Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By MJ (Thinus) Booysen, Professor in Engineering, Stellenbosch University

Across much of Africa, motorcycles are not leisure vehicles. They are workhorses. They carry commuters, schoolchildren, goods, medicines and deliveries. For millions of people, they provide the most affordable and accessible form of transport, while also creating livelihoods for riders and small businesses.

In many places, they fill the gap left by limited public transport. Kenya alone has about 1.5 million riders.

Of the 27 million motorbikes in sub-Saharan Africa, only about 0.1% are electric, running on clean and low-cost energy.

As part of a team of electrical and industrial engineers at Stellenbosch University, I work (and go on adventures!) to see if that share can be increased.

When our team rode a locally manufactured electric motorbike from Kenya to South Africa in 2024, charging it with only solar power and battery storage along the way, we were not only testing a vehicle. We were testing whether Africa could build and power its own electric mobility future.

The journey covered roughly 6,000km via cities, rural roads and border posts, showing that electric two-wheelers are not a distant dream for sub-Saharan Africa. They are already practical, and they point to a much bigger opportunity.

Feasible transition

Electric motorcycles with battery swapping fit the realities of mobility demand in African countries: relatively short daily trips, constant use, tight operating margins and the need for low-cost transport. It’s already been estimated that electrifying this segment will reduce total cost of ownership for riders by 35%-40%, improve urban air quality, cut greenhouse gas emissions and lower dependence on imported fuel.

Our own research suggests this transition is both technically and economically feasible.

Together, these findings suggest that electric micromobility in Africa is not only technically viable, but can be paired with local solar systems in ways that improve affordability, resilience and access.

An industrial opportunity

Africa should not simply become a market for electric vehicles designed and manufactured elsewhere. It should become a place where they are built, adapted and improved for African conditions. The continent’s mobility needs are specific. Vehicles must cope with rough roads, heavier loads, long operating hours and uneven access to charging. A motorcycle designed for Europe or Asia is not always right for a boda-boda rider in Kenya or a delivery rider in South Africa.

In one study, we developed and validated a physics-based model twin of an electric motorcycle under African operating conditions, showing that energy use can be predicted with good accuracy from real trips, terrain and payload. This digital twin can be used in virtual assessments of electric fleet deployments.

Local production would also create local jobs. It can create opportunities in assembly, fabrication, battery integration, electronics, software, data analytics, servicing and charging infrastructure. It would give young engineers, technicians and entrepreneurs a foothold in an industry that is already growing quickly.

But that growth will not happen on its own. It needs policy support. Ethiopia banned imports of internal combustion engine vehicles in 2024. This rapidly accelerated EV adoption and altered the economics of vehicle imports. South Africa’s belated 150% tax incentive for local electric vehicle production is a step in the right direction.

Tapping into local resources

Sub-Saharan Africa has some of the best solar resources in the world. At the same time, many communities still face unreliable grid electricity or no access at all. That may sound like a barrier to electrified transport, but it is also an opportunity.

Compared with large cars or buses, small vehicle batteries are far easier to charge from decentralised solar systems. Solar-powered charging points, battery swap stations, mini-grids and storage systems can all support electric motorcycles where conventional infrastructure is weak.

Charging has already been demonstrated on solar-hybrid mini-grids, particularly for rural electric two-wheelers, with documented cases in Nigeria and operator-led deployments in Sierra Leone.

Our research has found that decentralised solar can help power this transition: a school-centred solar trading model serving households and electric motorbikes achieved payback periods of under five years in favourable cases and improved supply reliability for external users by about 60%.

This matters especially in rural and peri-urban areas, where mobility poverty is often most severe. A locally manufactured electric motorcycle charged with solar power is more than a cleaner vehicle. It is a tool for inclusion. It can improve access to jobs, education, healthcare and markets while reducing exposure to fuel price shocks.

That is why this transition should not be framed only as a climate issue. It is a development issue.

Policy needs

African governments must make it easier to produce and sell electric vehicles locally. At present, many local manufacturers face the strange situation where importing a finished vehicle is cheaper and simpler than building one domestically. High duties on components, inconsistent regulations, costly certification, weak access to finance and uncertain policy signals all work against local industry.

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Read more: Ghana’s new vehicle tax aims to tackle pollution – expert unpacks how it’ll work and suggests reforms

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If governments are serious about industrial development, electric micromobility is a practical place to start. Support could include lower tariffs on components for local assembly, tax incentives for domestic manufacturing, development finance, clear technical standards and public procurement policies that create dependable demand. The aim should not be permanent protection, but smart support that helps African firms scale and compete.

Governments must support cross-border collaboration. Africa’s challenges are shared, but our responses are often fragmented. Countries create separate standards, separate pilot projects and separate industrial plans, even when their transport needs and energy constraints are remarkably similar. This duplication makes progress slower and more expensive.

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Read more: What’s stopping sunny South Africa’s solar industry? Court case sheds light on the wider problem

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Many African borders were imposed in colonial times. They do not reflect the deeper connections between economies, people or problems. Fuel insecurity, unemployment, poor public transport, congestion and unreliable electricity are not isolated national problems. They are regional realities. The response should therefore also be regional.

That means harmonised standards, easier trade in locally made vehicles and components, shared research platforms and coordinated industrial policy. A larger, more integrated African market would help manufacturers scale up, reduce costs and justify investment in skills and supply chains. It would also allow innovations developed in one country to spread more quickly across the continent.

Electric mobility policy must be linked to energy policy, especially solar energy.

From talk to action

Our journey from Nairobi to Stellenbosch, now told in our seven-episode documentary series, Recharging Hope, was not a publicity stunt. It was a practical demonstration that locally made electric motorbikes, powered by solar energy, can work across African roads and real African conditions. The question is no longer whether this future is possible. It is whether policy and investment will help Africa build it for itself.

With the right policies, partnerships and investment, electric micromobility can help the region move people more affordably, build local industry more confidently and use the power of the African sun more fully.

Africa’s mobility future should be built in Africa and powered by its own abundant renewable energy.

– Africa’s electric motorbike future can be built locally and powered by solar – our 6,000km ride shows what’s possible
– https://theconversation.com/africas-electric-motorbike-future-can-be-built-locally-and-powered-by-solar-our-6-000km-ride-shows-whats-possible-279008

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ding Fei, Assistant Professor, Cornell University

As African cities experience some of the fastest urban growth rates in the world, China has become a major bilateral financier for urban infrastructure.

From Nairobi’s elevated expressways to Lagos’s airport upgrades and Addis Ababa’s new riverside developments, Chinese-backed projects are transforming skylines and daily life across the continent.

