Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rennie Naidoo, Professor of Information Systems, University of the Witwatersrand

Generative artificial intelligence (AI), and especially large language models deployed as chatbots and digital assistants, are now part of everyday digital life.

These models are being framed as a helpful assistant, a patient tutor, a customer service agent and even a source of emotional support. But what happens when even more human encounters are mediated by machines?

This question matters especially in South Africa, where apartheid not only separated people by law, but also shaped who was seen, heard and recognised as fully human. Its legacy still lives in unequal access to education, healthcare, work, technology and public services.

This is also why ubuntu has become such an important part of South African debates about social life. Ubuntu is a way of thinking about personhood. It sees personhood as relational. It reminds us that dignity is not only individual. It is also formed through mutual belonging.

Ubuntu is expressed through the idea that “a person is a person through other persons”. People become themselves fully through relationships of recognition, care, responsibility and shared life.

As a scholar of technology and society, I have been exploring how AI is reshaping human relationships.

In my research on ubuntu and generative AI, I set about asking what this means in practice. What happens when machines begin to replace the human relationships through which people experience care, recognition and dignity? To answer this question, I used ubuntu as a lens to examine whether AI-mediated interactions can support the kinds of relationships through which human dignity is affirmed.

I argue that the rise of generative AI is more than a technical issue in two ways. Firstly, it is a relational one. Secondly, it’s about who gets access to human beings. In my paper, I describe this risk as a form of “relational apartheid”. By this I mean a social and technological pattern in which access to meaningful human engagement becomes unequally distributed. Some people are met by persons. Others are managed by systems.

This is not apartheid in the legal sense of the past. It is a warning about how old inequalities can reappear in new digital forms.

Simulated care is not the same as shared life

Large language models can now produce fluent and emotionally sensitive responses. They can apologise, encourage, advise and offer language that sounds consoling. They can remember details within a conversation and adjust their tone to the user. For many people, this can feel surprisingly human.

Yet the appearance of a relationship is not the same as a relationship.

A chatbot may respond warmly to a lonely student, a frustrated customer or a patient seeking reassurance. But it does not share in that person’s life. It cannot be vulnerable in return. It cannot be held accountable as a person. It cannot forgive, be forgiven, carry a moral burden or be transformed by the encounter.

Human relationships are difficult because they involve more than responsiveness. They involve mutual risk. We disappoint one another. We misunderstand one another. We apologise, repair and try again. These imperfect processes are part of what makes human relationships morally meaningful.

AI often offers a form of responsiveness without the mutual resistance found in human relationships. It can always be available, endlessly polite, and easily reset. That convenience is attractive. But it may also train us to expect relationships without the hard work of relationship.

The concern is not that every interaction with AI is harmful. AI tools can help people find information, write better, learn faster and access services. Used carefully, AI can create more space for human care rather than replace it.

The danger comes when AI is used as a substitute for human presence in areas where recognition matters.

Inequality is also about who receives human attention

Customer service offers one example. As organisations automate front-line support, people are increasingly routed through chatbots before they can reach a human being. This may reduce costs. It may also improve speed for simple queries. But it can create a tiered system in which some customers receive human attention while others are left with automated interaction.

The labour implications are also becoming visible. Salesforce, one of the world’s largest providers of customer service and business software, has reported that AI agents now handle a growing share of customer interactions. The company has also reduced thousands of support roles in recent years, although it would be simplistic to attribute all of these changes solely to AI. This does not mean all customer service work will disappear. But it does show how quickly routine service work can be reorganised once AI becomes the default front line.

Something similar could happen in healthcare, education and social support. Where human professionals are scarce, AI counselling tools, tutoring systems and advice bots may appear to offer a practical solution. In some cases they may help. But they also risk normalising a situation in which those who are already underserved are increasingly spoken to by machines rather than people.

In a society that the World Bank describes as among the most unequal in the world, old differences in income, education, language, geography and institutional power could reappear in new digital forms.

The problem is not only whether machines give accurate or inaccurate answers. The deeper problem is that some people may be denied the kind of encounter through which dignity is affirmed. A person does not only need a response. A person often needs to be recognised by another person.

Building ubuntu into AI

What about efforts to build ubuntu-aligned AI?

Scholars have explored how ubuntu might inform AI design, ethics and governance.

There is value in designing AI systems that are more sensitive to African languages, local histories and communal values. There is value in involving communities in decisions about how AI is built and used. There is also value in ensuring that technology does not simply import the assumptions of powerful companies and distant markets.

But can ubuntu simply be programmed into a machine?

Ubuntu is not only a set of polite phrases or cultural preferences. It is a way of thinking about persons in a relationship. It depends on shared life, mutual vulnerability and accountability. A system can be designed to support these values, but current AI systems cannot live them in the way people do.

This distinction is important for policy and design.

AI systems should be presented clearly as tools, not companions. They should not blur the difference between simulated care and real care, especially when used by children, elderly people, patients or socially isolated users. In sensitive settings, AI should support human professionals rather than replace them.

It may help South Africa improve public services, widen access to knowledge and support overburdened institutions. But it may also deepen the distance between people if efficiency becomes the main measure of progress.

– Could AI create a new form of inequality in South Africa?
– https://theconversation.com/could-ai-create-a-new-form-of-inequality-in-south-africa-283725

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mwangi Chege, Lecturer, American University

More and more of Kenya’s farmlands are coming under the control of people who live and work in urban centres. Over the past two decades, the proportion they control has grown to nearly a third of Kenya’s total agricultural land.

This trend has also been recorded in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. Urban residents acquire rural farmlands because they see land as an attractive investment. They think of farming as potentially rewarding because of rising food prices, liberalised agricultural markets and the growing demand for food in rapidly urbanising areas.

The rural, small-scale farmer has long been the focus of agricultural transformation efforts on the continent. But some researchers and policymakers regard urban residents engaged in farming from afar as more innovative and entrepreneurial – capable of advancing commercial agriculture. These urban residents have better access to financial capital as well as information on markets and commodities.

Other researchers have pointed out that the impacts of urban-based farmers are either ambiguous or negligible.

For my PhD in Geography I investigated whether and how Kenyan urban residents engaged in farming from afar were shaping the development of commercial agriculture in the country. I also looked into the relations that these urban residents have with the rural people and places where they are active.

I found that the increasing control of rural farmlands by urban residents is reshaping the agricultural profiles of rural areas. This happens through the decisions they make about what to grow on their farms. They also influence the livelihood opportunities that are available to rural residents as well as prevailing regimes of labour, expertise and food systems.

Their impact has also been felt through farming practices which prioritise profit over sound land stewardship. My research points to the need to pay closer attention to the impacts of these farmers on rural agricultural landscapes.

