Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saleem Badat, Research Professor, UFS History Department, University of the Free State

Ruth First, born 100 years ago, was a South African freedom fighter, journalist and scholar who worked against the racist system of apartheid during white minority rule. She was assassinated by apartheid forces in her office at the Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique in 1982.

Her ideas, work and legacy live on. Sociologists Saleem Badat and Vasu Reddy have edited a new book called Research and Activism: Ruth First & Activist Research. We asked them about her and their project.

---

Who was Ruth First?

Heloise Ruth First was born on 4 May 1925 in Johannesburg to Jewish parents who had migrated from eastern Europe to South Africa in the early 1900s. Her parents were founder members of the South African Communist Party.

She joined the Young Communist League and the Federation of Progressive Students and graduated from the University of the Witwatersrand in 1946 with a Bachelor of Arts degree.

At 21, First joined the left-wing South African newspaper The Guardian. When it was banned, the New Age took its place until it too was banned in 1962. She served as the newspaper’s Johannesburg editor for 17 years.

In 1963, First was arrested at the University of the Witwatersrand library and held in solitary confinement for 117 days, during which time she was ruthlessly interrogated. The following year she and her three children left South Africa for England on an exit permit, where they joined her partner, the activist and politician Joe Slovo. She would not set foot again in South Africa. Continuing with her activist research in England, she taught at Durham University and then joined Eduardo Mondlane University until hear death.

The mid-1940s to early 1960s were tumultuous years in South Africa. With the rise of formal apartheid in 1948, racial segregation was intensified.

First’s intrepid and penetrating journalistic research exposed her to the brutality of labour exploitation and control on the mines and the farms. It reinforced her understanding of South Africa in Marxist terms.

She wrote:

Silence in the face of injustice is complicity.

For her:

The will to fight is born out of the desire for freedom.

She was confident that:

The power of the people is greater than the power of any government.

First believed that ignorance is “the enemy of progress and justice” and that knowledge and education are “key to empowering individuals and challenging oppressive systems”. These words ring true in today’s global events driven by right-wing authoritarianism, US imperialism and acts of genocide.

On learning of her death, former South African President Nelson Mandela recalled:

I was in prison when Ruth First was assassinated, felt almost alone. Lost a sister in arms  … It is no consolation to know that she lives beyond her grave.

What is activist research and how is it applied in the book?

As authors, we revisit Ruth First’s life, work and ideas and its relevance for the current context. We focus especially on the nature of her scholarship and how she navigated the tensions between her activism and her research – whether journalistic or for her books on South West Africa (today’s Namibia), Libya or western investment in apartheid. Other of her acclaimed books included The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d’etat and, during her Mozambican sojourn, Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant.

In the process we invite renewed critical reflection about her life and work. Inspired by First’s contributions, the book considers how universities and scholars engage with institutions and social movements beyond the university.

For example, in the book a research group from Durham University in the UK considers how to balance objectivity (showing no bias) with more politically participatory research methods and how objectivity can be enhanced despite the difficulties faced by activist research.

Other scholars reflect on the work of the assassinated South African anti-apartheid activist scholar and lecturer Rick Turner on climate change. And on the complexities of undertaking activist research in Marikana with a women’s organisation, Sikhala Sonke. Marikana was the site where South African police opened fire on and killed 34 striking mineworkers in 2012.

There is examination of a research partnership between University of Cape Town activist scholars and some Khoi-San communities, reflection on the challenges of legal practice and education, and critical analysis of the decolonisation challenges of the KwaZulu-Natal Society of the Arts.

How do you frame activist research in your book?

The book shows that there is a difference between engaged research, critical research and activist research.

Engaged research tries to connect knowledge produced by academics with institutions, movements and experts outside the university to collaboratively address issues and promote cooperation.

Critical research uses radical critical theory to critique oppression and injustice, to show the gap between what exists today and more just ways of living. However, it does not necessarily connect with political and social movements.

First’s research was not only engaged, but also critical in orientation and activist in nature. As activist research it challenged oppression and inequality.

It both critiqued the status quo in South Africa and elsewhere and tried to change it. It was linked with movements and connected to political activism that was anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, and committed to socialism.

---

Read more: Lessons learnt from taking sides as a sociologist in unjust times

---

First’s activist research did not confine itself to the academic arena but engaged with larger, wider and more diverse publics. It used this experience to critique dominant and often limited thinking at universities and promoted other ways of producing knowledge. The expertise developed was used to improve scholarship in various ways.

What do you want readers to take away?

There is much talk about the “engaged university” and engaged research. However, only certain connections and engagements seem to be valued.

Prior to democracy in 1994, South African researchers connected with social movements for change. Now this is seldom the case. Universities and scholars largely engage with those with money – the state, business, elites and donors.

---

Read more: Regina Twala was a towering intellectual and activist in Eswatini – but she was erased from history

---

This raises questions about the roles of researchers in South Africa, whose interests are prioritised and the place of critical and activist research in the engaged university.

How should Ruth First be remembered?

We must honour her for her intellectual and practical activism. What matters is not just her knowledge archive, but also her example as both an outstanding interpreter of the world and an activist scholar committed to changing society in the interests of the downtrodden, marginalised and voiceless.

First was a critical and independent thinker who refused to accept anything as settled and beyond questioning. But that intellect was committed to loyalty to the national liberation movement of which she was an invaluable cadre.

---

The views expressed in this piece do not reflect or represent the position of the university to which Badat and Reddy are affiliated.

– Ruth First and activist research: the legacy of a South African freedom fighter
– https://theconversation.com/ruth-first-and-activist-research-the-legacy-of-a-south-african-freedom-fighter-257687

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Miemie Struwig, Professor, Department of Business Management, Nelson Mandela University

South Africans want to shop more sustainably, according to research published in the journal Sustainable Development. But most can’t tell which products are environmentally friendly.

Some food manufacturers have introduced eco labels – a certification symbol placed on product packaging. This indicates the product meets specific environmental standards set by a third party organisation.

These labels are meant to signal to consumers that a product has been produced in a way that limits harm to the environment. But our recent study with 108 South African consumers showed low recognition of eco labels, widespread confusion, and a need for clearer guidance.

The results show that most South African shoppers are unfamiliar with these labels or unable to differentiate between real and fictional ones.

In the European Union eco labels like the EU Energy Label are easily understood and highly visible. They are also usually supported by government awareness campaigns. Other examples of labelling systems that work well include those of Germany and Japan.

