Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Dylan O’Driscoll, Professor in Peace and Conflict, Coventry University

Climate change and its associated impacts can worsen security challenges, including those associated with violent extremism.

This is particularly the case in areas that are both vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and characterised by social and political instability.

In north-eastern Kenya, for instance, droughts, flooding and livelihood destruction are unfolding alongside, and worsening, activity by al-Shabaab, a terrorist network headquartered in Somalia. The terror group has evolved from carrying out large-scale attacks in Kenya, such as the Westgate Mall attack (in 2013) and the Garissa University attack (2015), to persistent, low-intensity attacks and broader community engagement in the border region.

Despite these overlapping crises, the understanding of how climate change and violent extremism interact remains limited.

As a multidisciplinary team, we set out to address this gap through workshops with policymakers and practitioners working across relevant policy areas in Nairobi and north-eastern Kenya, as well as focus groups and interviews with community members and leaders in the region.

Our findings highlight how in vulnerable environments, climate change acts as a threat multiplier. It intensifies:

• economic instability, by damaging and destroying livelihoods

• social fragmentation, by increasing the strain on social networks

• psychological strain, through the scale of destruction caused by cumulative climate events

• institutional weaknesses, by increasing pressure on public services and government access.

These conditions provide increased opportunities for extremists to influence or coerce the local population.

When we spoke with local herders and community leaders in north-eastern Kenya, we found that the impact of climate change left local communities more vulnerable to recruitment by extremists. At the same time, al-Shabaab activities in the area made it harder for communities to adapt to a changing environment. This reinforces a cycle of fragility.

Climate impacts and insecurity are interwoven dynamics that shape everyday life, governance and prospects for stability in north-eastern Kenya.

Our findings challenge the idea that climate change and security can be addressed separately. Effective responses must combine environmental, social and security strategies to build long-term resilience.

Livelihood destruction

For pastoralists in the north-eastern Kenyan counties of Garissa and Wajir, keeping livestock is not just a job. It is their identity, their food security and their children’s future.

However, as droughts and flash floods become more frequent, herds are being decimated. In times of desperation, al-Shabaab positions itself as a provider.

As one community member told us:

When the land dries up, animals die, farms fail, and people go hungry, especially the youth, they become desperate. Al-Shabaab knows this and exploits it. They offer food, money, and what seems like ‘purpose’ to young boys who feel abandoned by their own government.

What we had not anticipated before undertaking this research was the profound emotional toll of climate change and how this is creating ideal conditions for al-Shabaab recruitment. The loss of livestock causes a deep sense of shame among men who can no longer fulfil their role as providers.

A local herder told us:

We are men, supposed to provide, but we found ourselves helpless.

In a culture where “a man without animals is seen as a child, no matter his age”, as one respondent put it, this loss of status leads to depression and hopelessness.

Extremist groups exploit this emotional emptiness. They offer a sense of status to men who feel they have lost everything else.

Increased migration

As water and pasture vanish, herders are forced to travel much further from home, often entering remote, insecure areas where the state has limited presence.

This increased mobility is a necessary survival strategy. But it increases the likelihood of encountering al-Shabaab.

Individuals arriving in new areas with depleted resources and no social contacts are vulnerable to recruitment. In these remote areas, al-Shabaab often steps in to provide assistance, such as protection.

The lack of veterinary services and schooling creates several further vulnerabilities. When children drop out of school to follow herds, they become soft targets for recruiters.

Social breakdown

Beyond individual loss, violent extremism is unravelling social bonds.

In the past, neighbours could count on each other. Now, they are drifting apart because nobody has anything left to give, leading to a profound loss of community dignity.

As one community member put it:

When your neighbour comes asking for milk or sugar, you have nothing to offer. Our economy is not just about money; it is about sharing. When livestock die, that sharing disappears, and we become poorer not only in wealth but also in spirit.

Even the authority of community elders is under pressure. They are losing influence because their traditional wisdom about the seasons is no longer effective. Their status diminishes, creating a leadership vacuum.

Al-Shabaab is quick to attempt to fill this void, offering a new sense of order.

Governance challenges

The reach of the Kenyan state is limited in the remote and arid northern region.

When aid is delayed or distributed unevenly, it fuels grievances about neglect. Al-Shabaab is highly effective at using religious and political language to channel these frustrations against the state. It presents its own ideology as a path to justice.

Furthermore, insecurity prevents the delivery of the services needed for climate adaptation, leaving the most vulnerable populations dependent on anyone who will help. This gives al-Shabaab a clear entry point.

The way forward

Breaking this cycle of vulnerability requires a policy shift that integrates environmental and security strategies. It is necessary to formally recognise climate change as a critical security issue, to trigger the multi-agency coordination necessary for mitigation.

In practice, this means aligning national and county-level plans to prevent and counter violent extremism with climate adaptation strategies. This would enable agencies to share knowledge and pool funding.

Climate adaptation plans must incorporate conflict analyses to ensure aid does not inadvertently fuel grievances.

Most importantly, future interventions must look beyond technical solutions to address the emotional weight of lost dignity and the breakdown of social structures. This will foster resilience in the local economy and the community.

– Climate change is worsening violent extremism in Kenya – what can be done
– https://theconversation.com/climate-change-is-worsening-violent-extremism-in-kenya-what-can-be-done-279604

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Simon D. Angus, Professor, Department of Economics & SoDa Laboratories, Monash Business School, Monash University

Well, well. Kenyan marathon runner Sabastian Sawe has officially broken through the fabled “sub-2-hour” marathon barrier.

On a reportedly perfect Sunday, 26 April 2026 in London, the 31-year-old Sawe ran through the finish gate on the Mall in front of Buckingham Palace’s gilded architectural flourishes in an official marathon time of 1 hour 59 minutes and 30 seconds.

This betters the marathon world record by a whopping 65 seconds, the largest single improvement since 2018. The previous world record was held by the late Kelvin Kiptum, also of Kenya. Kiptum’s 2 hours and 35 seconds, set in Chicago in 2023, now somehow seems an entire era away.

In fact, saying Sawe broke 2 hours is something of an understatement. Such was the brilliance of the moment, that Sawe pushed the second-placed Yomif Kejelcha of Ethiopia below the sub-2-hour mark as well, just 11 seconds behind Sawe.

But as we absorb all of this, it’s hard not to wonder, “What next?”

My interest as a data scientist and economist (and fellow runner) lies in analysing the historical progression of the men’s and women’s world marathon records.

If sub-2 was the driving force behind the marathon in the last decade, what’s left to aim for?

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Read more: Marathon under 2 hours is closer than ever – scientist shows how Kenya’s Kiptum tests human limits

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Humanity seems obsessed with the limits of human creativity, ingenuity and performance. We award extravagant prizes for world firsts and remember the greatest achievements through bronze statues in prominent squares the world over.

But can we actually calculate these limits? Is there a “maths” of human endeavour?