Focus on financial returns

A popular term for people who farm from afar in Kenya is “telephone farmers”. Sometimes they’re called “weekend farmers” or “briefcase farmers”. I use the term “translocal farmers”.

The concept of translocality draws attention to how this type of farmer straddles rural and urban settings.

Over 14 months, I interviewed 50 translocal farmers, their farm managers, and county agricultural officials. I focused on the counties of Nakuru and Narok in Kenya’s Rift Valley region. These two counties have highly productive rural farmlands which jointly contribute about 9% of Kenya’s total agricultural production.

These farmlands attract urban residents who are interested in commercial farming, partly because they are close to the cities of Nairobi and Nakuru, and because land is available.

With the permission of the translocal farmers, I visited the farms to observe and record the activities there, including interactions between labourers and managers. The visits also enabled me to verify information obtained from the interviews.

This research revealed that translocal farmers were shaping the agricultural landscape through their decisions on types of crops to plant.

Translocal farmers said they preferred crops that promised decent financial returns and did not require a lot of attention. They chose to cultivate tree crops such as avocados, or grass varieties which could be used as fodder or hay. Vegetable crops such as cabbage, tomatoes and potatoes, or cereals like wheat require regular applications of pesticides and fertilisers. But tree crops and grasses typically only require close attention during planting and harvesting.

That makes them less costly in terms of labour and agricultural inputs, as well as time spent in supervision of farm activities. Vegetables have shorter growth cycles than tree crops or grasses and so can provide faster financial returns, but that means farmers have to source buyers on a regular basis. And vegetables perish fast, which might compel farmers to sell their produce at low prices.

This trend of translocal farmers choosing to plant trees or crops that require less intensive care has also been seen in areas of Tanzania and Uganda where urban residents have expanded their control of rural agricultural land.

Viewed against the reality of increasing control of rural agricultural land by urban residents, these choices shape the agricultural profiles of rural spaces.

Translocal farmers and soil degradation

Farming from afar may also have negative impacts on soil conservation and land degradation because translocal farmers are often absent from their land.

Agricultural officials pointed out to me that translocal farmers were frequently unavailable when the county was undertaking land and soil conservation initiatives that required farmer participation.

In Narok especially, farmers largely gained access to rural agricultural land by leasing from local land owners. County agricultural officers pointed to the high turnover of translocal farmers who would farm for a period and then disappear at the end of the lease period or if their enterprise failed.

As a result, county agricultural officials often did not know who was farming where. Further, translocal farmers felt greater pressure to maximise the returns from their farming so as to recover the funds spent in obtaining access to the land.

Sometimes they would farm in ways that degraded the land – like ploughing along the length of a slope instead of across it to conserve tractor fuel, or neglecting terracing and cover-cropping. Those soil conservation measures would reduce the ground area available for planting crops.

Agricultural policy often takes it for granted that farmers live where they farm. This research has shown that the increasing control of rural agricultural land by urban residents demands greater attention from Kenya’s government. At the national level, policymakers must understand what changing agricultural profiles mean for food security and rural livelihoods. And local government officials need to put more effort into engaging with the people who farm in their respective counties, whether or not they reside there.

– Kenyans living in towns are farmers too: what this means for rural landscapes
– https://theconversation.com/kenyans-living-in-towns-are-farmers-too-what-this-means-for-rural-landscapes-281901

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Enrico Nichelatti, Postdoctoral researcher, University of Luxembourg

Climate-related disasters are becoming more frequent and more intense across sub-Saharan Africa. Floods, droughts, heatwaves and storms are no longer isolated environmental events. They increasingly shape livelihoods, inequality, public trust and the relationship between citizens and the state.

Governments rely on taxes to finance schools, healthcare, infrastructure and climate adaptation policies. However, taxation depends on more than just enforcement: it depends on whether citizens believe the state is capable, fair and responsive in times of crisis.

Our research has focused on taxation, inequality, public finance and climate-related shocks in sub-Saharan Africa. In a recent study we examined an underexplored consequence of climate-related disasters in Africa: their effect on tax morale, in other words people’s willingness to pay taxes voluntarily.

Tax morale matters because many African countries struggle to raise enough domestic revenue. And citizens are more willing to pay taxes when they trust governments to be fair, effective and responsive.

We analysed data from 25 sub-Saharan African countries between 2011 and 2021. We combined Afrobarometer survey data with climate disaster records from the Emergency Events Database, an international disaster database. Our study looked at five types of disasters: droughts, floods, extreme temperatures, storms and wildfires.

We matched disaster events to respondents based on their location and interview date. We then used statistical models to examine how disaster exposure was associated with tax morale. The analysis also looked at the roles of inequality and trust in public institutions.

The findings reveal a complex picture. They show that disasters don’t all affect tax morale in the same way. Droughts and extreme temperatures are associated with lower tax morale. Floods, by contrast, go with slightly higher tax morale. Repeated exposure to multiple climate-related disasters is associated with an overall decline in tax morale.

We also found that disasters are associated with rising economic inequality. When inequality increases, trust in public institutions declines and tax morale weakens. The results of our analysis support this argument by incorporating the climate-disaster dimension. Climate-related disasters exacerbate inequality. In turn this erodes trust in public institutions and ultimately reduces tax morale.

Although climate disasters tend to reduce tax morale, our analysis shows that the institutional environment may mitigate the impact. On this issue we focused on Kenya, Benin and South Africa. All three are highly vulnerable to climate-related disasters. All three have introduced disaster management and climate-related legislation over the past decades.

This additional analysis allowed us to examine whether formal disaster-response frameworks can reduce the impact of disasters on citizens’ fiscal attitudes. The results indicate that these institutional frameworks substantially weakened, and in some cases completely removed, the negative effects of natural disasters on tax morale.

These findings suggest that citizens respond to the capacity of governments to manage and respond effectively to disasters.

Why would climate disasters influence attitudes towards taxation?

Taxation is not only an economic issue. It is also a social contract. Citizens are more willing to comply with taxes when they believe governments use public resources fairly and provide protection during crises.

Evidence from African countries suggests that trust plays a central role in shaping tax morale. Higher levels of trust in public institutions are associated with a greater willingness to comply with tax obligations. This is particularly true of local governments and public agencies.

The quality of public service provision appears to matter too. Effective service delivery tends to strengthen tax morale.

Previous studies demonstrate that climate disasters can erode this relationship in several ways.

First, disasters destroy livelihoods and reduce incomes, making it harder for households to meet basic needs. Where families struggle to afford the basics, survival comes first and paying taxes is less important.

Second, disasters can erode trust in government when responses are perceived as slow, unequal or politicised. Willingness to comply with taxes declines – even among higher-income taxpayers – if citizens believe disaster relief benefits only certain groups, or if corruption affects aid distribution.

