Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marlese von Broembsen, Associate Professor (in Labour Law and Development), University of the Western Cape

A new report from the International Labour Organisation outlines a set of propositions on how countries should go about formalising the informal economy. The report provides the basis for negotiations on the subject at the International Labour Conference in Geneva in June 2025.

Formalising the informal economy is a burning issue, particularly for countries in Africa. In some, such as Nigeria and Ghana, more than 80% of the workforce is informal.

According to the ILO report, the informal economy is a “structural barrier” to social justice and decent work. This is so because informal enterprises do not pay tax, therefore governments do not have the public revenue to meet their sustainable development goals.

Based on my research and policy work on the informal economy I believe that the ILO’s analysis, and its proposed solutions, are flawed. In my view, they follow a long tradition of misplaced thinking about the formalisation of informal work.

The ILO has the view that all “independent workers” should be “brought under” laws that regulate enterprises. And it assumes that providing “independent workers” with access to finance, business and skills training, and access to markets (“business development services”), will lead to more “productive” enterprises that create jobs.

I don’t agree.

Business development services have been tried in many countries since the 1990s – without success.

Clearly, informal enterprises that earn above the tax threshold must be “brought under” enterprise laws and must comply with labour laws if they employ others. But what about own-account workers, such as street vendors and waste pickers, who earn way below the tax threshold?

Labour law only covers employees, but I argue that it should be reformed to include own-account workers. That’s because given structural unemployment, artificial intelligence and a shift from firms investing in production to investing in financial products, industrial reform and business development services are not going to create sufficient jobs.

The flaws

The ILO report argues that the reasons “independent workers” don’t formalise are that: they lack the capital to be productive; it’s too costly to comply with legislation; and they don’t want to pay tax because they don’t trust state institutions.

This logic suggests that states should: support enterprises to become more productive and profitable; reduce the cost of compliance; make institutions trustworthy; and reform industrial policy to improve productivity and create jobs. This is exactly what the report recommends.

But these approaches haven’t worked. If decent work is the aim, most people in the informal sector should fall under labour law, rather than enterprise law.

Old wine in new wineskins

Policy approaches to the informal sector have changed over the decades. For example, in the late 1980s simplifying regulations and creating property rights was seen as the answer for informal micro-enterprises to formalise.

This was first popularised by Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto’s 1989 book The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World. He argued that Peruvians operated informally because complying with the regulations was too time-consuming and expensive. His insights were incorporated into the World Bank’s “good governance” development agenda.

Similarly, access to credit and markets, business and skills training – known as “business development services” – was the key strategy in the 1990s, when I first worked in this sector. When the first democratically elected government in South Africa published its small business strategy in 1996, this reflected “best practice” at the time.

South Africa’s policy visualised the formalisation process as a ladder: with the right support, micro-businesses would climb the “entrepreneurial ladder” to become “globally competitive businesses” and create jobs. Government’s role was to simplify regulations and provide funds to service providers.

Back in 2010, I critiqued this approach, in part because there was no evidence that livelihood activities (such as street vending) will grow into job-creating businesses simply by providing the inputs, correcting market failures and simplifying business regulations.

Since then, informality has increased everywhere, as evidenced in the ILO’s report. Kate Philip, the programme lead on the Presidential Employment Stimulus in the Office of the South African Presidency, argues that this approach places the responsibility on the most economically marginalised citizens to “self-employ themselves out of poverty”.

One size does not fit all

The ILO report lumps together employers – people whose businesses are informal and employ others – together with own-account workers into one category: “independent workers”.

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Read more: Informal workers in Ghana’s chop bars get no benefit from foreign aid: donors are getting it wrong

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ILO data show that own-account workers make up 47% of informal workers, and fewer than 3% are employers. In Africa, the percentage of own-account workers is even higher. In sub-Saharan Africa, street vendors comprise 43% of informal employment.

The goal is “bringing them under regulation, with both the advantages and obligations it entails” to realise decent work and to grow the tax base. It assumes that own-account workers are not regulated and are not contributing to the fiscus.

Both these assumptions are false. Public space, where many work, falls under nuisance, health and vagrancy regulations. And vendors pay “taxes” to local authorities to trade.

The report recognises that own-account workers suffer violence and harassment in their workplace. Violence, arrests and confiscation of goods – by municipal officials and the police – is ubiquitous. Workers are powerless to engage individually with the state. To realise decent work, they need to do that collectively.

Where labour law fits in

Labour law recognises that workers and employers’ interests are not aligned. It provides a collective bargaining framework for workers to negotiate as a group.

Although labour law only covers employees, I have argued that it can be reformed to include own-account workers. Street vendors and other own-account workers are here to stay. Reforming labour laws to realise their right to collective bargaining – to co-determine their working conditions – should be a critical part of formalisation.

– Waste pickers and vendors should be treated as workers, not small businesses – labour lawyer
– https://theconversation.com/waste-pickers-and-vendors-should-be-treated-as-workers-not-small-businesses-labour-lawyer-258635

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kate Gannon, Assistant Professor, London School of Economics and Political Science

Women in Africa are often framed as especially vulnerable to climate change. Our earlier research suggested that women entrepreneurs often face a “triple differential vulnerability” to climate risk compared to men.

What we mean is that there are three possible reasons for their additional vulnerability. First, their livelihoods are often in climate sensitive sectors. Second, they face additional barriers to accessing resources for adaptation in the business environment – such as finance, new adaptation technologies and markets for climate smart goods and services. Last, they also hold primary responsibility for managing climate risk at the household level.

However, our new research also suggests a parallel, more overlooked reality. Women entrepreneurs may also be leading the way in action on climate resilience in Africa.

Through the Women Entrepreneurs in Climate Change Adaptation (WECCA) project we are researching this role of women as strategic actors in inclusive adaptation action.

Women’s entrepreneurship is key to development outcomes in Africa. This is because their businesses make wide ranging contributions to economic activity. They are active in critical agriculture and food processing value chains, which boosts export earnings. And through cooperatives, and savings groups, at the local level, women create access points to finance and markets for others in underserved regions. Studies also suggest women are more likely to use their profits to address the most critical household needs.

Small businesses form the backbone of most African economies. They generate most employment opportunities and provide essential goods and services.

Yet, these businesses are on the frontline of climate impacts. Floods, droughts, and concurrent disruption to power, water and transport networks threaten supply chains, disrupt markets, interrupt livelihood activities and damage business assets.

Businesses must adapt to survive. But how they adapt can make the difference between building long-term resilience and deepening vulnerability.

Results from our study of small businesses in climate vulnerable regions of Kenya and Senegal suggest that businesses with women leaders take a more sustainable approach to adaptation than those with only male leaders. This safeguards long-term business resilience. Our results also found adaptation assistance has a stronger impact on helping women-led small businesses adjust to climate change, compared to those led only by men.

