Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ivor Chipkin, Associate lecturer, University of Pretoria

For much of the past two decades, South Africa’s recurring waves of protest have been interpreted through a dominant lens: the failure of the post-apartheid state to deliver services to its poorest citizens. Rising unemployment, corroding infrastructure and inadequate housing are the familiar explanations offered.

We are political scientists who have been analysing protests and protest data for years. In a recent article we propose that the overall pattern of protest activity in South Africa cannot be explained by socio-economic conditions alone. It tracks the internal power struggles of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC).

This has led us to a new reading of state capture.

As we set out in a paper in 2025, state capture in South Africa is often reduced to a phenomenon of large-scale corruption. The focus has been on the way that private businesses, working with politicians, repurposed legislative and administrative processes to serve their interests and disable the criminal justice system to avoid consequences.

The conventional understanding casts state capture as looting: the opportunistic and organised theft of public resources by politically connected networks and enabled by a compromised presidency.

We do not contest the reality of this pillaging. But we argue that it was also something more structurally purposeful. State capture, in our account, was the mechanism by which former president Jacob Zuma sought to forge a “power elite” in the ANC.

This is a term we borrow from the sociological tradition of C. Wright Mills to refer to a small cohesive group that is able to make decisions with national consequences in political, military and economic institutions. In contrast a politically connected network may have influence but is too diffuse to exercise power as such.

The power elite matters because it explains who really makes the biggest decisions in society and why democratic institutions do not always fully control those decisions.

The argument we’re presenting has consequences for how the country understands what state capture is, and the trajectory of South African democracy itself.

Protests as a barometer

Drawing on data from the South African Police Service, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, and the Institute for Security Studies, we identify a striking pattern. Protest events rose sharply from around 2006, reaching what some researchers called “insurrectionary proportions” by 2011.

Then they stabilised and began to decline between roughly 2013 and 2017. This period coincided with the consolidation of Zuma’s hold on power and the height of state capture.

After 2018, protests surged again to unprecedented levels. In 2021, the country experienced its worst civil revolt since the end of apartheid.

The socio-economic conditions typically cited to explain protest – unemployment, inequality, poor service delivery – do not follow this same pattern. They did not improve during the 2013-2017 lull. If anything, they worsened. As our paper records, municipal audit outcomes deteriorated sharply by the end of the period.

Inequality, measured by Gini coefficients across South Africa’s major cities, remained essentially unchanged. The exception was Cape Town, where inequality seems to have declined.

The stabilisation of protest activity, we conclude, cannot be attributed to improvements in the living conditions of poor South Africans.

Something else was suppressing the mobilisation of discontent.

Our answer draws on political sociology and on comparative work on elite formation in Africa and beyond. We conclude that protests are instruments of elite competition. This includes the tactical deployments of professional agitators by local politicians and their networks contesting for control of resources, positions and patronage within the ANC.

When these competitions are acute and unresolved, they spill outward as protests. When they are contained, protest subsides.

The how

By repurposing state-owned enterprises away from their public mandates, the Zuma network generated enormous rents that were then used for private enrichment and to finance factional political activity. This included paying for party rallies, sustaining provincial and regional networks, creating sympathetic media infrastructure, and distributing cash and contracts to potential opponents in exchange for loyalty or silence.

The result was a temporary stabilisation of what had been a fractured and contested elite terrain.

Between roughly 2013 and 2017, a group of politically aligned operators was able to discipline internal competition, in part by allocating positions in government, state-owned enterprises and the party apparatus.

Those who would not be bought were expelled, marginalised, or subjected to violence. We note that political assassinations rose sharply during Zuma’s second term. Evidence before the Zondo Commission into state capture pointed to the deployment of armed units under presidential operational control.

The relative “stability” observable in protest data between 2013 and 2017 was the successful suppression of elite competition through corruption, patronage and coercion. The modest improvement in municipal spending was the result of elite power exercised over administrative systems.

The unravelling under Ramaphosa

If Zuma’s presidency saw the construction of a power elite, Cyril Ramaphosa’s has seen its unravelling.

The consequences have been severe.

At the ANC’s 54th national conference in December 2017, Ramaphosa narrowly defeated Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma for the party presidency. Zuma’s internal compact then began to fracture. The spike in protest activity that followed was almost immediate.

Ramaphosa was not prepared to deploy corruption and violence as political solutions. But without an alternative basis for managing elite competition, the ANC’s internal fissures deepened.

There were symptoms of this disintegration in 2023:

Gatekeeping became decentralised and unregulated. Elite contestation began migrating out of the party system altogether.

A sobering conclusion, and hint of hope

We conclude that some of it will be pushed towards organised crime. Mafia-type networks, we suggest, should be expected to grow.

There is, however, a more hopeful possibility. The reason the ANC has functioned as the primary arena for elite competition is that it has controlled access to the “gate” – the allocation of positions in the state, the civil service and state-owned enterprises.

Remove that control, and the character of elite competition changes. This is precisely what is at stake in the amendments to the Public Service Act of 1994. Signed into law by Ramaphosa on 26 March 2026, it was gazetted on 1 April 2026.

The legislation aims to:

• reduce executive discretion over appointments in the public service

• insulate civil service recruitment and operations from party-political interference.

If implemented, political parties will be compelled to compete for support through policy and performance rather than patronage. Elite competition will shift to the public administration system itself. Ideally, this will be governed by merit, transparency and professional standards.

We are cautious about the prospects for this reform. History is not encouraging and the political conditions are challenging.

But if it can end gatekeeping, new legislation like the Public Service Amendment Act will change the elite social terrain in South Africa.

– Political violence in South Africa is driven by a power elite trying to establish dominance – new research
– https://theconversation.com/political-violence-in-south-africa-is-driven-by-a-power-elite-trying-to-establish-dominance-new-research-280504

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) should not be an arbiter of discussions about which other multilateral financial institutions should qualify for preferred creditor status. This is because the IMF is a direct beneficiary of the creditor hierarchy policy.

A preferred creditor status gives multilateral development institutions priority for the repayment of their loans should a borrower run into financial difficulties. This means preferred creditors have no non-performing loans on their balance sheets. This preserves their low-cost funding channels. Non-preferred creditors have high risk exposure and borrowing costs.

The events leading to Fitch Ratings’ downgrade in January 2026 of the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the rating agency’s subsequent withdrawal of the bank’s ratings illustrate this IMF conflict.

Fitch acted on a statement by the IMF declaring that Afreximbank was not treated as a preferred creditor in the finalisation of Ghana’s debt restructuring.

The effect of the IMF’s statement was to throw into doubt Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status, which it qualifies for by convention and through its member shareholders.

The IMF’s interpretation was that the agreement between Ghana and Afreximbank was consistent with the comparability of treatment under the official creditors’ committee framework. Official creditors are governments, government agencies, or international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Comparability of treatment is the principle that debtor countries must restructure all external debt on broadly equivalent terms. This is aimed at ensuring fairness and equal sharing of losses when a country defaults.