Third, climate shocks place extra pressure on public finances. Governments may collect less revenue while facing higher spending demands for reconstruction and emergency assistance.

What affects the willingness to pay

Our study showed that the strongest negative effects on tax morale came from droughts and extreme temperatures. This is not surprising. Droughts directly affect agricultural production, food security and rural livelihoods. Heatwaves also reduce labour productivity and increase health costs, particularly for vulnerable populations.

Floods produced different results. In some cases, they were associated with slightly higher tax morale. One possible explanation is that visible and effective government responses during floods, such as emergency relief and infrastructure, may strengthen perceptions of state responsiveness.

Our research also suggests that the effects of climate disasters are not uniform across countries and communities. The negative effect on tax morale is stronger in poorer countries and in rural areas. Here livelihoods depend more heavily on climate-sensitive activities such as agriculture. And rural households are often more exposed to floods and droughts. They also have weaker access to public services, financial protection and state support.

In these contexts, repeated climate shocks can reinforce perceptions that governments are unable or unwilling to protect vulnerable populations.

The role of climate policy

Climate adaptation policies need to address inequality and strengthen public trust. Otherwise, repeated climate shocks may undermine willingness to contribute to public finances.

Targeted social protection, equitable disaster relief and transparent public spending are essential. So are investments in climate resilience for vulnerable communities.

Our findings suggest that climate disasters don’t only threaten economies and livelihoods. They may also undermine the fiscal relationship between governments and citizens where inequality is high and institutional trust is low.

– Can climate shocks change how people feel about paying taxes?
– https://theconversation.com/can-climate-shocks-change-how-people-feel-about-paying-taxes-284097

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Justin Visagie, Associate Professor at the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa is in the midst of its most significant anti-immigrant mobilisation in years.

The emergence of the March and March movement, calls for the mass deportation of undocumented migrants by 30 June 2026, growing anti-immigrant violence, and the repatriation of foreign nationals by several African governments have pushed immigration to the centre of national debate.

The anti-immigrant protest movement argues that it is responding to rising unemployment, deteriorating public services and growing insecurity.

The question is not whether these grievances have merit. They do. It’s whether immigrants are, in fact, responsible for them.

This article draws from research by the Southern Centre for Inequality Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand. It examines the drivers and consequences of inequality. It focuses on the world of work, public spending, production and ownership, technological change and innovation, and the effects of climate change.

Our research provides important context for understanding the economic and social conditions in which anti-migrant sentiment has exploded – and its underlying causes. Immigration is not irrelevant to the multiple and overlapping crises facing South Africans. But it’s not their primary cause.

Joblessness and informality

Few issues illustrate this more clearly than employment.

South Africa has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world. More than four in every ten working-age adults who want work are unable to find it (this includes discouraged work seekers). The scale of this crisis understandably creates pressure to identify a cause and demand action.

Many South Africans have concluded that immigrants are taking jobs away from local workers. Our analysis of public opinion data shows that as many as 70% of South Africans believe that immigrants take jobs from people born in the country.

These views help explain the growing support for anti-immigrant mobilisation. But public perceptions do not always align with reality.

Administrative tax data suggests that foreign nationals occupy a very small share of formal employment in South Africa. Our researchers have found that less than 4% of formal jobs are held by foreigners. This share has remained largely unchanged for more than a decade.

The picture is somewhat different in the informal economy, where foreign-born workers represent a limited but larger 20% share of participants.

Related research by Southern Centre for Inequality Studies scholars together with the international informal workers’ organisation StreetNet and Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) in South Africa found that as the informal sector expands amid rising unemployment, competition has increased. This has made livelihoods more precarious and earnings more difficult to sustain.

Competition is particularly rife among spaza shop owners (informal neighbourhood grocery stores) and street traders, who purchase goods in the formal sector and resell them at a small profit margin. Foreign-owned spaza stores tend to run larger and collective operations – a similar role to wholesalers. This enables them to offer a wider range of products for lower prices.

Creating a supportive environment for informal operators would require policy shifts. They could include: access to start-up capital, wholesale sourcing of goods, secure access to public space, investment in affordable public infrastructure and services, and reduced harassment by municipal authorities.

Despite recent government plans to revitalise the township (historically segregated poor neighbourhoods) and rural economies, South Africa’s economic policy remains focused on the formal sector.

The frustrations experienced by South Africans are therefore understandable. But South Africa’s unemployment crisis is simply too large to be explained by immigration alone.

For example, our research suggests that the unemployment rate would fall by only six percentage points – from 43.6% to 37.6% – if all foreigners’ jobs were somehow handed to unemployed South Africans.

This is a relatively modest reduction given the scale of South Africa’s unemployment crisis. It highlights that foreigners do not dominate the labour market overall, even if some sectors and locations have higher concentrations of immigrant workers.

Yet, not only is it unrealistic to expect that jobs could be swapped one-to-one between immigrants and South Africans. It could even result in net overall job losses for South Africans because of the reduction in entrepreneurship, investment and skills which foreigners bring.

This was the conclusion of a World Bank report which found that one immigrant worker actually generates approximately two jobs for locals.

The economic contribution of migrants may also help explain why attitudes towards immigration vary across South Africa. A Southern Centre for Inequality Studies scholar found that residents of more deprived municipalities were sometimes more supportive of cross-border movement than those living in better-resourced areas. One possible explanation is that direct contact with migrants helped challenge stereotypes and helped make their economic contributions more visible.

If immigration is not the primary cause of joblessness, why does the perception resonate so strongly?

Part of the answer lies in the economic pressures experienced by ordinary households.

Economic pressures facing households

Households face rising costs associated with food, transport, electricity and other essentials. These pressures come on top of the deterioration of public services. Power outages, unreliable public transport, overcrowded schools, and long waits at public clinics have become part of everyday life for many South Africans. This has reinforced a sense that living standards are steadily declining.

Our research confirms that the reduction in government borrowing, mainly through reduced budgets and the collection of more revenue, has been squeezing out public services for a decade. This has contributed to worsening teacher-learner ratios, longer waiting periods at public health facilities, and increasing backlogs at courts.

These pressures are likely to intensify in the years ahead for a number of reasons.

First, climate change places disproportionate burdens on vulnerable groups, such as women, particularly through its effects on care work, livelihoods and access to essential resources.

Our recent research also suggests that the green transition will create highly uneven labour market impacts across South Africa. Some communities will bear significant job losses and economic disruption that could intensify social and political tensions.

Second, the limits of South Africa’s social protection are becoming more apparent. Social grants have become a lifeline for millions of households and play a vital role in preventing destitution. But they cannot substitute for decent work and economic opportunity. Our research on social protection shows people want something more than survival. They want meaningful work, dignity, independence and opportunities to build better lives.