Historical world record progression

Back in 2018, the legendary Eliud Kipchoge of Kenya ran 2 hours 1 minute and 9 seconds in the official Berlin Marathon. At the time, many dared to dream Kipchoge could be the one to take the men’s marathon below 2 hours.

In fact, a year later, Kipchoge appeared to do just that – running a phenomenal 1 hour 59 minutes and 40 seconds in a tightly orchestrated “breaking 2” display in Vienna.

However awe-inspiring, the Vienna effort would never make it into the official marathon books. The run was contrived in a number of ways, fully understood and acknowledged by Kipchoge and the organisation around him. This was never about the record, but instead, it was, he said, about proving that limits are there to be broken.

Around the same time, I had been working on a statistical approach to modelling the progression of marathon world records over the last few decades. I was intrigued to apply learnings from technological change in economics to the question of human performance.

There are all kinds of factors that feed into a world-record marathon performance. These range from training methods, nutrition, supplementation and biometrics, to performance analysis, and of course, clothing and shoe technology.

However, my approach, drawn from the economics of innovation, is founded on the idea that while performance gains can be made in any of these areas at any time – providing innovation rates stay steady over time – then the next world record marathon performance should be somewhat predictable.

Back then, I estimated that the official men’s marathon would break the sub-2 barrier around May 2032. That is, assuming a pretty rare 1-in-10 chance on any given marathon day of it happening.

Since then, we’ve had Kipchoge himself break his own record at Berlin in 2022, then Kiptum in Chicago in 2023, and now Sawe in London.

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Read more: Eliud Kipchoge broke the men’s marathon record by 30 seconds. How close is the official sub-2 hour barrier now?

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At each point, I’ve adjusted my predictions, since the model can use the new world record marks to improve its accuracy.

My most recent prediction, made in October 2023 for a runner similar to Kiptum, would be that the official sub-2 would go down in March 2027. From the perspective of a prediction exercise starting with data from the 1960s, Sawe was just a touch early!

How likely was Sawe’s run?

Using my original modelling framework, if we include data only up to Kiptum’s Chicago run in Oct 2023, the likelihood of a sub-2 on 26 April 2026 is estimated to be 1 in 4.29 (just less likely than 1 in 4 odds). In other words, pretty likely!

However, this is the likelihood of a run of just under 2 hours – 1 hour 59 minutes 59 seconds to be precise.

But Sawe went well under 2 hours, so what were the odds of his actual run?

If I use my framework to calculate the odds of Sawe’s actual time on that day, given the sweep of historical world records since 1960, I find the likelihood of 1 hour 59 minutes, 30 seconds on 26 April 2026 to be 1 in 7.4 (around 2 in 15) – that’s pretty rare.

Clearly, a lot of things had to click for the performance that played out in London. And indeed, the backstory already includes:

• the timing of Sawe’s fitness meshing perfectly with the London event;

• the importance of getting fuelling and shoe technology right;

• the “just so” conditions in London on Sunday (something that was absent in Berlin during Sawe’s previous attempt on the record); and, of course,

• the competitive environment that saw Sawe pushed by the second-best-of-all-time Kejelcha until the final few hundred metres.

So then what’s next?

My statistical framework uses an assumption that, over time, performance gains get harder and harder to achieve. Any of us who have aimed to improve on our local park run time will know all too well how hard it becomes to eke out more performance gains after the initial euphoria of the first week or two’s improvements is over.

In my model, if we follow the improvement process out for very long time periods, we can estimate the eventual limits of human performance. That is, an estimate of the best possible human marathon time ever. I call it the “limiting” time.

In 2019 when my findings were first published, based on men’s world record times up to and including Kipchoge’s world record of 2 hours 1 minute and 39 seconds set in 2018 in Berlin, the limiting men’s marathon time came out to be 1 hour 58 minutes and 5 seconds.

In 2023 I updated this forecast to include Kipchoge’s next world-record time of 2 hours 1 minute and 9 seconds (also set in Berlin, 2022) and Kiptum’s astonishing Chicago run of 2 hours 35 seconds (2023). At that time, and following the “Kiptum line” – a runner like him closer to the 1 in 4 odds line – the new limiting marathon time dropped to 1 hour 55 minutes 40 seconds.

As I remarked then, Kiptum had given the limits of human performance a real bump.

After Sawe obliterated the men’s 2-hour barrier, rerunning my model sees the limiting time once more drop, but this time, not by quite so much.

The new limit comes out to 1 hour 54 minutes – a full 5 minutes 30 seconds faster than Sawe produced in London. In performance gap terms, there is still around four and a half percent of performance gains to be made.

Naturally, there are a lot of inherent assumptions. And such is the exercise that new data points (new world records) tend to have a significant impact on forecasts. Furthermore, we are talking here about the limits of human endeavour – potentially hundreds of years into the future.

The tiniest deviations in a line of forecast today can have outsize impact on a point thousands of days into the future.

Which is a long way of saying, when Sawe’s Italian coach, Claudio Berardelli, hinted that Sabastian might go faster on a better suited course like Chicago or Berlin, I for one, will not be surprised.

The statistical arc of human endeavour in the marathon keeps bending upwards. There is still much to be inspired by.

– Kenya’s Sawe breaks the 2-hour barrier: what’s next for the men’s marathon world record?
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-sawe-breaks-the-2-hour-barrier-whats-next-for-the-mens-marathon-world-record-281568

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ishmael Tingbani, Associate Professor in Accounting, University of Southampton

Ghana introduced a new payment arrangement for petroleum imports in 2023, using gold instead of scarce US dollars. The policy was designed to ease pressure on the cedi by reducing the need for upfront dollar purchases to settle fuel import bills.

In an import-dependent economy, rising demand for US dollars usually weakens the domestic currency. Importers must exchange local currency for dollars. As the local currency loses value, the local cost of imports rises, driving inflation.

Ghana’s petroleum-for-gold strategy delivered short-term benefits. It reduced immediate demand for foreign exchange, supported relative stability in the cedi and contributed to moderating fuel price pressures and inflation.

The country is still vulnerable to global oil price shocks, however. That has become evident with the latest surge in oil prices triggered by instability in the Middle East. For oil-importing economies such as Ghana, geopolitical risks like this translate directly into higher fuel import costs and greater pressure on foreign-exchange reserves.

I am a scholar who has served as a technical adviser to Ghana’s Ministry of Energy and major oil firms. This article argues that Ghana’s current stabilisation measures are helping to manage short-term pressure, but they have not removed the country’s exposure to oil shocks. That matters because temporary relief should not be mistaken for structural reform.

The structural gaps are limited refining capacity, weak storage infrastructure and an underdeveloped downstream petroleum sector.

As long as these constraints remain, oil shocks will continue to transmit quickly into the exchange rate, inflation and the broader economy.

What’s working

Ghana is one of Africa’s largest gold producers, with output exceeding 120 tonnes annually.

