The Conversation – Page 14 – MIL Africa Engine

June 9, 2026

Anti-foreigner violence in South Africa is easily sparked: what hasn’t been done to deal with it

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alan Hirsch, Senior Research Fellow New South Institute, Emeritus Professor at The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town

Threats and deadly conflict over migration are spreading fast in South Africa. This is hugely worrying and could result in widespread injury and killings, as it has in the past.

The region’s investment prospects could be dimmed too, due to perceptions of political instability.

The need for effective responses is real and urgent. The death toll, while disputed, is rising, and reports of marches, threats, sacking of dwellings and violence are widespread across South Africa.

Anti-foreigner hysteria is being driven by online campaigns which appear to be highly organised. They include the use of faked information and graphics.

It is also being driven by campaign leaders and by politicians who support campaigns to root out foreigners, either actively or simply by justifying the arguments used by the more dangerous activists. The UN secretary general, Amnesty International and several foreign governments, including those of Mozambique, Nigeria and Ghana, have berated South Africa for not responding appropriately to anti-migrant mobilisation.

In a televised address on Sunday 7 May 2026, the country’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, outlined various initiatives to lessen the conflicts over migration. But was this a coherent response, or a missed opportunity to make real progress?

The core of the response was the five-point plan agreed to by a special cabinet committee meeting last week. The points included a law enforcement crackdown (including intensifying deportations), establishing dedicated immigration courts, rooting out employment of undocumented workers, securing borders, and tackling corruption (including a reform of identity systems.)

Ramaphosa admitted that economic conditions and the poor state of many public services explained why people were desperate and that grievances, including grievances about the influx of undocumented migrants, were “real”. Some have interpreted his stance as justifying the association of foreigners with the grievances that poor South Africans have.

Based on my work as a political economist in migration governance over the past decade, I know that virtually all the specific actions mentioned in the five parts of the plan had already been announced by the South African government, though not as a concerted platform to address the current crisis. Yet implementation has been painfully slow.

Clearly, there needs to be urgent and visible follow-through on these commitments. This should include the promise to clamp down on anti-foreigner agitators and those who have wounded or killed people they believed to be foreign. To my knowledge, very few agitators and attackers have been arrested, let alone charged. None of the leaders inciting dangerous actions have been arrested, or even called out by political leaders.

To help reduce the violence and the perception of risk, a number of additional steps need to be taken. Firstly, the forging of a collective political front of parties in the country against anti-foreigner activities. Secondly, the mobilisation of civic and religious institutions to fight against irresponsible politicking. Third, a renegotiation of colonial-era bilateral labour agreements with South Africa’s five neighbouring countries. And finally, addressing the country’s acute unemployment crisis.

Four steps that could make a difference

Firstly, the head of state – or the head of his political party – should bring together the leaders of all the significant political parties in a forum which commits to agreeing not to incite anti-foreigner sentiment, and also, as a group, condemns such behaviour.

Secondly, leaders of civic and religious institution could be encouraged to do the same – to warn against irresponsible politicking. Further than that, religious and community groupings could be encouraged and even assisted by government to drive programmes to include foreigners into the mainstream of South African society in a constructive way.

There are examples of how to do this in other parts of the world in developed and developing countries. These include South America and other African countries.

National, provincial and local governments could also drive initiatives to include foreigners into the national community. These could be standalone programmes or in cooperation with civil society institutions.

Thirdly, there should be a renegotiation of bilateral labour agreements with five neighbouring countries. In a white paper released in 2025 the government committed to establishing employment quotas for South Africans in various sectors of industry. It also committed to the renegotiation of the bilateral deals. The existing agreements are colonial in origin and form. They withhold virtually all labour and social rights from migrant labourers. And they don’t accommodate long-term labour migration contracts, now common in other parts of the world.

Such reforms could create more manageable as well as fair and equitable systems of migrant labour. South Africa could address its labour needs in a workable way. And the temptation to bypass the system should be lower, with fewer undocumented migrant workers.

It’s not realistic yet to do away with regional labour migration, but it could be far better managed.

Finally, Ramaphosa said he’d be sending out envoys “to seek to find sustainable solutions to these challenges”. But this has already been done, more than 20 years ago. South Africa and some of its neighbours agreed to a protocol on the facilitation of the movement of persons in the southern African region. This initiative was negotiated in the Southern African Development Community.

But since the protocol was signed by several heads of state in the region in 2005, there has been no progress. South Africa, its partners and the Southern African Development Community itself are guilty of negligence and should accept that they could have and can do more to avoid crises such as the present one.

Poorer South Africans are vulnerable to anti-foreigner mobilisation because of their dire economic circumstances: 32.7% unemployment; 37.8% of people classified as very poor. And public services are often very bad.

More growth and more jobs must dampen the powder-keg that is so easily sparked.

But even before that is achieved, there is a great deal that could be done to eliminate the spark itself – tensions over migration.

– Anti-foreigner violence in South Africa is easily sparked: what hasn’t been done to deal with it
– https://theconversation.com/anti-foreigner-violence-in-south-africa-is-easily-sparked-what-hasnt-been-done-to-deal-with-it-284778

June 8, 2026

South Africa’s anti-migrant campaigns use the language of democracy: why that’s dangerous

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Luke Sinwell, Professor of Sociology, University of Johannesburg

Anti-migrant campaigns in South Africa are increasingly being framed as acts of community protection. Protesters present their efforts as a response to community concerns about crime, unemployment and failing public services.

Leaders of these campaigns claim that weak border controls, ineffective immigration enforcement and undocumented migrants have contributed to deteriorating living conditions in many communities.

These campaigns are framed as “clean-ups”, “community protection” or removing “illegal foreigners”. But this is using democratic language to justify othering. It can legitimise the exclusion of migrants by casting them as outsiders, which could increase the probability of violence.

In 2024, the March and March group emerged in Durban. It led “clean up” campaigns to rid the city – and the country – of “illegal foreigners”.

Under these campaigns, vigilantism peaked. Protesters made citizens’ arrests of street vendors suspected of being undocumented. They shut down businesses owned by suspected “foreigners”.

Now, the group has set 30 June 2026 as a deadline for undocumented migrants to leave South Africa. And as the date approaches, anti-migrant mobilisation is intensifying across the country.

Groups are taking advantage of increased socioeconomic hardships. But instead of linking these to deeper structural causes, such as inequality, poor governance and economic stagnation, frustration is being directed towards the 3 million migrants in South Africa (about 5% of the population).

We have spent many years as researchers and activists involved in grassroots politics, social movements and popular struggles in South Africa. Our work has included extensive research on anti-migrant mobilisation, including the recurring episodes of xenophobic violence and exclusion that have shaped South African politics since the mid-2000s.

Drawing on our findings, we argue that the leaders of the current wave of anti-immigrant activity have the same playbook as previous campaigners. They use the language of community protection, active citizenship and people’s power to turn social and economic frustrations into campaigns against migrants.

But the line between “community protection” and organised exclusion is extremely thin. When ideas such as citizenship, safety and accountability are used to draw that line, they can make exclusion appear legitimate while weakening everyday security for everyone.