The challenge facing South Africa is not simply to reduce poverty, but to expand opportunity. South Africa’s economic prosperity is actually tied to trade and investment with the rest of Africa. Anti-immigrant politics may deliver short-term political gains. But they risk damaging the relationships and openness on which South Africa’s long-term growth depends.

A warning signal

The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment is a warning signal. It reflects genuine frustration with economic conditions and declining opportunities faced by the average South African. Ignoring those frustrations would be a mistake.

But so too would be blaming migrants for a crisis they did not create. Economic hardship may help explain anti-immigrant sentiment, but it cannot justify directing hostility or violence towards people whose rights and dignity deserve equal protection.

South Africa’s challenges demand better policy, not scapegoating, prejudice or violence against migrants.

The statement on which this article is based was signed by the following Southern Centre for Inequality Studies research staff: Comfort Molefinyana, David Francis, Geci Karuri-Sebina, Glen Robbins, Gontse Mabaso, Imraan Valodia, Julia Taylor, Khanimamba Masuluke, Khumisho Moguerane, Niall Reddy, Nirvana Pillay, Nishal Robb, Rahul Gandhi, Rashaad Mohamed Amra, Rheyna Pattni, Rozeena Das, Ujithra Ponniah.

– Blaming migrants ignores the real causes of South Africa’s economic crisis
– https://theconversation.com/blaming-migrants-ignores-the-real-causes-of-south-africas-economic-crisis-286157

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Hamza Benattia, Prehistory, University of Cambridge

For decades, stories about the ancient Mediterranean have centred on the grand cultures of Greece, Rome, Phoenicia and Egypt. North-west Africa seldom enters the picture before the arrival of Phoenician traders on the Moroccan coast about 3,000 years ago.

But archaeology is now revealing a different story.

Long before the first Phoenician ships (from today’s Middle East) sailed the western Mediterranean (between today’s north Africa and southern Europe), communities in what is now Morocco were farming and herding animals. They were also crossing the Strait of Gibraltar and participating in long-distance exchanges.

Over the past decade, I’ve worked on archaeology projects across Morocco. We’ve been investigating the origins of farming, long-distance exchange and the emergence of complex societies there. In my most recent study, I brought together archaeological evidence, radiocarbon dates and genetic data spanning nearly three millennia.

The study reveals that between roughly 3800 and 500 BCE – a period that saw the construction of Stonehenge, the flourishing of New Kingdom Egypt and the rise of Phoenician maritime trade – north-west Africa was not a marginal frontier. It was a crossroads linking the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Saharan worlds.

This has important implications for how we understand Africa’s past. For too long, interpretations of the continent’s history have underestimated the complexity and dynamism of its societies. By bringing north-west Africa back into the picture, archaeology is helping to correct that imbalance and reveal a richer, more interconnected reality.

A centre of multiple worlds

Geography helps explain why north-west Africa occupied such a strategic position in Mediterranean prehistory. The Strait of Gibraltar, which separates present-day Morocco and Spain, is only about 14km wide at its narrowest point. It served as a natural corridor linking Africa and Europe.

Far from being isolated, communities in today’s northern Morocco were embedded in long-distance networks for millennia. They maintained contacts with Iberia and other Atlantic regions and they interacted with Saharan populations. Later, they engaged with Mediterranean traders and settlers.

They were not passive participants in these exchanges. Archaeological evidence increasingly suggests that local communities actively participated in the networks that connected the western Mediterranean.

Early farmers and innovation

Farming was present in north-west Africa from at least 5400 BC, during the Neolithic period when agriculture was spreading across much of the western Mediterranean.

By around 3800 BC, communities in what is now Morocco were practising increasingly intensive farming and animal husbandry. One striking example is Oued Beht. At this large open-air settlement people cultivated crops, raised livestock and stored surplus food in hundreds of large underground pits.

Recent excavations reveal this was no small farming village. Covering around ten hectares, Oued Beht is among the largest agricultural settlements known in prehistoric Africa. The site may have supported a population of more than a thousand people, pointing to a level of organisation rarely documented in north-west Africa at this time.

These developments coincided with broader environmental changes, including the Sahara gradually becoming a desert. The dryness may have encouraged communities to invest more heavily in agriculture, food storage and long-term settlement in order to adapt to a less predictable environment.

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Read more: A 5,000-year-old farming society in Morocco fills a major gap in history – north-west Africa was a central player in trade and culture

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At the same time, there’s clear evidence of interaction with Iberia, the peninsula that includes today’s Spain and Portugal. Shared painted pottery styles, together with ivory and ostrich eggshell objects, point to regular contacts across the Strait of Gibraltar. These local communities were already active participants in wider networks of exchange.

New influences and local continuity

During the third millennium BC, north-west Africa became part of the wider Bell Beaker phenomenon. It takes its name from distinctive bell-shaped drinking vessels which appear across a network of communities that stretch across Atlantic Europe and the western Mediterranean.

For decades, the presence of Bell Beaker pottery in the region was interpreted as evidence that local communities were simply adopting cultural innovations from Europe.

Yet in Morocco, Bell Beaker objects are found alongside distinctive local traditions. This suggests local communities were selectively integrating new elements into existing cultural frameworks.

This was clearly a process of exchange, adaptation and local agency.

The elusive Bronze Age

The second millennium BC remains one of the least understood periods in north-west African prehistory. In Iberia, large, fortified settlements and clear social hierarchies emerge. The archaeological record in north-west Africa is more fragmentary.

Even so, there are important clues.

Burial practices such as stone-built cist graves point to changes in social organisation. At sites like Kach Kouch, there is evidence for settled farming communities with round houses, storage facilities and animal herding.

There are also signs of long-distance connections continuing into this period. For example, a bronze sword recovered from the bed of a river in northern Morocco has close parallels in the British Isles. This suggests links extending far beyond the Mediterranean.

Encounters with the Phoenicians

By the early first millennium BC, Phoenician traders and settlers from the eastern Mediterranean – today’s Lebanon – began establishing settlements along the north African coast. Traditionally, this has been interpreted as a process of colonisation, with local populations as passive recipients of a more advanced culture.

Recent archaeological evidence challenges this.

At sites like Kach Kouch, local communities continued their own architectural traditions and lifestyle. They selectively adopted new elements, like wheel-made pottery and iron tools.

Kach Kouch and other settlements suggest that these societies negotiated encounters with incoming groups. They incorporated new ideas into existing cultural traditions on their own terms.

The arrival of the Phoenicians, then, did not mark the beginning of complex societies in Morocco. It was a new chapter in a much longer history of interaction, adaptation and exchange.

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Read more: Discovery of a 4,000-year-old Bronze Age settlement in Morocco rewrites history

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These advances reflect decades of work by Moroccan and international research teams. Much remains for archaeologists to do. Large parts of the region are still underexplored and new discoveries have the potential to transform our understanding even further.