These results suggest that supporting adaptation for women entrepreneurs isn’t just about fairness. It’s also a smart strategy for scaling up climate resilient economies. Building an inclusive business environment for adaptation may deliver bigger returns on investments for governments and donors.

Women entrepreneurs as strategic actors

Our study analysed survey data of small businesses in semi-arid regions of Senegal and Kenya. The aim was to consider how having female owners and managers shaped a business’s adaptation to extreme events.

Our dataset covered the Senegalese regions of Louga, Saint Louis and Kaolack. In Kenya, it covered the county of Laikipia. The regions experience extreme drought and flooding that is expected to increase in the coming decades. Entrepreneurship in these regions is particularly concentrated in agricultural sectors. These are highly exposed to the impacts of these extremes.

We investigated how a business having female leaders impacted the number of sustainable and unsustainable adaptation strategies that they adopted.

Following earlier literature, we classified adaptation strategies as:

• “sustainable” when they maintain business operations at existing levels

• “unsustainable” if they help businesses “cope” in the short term but result in a temporary (or sometimes permanent) reduction in business activity. This could reduce the resources that they have to cope with future climate impacts.

We found that businesses which include women within their management and ownership teams adopted fewer unsustainable adaptation measures than those led solely by men. Unsustainable adaptation actions are typically reactive coping strategies that can help businesses address immediate needs to minimise the negative impacts of climate shocks in the short term. These might include selling off business assets or cutting staff.

But these actions often come at a cost. They reduce business activity, undermine future growth, and may limit a business’s ability to recover from subsequent climate impacts.

In contrast, we found that businesses with female leaders were more likely to adopt sustainable adaptation measures that protected the long-term health of the business. These included:

• diversifying income sources

• switching to different crops

• taking out loans or insurance.

Such strategies can help to reduce vulnerability to future climate shocks, and support income stability and recovery during periods of climate stress.

These findings are striking given the additional barriers that women face when trying to adapt.

It is well documented, for example, that women entrepreneurs in Africa face deeper constraints than men in accessing adaptation resources. This includes finance, training and technologies.

Similarly, gendered expectations around domestic responsibilities can limit women’s time and mobility, restricting their ability to attend training sessions or participate in external markets.

Social norms may also limit their decision-making power within households or businesses. This can make it harder to act independently on adaptation investments.

Given these constraints, the use of more sustainable adaptation strategies by women-led businesses deserves careful interpretation. Many of the sustainable measures we analysed – such as switching crops or diversifying income streams – can require less upfront capital than the unsustainable ones. Actions like selling assets or scaling back staff, meanwhile, are only possible if the business owns significant physical or financial resources to begin with.

The lower use of unsustainable strategies by women-led businesses may therefore reflect more limited coping capacity: they may simply have fewer assets to draw on when a shock hits.

Yet this makes the findings even more important. Sustainable strategies can still be highly effective. Our research suggests that women business leaders are often finding ways to adapt that are both practical and forward-looking, even when working with limited capital. In this sense, women entrepreneurs are not just more vulnerable – they are also strategic actors driving adaptation innovation, often with fewer resources.

What’s needed

These findings highlight not only the constraints women entrepreneurs continue to face, but also their untapped potential in adaptation.

What’s more, our study suggests that this potential can be especially powerful when the right support is in place. We found that when adaptation assistance (whether financial or technical) is made available, women-led businesses didn’t just catch up with their male-led counterparts. They often outperformed them.

This points to a highly strategic opportunity: that investing in adaptation for women entrepreneurs could deliver outsized benefits for climate resilience. For their businesses as well as the communities and economies they support.

This finding points to the need for governments to develop a business-enabling environment for adaptation that targets women entrepreneurs. This means designing policies, programmes, and support that address persistent gaps in access to tailored finance, technologies, and adaptation goods and services.

Better data is also needed. Our study used the best available data. But it was based on a relatively small sample from specific regions in Kenya and Senegal and should not be overgeneralised.

To test the strength of our findings, there is an urgent need for additional high-quality, gender-disaggregated datasets on business level adaptation behaviour.

The World Bank Enterprise Surveys could play a vital role, as one of the most extensive sources of data on small and medium-sized enterprises globally.

– African women entrepreneurs are a smart bet for climate change investment: research shows why
– https://theconversation.com/african-women-entrepreneurs-are-a-smart-bet-for-climate-change-investment-research-shows-why-252821

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

The governments of Ghana and Zambia recently took a decision that could have serious consequences for other African countries. The decision relates to arrangements on how the two countries will repay the debt they owe to Africa Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).

They have both taken decisions to relegate Afreximbank to a commercial lender from a preferred creditor. This means that the terms on which Afreximbank has lent money to these two countries will change. And it will lose certain protections. For example preferred creditors are repaid first, before any other lenders.

This protects preferred creditors’ balance sheets and enables them to continue lending during crisis periods when others cannot. In contrast, commercial banks get paid later or might not get paid at all. This higher risk factor means that they charge higher rates.

Based on decades of researching Africa’s capital markets and the institutions that govern them it’s my view that the long-term consequences of this precedent are detrimental. If other African borrowers follow suit, treating loans from African multilateral development banks as ordinary commercial debt during restructuring, it will erode the viability of these institutions. Investors who fund Afreximbank through bonds and capital markets may reassess its risk profile, pushing up its cost of funding and making future lending less affordable.

The ultimate losers will be African countries themselves, especially those with limited access to international capital. Afreximbank, along with other African financial institutions, is a lifeline for trade finance, infrastructure development, and crisis response. Undermining its legal protections weakens the continent’s capacity for self-reliant development.

Afreximbank was created under the auspices of the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 1993. It was set up with a public interest mandate to develop African trade and promote integration. Its legal status and structural features place it closer to international multilateral development banks than to private creditors, justifying its treatment as a preferred creditor.

The decision by Accra and Lusaka signals lack of confidence in African financial institutions. It suggests that they do not trust them to the same extent as global institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. These are treated as preferred creditors, on the assumption that they will lend to countries in crisis or distress when commercial lenders retreat.

The actions of Ghana and Zambia set a dangerous precedent by sidelining African financial institutions in favour of external creditors. That risks weakening Africa’s financial institutions and undermining the very concept of African solutions to African problems. Investors will become more sceptical and pessimistic, demanding more interest.

The continent needs to develop an ability to independently design, finance and implement its economic development policies without support from external financial institutions. Afreximbank helps to achieve this through financing African-designed infrastructure and counter-cyclical lending.

Ghana and Zambia still have an opportunity to correct course. In my view they should do so for the sake of the bank, its member states and the future of African economic sovereignty.