These countries show that long term institutional support, mandatory labelling in key sectors, and consistent public messaging can greatly improve eco label recognition.

We concluded from our research that South Africa lacks that national visibility and public education, leaving even motivated consumers unsure of what labels to trust. Based on our findings we recommend steps businesses, government and nonprofits can take to ensure that eco labels are clear, visible and understood.

Eco labelling at its best

The EU Energy Label is used on appliances such as fridges, washing machines and light bulbs to indicate their energy efficiency on a scale from A (most efficient) to G (least efficient).

In countries like Germany and Japan, eco labels are government backed as well as being integrated into school curricula, public service announcements and shopping platforms.

Germany’s Blue Angel label, which states “protects the environment”, has been in use since the 1970s. It appears on over 12,000 products and services, including paper goods, cleaning products, paints and electronics, that meet strict environmental criteria. It is supported by ongoing public education campaigns.

In Japan the the Eco Mark appears on products with minimal environmental impact. It appears on items like stationery, detergents, packaging and appliances. Many retailers display explanations next to these products to help consumers understand the label.

South Africans struggle to identify eco labels

We conducted a structured online survey of 108 South African consumers. Participants were asked about their environmental awareness and their ability to recognise both real and fictional eco labels across ten images. According to the global directory of eco labels and environmental certification schemes, there are around 50 eco labels in South Africa.

The EU Energy Label was the most recognised (87%).

The Afrisco Certified Organic label, which is a legitimate South African label, was the least recognised, identified by just 22% of respondents.

Fictional labels were mistakenly identified as real by many participants, revealing widespread confusion.

Only 3 out of 10 labels were recognised by at least half the participants, suggesting a general lack of eco label awareness. These include the Energy Star Eco label; the EU Energy label and the Forest Stewardship council label.

Age and employment status were significantly related to environmental awareness. Older and employed individuals showed higher levels of awareness.

These findings suggest that consumers are not opposed to eco labels, they simply lack the knowledge and confidence to use them effectively.

Eco labels have the potential to build brand trust, drive green purchasing behaviour, and support national sustainability goals. But they only work if consumers recognise and trust them.

In South Africa, inconsistent use, small label size, and a lack of consumer education are holding eco labels back from achieving their purpose.

What businesses can do

Based on our findings, we recommend the following:

• Use recognised and credible labels: Third-party certified labels are more trustworthy and reliable.

• Improve label visibility: The most recognised label in our study was the EU Energy Label and was also the most prominent. Small, cluttered logos go unnoticed.

• Educate your market: Explain what eco labels mean through packaging, marketing, and digital platforms.

• Partner with government and NGOs: Awareness campaigns at national and community levels can help standardise eco label understanding.

• Tailor communication efforts: Awareness efforts should consider age and employment demographics, as these affect levels of environmental engagement.

The way forward

South Africans are willing to support environmentally responsible products, but they need help identifying them.

Businesses, government and nonprofits all have a role to play in making eco labels clearer, more visible, and more trustworthy.

Eco labels must become more than symbols. They should be tools for transparency and trust, and a gateway to more sustainable shopping.

– Eco labels in South Africa don’t do the job: how to help customers make informed choices
– https://theconversation.com/eco-labels-in-south-africa-dont-do-the-job-how-to-help-customers-make-informed-choices-258081

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Pius Siakwah, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana

Narendra Modi’s trip to Ghana in July 2025, part of a five-nation visit, is the first by an Indian prime minister in over 30 years. The two countries’ relationship goes back more than half a century to when India helped the newly independent Ghana set up its intelligence agencies. Ghana is also home to several large Indian-owned manufacturing and trading companies. International relations scholar Pius Siakwah unpacks the context of the visit.

What is the background to Ghana and India’s relationship?

It can be traced to links between Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s first president, and his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1957. It is not surprising that the Indian High Commission is located near the seat of the Ghana government, Jubilee House.

Nkrumah and Nehru were co-founders of the Non-Aligned Movement, a group of states not formally aligned with major power blocs during the cold war. Its principles focused on respect for sovereignty, neutrality, non-interference, and peaceful dispute resolution. It was also a strong voice against the neo-colonial ambitions of some of the large powers.

The movement emerged in the wave of decolonisation after the second world war. It held its first conference in 1961 under the leadership of Josip Bros Tito (Yugoslavia), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt) and Sukarno (Indonesia) as well as Nehru and Nkrumah.

The relationship between Ghana and India seemingly went into decline after the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966, coinciding with the decline of Indian presence in global geopolitics.

In 2002, President John Kufuor re-energised India-Ghana relations. This led to the Indian government’s financial support in the construction of Ghana’s seat of government in 2008.

Though the concept of the Non-Aligned Movement has faded this century, its principles have crystallised into south-south cooperation. This is the exchange of knowledge, skills, resources and technologies among regions in the developing world.

South-south cooperation has fuelled India-Ghana relations. Modi’s diplomatic efforts since 2014 have sought to relaunch India’s presence in Africa.

In recent times, India has engaged Africa through the India–Africa Forum Summit. The first summit was held in 2008 in New Delhi with 14 countries from Africa. The largest one was held in 2015, while the fourth was postponed in 2020 due to COVID-19. The summit has led to 50,000 scholarships, a focus on renewable energy through the International Solar Alliance and an expansion of the Pan-African e-Network to bridge healthcare and educational gaps. Development projects are financed through India’s EXIM Bank.

India is now one of Ghana’s major trading partners, importing primary products like minerals, while exporting manufactured products such as pharmaceuticals, transport and agricultural machinery. The Ghana-India Trade Advisory Chamber was established in 2018 for socio-economic exchange.

Modi’s visit supports the strengthening of economic and defence ties.

The bilateral trade between India and Ghana moved from US$1 billion in 2011-12 to US$4.5 billion in 2018-19. It then dipped to US$2.2 billion in 2020-21 due to COVID. By 2023, bilateral trade amounted to around US$3.3 billion, making India the third-largest export and import partner behind China and Switzerland.

Indian companies have invested in over 700 projects in Ghana. These include B5 Plus, a leading iron and steel manufacturer, and Melcom, Ghana’s largest supermarket chain.

India is also one of the leading sources of foreign direct investment to Ghana. Indian companies had invested over US$2 billion in Ghana by 2021, according to the Ghana Investment Promotion Center.

What are the key areas of interest?

