are not unique in a region known for targeting civilians. However, the group has changed in the sense that Christians have become explicitly a stated target.

The third similarity is its continued emphasis on forced recruitment.

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Read more: Tracking the DRC’s Allied Democratic Forces and its links to ISIS

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What explains the resurgence in attacks?

Islamic State’s Central African Province’s most recent attacks on civilians may seem to suggest that it’s on an upswing, but this is not necessarily the case. Instead, the embattled group appears to be rebounding from several military defeats over the last years. The current situation fits in within an established pattern observed in the DRC over the last three decades. There has been a cyclical pattern of military offensives against Islamic State’s Central African Province. The group withdraws until the offensive ends, then reemerges. It is still in its withdrawal phase.

The current offensive against Islamic State Central African Province – Operation Shujaa – was launched jointly in 2021 by Uganda and DR Congo. The offensive seeks to defeat the Islamic State in North Kivu. By November 2023, the fourth phase of the offensive started. This operation was expanded further into areas west of the RN4 road, covering critical areas near the border of North Kivu and Ituri provinces. The last offensive was strained by Congo’s need to fight the M23 offensive further south, and Congolese distrust of Uganda’s intentions inside Congo, but proceeded. Uganda, which had stayed out of the M23/Congo conflict, launched 6,000 soldiers and used air assets in the following campaign. Local militias also fought against the Islamic State. The operations did force Islamic State Central African Province to withdraw camps, and to centralise its forces.

Why target Christians?

First, it gives the group media attention in the global press and in Islamic State outlets. African affiliates have grown in their importance for the Islamic State; they are seen as examples of “success” and the “new fields of jihad”. Islamic State Central African Province shows they are active, despite the beating it has received from Uganda. Such attention might also lead to both new foreign fighter recruits and more financial support from outside Congo.

Tanzanian-born commander “Abwakasi” leads the unit behind most of the attacks against civilians. His closeness to the Islamic State centrally might contribute to such a modus operandi. Abwakasi seem to have a stronger ideological leaning, and this might influence his actions against civilians.

Moreover, the need to plunder new villages to sustain the organisation inevitably causes civilian casualties. Violence becomes a strategy to create fear among the locals to smooth forced recruitment, and ease the plundering of villages in new areas that the larger camps are fleeing to.

For Islamic State Central African Province, violence against Christians serves both an instrumental and an ideological purpose.

Where does this leave the Islamic State’s Central African province?

The group has been known for targeting Christians in the past, and is one of the few Islamic State provinces that operates in regions with a majority of Christians. By presenting these attacks as victories, without the need to confront military enemies, it serves as a distraction from the losses the organisation has faced, and a way to plunder and recruit new recruits. It should not be misunderstood as a sign that the organisation is winning on the battlefield. It’s rather a part of a cyclical pattern of withdrawal and advance that we have seen for the last three decades.

– Islamic State massacres in eastern DRC: who are the insurgents and why are they killing civilians?
– https://theconversation.com/islamic-state-massacres-in-eastern-drc-who-are-the-insurgents-and-why-are-they-killing-civilians-263462

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Daniel Cash, Reader in Law, Aston University

Senegal’s dramatic two-notch credit rating downgrade in February 2025 by the credit rating agency Moody’s was followed by a Standard & Poor’s downgrade in July.

Moody’s decision marked a three-notch deterioration in Senegal’s rating in four months. The scale of the revisions was rare, especially for countries not already in default or active restructuring.

The ratings collapse triggered a selloff in Senegal’s Eurobonds. It also cast a shadow over the country’s ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.

More broadly, it sent a signal about how the credit rating agencies are now responding to governance failures, not just macroeconomic trends. For others watching closely, this was not just a market correction, it was a warning.

So why did it happen?

A report released by Moody’s in July 2025 on “large, unaccounted for debt increases” provides context. The report looked at how fiscal transparency failures – situations where governments provide incomplete, outdated or inaccurate information about their debts and budgets – undermine sovereign creditworthiness. This applies globally, not just to African countries.

Moody’s research centres on stock-flow adjustments. This is the gap between how much a government’s total debt rises in a year, and what that increase should be, based on the officially reported budget deficit. In other words, if a country runs a US$5 billion deficit, you would expect its debt to rise by about US$5 billion. When that debt increases by much more (or less), it suggests that something is missing or misreported in the official data.

The research demonstrates a clear correlation between large stock-flow adjustments and weaker governance scores.

Moody’s downgrade of Senegal’s sovereign rating, and its research report, underscore how transparency and governance issues are increasingly influencing sovereign credit assessments. Rating agencies have improved their methodologies to capture these risks. Governance factors now represent about 25% of sovereign ratings across major agency frameworks.

In addition, transparency issues are showing up as a stumbling block in debt restructuring negotiations. Zambia’s restructuring process took 3.5 years (2021-2024), partly due to transparency complications. Ethiopia’s ongoing restructuring (since 2021) demonstrates similar challenges. For its part, Ghana’s relatively faster process benefited from greater initial debt transparency.