I study China’s economic engagements in Africa, focusing on how development is enacted, negotiated, and contested across sites of production, governance, and everyday life.

My recent analysis of 267 Chinese‑financed projects in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo), Lagos (Nigeria), Luanda (Angola), Lusaka (Zambia) and Nairobi (Kenya) shows that while China delivers an impressive volume of infrastructure, it risks reinforcing Africa’s national government dominance in decision-making on urban infrastructure development.

The completion rate, and the speed at which most projects are finished, is impressive. But that’s only part of the equation. Cities – their governments and residents – are excluded from the project planning and negotiation process.

Across my project dataset, none of the infrastructure deals were financed directly through municipal governments. Instead, the agreements were mostly negotiated and funded through national ministries or state agencies. This happens partly because many cities are legally restricted from taking on external debt, and partly because lenders prefer working with sovereign governments.

This national-level dominance has far-reaching consequences for how African cities develop. When cities are not involved in financing negotiations, they lose the opportunity to align major infrastructure projects with long-term urban development plans.

China’s expanding footprint

African cities face massive infrastructure shortfalls. The African Union estimates that urban areas require about US$142 billion every year to build and maintain essential systems. In this context of urgent need, China has become one of the most important bilateral financiers helping to fill the gap.

The six cities examined in my study are the biggest urban centres in their respective countries. Together they house only about 13% of national populations. Yet they receive nearly 30% of all Chinese infrastructure financing flows into those countries.

Between 2000 and 2021, Chinese lenders committed about US$37 billion to urban infrastructure in these six cities. Transport projects account for the largest share, over US$17 billion. This is followed by social projects such as housing, schools and hospitals, which drew more than US$8 billion. Digital networks, electricity systems, water infrastructure and government buildings made up the remainder.

These investment patterns mirror the continent’s biggest infrastructure gaps, especially in transport and education, as identified in a 2022 UN-Habitat report.

Most of this financing is in the form of loans rather than grants. Loans represent nearly 68% of all projects and almost 89% of the total money committed to the six cities. The terms vary widely. Some loans are offered at very low interest rates. Others are closer to commercial rates, sometimes approaching 7%, with repayment periods stretching up to two decades.

Digital infrastructure projects often come with more favourable terms, though they are often tied to Chinese technology suppliers. Two large Chinese development banks, the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, provide nearly 94% of project lending.

One notable feature of Chinese finance is the speed at which many projects are completed. Of the projects with available information, about 74% were completed. Many were completed within two to three years.

This is a relatively high rate compared with typical attrition levels in infrastructure projects across the continent.

The overall completion rate shows a capacity to deliver infrastructure projects at speed.

Still, speed and scale tell only part of the story. Equally significant is who negotiates the terms of lending.

Bypassing city authorities

Local governments are often mandated to implement projects and operate new infrastructure. Yet they lack the power or resources to do so.

In 2020, subnational governments across Africa received only 24% of total public spending, well below the global average of 39.5%. Weak property tax systems, heavy reliance on transfers from central government, and restrictions on borrowing leave most cities with limited fiscal autonomy.

Chinese financing, while substantial, has not altered this structural imbalance.

It’s not that cities don’t get funding at all. As urban hubs in their respective countries, the six cities under study often attract high-profile, foreign-funded projects. The projects elevate a city’s skyline. But they often don’t address neighbourhood-level gaps in water supply, transit access, or environmental services.

My other research indicates that large, showcase projects funded by China often take precedence over localised, community-level improvements. Thus infrastructure is unevenly provided in urban areas.

Cities need fiscal power

If African cities are to manage the rapid urbanisation and meet the needs of the roughly 1.5 billion people expected to live in urban areas by mid-century, they need more than new bridges and roads.

They need the fiscal power and planning capacity to plan, finance and govern infrastructure on their own terms.

Based on my research findings, these steps would be useful:

• rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed

• strengthen municipal revenue and financial capacity

• improve planning coordination across governments.

Firstly, it is crucial to rethink how urban infrastructure is discussed in policy and the media. For years, the conversation has revolved around the idea that African cities simply lack enough roads, pipes, grids and public facilities.

While the shortfalls are real, this framing can reinforce the belief that only large, externally financed megaprojects can solve urban problems. It also risks sidelining the diverse and often creative ways communities already provide services when formal systems fall short.

Instead of viewing cities solely through the lens of what they lack, policymakers should also recognise the hybrid networks that public, private or community actors establish to keep daily services running. Examples of these include housing collectives in Harare and smart water meters in Nairobi.

Strengthening these systems requires a broader, more inclusive vision of what urban infrastructure can be.

Secondly, municipal revenue and financial capacity needs to be strengthened.

For cities to gain real decision-making power, they need stronger and more reliable sources of revenue. That means improving property tax systems, developing transparent land-based financing tools, and ensuring residents have equitable access to productive sector employment.

Some cities, such as Lagos, have already built robust tax bases and even issued municipal bonds to finance major projects.

But reforms cannot just happen at the city level. National governments must give municipalities clearer legal authority to raise revenues and borrow responsibly.

And when countries do rely on external finance, they need strong safeguards in terms of transparent bidding processes, rigorous project evaluations, and clear rules for how risks and costs are shared. Without oversight, long-term contracts can saddle cities with high user fees or hidden financial liabilities that become burdens on future budgets and residents.

Thirdly, planning coordination across governments and sectors must be improved.

Urban infrastructure does not function in silos. Transport depends on land use, water systems depend on energy, and digital networks depend on both. Yet planning is often fragmented across ministries, sectors and international partners.

A more coordinated approach is essential. National and local governments should work together through joint planning committees, shared databases and consultation processes that ensure new projects fit into long-term city strategies. Giving city governments and community groups a seat at the table, especially in the early stages of feasibility studies and project design, will help prevent mismatches between high-profile investments and everyday needs.

Reliable information is central to this effort. Many African countries still lack systems to track external financial flows, project progress, evaluation and management. Building comprehensive data systems is a cornerstone of transparent and responsible governance.

China’s involvement across multiple sectors offers an opportunity to pursue more integrated planning. The recent summits of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have pledged efforts to institutionalise subnational cooperation. But these will only be effective if African governments actively and strategically shape the agenda.

The challenge for African cities is not simply attracting more finance but gaining the authority and capacity to guide urban development. China will likely remain an important financier. But no external partner can substitute for strong city institutions, transparent financial systems, and coordinated planning.

– China is helping build Africa’s cities, but its approach sidelines local urban planners and residents
– https://theconversation.com/china-is-helping-build-africas-cities-but-its-approach-sidelines-local-urban-planners-and-residents-278209

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abeeb Babatunde Omotoso, Senior Lecturer at Oyo State College of Agriculture and Technology, Igboora, Nigeria and Senior Research Associate at North West University, North-West University

Agriculture is the backbone of Africa’s economy. It provides livelihoods for over 70% of the rural population and contributes to national food security and economic development.

