Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bomikazi Zeka, Associate Professor in Finance, University of Canberra

When interest rates rise, most people feel the financial pinch as repayments for home loans, car purchases or personal loans increase. This leads to less money for everyday spending and tightens the household budget.

Middle- and upper-income households tend to hold secured debt such as property, which builds wealth. Lower-income households are pushed into debt as they try to maintain their consumption levels. The result is that the impact of rising interest rates is even more significant for lower-income households. They may have to reduce spending on necessities to service interest payments. Even renters wanting to become home owners are indirectly influenced by rising interest rates, as home loans become less affordable.

Banks make money by charging consumers who borrow money while paying out little interest to those holding savings accounts. And most household debt is owed to the banking sector.

According to the World Bank, most African countries fall into the low- to middle-income bracket. In many of these economies, consumers tend to leave their cash sitting in transaction accounts because they are convenient, familiar and easy to access. While moving money out of transaction accounts and into savings products can offer a better return, most people tend to stick to what they know. And banks actually count on this “inertia”.

Whether it’s staying with the same bank out of habit or ignoring new investment products, that lack of movement is a huge win for the bank’s bottom line.

But there is an opportunity to gain from rising rates by moving excess funds into interest-earning financial products. Examples include:

• term deposits (a type of savings account that allows you to deposit a lump sum of money for a fixed period, with a guaranteed fixed interest rate)

• tax-free savings accounts

• bonds (a loan you make to the government or a company, giving you regular interest payments for a set period and your original investment in full at the end of the loan period).

Collectively these kinds of investments are known as fixed interest securities. They earn interest income in proportion to the amount you deposit. And the capital you deposit in them remains protected from fluctuations in the market.

If you access the funds, the amount of interest you earn will reduce proportionately.

As with any financial decision, it’s important to speak to a professional financial adviser to see which product best aligns with your needs and financial situation.

These kinds of financial instruments can earn you interest income. They won’t, however, outperform the returns you can get from more risky securities like shares. What they will do is allow your money to work for you in ways that money in a transaction account won’t.

And a guaranteed interest income from a fixed-interest investment is more attractive than zero return earned on a transactional account.

Making the most of rates rises in three steps

Firstly, get rid of the surplus in your transactional account.

There’s a common expression in the world of finance:

Idle cash doesn’t generate returns.

This implies that money that is dormant doesn’t grow. If you have excess money in your transactional account, consider how much you can comfortably afford to transfer into a term deposit, tax-free savings account or bonds.

By moving these funds into an interest-earning account, you turn your stagnant balance into a defensive asset that grows with time, shielding your portfolio from negative shifts in the economy.

Secondly, accept that you’re playing the long game.

To make the most out of interest-bearing investments, you need to commit your funds for a year or longer. Longer investment terms typically offer higher interest rates, rewarding you for keeping your money invested. The power of compounding is also on your side as the money you earn from an investment is added back into your balance, and then that new, larger amount earns even more interest. Therefore, with a longer investment period, you aren’t just earning interest on the initial capital. You will begin to earn interest on the interest too. Longer durations can protect you from future interest rate drops by locking in today’s peak interest returns.

Thirdly, look beyond the big banks.

While it’s easy to keep track of your finances when all your funds are with the same bank, consider the investment products offered by alternative or smaller banks. Alternative banks can offer better interest rates to attract more customers. As more consumers explore different investment options, this challenges the “Big Banks” to be more competitive with their rates and product offerings.

By taking action and moving your money, you aren’t just helping your wallet, you are also forcing the banking sector to be more competitive.

When central banks raise interest rates, debt holders feel the impact instantly. But higher rates also create an opportunity that’s easily overlooked. If you can put your money to work in interest-earning investments, those same rate rises can start working for you instead of against you. What feels like bad news on one side can quietly become a source of passive income on the other. It just depends on where your money is sitting.

– Higher interest rates: can I make them work for me?
– https://theconversation.com/higher-interest-rates-can-i-make-them-work-for-me-282632

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Thulani P. Makhalanyane, Professor of Microbiology, Stellenbosch University

South Africa has a paradox when it comes to food availability. Its supermarkets are overflowing. But it continues to record high levels of stunted growth.

This seems to be a global problem. Data suggest that the world has produced more food in the last two decades and more wealth. Yet, roughly 150 million children under five remain stunted (too short for their age).

Stunted growth and poor cognitive development often stem from the same early-life problems, like poor nutrition, illness and unhealthy environments. These impediments to a child’s learning ability and physical growth have been shown to have serious long-term consequences for health and future economic prospects.

More concerning is that it appears that putting calories into mouths is not enough to prevent stunting. The science points to the role played by our intestinal microbiome – the trillions of microscopic organisms, including bacteria, viruses and fungi, that live in and on us – and the inability to digest nutrients.

We – a microbiologist and a health economist – recently published a paper in which we outline emerging evidence demonstrating that poverty affects children’s physiology – the way their bodies work – not merely their access to resources. Addressing childhood stunting therefore requires moving beyond single interventions such as providing food. What’s needed are integrated approaches that simultaneously tackle sanitation, infection control, nutrition quality and early childhood stimulation.

Our findings support the growing scientific evidence that both physiological and environmental factors must be addressed together to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty and developmental impairment. Nutrition is not the full story. The gut microbiome plays a complementary role by breaking down complex carbohydrates that our bodies cannot digest on their own, converting them into forms that may be absorbed and used for growth and development.

Diet provides the essential raw materials, while the microbiome helps unlock their nutritional value, thereby contributing to growth and development. There is also strong evidence that the environment shapes the microbiome’s ability to carry out these functions.

Gut microbes, poverty and stunting

Children’s growth is affected not only by what they eat, but also by how well their bodies can process and absorb nutrients.

Children living in informal settlements, where sanitation is generally poor, are exposed to microorganisms through dirt, toxic dust and sewage. This exposure may lead to a condition called environmental enteric dysfunction. This is when an inflamed intestine impairs the absorption of nutrients, including fats, proteins and vitamins.

The result is stunting. This may remain undiagnosed but can affect health negatively across a lifetime.

The prevalence of environmental enteric dysfunction in South Africa remains unclear. One reason is that there are no easily administered diagnostic tests. The other is the lack of large scale coordinated national studies.

Evidence from studies in Asia supports the potential role of the microbiome as a central contributor to stunting. These studies suggest that gut microbial communities of healthy children tend to follow predictable developmental milestones during the first two years of life. Failure to achieve these milestones may compromise the microbiome’s capacity to process food efficiently, with important implications for child growth and development.

In contrast, children with severe acute malnutrition often carry an immature gut community that does not mature in response to food or interventions focused on water, sanitation and hygiene services alone.