As a researcher who has looked closely at the working of rating agencies, I suggest that Moody’s comprehensive analysis provides governments with a diagnostic tool as well as an early warning system for potential transparency issues.

The message for sovereign debt managers is clear: in an era of enhanced transparency requirements and sophisticated rating methodologies, the quality of fiscal data has become inseparable from creditworthiness.

Early warning signs

Moody’s research found that large and persistent stock-flow adjustments often signal weak fiscal transparency. And that, over time, they reflect incomplete reporting and weak expenditure controls.

Critically, Moody’s noted that

frontier markets in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America have experienced the biggest stock-flow adjustments over the past decade.

There are many technical drivers behind stock-flow adjustments. Many are often legitimate. These can include debt management operations, asset acquisitions, arrears clearance and statistical revisions.

But Moody’s research pointed out that these technical reasons accounted for only half of the stock-flow adjustments. The other half remained unexplained – an indicator Moody’s treats as a serious red flag for fiscal credibility.

Senegal’s transparency failures

Senegal’s situation exemplifies how transparency gaps can rapidly destabilise sovereign credit profiles.

Following the March 2024 election audit findings by Senegal’s Inspectorate of Public Finances, its Court of Auditors report revealed “substantially weaker fiscal metrics” with “central government debt at close to 100% of GDP in 2023, around 25 percentage points higher than previously published”.

The scale of the revisions was unprecedented: debt-to-GDP ratios jumped from a reported 74.4% to 99.7% for end-2023. The fiscal deficit was revised upward from 4.9% to 12.3% of GDP.

Moody’s assessment was unambiguous:

The scale and nature of the discrepancies portray a much more limited fiscal space and higher funding needs than previously thought, while also indicating material past governance deficiencies.

The rating impact was swift and severe. Moody’s downgraded Senegal’s rating to B3 from B1 in February 2025, changing the outlook to negative, following an earlier downgrade from Ba3 in October 2024.

Senegal’s debt metrics reflect the severity of the fiscal challenge. The International Monetary Fund estimates Senegal’s debt reached 105.7% of GDP by end-2024, with gross financing requirements – the total amount the government needs to repay and borrow again to keep functioning – projected at around 20% of GDP in 2025 by the Senegalese budget.

The International Monetary Fund suspended its US$1.8 billion Extended Credit Facility in June 2024 following the misreporting discovery. However, the fund, in a note on negotiations during an August 2025 staff visit that was focused on working with Senegal in light of the post-election audits, wrote:

The IMF staff team commended the Senegalese authorities on their commitment to fiscal transparency and accountability, following their disclosure of the large misreporting that occurred over the past few years.

Troubling patterns

Moody’s emphasises that stock-flow adjustments occur across all regions and income levels. But the persistence and magnitude differ significantly by region. Recent African cases demonstrate particularly troubling patterns.

Some examples include:

Why this matters

The economic logic of the correlation between large stock-flow adjustments and weaker governance scores is straightforward. Persistent positive stock-flow adjustments indicate that fiscal deficits may not accurately represent government financing needs. As Moody’s explains:

when stock-flow adjustments are positive, a higher primary balance is required to stabilise debt over the long term.

This creates both fiscal and credibility challenges that rating agencies must incorporate into their assessments.

For countries with histories of significant adjustments, Moody’s notes it may

make a more negative assessment of fiscal policy effectiveness.

Transparency matters too because a lack of it can complicate debt restructuring efforts. An example is negotiations under the G20 Common Framework, which aims to coordinate debt relief among official and private creditors.

The process depends on clear and comprehensive debt data to determine how much relief is needed, and who should provide it. When key debts are hidden, disputed, or poorly recorded, the entire negotiation slows down, or stalls entirely.

The way forward

The convergence of rating methodology enhancements and transparency requirements creates both challenges and opportunities for sovereign borrowers.

Improving fiscal data systems is no longer merely a technical accounting exercise. It’s a strategy for maintaining market access and creditworthiness.

The rating agency response suggests this trend will intensify.

For emerging and frontier market sovereigns, there are clear incentives for transparency improvements. Research shows governance improvements lead to decreased “spreads” in the market, while poor governance adds 50-200 basis points to sovereign spreads.

In other words, for sovereign borrowers, it pays to demonstrate better governance; investors clearly respond positively to the prospect of investing in borrowers who have clearly defined and transparent governance structures.

From warning to opportunity

Senegal’s case illustrates how transparency failures can trigger rapid and severe credit deterioration. But it also demonstrates the rating agencies’ increasing sophistication in detecting and penalising such weaknesses.

Sovereign borrowers shouldn’t view enhanced transparency requirements as burdensome oversight. They are opportunities to reduce borrowing costs.