For most rural households, farming is not just a source of income and sustenance. It also provides cultural identity and social stability. Over the past two decades, however, rural Africa has witnessed increasing levels of violent conflicts that undermine agricultural productivity, investment and long-term development.

Farmers facing insecurity often abandon productive crops, reduce land use and invest less in their farms. There are serious consequences for food security.

Conflict destroys lives and property. It also changes the decisions farmers make about investing in their land.

We are agricultural and applied economists with expertise in rural development,sustainable food system and climate-smart agriculture. We’ve studied the impact of conflict on food systems in the global south.

One of our studies examined how violent conflict influenced agricultural investment decisions among rural households in Nigeria. We combined nationally representative household data with detailed conflict records, to track how exposure to violence affects farming.

The findings showed that violent conflict altered agricultural investment decisions. It made farmers less likely to cultivate major crops.

The cultivation of yam, sweet potato, groundnut, cowpea, maize and cassava declined as conflict incidents increased. Sweet potato was the most affected, perhaps because it needs a lot of labour and a longer time to grow.

When conflict disrupts farming through abandoned fields, lost livestock, or altered investment decisions, it undermines food availability and long-term agricultural development.

Understanding these impacts is useful when designing ways to help farmers and sustain food systems in conflict-affected areas.

The reality

Our study used panel data from Nigeria’s Living Standards Measurement Study covering the periods 2012/2013, 2015/2016 and 2018/2019.

The national study provides detailed household-level information. This covers demographic characteristics, agricultural production, crop choice, land allocation, input use, production costs and market participation.

We combined the household coordinates with geocoded conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) to measure exposure to violent conflict. The ACLED database provides detailed information on battles, violence against civilians, remote violence, protests and riots.

Our study focused on three indicators of violent conflict exposure:

• total number of conflict incidents

• number of violent incidents affecting civilians (including Boko Haram-related violence)

• number of battles, including protests, riots and farmer–herder clashes.

To capture local exposure to violence, we measured conflict incidents within a radius of 10km of each surveyed household in a given year.

By linking spatial conflict data with household-level agricultural information across multiple survey waves, the study analysed how exposure to violent conflict influenced farmers’ production decisions, land allocation and agricultural outcomes over time.

The findings

The results indicate that insecurity discourages farmers from engaging in production activities that involve greater risk or long-term investment. Conflict exposure also affects land allocation decisions.

The analysis showed a reduction in the total cultivated land area and a decline in the share of land allocated to key staple crops.

This pattern suggests that farmers respond to insecurity by scaling down farming activities, avoiding distant plots, and concentrating on smaller or safer areas of land. Reducing the land cultivated may result in less food produced.

We found that conflict led to less spending on agricultural production. Farmers invested less in inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides and hired labour.

The effects varied across management types. Plots managed by men showed relatively stable investment levels. Production costs increased on plots managed by men and women. This could be due to reliance on external labour during periods of insecurity.

The findings demonstrate that violent conflict affects crop choices, reduces land use and discourages agricultural investment.

Disruptions also increase the cost of agricultural production and marketing, making farming less profitable. Government efforts to support agriculture, such as input subsidies and rural development programmes, don’t work so well in conflict zones.

The adverse effects are more severe for households in highly conflict-prone areas. Disputes have long-term economic impacts.

Recommendation and policy implications

The findings highlight the need for conflict-sensitive agricultural policies and targeted rural development interventions.

First, strong rural security and community conflict resolution mechanisms are essential. Government and local authorities should monitor security in major agricultural zones and help communities to build peace.

Policies should encourage farmers to plant climate-smart and low-risk crops that need fewer inputs and have shorter production cycles. This would make agricultural systems more resilient to conflict.

Extension services should advise farmers on which crops to plant, improved seed varieties, and farming strategies suitable for insecure environments.

Policymakers should invest in rural infrastructure and early-warning systems, including market access, transport networks and conflict monitoring systems.

– Violent conflicts are reshaping what Nigerian farmers grow: what this means for food security
– https://theconversation.com/violent-conflicts-are-reshaping-what-nigerian-farmers-grow-what-this-means-for-food-security-278719

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By David Campbell Francis, Senior Researcher, Southern Centre for Inequality Studies, University of the Witwatersrand

The informal economy is responsible for a large share of economic output across the continent. Yet economic policy is almost always designed for the formal economy and overlooks the informal economy.

We are labour-market economists interested in the informal economy and informal work. We have spent the last two years investigating the concept of an economic policy for informal workers. We spent several months interviewing informal traders, traders’ associations and key stakeholders. Our aim was to better understand their challenges, and to inform the development of an economic policy for informal trading.

Drawing on our research partnership with Women in Informal Employment Globalising and Organising, we argue that rethinking economic policy from the perspective of the informal economy is essential.

We begin from the premise that economic policy must actively support the everyday economy. Recognising informal traders as economic agents, and investing in systems that support them, allows local economies to become more resilient, inclusive and sustainable. Traders need a supportive ecosystem so they can move beyond survival, and contribute to local growth and development.

Our findings highlight five areas that should support a policy ecosystem: macroeconomic stability; efficient administration; regulation of competition; participation in policy and governance; and inclusive infrastructure.

On the ground

Our research focused on informal traders in Gauteng, South Africa’s economic hub. The sector provides vital income for marginalised communities and brings essential goods and services closer to where people live. Yet traders remain on the periphery of policy attention. Urban management often treats them as a problem to control rather than as economic actors to engage.

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Read more: Johannesburg has failed its informal traders: policies are in place, but action is needed

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Most informal traders are own-account workers, operating on survivalist incomes that often fall below the poverty line. They face unpredictable markets, limited access to infrastructure, and constant regulatory uncertainty. This makes it difficult to grow their businesses or improve earnings.

These difficulties reflect the fact that informal traders operate in environments that have multiple layers. These include:

• local factors: municipal regulations, permits, policing, infrastructure, competition, community networks

• broader national forces: macroeconomic trends, regulatory frameworks, structural inequalities, formal-sector dominance.

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Read more: Johannesburg’s produce market has supplied the informal sector for decades: a refresh is due

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Understanding these interlocking layers is essential when creating policies that support sustainable livelihoods and growth.

Five policy pillars

(1) Macroeconomic stability

This needs to be the first pillar of the economic policy. The informal sector is highly sensitive to macroeconomic conditions for a number of reasons.