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Read more: South African policy isn’t connecting child nutrition and sanitation

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In a study done in Malawi, scientists transplanted gut bacteria from malnourished children into young animals and showed that the animals developed growth deficits. Conversely, microbes from healthy children could restore growth.

These studies show that an unhealthy gut community may be a cause – not just a consequence – of poor growth. Although the concept of a “healthy” microbiome has been the subject of extensive debate, there is increasing consensus that healthy microbiomes are typically characterised by high microbial diversity, the absence of dominance by a single organism, the capacity to remain stable, resilience and the ability to maintain essential functions even when community composition changes or is subject to environmental disturbance.

Studies that look directly at the small intestine have found that many stunted children have bacteria from the mouth growing in the wrong part of the gut. These bacteria may interfere with how the body absorbs fat, creating a direct link between the makeup of gut microbes and poor growth.

Other studies show that what really matters is what the microbes do – their ability to make vitamins and other building blocks – not just which species are present.

Put simply, the microbiome can help determine whether the food a child eats is used to grow body tissue or is wasted.

Knowledge gaps

Progress in tackling stunting has been slow for a number of reasons.

Firstly, traditional interventions focused on food provision and sanitation without understanding the underlying biological damage that impairs how nutrients are absorbed.

Secondly, the evidence base relies on studies from high-income contexts where nutrition alone may be the primary constraint. In lower and middle income countries the biological mechanisms driving stunting involve multiple interacting pathways.

Part of the answer is geography of research. Many of the early groundbreaking studies come from Asia and south Asia and from a few sites in east Africa and Malawi. Large multicountry cohorts such as the MAL-ED project and several studies in Bangladesh have provided strong evidence about enteric pathogens and their links to growth.

But sub-Saharan Africa remains under represented in longitudinal microbiome studies despite carrying a large burden of stunting. That gap has real world consequences. We know that the gut microbiome varies considerably and is influenced by several factors including diet and geography.

Children in different places have different diets, different exposures and different baseline microbes. Interventions that work in one region may fail in another.

The answers

What’s needed is African led research that samples African children across geography to understand what will work on the continent.

This requires a change in approaches to policy and research.

First, policy makers must stop treating food availability as synonymous with nutritional success. Food security matters but it is not sufficient.

Secondly, routine growth must be monitored better at primary healthcare level so stunting is not missed in communities where short stature looks normal to the eye.

Third, studies must measure gut function – not only weight and height. This will show who is failing to extract the benefit of food.

Fourth, water, sanitation and hygiene must be integrated.

Finally, build African capacity for this work, and fund African research.

Where the science could lead

Research into the microbiome can shift strategies from treating hunger to restoring lifelong health.

For example, it may be possible to identify new microbes that block fat absorption or those that degrade essential vitamins. We may begin to map how early disruptions in gut function influence metabolism and increase the risk of non-communicable diseases later in life.

We may also learn to use simple stool or blood markers to identify children who, despite having enough food, will not grow without gut-directed therapy.

– Gut health: why food alone won’t fix childhood stunting
– https://theconversation.com/gut-health-why-food-alone-wont-fix-childhood-stunting-273395

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Salah Ben Hammou, Postdoctoral Research Associate, Rice University

Malian officials announced on 4 May 2026 that junta leader General Assimi Goïta would take on the post of defence minister after the killing of General Sadio Camara a week earlier.

Camara’s death occurred amid an offensive by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which launched attacks across Mali. Insecurity persists in Mali despite years of military rule, which was justified on promises of restoring order and defeating insurgent violence.

On the surface, Goïta’s decision to absorb the defence portfolio appears to be a pragmatic wartime measure, aimed at ensuring continuity within the armed forces during a period of instability.

But the move also follows a broader political path that has become visible in Mali since the junta seized power in 2020. Rather than institutionalising military rule, Goïta has concentrated authority around the presidency, tightened control over the state’s coercive apparatus, and relied on a small circle of military elites.

As political scientists who have extensively published and written on military coups and regime trajectories in west Africa, we observe this behaviour is not unique to Mali. It is the third country in the region to see military leaders consolidate their authority around individual leaders rather than the armed forces.

Across the post-coup Sahel, military regimes have shifted from presenting themselves as temporary “corrective” interventions to becoming personalised systems of rule. The other two examples are Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who took power in Burkina Faso in September 2022, and Niger’s General Abdourahamane Tiani, who seized power in July 2023.

The distinction matters because military regimes governed collectively by officer coalitions retain some internal balance and institutional constraint. As power becomes concentrated around a single ruler, however, decision-making revolves around personal loyalty rather than broader military or state interests.

Military rule and personalisation in Mali

Goïta (then a colonel) and his companions in Mali toppled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2020. The coup architects initially presented themselves as reluctant interveners. At the time, observers expected a short transition. Within months the regional body Ecowas had lifted its financial embargo.

Goïta pledged elections within 18 months, then 24.

A constitutional revision passed in 2025 removed the provision that had previously barred him from standing in any future presidential election. Political parties were banned. The transitional legislative body was filled by presidential decree. And civilian oversight institutions, including the electoral observation body, were dissolved.

The armed forces were restructured along lines scholars recognise as counterbalancing. This is best described as a coup-proofing mechanism. Regimes create parallel armed structures with distinct reporting lines to make it more difficult for any group to move against them.

In Mali, three specialised military units were created with overlapping counter-terrorism mandates that report to the executive. The police were also placed under military discipline.

Goïta assumed the defence portfolio, appointed the former chief of staff of the armed forces, Major General Oumar Diarra, as delegate minister, and named a new chief of staff to replace him.

The defence portfolio controls the largest share of the state budget, grown from 11.5% to 14.5% of GDP since 2020. It is where Mali’s relationship with Africa Corps, which since 2023 has replaced French forces in counter-terrorism operations, is managed daily.

As defence minister since the coup, Camara had been the primary link with Africa Corps.

The appointment of Diarra is consistent with what scholars describe as the rotation of commanders to limit the accumulation of loyalty around any single figure. Diarra had served as chief of staff since 2020.

Burkina Faso and Niger

In Burkina Faso and Niger, too, there have been signs that military regimes are concentrating power around individual military leaders rather than a collective of officers.

Traoré is perhaps the clearest example of this trend. Since seizing power in 2022, he has cultivated an image of himself as a revolutionary anti-colonial figure, drawing comparisons to the iconic Burkinabè leader Thomas Sankara.

Coordinated social media campaigns glorified Traoré while attacking critics. This was combined with nationalist rhetoric and highly publicised economic reforms. All helped elevate his image as the symbolic saviour of Burkinabè society.