The creation of the Ghana Gold Board, under the Ghana Gold Board Act, 2025 Act 1140, improves the state’s ability to mobilise gold through official channels. This is not a solution to Ghana’s energy problem. But it is a more credible stabilisation strategy than relying on politically driven fuel price interventions and implicit subsidies. Those strategies, seen in earlier periods, contributed to fiscal losses and market distortions.

Inflation has eased significantly over the past year, falling from peak levels in 2023 to around 3%-4% in early 2026. Fuel prices have moderated, with pump prices declining by over 20% year-on-year in Febuary 2026. This indicates that short term pressures are being managed.

But relief is not reform. Policies such as gold-for-oil cannot eliminate Ghana’s dependence on imported refined fuels.

The gaps

Ghana’s vulnerability to global oil shocks stems from the structure of its energy system. Despite producing crude from offshore fields such as Jubilee, TEN and Sankofa-Gye Nyame, the country remains heavily dependent on imported refined fuels priced and settled in US dollars. That mismatch ties the domestic economy directly to global oil markets.

In practice, this dependence is substantial. Domestic refining meets only a small share of demand, with roughly 72% of refined petroleum products supplied through imports in recent years. In other words, most of the fuel actually consumed in the economy is sourced from international markets rather than processed locally, reinforcing the country’s reliance on foreign currency.

These imports are concentrated in a few critical products that underpin everyday economic activity. Diesel accounts for the largest share, used extensively in transport, logistics, construction and backup power generation. Petrol (gasoline) supports road transport, while liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is widely used for household cooking and some commercial purposes. In effect, Ghana’s import bill is not abstract. It underwrites the economy’s core energy needs, from moving goods and people to powering businesses and households.

This dependency on imports is driven by three factors.

• Limited refining capacity. Ghana’s ability to process crude oil domestically is constrained by the limited and unreliable operation of its main refining asset, the Tema Oil Refinery. Although installed capacity exists, it has operated intermittently for years due to financial constraints, maintenance challenges and operational inefficiencies.

But expanding domestic refining capacity on its own won’t insulate Ghana from price dynamics. Domestic fuel prices remain linked to international benchmarks, meaning global oil shocks would continue to pass through to inflation.

Where refining could make a difference is on the financing side. It would lower demand for US dollars.

• Weak storage infrastructure. Ghana has limited strategic storage capacity for petroleum products, reducing its ability to build reserves and manage supply over time. The country must rely on frequent imports to meet demand, increasing exposure to external supply and financing shocks.

• An underdeveloped downstream petroleum sector. Beyond refining and storage, inefficiencies in the movement and sale of petroleum products constrain how effectively supply is managed within the domestic market. Distribution remains fragmented across importers, bulk distributors and retail outlets, with limited coordination and logistical bottlenecks in transportation and depot infrastructure. Regulatory rigidities in pricing and market participation further reduce flexibility. As a result, even when supply is available, it is not always efficiently allocated, and global price shocks are transmitted quickly and with limited buffering through the domestic economy.

What needs to be done

Four priorities now stand out.

First, recent gains must be consolidated through continued macroeconomic discipline and a firm avoidance of policy reversals.

Second, foreign-exchange buffers should be strengthened to better absorb future oil-price shocks and contain exchange-rate pressures.

Third, gold and foreign exchange strategies need to be integrated so that gold mobilisation directly reinforces external liquidity.

Finally, dependence on downstream imports must be reduced through credible investment in refining, storage and broader energy infrastructure.

The real test of Ghana’s fuel strategy is not whether it can withstand a single episode of oil-market volatility, but whether today’s stabilisation measures can be converted into a more resilient energy system.

– Ghana’s fuel payment strategy works for now: how to fix longer term problems
– https://theconversation.com/ghanas-fuel-payment-strategy-works-for-now-how-to-fix-longer-term-problems-281076

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ndidzulafhi Innocent Sinthumule, Associate Professor, University of Johannesburg

South Africa’s Limpopo province borders Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique. It is one of the poorest provinces in the country. This is due to a combination of historical underdevelopment, a high unemployment rate, heavy reliance on government grants and a rural-based economy with limited industrial diversification.

It’s an interesting place for a geographer like me. My work brings together the themes of traditional ecological knowledge, environmental geography, conservation and society. My research looks at sustainable environmental outcomes by recognising the role of local culture, sacred sites and community practices in managing natural resources in southern Africa.

In two recent studies I explored how local communities in Limpopo are commercialising the harvesting of local insects to manage extreme poverty.

In one I explored the process involved in the commercialisation of mopane worms. Mopane worms (Gonimbrasia belina) are a nutritious, high-protein seasonal delicacy for many communities in Limpopo.

In a similar study, I turned to the harvesting and commercialisation of termite alates in Limpopo.

These resources are important for food security and poverty relief. Mopane worms and alate termites offer both high-quality nutrition and substantial income-generating opportunities for rural households. Both foods are traded in local and regional, formal and informal markets.

This enterprise is largely driven by unemployment, economic hardship, and the need for cash income in rural areas.

My research shows clearly that these resources play an important part in rural households and it’s important to manage them sustainably. One way of ensuring this happens is to tap into local knowledge.

As a separate study I did shows, traditional knowledge can help manage scarce resources by integrating customary rules, taboos and seasonal monitoring to prevent over-exploitation.

Mopane harvesting and trade

The mopane worm study took place in June and July 2023 in Muyexe and Nsavulani villages, Mopani District, Limpopo. The area is dominated by mopane woodlands, trees which are the main food of mopane worms (caterpillars). These villages have not benefited from development in the past and people depend heavily on natural resources for survival.

The processing of mopane worms (from harvesting to a marketable commodity) involves a series of traditional, manual steps to ensure quality. They are degutted (squeezing the caterpillar to remove stomach contents or frass), washed, boiled and dried to allow them to be stored for long periods. They are then graded and sold at home or in towns.

I chose 161 households in Muyexe village and 82 households in Nsavulani village as respondents, and interviewed villagers using a questionnaire. The questions covered:

• the socio-economic profile of respondents

• the availability and procurement, processing, marketing, trading and livelihood benefits of mopane worms.

The study found that most of the harvesters in Muyexe (69%) and Nsavulani (59%) villages were women. Almost all processed the worms at home. They collected the worms for both household consumption and trade. Those who traded worms reported making between R1,000 (US$54) and R3,000 (US$163) per season. There are two mopane seasons in Limpopo: November to January and April to May.

The study found that 55% of households in Muyexe village and 70% in Nsavulani village derived income only from mopane worm sales. (Individuals were under 60 and didn’t qualify for a social grant, or administered grants for children, nor for themselves.) Although the income earned from the sale of mopane worms is seasonal, communities appreciate it. Commercialising mopane worms contributed significantly to rural livelihoods. It is a crucial source of food security and cash income. This helps alleviate poverty and improves the lives and livelihoods of those involved in the business.