What is already clear, however, is that the prehistory of north-west Africa is a story of local communities actively shaping their own place in the ancient world.

– Morocco’s hidden history: archaeology, DNA and carbon dating rewrite the story of the ancient world
– https://theconversation.com/moroccos-hidden-history-archaeology-dna-and-carbon-dating-rewrite-the-story-of-the-ancient-world-279226

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

The international legal order that was created after the second world war is no longer fit for purpose. Its response to urgent global problems like climate, poverty and pandemics is inadequate. Its key institutions like the United Nations are incapable of restoring peace in Ukraine, Iran, Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo or stopping genocides in places like Myanmar or Palestine.

The World Trade Organization is paralysed because its most powerful member states have lost confidence in the trading system that they created. The international community is unable to reform the global financial system so that it provides adequate development finance to Africa and other parts of the global south.

These developments lead many people to conclude that international law is merely nice-sounding words that hide a more cynical truth: the only effective international legal rule is (and has always been) that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”, as the ancient Greek historian Thucydides put it.

There is indeed a history of international law being used by the strong for evil purposes. For example, international law was used to justify slavery and colonialism. It was also used to force newly liberated Haiti to compensate its French colonisers for the loss of their slaves.

The International Court of Justice initially relied on legal technicalities to uphold South Africa’s unlawful post-second world war control of Namibia.

My experience as a scholar and practitioner of international law convinces me that this view ignores the many ways in which international law is essential for the functioning of the world. Without it, for example, planes would be unable to fly people around the world. Ships could not carry goods across the globe. And the services on which we all rely, such as the internet and cross- border payments, would not function efficiently. Governments could not be held accountable when they abuse the human rights of their citizens. Multilateral development banks would be able to avoid responsibility when they fail to comply with their own policies and procedures, causing harm in their borrower countries.

Although international law has failed to stop the current illegal wars, at least two of their perpetrators – Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu and Russia’s Vladimir Putin – have been charged with international crimes. They now find it difficult to travel outside their home states.

Most states know that without widely understood and accepted international laws and principles it would be harder to resolve their disagreements peacefully or to structure their international economic transactions with confidence. Their own sustainable development would proceed more slowly and unpredictably.

Consequently, they continue advocating for a world based on international legal principles. For example, this view motivated South Africa and The Gambia to bring cases to the International Court of Justice seeking to stop alleged genocides. It inspired students in Vanuatu to advocate for an advisory opinion from that court on the legal implications of climate change.

They seem to accept a more optimistic view of international law, originally articulated by the legal scholar Louis Henkin:

Almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.

Henkin’s qualified endorsement cautions that international law is an imperfect instrument. States will ignore it when they think it does not suit their purposes. Over time, the gap between the state of the world and the content of international law expands. Eventually it becomes too large and, to remain credible, the law is forced to adapt.

We are approaching such a tipping point.

But the current breakdowns can’t be fixed easily. There are two complex challenges that must be addressed if a new international legal regime is to be formulated, agreed and respected. It requires the international decision making process to become more inclusive. States must also accept that there are some issues that they cannot control alone because the issues do not respect national borders.

What needs to change

First, global decision-making arrangements must change so that they reflect the interests and concerns of the whole international community. The existing global institutions need to more completely incorporate those who were not present when the current legal order was created. These include the many states that only gained their independence in the past 70 years and are not fully part of the structures of global governance. Non-state actors like corporations, civil society organisations and international organisations that are influential in international affairs should also be brought in.

The need for these changes drives states in the global south to promote more inclusive governance in institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and to advocate for reform of the UN Security Council. It inspires both states and civil society organisations to try to make businesses more respectful of human rights and their tax obligations to their host states.

All these actors must accept that they have international responsibilities and obligations towards the communities and individuals that are affected by their decisions and operations.

Second, the international community must adjust to the fact that states are no longer fully sovereign. To be sure, states can close their borders. They can refuse to allow goods, services or people from other countries into their territory. They can refuse to participate in the global financial system and can break off diplomatic relations. However, there is at least one problem, climate change, that they cannot stop on their own. It transcends national borders. Resolving it requires collaboration among all state and non-state actors that are affected by and that influence climate change.

The new international order must rethink sovereignty so that it respects the agency of states and their citizens to the extent feasible.

But it must not allow states to use sovereignty as the excuse to avoid their global responsibilities. The new international law must acknowledge that individuals, communities, corporations, sub-national and national governments and supranational organisations all have an impact on the climate and are affected by it.

– The international legal order is broken: 2 key shifts needed to fix it
– https://theconversation.com/the-international-legal-order-is-broken-2-key-shifts-needed-to-fix-it-285844

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Joan Silk, Professor, School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University

Baboons are one of the most widespread of Africa’s primate groups. They range across sub-Saharan Africa and into the Arabian Peninsula.

Baboons’ ability to spread across such a vast geographic area is based on their great ecological adaptability and dietary flexibility. This enables them to flourish in a wide variety of habitats, including deserts, swamps, open grasslands, woodlands and tropical forests.

I am an evolutionary anthropologist. I rely on methods and theory from the field of behavioural ecology, which focuses on how ecological conditions and evolutionary forces shape the behaviour of organisms to enhance their chances of surviving and reproducing successfully. I am particularly interested in how studies of other species, particularly closely related ones like baboons, help us understand our own human origins.

Studies of non-human primates give us insight about how evolution may have shaped the behaviour of our ancestors and how it influences our own behaviour.

Over the last 40 years, I have been involved in long-term studies of three baboon species: chacma baboons, olive baboons, and yellow baboons. In these species, groups are composed of multiple adult males, multiple adult females, and immature animals. Males leave their birth groups near the time of sexual maturity to prevent inbreeding and may live in several different groups over the course of their lives. But females remain in their birth groups, and groups consist of multiple matrilines – sets of females connected through their maternal ancestors.

We have learned that females’ connections to their relatives shape their everyday lives and have long lasting effects on their survival and lifetime reproductive success (the number of surviving offspring they produce over the course of their lives).

Maternal training rules

Maternal kinship structures the lives of female baboons. Like other mammalian females, pregnant baboon mothers nourish their developing foetuses and buffer them from external stressors. After birth, mothers nurse their infants, carry them from place to place, and keep them warm and safe. After they are weaned at about 18 months, juveniles no longer depend on their mothers for food or transportation, but they maintain close ties to their mothers, spending much of their time near them and seeking their protection and reassurance when they are in danger.

Females sometimes intervene in support of their juvenile offspring, especially their daughters, when they are involved in conflicts. With their mothers’ help, young females can defeat all of the females that their mothers can defeat, and this leads to the formation of dominance hierarchies in which females acquire dominance rank positions just below their mothers.