The official creditors committee was formed in terms of the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments. The framework was created by the G20 to enable low-income countries that have hit financial trouble to restructure their debts, working with creditors.

Based on my work on rating agencies and African countries, I argue that the IMF’s statement on Afreximbank should not have been treated as a fact. In addition, no attempt was made to verify the specific terms with Ghana or Afreximbank. Fitch admitted in its rating report that it did not have details of the loan terms.

And based on the same agreement between Ghana and Afreximbank, GCR, a subsidiary of Moody’s, took a different view, affirming Afreximbank’s globally comparable ratings. Most importantly, GCR revised the bank’s rating from “rating watch evolving” to stable, arguing that Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status was strong.

Despite the differences in interpretation of the agreement between Afreximbank and Ghana, the IMF statement triggered a chain reaction. Fitch Ratings first downgraded the bank’s rating and later completely withdrew its rating of the bank.

But beyond the technical jargon of debt restructuring lies a deeper, more troubling reality. The IMF is not a neutral arbiter on any discussions relating to preferred creditor status. It is itself a direct beneficiary of the very creditor hierarchy it is pushing to maintain as policy.

Ghana and Afreximbank agreement

In December 2025, Afreximbank and Ghana announced that they had reached an agreement on a US$750 million facility.

The details of the agreement were not disclosed. But both Ghana and Afreximbank said they were happy with it.

Afreximbank’s preferred creditor status is not just a matter of convention. It is granted to the bank by its member shareholders.

If Ghana had treated Afreximbank’s loan facility as commercial, it would have bundled it together with other commercial lenders in the restructuring. Eurobond holders, for example, took a nominal 37% reduction in the value of what they had lent Ghana.

The ‘baby multilateral’ prejudice

The Ghana-Afreximbank case is one example of how conflicted the Bretton Woods institutions – the IMF and the World Bank Group – are when they are engaging on matters of global financing. This conflict of interest is at the heart of key challenges bedevilling global financial governance.

The IMF, together with the Paris Club (an informal group of official creditors), has long treated African multilateral financial institutions such as Afreximbank as second-class entities.

Their associate economists have dismissively referred to African multilateral financial institutions as complicating debt restructuring by claiming to be preferred creditors. Analysts also prejudicially referenced African multilateral banks as “baby multilaterals” relative to the size of IMF and the World Bank.

They have strongly resisted any suggestion that African multilaterals should be accorded status equal to the World Bank or the IMF, or even that they should be allowed to use the term “multilateral” development banks.

But the opposite could be true. Small multilaterals need the preferred creditor status more than Bretton Woods institutions. This is because the status is a strategic advantage.

Concessional lending argument is flawed

The IMF’s justification for why African multilateral banks should be denied preferred creditor status often sounds reasonable on the surface. It suggests that this status should be reserved for institutions that lend on highly concessional terms, with long maturities and low interest rates.

By this logic, African multilaterals do not quality for the same protection because they lend at slightly higher interest rates relative to bigger institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. But this argument is fundamentally flawed for two reasons.

First, preferred creditor status is not a reward for concessionality, it is a functional necessity for any multilateral lender that must recycle funds across multiple countries. The function of a multilateral development bank is to take wholesale risk so that its members do not have to. Size and concessionality – more favourable terms compared to commercial lenders – are not the criteria. Credibility and a developmental role are.

Second, if the IMF genuinely wanted African multilaterals to grow and lend at more concessional rates, it would have supported their access to resources. For example, through its quota system, the IMF constrained the 2021 reallocation of unused Special Drawing Rights that had been proposed for rechannelling to African multilateral financial institutions.

The Special Drawing Right is not a currency and derives its value based on a basket of currencies comprising the US dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling.

Of the US$650 billion in available Special Drawing Rights, it imposed a limit of just US$15 billion for allocation across all multilateral development banks. The African Development Bank was the only African multilateral financial institution that accessed the Special Drawing Rights fund.

The argument was technical. But the effect was political – keep African institutions small and dependent, and then point to their small size as a reason to deny them equal status. That is not neutrality but gatekeeping.

What needs to change

The IMF demands that African multilaterals prove their creditworthiness without preferred creditor status, while the IMF itself would likely see its own credit rating downgraded if it were treated as a common creditor. The IMF enjoys preferred creditor status not because it is the largest or most concessional, but because the system has been designed to protect it. It can thus not credibly adjudicate on whether others deserve it.

This needs to change in the following ways.

First, the global financial architecture must confront legitimate issues affecting developing countries and their institutions with neutrality. Creditors should establish clear, transparent and consistent criteria for preferred creditor status that apply equally to all multilateral lenders across the globe.

Second, rating agencies must stop treating IMF statements as presumptively correct, especially when the IMF has a direct stake in the outcome.

Lastly, African governments and their multilateral banks must collectively challenge the “baby multilateral” narrative, not by begging for recognition but by building alternative mechanisms.

If this does not change, the global financial architecture will remain a a two-tier system with the World Bank, IMF and their associates at the top and African-led institutions holding the bottom.

– The IMF enjoys preferred creditor status: why it shouldn’t be the judge when it comes to other lenders
– https://theconversation.com/the-imf-enjoys-preferred-creditor-status-why-it-shouldnt-be-the-judge-when-it-comes-to-other-lenders-280509

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ngodi Etanislas, enseignant-chercheur, Université Marien Ngouabi

The 2026 presidential election in Congo-Brazzaville (the Republic of the Congo) returned Denis Sassou Nguesso for a fifth consecutive term, with a definitive 94.90% of the vote.

We asked Ngodi Etanislas, a political scientist who focuses on the central African country, to sum up what happened and why it matters, now that the dust has settled.

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What political factors shaped the result?

Denis Sassou Nguesso’s huge victory is not the result of an open electoral race. It is, rather, the culmination of a political system built on decades of power consolidation since the end of the 1997 civil war. It was a “Soviet-style” outcome (overwhelming and predetermined) that can be explained by a few key political factors.

First, there is the political longevity of Nguesso, in power since 1979 (with an interruption from 1992 to 1997). This four-decade dominance gives him total control over the country’s political, institutional, and security apparatus. It makes political change not only difficult but structurally unlikely.

Furthermore, the rigged electoral process – especially through control of the state apparatus and election management bodies – contributed to this victory.

Electoral campaigning was also deeply unequal. Nguesso’s campaign looked like a “national tour”. It was built on a show of strength designed to project the image of a leader close to the people.

Did a divided opposition influence the result?

The fragmentation of the political opposition was arguably the most decisive factor behind the landslide. The opposition entered the election divided. They could not agree on a single candidate, which significantly reduced the chances of a democratic transition.

The election was marked by the absence of certain figures in Congolese politics. Some remain imprisoned (Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko and André Okombi Salissa). Others chose to boycott the poll, believing the conditions for a free and transparent election were not met. This stripped the contest of any real stakes. It helped secure a first-round victory for Nguesso. In 2016, he won 60.4% of the vote against a strong opposition.