Firstly, informal traders earn low and unstable incomes. This means that rising living costs quickly erode their ability to sustain livelihoods. This is particularly true when it comes to food, transport and energy prices.

Secondly, the sector is vulnerable to poor growth and unemployment. The informal economy functions as a safety net during economic downturns by absorbing workers displaced from the formal sector. This was well illustrated during the COVID pandemic. But there’s a downside. A flood of new entrants into a constrained sector leads to overcrowding. In turn this:

• leads to intensified competition for limited trading spaces

• disrupts existing organisational systems

• weakens trader networks

• reduces earnings.

Macroeconomic instability, therefore, expands informality. It also threatens informal livelihoods.

Revisiting macroeconomic policy should also include a tax policy that doesn’t prejudice informal workers.

(2) Efficient administration

Administrative inefficiencies and exclusionary practices create barriers for informal traders. For example, delays in issuing permits and other documentation leave traders vulnerable to harassment, bribery and eviction.

Inconsistent enforcement of bylaws creates an uneven playing field. Compliant traders are disadvantaged while irregular practices persist.

These burdens are not solely the result of local government shortcomings. They also reflect national-level failures such as delays in processing asylum-seeker applications. This disadvantages traders who rely on formal documentation to operate legally.

Together, these administrative challenges have a number of knock-on effects. They:

• intensify competition over limited spaces

• erode trust in authorities

• constrain the stability and growth of the informal sector.

(3) Regulation of competition

The South African informal sector faces competition on multiple fronts.

Traders compete among themselves for a limited number of customers and trading spaces. They also face intense competition from the formal sector. Examples include supermarkets, retail chains and shopping malls. Informal traders are pushed into less profitable or precarious locations.

It’s often assumed that there’s perfect competition in the sector – that market players can trade freely.

But they do face structural disadvantages such as regulatory barriers, formal-sector dominance and uneven access to prime trading spaces.

Formal-sector expansion is framed as economic “development”. But it frequently displaces long-standing informal systems.

Intense and unfair competition in the informal sector has another consequence: it forces traders to compete primarily on price rather than quality or service. This is because they can’t match the economies of scale, marketing power, or infrastructure advantages of formal retailers and better-resourced informal traders.

(4) Participation in policy and governance

An economic policy for informal traders needs to emerge from their involvement in policy and governance discussions.

Informal traders are often excluded from the planning and decision-making processes around things that affect them. This includes bylaw enforcement, market design and permit systems.

The result is policies that fail to reflect the realities of informal trade. In turn this:

• creates unnecessary obstacles

• increases uncertainty

• limits traders’ ability to plan, invest and grow.

(5) Inclusive infrastructure

Many traders operate in spaces without electricity, water, sanitation or safe storage facilities. Poor infrastructure limits the types of goods traders can sell and increases operational. It also exposes both traders and customers to health and safety risks.

Too often, cities treat infrastructure provision for informal traders as optional. Or it’s not designed with the needs of informal traders in mind.

This neglect produces unsafe and precarious work environments, undermining both livelihoods and local economic activity.

Infrastructure that is designed to meet traders’ needs will translate investment into higher productivity, improved earnings, safer working conditions and more vibrant local markets. This will benefit both traders and the communities they serve.

– Economic policy in South Africa neglects informal traders: 5 focus areas to support the sector 
– https://theconversation.com/economic-policy-in-south-africa-neglects-informal-traders-5-focus-areas-to-support-the-sector-278323

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Philippa Osim Inyang, Senior Researcher, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs

West Africa as a region has long had one of the most mobile populations in the world. Since 1979, the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) has allowed citizens of its member states to travel freely across borders without visas.

This freedom of movement has helped support regional trade, labour mobility and social ties. But a technological shift is changing how borders operate, with important implications for human rights.

Across west Africa, governments are introducing biometric identification systems, facial recognition cameras and artificial intelligence tools at airports and land borders.

As a researcher in international law, human rights and technology governance, I recently published a study on these developments. In it I argue that the growing use of AI-driven border surveillance risks undermining migrants’ rights. It is weakening data protection and placing pressure on the region’s commitment to free movement.

These systems promise to help governments combat terrorism, human trafficking and irregular migration. However, they also raise serious questions about privacy, discrimination and the future of free movement in the region.

The rise of ‘digital borders’

In the past, borders in west Africa were often lightly controlled. Many crossing points lacked sophisticated equipment. Regional mobility relied largely on trust and travel documents. This is rapidly changing.

In the past ten years, governments have turned to technology to strengthen border security and identification. They use surveillance tools like cameras and digital systems that monitor, track and record people’s movements.

Border posts are being upgraded with biometric scanners, centralised databases and automated border management systems. Nigeria, for example, now issues biometric passports. Residents have to register for national identification numbers that store fingerprints and facial data. Immigration authorities have also introduced biometric screening at major airports and land borders.

Artificial intelligence systems can analyse travel data and flag suspicious patterns. This helps authorities detect fraudulent documents or potential security threats. But these technologies also create “digital borders”: systems where access to a country depends not only on physical checkpoints but also on data stored in digital databases.

Europe’s influence on African border technology

The expansion of digital border systems in west Africa is not happening in isolation. European migration policy has played an important role. Over the past decade, the European Union has tried to control migration before migrants reach European territory. This strategy is often called “migration externalisation”. It involves funding border control initiatives in the countries that the migrants come from or travel through.

Through programmes such as the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, European institutions have funded control systems across west Africa. These projects are often presented as development assistance to improve governance.

But they also serve another purpose. They help European governments identify and deport migrants who reach Europe by verifying their nationality using biometric data collected in their home countries. Critics argue that this shifts Europe’s border enforcement into Africa.

Nigeria and Niger show two different paths

The impact of these technologies can be seen clearly in two countries: Nigeria and Niger. In this study, I found that Nigeria has gradually introduced biometric and digital technologies into its immigration system. These tools help modernise border management, but they also raise concerns about how data is collected, stored and shared. Nigeria has adopted data protection laws to regulate personal information, but enforcement remains uneven. Migrants may have limited ability to challenge how their biometric data is used.

Niger presents a different story. For years, the country was a key transit point for migrants travelling through the Sahara towards north Africa and Europe. Under pressure from the European Union, Niger adopted strict anti-smuggling laws in 2015 and expanded surveillance of migration routes. But in 2023, after a military coup, the new government repealed those laws and distanced itself from European migration policies. The decision reopened migration routes.

Risks for privacy and migrants’ rights

AI tools can improve efficiency and strengthen border management, but they also introduce new risks. One major concern is privacy.

Biometric data, including fingerprints and facial scans, is highly sensitive. Once collected, it can be stored indefinitely and shared across multiple databases. Migrants have little information about how their data will be used or whether it might be shared with foreign governments.