The key areas of collaboration are economic, particularly:

• energy

• infrastructure (for example, construction of the Tema to Mpakadan railway line)

• defence

• technology

• pharmaceuticals

• agriculture (agro-processing, mechanisation and irrigation systems)

• industrial (light manufacturing).

What’s the bigger picture?

Modi’s visit is part of a broader visit to strengthen bilateral ties and a follow-up to the Brics Summit, July 2025 in Brazil. Thus, whereas South Africa is often seen as the gateway to Africa, Ghana is becoming the opening to west Africa.

Modi’s visit can be viewed in several ways.

First, India as a neo-colonialist. Some commentators see India’s presence as just a continuation of exploitative relations. This manifests in financial and agricultural exploitation and land grabbing.

Second, India as smart influencer. This is where the country adopts a low profile but benefits from soft power, linguistic, cultural and historical advantages, and good relationships at various societal and governmental levels.

Third, India as a perennial underdog. India has less funds, underdeveloped communications, limited diplomatic capacity, little soft power advantage, and an underwhelming media presence compared to China. China is able to project its power in Africa through project financing and loans, visible diplomatic presence with visits and media coverage in Ghana. Some of the coverage of Chinese activities in Ghana is negative – illegal mining (galamsey) is an example. India benefits from limited negative media presence but its contributions in areas of pharmaceuticals and infrastructure don’t get attention.

Modi will want his visit to build on ideas of south-south cooperation, soft power and smart operating. He’ll want to refute notions that India is a perennial underdog or a neo-colonialist in a new scramble for Africa.

In 2025, Ghana has to navigate a complex geopolitical space.

– Ghana and India: Narendra Modi’s visit rekindles historical ties
– https://theconversation.com/ghana-and-india-narendra-modis-visit-rekindles-historical-ties-260281

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Peter M Macharia, Senior postdoctoral research fellow, Institute of Tropical Medicine Antwerp

The lack of reliable information about health facilities across sub-Saharan Africa became very clear during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid a surge in emergency care needs, information was lacking about the location of facilities, bed capacity and oxygen availability, and even where to find medical specialists. This data could have enabled precise assessments of hospital surge capacity and geographic access to critical care. Peter Macharia and Emelda Okiro, whose research focuses on public health and equity of health service access in low resource settings, share the findings of their recent study, co-authored with colleagues.

What are open health facility databases?

A health facility is a service delivery point where healthcare services are provided. The facilities can range from small clinics and doctor’s offices to large teaching and referral hospitals.

A health facility database is a list of all health facilities in a country or geographic area, such as a district. A typical database should assign each health facility a unique code, name, size, type (from primary to tertiary), ownership (public or private), operational status (working or closed), location and subnational unit (county or district). It should also record services (emergency obstetric care, for example), capacity (number of beds, for example), infrastructure (electricity availability, for example), contact information (address and email), and when this information was last updated.

The ideal method of compiling this list is to conduct a census, as Kenya did in 2023. But this takes resources. Some countries have compiled lists from existing incomplete ones. Senegal did this and so did Kenya in 2003 and 2008.

This list should be open to stakeholders, including government agencies, development partners and researchers. Health facility lists must be shared through a governance framework that balances data sharing with protections for data subjects and creators. In some countries, such as Kenya and Malawi, these listings are accessible through web portals without additional permission. In others, such facility lists do not exist or require extra permission.

Why are they useful to have?

Facility listings can serve the needs of individuals and communities. They also serve sub-national, national and continental health objectives.

At the individual level, a facility list offers a choice of alternatives to health seekers. At the community level, the data can guide decisions like where to place community health workers, as seen in Mali and Sierra Leone.

Health lists are useful when distributing commodities such as bed nets and allocating resources based on the health needs of the areas they serve. They help in planning for vaccination campaigns by creating detailed immunisation microplans.

By taking account of the disease burden, social dynamics and environmental factors, health services can be tailored to specific needs.

Detailed maps of healthcare resources enable quicker emergency responses by pinpointing facilities equipped for specific crises. Disease surveillance systems depend on continuously collecting data from healthcare facilities.

At the continental level, lists are crucial for a coordinated health system response during pandemics and outbreaks. They can facilitate cross-border planning, pandemic preparedness and collaboration.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, these lists informed where to put additional resources such as makeshift hospitals or transport programmes for adults over  60 years of age.

The lists are used to identify vulnerable populations at risk of emerging pathogens and populations that can benefit from new health facilities.

They are important when it comes to making emergency obstetric and newborn care accessible.

What goes wrong if you don’t have them?

Many problems arise if we don’t know where health facilities are or what they offer. Healthcare planning becomes inefficient. This can result in duplicate facility lists and the misallocation of resources, which leads to waste and inequities.

We can’t identify populations that lack services. Emergency responses weaken due to uncertainty about where best to move patients with specific conditions.

Resources are wasted when there are duplicate facility lists. For example, between 2010 and 2016, six government departments partnered with development organisations, resulting in ten lists of health facilities in Nigeria.

In Tanzania, over 10 different health facility lists existed in 2009. Maintained by donors and government agencies, the function-specific lists didn’t work together to share information easily and accurately. This prompted the need for a national master facility list.

What needs to happen to build one?

A comprehensive list of health facilities can be compiled through mapping exercises or from existing lists. The health ministry should take responsibility for setting up, developing and updating this list.

Partnerships are crucial for developing facility lists. Stakeholders include donors, implementing and humanitarian partners, technical advisors and research institutions. Many of these have their own project-based lists, which should integrate into a centralised facility list managed by the ministry. The health ministry must foster a transparent environment, encouraging citizens and stakeholders to contribute to enhancing health facility data.

Political and financial commitment from governments is essential. Creating and maintaining a proper list requires significant investment. Expertise and resources are necessary to keep it updated.

A commitment to open data is a necessary step. Open access to these lists makes them more complete, reliable and useful.

– How far is your closest hospital or clinic? Public health researchers explain why Africa needs up-to-date health facility databases
– https://theconversation.com/how-far-is-your-closest-hospital-or-clinic-public-health-researchers-explain-why-africa-needs-up-to-date-health-facility-databases-259190

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rich Mallett, Research Associate and Independent Researcher, ODI Global

Motorcycle-taxis are one of the fastest and most convenient ways to get around Uganda’s congested capital, Kampala. But they are also the most dangerous. Though they account for one-third of public transport trips taking place within the city, police reports suggest motorcycles were involved in 80% of all road-crash deaths registered in Kampala in 2023.