– Senegal’s rating downgrade: credit agencies are punishing countries that don’t check their numbers
– https://theconversation.com/senegals-rating-downgrade-credit-agencies-are-punishing-countries-that-dont-check-their-numbers-261583

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jack Swab, Assistant Professor Department of Geography & Sustainability, University of Tennessee

The African Union has endorsed the #CorrectTheMap Campaign, a call for the United Nations and the wider global community to use a different kind of world map. The campaign currently has over 4,500 signatures.

The map most commonly used is called the Mercator projection. Map projections are how cartographers (map makers) “flatten” the three-dimensional Earth into a two-dimensional map.

The Mercator projection was created over 450 years ago, designed for colonial exploration and maritime trade. But, over the centuries, it has become an “all purpose” projection for many governments, educators and companies.

That flat drawing inflates the size of countries closer to the North or South Pole. It exaggerates the area of North America and Eurasia while under-representing the size of much of South America and Africa. As the largest continent in the global south, Africa is a victim of this cartographic inequity.

The #CorrectTheMap campaign calls for a move to the Equal Earth map projection, developed in 2018 by an international team of cartographers. It addresses the distortions found in the Mercator projection.

Controversies over map projections are not new. Since the 1970s cartographers have discussed how certain projections distort how the Earth looks and how people imagine their place in that world.

At the heart of the debates about maps are tensions about what sort of power maps have in the world.

A change in map projections, for the African Union, is about more than correcting a technical flaw. It’s also a chance to influence how current and future map users view, talk about and value Africa.

The call is a demand for Africans to be represented on their own terms, rather than through cartographic traditions that have long diminished their scale and significance.

As cartographers, we pay attention to the social and communicative power of maps.

Given that maps help shape how we make sense of the world, the simplest decisions that go into crafting a map can have major geopolitical consequences.

Maps are not neutral

There are over 200 major projections of the world map. Each one warps the image of the Earth in different ways, making the choice of projection a consequential and complicated decision rather than a neutral one.

For example the Dymaxion projection, developed by the American engineer Buckminster Fuller, was designed to challenge ideas of the north and the south. Others, like the Lambert conformal conic projection, are used extensively in aviation to aid in flight planning.

Maps are a form of storytelling, as well as an information source. Even the lines, colours, symbols and size of regions depicted on maps communicate social meaning. They subtly but powerfully educate people, from schoolchildren to world leaders, about who and what matters.

US president Donald Trump’s recent interest in the US buying Greenland, citing its large size, was likely influenced by map distortion. The Mercator projection shows Greenland as nearly the same size as Africa, when in reality Africa is about 14 times larger.

Other projections do a better job at more accurately representing the true size of continents. Some projections are better than others for this specific task; for example the Gall-Peters projection has been used in the past as an alternative to the Mercator projection.

Cartography as a tool of control

Cartography has been a powerful tool of control throughout Africa’s history. Topographers and surveyors participated in the European conquest and colonisation of Africa, regularly accompanying military expeditions. Map-makers in Europe framed Africa as a landscape to be exploited by populating maps with trade routes, resources and blank spaces ready for development – all while often ignoring the mapping traditions and geographic knowledge of indigenous Africans.

The Berlin Conference of 1885, where European powers assembled with no African representation, was one of the pinnacles of this cartographic and colonial grab and partitioning of the continent.

The Mercator projection is joined by other kinds of western storytelling – found across popular culture, the news and diplomatic circles – that have stereotyped, degraded and undersized Africa’s place in the world.

Viewed in this light, the public reckoning over the Mercator projection can be interpreted as not just about the visual accuracy of a map, also the restoration of dignity and autonomy.

Why changing the world map is difficult

Bringing about changes won’t be easy.

Firstly, global map production is not governed by a single authority. Even if the United Nations were to adopt the Equal Earth projection, world maps could still be drawn in other projections. Cartographers are frequently commissioned to update world maps to reflect changes to names and borders. But the changes don’t always find quick acceptance. For example, cartographers changed English-language world maps after the Czech Republic adopted the name “Czechia” as its English name in 2016. While making the change was not difficult, broader acceptance has been harder to achieve.

A person’s mental image of the world is solidified at a young age. The effects of a shift to the Equal Earth projection may take years to materialise. Previous efforts to move away from Mercator projection, such as by Boston Public Schools in 2017, upset cartographers and parents alike.

Given the African Union’s larger goals, supporting the Equal Earth projection is the first step in pushing the global community to see the world more fairly and reframing how the world values Africa. Mobilising social support for the new projection through workshops with educators, diplomatic advocacy, forums with textbook publishers, journalists, and Africa’s corporate partners could help move the world away from the Mercator projection for everyday use.

Shifting to the Equal Earth projection alone will not undo centuries of distorted representations or guarantee more equitable global relations. But it’s a step towards restoring Africa’s rightful visibility on the world stage.

– World maps get Africa’s size wrong: cartographers explain why fixing it matters
– https://theconversation.com/world-maps-get-africas-size-wrong-cartographers-explain-why-fixing-it-matters-263833