As females mature and begin to reproduce themselves, they remain closely connected to their mothers and sisters. Adult females spend much more time grooming their mothers, daughters and sisters than they spend grooming others.

Close kin maintain close social bonds as long as they live together, while relationships among unrelated females tend to fluctuate in strength from year to year.

For behavioural ecologists like me, it is not only important to describe patterns of behaviour but to try to understand why evolution has favoured them. Grooming and support are forms of cooperation. When a female grooms another female, she painstakingly parts her partner’s fur and removes parasites from the skin. This is beneficial to the recipient because these parasites can cause irritation and diseases.

But the female who provides grooming gives up opportunities to forage or rest, and this may be costly.

The benefits of social bonds

Natural selection is expected to favour behaviours that increase the relative fitness of individuals, the number of surviving offspring that they produce over the course of their life time. Behaviours like grooming seem puzzling because they are costly to the actor, but beneficial to the recipient.

However, according to the theory of kin selection, altruistic interactions like grooming can evolve among genetic relatives because they share some fraction of their genes. For example, offspring acquire half of their genes from each of their parents. This may be the reason that baboons and other primates form such close ties to their kin.

It’s also important to understand how females benefit from social bonds. Several lines of evidence suggest that social bonds help females cope with stress. Glucocorticoids (like cortisol in humans) are released into the bloodstream to help animals mobilise energy to respond to acute threats, like predator attacks. But chronic activation of the stress response can be harmful.

Researchers can track glucocorticoid levels in wild primates by collecting faeces from known individuals and measuring the concentrations of metabolites (small molecules produced, used, or broken down during metabolism). Results from several studies suggest that close social bonds help females cope with stressful events in their groups and the disruption of close social bonds creates stress for females.

Females’ coping ability may have long-term consequences because sustained exposure to glucocorticoids decreases females’ life spans.

The quality of females’ social bonds may have long-term consequences too. Data from long-term studies of baboons in the Amboseli Basin, which lies along the border of Kenya and Tanzania, and in the Moremi Reserve of the Okavango Delta of Botswana, show that females that have strong and stable social connections live substantially longer than females who were more socially isolated.

It has taken decades of research by dozens of researchers at many different sites to construct this rich picture of the lives of female baboons. But there are still many questions to answer. Why are some females more sociable than others? What are the mechanisms that link social bonds and longevity? As we have learned more about the form and consequences of social bonds among baboons and other primates, we have come to appreciate the parallels between the benefit of social connections for baboons and for ourselves.

– Female baboons keep family bonds strong: research reveals the benefits
– https://theconversation.com/female-baboons-keep-family-bonds-strong-research-reveals-the-benefits-284860

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Luisa F. Escobar Alvarado, Post Doctoral researcher, Università di Torino

Few places in Africa have been as isolated and understudied as eastern Angola, particularly the highlands of the Moxico provinces, a region rich in biodiversity, culture and history. The country’s political past helps explain this isolation. Having achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 after 11 years of war, Angola descended into a civil war that lasted 27 years, one of the longest conflicts in Africa.

Since peace was established in 2002, development has concentrated in the capital Luanda, on the west coast. The east of the country has remained deeply marginalised, with limited access to basic services such as healthcare and education. Infrastructure is scarce and portions of the territory still have many landmines.

In these areas the state’s limited presence, likely a legacy of political exclusion and geographic isolation, has allowed communities a good deal of autonomy over land and resources. This has contributed to ecological preservation but hindered social and economic development.

Isolation has also shaped something less visible: the role of fire in human survival and the woodland ecosystem.

As a team of ecologists, social scientists and political scientists from the University of Edinburgh and the University of Turin, supported by the Okavango Wilderness Project, we have been researching ties between forests and local communities in this region. Fire is one of the main tools communities use to manage the landscape – clearing fields, improving visibility, stimulating fruit growth, and aiding hunting.

In a recent paper we set out our findings about how civil war had shaped fire regimes (patterns of fire in an ecosystem) in eastern Angola. We combined analysis of satellite data on burned areas and in-depth interviews with 42 elders who lived through the conflict and still live in the area now.

We found something that surprised us and that runs counter to what researchers have documented elsewhere. During the war, fire activity was lower than before or after it. In most conflict zones, war has tended to be associated with higher fire activity. This is important since how “normal” fire activity is defined determines how fire is managed.

Wartime in Angola’s highlands

Our fieldwork took place in three villages in the Moxico highlands. Dry forests and miombo woodlands grow in the high parts. Lower down there are grasslands and rivers – the headwaters of the Okavango Delta, whose waters sustain ecosystems and communities across southern Africa. This remote area is sparsely populated and the main activities are subsistence farming and honey collection.

Local people have traditionally used fire to clear their fields and the bush for easier hunting. They use controlled burns in savannas and woodlands to reduce the risk of larger fires reaching homes, and to help keep snakes away from villages. The villagers also use smoke in harvesting honey and firewood for cooking.

Customary authorities still govern the use of natural resources.

Elders told us fire was used less during the war: people were constantly displaced, relying heavily on woodland products – honey, fruits, mushrooms and wild animals – for survival. A woman said:

During the war, we had to move constantly; you built a house, stayed a month or a year, then moved again.

Armed forces strictly regulated the use of fire for cooking or hunting, since it could reveal people’s location; therefore, it was often used at night, when aircraft were not around. Forest cover was needed for safety. Careless use could result in harsh punishment and even death. One respondent told us:

If you burned, that was a crime! You would get whipped!

Respondents said that during the war, forested areas expanded and got denser.

Our spatial analyses of burned areas confirmed that fire decreased by an average of 36% during the war compared with the average after the war (2003 to 2018), with sharper declines in some periods. There was a 46% drop between 1991 and 1992, possibly linked to renewed violence after Unita (one of the parties in the civil war) rejected the Bicesse Accords election results. After the war ended in 2002, burned area rose 60% above the wartime average.

Fire and conflict

The case of eastern Angola shows some interesting patterns which can bring a new perspective to the relationship between fire regimes and armed conflict.

One is that most research on war and fire documents an increase in fire. This has been seen in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Ukraine.

Our study shows the opposite: a marked decrease in fire activity during the conflict, followed by a sharp postwar recovery.

This drastic increase was likely driven by returning populations, restored livelihood practices and expanded market connections, all likely exacerbated by natural fuel accumulated during years of suppressed burning.

We read it not as an anomaly but as a return to a peacetime baseline. We suggest that it was the wartime suppression of burning that was exceptional.

This distinction is important not only for academic debates on human-fire interactions but also for fire governance and policy in the region. Taking the low-burning years of the war period as the baseline fire regime can lead to management strategies that focus on suppression, like banning early controlled burning. These can in turn disrupt fire-dependent livelihoods, overlook longer-term historical patterns, and promote narratives that are not necessarily grounded in local ecological or socioeconomic realities.