The danger is that daily life becomes organised around constant boundary-making. This means belonging is closely policed and violence can become a means of enforcing those boundaries.

The rise of anti-migrant mobilisation

The first major xenophobic attacks in democratic South Africa started in 2008 in Alexandra, a working-class township, just a walk away from the ultra-rich Sandton City. The attacks then spread to different parts of the country.

The ruling African National Congress denied that it was xenophobia, claiming it was mere criminality. Xenophobia contradicted the “rainbow nation” image of ubuntu and human rights that the leaders of national liberation had cultivated after taking power.

Since then, xenophobic attitudes and attacks have continued in parts of the country.

Operation Dudula was born in 2020, targeting migrants from other parts of the continent. It is an organised movement with a programme and a leadership. It organises marches, and often dominates mainstream and social media with its messages and presence.

Operation Dudula is a separate organisation from March and March. But the two are closely connected through their anti-migrant mobilisation. Both take real grievances and turn them into a simple message: migrants are the problem.

In this process, democracy becomes the idea that some groups have the right to decide who belongs and who does not.

A key example is the April 2022 events in Diepsloot, North of Johannesburg. Residents protested about violent crime, frustration with policing and government failure. These concerns were real and widely shared. But during the protests, Dudula leaders encouraged people to take matters into their own hands.

Zimbabwean migrant Elvis Nyathi was set alight and killed by a vigilante mob of about 30 local men, after they identified him as an “illegal foreigner”.

Our research suggests that when migrants are repeatedly described as dangerous, it can create conditions where violence becomes easier to justify in the name of “community protection”.

Our argument is that anti-migrant campaigns invoke the notion of active citizenship and reinterprets it to espouse a politics of hatred of the black foreigner.

Thus, migrants become victims of the weaponisation of protest and grassroots democracy. They are scapegoats for the problems faced by South Africans.

Instead of challenging big business, capital and landowners, anti-migrant campaigners fight the man or woman on the street who has nothing, and who has been dispossessed by the economic and political processes that caused them to become migrants.

There is also a wider, global pattern: across many countries, political movements link everyday hardship to anti-migrant ideas, presenting exclusion as common sense or self-defence.

What next

Our research suggests that responding to this issue requires more than reacting after mobilisation and violence occur. It requires addressing the conditions that allow scapegoating to grow.

First, structural problems must be taken seriously by anyone who wishes to address poverty and inequality. People face unemployment, inequality and failing services. If these conditions do not change, anger will be directed towards vulnerable groups.

Second, language matters. Terms associated with anti-migrant campaigns like “illegal foreigners”, “criminals” and “clean-ups” are not neutral. They shape how people think and act, making exclusion seem normal or even necessary. Public debate should focus on concrete evidence, accountability of those in power, and structural solutions.

Third, the answer cannot be to divide poor and working-class people according to nationality. South Africans and migrants often face the same problems of unemployment, poverty and insecure livelihoods. Building solidarity against the system of capitalism (white monopoly capital in particular) is more likely to improve people’s lives than treating migrants as the cause of hardships.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the killing of migrants is a reminder of where othering can lead when it becomes normal to decide who belongs and who does not. Once this logic takes hold, it rarely stays limited to one group. In moments of crisis, it can expand to other vulnerable people. This was seen during the country’s May 2008 xenophobic violence in which 21 out of the 62 people killed were South African.

– South Africa’s anti-migrant campaigns use the language of democracy: why that’s dangerous
– https://theconversation.com/south-africas-anti-migrant-campaigns-use-the-language-of-democracy-why-thats-dangerous-284370

June 8, 2026

South African telescope detects record-breaking signal from the early universe

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thato Manamela, South African Radio Astronomy Observatory (SARAO) post-doctoral researcher, University of Pretoria

Astronomers using the MeerKAT radio telescope in South Africa have discovered the most distant hydroxyl megamaser ever detected, opening a new radio astronomy frontier. A hydroxyl megamaser is a natural space laser, and this one is located in a violently merging galaxy more than 8 billion light-years away.

We spoke to the astronomers, Thato Manamela, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Pretoria, and Roger Deane, director of the Inter-University Institute for Data Intensive Astronomy and a professor at the universities of Cape Town and Pretoria, about their study.

What you’ve found has been described as a ‘new frontier’ in space research. Why is it extraordinary?

This discovery is extraordinary because of the record distance at which we’ve detected it, over eight billion light-years away. That places it deep into the early universe. This means that we aren’t seeing the galaxy as it exists today. We are seeing it as it was 8 billion years ago. Since the Big Bang happened about 13.8 billion years ago, we are looking at a “toddler” version of the universe. At that stage where the maser signal was transmitted by the host galaxy, galaxies were much more “chaotic”, they collided more often and were much more active than the stable, mature galaxies we see nearby today.

It gives us a rare glimpse of galaxy interactions and extreme star-forming environments when the cosmos was less than half its current age. Think of light like a letter in the mail. If a friend sends a letter from overseas, by the time you read it, the news is old. In space, light is the letter. The “news” from this galaxy took 8 billion years to reach us. We see the galaxy as a “toddler” even though, in its own time, it has already grown up or changed.

We detected this megamaser, which operates on a scale of power millions of times greater than a typical galactic maser. Both megamasers and gigamasers are cosmic radio lasers. While a megamaser is a million times more luminous than a standard maser found in the local universe, a gigamaser is a billion times more luminous, making it 1,000 times more powerful than a megamaser.

In just five hours of observing time we found a signal that typically requires hundreds of hours of observation, given its distance and rarity. But gravitational lensing boosted the signal enough to detect it. Additionally, while we were targeting neutral hydrogen, MeerKAT’s wide bandwidth enabled the surprise discovery of the megamaser signal in the same data.

This rapid detection suggests that future surveys with MeerKAT and the upcoming SKA Observatory could uncover many more such distant, extreme objects. Its ability to find this so quickly proves that we finally have the technology to see faint signals from the very distant past. It’s a preview of what the upcoming Square Kilometre Array (SKA), a unique, one-of-a-kind international mega-project, might achieve.

But a highly complementary next-generation facility called the next-generation Very Large Array (ngVLA) is being planned and designed for construction in the US. The SKA Observatory (SKA-Low and SKA-Mid) focuses on low-to-mid radio frequencies. The ngVLA will operate at much higher frequencies. Together, they will form two of the major pillars of next-generation global radio astronomy. The finding gives astronomers a new way to study how galaxies evolved in the early universe.

What technologies or capabilities made this possible?

The discovery was made possible by the sensitivity and wide frequency coverage of the MeerKAT radio telescope. Its ability to detect faint signals over a broad frequency range allows us to search for spectral lines across large cosmic volumes. A spectral line is a cosmic chemical fingerprint. Every atom or molecule emits electromagnetic waves at specific frequencies. Detecting those frequencies tells astronomers what the gas is made of.

In this case, MeerKAT’s wide bandwidth allowed us to detect both the hydroxyl line and neutral hydrogen absorption in a single observation. Previously, with older technology, this would have taken two separate observations.