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Read more: Africa’s ageing leaders: succession race in Cameroon, Congo and Equatorial Guinea could destabilise the region

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For many observers, the six candidates in the race were largely unknown or lacked any real political base. Some appeared to be using the election to gain some visibility, or better yet, political legitimacy ahead of future contests. They were no match for Nguesso. They lacked the financial resources to campaign nationwide and build local support to defend their platforms.

Finally, the digital blackout – including a countrywide shutdown of phone networks and internet on election day – added another layer of opacity of the process. It created an unprecedented information blackout.

This reduced the opposition’s ability to organise collectively and deploy its delegates. It also aimed to limit the spread, on social media, of rumours about ballot stuffing, vote buying, and other politically sensitive content. The president was clearly worried about low turnout figures leaking out.

What was the mood among voters?

Voting was marked by deep disaffection, fuelled by the opposition’s boycott and a sense among many young people that voting was pointless. It also took place in a climate of fear perpetuated by the repressive environment. This included operations carried out early in the year by the General Directorate of Presidential Security, as well as intimidation and crackdowns targeting activists and political opponents.

The issue of voter turnout lies at the heart of the controversy surrounding this election.

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Read more: Corrupt, brutal and unprofessional? Africa-wide survey of police finds diverging patterns

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Two scenarios can be considered.

The first is turnout orchestrated by the government through political and patronage networks. The goal is to boost participation in order to legitimise the electoral process and bolster the credibility of the results.

The second scenario involves a boycott of the election encouraged by the opposition, aimed at achieving low turnout, which could spark challenges over the election’s legitimacy.

Reports highlight a clear gap between official figures and field observations, suggesting a more complex picture of voter turnout than is apparent. The official turnout rate reportedly jumped by nearly 17% – from about 67.57% in 2016, when there were more opposition figures, to 84.65% in 2026, despite a widespread boycott. Yet polling stations across 6,620 booths in 4,011 centres appeared largely empty.

What challenges lie ahead?

To escape political and social stagnation, several democratic reforms are urgent:

• Restoring electoral credibility and the independence of institutions is one of the most sensitive issues. The election exposed serious shortcomings in electoral governance – lack of transparency, inclusiveness and fairness.

• The reliability of voter rolls, the impartiality of the Independent National Electoral Commission and unequal access to the media pose ongoing problems. All this happened without effective independent oversight. Without sweeping reforms of the electoral system, abstention and disengagement will continue to grow, particularly among young people.

• Building a pluralistic political space and a viable opposition is essential for reshaping the Congolese political landscape. Releasing political prisoners and guaranteeing an effective right to opposition would be essential prerequisites for any national reconciliation.

• Protecting fundamental freedoms and civic space. Human rights violations have been on the rise and there is no political dialogue between the government, the opposition, and civil society.

• Succession and transition. The questions of what comes after Nguessou, whether power remains within the presidential majority, or ensuring continuity for a new term in 2031. This may include scenarios of dynastic succession within the presidential family.

• Turning oil wealth into human development. Nearly half the population lives below the poverty line. The challenge is to convert oil revenues into public services (health, education) and opportunities for young people.

• Reconnecting citizen participation, particularly young people, to politics. Young Congolese and civil society need to be brought back into the political process. Citizen participation remains crucial to the legitimacy of the electoral process.

What implications could the election have on political stability?

Stability rests on fragile foundations. A large part of the population sees the government as lacking legitimacy. Distrust in the electoral system runs deep.

Youth frustration is a particularly worrying indicator. A 2024 survey indicates that young people have little confidence in the political system. Many feel that voting is pointless. Chronic unemployment and lack of economic prospects deepen their frustrations.

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Read more: Weaning African leaders off addiction to power is an ongoing struggle

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The internal struggle within the ruling party over who comes after Sassou Nguessou could become the main source of instability. The risk grows if no clear widely accepted successor emerges. Internal divisions seen during the party’s congress in 2025 show how central succession is. They also show ongoing shifts in power and elite positioning.

The March 2026 presidential election did not resolve any key issues.

– Congo-Brazzaville election: boycotts, blackouts and growing dissent but Denis Sassou Nguesso held on to power
– https://theconversation.com/congo-brazzaville-election-boycotts-blackouts-and-growing-dissent-but-denis-sassou-nguesso-held-on-to-power-279539

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Charles Helm, Research Associate, African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience, Nelson Mandela University

The south coast of South Africa’s Western Cape province is a rich source of fossil tracks and traces – clues suggesting what this environment may have been like many thousands of years ago.

We’re a research group from the African Centre for Coastal Palaeoscience who have been finding and documenting these tracks since 2007. So far we have identified more than 400 tracksites left by vertebrates, including pangolins, giraffe, snakes, rock hyraxes, crocodiles and elephants. They include a variety of marks, from footprints to butt-drag impressions and even traces of sound vibrations. Some of these animals have never been found in the vicinity through the body fossil record, only from their tracks.

Most have been dated to the Pleistocene era, between 130,000 and 90,000 years in age, using a technique that measures how long ago grains of sand were exposed to light. Some of the fossil tracks and traces are the first of their kind ever found anywhere.

Our research has recently yielded two more world firsts in the fossil record:

• the only known giant tortoise tracks, and tramline tortoise trackways

• the only known tracks of a bird called the hamerkop (“hammerhead”).

These sites are in danger of being destroyed in rockfalls, but our work ensures that the traces they preserve are not lost and we can continue to build a picture of the environment back when this area – now a coastline – was a giant plain full of creatures, like today’s Serengeti.

First known fossil tracks of the hamerkop bird

The bird trackway we’ve recently found was definitely made by a hamerkop (family Scopidae). These are the first fossil tracks of this bird found anywhere in the world.

The foot of a hamerkop track is roughly similar to that of a heron or egret, except that it has substantial webbing between the toes. Members of the heron family (Ardeidae) have three forward-pointing toes, and one backward-pointing toe that is slightly offset to the side. No or minimal webbing is evident. A well-preserved hamerkop track, however, will show a similar orientation of digits, but will also have webbing.

That is exactly what we found at a tracksite on the ceiling of an overhang on a remote stretch of coastline.

We don’t know why hamerkops have webbing. Perhaps more ancient members of the lineage needed it to aid in swimming.

A couple of bones of a Pliocene hamerkop, probably about 4-5 million years old, have been identified at the South African west coast fossil site of Langebaanweg, and have been assigned to the species Scopus xenopus.

While we cannot determine if the tracks we have identified were made by the extant hamerkop (Scopus umbretta) or the extinct Scopus xenopus, a hamerkop origin is clear.

It is unusual to be able to identify a trackmaker to genus level based on just a few tracks, but a hamerkop provides a welcome exception to the rule.