The background

Ghana and Zambia have both defaulted on their external bonds in the last four years. Zambia in October 2020 and Ghana in December 2022. This forced them to negotiate new sustainable terms with creditors.

During their respective debt negotiations, both countries have announced that they would include African multilateral development banks such as Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank in the debt restructuring.

This followed private and bilateral creditors contesting unequal distribution of restructuring burdens, where they face losses while some multilateral institutions are shielded. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which are preferred creditors, do not fund infrastructure, they only offer balance of payments support.

The decision by Ghana and Zambia to relegate Afreximbank was made during an ongoing comprehensive debt restructuring. Ghana and Zambia have been negotiating with creditors for over a year in an attempt to resolve their sovereign debt crises.

The two countries were complying with International Monetary Fund supported restructuring terms. Bilateral creditors were also demanding fair burden sharing with African multilateral banks.

Afreximbank: not just another lender

Ghana and Zambia don’t have a legal leg to stand on.

Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status is not an informal privilege but derives from Article VX(1) of its founding agreement. The agreement has been signed and ratified by member states into national laws, including Ghana and Zambia.

This status is further reinforced by the bank’s diplomatic immunities and privileges and its ability to operate across African jurisdictions under protected legal frameworks. The role of Afreximbank, therefore, goes beyond that of a traditional commercial bank.

Preferred creditor status protects development finance institutions in a number of ways. The biggest protection is that lenders are prioritised for repayment. This protects their balance sheets, enabling them to continue lending when others cannot.

A preferred creditor status is accorded for a reason. It is to ensure that development finance institutions can lend in times of distress with confidence, on the guarantee that they will be repaid ahead of other creditors. Country actions that violate this principle disrupt the implicit covenant that enables counter-cyclical financing. This is breaking the financial lifeline that countries might need when nobody else is willing to help them. This is precisely the kind of support that Ghana and Zambia relied on during their respective debt crises in December 2022 and October 2020, respectively.

A bank that has consistently stepped up

It is worth recalling that during the COVID-19 pandemic (2019–2021) and again when global markets closed access to Eurobond issuances for African countries, investors didn’t want to lend African countries for fear of defaulting. Afreximbank was one of the few institutions that continued to lend to African sovereigns. This included US$750 million to Ghana and US$45 million to Zambia.

When Ghana, Zambia and other commodity export-dependent countries faced acute foreign currency shortages and tightening global liquidity caused by the 2015/16 commodity crisis of low prices, Afreximbank did not hesitate to deploy resources.

Zambia has also benefited significantly from Afreximbank’s trade and development finance in energy, agriculture and healthcare. These are areas that many commercial banks view as too risky or low-margin.

For Zambia and Ghana to classify Afreximbank in the same category as hedge funds, bondholders or purely commercial lenders, is ahistorical and unwarranted.

Restructuring loans from Afreximbank risks inadvertently raising the cost of capital for African countries. If Afreximbank can no longer be shielded under preferred creditor status norms, it may be forced to adopt more conservative lending practices, charge higher risk premiums or retreat from high-risk markets altogether.

The knock-on effect is reduced access to affordable, timely financing for countries that need it most.

Afreximbank has rejected the idea that its loans ought to be restructured.

Ghana and Zambia should correct course

Ghana and Zambia still have an opportunity to correct course. They can reaffirm Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status, exclude it from restructuring tables meant for commercial creditors, and honour their legal commitments.

In doing so, they would not only preserve their reputations as reliable debtors but also strengthen the broader fabric of African financial solidarity.

African countries must be cognisant that no one else will build their institutions for them. If they do not defend and respect them, they cannot expect the rest of the world to do so. The credibility, sustainability and legitimacy of Africa’s financial independence depends, in large part, on how they treat the institutions they have built.

The decision to treat Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank like commercial lenders is short-sighted and self-defeating. It must be reversed.

– Ghana and Zambia have snubbed Africa’s leading development bank: why they should change course
– https://theconversation.com/ghana-and-zambia-have-snubbed-africas-leading-development-bank-why-they-should-change-course-258467

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Adrienne Lees, Researcher, Institute of Development Studies

Uganda is one of the countries most exposed to recent cuts in international aid, particularly with the dissolution of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In 2023, about 5% of gross national income – a measure of a country’s total income, including income from foreign sources – was received in aid.

The cuts have given new impetus to the drive to increase taxes raised from domestic businesses.

Less than half (45%) of the Ugandan budget is financed through domestic revenue. The remainder is funded largely through debt and budget support (grants) from bilateral and multilateral donors. Corporate income tax makes up around 8% of total domestic revenue. Firms also collect employee income tax (pay-as-you-earn), value added tax, excise duties and fuel duties.

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute a small share of overall corporate income tax collection. But they make up over 90% of the private sector. The economy is heavily reliant on these firms for employment and growth.

These businesses struggle to navigate an increasingly complex tax system.

The complexity of Uganda’s tax system makes for a time-consuming tax filing process, compounded by low taxpayer knowledge and high levels of distrust in the Uganda Revenue Authority. The time, money and effort incurred by taxpayers to meet their tax obligations adds to their total tax burden.

These compliance costs also have real economic consequences. Firms might miss out on tax benefits or artificially constrain business growth to avoid greater reporting requirements. Since smaller firms are more constrained in their ability to document revenues, accurately calculate tax liabilities and file returns, they might even pay more tax than necessary.

At the margin, compliance costs affect the economic choices people make: the fear of high compliance costs might induce a potential entrepreneur to take a salaried job instead of starting a new business.

Relieving this burden could unlock greater productivity and growth, and encourage innovation and investment.

For my PhD in economics I collaborated with the Uganda Revenue Authority to generate detailed measures of tax compliance costs, using data from a survey of nearly 2,000 taxpaying SMEs. My research finds that the burden of compliance is significant, even for firms with very little tax revenue to contribute.

Solutions should focus on making compliance easier and ensuring that tax thresholds are set appropriately to exclude unproductive small firms.

The burden

The median firm faces total annual compliance costs of about US$800, equivalent to just under 2% of turnover. These costs are also highly regressive: smaller firms face costs exceeding 20% of turnover, versus less than 1% for the largest firms.

A more troubling result is that many firms, and particularly smaller ones, spend more on completing their tax returns than they pay in actual income tax.

Much of this burden stems from labour time. Employees and firm owners dedicate over 30 hours a month on compliance-related activities, primarily compiling tax documentation and preparing returns. For firm owners personally involved in tax compliance, this responsibility consumes around 20% of their working hours, on average.

Somewhat surprisingly, the amount of time spent on tax compliance does not increase significantly with firm size.