Another concern is algorithmic discrimination. AI systems used in border control rely on historical data to identify patterns. If past enforcement targeted certain nationalities or ethnic groups, those biases can become embedded in automated decision-making systems. This may lead to some travellers being flagged for additional screening or denied entry.

Finally, digital border systems can weaken the Ecowas free movement regime if they are used to restrict mobility rather than facilitate it.

Why are regional rules needed?

West Africa already has legal frameworks that could help regulate these technologies.

The 1979 Ecowas Protocol on Free Movement guarantees the right of movement to citizens of member states. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights also protects freedom of movement and prohibits discrimination. But existing laws were written before the rise of artificial intelligence and biometric surveillance. Without updated regulations, governments may adopt powerful surveillance tools without adequate safeguards.

Ecowas has an opportunity to develop regional guidelines on AI and border governance. This could build on frameworks such as the African Union’s Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy and the G20 AI Principles. These could include rules on data protection, transparency in algorithmic decision-making and independent oversight of surveillance systems. Similar safeguards are already being put in place elsewhere, like the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act.

Artificial intelligence is likely to play an increasing role in border management worldwide. The question is not whether west Africa will adopt these technologies, but how they will be governed. The region is well placed to develop a model centred on human rights.

– AI-driven border surveillance is spreading across west Africa. What this means for migrants’ rights
– https://theconversation.com/ai-driven-border-surveillance-is-spreading-across-west-africa-what-this-means-for-migrants-rights-278552

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Florian Léon, Chargé de recherche, Fondation pour les Etudes et Recherches sur le Développement International (FERDI); Chercheur associé au CERDI (UMR UCA-CNRS-IRD), Université Clermont Auvergne (UCA)

Africa holds abundant private savings, but much of it remains informal. As a result, its contribution to development financing is limited.

Researcher Florian Léon is one of the authors of a recent report on the potential of the “Caisse de dépôt” model – a financial management framework designed for long-term investment that bridges the gap between public funds and economic development. We asked him how this kind of public savings and investment fund could capture and channel these resources into productive investment, alongside development banks.

He outlines the institutional barriers, the reforms needed, and the paths forward for mobilising both local and diaspora savings.

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What’s the main obstacle to mobilising private savings for development finance in Africa?

First, we need to separate two distinct issues: mobilising private savings; and directing those savings to development financing. African economies have untapped potential on both fronts.

Africa does not lack savings. World Bank data show that household saving rates in the continent are broadly similar to other regions. However, only a small share of these savings is formalised in Africa. Households often prefer informal saving methods, such as hoarding cash.

There are a variety of reasons for this. They range from the cost of using banking services (such as opening an account), to a lack of trust in banks. As a result, much of these savings remains outside the financial system and can’t be put to work for African economies.

That said, even private savings that flow through the banking system rarely fund development in Africa. African commercial banks are often reluctant to grant loans to new clients. Among many factors, financial intermediaries see lending as unprofitable or too risky.

Africa therefore faces a twofold challenge. The continent needs to mobilise more savings and also make better use of the resources already in the financial system.

Our report highlights that if Africa as a region were to catch up with the average developing country in these two areas, it could unlock an additional 10% of the continent’s gross domestic product (GDP) per year.

How do funds like this differ from development banks when it comes to long-term investment?

National development banks and Caisses de dépôt share a common mission. Both aim to finance development and support long-term strategic projects.

The differences between them lie in how they operate. Development banks borrow at low rates. They borrow either on the markets or through loans from other development banks (World Bank, African Development Bank). They then lend at better terms than those available on the market (in terms of rate, duration, or amount).

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Read more: Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

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Caisses de dépôt collect private third party funds. These include consignments (funds deposited for temporary safekeeping before restitution, such as prisoners’ savings or unclaimed funds), mandatory deposits, or a portion of regulated savings. They use part of these resources to invest in domestic companies through equity investments. Some of the largest institutions also provide loans.

In short, a fund like this channels domestic private savings into development projects. As for development banks, they rely mainly on borrowed funds – often from external sources.

These two institutions complement each other, as they mobilise different resources and financing tools.

It should be noted that in some countries, including France, Italy and Mauritania, public savings and investment institutions also act as national development banks.

What reforms could make them more effective?

Caisses de dépôt in Africa face a basic problem. They struggle to access the funds they are supposed to manage, such as legal professional deposits or pension reserves. Without them, these can’t play a meaningful role in financing the economy. This situation reflects a lack of political support, depositor mistrust and the reluctance of financial intermediaries (banks) to transfer their resources. Our report identifies three priorities to fix this.

• First, these institutions must build trust with stakeholders, including governments, depositors and financial institutions. This requires strong legal frameworks, sound governance and transparency. They must demonstrate that funds are secure and properly managed.

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Read more: Africa’s public finances are in a mess: a new book explains why and what to do

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• Second, they must broaden their funding base. This involves having a frank discussion with the depositors and custodians of these resources and with the state, which must provide backing. They can then diversify their resources, for instance by developing regulated savings tools.

• Finally, when they have sufficient resources, they can step up as development finance actors. However, they should focus on filling market gaps rather than competing with existing financial intermediaries.

In addition, they can support the development of local financial systems by helping grow segments such as private equity.

How can informal savings and diaspora savings be better harnessed to finance development?

There is no silver bullet, but some lessons can be learned from past experiences. As early as the 1800s, European countries created innovative solutions to offer savings products to the “working population”. By offering liquid, safe savings options backed by the state and providing returns, financial inclusion expanded significantly.

That same formula explains the success of products such as livrets A in France or postal bonds in Italy.

African countries can draw on these models. The practical details must be adapted to the local context, especially to target people living far from urban centres. Digital solutions and mobile money networks could help. If such products existed and were accessible, they could increase the formalisation of public savings.

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Read more: Development finance: how it works, where it goes, why it’s needed

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Mobilising funds from the diaspora raises different challenges. The amounts involved are significant (African diaspora savings are estimated at nearly US$35 billion) and some of these Africans living elsewhere in the world are willing to invest back home. However, mobilising these savings is more complex for various reasons. The diaspora may be spread across many countries. Each group may require tailored solutions that comply with regulations and offerings in host countries.

Currency risk adds another layer of complexity. Diaspora members earn and save in foreign currencies (dollars, euros), but their savings end up in their home country’s currency, which can be weaker and lose value over time. On top of that, diaspora members have different expectations. The offer must be carefully designed to match their preferences.

Efforts are already underway. DiasDev by Expertise France, for example, is working with several African Caisses de dépôt to overcome these challenges. But turning diaspora savings into a real engine for development finance will take time.