The hamerkop track adds to 48 other fossil bird tracksites identified on the Cape coastline, including tracks of ostriches, storks, cranes, egrets, flamingos, guineafowl, spurfowl, oystercatchers and other shorebirds, terns, doves, and possibly cormorants, ducks and pelicans.

Bird body fossils are not common in southern Africa from this time period (from 194,000 to 57,000 years ago), but of those that have been found, most were in this coastal area.

A recurring theme in our work has been the identification of larger-than-expected bird tracks, hinting at the possibility either of extinct species or larger Pleistocene versions of extant trackmakers.

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Read more: Fossil tracks reveal which birds once roamed South Africa’s Cape south coast

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Tramlines and giant tortoise tracks

Our team found the world’s first fossilised giant tortoise trackway in 2022 on a rugged, remote stretch of the same coast. From the size of the tracks and trackway, we estimated that its maker was 106cm long, making it 50% longer than the largest tortoise that currently inhabits South Africa, the leopard tortoise (Stigmochelys pardalis).

Tragically, within a couple of months of being found, the loose rock slab bearing the trackway of the giant tortoise had slumped down the sandy slope and disappeared into the ocean.

So we were excited to find a second set of giant tortoise tracks.

In the Walker Bay Nature Reserve we found typical “toe-tip traces” of a tortoise, and were able to estimate that the trackmaker was 98cm in length. This is, therefore, the second set of trace-fossil evidence of giant tortoises found in the world.

But first, we found three tortoise trackways showing the typical tramline pattern of smaller versions of these reptiles, with a wide “straddle” and closely spaced tracks in each line of the tramline. These fossilised tramline trackways are the first of their kind to be found in the world, and fill a notable gap in the fossil record.

One is located in the De Hoop Nature Reserve, and was probably made by a leopard tortoise. It is only rarely exposed, usually being covered by a thick layer of beach sand.

The other two are located in the Walker Bay Nature Reserve, and were probably made by the angulate tortoise, Chersina angulata.

Significance of these finds

There aren’t any body fossils of giant tortoises in southern Africa from the Pleistocene, but here we have track fossils.

Why the mismatch?

The answer may lie in the fact that the Pleistocene body fossils (of various animals) that have been uncovered in the region are mainly from caves our human ancestors inhabited. If our ancestors ate giant tortoises, it might have made more sense to butcher, cook and eat them on the spot, rather than carry a creature weighing 100kg all the way back to “home base”, which might have been as much as 10km away.

This is therefore an example of the trace fossil record delivering unanticipated findings and evidence that could not have been suspected from the traditional body fossil record.

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Read more: Fossil treasure chest: how to preserve the geoheritage of South Africa’s Cape coast

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The hamerkop site is now threatened. An enormous rockfall from the cliffs above has obliterated a couple of tracksites just a few metres to the east, rendering the entire band of cliffs unstable and dangerous.

Our photogrammetry work (making three-dimensional models from two-dimensional images) at all the sites, however, will digitally preserve the tracks and trackways. It will also allow for the production of exact replicas which can be exhibited.

Given that these are the only known fossilised hamerkop tracks and the only remaining fossil tracks of a giant tortoise and of tramline tortoise trackways, it is reassuring to know that they will not be lost forever.

– Bird and tortoise fossil tracks on South Africa’s coast – latest findings are world firsts
– https://theconversation.com/bird-and-tortoise-fossil-tracks-on-south-africas-coast-latest-findings-are-world-firsts-278123

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kawtar Ech-charay, Geologist Faculty of Sciences Dhar El Mahraz of Fez, Université Sidi Mohammed Ben Abdellah

In the heart of the Middle Atlas Mountains in central Morocco, a global team of palaeontologists and geologists has discovered new remains of a very unusual dinosaur. It belonged to the group called ankylosaurs, plant eaters whose bodies were covered in bony plates.

The fossils reveal a heavily armoured dinosaur. It has distinctive outward-pointing spikes along its body. These fossils are now considered to represent the oldest known ankylosaur remains in the world – it lived about 165 million years ago. As geoscientists who were part of the team that discovered and examined them, we had the unique opportunity to study these remarkable specimens firsthand.

This species, named Spicomellus afer, literally meaning a spiky armoured dinosaur from Africa, was first described in 2021 from a single rib discovered at the same site in Morocco. At the time, the discovery was extraordinary because of the rarity of ankylosaur fossils from the Middle Jurassic, around 165 million years ago.

The rib represented the earliest evidence of this dinosaur group, which is otherwise best known from the Late Jurassic and Cretaceous periods, between about 145 million and 66 million years ago. The original rib of Spicomellus afer is housed at the Natural History Museum in London.

The new fossils come from the same Middle Atlas locality and are curated at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University in Fez.

These additional bones provide new insights into the anatomy of this remarkable dinosaur. Key parts of the new discovery are spiked ribs nearly one metre long, a cervical (neck) half-ring, and parts of the pelvic bones.

These fossils show that this ankylosaur was covered in spikes. These spikes were not just part of the outer covering; some were fused directly to its skeleton. The findings also show that the tail weapons characteristic of ankylosaurs evolved much earlier than scientists had previously believed. The research also suggests that ankylosaur armour may have served a dual purpose early in the group’s evolutionary history: as a defensive shield and as a means of display.

The tail: defence and display

Spicomellus had a stiffened tail with fused vertebrae. This likely served as a defensive shield against predators. Its body spikes added protection and made it a formidable target.

These features push back the origin of ankylosaur tail weapons by millions of years. This evidence shows that complex defensive adaptations evolved much earlier than previously thought.

The tail and armour may also have functioned in display or social signalling. So, defence and communication may have shaped its evolution.

Geological context

The fossils were found in the Jurassic red beds of the Middle Atlas Mountains in Morocco. Red beds are sedimentary rocks, mainly sandstones and mudstones, coloured reddish by iron oxides. They typically form in continental environments such as rivers and floodplains under semi-arid to arid climates.

The Middle Atlas is characterised by high plateaus, forested mountains and many lakes, making it an important ecological region. Geologically, it preserves extensive Jurassic sedimentary successions, including the red beds that record the tectonic and climatic history of the Atlas system.

In this region, a sauropod dinosaur (Cetiosaurus moghrebiensis) was first reported in 1955. More recently, in 2019, our team, led by dinosaur researcher Susannah Maidment, described a stegosaur (Adratiklit boulahfa). We also identified teeth belonging to the oldest known turiasaur and reported remains of the earliest known cerapodan dinosaur.

The sites lie about 150km south of Fez, near Boulemane, at nearly 1,900 metres above sea level. Beyond the town, rough mountain tracks lead to the red sandstone outcrops, and the final approach often requires hiking across steep and rugged slopes. Harsh sun, strong winds and winter snow make fieldwork challenging. So each fossil recovered reflects both its scientific importance and the considerable effort required to reach these remote locations.

The region was once a marginal marine environment, with rivers, floodplains and possibly coastal settings under a warm climate. These conditions shaped both the habitat of the dinosaurs and the preservation of their remains.