Promising to solve the safety problem while also improving the livelihoods of moto-taxi workers, digital ride-hail platforms emerged a decade ago on the city’s streets. It is no coincidence that Uganda’s ride-hailing pioneer and long-time market leader goes by the name of SafeBoda.

Conceived in 2014 as a “market-based approach to road safety”, the idea is to give riders a financial incentive to drive safely by making digital moto-taxi work pay better. SafeBoda claimed at the time that motorcyclists who signed up with it would increase their incomes by up to 50% relative to the traditional mode of operation, in which riders park at strategic locations called “stages” and wait for passengers.

In the years since, the efforts of SafeBoda and its ride-hail competitors to bring safety to the sector have largely been deemed a success. One study carried out in 2017 found that digital riders were more likely to wear a helmet and less likely to drive towards oncoming traffic. Early press coverage was particularly glowing, while recent academic studies continue to cite the Kampala case as evidence that ride-hailing platforms may hold the key to making African moto-taxi sectors a safer place to work and travel.

---

Read more: Ride-hailing in Lagos: algorithmic impacts and driver resistance

---

Is it all as clear-cut as this? In a new paper based on PhD research, I suggest not. Because at its core the ride-hail model – in which riders are classified as independent contractors who do poorly paid “gig work” rather than as wage-earning employees – undermines its own safety ambitions.

Speed traps

In my study of Kampala’s vast moto-taxi industry – estimated to employ hundreds of thousands of people – I draw on 112 in-depth interviews and a survey of 370 moto-taxi riders to examine how livelihoods and working conditions have been affected by the arrival of the platforms.

To date, there has been only limited critical engagement with how this change has played out over the past decade. I wanted to get beneath the big corporate claims and alluring platform promises to understand how riders themselves had experienced the digital “transformation” of their industry, several years after it first began.

---

Read more: Kenya’s ride-hailing drivers say their jobs offer dignity despite the challenges

---

One of the things I found was that, from a safety perspective, the ride-hail model represents a paradox. We can think of it as a kind of “speed trap”.

On one hand, ride-hail platforms try to moderate moto-taxi speeds and behaviours through managerial techniques. They make helmet use compulsory. They put riders through road safety training before letting them out onto the streets. And they enforce a professional “code of conduct” for riders.

In some cases, companies also deploy “field agents” to major road intersections around the city. Their task is to monitor the behaviour of riders in company uniform and, should they be spotted breaking the rules, discipline them.

On the other hand, however, the underlying economic structure of digital ride-hailing pulls transport workers in the opposite direction by systematically depressing trip fares and rewarding speed.

Under the “gig economy” model used by Uganda’s ride-hail platforms, the livelihood promise hangs not in the offer of a guaranteed wage but in the possibility of higher earnings. Crucially, it is a promise that only materialises if riders are able to reach and maintain a faster, harder work-rate throughout the day – completing enough jobs that pay “little money”, as one rider put it, to make the gig-work deal come good. Or, as summed up by another interviewee:

We are like stakeholders, I can say that. No basic salary, just commission. So it depends on your speed.

We already know from existing research that the gig economy places new pressures on transport workers to drive fast and take risky decisions. This is especially the case for workers on low, unsteady pay and without formal safety nets.

And yet, it is precisely these factors that routinely lead to road traffic accidents. Extensive research from across east Africa has shown that motorcycle crashes are strongly associated with financial pressure and the practices that lead directly from this, such as speeding, working long hours and performing high-risk manoeuvres. All are driven by the need to break even each day in a hyper-competitive informal labour market, with riders compelled to go fast by the raw economics of their work.

Deepening the pressure

Ride-hail platforms may not be the reason these circumstances exist in the first place. But the point is that they do not mark a departure from them.

If anything, my research suggests they may be making things worse. According to the survey data, riders working through the apps make on average 12% higher gross earnings each week relative to their analogue counterparts. This is because the online world gets them more jobs.

But to stay connected to that world they must shoulder higher operating costs, for: mobile data (to remain logged on); fuel (to perform more trips); the use of helmets and uniforms (which remain company property); and commissions extracted by the platform companies (as much as 15%-20% per trip).

As soon as these extras are factored in, the difference completely disappears. The digital rider works faster and harder – but for no extra reward.

Rethinking approaches to safety reform

Ride-hail platforms were welcomed onto the streets of Kampala as an exciting new solution to unsafe transport, boldly driven by technological innovation and “market-based” thinking.

---

Read more: Uganda’s speedy motorbike taxis will slow down for cash – if incentives are cleverly designed

---

But it is important to remember that these are private enterprises with a clear bottom line: to one day turn a profit. As recent reports and my own thesis show, efforts to reach that point often alienate and ultimately repel the workers on whom these platforms depend – and whose livelihoods and safety standards they claim to be transforming.

A recent investment evaluation by one of SafeBoda’s first funders perhaps puts it best: it is time to reframe ride-hailing as a “risky vehicle” for safety reform in African cities, rather than a clear road to success.

– Uganda’s ride-hailing motorbike service promised safety – but drivers are under pressure to speed
– https://theconversation.com/ugandas-ride-hailing-motorbike-service-promised-safety-but-drivers-are-under-pressure-to-speed-259310

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Beloff, Postdoctoral Research Associate, King’s College London

The foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) signed a new peace agreement on 27 June 2025 under the auspices of the US.

The agreement aims to foster long-term peace, and increased economic trade and security. The DRC is one of Africa’s largest nations, with over 110 million people. Rwanda has a population of 14 million.

After three decades of war and tensions between the two neighbours since the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, the hope is that this agreement will establish the foundations for progress that benefits both nations.

It was the Donald Trump administration’s moment to illustrate the effectiveness of its “transactional” foreign policy, focused on exchanges and short-term benefits for each actor.

Most of the agreement’s details remained undisclosed until its signing. One aspect that’s surfaced was the claim that the DRC abandoned its demand for the removal of Rwandan soldiers from its territory. The Congolese government, research groups and the UN have accused Rwanda of supplying military aid, including soldiers, to the March 23 Movement (M23), which has been at war with the government in Kinshasa since 2021. The Rwandan government denies any active involvement but has some sympathies for the Congolese rebel group.

Under the June 2025 agreement, each side provided concessions and demands that are perhaps easier said than done. Both countries also want to show the Trump administration their willingness to negotiate and make a deal. This is in the hopes of future deals with the US, which Trump has remained vague on.