To compensate for limited tax knowledge, many firms use the services of a tax agent. These include external accountants, consultants, or other tax specialists who assist with tax compliance. My research finds that the use of agents is common across all taxpayer categories and is primarily driven by a desire to ensure proper compliance, rather than to minimise tax liabilities.

Although these agents do not necessarily reduce compliance costs, since firms spend an average of US$54 per month on agents’ fees, related research shows that they have a broadly positive impact on the quality of tax returns submitted.

What can be done

The Ugandan parliament recently voted on the 2025 tax amendment bills, with measures aiming to bolster revenue collection and simplify compliance. For instance, policymakers propose to use the national identity document as a taxpayer identification number, rather than requiring separate tax registration.

But policymakers should consider bolder actions.

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Read more: Uganda’s tax system isn’t bringing in enough revenue, but is targeting small business the answer?

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Firstly, the administrative thresholds for corporate income tax and presumptive tax (a simplified tax on business income for the smallest firms) have not been adjusted for over a decade. In a high inflation environment, this means that the tax system is capturing many firms with very little profit, and no tax to pay. Yet, these firms still bear compliance costs, and the revenue service incurs administrative costs registering and monitoring unproductive taxpayers.

Roughly 30% to 35% of firms filing returns each year file a nil return, meaning that they report zero on all significant fields of the tax return. Even these firms report compliance costs of, on average, around US$500 per year.

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Read more: Uganda study shows text messages can boost tax compliance: here’s what worked

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Rather than chasing the “little guy”, bigger revenue gains are likely to come from focusing on the largest businesses. For instance, research shows that tax incentives and exemptions cost Uganda over US$40 million in lost revenue per year.

Secondly, the Ugandan corporate income tax return is particularly long, complex, and more suited to the business structure of very large firms, rather than the SMEs making up most of the Ugandan economy. In addition to changing the thresholds, simplifying the return would be beneficial.

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Read more: Wealthy Africans often don’t pay tax: the answer lies in smarter collection – expert

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Filing processes could also be eased through automated pre-filling, for instance by using information from a firm’s monthly VAT returns to pre-populate parts of the corporate income tax return. The rollout of the Uganda Revenue Authority’s electronic invoicing system for VAT is a promising step in this direction, although it has been met with resistance by taxpayers.

– Uganda’s tax system is a drain on small businesses: how to set them free
– https://theconversation.com/ugandas-tax-system-is-a-drain-on-small-businesses-how-to-set-them-free-258120

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Scott Firsing, Senior Research Associate, University of South Africa

The African Space Agency was officially inaugurated in Cairo’s Space City in April 2025. The event marked a milestone in a process that had been in the works since the early 2000s. Drawing inspiration from the European Space Agency, it unites African Union (AU) member states to harness space technology for development. This is in line with the AU’s Agenda 2063, aimed at advancing Africa into a prosperous future.

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Read more: Africa has ambitious goals for 2063: plans for outer space hold the key to success

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The agency’s goal is to:

• coordinate and implement Africa’s space ambitions by promoting collaboration among the AU’s 55 member states

• harness space technologies for sustainable development, climate resilience and socio-economic growth

• oversee the African Space Policy and Strategy to enhance access to space-derived data

• foster partnerships with international space agencies like the European Space Agency and others.

Over 20 African countries operate space programmes and more than 65 African satellites have been launched. It is my view as a global space diplomacy expert that the agency can help ensure that Africa isn’t a bystander in the space economy. This sector is projected to be worth US$1.8 trillion by 2035.

The space agency positions Africa to address pressing challenges and take advantage of opportunities in the global space economy. These include using satellite data, boosting connectivity, driving economic growth, fostering global partnerships and training future leaders.

Five benefits

Valuable eyes in the sky

Space assets, particularly Earth observation satellites, offer a number of advantages. The continent faces significant climate risks like droughts, fires and floods. This is particularly problematic as the agricultural sector is approximately 35% of Africa’s GDP and employs about half of its people across over 1 billion hectares of arable land.

Satellite data optimises crop yields, supports climate-resilient farming, and enhances sustainable fisheries and port modernisation. Nigeria’s National Space Research and Deveopment Agency, for example, has used satellites like the NigSat-2 to monitor crop health and predict yields.

Beyond agriculture, satellites assist in project planning in cities across Africa. Kenya uses a satellite to track urban development trends and enhance municipal urban planning capacities.

Satellites also keep an eye on Africa’s resource-abundant territories while tackling problems like armed conflict, deforestation, and illegal migration and mining.

The African Space Agency will help provide access to AI-enhanced satellite data. This will enable even nations with constrained resources to tackle local needs. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire’s first locally made satellite, launched in 2024, shows how African nations are building their own capabilities.

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Read more: Côte d’Ivoire is launching its first satellite for Earth observation – and it’s locally made

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By making it easier to share data, the African Space Agency also positions the continent to generate revenue in the global space data market. That fuels innovation.

Enhancing connectivity and enabling cutting-edge technology

Africa’s digital divide is stark. Only 38% of its population was online in 2024, compared to the global average of 68%. The African Space Agency aims to bridge this gap through satellite-based communications. This technology can deliver broadband to remote regions where cell towers and undersea cables are impractical.

Connectivity enables education, e-commerce and telemedicine.

Satellite services, like those provided by SpaceX’s Starlink in 21 African countries, will drive digital inclusion. In turn this promises to reduce unemployment and help entrepreneurs.

The African Space Agency is also positioning Africa to embrace new space technologies. Examples include Japan’s 2025 demonstration of beaming solar power from space, following a US achievement in 2023.

This could revolutionise energy access. Space-based solar power captures solar energy in orbit via satellite and transmits it as microwaves to Earth. This offers a solution to Africa’s energy poverty. It could provide reliable power to remote areas without extensive grid infrastructure.

The African Space Agency’s role in coordinating satellite launches and data sharing will make these technologies more accessible and cost-effective.

Driving economic growth and innovation

Africa’s space sector, now worth over US$20 billion, is growing rapidly. The industry has seen an increase of private companies and investor support, moving beyond sole dependence on government funding. Investment is being fuelled by 327 NewSpace firms, a term used for the new emerging commercial space industry in nations such as Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. These firms often excel in satellite communication, Earth observation and component manufacturing.

But many African nations lack resources. The agency will lower barriers by fostering collaboration, coordinating national space programmes, and reducing duplication.For example, the African Space Agency’s efforts to streamline satellite development and launches will spur local manufacturing and tech hubs.

This means that smaller economies will be able to participate.

Strengthening regional and global connections

Africa’s space sector relies on partnerships with space agencies and commercial space companies based in the “space powers”. These include the US, Russia, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. These institutions provide launch services, satellite development and ground stations.