Allegations of assassination attempts and coup conspiracies helped rally public support around Traoré as a besieged national leader. They also served as valuable pretexts for targeting political opponents and rivals in the military.

Traoré has appointed family members and trusted allies to strategic positions. Individuals like his brother, Inoussa Traoré, hold senior positions and help curate the regime’s digital message while maintaining links with sympathetic civil society.

Elections are repeatedly delayed and Burkinabes are urged to “forget about democracy”. Traoré is slated to remain in power until 2029.

In Niger, Tiani, the former commander of Mohamed Bazoum’s Presidential Guard, has extended his rule until at least 2030.

Much like Goïta, he has made the timeline conditional on the state of the country’s security.

Tiani dissolved political parties, promoted himself to army general, a first in Niger, and was cast as a national hero. He has reportedly retreated almost entirely from public life and conducts government from within the presidential guard compound.

From there, Tiani has militarised the civilian administration and placed trusted figures around him. General Salifou Mody at defence serves as his principal relay with Russian partners and with the chief of staff of the armed forces, General Moussa Salaou Barmou.

The regime also moved to repress political opponents through civilian-facing institutions, such as the Commission de lutte contre la délinquance économique, financière et fiscale.

The perils of personalism

For decades, political scientists have highlighted the dangers and weaknesses of personalist political systems. Concentrating power around a single ruler often weakens the institutions needed for effective governance and long-term stability.

In military-ruled countries like those in the Sahel, the consequences can be especially severe. Armed forces may be reorganised less around operational effectiveness than around protecting the ruler from rivals and internal threats.

Promotions and command positions become tied to loyalty, parallel security structures proliferate, and mistrust within the officer corps deepens. On the battlefield, these dynamics can undermine coordination and reduce the military’s ability to respond effectively to insurgent violence.

– Mali’s military leader is consolidating power. Why this is dangerous
– https://theconversation.com/malis-military-leader-is-consolidating-power-why-this-is-dangerous-282923

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kevin J.A. Thomas, Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Rice University

During the Ebola epidemic of 2014 to 2016, Musu, a resident of Monrovia, Liberia contracted the Ebola virus along with her husband, five sons and daughter.

A few weeks later, six members of her family died. Musu and her youngest son survived. Since then, their lives have not been the same. Her husband was the family’s sole breadwinner. Now a widow and a single parent, Musu struggles to make ends meet. As she put it, “There is no one here to help besides God. No boyfriend. No father. I am the father, the mother, the uncle, and the brother. At the place we are renting, we can’t even find food to eat.”

Musu is one of the many survivors who recovered from the world’s largest Ebola epidemic. The epidemic started as a localised disease outbreak in the village of Meliandou in Guinea but spread to neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Over the course of three years, the disease infected 28,600 people. Approximately 11,000 of them died while 17,000 survived.

On 9 June 2016, the World Health Organization announced the official end of the Ebola epidemic in Liberia.

Compared to the widespread media coverage of the epidemic when it started, news reports on its aftermath have been limited. As a result, very few people know that Ebola survivors have struggled to continue with their lives since the end of the epidemic.

These survivors include widows like Musu, orphans who are now homeless, and thousands of people who are now blind or have permanent vision problems.

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Read more: Ebola survivors can lose their eyesight. What we’re doing to prevent it

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I am a social demographer who studies health and population trends. My recent book Life After Epidemics: Ebola Survivors and the Social Dimensions of Recovery documents many of these experiences. Based on interviews with 250 Ebola survivors in Liberia and Sierra Leone, I set about trying to understand why many survivors live in worse conditions than before the epidemic, and what’s preventing them from returning to their normal lives.

Understanding these issues is a first step towards developing solutions to the problems currently faced by Ebola survivors. Learning about their experiences can prevent these problems from occurring among survivors of future epidemics.

Medical versus social responses to epidemics

The process of determining what went wrong begins by understanding the contrast between two types of responses to epidemics.

The first is the medical response, which emphasises the use of clinical medicine to save lives and care for infected patients.

The second is the social response, which addresses issues such as the provision of sustainable livelihoods, supporting orphans, and integrating survivors into their communities.

Policy makers placed a greater priority on short-term medical responses to the consequences of the Ebola epidemic than on long-term social responses.

The main objective of my research is to examine how Ebola survivors have been affected by that emphasis. I used information from interviews and other sources to assess how their health, sources of livelihood, and family lives have changed since the end of the epidemic.

The research provides evidence on the ways in which the limited investment in social responses continues to negatively affect the lives of survivors.

For example, there are no programmes that provide them with comprehensive access to healthcare, even though many of them are either blind, suffer from musculoskeletal conditions, have neurological conditions, or live with other long-term side effects of the virus.

It also describes the experiences of farmers in poor health, who can no longer till their land, and hunters who can no longer see. They are among the many survivors who were previously self-employed but have lost their sources of livelihood.

With the limited investment in social responses, the stigma of Ebola continues to thrive in local communities. As a result, the social interactions of Ebola survivors are often plagued by the fears of people who believe they are still infected. These fears caused business owners to lose clients and contributed to the end of marriages.

Many survivors no longer receive invitations to attend social events such as weddings and child naming ceremonies. In some cases, their children have also lost playmates after neighbours banned their children from playing with the children of Ebola survivors.

Humanitarian organisations played a major role in containing the spread of the disease during the epidemic. Some of their policies had unintended consequences, however, that have added to the problems of patients who survived. For example, the practice of burning the belongings of infected patients to prevent further transmission of the virus has increased economic hardship among many survivors.

The burning process led to financial losses among survivors who kept their savings under their mattresses, lost farming tools, and had to pay for equipment borrowed from neighbours that was also destroyed.

Some of the messages employed in public health campaigns used to contain the spread of the virus during the epidemic have also had unintended consequences. These campaigns warned the public to avoid touching infected people as a way of stopping transmission of the disease, because there was no cure for Ebola. Since the end of the epidemic, many people in local communities have continued to avoid touching survivors. They question how survivors can claim to be Ebola-free when the public was told that the disease had no cure.

Why Ebola survivors feel abandoned

Hearing the stories of the survivors made it clear that many of them felt abandoned. The visits from community leaders have stopped. The specialised care they received from hospitals has been discontinued. Many of the promises of political leaders who claimed they would provide resources to support their recovery remain unfulfilled. Some of the resources provided by donors were lost to fraud.

Meanwhile, Ebola survivors continue to be affected by the irreversible losses they experienced a decade ago. These experiences and the lack of attention to their social circumstances still define their lives.

Policy makers will need to give equal attention to medical and social issues when responding to future epidemics. This will require sustained investments to improve the lives of survivors long after we celebrate the end of epidemics.