The DRC has immense mineral wealth, including gold, diamonds, tungsten, coltan, tin and lithium. These latter minerals are used in computer chips, batteries and other technologies.

---

Read more: Rwandan-backed M23 rebel group seeks local power in DRC, not just control over mining operations

---

The question is whether this latest agreement will lead to peace in the DRC. The likely answer is no, based on research on instability in the eastern DRC, Rwandan foreign policy and the security and political dynamics between Rwanda and the DRC for over 15 years.

This is mainly because

• key players involved in the crisis were left out of negotiations

• no provisions are made for enforcement

• the opportunities for US companies remain questionable given the lack of security in the mining regions.

The roots of the crisis

After the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, former genocide perpetrators used the DRC’s vast size as cover to plan attacks on Rwanda. They intended to return to Rwanda to finish the genocide. The consequences led to the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

It was during the bloody second war that the DRC was carved up by multiple rebel groups aligned with various nations and political actors. The UN accuses Rwanda and Uganda of carrying out a massive illegal mineral trade. Both nations deny this.

The consequences of the conflict are still felt over 20 years later. Despite multiple peace agreements, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, an estimated 120 rebel groups remain active in the Congo.

One of them, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), aims to return Rwanda to ethnic division and the genocide. The Rwandan government fears the group’s genocide and hate ideology.

Additionally, the FDLR and other extremist actors such as Wazalendo target the Banyarwanda. This ethnic group, residing primarily in eastern DRC, is historically related to Rwanda. It has been the target of attacks, which have forced tens of thousands of people to flee into Rwanda.

---

Read more: The Banyamulenge: how a minority ethnic group in the DRC became the target of rebels – and its own government

---

These attacks led to the resurrection of the M23. Despite its failures in 2013, the M23 scored major advances in late 2021 in response to attacks on the Banyarwanda. The rebel group led a successful military campaign that occupied large swathes of territory in eastern DRC.

Their success is largely attributed to the Rwandan Defence Forces, despite Kigali denying this claim.

Concessions from each nation

The latest peace agreement addresses the security, political and economic interests of both nations.

The specifics are still unavailable. However, several assumptions based on the framework and leaked reports can be made.

The first is that both nations must respect each other’s territorial sovereignty and stop aiding rebel forces. This will include joint security coordination, and working with the existing UN peacekeeping mission. Additionally, Congolese refugees who fled eastern DRC – estimated to be over 80,000 – will be allowed to return. Finally, the two nations will establish mechanisms to foster greater economic integration.

The DRC has also signalled its willingness to attract American investors. DRC’s vast mineral wealth remains largely underdeveloped. American investment could develop mining that’s safer and extracts larger amounts of minerals than current methods. Kinshasa has also agreed to combat corruption and simplify the tax system.

While most of these incentives would be aimed at mineral extraction companies, they also include private security firms. The Congolese military’s inability to defeat the M23 highlights a problematic security environment that some in the DRC believe can be addressed through foreign intervention. However, these security guarantees are still relatively unknown and face complications that could affect the success of any agreement.

The weaknesses

There are a number of reasons this latest agreement is unlikely to lead to peace.

First, the M23 did not participate in the negotiations. Given that they are the primary military actor in eastern DRC, their commitment to a peace process cannot be guaranteed.

Second, other rebel forces in different parts of the country will feel left out too. They could see this agreement as an opportunity to press for greater concessions from the Congolese government.

Third, there are few mechanisms to enforce the agreement. Since the Second Congo War, there have been multiple treaties, agreements and disarmament programmes with little success. The Pretoria Accord between Rwanda and the DRC in 2002 did not lead to long-term peace. The M23’s name is a nod to their anger over a failed 2009 agreement. In 2024, Rwanda and Congo nearly reached an agreement under Angola’s mediation, but Angola stepped down. The process was then taken over by Qatar and later the US.

Lastly, American investors may be deterred by the security, regulatory and corruption issues that plague the DRC. Even if the Congolese government promises to address these issues, it lacks the necessary capabilities to fulfil its commitment.

– DRC and Rwanda sign a US-brokered peace deal: what are the chances of its success?
– https://theconversation.com/drc-and-rwanda-sign-a-us-brokered-peace-deal-what-are-the-chances-of-its-success-260066

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lauren Graham, Professor at the Centre for Social Development in Africa, University of Johannesburg, University of Johannesburg

More than a third of young South Africans are not in employment, education or training. This cohort of 3.4 million (37.1% of those aged 15–24) risks long-term joblessness. Discouragement – giving up looking for work – is also a risk, as the latest data show.

This has serious social and economic implications. Social and economic exclusion can lead to declining mental health, social drift, long-term dependence on grants and lost economic potential.

To help break this cycle, a research team we were part of piloted a Basic Package of Support programme that offered personalised coaching and referrals to services to tackle the barriers young people face. Between 2022 and 2024 we worked with 1,700 young people in three of South Africa’s nine provinces – Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. The team worked in peri-urban areas where there were high rates of young people not in education, employment or training.

The initiative aimed to help young people clarify their goals and find pathways into relevant learning and earning an income.

The results of the programme showed improved mental health, reduced distress and a stronger sense of belonging. The findings show the power of targeted and multifaceted support to prevent social drift.

The programme and its participants

The pilot took place in three peri-urban communities with limited job and learning opportunities, and high rates of poverty and unemployment. We chose these areas for their high rates of young people who are not in education, employment or training.

Over half of the participants (51%) were aged 18-20, 43% were 21-24 and just under 6% were aged 25-27. While 51% had completed high school, 30% had grade 9-11, and under 2% had less than grade 9. A further 17% held a university degree. Most (77%) had been actively seeking work, or opportunities in training or volunteering (73%), when they started the programme.

Data were collected at intake and after three sessions. A monitoring survey after each coaching session was used to determine whether the participant was in any earning or learning opportunity.

The qualitative component included in-depth interviews with young people who had completed multiple coaching sessions. Interviews were conducted six to eight months after pilot sites were opened to explore participants’ situations, experiences of coaching, and any shifts in perspective.

The primary objective of this pilot phase was to assess the programme’s capability to:

• engage and support disconnected young people

• achieve anticipated outcomes, including improved sense of belonging, wellbeing and connection to learning or earning opportunities.

In general, feelings of being supported and having access to resources in their community were low among the participants: 18.33% reported having had low levels of support in general, from adults and from peers. Young men reported considerably higher access to peer support than women (9% of men rated peer support as low relative to 24% of women).