Equally important are advances in data processing and computing. The data were processed using high-performance computing resources at the Inter-University Institute for Data Intensive Astronomy (IDIA).

Processing such massive amounts of data is like trying to drink from a firehose. MeerKAT collects gigabytes of information every second, resulting in files far too large for a standard computer to handle. To find a signal from 8 billion years ago, which is millions of times fainter than a cell phone signal, we must use robust calibration pipelines. These act like an automated high-tech car wash to scrub away digital noise and sharpen the telescope’s focus. This “cleaning” process requires trillions of mathematical calculations, necessitating the use of supercomputers that work for days to transform raw radio interference into a clear scientific discovery.

Gravitational lensing also played a key role. A massive foreground object, like a star or galaxy, for example, amplified the signal from the distant galaxy, effectively acting as a natural telescope and boosting our ability to detect it.

How does what you’ve found change our understanding of the universe?

It’s rare that a single astrophysical system, a collection of celestial objects, in this case, two galaxies forming a lens system, can change our understanding of the universe. We typically need large sample sizes to do that. But the combination of the recording-breaking distance and the speed of the discovery was impressive.

It suggests that systematic searches – such as those conducted by deep MeerKAT surveys – could convert these once-rare finds into powerful probes of extreme, yet highly obscured star formation in the distant universe. As a result of this observation, the SKA Observatory and other future telescopes won’t just be looking for more of the same; they will be looking for hidden history.

Hydroxyl megamasers are usually associated with galaxy mergers. We expect some galaxy mergers to host pairs of supermassive black holes. Almost every large galaxy has a supermassive black hole at its centre. When galaxies merge, the supermassive black holes at their centres can eventually spiral towards each other, producing gravitational waves, ripples in space-time. Finding systems like this helps astronomers study an important stage in galaxy evolution and the environments where these extreme events occur.

By using megamasers to find these pairs, we can study the final stages of how the largest objects in the universe are built. This is a major milestone in a galaxy’s life. By finding these galaxies now, we are catching them at a key evolutionary stage, the final countdown before they collide and release a massive burst of energy that our next generation of detectors will be able to hear.

The strength of the MeerKAT-detected hydroxyl signal after such a short observation time therefore implies that astronomers will be able to detect large numbers of these systems across most of cosmic time.

What does the discovery say about South Africa’s place in data-intensive radio astronomy?

This discovery highlights South Africa’s leading role in radio astronomy. Facilities such as MeerKAT, combined with data-intensive platforms like IDIA, provide world-class capabilities for both observation and analysis. It also demonstrates strong local expertise in handling large, complex datasets.

Discoveries like this rely on advanced data processing, signal extraction and scientific interpretation. These are all key strengths within the South African research community. As we move from using current scout telescopes like MeerKAT to building and operating the world’s largest radio observatory, the SKAO, South Africa is well positioned to remain a hub for data-intensive astronomy. Results like this reinforce the country’s role in shaping the future of the field.

– South African telescope detects record-breaking signal from the early universe
– https://theconversation.com/south-african-telescope-detects-record-breaking-signal-from-the-early-universe-280060

June 7, 2026

Ghana wants learner-centred classrooms – but many teachers still favour old methods

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Frank Quansah, Senior Lecturer, Educational Assessment, Measurement and Evaluation, University of Education, Winneba

Across Africa, countries are redesigning school curricula to prepare children for the demands of the 21st century. These reforms aim to nurture creativity, critical thinking, collaboration and problem-solving rather than rote memorisation in schools. Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa and Zambia have made changes, and Ghana is part of the movement too.

In 2019, Ghana introduced a new curriculum for basic schools that strongly promotes learner-centred teaching. The idea is simple: instead of teachers dominating classroom instruction through lectures and note-taking, learners are expected to take a more active part through discussions, group work, inquiry and practical learning activities.

But changing classroom practices is not as simple as introducing a new curriculum.

Existing research in Ghana and other African countries shows that schools continue to struggle with overcrowded classrooms, limited teaching materials and examination systems that still reward memorisation rather than critical thinking and creativity.

In our previous work on educational assessment, we also found that examination pressures can discourage the development of critical thinking and practical problem-solving skills promoted under Ghana’s new curriculum. The pressures can make it seem more practical and effective to give the teacher more control.

As education researchers, we wanted to understand whether teachers themselves believed in the value of learner-centred teaching. Our newly published study examined teachers’ beliefs about it. These beliefs matter because they are likely to influence how curriculum reforms are applied in classrooms.

Teachers support reform, but with reservations

In our study, we surveyed 282 basic school teachers in Ghana and examined their beliefs about the new approach. Most of the participants were professionally trained teachers (83%), and nearly 80% had 10 years or less of teaching experience. About 90% had received training on Ghana’s new curriculum. We used a statistical method called latent profile analysis to examine patterns in what they said.

The findings revealed two distinct groups of teachers.

The first group strongly embraced learner-centred teaching. These teachers believed learners should actively participate in lessons, collaborate with others and take some responsibility for their own learning. They were more likely to support flexible and interactive classroom environments.

But this group was the minority (74 teachers, 26.2%).

Most teachers fell into a second category that we described as “conditional learner-centred believers”. These teachers support student-led learning, but still believe the teacher must be the main authority figure in the classroom.

In other words, many teachers had one foot in the new and another in the old. They supported modern ideas about active learning while still believing that effective teaching depends heavily on teacher authority, structured instruction and delivering content directly.

This tension matters because research shows that teacher beliefs shape classroom practice. Teachers do not simply carry out curriculum reforms exactly as policymakers design them. They interpret reforms through their own experiences, professional training and classroom realities. And these interpretations, or beliefs, influence the way they teach.

Why reforms falter inside classrooms

Teachers’ hesitation arises from the realities they face in many schools in Ghana. These include overcrowded classrooms, limited teaching materials, insufficient instructional time and pressure to prepare learners for examinations that still reward memorisation.

Under those conditions, learner-centred teaching can be difficult to apply consistently. A teacher responsible for large classes may rely more on lecture-style teaching to maintain order and complete the syllabus, even when they value learner-centred education.

This challenge is not unique to Ghana. Many countries across eastern and southern Africa implementing competency-based or learner-centred curricula face similar gaps between reform ambitions and classroom realities.

Experience shapes beliefs

Our study also found that teaching experience mattered.

Teachers with more years of experience were less likely to hold a strong belief in learner-centred methods. One possible explanation is that they were trained under older education systems that put teachers at the centre.

Less experienced teachers, by contrast, are more likely to have received the training introduced in 2018 to align with the curriculum reforms.

In addition, experienced teachers have spent years working within traditional classroom systems and examination-driven school cultures. As a result, shifting towards newer instructional methods may not be easy, particularly in school environments where classroom conditions and assessment practices still favour the older ways.

Teacher training could determine reform success

In Ghana, workshops and professional learning activities are often encouraged as part of curriculum implementation, although participation levels vary across schools and teachers. Our findings show that teachers who attended more professional development programmes per year were about 30% more likely to support learner-centred teaching.