– Development finance in Africa: economist explains how private savings could be unlocked
– https://theconversation.com/development-finance-in-africa-economist-explains-how-private-savings-could-be-unlocked-277204

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kwasi Konadu, Professor in Africana & Latin American Studies, Colgate University

The resolution passed by United Nations General Assembly on 25 May 2026 seeking recognition of the transatlantic slave trade as the “gravest crime against humanity” potentially creates a broader definition of crimes against humanity in international law and allows for restitution claims against perpetrators. The resolution could elevate the legal and moral standard for what counts as the worst crimes against humanity, and compel more people to legally pursue reparations or compensation cases and thus deter such crimes.

Proposed by Ghana, it was adopted with 123 votes. The United States, Israel and Argentina voted against it. Fifty-two countries abstained, among them the UK and European states.

There has never been a single “gravest crime” designation applied to one human event or condition. Instead, international law defines categories of crimes considered the most serious. Examples are genocide, war crimes, crimes of aggression, and crimes against humanity. Being classified under these categories triggers severe legal consequences. These include global prosecution, lifelong accountability, international sanctions, and reparation claims.

Ghana’s declaration views transatlantic slavery and its system of forced African labour as the worst crime ever committed. It explains how millions of Africans were abducted, treated like property, and abused because of their race.

The declaration points out that the effects of slavery still influence inequality and racism today. It calls on all nations to recognise what happened, teach its history honestly, and remember the victims. It also works towards fixing the lasting damage, including institutional and monetary reparations.

I am a professor of history who has researched and written extensively on the slave trade and its impact. I argue that Ghana’s resolution represents more than a moral or diplomatic statement. It marks a decisive step in an ongoing effort of historical reclamation and political transformation. It asserts that the histories of enslavement, displacement and organised theft are foundational to the modern world.

More importantly, it insists that recognition must lead to action. For contemporary Africa, this moment is about leveraging historical truth to reshape present conditions and future possibilities within a global system still marked by the legacies of transatlantic slaving.

Slavery shaped the modern world

Transatlantic slaving was not an isolated historical episode but a foundational process that made the modern world. Between the 15th and 19th centuries, over 12 million Africans were forcibly removed from their homelands. It was a massive, organised system of theft that left African societies dealing with long-term demographic, political and economic disruptions.

During the 1800s slavery changed form. It became tied to European imperialism. Powerful nations such as Britain and France took over land in Africa and other regions. The countries that had been major slave traders became the leading imperial powers in Africa. For example, French forces in the late 1800s still captured people and forced them into service. Laws in French west Africa didn’t truly end slavery. They simply allowed colonial governments to take over land.

The colonising countries often claimed they were bringing “civilisation”. Similarly, European colonisers in central Africa – especially under Belgian rule in the Congo Free State (1885-1908) – caused massive suffering and death. Around 10 million people died over about 40 years.

The creation of diaspora communities

Over the course of transatlantic slaving, Africans participated, resisted, adapted, and preserved cultural and intellectual systems that would later shape diaspora communities and their bonds with Africa. Those bonds included shared historical experiences, cultural practices, religious systems, political ideas and intellectual traditions that travelled and transformed across the ocean.

Recent calls for reparatory justice emerge from this long-standing network of connections.

Ghana’s resolution comes out of a convergence of continental and diaspora political efforts. African states and Caribbean nations have increasingly coordinated their positions on historical injustice and reparations.

Ghana’s resolution was built on earlier declarations:

The Ghana declaration sets a precedent. It seeks to redefine the moral language of the international order. Elevating it as the gravest crime underscores slavery’s scale and duration. Its systemic nature establishes it as the fundamental architect of global capitalism, racial hierarchies and modern state formation.

Why it matters

The Ghana declaration recognises the centrality of transatlantic slavery and compels a reassessment of how modern inequalities are explained and addressed.

For contemporary Africa, this recognition carries material implications. The aftermath of transatlantic slaving are evident in patterns of underdevelopment, external dependency and unequal integration into global markets. A formal recognition at the highest level of international governance strengthens the basis for claims to reparatory justice.

Such claims may take multiple forms. These may include investment in infrastructure, education and health systems. There could also be reforms to global financial institutions that boost mobilising resources within African borders.

Equally significant is the resolution’s role in consolidating pan-African and diasporic solidarity. By aligning African states with Caribbean nations and broader diaspora communities, it reactivates a political consciousness rooted in shared histories and strategic alignments.

A unified transatlantic African bloc possesses greater leverage within – and outside – international institutions and can more effectively advocate for systemic transformation.

The Ghana resolution also functions as a global educational intervention. Public understanding of transatlantic slaving often remains fragmented or minimised. This is true particularly in regions where some groups or historical individuals benefited from it.

By placing this issue before the United Nations General Assembly, Ghana compels a broader confrontation with the scale and consequences of transatlantic slaving. This is essential for historical accuracy as well as for shaping near future policies and coordinated actions.

Resistance lies ahead

The resolution will face resistance. Some nations such as the United States and Great Britain remain wary of the legal and financial implications of a “gravest crime” recognition. The subject of reparations for them is contentious and untenable. These tensions reveal enduring asymmetries in global power and the difficulty of translating moral or historical claims into enforceable outcomes.

Yet resistance itself underscores the resolution’s significance. It exposes the extent to which historical injustices remain embedded in contemporary political and economic power arrangements.

– The transatlantic slave trade is the gravest crime against humanity – why the UN declaration matters
– https://theconversation.com/the-transatlantic-slave-trade-is-the-gravest-crime-against-humanity-why-the-un-declaration-matters-279218

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rodwell Makombe, Professor of English Literary and Cultural Studies, North-West University

South-African born writer and world literature scholar Elleke Boehmer’s sixth novel, Ice Shock, is a breathtaking story about two lovers who, soon after they meet, find themselves separated to pursue different career choices in different parts of the world.

Niall Lawrence spends 14 months at a polar institute in Antarctica while Leah Nash pursues a writing career in London. This relationship, which starts when the two meet on a London train, sets in motion a philosophical interrogation of love, career choice and the sustenance of both in a turbulent world.

Through this love story told across two continents, Boehmer paints, in broad strokes, a picture of a planet in crisis, reflected through the melting ice in Antarctica, the Fukushima disaster in Japan and the volcanic eruptions that disrupt global air travel.

In this new world, the old distinctions between “here” and “there” – the centre and the periphery – are disrupted and new ways of inhabiting the planet are imagined. The changing climate intrudes into and disrupts private lives as Leah and Niall struggle to communicate across vast distances and in hostile weather conditions.