One-third of young people reported a lack of access to, or availability of, resources in their community. These resources included health, psychosocial, or training resources.

Changes in well-being and mental health

Emotional wellbeing and psychosocial factors are critical precursors to engagement in the labour market. Having a sense of control, positive sense of self-esteem, and future orientation promote resilience, which is critical to searching for and taking up opportunities.

Research has also shown that spending a long time without learning or earning creates disillusionment and poor mental health, creating a cycle of chronic unemployment and social drift.

For these reasons we felt it was important to examine how the young people’s well-being had changed as they progressed through the programme. The programme involved:

• reaching out to young people

• conducting an assessment to understand where they wanted to go and the barriers they faced

• coaching sessions

• referrals to relevant services to overcome barriers

• opportunites to take steps towards their planned objectives.

The research team saw positive changes in all emotional well-being indicators, including quality of life, anxiety, emotional distress, and sense of belonging. Participants also showed an interest in taking up available training and work opportunities. They showed improvements in the three key outcomes we examined for this pilot phase.

Firstly, participants felt supported, were more resilient, and had better mental health outcomes than before they completed three coaching sessions.

Secondly, they showed increased capacity, knowledge and resources to navigate and access the systems and services needed to realise their aspirations.

Thirdly, 40% of them took up available opportunities to learn and earn income after just three coaching sessions. Larger numbers of these young people connected to training or education opportunities than to job opportunities. This is hardly surprising in the context of low job growth.

Taken together, these findings showed that the young people felt more positive about their lives after completing three coaching sessions. They indicated that, prior to starting the programme, they had been feeling unhappy about life and lost about how to move forward in their lives.

Part of their frustration was not having anyone to talk to about how they were feeling.

A 21-year-old female participant said after completing round two:

I didn’t know where I was going in life, what I was going to do, I didn’t know where to start. It was a whole blank page for me.

A young man said after round one:

Before I got here, the way I was feeling I didn’t think I can do anything progressive about my life. I had finished high school, but I didn’t know what step to take from there and … I did try but nothing worked … Coaching helped me cope and feel more optimistic.

Next steps

The programme is based on the idea that some young people need more time and support to find their way back into work or education. This might mean connecting them to counselling, childcare, nutrition or social grants.

The pilot revealed high levels of emotional distress, echoing recent labour force data that shows growing discouragement in the working age population. It’s clear that skills training alone isn’t enough; many young people need broader, deeper support to reconnect and thrive.

Efforts to help young people become employable need to offer more support than simply skills training. People involved in the youth employability/youth employment policy and programming sector have to understand young people from a holistic point of view and take into account the significant barriers that poverty and deprivation continue to create. This is the only way to achieve employability programmes that make an impact.

– Jobless young South Africans often lose hope: new study proves the power of mentorship
– https://theconversation.com/jobless-young-south-africans-often-lose-hope-new-study-proves-the-power-of-mentorship-259168

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alexander Richard Braczkowski, Research Fellow at the Centre for Planetary Health and Resilient Conservation Group, Griffith University

In the shadows of Python Cave, Uganda, a leopard leaps from a guano mound – formed by bat excrement – and sinks its teeth into a bat. But this is no ordinary bat colony. The thousands of Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) found in this cave are known carriers of one of the world’s deadliest viruses: Marburg, a close cousin of Ebola.

Over just four months, our cameras recorded 261 predator encounters: crowned eagles, Nile monitors, leopards, pythons and blue monkeys all caught feeding on, or scavenging from this virus-harbouring colony.

And yet, this wasn’t the work of a global health agency or virology lab. The discovery came from a 25-year-old Ugandan undergraduate, Bosco Atukwatse, working with our small Volcanoes Safaris Partnership Trust Kyambura Lion Project team in Queen Elizabeth National Park. His only tools: a trail camera, curiosity and ecological instinct.

I am a conservation scientist with over 17 years of experience in wildlife ecology, monitoring and human-wildlife conflict. I’m the co-founder of the Kyambura Lion Project, which made this discovery.

For years, scientists studying how diseases spread from animals to humans have hypothesised that zoonotic diseases jump from a wildlife reservoir (like a bat) to an intermediate host (monkey) and potentially to us, humans.

For past Marburg outbreaks in Uganda, two spillover pathways have been identified: the first, involves humans coming into contact with a fruit bat habitat (namely caves filled with bat guano). Indeed, fruit bats are thought to have infected two tourists at Python Cave in 2007 and 2008.

The second pathway involves humans and animals eating the same fruit that bats have fed upon or made contact with. This second spillover pathway was identified by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention scientists in 2023. They tracked bats from the cave entering cultivated gardens to feed.

But Atukwatse and the team of young Ugandan scientists (Yahaya Ssemakula, Johnson Muhereza, Orin Cornille and Winfred Nsabimana) have potentially found another pathway: predation by at least 14 species.

Such rich visual evidence of a viral interface – bats, predators and people – is virtually non-existent in the literature. Many theoretical depictions of this process exist, and there are isolated incidents of a monkey predating on a bat or wildlife feeding on bat guano, but Atukwatse’s discovery of this many different predators repeatedly feeding on a known Marburg virus reservoir is a first.

His discovery highlights two uncomfortable truths:

• many potential zoonotic interfaces remain undocumented – often right under our noses

• the people most likely to detect them first are those living closest to wild frontiers.

But the bigger message is this: global health institutions need to stop overlooking local scientists and start funding field-based detection systems across Africa and Asia.

If we want to detect the next outbreak early, we should be empowering more Atukwatses, not waiting for the next lab test.

A hunch pays off

In early February 2025, Atukwatse and our small team of local scientists was expanding our long-term African leopard and spotted hyena monitoring grid into a new part of Queen Elizabeth National Park – the Kyambura Wildlife Reserve and Maramagambo forest.

Atukwatse had heard from nearby guides that a large bat cave lay close to the survey grid. That kind of site, he reasoned, could be perfect leopard territory: a place to hunt, rest or avoid the heat.

This is ecological attentiveness at its best – the field biology equivalent of a commodities trader spotting volatility in a geopolitical flashpoint.

Atukwatse had his radar on and acted on instinct, setting five camera traps at the cave’s entrance and along the surrounding animal trails. Just one week later, he got what he hoped for: three separate clips of a leopard hunting bats in broad daylight. He left the cameras in place in protective casing. He checked them every 7–10 days.

But that was just the beginning.