Instead of mainly giving instructions and explanations, teachers are now expected to guide discussions, encourage participation and support problem-solving activities. This shift requires continuous training and support.

Teacher support matters

Although the study involved only 282 teachers from one municipality in Ghana, the findings offer important insights into the challenges facing curriculum reform.

Education reforms often struggle in practice, as seen across several eastern and southern African countries, because too much attention is placed on curriculum design and too little on the realities teachers face every day. If governments want learner-centred education to work in practice, teachers need continuous professional support, better classroom resources and assessment systems that align with the goals of the new curriculum. Reducing overcrowded classrooms and improving access to teaching and learning materials may also make it easier for teachers to apply learner-centred methods consistently.

Professional development should move beyond one-time workshops, usually held during curriculum rollout. Teachers need regular opportunities to learn, practise and reflect on newer approaches within their everyday classroom realities.

– Ghana wants learner-centred classrooms – but many teachers still favour old methods
– https://theconversation.com/ghana-wants-learner-centred-classrooms-but-many-teachers-still-favour-old-methods-283010

June 7, 2026

Internet access is unequal in South Africa’s economic powerhouse: survey shows race and income mark the digital divide

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christian Hamann, Researcher, Gauteng City-Region Observatory

Digital technologies create great opportunities, but the transformation they offer isn’t equally within reach of everyone. Access is determined by a vast digital divide.

The digital divide refers to the gap between individuals and households who have access to the internet, and those who do not. The digital divide can restrict education attainment, economic opportunity, the ability to adapt to rapidly changing employment environments, healthcare access, social inclusion, and overall quality of life.

While digital technology will bring about many environmental, social and economic gains, the pathway to South Africa’s digital future is not without challenges. The country needs to make the benefits inclusive and equitable.

As a researcher at the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO), I analyse urban development with the aim of providing evidence for policies. I recently explored Gauteng’s digital divide to understand how it might shape inequalities in the future. I asked whether residents of Gauteng – South Africa’s most populous province and a regional economic power house – have equal access to opportunities in our digital futures.

My findings show that there’s a marked digital divide in Gauteng. It is spatially concentrated and characterised by social inequality in terms of race and household income.

These findings matter because digitalisation and digital transformation are increasingly affecting the shape of the economy and society. Not having access reduces opportunities. Maximising the benefits of digital futures depends on reliable and affordable connections to the internet for everyone.

The measuring

South Africa’s digital divide is a function of extreme social inequality. Many residents still lack the financial means to access the internet, or live in areas with poor internet connectivity. Large parts of our society are unable to participate in digitisation and digital transformation and benefit from it.

I used Quality of Life Survey 7 (2023/24) data to explore how access to home internet varies in Gauteng. This survey series is one of the largest and longest-running social surveys in South Africa. It collects information from adult respondents in Gauteng to measure quality of life and understand the successes and challenges of the province.

The 13,795 survey respondents were asked whether their household had access to a selection of things that were in good working order. The list included things like a microwave oven or air fryer; a smartphone; a television; a personal computer, laptop or tablet; a car; fibre-based home internet; or other home internet connection.

In this analysis, I focused on the last two assets. Does a household have access to a fibre-based home internet connection or access to another home internet connection (Wi-Fi, home-based 5G, LTE connection or any other internet connection that is used in the household)?

Connectivity

Among all the survey respondents, 46% lived in households with home internet connections. The remaining 54% of respondents lived in households without any home internet connection.

The research also showed that 85% of respondents lived in households with a working smartphone. This means that most households had other means to access the internet from home. This can be through mobile networks or access to municipal Wi-Fi networks. However, mobile data is expensive and smartphones are somewhat limited when it comes to remote work or online learning.

A home internet connection is also very important for survey respondents with access to a resource like a laptop. About 39% of survey respondents live in a household with a personal computer, laptop or tablet, but 25% of these respondents do not have access to home internet. This reduces the potential value of having a laptop because the laptop cannot be connected to home internet in order to do remote work, pursue online qualifications, or just get useful information.

Spatial divide

Drilling further into the survey results shows that access to home internet is uneven across wards in Gauteng. In suburban areas like Centurion, Midrand and Randburg, more than 80% of households have home internet. Suburbs in South Africa are low density residential areas where households typically have above average incomes.

In low-income communities like Hammanskraal, Soweto and Katlehong, there are many wards where only 40% of households have home internet. Similarly, in parts of Mamelodi, Sebokeng and Daveyton, less than 20% of households in a ward have access to home internet.

The spatial patterns are substantially influenced by infrastructure and service coverage (5G and LTE coverage), the infrastructure rollout plans of fibre installers, and household income.

For example, fibre infrastructure rollout is driven by the private sector and requires space on the road verge. This means that rollout is focused on areas where there is guaranteed demand and where it is practically feasible to install fibre lines on road verges.

Why it’s important

The digital divide is deeply associated with socio-economic inequality.

Only 39% of black African respondents lived in households with home internet, compared to 87% of Indian/Asian respondents and 86% of white respondents.

Access to fibre-based home internet is further skewed. Only 18% of black African respondents lived in households with fibre-based home internet, compared to 74% of Indian/Asian respondents and 70% of white respondents.

Similar differences were visible between households with lower or higher income. Only 20% of households in the lowest monthly income bracket had home internet, compared to more than 80% of households in the top monthly income brackets. Once again, access to fibre home internet was even further skewed.

Only 5% of households in the lowest monthly income bracket benefit from having fibre, compared to more than 60% of households in the top monthly income brackets.

What should be done?

The digital divide needs to be narrowed if Gauteng is to follow a path of inclusive growth. This analysis can enable policymakers and community leaders to make strategic decisions about inclusive digital futures.

The results also show that closing the digital divide will require partnerships between the private and public sectors.

– Internet access is unequal in South Africa’s economic powerhouse: survey shows race and income mark the digital divide
– https://theconversation.com/internet-access-is-unequal-in-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-survey-shows-race-and-income-mark-the-digital-divide-282424

June 5, 2026

When global trade becomes a weapon, how can African economies protect themselves?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury University

“Today, everyone recognises that trade is as much a security issue as an economic one.”

European Central Bank president Christine Lagarde made this comment in February 2026, while addressing the Munich Security Conference.

Although she was speaking about Europe, her words matter profoundly for Africa.

The continent’s 54 economies face a three-way tension that has no easy resolution.

Firstly, they must stay integrated enough with the world economy to grow. Secondly, they must pull back enough to protect themselves economically against the deliberate weaponisation of external dependencies. Weaponised interdependence is the use of a country’s position within global economic and technological networks as a tool of political influence or coercion against other countries. And thirdly they must remain open enough to diversify beyond commodities – which account for more than 60% of total merchandise exports in 45 African countries – if they are to build lasting prosperity and reduce their vulnerability to commodity price shocks.

As an economist who studies African trade and development, I don’t believe the answer to weaponised interdependence is retreating from the global economy. The real challenge for Africa is navigating this tension between interdependence, economic security, and diversification rather than simply choosing one objective and abandoning the rest. This will be one of the continent’s most important policy tests in the years ahead.