– Ebola survivors struggle to return to normal lives: what I found out in Sierra Leone and Liberia
– https://theconversation.com/ebola-survivors-struggle-to-return-to-normal-lives-what-i-found-out-in-sierra-leone-and-liberia-281678

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nyashadzashe Chiwawa, AIA Research Co-ordinator in the College of Law and Management Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Across many cities and towns in South Africa, turning on a tap no longer guarantees water. Instead, trucks – known as water tankers – arrive to deliver water to communities facing shortages.

Water tankers have shifted from being an emergency stopgap to a routine feature of water provision by municipalities. In many communities, especially informal settlements and areas affected by repeated outages, residents now depend on trucks to deliver water for months at a time.

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Read more: Access to water has a long racial history in Durban: I followed the story in the city’s archives

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This reliance has grown over more than 10 years as ageing pipes, leaking networks, failed pumps, power cuts and poor maintenance have made supply increasingly unreliable.

Water tankering has also become a lucrative municipal business. Johannesburg Water, an entity owned by the City of Johannesburg, reportedly spent R130.5 million (US$8 million) on tankers in the 2024/25 financial year. Although this is only about 0.16% of Johannesburg’s combined R83.1 billion operating and capital budget for 2024/25, it is a large recurring outlay for what is meant to be an emergency service. It is also about 1.8% of the city’s R7.4 billion capital budget, money that could otherwise support longer-term infrastructure investment.

In Johannesburg, the tankers are largely supplied through private contractors appointed by Johannesburg Water. They deliver water from Johannesburg Water’s own supply.

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Read more: The lack of water in South Africa is the result of a long history of injustice – and legislation should start there

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The water tanker contracts have also attracted controversy: a R263 million (about US$16 million) Johannesburg Water contract for 70 water tankers was declared invalid and set aside by the Gauteng High Court in December 2025 because of irregularities in the tender process.

South Africa’s growing reliance on water tankers reflects a deepening collapse in municipal water systems. A 2023 government report found that 46% of water supply systems in the country had poor or bad microbiological water quality, compared with only 5% in 2014.

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Read more: Community dialogue can show the way to meeting water needs: a South African case

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Water lost through leaks, faulty meters, illegal connections, poor billing or uncollected revenue rose from 37% in 2014 to 47% in 2023. This is far above the international average of about 30%.

By 2025, 47% of audited wastewater treatment systems were in a critical state, up from 39% in the previous assessment. Water systems rated excellent or good fell from 14% to 8%.

Together, these reports point to a long-running deterioration in municipal capacity: infrastructure is ageing, maintenance budgets are inadequate, skilled staff are in short supply, and many municipalities are losing treated water faster than they can reliably deliver it.

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Read more: Water in the dams, but South Africa’s taps are dry: essential reads on a history of bad management

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As a researcher working in public governance and service delivery, I conducted a study aimed at understanding what happens when a temporary water solution becomes permanent. I wanted to find out how this shapes the lives of people forced to collect their only water supply in buckets from tankers over long periods.

My research explored how tanker-based water provision affects fairness, environmental sustainability, and trust in government in the eThekwini Municipality (formerly known as Durban), a coastal city in South Africa.

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Read more: Sewage leaks put South Africa’s freshwater at risk: how citizen scientists are helping clean up

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The findings reveal a troubling pattern. Marginalised communities, particularly those in informal settlements or peri-urban areas, receive irregular and unreliable water deliveries. Some wait hours or even days for water, while others have more consistent access.

The key findings of my research are that water tankering:

• delays real solutions to water shortages

• is the result of top-down decisions that communities haven’t been part of

• has a negative impact on the environment

• makes inequality much worse.

The challenges seen in eThekwini are not unique. Cities around the world are facing similar pressures from climate change, urbanisation and ageing infrastructure. Relying on short-term fixes like tankering is becoming more common. But understanding its consequences is critical for avoiding larger crises in the future.

On the ground

I spoke directly to people affected by water shortages and those responsible for managing supply: municipal officials, engineers, community leaders, activists and residents living in water-scarce areas. My aim was to record real life stories about how people receive water, how they perceive the system and what challenges they face.

The problems identified included:

• delays in real solutions to water shortages. Instead of investing in infrastructure like pipes, reservoirs and treatment plants, municipalities are relying on tankers as a stopgap. Over time, this delays tackling the root causes. As one participant described, tankering becomes a “Band-Aid” rather than a cure.

• a lack of community involvement. Decisions about water distribution are often made without input from those most affected, leading to mistrust, frustration and a sense of exclusion. When people feel they have no voice in how water is managed, it undermines both governance and social cohesion, as one person I interviewed told me:

I advocate for community-driven solutions such as rainwater harvesting systems or decentralised water treatment facilities. These approaches empower communities to manage their water resources sustainably and reduce dependence on external interventions like water tankering.

• environmental impact. The tankers use diesel, which causes carbon emissions and pollution. Extracting and transporting water at scale can strain natural resources, especially in already water-stressed regions. As another person I interviewed said:

It’s not a sustainable solution for ensuring water security. It’s costly, energy-intensive, and can have negative environmental impacts.

• inequality. Water is essential to life, health and dignity. When access to water is unequal, it affects everything from education and employment to public health. Children in water-scarce households may miss school. Families may spend hours collecting water instead of working. Poor water quality can lead to disease. These are not isolated issues. A community member told me that getting water from tankers instead of from the tap is frustrating and demoralising:

We feel like second-class citizens, constantly at the mercy of erratic delivery schedules and uncertain water quality. Ethically, we deserve access to reliable, clean water just like any other community. The current situation undermines our dignity and perpetuates a cycle of poverty and dependence.

What needs to happen next?

First, governments must shift from reactive to proactive solutions. This means investing in long-term water infrastructure rather than relying on emergency measures. Pipes, treatment plants and storage systems may require large upfront costs, but they provide sustainable and equitable access to water over time.

Second, governance must improve. Transparency, accountability and anti-corruption measures are essential to ensure that resources are used effectively. Public funds spent on repeated tanker contracts could often be better invested in permanent systems.

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Read more: Stormwater harvesting could help South Africa manage its water shortages

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Third, communities must be included in decision-making. Local knowledge and participation can lead to more effective and context-specific solutions, such as rainwater harvesting or decentralised water systems. When people are involved, they are more likely to trust and support water management strategies.

Finally, policymakers need to treat water access as a matter of justice, not just logistics. This means recognising water as a basic human right and ensuring that policies prioritise the most vulnerable populations.