Termite harvesting and trade

In a similar study, I turned to the harvesting and commercialisation of termite alates in Limpopo. I interviewed 71 respondents in Thohoyandou and Sibasa towns (who came mainly from villages), as well as Mukula and Tshidzivhe villages, and found that these insects were harvested to eat at home and to sell.

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Read more: My formula for a tasty and nutritious Nigerian soup – with termites

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Women of all ages were more involved than men in this enterprise, making up 75% of the respondents. Almost half had secondary education and 23% had tertiary education; 63% were self-employed. The majority lived below the upper bound poverty line of R1,558 (about US$95) per person per month. About 31% of the traders indicated that over the selling season (October to December), alates contributed up to 100% of the income in their households.

Management for the future

While commercialisation puts pressure on resources, traditional rules and local management protect the trees. In the study on traditional ecological knowledge, I found that the communities imposed rules that:

• prohibited cutting of green branches

• restricted harvesting during specific seasons to allow for maturity

• prohibited tree damage during the mopane worm harvest.

Traditional ecological knowledge regulated the timing of harvest, protected host tree health, and ensured long-term livelihood security for local communities.

This shows that integrating local traditional ecological knowledge into harvesting practices is crucial for managing these resources sustainably.

Management strategies should be integrated into local and regional planning efforts. Efforts should also be made to communicate these strategies to relevant authorities to foster cooperation and raise awareness about the importance of mopane trees for all user groups.

To ensure the sustainable future of this woodland species, I recommend that the government work with traditional leaders and communities to support and enforce existing traditional practices.

– Mopane worm and termite sales relieve poverty in rural South Africa – studies explore the impact
– https://theconversation.com/mopane-worm-and-termite-sales-relieve-poverty-in-rural-south-africa-studies-explore-the-impact-280926

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Krystal Tolley, Principal Scientist, University of Johannesburg

Tropical rainforests are known for their unique biodiversity, with species found nowhere else on Earth. But nearly 30% of tropical rainforest has been destroyed or has become seriously degraded since 1990. Many of these forests have not been fully explored for their biodiversity. This means that the world may be losing species before they are even discovered by modern science.

In Africa, forest loss is rapid; about 25% of the continent’s tropical forest has been lost since 1990, against a backdrop of incomplete knowledge of where the biodiversity is located.

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Read more: Africa has the highest rate of forest loss in the world – what the G20 can do about it

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Greatly lagging in this respect are the “sky islands” of northern Mozambique: isolated granite mountains that rise sharply out of the savanna plains. They were left standing when softer rock around them gradually eroded, and can be as high as 3,000 metres elevation. Because they rise so steeply, the sky islands attract clouds and rainfall, feeding moisture to the tropical rainforests on their slopes within an otherwise arid terrain. Isolation has allowed unique species to evolve on each mountain, such as geckos, rodents, fishes, crabs, frogs, butterflies and bats.

From 2014 to 2018, a research team led by fellow herpetologist Werner Conradie and myself explored these sky island forests to catalogue the species of reptiles found there. We found that each sky island forest is home to a previously unknown species of chameleon within the genus Nadzikambia (forest-dwelling “sylvan chameleons”).

Unfortunately, these chameleons are already at risk of extinction due to the heavy slash-and-burn clearing of the forests, the only place they can call home.

We’ve described these new species, choosing four names to highlight pioneering women scientists whose work inspired us to strive towards new discoveries, but also to call attention to the losses of their forest habitat.

Hunting for chameleons

Over the course of several years, we explored four of Mozambique’s sky islands – Mount Namuli, Mount Inago, Mount Chiperone and Mount Ribáuè – with the aim of cataloguing all reptiles but also in the hopes of finding new species of chameleons. This was because a species of sylvan chameleon had been discovered on one of these mountains during the 1960s, but they were not known from any other mountains.

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Read more: Namibia and Angola’s remote Ovahimba mountains reveal a haven for unique plants – new survey

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However, chameleons can be very difficult to find, given their ability to remain camouflaged against the background coupled with their slow movements. They are more easily spotted at night while they are sleeping, as they stand out against the vegetation when illuminated by a strong beam of light. Sylvan chameleons are even more difficult to spot than others, as they usually perch high in the thick forest canopy – tens of metres up.

The search meant dealing with some tough conditions: a long, arduous trek up the hot, arid slopes to reach the forest high up the mountain. Establishing a remote base camp was essential. All food, clothes and gear had to be packed into the camp, and we didn’t know how long it would take to find any animals.

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Read more: Dung beetles: expedition unearths new species on Mozambique’s Mount Mabu

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At each of these mountains, we surveyed every night for chameleons – no trails to follow, no GPS signal to guide us, no cellphone signal to call for help.

Sometimes we were lucky and found chameleons on the first or second night. At other mountains we were not so lucky, with fruitless searches making it necessary to return another year.

Eventually these mountains revealed their secrets and we discovered four new species of sylvan chameleon, one on each of the four mountains.

We don’t know how big their populations are, but we assume they are in decline. Most of their habitat has been destroyed by forest clearing to make way for agriculture, with increasingly rapid losses in the last decade. We estimate that in some cases, 80%-90% of their habitat has been destroyed.

When parts of an ecosystem are lost, the whole becomes unstable and is eventually lost.

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Read more: Increasing land use could turn Mount Kilimanjaro into an ecological island

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Choosing names for the new species

To highlight their predicament, we have described and named these chameleons and have forecast that three of these species are at high risk of extinction.

In particular, we highlight Nadzikambia goodallae from Mount Ribáuè. This species has been named in honour of the distinguished scientist Jane Goodall, whose own study species, the chimpanzee, is under similar pressures from loss of its rainforest habitat.

We also honour the renowned discoverer of the structure of DNA, Rosalind Franklin, by naming the species from Mount Namuli as Nadzikambia franklinae. The use of DNA data from these chameleons was essential to confirm them as new species.

We have dubbed the species from Mount Inago as Nadzikambia evanescens, meaning “vanishing” in Latin, acknowledging the state of the forest destruction.

The final species, Nadzikambia nubila, is named for the cloudy aspect of Mount Chiperone. This species has a lower risk of extinction given that the local community view the forest as sacred, and say it should be protected.

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Read more: What Cameroon can teach others about managing community forests

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This latter case is significant, as it demonstrates that wholesale destruction of these forests is not an essential trade-off for local people to thrive. If encouraged and supported, community support and buy-in can be a solution to protect biodiversity in these sensitive ecosystems.

– Mozambique ‘sky island’ expeditions found 4 new species of chameleon – already at risk from forest loss
– https://theconversation.com/mozambique-sky-island-expeditions-found-4-new-species-of-chameleon-already-at-risk-from-forest-loss-279908

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marie-Francoise Roy, emerita professor in mathematics

Academia isn’t strong on gender equality. Women are under-represented throughout, in the research workforce and even more so as leaders in scientific organisations. This is true for science academies (prestigious bodies within national science systems) and scientific unions (international organisations representing disciplinary communities).