An example is Senegal’s GaindeSAT-1A, a CubeSat launched in 2024 via America’s SpaceX with French collaboration.

Meanwhile, countries like South Africa are exploring local rocket programmes to enhance the agency’s self-reliance. Africa’s space ground stations are already located across the continent, supporting the European Space Agency and commercial missions. They will soon host a deep space ground station for America’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Funding remains a challenge. African nations allocated just US$426 million to space programmes in 2025. That’s less than 1% of global spending. The European Space Agency has an US$8 billion budget.

However, initiatives like the €100 million Africa-EU Space Partnership Programme (2025–2028) aim to boost Africa’s space sovereignty and innovation.

The agency’s vision extends beyond Earth, with an eye on the Moon. Some members, notably Angola, Nigeria and Rwanda, have already signed the US-led Artemis Accords for lunar exploration. For their part Egypt and South Africa are collaborating with China and Russia on the International Lunar Research Station.

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Read more: Outer space: Rwanda and Nigeria sign an accord for more responsible exploration – why this matters

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Training the next generation

A skilled workforce is critical to Africa’s space industry. The Africa Space Agency Space City plans to host a training academy. It will build on Egypt’s programmes in space project management, satellite design, and orbital simulation.

Partnerships like the Africa-EU programme offer scholarships, while private initiatives, such as the Pathways to Space programme by Boeing and the Future African Space Explorers STEM Academy, engage students in 63 schools in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania.

– 5 benefits Africa’s new space agency can deliver
– https://theconversation.com/5-benefits-africas-new-space-agency-can-deliver-258098

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Adebusola Okedele, Senior Lecturer, Political Science, Babcock University

A new ranking by UN Women and the Inter-Parliamentary Union puts Nigeria 179th out of 185 countries for the percentage of women in the national legislature.

Women currently make up only 3.9% of seats in the House of Representatives. In the Senate, three of the 108 current members are women. In the executive branch, women head eight of 45 (17.8%) of ministries.

This absence of women in prominent positions in politics subtly reinforces societal biases and moulds public opinion, which subconsciously excludes women from political leadership.

We are a group of researchers who have expertise in gender and African politics and childhood political socialisation. We have been researching the political socialisation of children in Nigeria for the past three years.

Our research in Ogun State reveals that children are internalising what they see on the political stage. We asked children aged 5 to 16 at 12 schools in Ogun State to imagine and draw a leader such as a president, governor, or member of a national or state assembly at work. Only 5% of 981 children drew a woman as a political leader.

Ninety-two percent of girls drew a man, compared to 98% of boys.

Why do so few children draw women as political leaders? Children absorb the power dynamics and gender roles they observe in political happenings, shaping their understanding of politics.

In democracies, a lack of women interested in politics, as well as running for and winning political office, matters. If women are absent in decision-making spaces, their concerns might not be considered. While men can represent women’s interests, women committed to change can draw on their experiences and those of women in their networks to bring new ideas to the table.

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Read more: Nigeria’s National Assembly: why adding seats for women isn’t enough

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Women in authority in Nigeria

We conducted our study in the three senatorial districts of Ogun State, one of Nigeria’s 36 states. In Ogun State, the deputy governor, Noimot Salako-Oyedele, is a woman, and her picture is on many classroom walls.

The late anti-colonial activist and leader Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti was from Ogun State too. The presence of visible women leaders could encourage some children in the state to imagine and depict women as political leaders. Thus, it is possible that our sample of children were more likely to draw a woman than children in other states.

Six other states have women deputy governors: Akwa Ibom, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Kaduna, Plateau and Rivers States.

But women’s representation in state assemblies throughout the country is low. No woman has ever been elected to be a governor in Nigeria.

In our study, we asked children what jobs they would like to have in the future. In general, boys were more interested in jobs in politics (president, governor, local government chair) than girls were. For the specific job of president or governor, however, girls seemed to be just as interested as boys.

The children’s response isn’t specific to Nigeria. In a study conducted in 2017 and 2018 in the United States (where 19.3% of members of the House of Representatives at the time were women), only 13% of children drew a woman political leader.

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Read more: Nigeria has few women in politics: here’s why, and what to do about it

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Broader forces

Multiple factors hinder women’s representation in elected offices in Nigeria. These include political party practices that favour the recruitment and selection of men candidates, the high costs of running for office, as outlined in Ayisha Osori’s book Love Does Not Win Elections, and societal biases against women holding positions of political power.

Deeply entrenched societal biases add to the challenges. Cultural norms assign leadership roles to men and certain religious interpretations restrict women’s public participation.

The perception that women are more suited for domestic roles, or lack assertiveness, impedes their ability to garner support for political leadership.

Low numbers of women representatives also suggest there are systemic biases in the democratic electoral process.

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Read more: Ghana’s election system keeps women out of parliament. How to change that

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Children pay attention

Recent research shows that when girls observe women in political power or running for political office, they are more engaged in politics later in life. This suggests that positive exposure to women in politics may have positive effects on girls’ political engagement. Negative exposure could have negative effects.

Take, for example, the “Natasha-Akpabio case” in Nigeria. Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan alleged that Senate president Godswill Akpabio had sexually harassed her. The Senate president denied the allegation. Akpoti-Uduaghan was suspended from her position by the Senate ethics committee for what it described as misconduct and disregard for the Senate standing orders.

Experiences like those may influence future generations’ understanding of gender equality in leadership. When young Nigerians observe powerful women facing harassment and retaliation for voicing their concerns, it may undermine the notion that women are equally capable of political authority.

Girls may internalise the idea that politics is a hostile space for women. For boys, seeing women leaders undermined might reinforce a sense of male dominance.

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Read more: AU commission has made a good start on gender equality. But a lot remains to be done

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Policy solutions

Our finding that children largely see politics as a “man’s world” prompts reflection on societal and political biases. To address the under-representation of women in political leadership positions in Nigeria, it is important to invest in civic education programmes. Children should be helped to understand the significance of equitable political participation from an early age.

Campaigns should use different media platforms to challenge gender stereotypes in leadership.

Finally, enacting and enforcing legislated gender quotas across all levels of Nigerian government and within political parties is a crucial step to improve the representation of women in leadership positions.

– Nigerian children don’t imagine women as political leaders: what shapes their view
– https://theconversation.com/nigerian-children-dont-imagine-women-as-political-leaders-what-shapes-their-view-256638

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Koffi Améssou Adaba, Enseignant et chercheur en sociologie politique, Université de Lomé

A survey of Togolese citizens recently looked into perceptions of their government’s handling of the terrorist threat in the northern region and of the Alliance of Sahel States – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. The survey was carried out by Afrobarometer, an independent, pan-African research network, in partnership with the Center for Research and Opinion Polls.