Global collaboration

This discovery and its interpretation result from close international collaboration between palaeontologists and geologists from the UK, Morocco and the US.

The fossils were prepared, curated and studied at the Department of Geology in the Faculty of Sciences Dhar El Mahraz in Fez, using equipment provided through the University of Birmingham’s Research England International Strategy and Partnership Fund. Additional support was provided by the British Institute of Libyan and Northern African Studies, the Natural History Museum’s Science Investment Fund, and the University of Birmingham’s International Science Partnerships Fund.

Future work will focus on detailed anatomical (body structure) and histological (tissue) analyses of the material, alongside continued field exploration to identify additional specimens.

These efforts aim to refine our understanding of the early evolution, functional morphology and palaeoecology of armoured dinosaurs in north Africa. We hope to explain why they looked the way they did and how they lived in their ancient environment.

– Moroccan dinosaur’s fearsome tail spikes evolved much earlier than we thought – new discovery
– https://theconversation.com/moroccan-dinosaurs-fearsome-tail-spikes-evolved-much-earlier-than-we-thought-new-discovery-264394

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Brendon J. Cannon, Associate Professor, Khalifa University

China recently pledged to expand military support to Somalia in its fight against al-Shabaab militants. Beijing has promised equipment, training and closer security cooperation with Mogadishu. This marks a shift from China’s traditionally cautious and small presence in the country. Brendon J. Cannon has researched how external powers – including China – engage with sub-Saharan Africa. He explains how these dynamics are converging in Somalia.

What form does China’s support in Somalia take?

China’s interests in Somalia take two paths.

The first is broadly geopolitical. It relates to China’s long-standing interests in the Horn of Africa as a strategic crossroads. The region links the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. The Horn of Africa includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Somaliland. Sudan and Kenya are important actors in the region’s affairs.

Beijing’s priorities here are about expanding political influence and embedding itself in regional security architectures. This explains its existing military presence in Djibouti and infrastructure investments across Ethiopia, as well as neighbouring states like Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan.

The second path is specific to Somalia. It is mainly shaped by China’s domestic politics and stance on Taiwan. Beijing considers Taiwan a breakaway province, and is concerned that Somaliland’s ties with Taipei could lend legitimacy to separatist movements. Somaliland is a de facto independent state that left its voluntary union with Somalia in 1991, and diplomatically recognised Taiwan in 2020.

To understand this Somalia-specific dynamic, it is necessary to look at what China’s support to Somalia entails. Beijing provides diplomatic backing, development assistance and, more recently, security cooperation framed around counterterrorism and support for Somalia’s fight against al-Shabaab militants.

Even so, China’s economic footprint remains modest. Unlike neighbouring Ethiopia, where Beijing has financed railways, ports and airports, Somalia has not received large-scale Belt and Road infrastructure.

Chinese engagement is, therefore, better understood as selective and strategic rather than transformative.

What are the strategic interests driving this engagement?

China is increasingly involved in Somalia because of Somaliland’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and its progress in pushing for its own international recognition.

Since 1949, Taiwan has been an independent, self-governing state, though the People’s Republic of China lays claim to the island.

Beijing has worked over the past three decades to isolate Taiwan diplomatically. It’s offered development, technology and infrastructure assistance in exchange for states severing diplomatic relations with Taipei.

As of 2026, only Eswatini and Somaliland in Africa maintain some form of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

From Beijing’s perspective, the fact that a small, de facto independent state in the Horn of Africa had the temerity to exchange diplomats with Taiwan was bad enough. When Israel became the first state to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence in December 2025, Beijing reaffirmed its support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. US policymakers are also pushing to recognise Somaliland.

China and Somalia’s leaders in Mogadishu frequently affirm their support for “One Somalia” and “One China”, respectively. In their view, Somaliland must submit to Mogadishu’s rule. Ditto for Taiwan: it must join the People’s Republic of China.

Neither Somaliland nor Taiwan wish to be part of what they view as broken political experiments.

Their larger, angry neighbours don’t care. They resort to bullying and threaten violence – in different ways.

China has wealth, economic power and a global profile. It also has a huge military and growing navy, much of it tailormade to invade Taiwan. Despite this, Taiwan still prefers to go it alone, with support from the United States, Japan, Australia and others.

Mogadishu, on the other hand, is unable to exercise legitimate control over much of its own territory. Despite decades of external security assistance and military training, Somalia still has no capable military. The national army continues to underperform against al-Shabaab and remains entangled in clan-based politics.

Failure to shift the status quo in either Taiwan or Somaliland unites China and Somalia against smaller, weaker entities.

How does China’s approach in the Horn of Africa differ from that of western actors?

In my view, Beijing’s growing interest in Somalia is less about development corridors and more about political alignment, diplomatic positioning and security cooperation.

Western states have tended to emphasise counterterrorism operations, governance reforms and security sector training. Other actors like Turkey and the United Arab Emirates have combined military engagement with infrastructure investment and commercial interests, sometimes becoming deeply embedded in Somalia’s internal politics.

China, by contrast, has focused on regime support to reinforce Somalia’s territorial integrity. This assistance has been less overtly military, and is closely tied to diplomatic objectives.

China prefers building technological and institutional dependencies – in telecommunications, technology and surveillance, for example – across much of Africa.

In both the short and long term, greater Chinese involvement risks adding another layer of geopolitical competition in an already fragile region. Rather than acting as a stabilising force, Beijing may find itself drawn into the same local dynamics that have frustrated other external actors.

Somaliland, in comparison, has developed a relatively functional security sector and a high degree of domestic political legitimacy.

What could greater Chinese involvement mean for Somalia’s security?

There is little reason to expect China’s military assistance to succeed where others have failed. Its broader impact will likely be political rather than operational.

Increased Chinese backing for Mogadishu could deepen internal divisions within Somalia. It may intensify competition over territory, authority and external patronage.

Nowhere is this dynamic more visible than in Las Anod, a contested city in eastern Somaliland.

It has recently become the focal point of a new political entity – SSC Khatumo, armed by external state actors, including China, according to reports. It is backed by Mogadishu and viewed by Somaliland as illegitimate.

Political developments in Las Anod have taken on geopolitical overtones. Abdikhadir Firdhiye was inaugurated in January 2026 as the first president of what Mogadishu has recognised as its Northeast State. The SSC Khatumo administration considers Las Anod its capital.

Among those attending Firdhiye’s inauguration were ambassadors from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, China, Djibouti and Sudan. Their interests extend well beyond local governance.

For Somaliland, the message was clear: its bid for independence is now entangled in a much wider geopolitical contest.

– China’s military support for Somalia is on the rise – what Taiwan and Somaliland have to do with it
– https://theconversation.com/chinas-military-support-for-somalia-is-on-the-rise-what-taiwan-and-somaliland-have-to-do-with-it-279600

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of Sydney

The global geoeconomic volatility wrought by the second Donald Trump US presidency and hostilities in the Middle East make the shift in China’s Africa strategy even more important for China and for Africa.