Women today make up nearly a third of the global research workforce. According to Unesco, they accounted for 31.1% of researchers worldwide in 2022 – up from 29.4% in 2012. Women are particularly underrepresented in engineering and technology (one quarter or less), while gender balance is largely achieved in the social sciences and humanities.

But workforce representation does not automatically translate into senior or leadership positions. A recent global study shows that women remain underrepresented in organisations that influence scientific agendas and norms, recognise scientific excellence and advise governments.

This 2026 report is based on data from more than 130 scientific academies and international scientific unions, alongside a survey of nearly 600 scientists. It was produced by the International Science Council, the InterAcademy Partnership and the Standing Committee for Gender Equality in Science, and follows studies in 2015 and 2020. I was one of the authors of the 2026 report, with Léa Nacache and Catherine Jami.

National science academies illustrate the scale of the gender gap. In 2025, women represented on average 19% of members of these bodies. That is an improvement from the results of the two previous studies – 12% in 2015 and 16% in 2020. But it still falls well below their presence in the wider research community. And the global average masks sharp disparities: in some academies, women account for fewer than 5% of members; in others, they approach 40%.

The task of international scientific unions is to help develop and structure their discipline, organise global congresses and award prizes. These unions show a somewhat different pattern from academies. On average, women now hold 40% of leadership positions in the international unions that were surveyed. But here, too, progress is uneven. Long-standing disciplinary inequalities remain, particularly for the most prestigious scientific awards.

Our report looks at the reasons for these patterns, how institutions operate in practice, and how change could be achieved.

The findings matter because scientific academies and unions play a significant role in the governance of science. Persistent gender imbalances in these bodies, therefore, raise questions not only of fairness, but of legitimacy and effectiveness. The legitimacy of science depends in part on whether its institutions reflect the diversity of the scientific community. And legitimacy is important in a context of global challenges – from climate change to pandemics – where public trust in science is fragile.

Beyond pipeline effects

Gender disparities in scientific leadership are often explained as a lagging effect: if fewer women entered certain fields decades ago, fewer will now be in senior positions or eligible for nominations in academies or for scientific prizes. Pipeline dynamics do play a role, as do traditional disciplinary gaps. But they do not explain the full picture.

Most scientific organisations report formally open and merit-based nomination, election and awarding procedures. Yet, the data show that women are consistently underrepresented in nomination pools relative to their presence among eligible scientists.

Our analysis points to the importance of institutional processes. Who is eligible to nominate? How are suitable candidates identified? How transparent are the nomination criteria? How much weight is given to informal reputation and networks?

In 90% of the academies surveyed, nomination relies on existing members. In contexts where membership is already predominantly male, such procedures seem to perpetuate existing imbalances. Even in the absence of explicit discrimination, informal sponsorship networks and patterns of professional visibility influence who is put forward. Evaluation of who would make a good nominee is therefore shaped by social and institutional dynamics, and not solely by individual achievement and merit.

Our survey of the gender equality initiatives in place showed that encouragement and awareness-raising practices alone have had limited impact. They need to be accompanied by structural reforms. In most organisations, gender equality measures lack dedicated structures, formal mandates, budgets or monitoring mechanisms.

Participation without equal progression

The quantitative findings were complemented by survey responses from individual scientists active in scientific organisations. These provided insight into how the structural patterns operate in practice.

Women who join scientific organisations report participating at levels comparable to men. They serve on committees, attend meetings and contribute to activities. But we found that this engagement does not translate into equivalent progression or recognition.

Women are three times more likely than men to report barriers to advancement within their scientific organisation. Women are 4.5 times more likely than men to report missing important events due to care responsibilities. And when they are able to attend, they are six times more likely to report not feeling they can participate to the levels of men.

Women are 2.5 times more likely than men to report experiences of harassment or microaggressions in their activities within scientific organisations. They also express lower levels of trust in the transparency of selection processes and in mechanisms to report and address misconduct.

Qualitative interviews documented strategies that women develop to navigate these environments. They include building women-only networks, investing in international engagement to escape restrictive local cultures, or collectively advocating for change. These strategies appear to be effective and organisations should encourage them.

From diagnosis to change

The report does not argue for a single model or fixed targets applicable everywhere. Scientific organisations vary widely. However, the evidence and case studies featured in the report point to a set of key institutional levers that can make a difference.

To take an example, in academies where formal rules and structures have been revised, improvements in women’s representation have been more sustained. Such good practices need to be systematically identified and generalised.

The central conclusion is straightforward: the underrepresentation of women in scientific governance is not a question of insufficient talent. It reflects institutional practices based on cultures that developed within male-dominated scientific communities.

If science aims to serve society as a whole, the bodies that define and represent it must be willing to examine how they operate – and who they include.

Many colleagues made contributions that helped shape and improve the report on which this article, prepared with Peter McGrath (InterAcademy Partnership) and Léa Nacache (International Science Council), is based.

– Women in science – global study finds presence without power
– https://theconversation.com/women-in-science-global-study-finds-presence-without-power-279248

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christophe Premat, Professor, Canadian and Cultural Studies, Stockholm University

Who counts as an intellectual? In many traditions, the figure of the intellectual is tied to the search for truth, social critique and public engagement. From the Dreyfus Affair (a political scandal in 1894 in France that mobilised writers and thinkers to defend justice) to postcolonial debates, intellectuals are those who intervene in society, not just to interpret the world, but to challenge it.

In the African context, this role takes on particular urgency. Intellectuals on the continent and in the diaspora have long navigated a complex terrain shaped by colonial legacies, political constraints and global inequalities. They are not simply producers of knowledge. They are mediators between worlds, engaged in a struggle over meaning, identity and historical narrative.

As a scholar of cultural studies and postcolonial thought, I’ve sought, in a new French book, to analyse their paths not as isolated figures, but as part of a broader constellation of what we’ve called “African intellectual sensibilities”.

These are ways of thinking that are at once critical, situated and globally engaged. This approach highlights how African thinkers contribute not only to debates about Africa, but also to the redefinition of knowledge production itself.

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Read more: Sophie Oluwole, the trailblazing Nigerian woman who redefined philosophy

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So, identifying African thinkers is not just an exercise in recognition. It’s part of a broader effort to rebalance an intellectual history that has too often marginalised or misrepresented African contributions. As Congolese philosopher Valentin-Yves Mudimbe famously argued, Africa has often been constructed as an object of knowledge rather than a subject producing it.

From this perspective, here are six intellectuals whose work helps us rethink Africa and the world.

The famous

1. Valentin-Yves Mudimbe (1941-2025)

Mudimbe is one of the most influential African philosophers of the late 20th century. His seminal work The Invention of Africa dismantles what he calls the “colonial library”, the body of western knowledge that has historically defined Africa from the outside.

Rather than simply rejecting western thought, Mudimbe proposes a critical archaeology of knowledge. His work invites us to rethink how Africa can be known and, crucially, how it can speak for itself. He shifts the question from what Africa is to who has the power to define it.