– Water tank delivery in South Africa has stopped pipes getting fixed and opened the door to corruption – research
– https://theconversation.com/water-tank-delivery-in-south-africa-has-stopped-pipes-getting-fixed-and-opened-the-door-to-corruption-research-281752

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

The World Bank made history in 1994 by creating the Inspection Panel, the first independent accountability mechanism at any international organisation. Its function is to investigate complaints from communities who allege they were harmed because the bank failed to comply with its own policies and procedures.

By establishing the three-member Inspection Panel, the World Bank showed support for a democratic vision of international governance based on the rule of law and the rights of individuals to take part in development decisions that affect their lives.

To date, the panel has received 186 complaints. Fifty-two have been from Africa. They involved projects in 56 countries, including 26 African countries. The complaints have raised issues such as the World Bank’s failure to comply with its own policies regarding public consultations, environmental and social impact assessments and involuntary resettlement in the projects that it funds.

The board has expanded the bank’s accountability process to include both compliance reviews and dispute resolution processes. Today, the World Bank Group has three independent accountability mechanisms:

• the Inspection Panel, which focuses on compliance reviews in public sector projects

• a separate dispute resolution mechanism for public sector projects

• the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, which offers both compliance reviews and dispute resolution services for private sector projects, primarily funded by the International Finance Corporation.

These accountability mechanisms have operated with mixed success. There have been some wins, for example in a case in Uganda involving risks for women and children associated with the building of a road. And some failures. An example is the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman finding against the International Finance Corporation for noncompliance in a coal fired power plant in India that was ignored.

We were involved, as legal academics and working with civil society organisations, in the establishment of the Inspection Panel. We have been following the activities of these independent accountability mechanisms for over 30 years. We are concerned about their future.

The World Bank Group is seeking to become a “bigger and better” bank. This involves promoting more collaboration between the five entities that make up the group. It is doing so under the banner of “One WBG”. This is an important development because the World Bank is the only global multilateral development bank. It offers developing countries both financial and advisory services. For example, it is the biggest funder of development projects in Africa.

The increasing collaboration between the different institutions in the bank raises concerns about which of their policies are applicable to a particular project. It also raises the issue of whether the bank should integrate the group’s independent accountability mechanisms so that there is no question about which mechanism is applicable to the project.

We believe that resolving this issue offers the bank’s board an opportunity to improve the structure of its independent accountability mechanisms and their contribution to the bank’s operations.

The dangers

The board appointed a two-person task force in September 2025 to advise it on the feasibility of integrating the three organisations in a way that does not reduce their independence, accessibility and effectiveness. The task force prepared a thorough and well-reasoned draft report.

The report was finalised after public consultations and is being considered by the board. It shows that integration of the mechanisms is a feasible, but complex exercise. The existing mechanisms have different operating cultures, policies and practices and human resource needs. The report describes various models for integrating the existing mechanisms.

The report also demonstrates that if mishandled, the exercise could result in a less independent and less effective accountability mechanism. To avoid this risk, we propose that the board adopt a model consisting of two separate independent accountability mechanisms. One to cover compliance reviews across the entire group. The other to cover dispute resolution across the group. This will enable both functions to operate independently and efficiently.

Our proposal raises four issues.

First, it is important that each mechanism is independent of the bank’s management. Each mechanism must have sufficient resources to undertake effective compliance reviews or dispute resolutions. Their processes must also be robust enough to result in meaningful outcomes for the complainants.

Second, the new compliance mechanism must retain a three-member panel appointed by and reporting to the bank’s board. The panel should have a permanent chair serving a six-year term. The chair must have the authority to decide which cases need the panel’s attention. The other two panel members should also serve staggered six-year terms.

A three-person panel allows for some geographic, technical and experiential diversity. Gaining a consensus among the panel members improves the quality and increases the credibility of the panel reports. A three-member panel is better able to withstand pressure from the bank’s management and other stakeholders than is a mechanism headed by one person.

Third, the dispute resolution mechanism should be headed by an experienced dispute resolution professional at the vice-president level. This official should report to the president of the bank. Our view is that this arrangement could encourage the institution to play a more proactive role in resolving disputes.

To ensure that the unit has some independence it should also have regularly scheduled meetings with the board. The head of the unit should also be able to request a meeting with the board whenever they deem it necessary and without requiring the prior approval of the bank’s president.

Fourth, the process of consolidating accountability mechanisms will be complex. Consequently, the board should first decide on the basic structure: a compliance review unit headed by a three-member panel and a separate dispute resolution unit headed by a senior professional.

It should delay any decisions on the policies, principles and practices of the mechanisms until it receives advice from a multi-stakeholder working group that includes external stakeholders and management and is co-chaired by one person from each of the units being merged.

An opportunity to fix things

The bank has the opportunity to strengthen its development mission. The changes it makes should be designed to:

• help make the bank a better institution that supports higher quality projects

• make the bank a learning institution that openly accepts criticism and looks to implement solutions

• ensure it becomes an institution that recognises that people affected by bank-funded projects are stakeholders in its operations who may be forced to risk their well-being for the greater good.

– The World Bank wants to change the way it manages complaints: the fixes that could make it better
– https://theconversation.com/the-world-bank-wants-to-change-the-way-it-manages-complaints-the-fixes-that-could-make-it-better-282695

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ongama Mtimka, Lecturer, Nelson Mandela University

Julius Malema, the leader of South Africa’s fourth-largest party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), is a divisive figure: loved by some, hated by others.

Malema made headlines in April 2026 after a lower court found him guilty of illegal possession and discharging of a firearm and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. He is appealing the conviction and sentence.

Within a few weeks he made headlines again when the country’s Constitutional Court ruled in a case the EFF had brought before it. The case was about the alleged theft of a large sum of foreign currency from President Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa’s private game farm, Phala Phala. The court found in favour of the EFF and the other party to the case, the African Transformation Movement.

Malema hails from Seshego, a small village in Limpopo, which is one of South Africa’s poorer provinces. Born in 1981, he has become something of a generational peculiarity in the body politic of the country.

The old guard of liberation fighters who were active from the 1960s and 1970s onwards continue to dominate South Africa’s political landscape. They include leaders of parties in parliament like the African National Congress (ANC), Bantu Holomisa of the United Democratic Movement, and Patricia De Lille of the Good party, among others. But Malema broke that mould.

Few South African politicians have achieved what he has.

In 2013 Malema, together with Floyd Shivambu, announced the founding of the Economic Freedom Fighters as the main host for radical youth politics in South Africa. This was after they were fired from the ANC while serving as leaders of its youth wing.

The EFF went on to poll numbers that put it in third place in four successive elections between 2014 to 2021. In the most recent national poll in 2024, however, the party lost this spot to the former president Jacob Zuma’s new uMkhonto weSizwe Party.