The scale of the discovery

When I first looked at Atukwatse’s videos, our joint excitement was around the leopard footage. We knew they were adaptable and could even eat small rodents , but no one had ever recorded them eating bats in Africa.

As more clips came in, we realised something bigger was unfolding. Blue monkeys were seen grabbing bats mid-roost. A crowned eagle and a Nile monitor fought over two bat carcasses. A fish eagle – typically a piscivore, which is a carnivorous species that primarily eats fish – was filmed clutching bats in its talons.

---

Read more: African wild dogs: DNA tests of their faeces reveal surprises about what they eat

---

Over 304 trap-nights, Atukwatse’s traps recorded 261 independent predator events from at least 14 different species.

Then came the second shock: over 400 human visitors – many of them tourists – were filmed approaching the cave mouth without any protective gear. Some stood just metres from a known Marburg virus reservoir. Importantly, the Uganda Wildlife Authority has built a sanctioned viewing platform about 35 metres from the cave. However, tourists broke park rules and walked within two metres of the cave mouth.

It was only after I visited the cave myself to take stills of the team that we put this all together. Atukwatse had just found the first visual evidence, at a large scale in nature, of at least 14 predators feeding on a known wildlife virus reservoir harbouring one of Earth’s deadliest viruses.

This wasn’t the result of million-dollar pathogen surveillance. It wasn’t even the core aim of our leopard survey. This happened because a young Ugandan field scientist followed his ecological gut.

Why does the discovery matter?

For decades, disease ecologists have known that major outbreaks often originate in wildlife – swine flu, avian flu and even SARS-CoV-2 all trace back to animal hosts. But what’s often missing is direct observation of spillover interfaces – the exact moments when a virus jumps from a bat, goose, or other animal into new species like humans, livestock or other wildlife.

Atukwatse’s discovery may be the first large-scale visual record of such an interface in nature: a roost of Egyptian fruit bats known to harbour a deadly virus, actively predated upon by at least 14 species, with hundreds of humans visiting the same cave mouth unprotected.

This may be a Rosetta Stone moment for spillover ecology – shifting our understanding from hypothetical models to a real, observable interface.

These kinds of spillover sites exist in other places in nature: in a Chinese wet market where a civet meets a meat processor, or in a Gabonese village where a bat is butchered for bushmeat. The difference? Most of them go undocumented. Atukwatse just filmed one.

– How does Marburg virus spread between species? Young Ugandan scientist’s photos give important clues
– https://theconversation.com/how-does-marburg-virus-spread-between-species-young-ugandan-scientists-photos-give-important-clues-259806

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors are pressing them to default on loans to two African multilateral financial institutions: the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the Trade and Development Bank (TDB).

These creditors, in effect, are demanding that the two countries prioritise repayments to themselves over payments to these two banks.

As academics who have worked on the challenges of financing sustainable development in Africa, we believe this action is short-sighted.

The action by Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors has two significant implications.

First, they are demanding that the two countries treat Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank as commercial creditors. This would undermine the banks’ credit ratings and increase their borrowing costs. It would also reduce their capacity to finance sustainable development in Africa.

Second, pressing Ghana and Zambia to default, rather than supporting pragmatic restructuring aligned with their strong growth prospects, exacerbates Ghana and Zambia’s financial vulnerability. Either they would have to use scarce resources to pay these debts or default on their obligations, in which case, the banks might well sue them.

Quotes from Ghana and Zambia’s ministries of finance suggest the decision to default is their own. However, they faced intense pressure from their official creditors to treat the two African multilateral financial institutions differently from all their other multilateral creditors.

Why does this differential treatment matter?

Preferred creditor status

Multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank and African Development Bank, have a preferred creditor status. This is in recognition of the special role they play. They are expected to provide relatively low-cost funding for public investment, economic stability and long-term sustainable development in low- and middle-income countries.

Their preferred creditor status ensures that, when countries experience debt distress, their development mandate is prioritised over the concerns of commercial creditors. Commercial creditors normally only fund commercially viable transactions. They charge high interest rates to compensate for the risk of default on these transactions.

Both Afreximbank and Trade and Development Bank were created to fill a gap in Africa’s access to critical development finance. They provide financing for projects and transactions that commercial institutions and other multilateral financial institutions cannot – or will not – provide, because of capital limits, regulations or perceptions of risk.

For example, Afreximbank’s charter notes that

the decline in African exports has impacted adversely on the economies of African states and hindered their ability to achieve a self-reliant development.

It further recognises that stimulating economic development

can best be achieved through the creation of a trade financing international institution whose principal purpose is to provide and mobilise the requisite financial resources.

Historically, it has enjoyed preferred creditor status to support its role in meeting this purpose.

Why preferred creditor status is being challenged

The two countries’ official creditor committees, the rating agency Fitch and other commentators are challenging the preferred creditor status of the two African institutions. They argue that the two banks are different from multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank that only have states as shareholders. They suggest that the private shareholders in the two African banks should not benefit from preferred creditor status. Instead, they should receive the same status as commercial creditors.

---

Read more: Ghana and Zambia have snubbed Africa’s leading development bank: why they should change course

---

This view ignores the reason that Afreximbank’s and the Trade and Development Bank’s member states authorised them to have private shareholders. It was a deliberate, pragmatic measure designed to fill a gap in Africa’s access to affordable development finance.

The idea was to create new multilateral institutions that could raise capital flexibly and quickly on terms that the individual African states could not match on their own. Several other regional development banks have this hybrid model, including CAF, a highly rated development bank in Latin America.

It is perverse that this creative and pragmatic approach to filling a gap in the global financial system is now being used against the two African banks.

The consequences

The cost of capital for the two African financial institutions will increase if they are treated like commercial creditors. This will reduce their capacity to lend and their financing will become more expensive. It will also deepen inequality in the global financial system. Lastly, it will increase the risk of future African sovereign debt defaults.

In other words, downgrading their status risks undermining the very stability that official creditors claim to safeguard. It will also create another obstacle to Africa’s efforts to access stable, predictable and affordable flows of development finance.

The eventual outcome of the official creditors’ action will ultimately depend on negotiations between Ghana and Zambia and their creditors. This will include the two African institutions. It will also be influenced by how these different groups of creditors behave in other African sovereign debt restructurings.

However, the international community can seek to influence the outcome by taking actions in appropriate international settings.