How interdependence became a weapon

To see why this tension is so difficult to navigate, it helps to understand what has changed. When the world economy was governed by shared rules and norms from the 1990s to the 2010s, deeper economic integration had some benefits. Countries that plugged into global supply chains and attracted foreign capital grew faster. Interdependence was an asset.

That is no longer the case. We have entered a new era that is being shaped by the deliberate use of chokepoints – economic and geographic areas that underpin the interdependent global economy – as instruments of coercion. In 2025, China imposed sweeping export controls on rare-earth elements, inflicting pain on importing countries deeply integrated with its mineral supply chains. The United States has repeatedly deployed the dollar and advanced semiconductor technology as weapons against adversaries.

The consequences can be sudden and severe. In early 2026, Iran disrupted tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz – the world’s most important geographic chokepoint, carrying roughly 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas on any given day, with no alternative routes.

African countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda – each sourcing more than half their petroleum imports from the Middle East – faced an immediate and unexpected surge in energy costs. Their fiscal positions were ill-equipped to absorb it.

Fertilizer and food prices followed. Financial markets roiled and remittances from diaspora workers in the Gulf region to highly dependent economies such as the Comoros, Gambia, Lesotho and Liberia fell sharply.

The timing was particularly painful. Africa had just achieved its fastest growth in a decade – 4.5% in 2025, according to the IMF. The World Bank has revised this down to projected regional growth of 4.1% in 2026.

Today, the world that made integration so attractive is now vulnerable to deliberate weaponisation by external actors pursuing geopolitical objectives.

The three-way tension, unpacked

The tempting response to weaponised interdependence is to reduce it. Yet history shows that retreating from economic integration can be costly. The protectionist wave of the 1930s – when countries raised trade barriers and turned inward – contributed to the collapse of global trade and deepened the Great Depression.

Integration is not merely a risk. It is a source of the prosperity that makes resilience worth building in the first place.

The World Bank projects that non-resource-rich African countries will have per capita incomes nearly 20% above their 2014 levels by 2026. Abandoning engagement to reduce vulnerability would mean sacrificing the growth needed for long term stability and economic security.

Worse, if African countries attempt to reduce their vulnerability independently, their exits from shared global markets lower the value of these markets for those who remain. That encourages further exits, in a self-reinforcing spiral. This dynamic is already playing out in other countries. US “Buy American” policies have prompted the EU to advance similar “Buy European” measures. Economists call this the “fragmentation doom loop”.

In addition, building alternative supply chains domestically is costly for exiting countries. Replacing established international production networks requires significant investment and can raise costs for businesses and consumers. The IMF has warned fragmentation would reduce incomes and everyone ends up worse off.

Diversification and economic security also pull against each other. Economic diversification would involve shifting African economies away from commodity extraction towards a broader private sector, and spreading trade relationships across multiple partners. It is essential both for long-term prosperity and for reducing exposure to commodity price shocks.

For example, Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire, which diversified away from commodity dependence, are projected to have per capita incomes more than 45% above their 2014 levels by 2026.

By contrast, Angola and the Republic of Congo, which remained heavily dependent on oil exports, are projected to have per capita incomes more than 25% below their 2014 levels. They have still not recovered a decade after oil prices collapsed.

Natural resources alone generate around 62% of Africa’s GDP, according to the African Development Bank. Moving beyond that concentration requires both diversification and deeper integration which provides access to foreign investment, technology transfer and larger markets.

But deeper integration is precisely what creates the vulnerabilities that great powers have learned to exploit. The US-China rivalry and the Iran crisis have made this plain. The goal of diversification cannot be pursued without the openness that creates security risks. This is a genuine structural tension that policy must navigate.

Strategies for managing the three-way tension

The resolution of these tensions does not lie in choosing one objective and abandoning the others. Three strategies, pursued in combination, can advance all three goals at once.

Pursue security collectively, not unilaterally. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the continent’s most important instrument for avoiding the fragmentation doom loop. An integrated continental market of 1.4 billion people:

creates the scale needed to attract diversified foreign investment
gives African countries the collective bargaining power to negotiate with great powers from a position of greater strength
enables the development of intra-African supply chains that reduce dependence on external actors, without sacrificing the gains of integration.

In the current environment, the AfCFTA is no longer primarily a trade liberalisation project. It is a security strategy.

Make partner diversification targeted. Not all trade relationships carry equal risk. The goal is to engage more strategically in the global economy by expanding trade and investment ties across a broader range of partners, particularly in sectors where multiple suppliers and markets exist. This reduces dependence on any single country and limits the ability of one partner to use economic ties as a source of leverage.

Build indispensability in critical supply chains. The most durable form of economic security is not reducing dependence on others – it is ensuring that others depend on you. Africa holds genuine chokepoint positions in several minerals critical to clean energy technology. Here are some examples.

The Democratic Republic of Congo accounts for roughly 65% of global cobalt production. South Africa dominates platinum-group metals. Guinea holds the world’s largest bauxite reserves. Zambia is a major copper producer and Zimbabwe is one of the world’s largest lithium producers.

The indispensability strategy means building on this: processing cobalt in the DRC rather than exporting raw ore, developing platinum beneficiation in South Africa, and building battery supply chain infrastructure around existing mineral wealth.

Done well, this simultaneously advances diversification (moving up the value chain, away from raw commodity exports), strengthens security (creating dependencies that deter coercion), and deepens integration on Africa’s own terms.

The Hormuz disruption of early 2026 was a warning. It demonstrated that the vulnerabilities created by decades of open integration are real, that external actors are willing to exploit them, and that the consequences for African economies can be swift and severe. But the answer is not withdrawal. Africa’s growth story has been built, in part, on engagement with the world economy. The task is to make that engagement more resilient.

– When global trade becomes a weapon, how can African economies protect themselves?
– https://theconversation.com/when-global-trade-becomes-a-weapon-how-can-african-economies-protect-themselves-284321

June 4, 2026

Are Uganda’s environmental impact reports just a box-ticking exercise? What a study of 108 projects reveals

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mulumba M Agaba, Researcher, University of Liverpool

Uganda’s environmental impact assessment system is meant to protect the environment from harmful development projects. For nearly 30 years, the law has required developers applying for approval to consider alternatives to their proposed projects, such as different sites, designs, technologies or even whether the project should go ahead at all. This is intended to make sure that the least environmentally damaging option is chosen. Biodiversity and environmental impact assessment researcher Mulumba M. Agaba examined 108 environmental impact statements submitted between 2001 and 2023 to assess whether developers were complying with this requirement.

Why aren’t developers allowed to propose only one option?

Environmental impact assessments globally are used to evaluate the environmental consequences of major projects before they are approved. They give decision-makers clear information about the likely impact of the project on the environment, and about whether less damaging options are available. In Uganda, assessors must be certified by the National Environment Management Authority. However, they are usually hired and paid by the project developer.

The main aim in project planning is to first avoid harming the environment. If that’s not possible, developers need to reduce the damage they do. The last option – repairing damage and paying compensation – should only happen when there is no better option.

The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework and the Convention on Biological Diversity stress that it’s best to avoid environmental damage rather than managing it later.