The Savanes region in northern Togo, bordering Burkina Faso, has become an area of insecurity since a jihadist attack in 2021. This security crisis is part of a broader context of growing destabilisation in west African countries, centred on the Sahel region. It led to the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in July 2024. The survey also covered perceptions of foreign influence in Togo and discrimination against women and girls among other topics.

Koffi Amessou Adaba, a political sociologist and one of the lead authors of the study, shares insights into the survey’s key findings, and the potential implications for Togo’s future.

What are the key findings of the survey?

The survey, which involved 1,200 people, reveals that 64% of Togolese respondents believe the withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) to form the Alliance of Sahel States is “somewhat” or “very” justified. This view is driven by three main factors:

• a perception that Ecowas is influenced by foreign powers

• a widespread rejection of Ecowas sanctions against Sahel states

• the belief that Ecowas failed to provide military support during those countries’ security crises.

In addition, 54% of Togolese consider the presence of Russia (or the Wagner Group, now known as Africa Corps) in the Alliance of Sahel States to be beneficial. This trust in a non-western external actor reflects a profound shift in geopolitical perceptions in the region.

Another important finding of this study is that 54% of Togolese believe their country would benefit from leaving Ecowas to join the Alliance of Sahel States.

But opinions are split on whether the Alliance of Sahel States helps or hurts west African integration: 39% believe it doesn’t undermine regional integration, but 37% think it does.

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Read more: West Africa is changing: five essential reads on breakaways from Ecowas

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How do you make sense of the Togolese push to leave Ecowas?

This sentiment reflects growing frustration with Ecowas, which many Togolese now see as out of touch with the region’s realities.

The bloc is widely perceived as being too close to foreign powers and ineffective in responding to major security threats. Its repeated failures to help resolve Togo’s political crises (of 2005 and 2017 for example) have only deepened public disillusionment.

This frustration is unfolding alongside a broader wave of pan-Africanism in the region, marked by a growing rejection of former colonial powers and their institutional ties.

But this momentum should be approached with caution. The desire to leave Ecowas reflects anger and a strong appetite for change, not necessarily a clear assessment of the economic and diplomatic fallout such a move could bring.

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Read more: Ecowas breakup could push up food prices and worsen hunger in west Africa

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What do respondents think about terrorism in the north of the country?

Nearly six in ten Togolese (59%) say they trust the government to contain or root out the terror threat. This shows broad support for official counter-terrorism efforts, although some question the current strategy.

Opinions are especially split on how the crisis is communicated. Some find the messaging vague or lacking in transparency. Others think it helps keep people alert without sparking panic.

The survey reveals deeper concerns. Even Togolese outside conflict zones report growing insecurity. The northern crisis appears to be fuelling nationwide anxiety.

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Read more: Mali is still unsafe under the military: why it hasn’t made progress against rebels and terrorists

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Should Togo leave Ecowas?

Since tensions flared, Togo has been neutral. It has not openly condemned the Alliance of Sahel States countries and has maintained its membership of Ecowas. This careful stance reflects national sentiment – which leans towards support for the Alliance of Sahel States – while preserving Togo’s strategic and economic interests.

This approach isn’t new. It’s part of a long-standing Togolese tradition of balanced, pragmatic diplomacy. The nation has always pursued pragmatic and independent foreign policy that adapts to regional dynamics.

As west Africa’s geopolitical landscape shifts, Togo should:

• maintain open cooperative relations with both Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States

• preserve its strategic position as a logistics and trade hub for the region, particularly through the Port of Lomé

• strengthen its image as a diplomatic force for stability in west Africa.

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Read more: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have a new defence alliance: an expert view of its chances of success

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Can Togo maintain its delicate balancing act?

Togo’s careful balancing act remains its safest bet. The truth is, no one knows what the future holds for the Alliance of Sahel States bloc. But this middle ground gives Togo strategic flexibility regardless of how regional politics evolve.

Togo’s position leaves it well-placed either way. If the Alliance of Sahel States countries rejoin Ecowas, Togo keeps its influence. If they don’t, it still benefits from its neutrality.

Ultimately, Togo should keep playing this diplomatic card. Its measured approach offers rare stability in a volatile region.

– Togo’s citizens want to leave Ecowas – new survey suggests why
– https://theconversation.com/togos-citizens-want-to-leave-ecowas-new-survey-suggests-why-256928

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jan Pospisil, Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Security, Coventry University

The civil war in Sudan between the Sudanese army and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023, has had an impact on its neighbours. One of the most keenly affected countries is South Sudan, which became an independent state in 2011 and went on to endure its own civil war. This ended in 2018 with a tenuous peace agreement.

The impact of the Sudanese war on South Sudan, however, isn’t a straightforward spillover catastrophe. The picture is more nuanced, and this is most clearly seen in South Sudan’s oil economy. Jan Pospisil, who has studied the dynamics in Sudan and South Sudan, explains.

What is the current status of oil exports from South Sudan through Sudan?

Landlocked South Sudan is reliant on its neighbour to the north to transport oil from its fields to the international market. Crude oil is transported via pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea.

However, recent drone strikes on Port Sudan carried out by the Rapid Support Forces targeted power plants that supply electricity to pumping stations along Sudan’s critical oil pipelines.

Soon after, the Sudanese army formally notified South Sudan that it would have to halt exports. Following hectic negotiations, the South Sudanese government released a statement that the stoppage could be prevented.

This back and forth has reopened the pressing question of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan’s economy and, in particular, the role of crude oil.

Assessments of the impact of Sudan’s war on South Sudan suggest the worst: oil revenues would account for 80% of South Sudan’s budget and 90% of its fiscal revenue.

This informs the International Monetary Fund’s warnings of looming economic collapse in case of a breakdown of oil exports. The predominant view is that a shutdown of the oil pipeline through Sudan would lead to a collapse of dollar inflows to South Sudan, triggering a severe economic crisis.

However, South Sudan’s 2024-25 budget suggests a high reliance on non-oil revenue.

In fact, government oil revenues for 2024-25 are based on a volume of only around 16,000 barrels per day. This is the share of total production of about 130,000 barrels per day controlled by South Sudan. Attempts to increase production to pre-war levels of up to 400,000 barrels failed. The substantial drop in production is explained by a decline in the quality of South Sudan’s oil wells, especially in Paloch in the north-east’s Upper Nile State, and Unity State in the north-central region.

South Sudan additionally lacks the operational capacity to extract the oil it has in the ground.

The 2024-25 budget projects a hefty fiscal deficit. The revenues projected will cover only about half of total planned state spending. Oil and non-oil revenues – which mainly include tax income from international NGOs and businesses – each account for about half of the revenue that’s expected to come in.