Global leaders are searching for ways to scale up and strengthen the capacity of regional and subregional development banks like Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank. This requires respecting their preferred creditor status and increasing their access to affordable capital.

This is precisely the opposite of what is unfolding.

There is still time for the creditor governments to change course by demonstrating their support for African multilateral financial institutions.

– Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price
– https://theconversation.com/africas-development-banks-are-being-undermined-the-continent-will-pay-the-price-259404

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has raged since April 2023. It’s turned Sudan into the site of one of the world’s most catastrophic humanitarian and displacement crises.

At least 150,000 people have been killed. More than 14 million have been displaced, with over 3 million fleeing to neighbouring countries like Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Once a vibrant capital city, Khartoum is now a “burnt-out shell”.

This devastating war, rooted in long-standing ethnic, political and economic tensions, has been compounded by what international and regional actors have done and failed to do. As Amnesty International notes, the international response remains “woefully inadequate”.

The problem lies in the fact that external involvement has not been neutral. Instead of halting the conflict, many external players have complicated it. In some cases, international interventions have escalated it.

More than 10 countries across Africa, the Middle East and Asia have been drawn into Sudan’s war. This has turned it into a proxy conflict that reflects the interests of external actors, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Several actors have taken sides.

Saudi Arabia, for instance, backs the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is alleged to support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Egypt, citing historical ties, backs the army. For their part, Ethiopia and Eritrea reportedly support the paramilitary group. Chad has been accused of facilitating arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces via its eastern airports. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have also been linked to diplomatic and military support to Sudan’s army.

These geopolitical entanglements have made peace nearly impossible, deepening the conflict instead of resolving it.

I have studied Africa’s governance failures for more than 30 years, from military elites and coups to state capture and political instability. Based on this, my view is that Sudan’s conflict cannot be resolved without serious international commitment to neutrality and peace.

---

Read more: Sudan’s peace mediation should be led by the African Union: 3 reasons why

---

The involvement of foreign actors on opposing sides must be reversed. International involvement must be premised on helping the Sudanese people develop the capacity to resolve governance problems themselves.

For this to happen, regional diplomacy must be stepped up. The African Union must assert its legitimacy and take the lead in addressing this challenging crisis. It can do this by putting pressure on member states to ensure that any ceasefire agreements are enforced.

The East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development can provide assistance in securing a peace agreement and ensuring it’s enforced. Members of these continental organisations can encourage external actors to limit their intervention in Sudan to activities that promote democratic governance and sustainable development.

The African Union

The African Union should play a central role in bringing peace to Sudan. But its absence has been conspicuous.

Despite adopting the “African solutions to African problems” mantra, the African Union has neither held Sudan’s warlords accountable nor put in place adequate civilian protection measures.

First, it could have worked closely with the UN to deploy a mission to Sudan with a mandate to protect civilians, monitor human rights (especially the rights of women and girls), assist in the return of all displaced persons and prevent any further attacks on civilians.

Second, the African Union could have sent an expert group to investigate human rights violations, especially sexual violence. The results could have been submitted to the union’s Peace and Security Council for further action.

Third, the African Union could have worked closely with regional and international actors, including the Arab League. This would ensure a unified approach to the conflict, based on the interests of Sudanese people for peace and development.

Finally, the AU could have addressed the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts, which include extreme poverty, inequality, political exclusion and economic marginalisation.

The African Union could also make use of the insights and knowledge gleaned by African leaders like Kenya’s William Ruto and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who have attempted to mediate, but have failed. The AU should also use the political expertise of elder statesmen, such as Thabo Mbeki, Moussa Faki and Olusegun Obasanjo, to help address the conflict and humanitarian crisis.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is alleged to back the paramilitary troops in the war. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly involved in African conflicts. It has supported various factions to conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and Libya.

Its increased involvement in Africa is driven by several strategic interests. These include fighting terrorism, securing maritime routes, and expanding its trade and influence.

---

Read more: Sudan is burning and foreign powers are benefiting – what’s in it for the UAE

---

In 2009, the UAE helped Sudan mediate its border conflict with Chad. The UAE supported the ouster of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, as well as Sudan’s transitional military council.

In 2021, the UAE signed a strategic partnership with Sudan to modernise its political institutions and return the country to the international community. The UAE has stated that it has taken a neutral position in the present conflict. However, on 6 March 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE to the International Court of Justice. It accused the UAE of complicity in genocide, alleging that the UAE “has been arming the RSF with the aim of wiping out the non-Arab Massalit population of West Darfur.”

The United States

During his first term, US president Donald Trump spearheaded the Abraham Accords. These agreements were aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including Sudan. Subsequently, Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The accords appeared to have brought Khartoum closer to Washington. They provided avenues for the type of engagement that could have placed it in good stead when Trump returned to the White House in 2025.

However, Sudan’s internal political and economic instability, including the present civil war, has complicated the situation.

The Abraham Accords were a significant foreign policy achievement for Trump. A peaceful, democratically governed, and economically stable and prosperous Sudan could serve as the foundation for Trump’s “circle of peace” in the Middle East.

But Trump and his administration are preoccupied with other domestic and foreign policy priorities. During his May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump did not officially address the conflict in Sudan. Instead, he placed emphasis on securing business deals and investments.

The European Union

The European Union has strongly condemned the violence and the atrocities committed during the war in Sudan, especially against children and women. The organisation has appealed for an immediate and lasting ceasefire while noting that Sudan faces the “most catastrophic humanitarian crisis of the 21st century”.

Unfortunately, member countries will remain preoccupied with helping Ukraine, especially given the growing uncertainty in Washington’s relationship with the authorities in Kyiv.

The preoccupation and focus of the EU and the US on Gaza, Ukraine and Iran may, however, be underestimating the geopolitical risks Sudan’s war is generating.

A peaceful and democratically governed Sudan can contribute to peace not just in the region, but also in many other parts of the world.

What now?

To end Sudan’s war and prevent future ones, international and African actors must do more than issue statements. They must act coherently, collectively and with genuine commitment to the Sudanese people’s right to peace, democratic governance and sustainable development.

Democracy and the rule of law are key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in Sudan. However, establishing and sustaining institutions that enhance and support democracy is the job of the Sudanese people. The external community can provide the financial support that Sudan is likely to need. It can also support the strengthening of electoral systems, civic education and citizen trust in public institutions.

– Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them
– https://theconversation.com/sudan-foreign-interests-are-deepening-a-devastating-war-only-regional-diplomacy-can-stop-them-259824