For this reason, it’s international best practice for developers to come up with alternatives to their planned projects. Considering more environmentally friendly alternatives is an important step in constructing new projects and is meant to shape decisions before projects are locked in.

What’s wrong with the system?

We examined 108 environmental impact assessment reports to see whether developers had properly considered different project options. We also interviewed 18 environmental assessment practitioners about how alternatives are chosen, whether environmental concerns are taken seriously, and why these assessments so often fail to change the final decision on projects.

Our findings are concerning.

Developers routinely include other project options in environmental impact assessment reports, but the study found these were often given only limited attention. The alternatives were usually described briefly, with little evidence-based comparison. In many cases, the reports did not explain why one option would be better for the environment than another. The researchers concluded that alternatives rarely appear to shape the final decision on which projects are approved.

Second, biodiversity gets very little attention in these assessments. Even where different options are considered, they are usually judged mainly on cost or whether they are technically possible, while environmental impacts are treated as less important or ignored. For example, different options were not compared based on their likely impact on habitats, species, ecosystem services, protected areas and other environmentally sensitive areas.

Sectors vary in how clearly reports set out different options, how carefully they compare them, and whether they consider biodiversity when explaining a choice. Projects in sectors that face strong outside scrutiny, such as oil and gas, tend to do this better. Manufacturing and urban development projects tend to do this poorly.

There has been little improvement over time. Uganda’s National Environment Act was passed in 2019, and emphasises that the first priority is to cause no damage to the environment. But in the assessments that followed, there was no clear evidence that biodiversity was being better integrated into decision-making.

Which alternatives get attention, and which are ignored?

Our research found that most environmental impact assessments describe what might happen if the project does not go ahead, but they focus on how the economy will lose out rather than on how the environment will gain.

Technology and design alternatives are sometimes considered, but rarely in depth. Moving a development to a different location is often not explored at all.

The areas where projects could most reduce harm to the environment are the ones that get the least attention. For example, we found that developers rarely compare whether a different way of building or running a project would cause less environmental damage. They rarely consider changing timing or building methods.

Environmental impact statements usually stick to one chosen approach, and then add mitigation measures afterwards, rather than properly testing whether other approaches might be better for nature from the start.

There is a clear pattern. Alternatives that could genuinely reduce environmental harm are the least explored.

What can be done to change this?

Our research developed a Biodiversity Inclusion Index to assess whether 108 environmental impact reports properly considered alternative options and their effects on species, habitats and entire ecosystems.

The index examines whether biodiversity was properly considered when different project options were compared. It looks at whether the assessment explained how different choices could avoid or reduce harm to species, habitats and ecosystems.

The results are stark. The average score was just 0.33. This indicates weak and inconsistent integration of biodiversity across most projects. A good score would be 1 – meaning that biodiversity is clearly included in how alternatives are identified and justified.

Only a small number of projects performed well. These are typically projects with international financing or higher regulatory scrutiny.

Why does this matter?

Once a project’s location, design, phasing and technology are fixed, environmental damage can only be fixed later. In other words, the focus shifts to mitigation. At that point, the best ways to protect the environment are already off the table.

This is not the way to protect Uganda’s biodiversity. Choosing a different site, adjusting a development’s layout, or changing when it is built can prevent irreversible damage. These decisions must happen before the development gets started because they determine whether ecosystems are protected or lost.

Our research found that many Ugandan developments give the appearance of complying with environmental laws. But actually, they are locking in avoidable biodiversity loss.

The Biodiversity Inclusion Index offers a practical way to check whether alternatives analysis is genuinely considering biodiversity. It could be adapted by developers, regulators and reviewers to improve how project options are compared before decisions are locked in.

Environmental impact assessors can use this index to improve the quality of their assessments. Policymakers can use our research to find ways of better enforcing environmental protection.

– Are Uganda’s environmental impact reports just a box-ticking exercise? What a study of 108 projects reveals
– https://theconversation.com/are-ugandas-environmental-impact-reports-just-a-box-ticking-exercise-what-a-study-of-108-projects-reveals-281936

June 4, 2026

Poison or poverty: the impossible economic choices facing Ghana’s e-waste workers

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Brandon Marc Finn, Research Scientist at the School for Environment and Sustainability, University of Michigan

Agbogbloshie, in Ghana’s capital city, Accra, is a sprawling, open-air scrapyard located next to a lagoon and a growing informal settlement. Roughly 6,000 people dismantle, recycle and burn old and broken electronics there.

The world produces approximately 62 million tonnes of electronic or e-waste every year. The Agbogbloshie site is one of the world’s biggest.

E-waste is old, broken and thrown away electronic devices with cords or batteries, such as cellphones, household appliances, and televisions. Over 80% is dumped in landfills or processed informally by workers who have no health and safety protections, operating largely without government oversight, support, or occupational safety.

Much of the world’s e-waste is shipped to countries like Ghana in west Africa where copper and aluminium are extracted, and batteries containing lithium and cobalt are recycled. The old electronics are burned out in the open to extract the minerals. Uncontrolled acid leaching is also used.

The exact value of the minerals fed back into the global supply chain is unknown. However, we do know that informal workers are shortchanged. This is because exporters buy recycled minerals like copper at prices well below international market rates.

Continually recycling and reusing goods, instead of throwing them away, is a core part of the “circular economy” concept. It is supposed to promote sustainability and help address climate change.

But as researchers who study informal economies and how materials move through global supply chains, my colleagues Patrick Cobbinah, Dimitrios Gounaridis and I recently found that the reality behind these supposedly “sustainable” supply chains in Agbogbloshie’s e-waste sites is very different.

We found that informal recycling provides an income for workers which is often relatively better than other available work. But the side effects of burning plastic and metal or using acid to extract minerals from the e-waste are devastating to human health and the natural environment.

The situation in Agbogbloshie is part of a global injustice. Wealthy countries enjoy the benefits of recycled materials like copper and aluminium, while some of the world’s most vulnerable people are forced to compromise their own health and environments to sustain these supply chains.

Rather than turn away from people living in informal settlements and working in the informal economy, community engagement should influence government policy to improve their working conditions. Supportive infrastructure must be developed at the e-waste site and in the informal settlement. Equally importantly, international regulatory bodies and policy makers from exporting and importing countries must better govern the flows of e-waste. It’s too easily dumped in countries like Ghana with little to no recourse.

Where earning a living means breathing toxic air

The men and women working in and supporting the informal e-waste economy in Agbogbloshie are navigating what we call the “informal paradox”. This is where workers have to expose themselves and their communities to toxic pollution in order to get short term livelihood gains. The informal paradox shows that the immediate need to survive replaces the need to avoid chronic threats to human and environmental health.

Courtesy University of Michigan School for Environment and Sustainability.

For example, open burning of electronics has, in part, led to extreme exposure to particulate matter 2.5 (millions of tiny particles of polluting matter such as dust, dirt, soot, or smoke that are released by burning).

The e-waste workers in Agbogbloshie breathe this in at concentrations five times higher than the World Health Organization’s safety standards. This increases the risk of heart attacks, cancer, nervous system damage and other diseases.