His contribution goes further. By drawing on thinkers like Michel Foucault from France, he shows that knowledge is never neutral. It’s embedded in structures of power. This allows Mudimbe to expose how academic disciplines, from anthropology to history, have participated in constructing a distorted image of Africa.

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Read more: Valentin-Yves Mudimbe: the philosopher who reshaped how the world thinks about Africa

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His work opened the way for a generation of scholars who now seek to produce knowledge from within African perspectives rather than about Africa as an external object.

2. Achille Mbembe (born 1957)

A major voice in contemporary global theory, Cameroonian historian Mbembe explores how power operates in postcolonial societies. In works such as On the Postcolony and Critique of Black Reason, he analyses the afterlives of colonial violence and their impact on subjectivity.

Mbembe also emphasises the need for Africa to produce its own narratives. For him, intellectual work is inseparable from historical trauma, but also from the possibility of reinvention.

One of his key contributions is the concept of “necropolitics”, which examines how modern forms of power determine who may live and who must die. This framework has been widely used to analyse conflicts, borders and inequalities far beyond the continent.

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Read more: Achille Mbembe on how to restore the humanity stolen by racism

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At the same time, Mbembe insists on moving beyond victimhood. His work points toward what he sees as an emerging African future, shaped by mobility, creativity and new forms of belonging in a globalised world.

The fascinating

3. George Ayittey (1945–2022)

Ghanaian economist and thinker Ayittey stands out for his uncompromising critique of postcolonial African elites. While acknowledging the impact of colonialism, he argues that many of Africa’s problems today stem from internal governance failures such as corruption, authoritarianism and institutional decay.

One of his most influential ideas is the distinction between “cheetahs” and “hippos”. Cheetahs are a new generation of reform minded Africans, hippos are entrenched elites resistant to change. This captures a broader critique of political stagnation and elite capture.

Ayittey also insists on the importance of indigenous African institutions as resources for political renewal. His work is therefore not only critical, it is also programmatic, calling for a reconstruction of governance.

4. Kwasi Wiredu (1931-2022)

Ghanaian philosopher Wiredu is one of the most important figures in African philosophy. His central project, conceptual decolonisation, aims to free African thought from uncritically adopting western philosophical categories.

For Wiredu, language plays a crucial role. Philosophical problems are often shaped by the language they’re formulated in. By returning to African languages, he shows that debates about truth, personhood or political organisation can be reframed in very different ways.

His work on consensus-based political systems, inspired by Akan traditions, is particularly influential. Rather than relying on majoritarian democracy, Wiredu explores forms of deliberation that include agreement and social cohesion. In the process, he does not reject universality. He redefines it from within African intellectual traditions.

5. Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí (born 1957)

Nigerian sociologist and gender scholar Oyěwùmí’s work offers a powerful critique of western ideas being applied to the rest of the world. In The Invention of Women, she argues that gender, as understood in western societies, was imposed on Yoruba social structures through colonialism.

Her research demonstrates that social organisation in Yoruba society was not originally structured around gender in the same way.

Rather than gender serving as the main axis of social difference, other markers such as age and status played a more central role. This challenges the assumption that categories such as man and woman are universally foundational.

More broadly, her work invites us to question how knowledge travels and how it can distort the realities it claims to describe.

The rising

6. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (born 1967)

Zimbabwean historian Ndlovu-Gatsheni is a leading voice in decolonial theory. His work focuses on coloniality, understood as the persistence of colonial patterns of power long after formal independence.

He criticises the global division of intellectual labour, where African scholars are often confined to producing data while the theory is developed elsewhere. For him, the issue is about who has the authority to produce knowledge.

His work calls for African perspectives to be put in the centre of global debates and for a transformation of the structures that continue to marginalise them.

Beyond a list

African intellectuals are not a uniform group. They operate across disciplines such as philosophy, history, economics, sociology and literature, and across spaces around the world.

What unites them is a shared engagement with a central question. How can Africa be thought critically in a world still marked by unequal power relations?

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Read more: Is ‘Africa’ a racial slur and should the continent be renamed?

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There are, of course, many other prominent African thinkers whose work deserves attention. The figures here have been chosen because they are particularly representative of different ways of thinking from and about Africa.

Each of them opens a distinct intellectual pathway, whether through the critique of knowledge, the analysis of power, the rethinking of social categories or the transformation of political and philosophical frameworks.

– 6 African thinkers who help us understand the world – new book
– https://theconversation.com/6-african-thinkers-who-help-us-understand-the-world-new-book-280090

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Clement Sefa-Nyarko, Lecturer in Security, Development and Leadership in Africa, King’s College London

Ghana’s parliament ratified the country’s first lithium mining agreement in March 2026. This came three years after lithium mining was confirmed as commercially viable in September 2023.

The Ewoyaa Lithium Project, in the Central Region of Ghana, covers an area where farming communities have lived for generations. It spans several communities.

The agreement is between the government and Barari DV Ghana Limited, the local subsidiary of Australia-based Atlantic Lithium. Lithium is a mineral used in batteries that power electric vehicles, renewable energy storage systems and everyday electronics. It’s at the heart of global minerals supply chains to decarbonise energy and transport.

With the deal in place, formal discussions will begin with mining communities about relocation, compensation and restoring livelihoods. Compensation could include payment for land, crops, construction work and other assets that will be affected by mining operations, as required under Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act.

The ratification of the deal also marks the end of a legal moratorium set out in Ghanaian law. This comes into force once minerals of commercial value are discovered.

The moratorium, which lasted three years in the case of the Ewoyaa Lithium Project, was designed to protect both the state and mining firms from complications such as speculative construction, sudden land claims, and inflated compensation demands that may arise from new developments.

Under Ghana’s mining law, once minerals of commercial value are confirmed, temporary restrictions are placed on new permanent structures, farm expansion and other major land use changes in the affected area. It lasts until there is a mineral agreement and compensation arrangements are clear. The intention is to stabilise land use and ensure fair valuation.

It has profound social consequences.

For people already living in these areas, the moratorium can mean extended periods of uncertainty. During this time, everyday decisions about livelihoods, housing and the future are placed on hold.

Its practical impact is that residents living on or near the mining area can’t build, expand their farms, or make other major decisions about land use.

The affected communities live in a state of suspended time during the moratorium. Farmers are unable to plan their next season confidently. Families delay home improvements. Young people postpone major life decisions because their future access to land remains unclear.

The mining agreement doesn’t end the waiting. Instead, it opens a new phase of negotiations, compensation assessments and administrative back and forth. It could stretch on for months or even years.

This prolonged uncertainty causes real social and economic harm. Yet its effects are often overlooked.

My academic work examines governance, natural resources, politics, and energy transitions. In a recent paper, based on extensive fieldwork in the lithium-rich communities of Ewoyaa, Krampa Krom and Krofu, I investigated how these delays and uncertainty shaped everyday life. I gathered firsthand accounts of how people navigated this period of waiting. All are affected by the project.