Malema is a career politician who has used the political liberties bequeathed to democratic South Africa to his personal and political advantage. Yet, he continues to agitate against the emerging order, as if he himself were the victim of it, not a beneficiary high up in the distribution chain.

As a political analyst and senior lecturer, I have studied the rise of Malema and his party as part of South Africa’s ongoing leftist, worker-driven political wing. Tracking the gains and failings of the EFF, I believe there are several factors that contribute to Malema’s successes and shortcomings.

His skills at building a party and running a tight ship have been bolstered by his charisma and speech-making capability. But there have been controversies over showmanship and the use of divisive and incendiary speech. This has produced a complex and ambiguous public figure. And a party in flux.

The rise of a firebrand politician

Malema shot to national prominence in 2007 in the build-up to the major political upheaval of the democratic period, the 52nd conference of the ANC in the city of Polokwane. The league had assumed a kingmaker role in ANC succession battles in various times in the history of the liberation movement, helping remove president AB Xuma in 1949 and then president Thabo Mbeki through its active campaigning.

Events at the conference would change the trajectory of South Africa. Mbeki was president of the country as well as the party and was seeking a third term to run the party. His deputy in the party, Jacob Zuma, whom he had suspended as deputy president of the country, defeated Mbeki and delegates to the conference elected him to lead it.

After Zuma had come to power, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and the ANC Youth League became critical of him.

Youth league members, including Malema, were hauled before the disciplinary structures of the ANC. According to his biographer, Fiona Forde, this was an attempt to curtail his rising influence in the party and the potential to disrupt succession.

Nonetheless, Malema’s EFF avoided the fate of quickly disintegrating, unlike other breakaway parties such as the Congress of the People.

He did this by building his party with the leaders who followed him from the Youth League. He used strong control of the party platform as its chief communicator, building a militant persona.

Malema’s wider public success can be attributed to his rhetoric, chants and tactics that have bordered at times on anarchy, war mongering and glorification of violence.

He has fashioned himself into a warrior figure who exploits black rage to gain popularity. The party stands for a more radical path to economic transformation in South Africa, particularly expropriation of land without compensation and nationalisation of mines.

But, as my research shows, his purpose appears less about waging a true revolutionary war and more about drawing political value from the perception that he could.

This creates a stark contradiction. Malema performs the role of a fearless revolutionary within a stable democracy that offers him all the securities and legal protections he needs to sustain this performance. Unlike those who rise against authoritarian regimes, he faces no mortal risks.

He appears to care deeply for the plight of the poor, yet his lifestyle suggests he is high up the distribution chain, with a taste for the finer things in life.

Many revolutionaries throughout history came from better backgrounds than the people they spoke for. Karl Marx, Frans Fanon, and Martin Luther King Jnr are but some of the examples. Yet few have balanced so overtly the “militant” brand with such personal comfort.

The primary mechanism for this warrior persona is a calculated mix of word, appearance and branding.

Malema uses the media and public events as a platform for his politicking. He has received significant media coverage as a result of his activities. But this hasn’t stopped him from frequently attacking the fourth estate.

In Parliament he has used disruptive tactics to draw attention to the party, even though it now only has 47 seats out of a total of 400.

An ambiguous future

Now that Malema has been convicted and sentenced to an effective five-year term in prison, he faces a turning point. He may be disqualified from serving as an MP and could even go to prison. This places the EFF into the realm of the ambiguous and uncertain.

Because the party has been held together by his firm grip, which clamped down on ambition, the EFF is not yet prepared for a succession. The potential loss of its leader leaves the “Red Berets”, and the rage they channel, in a state of flux.

The South African Communist Party has resolved to contest elections independently of the ANC. It remains to be seen how this will reconfigure left politics in terms of control over municipal councils in 2026. South Africa is scheduled to go to the polls in November 2026.

– Julius Malema: South Africa’s performative revolutionary is facing his biggest battle
– https://theconversation.com/julius-malema-south-africas-performative-revolutionary-is-facing-his-biggest-battle-281750

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Wafula Yenjela, Research associate, University of the Free State

At the dawn of Kenya’s colonial era in 1902, consumption of home-made alcohol was deeply embedded in society. For instance, among the Mijikenda of coastal Kenya, palm wine was integral (p.290) to traditional ceremonies, such as marriage and initiations, and in ritual offerings.

This partly explains why the colonial authorities did not consider prohibiting African home-made liquors.

As early as 1908, however, they did prohibit Africans from consuming or handling European liquors. The prohibition was ratified on the pretext of Europe’s commitment to preserving the presumed innocence of Africans. The ban on Africans’ consumption of European liquor fostered and sustained racial “social distance” between the colonised Africans and European colonisers.

The socio-political landscape began to change after the second world war. Neoliberal capitalism was becoming dominant in Africa. Multinational breweries took command of the market through advertisements, propaganda, and networking with government agencies to subdue home-made brews.

It was also a time of growing political awareness by a now sizeable educated African elite. A case in point is the mid-1940s boycott of traditional brews by African elites in Nairobi and in Dar es Salaam, agitating for access to bottled beer.

The prohibition of Africans’ consumption of bottled beer, wines and spirits in Kenya was lifted at the end of 1947. The end of the prohibition marked the beginning of condemnation, criminalisation and vicious attacks on the indigenous African alcohol industry.

Successive governments and religious groups opposed these brews directly. Multinational breweries also targeted them indirectly.

In the emerging propaganda narratives, bottled beer was presented as the consumers’ mark of civilisation, patriotism and respectability. Kenyan media, through popular advertisements, touted the notion of bottled beer as a mark of “good citizenship”.

Consumers of traditional home-made brew were identified as unrespectable, unpatriotic.

My recent research examined three novelistic portrayals of “respectable” alcohol consumption in Kenya. Meja Mwangi’s Going Down River Road (1976) and The Cockroach Dance (1979), and Charles Mangua’s Son of a Woman (1971), highlight urban class imaginaries that emerge from alcohol indulgences at the time.

Based on the analysis of the themes in these novels, I conclude that the Kenyan state’s war against traditional brews was a psychological war driven by a colonial mentality of African barbarism. State operatives’ attempts to wipe out traditional brews, their brewers and patrons sought to create the impression that Kenya was now a civilised country that consumed European liquors.

Novelistic portrayals of alcohol consumption

The novelistic representations of alcohol consumption are set in the 1970s. This was a time when Africans were emerging from a highly racialised atmosphere that was the Kenyan colony. The African elites at that time were attempting to adjust to the prevalent notions of respectability. They desired co-option in the colonial order, which they believed was the epitome of civilisation and modernity.