The toxic dust also spreads out across nearby informal settlements and the entire city of Accra. Agbogbloshie’s soil and water are also highly contaminated with these and other heavy metals. The effects spill over to the nearby produce market and lagoon.

What 20 years of satellite data revealed about pollution and survival

To understand how serious and complicated this problem has become, we studied 20 years of satellite data and interviewed 55 community members and city experts in Accra.

Our research found that between 2000 and 2020, air pollution and particulate matter 2.5 increased dramatically around Agbogbloshie. The number of people in nearby informal or shack settlements steadily increased during that time, so more people breathed in the toxic soot.

People migrate from rural areas to Agbogbloshie to escape famine, conflict, and worsening farming conditions linked to climate change. For many, processing and recycling e-waste is the only way to earn a living.

The e-waste workers told us they are aware of the dangers they face. As one said:

The hunter does not fear guns, the same way we don’t fear the weapon we work with.

Informal work is the global norm, not the exception

A huge 61% of the world’s workforce is employed informally. This means that working informally is not something that only people on the margins of society experience. It is global and commonplace.

Therefore, new ways to include informal work in the world’s development and supply chains are needed. These must be based on working with, not against, the people who have the least access to services and opportunities.

Guaranteeing basic human and labour rights must be a non-negotiable foundation of the global circular economy. There are also very real economic opportunities in improving working conditions in the e-waste sector. Global e-waste stocks are estimated to be worth US$65 billion. Yet many e-waste workers earn less than US$1.25 a day.

If responsibly managed in the interests of local communities, recycling could lift thousands of people out of poverty and contribute to an actually sustainable circular economy.

What to do about it

Ghana has ratified both international conventions that regulate e-waste. The country also passed a law to manage e-waste in 2016.

But government intervention remains very weak and sometimes even actively harmful. The government has carried out hostile evictions and housing demolitions to remove people from the dumpsite. These have not reduced e-waste recycling though, and have only made workers’ lives more precarious.

To properly address these problems, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly must end home demolitions and evictions in Agbogbloshie’s informal settlements.

Instead, the government should invest in and strengthen the ways residents are already working together to share resources and improve their neighbourhoods. One way to do this is by providing safer equipment, such as mechanised wire-stripping machines to stop the burning as well as protective gear. Local government in Accra could also ensure that e-waste workers earn fair wages in return for using safer, more environmentally friendly methods.

Second, transparency at the point of e-waste sale is essential. New regulations are needed to compel large-scale scrap dealers to officially record the weight of the material they buy, and ensure they pay a publicly accessible market rate.

Third, working with the e-waste workers and community members to set up reliable, clean water sources, limit burning, and reduce the use of acid in e-waste recycling is also critical.

These steps require a transformation in the ways people think about and support those who live and work in informal economies and settlements. This process begins with treating people with the respect and dignity they and their work deserve.

– Poison or poverty: the impossible economic choices facing Ghana’s e-waste workers
– https://theconversation.com/poison-or-poverty-the-impossible-economic-choices-facing-ghanas-e-waste-workers-281479

June 4, 2026

School in a hot world: what research is saying about children’s health and learning

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caradee Yael Wright, Chief Specialist Scientist (Public Health), South African Medical Research Council

Climate change is making southern Africa hotter. While much attention has focused on climate impacts like droughts, floods and food insecurity, another crisis is unfolding quietly inside classrooms. Research has shown that some schools are becoming dangerously hot places for children to develop, learn and play.

Hot classrooms can affect concentration, memory, behaviour and academic success. Extreme heat also increases risks to children’s physical and mental health, especially in schools with poor ventilation, overcrowded classrooms and limited access to drinking water.

For many children, especially those in poor communities, school may now be one of the hottest places to spend their day. This is a serious but under-recognised education and public health issue.

Our research as environmental health scientists at the South African Medical Research Council highlights how rising temperatures are affecting daily life and well-being. Multiple studies support this.

Together with the University of Johannesburg, we’ve studied classroom thermal conditions and possible impacts on children’s health in Gauteng province – more than half of the temperature and humidity readings called for caution or extreme caution. Another of our studies, led by University of Johannesburg environmental health researcher Shalin Bidassey-Manilal, measured classroom temperatures in Johannesburg and found that almost all the children reported low concentration levels. One of our studies traced relationships between classroom temperature and absenteeism, which increased at temperatures over 25°C.

Yet, school buildings and playgrounds are not often designed or adapted for protecting children against extreme heat.

Home isn’t always safer either: we’ve shown that families living in government-built low-cost and informally constructed homes are the most at risk for indoor temperature extremes.

Our most recent study has shown that the impacts differ between rural and urban schools too. For example, one of our findings was that urban classrooms were better at keeping the temperature at a comfortable 25°C-28°C compared to rural classrooms. Differences like this deepen educational and health inequalities.

For many people, climate change still feels like a future problem. But for children sitting in overheated classrooms, it is already affecting their ability to learn, thrive and stay healthy. Education systems across southern Africa must better prepare for a hotter future.

Heat affects how children learn

The human brain works best within a relatively narrow temperature range. When classrooms become too hot, children may struggle to concentrate, process information and retain knowledge.

International studies have linked hotter classroom conditions to poorer test scores, reduced attention spans and lower productivity. Teachers may also experience fatigue, headaches and a reduced ability to teach effectively.

Young children are especially vulnerable because their bodies do not regulate heat as efficiently as adults. Children can also become dehydrated more quickly.

In many southern African schools, temperatures inside classrooms may be even higher than outdoor temperatures because of metal roofs, poor insulation, overcrowding and lack of airflow. Some classrooms effectively become heat traps. This problem is likely to worsen as climate change increases the frequency and intensity of heatwaves.

Poorer communities face the greatest risks

The impact of heat is not experienced equally.

We compared schools in urban and rural areas of South Africa (the city of Tshwane and rural Giyani). Among our key findings were that:

the maximum daily average temperature in the urban school was 32°C; in rural schools it was as high as 42°C
indoor temperatures and humidity levels at rural schools were more variable than those in urban classrooms
fan cooling was effective in the city but not in rural classrooms
broken or missing ceilings in rural schools made the rooms hotter
urban classrooms were better at keeping the temperature at a comfortable 25°C-28°C compared to rural classrooms.

Some learners spend hours in classrooms made from corrugated metal or prefabricated materials that absorb and retain heat. Others walk long distances to school in extreme temperatures. Water shortages create additional risks. Without access to safe drinking water, children may become dehydrated during the school day.

The increase in temperatures due to climate change therefore risks deepening educational inequality across the region.

Heat is also a health issue

Extreme heat affects more than academic performance. Children exposed to high temperatures may experience headaches, dizziness, exhaustion and heat stress. Learners with asthma or other chronic conditions may face additional health risks, especially where heat combines with poor air quality. Sleep disruption during hot nights can further affect children’s concentration, mood and school attendance.

Teachers are also affected. High temperatures may contribute to fatigue, stress and reduced workplace wellbeing, particularly during prolonged heatwaves.