The effects were unmistakable. People described the moratorium as a form of “frozen time”, when life could not move forward.

The economic setbacks and emotional strain from long periods of uncertainty often go unrecognised in public policy discussions.

Time on hold

My research identified a number of negative effects of the delays in getting mining operations off the ground.

Firstly, households described how it eroded local opportunities and contributed to young people leaving the area. Young people expressed frustration as their job prospects remained frozen, and they lacked clarity on whether future employment at the mine would be accessible or meaningful.

Many young adults, already frustrated by years of stalled prospects, had left in search of work elsewhere.

The few lower-paid jobs associated with early stage mining activities were not yet available.

Secondly, farmers reported clear losses: they could not expand or invest.

Thirdly, women traders, many of whom sell farm produce and foodstuffs, reported disruptions in household income patterns because farming activities were stalled.

Fourth, community elders, reflecting on years of limited communication, described a growing distrust towards government institutions and the processes governing the mineral agreement.

Across these accounts, what united residents was the feeling that their lives had been interrupted by forces far beyond their control. The moratorium did more than pause development, it suspended decision making, aspirations and the ability to plan even the simplest aspects of the future.

“Time on hold” shaped economic choices, social relationships and the very rhythm of community life.

In my study, I argue that these prolonged delays are a form of “temporal injustice”. This concept emerged directly from listening to residents describe how their aspirations, livelihoods and sense of security were reshaped by bureaucratic time.

Temporal injustice occurs when certain groups bear unfair burdens of waiting, uncertainty and delayed decision-making. These disruptions may seem minor when viewed from the outside. But they have broader implications. They affect project timelines, investor confidence, and the long-term reliability of the supply chains that power the global clean energy transition.

Looking forward

As Ghana and the mining company move into the compensation and community engagement phase, they have an opportunity to address not only material losses but the temporal burdens that communities have endured.

First, compensation frameworks should recognise that the moratorium itself caused harm. Beyond land, crops and structures, policymakers must account for the economic and social costs of years spent waiting.

Second, community engagement must be timely, transparent and genuinely participatory.

Information should flow consistently, especially when people’s livelihoods depend on it.

Third, Ghana should incorporate temporal justice principles into mining governance, including clearer timelines, regular updates and support for communities facing prolonged delays.

Finally, as Ghana deepens its role in the global critical minerals supply chains, local communities should share the benefits rather than being left to carry hidden costs. A just energy transition demands fair distribution not only of mineral wealth, but of time, certainty and opportunity.

– Ghana’s mining law aims to stop speculation but leaves communities in limbo – insights from a lithium case study
– https://theconversation.com/ghanas-mining-law-aims-to-stop-speculation-but-leaves-communities-in-limbo-insights-from-a-lithium-case-study-279594

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicodemus Minde, Researcher, United States International University

The East African Community is one of Africa’s oldest regional economic organisations. Its birth in 1967 was the culmination of decades of economic ties forged in the colonial era between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. It’s no surprise that the EAC is also the most deeply integrated regional entity.

In its heyday between 1967 and 1977, the bloc shared a common currency, jointly operated a development bank and administered its transport infrastructure as one. There was a common education policy with a single syllabus and examining body as well as the University of East Africa with specialised colleges in the three countries.

Political friction and conflicting priorities, among other factors, led to its collapse in 1977 but it was revived in 1999. Citizens within the bloc currently benefit from free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, along with the rights of establishment and residence. Unmet objectives include the return of a common currency and a political federation.

Meanwhile, the bloc has grown from three to eight – Rwanda and Burundi joined in 2007; South Sudan in 2016, the DR Congo in 2022 and Somalia in 2023. The territory covers stretches from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic and brings together over 331 million people and a combined GDP of US$313 billion as of 2025.

However, this rapid expansion has triggered financial difficulties, putting the economic integration agenda at risk. While partner states are expected to contribute to fund the bloc’s operations, only Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda regularly meet their quota. The budget shortfall has led to massive staff layoffs and a freeze on new recruitment.

So serious is the crisis that it was top of the agenda at the annual summit of the heads of state in March 2026. The leaders stepped up to reform the funding model and signalled that the bloc was ready to sanction or sideline countries that compromise funding.

I have studied regionalism and integration in eastern Africa, conducted research on the EAC and published on Tanzanian citizens’ sovereignty, popular participation, and the EAC integration and democratisation.

It is my view that the radical proposals will compel non-paying partner states to either shape up or ship out. These reforms will salvage the East African Community but could potentially trigger mistrust and perception of unequal benefits in the long run.

The cost of rapid expansion

Each of the eight partner states is expected to contribute approximately US$7 million to fund the bloc’s operations. In addition, the bloc relies on development partners to fund some activities.

In recent years, six of the eight member states have missed their budget contributions. This resulted in a US$90 million budget shortfall. Regional institutions affected by these include:

• the East African Legislative Assembly, the regional parliament

• the East African Court of Justice, responsible for the interpretation and application of the EAC Treaty.

The two have failed to perform their core functions due to resource constraints. The regional assembly, on occasion, has been forced to skip sittings. This has an effect on critical debates and enactment of new laws to foster economic integration. The regional court grapples with case backlogs.

In November 2023, the EAC Summit adopted a new financing model. It shared 65% of the budget equally among partner states and the rest based on each country’s financial capacity. This capacity is assessed using the World Bank’s average nominal GDP per capita metric for the previous five years.

But only Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda – and occasionally Rwanda – have remitted their contributions on time. Domestic conflicts in South Sudan, the DRC and Somalia may have played a role in the slow contributions of these newer EAC members. In the 2024-2025 financial year, Burundi paid only 19% of its expected contribution, the DRC paid 14%, Somalia paid around half, and South Sudan paid a mere 7%.

Overall compliance stood at roughly 58%, leaving the bloc with arrears exceeding US$55 million. In the 2025-2026 cycle, the picture was even bleaker: compliance slipped to just 36.6%, while outstanding obligations climbed to about US$90 million.

The pattern also hints at something deeper: political ambivalence among non-paying members, and uneasiness among some partner states about the benefits of belonging to the bloc. Despite the funding challenges, inter-regional trade in the EAC has been on the rise due to increased trade facilitation under the customs union and common markets protocols. The EAC has also made advances in peace and security. In 2022 for example, through the Nairobi Process, the EAC facilitated peace talks and deployed the East African Community Regional Force in DRC.

Beyond funding, personal and political differences between the DRC’s President Felix Tshisekedi and Rwanda’s Paul Kagame have contributed to tensions within the bloc.

What did the leaders decide at the March summit?

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, in a rather surprising but decisive move, pushed for a new financing formula, replacing the model adopted in 2023.

The highlights of the new financing formula include:

• 50% of the budget will be shared equally among all partner states, while the remaining 50% will be based on each country’s economic strength. The formula will take effect from 1 July 2026. By factoring in differences in economic capacity, the reform aims to reduce the burden on smaller economies and make the bloc’s funding more sustainable.