Oil income has to account for debt (capital and interest) repayments on loans, as well as pipeline transport fees paid to Sudan. This means that even the optimistically assessed net contributions of oil revenue would only pay for 16% of planned government spending. South Sudan remains with a hefty deficit.

What are the challenges South Sudan is facing in growing oil revenues?

First, Petronas, a Malaysian multinational oil and gas company, withdrew from South Sudan in August 2024 after three decades.

It left behind substantial challenges, including an arbitration process worth more US$1 billion. This followed the government preventing Petronas from selling its shares to the British-Nigerian group Savannah Energy.

As a short-term solution, South Sudan de facto nationalised Petronas’ shares. It did this by transferring the shares to the state’s oil and gas company, Nile Petroleum Corporation (NilePet). This was perhaps in the hope of increasing revenue in the short term.

However, NilePet hasn’t been able to replace Petronas’ production logistics. This has resulted in huge challenges in restoring production to levels before the 2024 pipeline disruptions.

A second factor is the sale of oil forward. The then finance minister said in 2022 that most of the oil production had been sold in advance until 2027. He later retracted the statement, saying instead that some oil advances were merely “spread up to 2027”. While this walk-back attempted to soften the political fallout, it reinforced wider uncertainty about how much control NilePet actually retains over the revenues formally under its authority.

Given the limited relevance of oil revenues for the official South Sudanese budget, why the major concern about disruptions?

There are three reasons.

First, NilePet plays a structural role in South Sudan’s informal and often dubious hard currency circulation, which international observers would call large-scale corruption. NilePet’s accounts rarely appear in any official financial accounts and are often channelled off-budget. NilePet functions as a black box within the public finance system where real money flows can only rarely be traced. Recent intentions by the president to structurally reform the company might implicitly confirm this.

Second, there are indirect oil revenues that are important to the country’s security apparatus. This includes protection rents which come from protecting South Sudanese oil fields. This revenue never hits the budget. It pays the National Security Service either directly as salaries, or is reinvested in the considerable conglomerate of companies owned by the security service to multiply profits. Losing this revenue could destabilise the country because the funds are used to pay the salaries of the best-trained and best-equipped security service in the country.

Third, South Sudan’s ability to attract new loans depends on the repayment of existing ones. These repayments largely depend on oil production. As the 2024-24 budget shows, South Sudan desperately needs new loans to keep even core state functions operational. Yet, funding from multilateral agencies has dwindled to small-scale loans from the African Development Bank. The International Monetary Fund has currently ended all its funding programmes.

This is not a result of the war in Sudan. It is due to persistent concerns over insufficient financial governance in South Sudan and the state’s performance. Negotiations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates for new loans appear to have stalled, not least because of a default in repayments to Qatar.

These factors show that the flow of oil to Port Sudan is significant to the availability of hard currency in South Sudan’s economy. But this is in more indirect ways than the outdated claim of an 80% budgetary dependency would suggest.

The war in Sudan has a significant yet multifaceted impact on South Sudan’s economic health. But Juba’s biggest challenges are internal.

South Sudan’s economy over the last six years has been mainly dependent on international loans coming in – a flow which has now dried up, resulting in a severe economic crisis unprecedented in the young country’s history.

– Is Sudan’s war the reason for South Sudan’s economic crisis? What’s really going on with oil revenue
– https://theconversation.com/is-sudans-war-the-reason-for-south-sudans-economic-crisis-whats-really-going-on-with-oil-revenue-257375

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Egodi Uchendu, Professor (of History and International Studies), University of Nigeria

The west Africa–Sahel region has seen a proliferation of militant Islamist groups since the 1990s.

One of the most vicious groups operating in the region is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Support Group for Islam and Muslims). The militant group emerged in 2017 in Algeria and Mali, and has targeted civilian populations.

The UN listed the group as an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2018. Al-Qaeda is an Islamist organisation founded by Osama bin Laden in the 1980s.

The 2024 global terrorism index listed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organisations. Its influence has expanded in most parts of the Sahel. The group emerged to strengthen the jihadist insurgency under al-Qaeda. It combines violence with diplomacy to expand its influence and challenge state authorities.

Despite growing pressure from counter militancy campaigns spearheaded by local, regional and international militaries, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin continues to survive and adapt by regrouping and reorganising. This was demonstrated in its latest operation in Burkina Faso in 2024. The group exerted significant control by closing schools, setting up taxation checkpoints and abducting locals.

Its engagement in illicit economies has been key to the group’s successful expansion. This revenue is used to carry out devastating attacks.

We research jihadi-based insurgencies, and have found that this is a common tactic among terrorist groups in the west Africa-Sahel axis, including Boko Haram militants.

From our research, we find that Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin funds its activities by relying on

• artisanal mining

• kidnapping

• livestock theft

• money laundering.

Dismantling the group’s illicit economies and blocking its financial flows are key to countering its activities.

Financial resources

The group needs money for fighting, and to sustain political and social influence in its areas of operation.

Artisanal gold mining has proven to be a major factor in its expansion and resilience. In areas where the group exerts influence, illicit gold mining generates over US$30 billion annually. According to a report by Swissaid, a development group based in Switzerland, the main destinations for this gold are the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Switzerland.

The jihadists gain access to gold by controlling mining sites and transport routes to and from mines. They sometimes allow trusted allies, who include local armed groups, bandits and other criminal networks, to mine in exchange for a payout. The extent of gold mining funds is not exactly known, but the artisanal sites in areas controlled by the group have the capacity to produce 725 kilograms of gold per year, valued at US$34 million.

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Read more: West Africa could soon have a jihadist state – here’s why

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Another source of income – and political influence – is kidnapping for ransom. Kidnap victims include cattle owners, businessmen, state officials and foreigners. The group received a ₤30 million ransom in 2020 to release one French and two Italian hostages. Between 2017 and 2023, the group and its affiliated units were responsible for 845 out of approximately 1,100 recorded kidnappings in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Burkina Faso and Mali remain the epicentre of the group’s violent activities. In the first quarter of 2023, over 180 cases of kidnapping were recorded in these countries’ war-torn areas.

Livestock theft has also been a critical source of funds. The practice of livestock theft as economic warfare and a means to generate funds has led to livestock being forcibly taken from herders who fail to pay zakat (a religious fee among Muslims) or subscribe to the group’s ideology. The stolen livestock are sold in Mali, Mauritania or Senegal. The ability to monetise stolen livestock makes their theft a cornerstone of the Sahelian war economy and a source of cash for weapons and vehicles.

Money laundering is another illicit economy central to the militant group’s financing. It lends money to merchants, invests with banks and funds small shops with the aim of getting profits. This helps ensure a constant flow of money and provisions to support the group’s terrorist acts. It has attached much importance to this illicit economy, to the extent of assassinating those who interfere with its investments.