Despite these risks, many schools have no heat-health plans or guidance on how to protect learners and staff during extreme heat events. The National Heat Health Action Guidelines call for schools to consider heat in their planning.

Schools need to adapt to a hotter future

The good news is that many solutions are practical and achievable. Schools can reduce heat exposure through better building design, improved ventilation, shade trees, cool roofing materials and access to drinking water. Even relatively simple interventions, such as planting trees or adjusting classroom layouts to improve airflow, can make a meaningful difference.

Governments and education departments should also consider heat when designing new schools and upgrading older infrastructure.

School timetables may need to become more flexible during heatwaves, particularly for sports and outdoor activities.

Teachers and school staff should receive guidance on recognising signs of heat-related illness.

Heat-health warning systems could also include schools as priority sites for communication and intervention.

Importantly, children and young people themselves should be involved in climate adaptation planning. They are already experiencing the impacts of climate change directly.

– School in a hot world: what research is saying about children’s health and learning
– https://theconversation.com/school-in-a-hot-world-what-research-is-saying-about-childrens-health-and-learning-283300

June 4, 2026

Sudan peace: the shadow of the al-Bashir regime looms over talks

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Samir Ramzy, Researcher, Helwan University

Three years into the civil war in Sudan that began on 15 April 2023, a coalition of civilian, political and armed factions has launched a new peace initiative.

Announced in the Kenyan capital Nairobi in May 2026, the roadmap seeks to end the conflict and revive Sudan’s stalled transition to civilian rule.

Its backers – a civilian, anti-war bloc independent of both warring parties – argue that previous peace efforts have failed because signatories weren’t given sufficient opportunity to address the root causes of the war.

The Nairobi document proposes a three-track process. It combines humanitarian measures, a renewable internationally monitored ceasefire and a political transition focused on state reform. It also seeks to address grievances, like the marginalisation of regions such as Darfur, to tackle the roots of conflict.

The roadmap seeks to exclude the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces from the political process. Its signatories argue that this is a result of their responsibility for the war. However, the warring parties are to participate in ceasefire talks.

In addition, the Nairobi initiative seeks to bar leaders of the Islamist movement organisation – including its political arm, the former ruling National Congress Party – from political participation and security-sector reform. The party was in power from 1989 to 2019.

In Sudan, “Islamists” generally refers to political actors associated with the National Congress Party. The party formed the ideological and political backbone of Omar al-Bashir’s regime. Bashir was overthrown in 2019. However, many of the movement’s networks within the state, security sector and business community have endured.

The Nairobi proposal reflects a belief among the signatories that Islamist actors helped create the conditions that led to war in 2023 as a way to regain power.

The Nairobi initiative primarily brings together the Sudan Liberation Movement and the “Somoud” coalition.

The Sudan Liberation Movement is one of the main armed groups that has remained relatively distant from direct involvement in the ongoing war.

Somoud was formed in February 2025. It is a group of civic and political actors led by former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok. It includes several parties that played leading roles in the transitional government established after Bashir’s regime was overthrown. It lasted until the October 2021 military coup.

The Nairobi initiative is part of a broader landscape of peace efforts in Sudan. These include:

the Quad initiative. It involves the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. It focuses on negotiations between the warring parties: the army and the Rapid Support Forces.
the Quint mechanism. It brings together the UN, African Union, European Union, Arab League and Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It emphasises the design of a future political process in Sudan.
a conference in Berlin in April 2026 with broad international participation.

Drawing on more than a decade of research on Sudanese politics, I argue that the Nairobi initiative has sharpened debate over the role of Islamists in Sudan’s post-war political order. How that question is resolved will prove crucial to the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

In my view, a ceasefire without broader political settlement could institutionalise Sudan’s current military fragmentation rather than resolve it.

The debate

The Berlin and Nairobi talks illustrate that several important factions are aiming for agreement on a ceasefire in Sudan. However, the issue of whether Islamist parties or leaders should be part of any settlement remains unresolved.

The Islamists’ current electoral weight is difficult to assess. Leaders of the Islamic movement have claimed a membership of around two million out of 53 million Sudanese. The former ruling National Congress Party had argued that it represents more than 25% of Sudanese society.

Such claims are difficult to verify. They were challenged by the mass protests that contributed to the fall of Bashir’s regime in 2019.

The Berlin conference ended with a statement calling for an “inclusive” political dialogue involving all Sudanese parties.

By contrast, both the Nairobi initiative and the Quad process have called for excluding Islamist leaders from the post-war political order.

Supporters of this position argue that the Islamist movement bears significant responsibility for the conflict. They point to their political and military influence during the three decades following Bashir’s 1989 coup, and a continued presence within key state institutions.

These contrasting approaches reflect different political leanings.

The Nairobi coalition emerged largely from forces associated with Sudan’s 2019 uprising. It views Islamist exclusion as essential to preventing a return to the old order. The Berlin process, meanwhile, reflects a broader international preference for inclusivity as a foundation for peace.

Excluding Islamists entirely may prove difficult. Despite the collapse of Bashir’s regime, the Islamic movement retains influence within parts of the state and security apparatus. This includes government ministries, and intelligence and military institutions.

Sudan and the Islamist movement

Despite Bashir’s fall in 2019, Islamists remain one of Sudan’s most influential political forces. This is largely through networks linked to the former ruling party.

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, Islamist groups have broadly aligned themselves with the Sudanese Armed Forces. Some have played a direct military role through armed formations that have fought alongside the army.

Others have supported the army through political mobilisation. They have led fundraising, recruitment campaigns and public advocacy. Their influence within communities in northern, central and eastern Sudan has helped mobilise volunteers for army-aligned forces.

This alignment reflects the legacy of Sudan’s post-2019 transition.

After Bashir’s removal, transitional authorities sought to exclude former regime networks from political power. Many Islamists came to view an army victory as the best chance of preserving any influence.

As a result, Islamist groups have become a target of several actors in the conflict. The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North are two of the principal forces fighting the army. They have explicitly called for the removal of Islamist influence from state institutions.

The challenge facing future peace efforts is that Islamists still retain significant political and military influence. This makes them difficult to ignore. Yet many of their opponents see their participation as incompatible with a lasting settlement.

What next?

Anti-army actors are unlikely to support the reunification of Sudan’s fragmented armed forces without guarantees that Islamist influence within the military and state institutions will be eliminated.

At the same time, any sustainable settlement is likely to require accountability for Islamist figures implicated in violence, abuses or crimes committed against Sudanese civilians.

This points to a difficult middle path: excluding individuals linked to serious violations or the former regime’s coercive apparatus, while pursuing broader state reforms designed to reduce party influence.

Efforts to exclude Islamists entirely may prove difficult to enforce. Yet attempts to restore them to the centre of power could deepen mistrust and internal divisions. This could further fragment Sudan’s political and military landscape. How Sudanese actors and international mediators handle this dilemma will help determine if peace initiatives produce a lasting settlement.

– Sudan peace: the shadow of the al-Bashir regime looms over talks
– https://theconversation.com/sudan-peace-the-shadow-of-the-al-bashir-regime-looms-over-talks-284346