Ice Shock asks serious questions about choice, decision-making and the extent to which the unforeseen and the coincidental interrupt and change the courses of our lives. The central question is how the two manage to strike a balance between commitment to love and to career.

How is it that two people who are not looking for love become so strongly connected that their lives take a completely different turn? Is it possible some people are meant for each other? Soulmates?

Leah and Niall are entangled, we are told, like particles in quantum physics, which, once they have interacted, “remain intrinsically linked even when separated by astronomically large distances”. Their birthdays come one after the other – on 31 December and 1 January – and even their initials (NL and LN) interconnect.

As a literary scholar with an interest in travel and migration, I read my colleague’s new book as a radical re-examination of taken-for-granted distinctions such as north and south, here and there, us and them.

This book brings into sharp focus the urgency of the heating planet, showing that its effects are disrupting the most mundane human activities, incuding love relationships.

In Ice Shock, Boehmer combines the teasing style of romance fiction with the contemplative edge of a modernist novel to write about how both the global and the local are making an impact on the way people live, work and love.

Modernist novel

When I first read the book, my impression was “this is a modernist novel”. The modernist novel, which became popular at the turn of the 1900s, radically broke away from the traditional, realistic way of telling stories.

Modernist novels experimented with new narrative styles like stream of consciousness and fragmentation. Modernist writers such as Virginia Woolf and James Joyce wrote novels that were not only interested in telling stories but also engaging with ideas and exploring the minds of their characters.

The backdrop of Boehmer’s story (global disasters and a warming planet) mirrors the backdrop of the modernist novel (massive industrialisation, technological innovations and global catastrophe in the form of the first world war).

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Read more: African sci-fi imagines new ways of living in climate-changed worlds

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Ice Shock deploys a non-linear narrative style and an open-ended plot. Typical of the modernist novel, it refuses to speak about anything with certainty.

It recalls Woolf’s 1925 novel, Mrs Dalloway, not only because of how it explores, in explicit detail, the minds of the characters but also because of the intensity of the relationship between Niall and Leah. Like Niall in Ice Shock, Peter in Mrs Dalloway loves Clarissa to the point of suffocation.

Epic love story

Ice Shock seems to ask the basic question about what it means to love. Is love the intense emotional connection between two people? Is it sacrifice? Faithfulness? Can one love without being faithful?

This is not only a story about the beauty of love but also the pain of it. Niall and Leah may be entangled like particles in quantum physics, but they are still human beings susceptible to human frailties.

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Read more: Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s new book Dream Count explores love in all its complicated messiness

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They enter into and keep various flirtatious relationships and fateful romantic entanglements from each other and, somehow, readers are complicit because we do not want to see the lovebirds separate.

Still, they remain powerfully connected. The constant friction between them seems to be the fuel that keeps them going. Boehmer suggests that love, especially between soulmates, thrives in a state of constant but productive tension.

Leah is a free-spirited, self-driven personality while Niall is thoughtful and considerate. They both know and understand each other telepathically, without words. Across vast distances, they communicate with each other through the stars and the moon.

In her review of Ice Shock, South African literary scholar Barbara Boswell describes it as “a novel saturated with extremes”.

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The lovers know their relationship is moving too fast, but they do not know how to slow it down. Is this a reflection of the preoccupation with speed in the contemporary world or the fast pace with which the planet is warming?

Perhaps the question that Boehmer is asking is how much love is enough to maintain a healthy relationship. Ice Shock is an intrusive novel that captures the inner thoughts (and reflections) of the characters in a way that blurs the distinction between fiction and reality, self and other.

Burning planet

Niall and Leah’s intense, ferocious love affair, in a sense, mirrors the seemingly irreversible catastrophe of global warming – as if to say, we all know the effects of unsustainable human activity on the planet but somehow, we keep going with the same ferocity and intensity. Leah and Niall’s love, like the warming planet, has no reverse gear.

Ice Shock is an attempt to rethink and rewrite how we inhabit the planet.

– Ice Shock is a novel about passionate love in a time of climate crisis
– https://theconversation.com/ice-shock-is-a-novel-about-passionate-love-in-a-time-of-climate-crisis-277016

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tinashe Mushakavanhu, Assistant Professor, Harvard University

A new feature film, Makemation, is an African coming-of-age story set in a time of artificial intelligence (AI).

Makemation was produced by Nigerian AI-developer-turned-filmmaker Toyosi Akerele-Ogunsiji. As conversations about AI are dominated by external global powers, his film offers a different vantage point: an AI story rooted in African realities.

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Read more: AI in Africa: 5 issues that must be tackled for digital equality

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After a successful run in Nigerian cinemas in 2025, it’s now touring internationally and I attended a screening at the Harvard Center for African Studies. It was followed by a discussion with its producer and economist Ebehi Iyoha, who researches AI in Africa. The evening foregrounded precisely what the film so deftly dramatises: that the future of AI can also be imagined, contested and built on the African continent.

Makemation is about a young girl, Zara, who discovers AI as a tool not just for personal advancement, but for transforming her community. She must navigate poverty, gender expectations and limited access to science, technology, engineering and maths education. In the process, her journey becomes a powerful reflection on youth innovation, digital inclusion and the possibilities of homegrown technology in Africa.

As a scholar of literature and cultural studies, I see Makemation as a vital intervention that challenges the dominance of western techno-narratives. It places AI within local histories of inequality, aspiration and improvisation.

My work also examines popular media as cultural archives through which African futures are imagined and debated. Makemation expands the archive through which we study who gets to imagine and write African futures.

African tech futures

The title of the film is a blending of words that combines “make” and the suffix “–mation” to evoke ideas like automation, transformation and imagination. It captures the film’s central claim: that young Africans are not passive consumers of AI, but active makers of it.

Makemation asks: who gets to shape the AI revolution? Who benefits from it? And what does innovation look like in places where infrastructure is fragile? Where formal employment is scarce, and ingenuity is often born of necessity?

It does not treat Africa as a technological afterthought. Much of the global AI debate remains abstract and heavily mediated by the concerns of major technology companies or the governments of China and the US: existential risk, large language models, automation at scale.

These conversations, while important, often obscure the material realities of communities where access to electricity, stable internet or quality education cannot be taken for granted. In many African cities, largely informal and dynamic, young people are already improvising with technology in ways that challenge narrow definitions of innovation.

Makemation demonstrates this vividly. Informality is not depicted as absence or lack, but as a site of creativity. The protagonist captures this tension when she says, “My father is a welder and my mother sells akara (street food).” She goes on to explain that she believes education and innovation can create opportunities. Lines like this connect the film’s discussion of AI to everyday forms of labour, grounding its ideas in the realities of family, work, and aspiration.