China’s Africa strategy started to shift in 2019, towards investment. It is anchored in Hunan Province.

The “Hunan Model” emerged because the “Angola Model” (building infrastructure and extracting resources) faced sustainability hurdles. Given the vulnerability of African countries to shocks, they often struggle to keep up with mounting debt repayments. The other factor was China’s changing domestic needs.

Traditional trade partnership and growth corridors were also under increasing contestation and subject to high trade barriers.

Under these pressures, Beijing selected Hunan Province to become its “project implementation unit” for a new era of trade and development between China and Africa.

The model has become more important since formal approval of the China-Africa Economic and Trade Deep Cooperation Pilot Zone in early 2024 and the growth of the China-Africa Economic and Trade Exhibition since launch in 2019.

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Read more: China’s Africa strategy is shifting from extraction to investment – driven from the industry-rich Hunan region

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It seeks to deepen and bring greater balance to China-Africa trade and industrial integration. It is also at the heart of efforts to overcome the three main barriers to African development – shortages of capital, skilled labour and infrastructure – while offering China a secure and growing supply of resources.

Based on years of study of China-Africa trade relations, I argue that the tensions in the Middle East and the economic disruptions they have caused globally will speed up China’s thrust towards renewables and the electrification of its economy. It will also accelerate its push for new markets. This has implications for Africa.

Hunan Province is central to green transportation and to construction, heavy industry and minerals processing. It is also central to China’s economic relations with Africa.

What Hunan is all about

At the centre of the Hunan Model sit two national policy initiatives:

Hunan Province’s capital, Changsha, is home to China’s third-largest wholesale market, the Gaoqiao Grand Market. It is the primary distribution hub for non-commodity African imports landing in and near Changsha and passing through “green lanes” that fast-track African exports into China.

The market has a permanent trade facilitation hall where African countries market their goods directly and which provides other trade services.

The Hunan Model also has three functional areas to support trade between land-locked Hunan and the world, with an emphasis on Africa:

The China-Africa cooperation zone also has five “functional clusters” that drive trade, investment and industrial development between and within China and African nations. These target specific sectors where Hunan excels – and that match potential for growth and industrialisation in Africa. Construction machinery, mining equipment and precious metals processing are among them.

The China-Africa Economic and Trade Exhibition comprises the permanent exhibition hall in the zone and a series of trade expos, held in China and in Africa.

In the last few years, as I’ve detailed in a journal article, a series of China-Africa Economic and Trade Exhibition events have also begun springing up in African countries, including Kenya and Nigeria.

Impact of Middle East conflict

The importance of the Hunan Model has, arguably, been increased by the second Trump presidency and intensifying US-China trade tensions. As western markets become more restrictive, China has pivoted towards the global south with remarkable speed. Africa is no exception. In 2025, while Chinese total foreign trade grew by 3.8%, China-Africa trade surged by 17.7%.

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Read more: US trade wars with China – and how they play out in Africa

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More recently, tensions in the Middle East have offered a dramatic shock to the global economy and its energy supply chains. This is likely to intensify China’s push towards renewables and electrification of its economy. It may also elevate global demand for electric vehicles, and it is Hunan Province that is home to Chinese e-vehicle giant BYD.

Given Hunan’s centrality to China’s own renewables industry, especially electric transformation and minerals processing, as well as construction, the Hunan Model can drive a new renewables-run era in China and between China and Africa too.

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Read more: China’s interests in Africa are being shaped by the race for renewable energy

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In 2025, the “biggest highlight” of Changsha’s exports to Africa was the explosive growth of the “new three items”. These are lithium batteries, electric vehicles and photovoltaic products. Hunan’s exports of these items to Africa increased by 160.4%, 840.4% and 62.1% year-on-year, respectively. That’s why they have become a “new calling card” for Hunan’s exports to Africa.

Alongside electric transportation companies like BYD, Hunan Province is also home to electric railway giants like CRRC, which is at the heart of a “green” rail export surge. Moreover, in the wake of conflict in Iran, China has announced a new rare minerals research and innovation hub, to be set up in Changsha, Hunan.

Avoiding ‘Africa last’

While the Hunan model offers a focus on surmounting non-tariff barriers to trade and an industrial-focused alternative to past extraction-heavy policies, risks remain. The sheer scale of Chinese exports to Africa – up 17.7% in 2025 while African exports to China grew only 5.4% – underscores a growing trade imbalance.

African countries and sub-regions must build their own industrial supply chains, as China did with investment from earlier industrial giants.

The Hunan Model has its own research alliance of Chinese scholars and industry experts to inform its advance and progress. African nations require their own equivalent.

Shock after shock is upsetting the world economy. The Hunan Model is no longer just an experiment or a policy idea. It is driving China-Africa economic transformation. It offers potential for growth and development in China and Africa.

– China’s Africa strategy is shifting and Iran conflict will speed it up
– https://theconversation.com/chinas-africa-strategy-is-shifting-and-iran-conflict-will-speed-it-up-280046

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kaitlyn Rabe, Lecturer, The Ohio State University

Rwanda has threatened to withdraw its troops from Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, signalling a potentially decisive shift in the southern African country’s security architecture.

The threat of withdrawal is driven by a European Union (EU) warning that it may stop funding the Rwandan Defence Forces’ mission in Mozambique in May 2026.

Rwanda’s military intervention in northern Mozambique began in July 2021, when Kigali deployed about 1,000 troops and police at the request of the Mozambican government.

Around December 2022, the EU began to contribute to this Rwandan mission, initially disbursing €20 million, and adding another €20 million in November 2024.

The deployment followed a major escalation of violence by Islamist insurgents in Cabo Delgado. The insurgents captured strategic towns near natural resource sites, such as Mocímboa da Praia, and carried out attacks near a TotalEnergies gas project in Palma.

Rwandan forces quickly helped retake key areas and stabilise zones critical to energy infrastructure, in this way distinguishing themselves from slower-moving multilateral responses.

In 2024, Rwanda increased its troop presence. This helped fill the void left by the withdrawal of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission which had begun in July 2021.

However, the Rwandan mission has begun to look less effective in the last couple of years. There were only four documented clashes between Rwandan forces and Islamic State rebels in Mozambique between December 2024 and March 2025. This had deadly consequences for civilians, who are a strategic target of the rebel group.

I study security dynamics, regional interventions such as Rwanda’s mission in Mozambique, and insurgency responses across sub-Saharan Africa. In my view, Rwanda’s threatened withdrawal wouldn’t be just a tactical shift. It would be a structural turning point. This risks creating a security vacuum in Cabo Delgado.

This exposes the limits of regional and continental intervention mechanisms when local structures remain weak, fragmented and unable to sustain security gains without external support.

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Read more: Rwanda’s military support to other countries is part of a strategy to boost its reputation

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Should Rwanda withdraw from Mozambique, Maputo would face a limited set of options.