The effects of the war extended well beyond its end in 2002. Before the conflict, fire was managed collectively through long-standing community traditions. Wartime restrictions on burning, together with the disruption caused by the conflict, eroded these practices and the intergenerational knowledge that sustained them. As a result, fire use today is largely shaped by individual decisions rather than coordinated community management.

Managing fire in context

This case carries several implications: war can reshape fire regimes in ways current literature has overlooked, and fire itself is still too often framed as a danger or disaster, rather than a crucial tool for rural communities. Managing fire in this landscape calls for approaches that fit local realities, recognising fire as a socio-political process as much as an environmental one, and placing local livelihoods at the centre of governance.

The highlands of Moxico may represent an extreme case, but they are a reminder that war’s consequences for landscapes and livelihoods can be complex, unexpected and long-lasting – especially for marginalised groups.

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Author’s note on photos: before we take pictures with people we always ask for their consent, and we ask if we can share those pictures in different places. We obtain oral consent since most of the people we work with don’t read or write.

– Angola’s long war changed the way farmers used fire – why it matters
– https://theconversation.com/angolas-long-war-changed-the-way-farmers-used-fire-why-it-matters-285616

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Glen Robbins, Research Associate, PRISM, University of Cape Town; Adjunct lecturer, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria, University of the Witwatersrand

Just over a third (38%) of the residents of South Africa’s commercial capital, Johannesburg, reported being satisfied with their electricity services in a survey conducted in 2023/2024. This was down from 77% in 2017/18. The decline reflected years of citizen concerns about the service. In 2026 the auditor general noted that the city had spent only 1% of its operating budget on maintenance in 2024/25, against a national treasury guideline of 8%. As part of a response to these concerns, in May 2026 the City of Johannesburg and the German state-owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) announced agreement on a R3.8 billion (over US$230 million) concessional loan to help fix the city’s electricity utility, City Power.

The announcement came weeks after a letter sent by the finance minister to the city raised concerns about years of unfunded budgets and poor financial management. The Conversation asked urban and economic development scholar and specialist Glen Robbins to reflect on issues related to the loan.

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Why do South African cities borrow?

Since the 1994 democratic settlement in South Africa, and as part of the reforms to the country’s local government arrangements, there has been some level of borrowing to support metropolitan budgets. It’s been used alongside national and provincial grants, and own revenue, to:

• extend services for new developments

• tackle the investment backlogs arising from apartheid urban development patterns.

In National Treasury’s 2017 update of the Policy Framework for Municipal Borrowing a commitment was made to increase the share of borrowing to finance municipal capital programmes. It was then around one quarter for the larger metros.

The same document indicated concern that most metros had become dependent on national grants for over 50% of their capital spending. Metros were supposed to fund the bulk of their capital programmes.

According to a 2022 report the five largest metros (Johannesburg, Cape Town, eThekwini, Ekurhuleni, Tshwane) averaged a little under R6 billion (around US$365 million) of total borrowing a year during the 2010s.

National Treasury has set a guideline ceiling for total borrowing for each of the metros: it should not exceed 45% of total annual revenue. However, the largest South African cities have tended not to push their total borrowing much beyond 30%-35% of total annual revenue.

The KfW loan is one in a long line of medium- to long-term loans that Johannesburg has sought to use for its budgeted programmes.

According to the city’s financial reporting, total loans and borrowings (as part of non-current liabilities) amounted to R19.4 billion (US$1.181 billion) in 2025. This figure refers to the outstanding loans and borrowings beyond the financial year of reporting. Johannesburg has to pay annual interest and also budget for paying down the capital of loans.

What’s this particular loan for?

The city’s leadership says the funds are needed to attend to urgent capital works for the municipal electricity utility, City Power. Municipal electricity utilities are important as generators of revenue for South Africa’s cities. City Power’s electricity sales are projected to generate 30% of Johannesburg’s budgeted revenue for 2026/27.

City Power’s infrastructure has become increasingly prone to failure.

KfW says it is supporting obligations associated with South Africa’s development intentions, including the Just Energy Transition Investment Plan. This was agreed between a number of western donor countries and South Africa during the 2021 COP26 Climate Summit.

South Africa’s largest cities are among the most significant groupings of customers for power from the country’s state-owned utility, Eskom. They are widely considered to be critical to the country’s complex energy transition.

A City of Johannesburg press release reports the loan as having a term of 15 years. This includes a five-year grace period on capital repayments. For the first five years the city would only need to pay interest on the loan. Repayments on the capital would only start in 2031.

This has allowed the city to project a lower cost of repayments than has been the case in recent years.

KfW also announced that the loan would be in local currency, thus reducing currency risk.

The interest rate for the loan has been set at 8.56%. Some previous loans were at rates closer to or above 11%. This lower rate has much to do with the fact that the South African Reserve Bank repo rate – the rate at which it lends money to banks – improved in 2025.

A press report in mid-2026 indicated that the electricity infrastructure backlog for City Power is estimated at around R40 billion (US$2.4 billion).

Are there concerns?

Both City Power and the City of Johannesburg have struggled for some time to deliver on their mandates.

The city failed to budget adequately to support City Power’s operational and infrastructure needs. And it allowed outstanding payments to Eskom for bulk electricity supplies to balloon to over R5 billion (US$304 million).

City Power has not fixed its poor revenue collection system. Losses on sales are reported at R5.7 billion in 2024/25. And it has not kept up with maintenance work.

Both have been linked to probes by the Special Investigating Unit, which was set up to look at corruption, malpractice and maladministration. This has earned it rebukes from the auditor general.

These challenges have been compounded by pressures of a growing population, years of power cuts by the state utility and high increases in its bulk supply costs to municipal utilities.

Culpability for many of these issues can be laid at the feet of the City of Johannesburg’s political and administrative leadership. But concerns have also been raised about the years of weak responses from national policy makers.

These circumstances clearly raise public concern that the funds might not deliver improvements.

What can people living in Johannesburg expect?

This loan will be unlikely to change a lot in terms of the experience of citizens of Johannesburg and their electricity services in the short term. There’s likely to be ongoing pressure to increase revenue through electricity price increases above the inflation rate. There will probably be attempts to correct troubled metering and billing systems. Efforts at reducing the very high level of informal connections are also likely.

The backlog on maintenance and major capital works will take time to attend to. Consistent improvements in services are likely to take some time to materialise.

What else can be done about the problems?

Metropolitan utilities do have capacity. Even City Power has shown that it can turn its hand to more innovative service delivery. This was evident in a recent off-grid project in an area that had no municipal grid infrastructure.