Way out

To cut down Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin’s financial base – and thereby weaken its capacity for militancy – counterinsurgency efforts need to take the following actions.

• Government security actors should collaborate with local self-defence militias to regulate artisanal mining and thwart kidnappings.

• Financial intelligence units need to identify merchants who receive money from the militant group to block the flow of illicit funds.

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Read more: Jihadism and coups in West Africa’s Sahel region: a complex relationship

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• Specialised courts that deal with money laundering and terrorism financing cases should be established and made operational in Burkina Faso and Mali, the epicentres of the group’s activities.

• Burkina Faso and Mali should increase security around civilians to minimise civilian casualties from terror operations.

Since finance is the basis of the militant group’s strength, regional security co-operation should be strengthened. This would help with systematically tracking illicit flows and stopping them.

– Funding terror: how west Africa’s deadly jihadists get the money they need to survive
– https://theconversation.com/funding-terror-how-west-africas-deadly-jihadists-get-the-money-they-need-to-survive-242306

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Roger Southall, Professor of Sociology, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africans are wearily attuned to governments’ Orwellian misuse of language. After all, South Africa is a country where a one-time government passed a law (the Natives Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act of 1952) which extended rather than abolishing the notorious pass system. This made it compulsory for black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry a passbook. And the same government passed the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 which made it more, not less, difficult for black students to register at “open” (or white) universities.

So perhaps they should not be unduly surprised that the government of the US has imported 49 Afrikaners and labelled them as “refugees”. The claim is that they are escaping from the persecution of Afrikaners – and white people more broadly – in South Africa today.

The Trump administration knows perfectly well this claim is a complete fabrication. As President Cyril Ramaphosa and his government have pointed out, there is no evidence whatsoever that Afrikaners or white people more generally are subject to genocide.

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Read more: Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?

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True, South Africa has one of the highest murder rates in the world. But it is poor black South Africans – not whites – who are principal victims of such deadly violence. Nor are Afrikaners/whites subject to persecution. Along with all other South Africans, their human rights are protected by a constitution. This is no mere piece of paper. Its provisions are (albeit imperfectly, and unlike in the US these days) largely enforced by the courts.

Furthermore, genocide implies the deliberate elimination of a people on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds. Therefore, if a genocide of whites and Afrikaners was taking place, we might assume that their numbers would be falling. In fact the reverse is true. The white population has continued to grow (albeit slowly) in absolute numbers since 1994.

Worse, the characterisation of Afrikaners as refugees at a moment in time when the people of Gaza are daily subject to a regime of death, terror, and murder inflicted on them by the Israeli government is not merely an absurdity but a downright insult to those genuinely subject to genocide.

So, what is really going on?

The drivers

Extensive commentary has correctly highlighted the motivations of the Trump administration.

First, the administration has launched an attack on what it terms the “tyranny” of “diversity, equity and inclusion” policies across the entire spectrum of public and private institutions in America. Critics argue this is driven by an appeal to Trump’s white Christian nationalist political base. Because post-apartheid South Africa, rightly or wrongly, has become the poster-country of diversity, equity and inclusion policies internationally, because of its constitutional commitment to non-racialism and diversity, it has been singled out for attack.

Secondly, labelling Afrikaners as refugees plays to the insecurities of Trump’s political base. This finds the idea of a white minority being ruled by a black majority government difficult to swallow.

Third, characterising Afrikaners as subject to genocide is a very deliberate response to South Africa’s charging of Israel as guilty of genocide against the Palestinian people before the International Court of Justice. But this is unacceptable to the US Christian nationalist right. For them the existence of Israel represents the realisation of Biblical truth – the return of Jews to the Holy Land.

Trump is saying that the US can and will play the same game, using it to clobber South Africa regardless of the groundlessness of the charge. But, being Trump, he will balance pandering to his support base against what economic benefits he can extract from South Africa.

The landscape

But what of the 49 Afrikaners themselves? Why have they chosen to accept the opportunity offered to them by the US government? After all, extensive attention in the South African media has been given to Afrikaners who have defiantly stated that they are committed to staying in South Africa. The reasons they give are that it’s their home. And they fully accept that, at least formally, South Africa has become a non-racial democracy.

Likewise, as I have detailed in my book on Whites and Democracy in South Africa, Afrikaners and whites have not only survived in democratic South Africa but, generally, have prospered economically. Furthermore, whites as a “population group” (to use outdated apartheid-era terminology) have participated fully in South African democracy. They are more highly disposed to voting in elections than other racial groupings, and de facto, they are well represented in parliament and local government by the Democratic Alliance, which is a vigorous defender of their interests.

But (there is always a but), if we want to guess the motivations of Trump’s 49 “refugees”, we need to bear in mind the following.

First, until we know more about the personal circumstances of the individuals involved, we cannot really know what has driven them to take the drastic step of leaving families and their personal history behind by moving to America.

Second, most whites have responded to the arrival of democracy pragmatically. They have their numerous complaints, notably about equity employment (affirmative action policies in favour of blacks) which they view as discriminatory against whites. But they have continued to enjoy high rates of employment. Indeed they continue to occupy the higher ranks of employment in the private sector in disproportionate numbers.

However, although many whites continue to live in a de facto overwhelmingly white world, both at work and at their homes in suburbia, there remains a minority which has remained wholly unreconciled to the changes which have taken place politically and economically since 1994. The armed opposers linked to the far-right have long been defeated. But we may presume the 49 belong to a broader category of passive resisters who have withdrawn into a white world as much as possible.

Third, although most whites continue to do well economically, the changes which have taken place since 1994 have led to the re-appearance of a small class of largely uneducated poor whites who feel excluded from employment by equity employment legislation. And who generally feel the loss of their racial status under democracy.

Opportunists, not refugees

Having said all that, some interesting questions remain.

Presumably the Afrikaner 49 belonged to that category of whites which, for one reason or another, is disposed to leave South Africa. However, emigrating requires jumping through numerous hoops; meeting educational and professional qualifications, getting a job offer, having sufficient financial resources to take with them to support themselves and their families before they can qualify for recipient countries’ social security systems, and so on. Apart from the emotional costs involved, emigration is not always the easiest of options, even for those who wish to “escape”.

The evidence suggests that the heads of household among the Afrikaner 49 are drawn not only from that minority of Afrikaners who are totally unreconciled to democracy, but who – quite simply – are opportunists who have availed themselves of a short cut to emigrate.

– Trump’s Afrikaners are South African opportunists, not refugees: what’s behind the US move
– https://theconversation.com/trumps-afrikaners-are-south-african-opportunists-not-refugees-whats-behind-the-us-move-257017