It could once again turn to multilateral forces, such as the SADC or the African Union. Given that the SADC has struggled to meet past security commitments, this appears unlikely. Instead, Mozambique may continue to prefer bilateral commitments – most likely with Tanzania – to shore up its counterinsurgency efforts.

In any case, any disruption of counterinsurgency efforts – and failure to address the root causes of unrest – will inevitably lead to further violence and suffering for civilians.

Inside Cabo Delgado

Cabo Delgado is endowed with natural resources, but is one of the poorest regions of Mozambique. It holds reserves of graphite, gold, timber and precious gems. The region contributes about 80% of the world’s ruby supplies.

The discovery of a natural gas reserve in 2010 led to an influx of foreign direct investment by gas companies.

The perception that these resources and investments have not benefited the local population has driven resentment. This began to manifest in the growth of the Islamic State-affiliated Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jamma’ah (ASWJ), which locals refer to as “Al-Shabaab” (not connected with the Somali entity of the same name).

The group sought to present itself as a legitimate alternative to a state that had failed to deliver services.

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Read more: Offshore gas finds offered major promise for Mozambique: what went wrong

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Although the Cabo Delgado insurgency began in 2017, it hit major international headlines in March 2021. This followed a jihadist attack in Palma that targeted a TotalEnergies natural gas project, killing dozens and forcibly displacing thousands. TotalEnergies suspended operations, and only in November 2025 announced its intention to restart activities in Mozambique.

Since the insurgency began in 2017, about 6,500 people have been killed, and 1.3 million displaced.

After years of failing to contain the insurgency, the Mozambican army was forced to seek external counterinsurgency and counterterrorism support.

The SADC sent an initial contingent of peacekeepers in July 2021. However, member states were accused of lagging on their commitments. Meanwhile, Rwanda – outwardly eager to cement its reputation as Africa’s most professional and effective military force – quickly garnered a reputation for its incisive interventions.

But it intervened largely in areas rich in natural resources, while neglecting other areas of Cabo Delgado.

Potential scenarios

The mere announcement of a potential drawdown of Rwandan troops is a psychological victory for Mozambique’s jihadist groups. In May 2024, insurgents claimed victory over SADC forces following news of the mission’s withdrawal. A dangerous vacuum would follow the withdrawal itself.

In my view, there are three possible scenarios for the security of Mozambique.

First, Mozambique could invite the SADC to return as part of a multilateral mission. It would, however, have the same logistical and political obstacles that plagued its first mission.

Second, the African Union could intervene under Article 4(h) of the act that established it. This provision allows for intervention in cases of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity in member states. Though legally plausible given the documented crimes against humanity in Cabo Delgado since 2017, an AU direct intervention is unlikely. The union has shown consistent reluctance to invoke Article 4(h) without invitation from member states.

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Read more: Mozambique’s long struggle to build a nation – four novels that tell the story

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Third, the most probable scenario is a reinforcement of Tanzania’s existing, if modest, military presence in Cabo Delgado. Dar es Salaam has the clearest strategic interest in stabilising its southern neighbour.

Malawi, which also borders Mozambique’s northern regions, has a fraught historical relationship with Maputo. This is a result of Lilongwe’s support for Mozambican guerrilla movements throughout the civil war of the 1970s and 1980s.

Tanzania’s porous border with Cabo Delgado and the involvement of Tanzanian nationals in Mozambique’s violent extremist groups make it the neighbouring country most affected by counterinsurgency in Mozambique.

Scaling up from the current contingent of 300 troops in Mozambique, however, would require considerable political will and logistical coordination.

What next

Those are only some of the scenarios that may occur.

The African Union will most likely not intervene with a multilateral mission of its own accord. The government of Mozambique itself would have to request it, but prefers more agile, bilateral missions.

Whichever actor may replace Rwanda, the withdrawal of troops would result in a security vacuum with likely fatal consequences for civilians in Cabo Delgado, and repercussions for neighbouring countries, particularly Tanzania.

– Mozambique relies on Rwanda’s troops to fight terrorism: what happens if they leave?
– https://theconversation.com/mozambique-relies-on-rwandas-troops-to-fight-terrorism-what-happens-if-they-leave-280045

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abdoulaye Sakho, Professeur de droit, Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar

Two months after the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon) final, which was won by Senegal in January 2026, the appeal board of the Confederation of African Football (Caf) decided to strip them of the title and give it instead to their opponents, Morocco. This was because the Senegalese team had walked off the pitch for about 10 minutes.

Caf’s ruling is based on Articles 82 and 84 of the African football body’s regulations. It goes against the referee’s decision to resume play and see the match through to its conclusion. What does sports law say on this matter? And what are the implications of the decision? We asked sports law specialist Abdoulaye Sakho for his opinion.

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What is the legal basis for the decision?

The legal basis lies in Chapter 35 of the Africa Cup of Nations regulations, which covers team withdrawals, specifically Articles 82 and 84, which govern team withdrawal.

The Caf appeal panel decided that:

In application of Article 84 of the regulations of the Caf Africa Cup of Nations (Afcon), the Senegal national team is declared to have forfeited the final match.

The legal classification is a central issue. Some described Senegal’s exit from the pitch as “match abandonment”. The panel labelled it “withdrawal” as defined in the regulations.

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Read more: Senegal stripped of title: Afcon ruling is lawful, but it puts Caf’s reputation at risk

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While similar tournament rules might refer to a “forfeiture of the match”, the appeals panel adopts the concept of “withdrawal” as defined by the Afcon regulations. In law, and especially in sports law, this distinction is crucial. It determine which rules apply. Think of it as a medical diagnosis. Give the wrong one, and the treatment that follows may do more harm than good.

What was their reasoning?

It is difficult to speak with certainty about the panel’s reasoning. However, we can assume that the Caf appeals board acted independently and exercised its full discretion as an autonomous body. It was within its rights to disregard a key factor: the match was played to completion.

Yet, I will admit that their reasoning remains puzzling to me. One thing is certain, the referee never stopped the match. Some Senegalese players left the pitch, then resumed play. He opted for a brief suspension, then resumed play. He did not declare the match over. That decision to resume the match is significant. Under law 5 of the International Football Association Board, the referee has

full authority to enforce the laws of the game … stop, suspend or abandon the match for any offences or because of outside interference.

The regulations don’t stipulate that there is a set time limit – such as 10, 15, or 20 minutes – after which a match must be abandoned. In this instance, the referee is the master of the game. He has made his decision, and that decision is binding on everyone, erga omnes (towards everyone) as legal purists would put it, because Law 5 is equally clear on this point:

The decisions of the referee regarding facts connected with play, including whether or not a goal is scored and the result of the match, are final. The decisions of the referee, and all other match officials, must always be respected.

Has there ever been a case like this at this level?

I am not aware of a similar case in an Afcon final. This is unprecedented at a continental final level. In football, authorities rarely overturn decisions on the pitch.