Efforts could be made to integrate business and residential roof-top solar and battery storage systems into City Power’s network. Efforts to increase cheaper bulk energy procurement from renewable energy suppliers could also bring benefits.

Work-flow planning and contract performance tracking could make a difference relatively quickly.

More support for low-income households could also make a difference.

The combination of the loan and support from the National Treasury’s Metro Trading Services Reform Programme may give the city and City Power the best chance they have had for many years to correct their path.

Progress will also require citizen groups, organised business and other stakeholders to push for transparency and accountability.

But nothing can be taken for granted. A media outlet recently reported that the City of Johannesburg was unable to obtain an additional loan from AFD, the French development bank, because of concerns about inadequate oversight of spending.

City finance figures quoted come, in the main, from annual budget reports for the various cities as well as annual reports and annual financial statements. These can be found on municipal websites and also from the National Treasury’s GoMuni portal. Budgets are subject to change within financial years and there can be a delay in the publication of audited figures.

– Johannesburg has taken a big new loan to help fix its electricity problems, but the results will take time
– https://theconversation.com/johannesburg-has-taken-a-big-new-loan-to-help-fix-its-electricity-problems-but-the-results-will-take-time-285658

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By XN Iraki, Professor, Faculty of Business and Management Sciences, University of Nairobi

Kenya’s Gen Z-led protests of 2024 drew global headlines. For weeks, young people mobilised against proposed tax increases, the rising cost of living, unemployment, corruption and what they saw as an unresponsive political class. But what began as opposition to the 2024 Finance Bill quickly evolved into a broader challenge to the way the country was being governed.

The protests were remarkable for their scale, decentralised nature and ability to mobilise through social media. They were eventually subdued through political concessions and state repression. At least 63 people were killed.

The issues that drove the protests haven’t disappeared. Questions about taxation, unemployment, public spending and inequality remain central to Kenya’s political debate. XN Iraki, an economist who has researched and taught in Kenya and beyond for more than two decades, explores the challenges.

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What has changed in the government’s approach to taxation and spending?

Economic policymaking in Kenya has become more politically constrained. The government can no longer assume that tax measures will be accepted.

As a result, the government has become much more cautious when it comes to tax policy.

The government is far more careful about introducing new taxes or increasing existing ones. Several proposed tax measures have been dropped or watered down, reflecting a greater sensitivity to the political risks of being seen to increase the cost of living. These include a 16% rise in the price of electric bikes resulting from new taxation.

Instead, policymakers have pursued two alternative approaches.

The first has been to widen the tax base, particularly by targeting Kenya’s vast informal sector, which accounts for 8 in 10 jobs (over 18 million employees).

Government officials argue that the tax burden is currently carried by registered taxpayers (only 40% out of 22 million taxpayers), and that everyone should contribute.

But taxing the informal economy remains difficult because many businesses in this sector operate without formal records and survive on thin margins. Small traders are already struggling to make ends meet.

The second approach has been a gradual shift from direct taxes towards levies, fees and charges on services. These include digital payment charges. They are often less politically controversial, but they still raise the cost of doing business. In turn, higher costs can make Kenyan goods and services less competitive and place pressure on consumers.

The protests have also influenced spending priorities. The last two national budgets have included more programmes targeting young people, including internships, enterprise support and procurement opportunities reserved for youth. Yet youth unemployment remains high, at about 67% (ages 15-34). This suggests the scale of the challenge exceeds the resources being devoted to it.

The biggest fiscal consequence has been on borrowing. There are still budget deficits, so borrowing bridge the gap. Recent budgets have relied increasingly on domestic borrowing to finance spending. Domestic borrowing refers to money the government raises from Kenyan investors through the sale of treasury bills and bonds. Kenya also borrows from international lenders, which is often cheaper but carries exchange-rate risks as repayments are made in foreign currencies.

In the 2026-27 budget, 90% of a Sh1.2 trillion (US$9.3 billion) deficit will be borrowed locally. In the 2023-24 financial year, domestic borrowing was 70%.

Domestic borrowing may be politically easier than raising taxes. But it raises concerns about the “crowding out” effect. This happens when government borrowing absorbs funds from lenders, such as banks, that might otherwise have been available for private sector investments and job creation.

What have been the key implications for the economy?

A major concern is that government spending has remained high. Many Kenyans expected the protests to trigger a serious effort to reduce waste and lower spending. That is work in progress.

Two spending items stand out. The first is the public wage bill, which absorbs a significant share of tax revenues. In theory, technology and digitisation should make the government leaner and more efficient. In practice, reducing public sector employment carries political risks, particularly given Kenya’s high unemployment rate.

The second is debt servicing. Kenya spends a large portion of its revenue repaying loans. This leaves less money available for development projects and public services. It creates a vicious cycle. High spending leads to more borrowing, which in turn requires higher future taxes or further borrowing.

The government is caught between competing pressures.

Citizens want lower taxes and a lower cost of living. The state needs revenue to fund services and repay debt. And politicians are reluctant to cut spending ahead of the 2027 general election.

What are the policy hits and misses?

The biggest policy success has been the government’s recognition that young people need to be more deliberately included in economic policy. Recent budgets have expanded funding for youth empowerment programmes.

The misses, however, are more significant.

One is the attempt to expand taxation into parts of the digital and gig economy, where many young Kenyans have sought opportunities. Taxing these sectors risks discouraging innovation and entrepreneurship.

Another is the gap between expectations and delivery. The government’s promise to create overseas employment opportunities for young people has generated publicity, but the numbers remain small relative to the scale of youth unemployment.

Perhaps the most important policy failure is that young people are still viewed primarily as a political challenge rather than an economic opportunity or asset.

Around the world, countries are grappling with ageing populations and shrinking workforces. Kenya has the opposite advantage: a large, educated and technologically savvy young population. Yet corruption and limited economic opportunities mean many young people feel their talents are undervalued and underutilised. This can create frustration.

What economic issues might mobilise young people again?

The issues that brought young people onto the streets in 2024 have not disappeared.

Youth unemployment remains high. Slower economic growth intensifies these frustrations.

Corruption remains another powerful mobilising issue. Many young Kenyans believe public resources are still being mismanaged while essential services remain inadequate.

As Kenya approaches the 2027 elections, the greatest risk for policymakers is assuming that the protests were solely about the Finance Bill. The bill was merely the trigger. The deeper concerns – jobs, corruption, inequality, accountability and economic opportunity – remain largely unresolved. Those issues are likely to continue shaping political mobilisation, even beyond 2027.

– Did Kenya’s Gen Z protests achieve anything? An economist weighs up what’s changed and what’s stayed the same
– https://theconversation.com/did-kenyas-gen-z-protests-achieve-anything-an-economist-weighs-up-whats-changed-and-whats-stayed-the-same-285722