• members of the legislative assembly should be paid by their respective national assemblies with effect from December 2027

• the council of ministers should finalise the schedule of sanctions considering the new financing formula. The EAC aims to deal with mounting arrears and non-payment through a sanction regime.

A quorum for the meeting of all organs and institutions of the community will be two-thirds of all partner states. Previously, all states had to participate in passing crucial resolutions, and this was frustrated by absenteeism, especially by non-paying countries.

Nominations for the key institutional positions will depend on the sponsor state’s ratification of all community legal instruments, domestication of the treaty, and full implementation of the roadmap for the partner state’s integration.

What’s next

These are radical proposals, with consequences. Take the example of the decision to appoint Stephen Mbundi of Tanzania as the new secretary general. Based on the rotational principles of the EAC, South Sudan was poised to take over the position from Kenya’s Veronica Nduva. But South Sudan is a defaulter.

This decision signalled the bloc’s commitment to financial compliance and commitment to the spirit of regional integration. Uganda’s president, Yoweri Museveni, also took over the chairman’s position, bypassing Somalia and the DRC, which were poised to lead the community for a year. Somalia and the DRC have been behind in their annual payments.

The proposals, which appear to have been orchestrated by the founding members, suggest a pragmatic move to salvage the EAC.

– East African Community’s expansion has triggered financial troubles: why solutions come with risks
– https://theconversation.com/east-african-communitys-expansion-has-triggered-financial-troubles-why-solutions-come-with-risks-280632

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Esther Leah Achandi, Post Doctoral Fellow- Gender, International Livestock Research Institute

In some communities in Uganda, women aren’t supposed to work with pigs. This stems from restrictive social and gender norms, some of which are rooted in culture and religious beliefs.

Until recently, eating pork was associated with drunkards because the meat was typically served alongside home-brewed alcohol in local bars. That’s changing, as “pork joints” become popular everyday eating places. What’s more, pigs are unfairly thought of as dirty and therefore some people think the people who work with them must be dirty too. Women, in particular, according to prevailing social norms, are meant to keep themselves clean.

The pig sector is growing rapidly in east Africa on the back of rising demand. Uganda is one of three top pork producers in Africa, after Nigeria and Malawi. The country also has the highest per capita consumption of pork in the region, estimated at 3.4 kilograms per person per year. This has led to job opportunities in pig farming, trading, butcheries, food stalls, artificial insemination, and feed and veterinary supply shops.

Across Africa, social and gender norms determine whether a woman can work, what kind of work she can do, where she can work, with which animals, and how much she gets paid. This is the case in Uganda. In some parts of central Uganda, while the management – and cleanliness – of piggeries have improved, resulting in better perceptions about pig hygiene, lingering prejudices have meant women working in the pig industry have little bargaining power and lower incomes, and may feel pressured to work covertly. All this results in missed opportunity for women to develop professional skills and support their families, and reduced food safety for everyone.

In 2022/2023 we conducted a study in two districts to understand how local gender norms affected women in the pig farming sector. The findings revealed that women faced restrictions in conducting artificial insemination, castrating animals, taking sows to boars for mating, and transporting pigs on motorcycles. Additionally, certain activities – including slaughtering, trading livestock, producing feed, and owning large farms – were deemed inappropriate for women.

We also found systemic barriers such as lower wages, lack of control over income, restricted physical mobility, and exclusion from influential networks blocked them from fully reaping the benefits of the sector.

These findings led us to launch a range of interventions in the districts. Working with the international NGO Ripple Effect, my team at the International Livestock Research Institute and I trialled a range of interventions in Uganda’s Masaka and Mukono districts.

The results, evaluated a year later in December 2025, showed that social norms can be both accommodated and transformed for the benefit of all. For example, radio shows and conversations challenged widely held sentiments and sought to normalise roles that were taboo for women – such as providing pig insemination services to other farmers and contributing to a growing pig sector.

Our findings have lessons that are of value across many industries and in many places.

Doing things differently

We worked with pig farmers, business people, regulators and community members in five different communities to address the restrictive norms that prevented women from engaging in pig businesses. The work was carried out in Masaka district (south-west of Kampala) and Mukono district (east of the capital).

The interventions we put in place included:

• providing women farmers with weigh-bands to estimate live pig weights and make sure they weren’t being cheated

• offering training for women farmers to help them negotiate better prices and animal services

• providing branded lab coats and badges to certified professionals to help combat the lack of respect for women in technical roles like artificial insemination

• providing aprons, head wraps and boots to women working in slaughterhouses and butcher shops, so they would not be seen wearing dirty clothes.

These interventions provided solutions to accommodate existing norms without directly challenging them.

We also trialled some interventions aimed at transforming gender norms. We organised broadcasts on local radio talk shows, featuring a panel discussion between gender officers from Ripple Effect, community leaders and local men who explained why they supported their wives and daughters to work in the pig industry.

For instance, in one broadcast, one local leader shared his family’s story:

My wife rears pigs in large numbers, and I help her look for markets. When I travel, I bring her feeds for them. A home without money is unhappy. Piggery projects are family enterprises … When a woman earns an income, her husband is relieved financially; an empowered woman is a responsible woman.

We also held large community meetings, and used recordings from these shows to spark dialogue about these issues.

The changes

Over a year we observed changes.

Women butchers, farmers and artificial insemination agents felt more confident and accepted, and their services were sought after, especially by other women.

They were able to negotiate higher prices for their pigs. They invested their savings in their piggeries; some were able to use the profits to buy their own land and build houses.

There has been movement towards policy changes, too. Traditionally, pigs have had to be killed in official slaughterhouses – male-dominated spaces. Women did not feel welcome there, and men felt women would not be able to cope with the practical act of slaughter.

After our work in the sector, including inspection officials, authorities are now allowing some women to slaughter their pigs at home.

Lessons

Norms are powerful. Any efforts to improve livelihoods, boost community health, or grow a particular industry will be shaped by these norms. Ignoring them is a recipe for failure, while understanding them – and, where appropriate, moving beyond them – can benefit a whole community.

To transform restrictive norms, both men and women must be included in dialogues that encourage critical curiosity about their impacts. Religious, political and community leaders – people who often enforce these unwritten rules – must also be part of the conversations and solutions.

Radio talk shows and social media can showcase women successfully performing traditionally masculine tasks and supportive men, to normalise new behaviours and reduce shaming. And something as simple as professional clothing can send a signal that women are competent – and clean.

Gender norms can change, and these social changes can have practical and economic effects. Livestock development, as we have seen in Uganda’s pig industry, can be an entry point to promote gender equality.

At the same time, removing barriers to women’s participation can boost families’ incomes, bolster rural industries and alleviate poverty.

Challenge norms, empower women, and everyone benefits.

– Women working in Uganda’s pig sector: how challenging prejudices can unlock opportunities – research
– https://theconversation.com/women-working-in-ugandas-pig-sector-how-challenging-prejudices-can-unlock-opportunities-research-277751