In the discussion after the screening, Akerele-Ogunsiji spoke about the importance of storytelling in shaping technological futures. If narratives about AI continue to centre only a handful of geographies and demographics, they risk entrenching existing inequalities.

Africa’s youth bulge

Africa, according to the UN, is home to one of the youngest populations in the world. This demographic reality has profound implications for AI adoption, labour markets and education systems.

If supported by inclusive policies and meaningful access to digital tools, this film tells us, this generation could shape AI in ways that reflect local priorities rather than imported assumptions.

At the heart of the film lies a set of intertwined questions about access and privilege. Who has the bandwidth, literally and figuratively, to participate in AI development? Who has the confidence to imagine themselves as technologists?

The young protagonist’s journey is not simply about mastering code or winning a competition. It’s about negotiating gender expectations, economic precarity and the psychological barriers that tell many young African girls that technology is not for them.

In this sense, Makemation is as much about social infrastructure as it is about digital infrastructure. Mentorship, community support and visible role models matter. The film does not romanticise hardship. Instead, it shows how structural constraints shape technological possibility.

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Makemation works not only because of its idea but also because it is well made. The camera often stays close to the characters, and the soft colours create a reflective mood. The slow editing gives the story time to develop.

Its most important message is to destabilise the idea that meaningful AI conversations happen only in elite spaces. Makemation demonstrates that debates about AI technologies and opportunities that come with them are already unfolding in classrooms, community centres and informal neighbourhoods across Africa.

– Makemation: a Nollywood movie that shows AI in action in Africa
– https://theconversation.com/makemation-a-nollywood-movie-that-shows-ai-in-action-in-africa-277693

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Saheed Babajide Owonikoko, Researcher, Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology

The recent deployment of US soldiers in Nigeria to assist the west African country in its counterterrorism campaign could worsen Nigeria’s insecurity.

It might be perceived as a sign of weakness; deepen religious divisions; widen the rift between the Economic Community of West African State (Ecowas) and the breakaway Alliance of Sahel States (AES); provoke terrorist attacks; and hinder the development of Nigeria’s armed forces.

Since Nigeria’s 1999 transition to civil rule, insecurity has worsened in the country’s northern regions. In 2024, 9,662 people were killed nationwide, 86% of them in the north. In 2025, violent deaths rose to 11,968, with northern Nigeria still the most affected.

The first batch of US soldiers was deployed barely two months after the US bombed militants in Nigeria’s north-west on Christmas Day 2025.

The director of defence information at Nigeria’s defence headquarters said the US troops’ presence would give Nigerian troops access to specialised technical capabilities. This would strengthen Nigeria’s ability to deter terrorist threats and enhance the protection of vulnerable communities across the country.

This is not the first time foreign boots have been brought into Nigeria since its independence in 1960. Foreign soldiers were deployed to fight the Nigerian Civil War, and to re-professionalise the Nigerian Armed Forces.

Between December 2014 and April 2015, Nigeria is said to have hired a private military company called Specialised Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP) International, involving 100 to 250 South African ex-soldiers, for a direct combat role against insurgents in Maiduguri. The government denied this.

Now is the first time US soldiers will be deployed in a combat-related operation as part of Nigeria’s counterterrorism efforts. Among members of the public, there are divided opinions over this.

As a security scholar who researches Nigeria’s security crises, I have serious concerns that the deployment of US soldiers in Nigeria, regardless of their number, may exacerbate insecurity rather than improving it.

Why it may backfire

The armed forces of any country are an emblem of sovereignty. Foreigners in a combat operation against terrorism in another country may be framed domestically as a loss of control over security.

The US has long sought to station its Africa Command (Africom) in Nigeria. Nigeria resisted this, largely due to the sovereignty issue, regional politics in Ecowas and other strategic calculations. Since the US Christmas Day bombing, President Bola Tinubu has come under heavy criticism for not being able to truly act as commander-in-chief while a foreign power handles the security.

What is more, President Donald Trump has widened existing religious divisions across Nigeria by:

• framing Nigeria’s security challenge as persecution of Christians

• declaring Nigeria a country of particular concern

• threatening to deploy the US military to Nigeria unilaterally to defend Christians.

Given this context, US boots on the ground in Nigeria may feed into several conspiracy narratives. One is the perception that the US is seeking access to Nigeria’s critical mineral resources.

It could reinforce the Alliance for Sahelian States-Ecowas crisis, deepening the security conundrum in the Sahel. Nigeria would likely be the most affected.

After the coups in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, and Ecowas efforts to force the coupists to return power to civilians, the Alliance of Sahel States formed and disengaged with western powers. Animosity developed between the two regional groupings.

The Alliance of Sahel States countries, which used to be allies of France and the US, have now shifted to Russia and China. Niger’s junta ordered the withdrawal of over 1,000 foreign military personnel and closure of US facilities, including a drone base in Agadez.

Russia currently has at least 1,500 foreign troops, tagged as the African Corps (previously Wagner), fighting in Mali alone.

The deployment of US troops to Nigeria, given the context of fracture within Ecowas and the shift in foreign alliances, could lead to an escalation of insecurity in the region.

Thirdly, the US is the global arrowhead of westernisation that most Islamist terrorist organisations usually select as the target of attacks. Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria and the support it gets from foreign terrorist organisations like al-Qaeda and ISIS are due largely to the perception that Nigeria is a proxy for the US.

With US soldiers in Nigeria, Nigeria’s value as a target for terrorist organisations may increase. There are already signs that terrorist attacks are escalating in Nigeria since the Christmas Day bombing.

Even with US troops deployed to Nigeria’s north-east, terrorist attacks have become more daring. On 5 March, Islamic State West Africa Province attacked military bases in Borno State. Several high-ranking military officers were killed and arms and ammunition were carted away.

If US forces are attacked, Trump is more likely to deploy more soldiers.

This was the case in Somalia in May 2017. Trump expanded US military operations in Somalia after a US Navy Seal was killed by al-Shabaab.

Even if the presence of the US soldiers in Nigeria is to help Nigerian Armed Forces in operational capacities such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, logistics and air power manoeuvres, heavy reliance on the US could weaken the long-term development of the Nigerian Armed Forces.

What to do

US support is key to Nigeria’s improved capability to address its security challenge, but this should not take the form of US military boots on the ground in Nigeria. It can come in the form of training support and supply of precision equipment. That would help to address critical shortages that affect Nigeria’s ability to deal with insecurity.

– US troops in Nigeria to help fight terrorism could end up making it worse – analyst
– https://theconversation.com/us-troops-in-nigeria-to-help-fight-terrorism-could-end-up-making-it-worse-analyst-278112