The consumption of bottled beer was one of the available illusory affirmations of European civilisation. Going Down River Road foregrounds clubs in the inner city: Karara Centre, The Capricorn, Small World, Eden Garden. Through these drinking centres, the novelist paints a picture of Nairobi’s 1970s economic disintegration mostly experienced by the city’s marginalised low-income population.

Patrons in Karara Centre admire bottled alcohol adverts on the centre’s walls. The owner sells African brews but displays adverts for Johnnie Walker, pilsner and Scotch whisky. Empty bottles of the European brands are displayed on the counter to reinforce the colonial hype of the superiority of European alcohols.

James, a civil servant, drifts to Karara Centre when broke. He reminds the regular patrons of the home-made alcohol that he is a patriot who builds the nation. That is, he regularly drinks bottled beer. Such sentiments reflect the power of adverts in the construction of a people’s identities.

On payday, Ocholla and Ben abandon Karara Centre for The Capricorn, a club that sells bottled beer. There, they imagine themselves to be in an advanced, modern joint, and among the respectable. But this lasts for only one day before they slip back to Karara Centre, their dependable base.

What we note here is that the colonial histories of bottled beer coupled with the advertisements contribute to a sense of inadequacy among the underdogs who aspire to be among the “civilised” through consumption of bottled beer in “modern, advanced” joints yet cannot afford it.

But in The Cockroach Dance, Meja Mwangi upsets the neoliberal capitalist posturings regarding bottled beer. While the adverts insist on bottled beer being a lubricant for lasting friendships and patriotism, events in the novel highlight the revolutionary savagery of alcohol.

Duzman Gonzaga and Toto, key characters in the novel, partake of bottled beer. Their experiences in various bottled beer joints reveal that the spaces are chaotic. After consuming the alcohol, patrons engage in violent rampages against their neighbours. Essentially, the novel demonstrates that bottled beer is not the hallmark of modernity and orderly development.

My analysis of the novels reveals that the claim that bottled beer was a mark of respectability was merely a marketing strategy. The strategy fed into the neoliberal capitalist interests of the multinational brewing and distillery giants, distributors and retailers. Consequently, traditional home-made alcohols’ criminalisation and condemnation features here as misplaced aggression.

Colonial doctrine against African brews

The sale of home-made brews in informal urban settings is sometimes treated as an act of terrorism against the state. Indeed, distilled home-made alcohol known as chang’aa has caused the deaths of an alarming number of its consumers in recent years. Laboratory tests reveal the brewers’ use of dangerous additives such as industrial methanol.

In February 2024, state operatives led by the country’s deputy president embarked on rounding up and destroying the alcohol and distillation equipment in various places. Despite crackdowns such as these, the sale and distribution continues.

The political elites’ war against the African indigenous brewery industry reveals their colonial anxiety – their own fears of regressing to barbarism.

Alcohol history in Kenya played a crucial role in the making of postmodern identities in the country. Colonial condemnation of African brews as emblematic of regression to African barbarism swayed the African psyche. The African elites who aspired to belong to a progressive postmodern world quickly learnt the colonial doctrine of condemning African brews.

The Kenyan state’s anxieties against home-made alcohol are mainly rooted in respectability politics.

– Kenya’s war on traditional alcohol: a colonial hangover about what it means to be ‘civilised’
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-war-on-traditional-alcohol-a-colonial-hangover-about-what-it-means-to-be-civilised-281377

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Comas, Full Professor, Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Instituto de Biología Evolutiva (IBE – CSIC – UPF)

Sudan lies at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East. It has played a key role in human demographic movements, reflected in the diversity of its cultures and languages. Although much of the country is arid, the Nile River has long acted as a corridor for trade, facilitating human migration through the region for thousands of years.

This makes Sudan a valuable place to study human genetic diversity and evolutionary history, which has important implications for understanding population-specific adaptation and health.

The Copts are a population that migrated from Egypt from the 7th century and mixed with populations in neighbouring regions, but also remained somewhat isolated. Copts are historically distinguished by their Christian faith and their language. In Sudan their numbers are estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands.

As a group of evolutionary biologists we conducted a genomic study to understand the complex demographic history and identify signals of adaptive selection among Sudanese people. Our research is the first whole-genome sequencing study carried out in Sudan. This is a method scientists use to read and analyse a person’s complete DNA, the full set of genetic instructions, to understand traits, ancestry and disease risk.

Our research covered a total of 125 individuals from five population groups, defined by their language and cultural identity, known as ethnicity.

We found that Sudanese Copts showed unusually high resistance to Plasmodium vivax, the most geographically widespread malaria-causing parasite. This protection comes from a genetic variant they acquired after mixing with local Nilo-Saharan people.

Similar examples of recent adaptation to malaria after population mixing have previously been reported in Madagascar, Cabo Verde and Pakistan. But this is the first time such a process has been documented within mainland Africa itself.

The selection signal observed in Sudanese Copts is among the strongest ever detected in humans.

These findings show that strong natural selection can reshape the human genome very rapidly and that recent demographic history is crucial for understanding present-day genetic patterns. These can help explain differences in disease susceptibility across populations, informing medical research and public health strategies.

Human migrations in the region

The expansion of Arabic-speaking people in north Africa started in 639 CE in Egypt and gradually moved southward. It intensified between the 10th and 11th centuries with the migration of Bedouin groups into north Africa and Nubia. By the 16th century, the spread of Arab culture and Islamic faith contributed to the collapse of the last Christian kingdoms in the region.

But some populations remained in more isolated areas and preserved their own languages and cultural traditions. These include Nilo-Saharan-speaking groups in Darfur, around the Jebel Marra mountains, and Kordofanian speakers from the Nuba Mountains.

These mountainous regions also acted as partial genetic barriers. They limited interactions with surrounding populations. Today these populations show little or no genetic influence from the Arab expansion.

Our study confirms this pattern reported in previous studies. With the use of whole-genome sequencing data, our findings further strengthen this insight.

Adaptive selection to malaria protection

Our study indicates that around 1,000-1,500 years ago, the ancestors of Sudanese Copts intermarried with local Nilo-Saharan groups. The geographical barrier is not applied for all Nilo-Saharan speaking groups, only for those from Darfur. Copts could have admixed with other groups with a Nilo-Saharan origin but living in a more accessible area. The individuals from Darfur are the group in our dataset that better represent these ancestors, but that does not mean they are their direct ancestors. Through this mixing, they acquired the Duffy-null allele. This is a genetic variant (one of the different versions of a gene) that is widespread in Africa south of the Sahara.