One exception was the South Africa vs Senegal match in the 2018 World Cup qualifiers. It was replayed after it was proven that the match referee, “bribed” by bettors, had made a decision that had an “illegal influence on the match result”.

There are also well-known cases of suspended matches in the history of African soccer. One example is the 2019 Caf Champions League club final between Morocco’s Wydad Casablanca and Tunisia’s Espérance de Tunis. The Wydad players had refused to resume play after a disallowed goal. The referee also refused to consult the video assisted referee, because of a technical malfunction.

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Read more: Afcon drama: what went wrong and what went right at the continent’s biggest football cup in Morocco

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Wydad never returned to play. After more than an hour of deliberation, the referee blew the final whistle, ruling that Wydad had forfeited the match. The final ruling in that case upheld that the refusal to resume play constituted a forfeit under the Caf disciplinary code, and the Moroccan team lost the match by default. The key difference is that in the 2025 Afcon final, Senegal did resume the match and played it to its conclusion.

What happens next?

It is well established in sports law that when a sports authority has rendered a final decision – as is the case of the decision by the Caf appeals board – the international Court of Arbitration for Sport may be approached to review the decision through an act called a “statement of appeal”, with a filing fee of US$1,279.

Both sides submit written arguments, a hearing is held and then the court issues its ruling. Senegal’s football federation has filed a request to the court to suspend the Caf decision. This will allow it to retain its title until the final court ruling, which is expected in a few months.

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Read more: Can an African team win the World Cup? New football study crunches the numbers

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This case is a textbook example for sports law because it raises several complex legal issues that cannot be fully addressed here, including the interpretation of sports regulations, the referee’s authority over the game, the composition of judicial bodies, the issue of estoppel (ethics) in ongoing legal proceedings, and the governance of sports organisations.

– Afcon controversy: what a sports law specialist says about Senegal being stripped of the title
– https://theconversation.com/afcon-controversy-what-a-sports-law-specialist-says-about-senegal-being-stripped-of-the-title-279779

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anthony Michael Butler, Professor of Political Studies, University of Cape Town

Nelson Mandela remains one of the most revered political leaders of modern times. He is widely credited with guiding South Africa through a peaceful transition from apartheid to democracy. He embodied racial reconciliation, and lent moral authority to a fragile new state. Yet admiration for Mandela the symbol has often obscured a more difficult question. How effective was Mandela in the day-to-day exercise of presidential power?

Most assessments of political leaders focus on their impact in terms of economic success and policy achievements. Some are also assessed through their character, integrity and moral vision. Both approaches have value, but they risk missing something essential: how leaders actually use the power of their office.

I am a professor of political studies. In a recent study, I proposed a simple framework for analysing presidential leadership across four dimensions – the relationships between:

• executive and symbolic power

• party and state

• domestic and international roles

• formal authority and informal influence.

Applying this framework to Mandela’s presidency between 1994 and 1999, I derive a more complex, and more critical, assessment than is often offered. Such an analysis is useful at a time when Mandela’s legacy is increasingly contested.

A powerful symbol, a limited executive head

Mandela’s symbolic authority was extraordinary. He helped to stabilise a deeply divided society and reassured anxious minorities fearing a loss of power and privilege. He gave moral meaning to the new democratic order. His gestures, such as donning a Springbok (South Africa’s national rugby team) jersey at a world cup final and embracing former adversaries, were not incidental. They were central to his political project of reconciliation.

But Mandela showed far less interest in the executive dimension of leadership. He delegated most of the core work of governing to his deputy, Thabo Mbeki. He also allowed cabinet ministers considerable autonomy. As a result, key areas of policy were shaped without sustained presidential direction or public accountability. This mattered because the presidency in South Africa’s system combines both head-of-state and head-of-government roles. The potential synergy between symbolic authority and executive control was therefore left largely unrealised.

The consequences were especially visible in moments of crisis. The HIV/Aids epidemic, which intensified during Mandela’s presidency, required both decisive executive action and strong public leadership. Mandela delivered neither of those, and he later acknowledged his failure to act more forcefully.

Blurring party and state

Mandela also struggled to manage the relationship between the governing African National Congress (ANC) and the state. South Africa entered democracy as a dominant-party system, and the ANC’s authority was both a source of stability and a potential danger.

Rather than drawing clear institutional boundaries, Mandela endorsed practices that blurred them. The policy of “cadre deployment” – placing loyal party members in key state positions – was intended to transform a state inherited from apartheid. But it also weakened institutional autonomy and contributed to longer-term problems of patronage and politicisation.

Mandela was not alone in shaping these developments. Many of the ideas originated with colleagues such as Mbeki. But as president, he lent his authority to them and did little to mitigate their risks.

Foreign policy: ideals and inconsistencies

Internationally, Mandela was expected to champion human rights and democratic values. Early statements under his name suggested that these principles would guide South Africa’s foreign policy.

In practice, however, foreign policy was often inconsistent. The government maintained close relationships with authoritarian regimes that had supported the anti-apartheid struggle. There were also tensions between proclaimed values and strategic or financial considerations. Efforts to isolate Nigeria after human rights abuses, for example, generated backlash within Africa. Relationships with countries such as Libya and Indonesia raised questions about the role of party funding in diplomatic decisions.

Mandela’s global stature brought South Africa visibility and goodwill. But this was not systematically used to advance clear domestic or economic priorities.

The hidden world of informal power

Finally, Mandela’s presidency illustrates the importance of informal power. Beyond formal constitutional authority, leaders shape outcomes through networks, appointments, and the mobilisation of financial resources.

Mandela was deeply involved in fundraising for the ANC, both domestically and internationally. Some of these practices blurred the line between party and state, and between legitimate support and undue influence. He also relied on personal relationships and informal interventions to shape economic and political outcomes. For example, he gave R2 million (hundreds of thousands of US dollars) to embattled politician Jacob Zuma in 2000, followed by another R1 million on 23 June 2005, days after Mbeki had sacked Zuma as deputy president and prosecutors had announced he would be charged with corruption.

Such practices were not unique to Mandela, nor to South Africa. But they helped establish patterns that would later become a problem, particularly as competition within the ANC intensified and access to resources became central to political power.

Rethinking a legacy

None of this diminishes Mandela’s historic role in ending apartheid or his contribution to national reconciliation. He set an important precedent by stepping down after a single term, and he helped to anchor South Africa’s constitutional order in its formative years.

But a focus on leadership practice rather than rhetoric, symbol and myth reveals a more uneven record. Mandela was an exceptional symbolic leader. He was less effective in integrating that symbolic authority with the demands of executive governance, institutional design and policy leadership.

Reassessing Mandela in this way is not an exercise in revisionism for its own sake. It is a reminder that even the most admired leaders operate within constraints. Understanding how they use power is essential if we are to learn from their successes, as well as their limitations.

– Nelson Mandela was a towering global symbol – but how effective was he as a president?
– https://theconversation.com/nelson-mandela-was-a-towering-global-symbol-but-how-effective-was-he-as-a-president-279599