This allele is a classic example of natural selection in humans, showing strong geographic differentiation between African populations and the rest of the world. The Duffy-null allele prevents the expression of the ACKR1 receptor, a protein found on red blood cells, used by P. vivax to enter and infect these cells.

Individuals who have inherited the allele lack this receptor and are therefore protected against this form of malaria.

Because the Duffy-null allele is rare among north African and Middle Eastern groups, it would not be expected to be prevalent in Copts. However, our findings show that about 89% of Sudanese Copts carry it.

Our study shows that after admixture with local populations, the variant was introduced into the Coptic population. Natural selection meant it was passed down through generations and became more common.

Having the allele gave people a survival advantage in a malaria area. Sudan reported over half million cases of P. vivax malaria in 2017. There is little or no information on regional variation, but the presence of the adaptive variant in Darfur does not necessarily mean adaptation occurred there.

This provides a clear example of a genetic population adapting to disease, occurring within the past 1,500 years.

Fixing Africa’s under-representation

Our study also identified more than one million previously unknown genetic variants, over 1,500 of which may affect genes and their functions. This highlights a major gap in global genomic databases. These are still heavily biased towards people of European ancestry, although Africa harbours the greatest genetic diversity. North Africa, in particular, has often been overlooked.

It’s important to know more about the genetic heritage of different populations because, as the Coptic resistance to malaria shows, it can guide medical research and help understand human evolution better.

Although whole-genome sequencing has transformed the study of human health and disease, truly global representation remains essential. Africa, as the birthplace of modern humans, harbours the greatest genetic diversity on Earth and should therefore be a top priority for genomic research.

This study fills important gaps in our understanding of Sudan’s and Africa’s demographic histories and increases diversity in global genetic datasets. It also shows the importance of including recently mixed populations to obtain a fuller picture of human evolution.

Hisham Y. Hassan was a co-author on the article.

– In Sudan, a migrant community reveals a resistance to malaria: the genetic study helping shape medicine
– https://theconversation.com/in-sudan-a-migrant-community-reveals-a-resistance-to-malaria-the-genetic-study-helping-shape-medicine-278806

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Pape Abdoulaye Seck, chercheur, Académie nationale des sciences et techniques du Sénégal (ANSTS)

Agriculture is the lifeblood of Africa. More than 60% of African households depend directly or indirectly on the land for their livelihoods. And the continent has nearly 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land.

Farming is a fragile sector, however. It has to deal with climate change, market volatility, weak infrastructure and demographic pressure. Addressing these challenges requires political commitment and investment. It also requires science, innovation and high-quality research.

I have been involved in scientific research, particularly agricultural research, for more than four decades. My roles have included researcher, member of multiple science academies, director general of the Africa Rice Center/CGIAR, and Senegal’s minister in charge of agricultural research.

Throughout these years, one criticism has repeatedly surfaced: agricultural research is often perceived as expensive while delivering little for people. This perception is widely shared and frequently echoed in political and media debates.

Based on my experience, I believe the criticism rests on a questionable assumption: that the impact of science depends exclusively on those who produce it. When innovations fail to change the world, scientists themselves are often presented as the culprits.

The reality is far more complex. The history of agricultural transformation across the world shows that research alone never changes societies. Impact follows when an agricultural ecosystem effectively connects science to producers, markets, finance, institutions and public policy.

International institutions have highlighted the difficulties many developing countries face in turning scientific knowledge into development. The reasons include weak innovation ecosystems, too little infrastructure and limited institutional coordination.

An example of what success looks like is the Green Revolution in Asia. Scientific breakthroughs improved wheat and rice varieties which transformed agriculture. It was not simply because the science was strong. There were other factors too. They included governments investing in irrigation, extension services, rural infrastructure, credit systems and market organisation.

In India and Vietnam, for example, science operated within a coherent system linking researchers, farmers, institutions and markets.

Science generates knowledge, informs policies, stimulates innovation and opens new possibilities. But it does not change societies on its own.

The missing parts

Recent decades have brought advances on a number of fronts. In seeds, irrigation, soil fertility management, climate adaptation, biotechnology, digital agriculture, agroecology and sustainable food systems.

African researchers, universities and international agricultural research centres have contributed enormously to this progress.

Rwanda and Ethiopia provide useful examples of how coordinated ecosystems can speed up change. In both, stronger links between research, extension systems, public investment and farmer support mechanisms have made a difference. They have contributed to faster uptake of new technologies. And they have led to productivity gains in several strategic crops such as maize, rice, cassava, beans and soybeans.

Another example is rice. During my years at AfricaRice, I saw major scientific advances in rice research. This included the development of New Rice for Africa varieties. ⁠ These resulted from years of scientific work combining the high productivity potential of Asian rice with the resilience of African rice, particularly its tolerance to drought, poor soils and local climatic stresses. It wasn’t easy, because the two rice species are genetically distant.

Farmers quickly took up the new varieties. Farmer incomes and food production improved in countries where governments, seed systems, extension services and development partners worked together. In Uganda, Guinea and several west African countries, coordinated programmes helped accelerate adoption among smallholder farmers.

These examples show that effective agricultural innovation will only be adopted and scaled if several conditions are met together. These include:

• access to inputs and technologies

• accessible financing

• efficient extension services

• functioning infrastructure

• organised markets

• coherent, predictable public policies.

Without these conditions, innovations often remain confined to research stations, pilot projects or scientific publications. Where seed systems, rural financing or market organisation are weak, good science makes little difference.

In several African countries, farmers aren’t using improved seed varieties because they can’t get certified seeds at scale. Likewise, promising innovations in irrigation, post-harvest technologies or digital agriculture have struggled because of weaknesses in infrastructure, rural credit or institutional coordination.

What’s needed

Debates on agricultural research in Africa must go beyond simplistic criticism. Agricultural research should not be viewed as a cost. Rather it is a strategic investment in food security, economic sovereignty, environmental sustainability, public health, social stability and human dignity.

Blaming science for lacking impact masks the weaknesses of broader development systems.

As Africa faces the defining challenge of the 21st century – feeding its population without destroying the planet – it would be a mistake to weaken scientific research. The continent must instead strengthen alliances between science, policy, finance, private sector actors, farmers, universities and civil society.

Across Africa, emerging innovation platforms show that when these actors work together, scientific advances can create tangible economic and social change. The challenge now is to broaden this beyond isolated successes.

In the end, the impact of science is a collective responsibility.

And science can only change the world when societies decide to give it the means to do so.

– Agriculture in Africa: science and research can’t make an impact without investment and good policies
– https://theconversation.com/agriculture-in-africa-science-and-research-cant-make-an-impact-without-investment-and-good-policies-282430