Archaeology has evolved: Four eras of understanding Africa’s past

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Forssman, Senior Lecturer, University of Mpumalanga

What is the past? It may seem a simple question to answer, but it is more complex than we might think at first. As science, politics, technologies and ways of thinking change, so does our understanding of what went before.

Tim Forssman is an archaeologist who has conducted research in South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Mozambique. He recently completed a book about how the history of archaeology in Africa has shaped the way we understand the past. Here he shares some thoughts about why the discipline matters.


What are the key phases of archaeological work in Africa?

In my book, I divided the practice of archaeology in Africa into four phases: the early years, the emergence of archaeology, a coming of age, and archaeology’s diaspora across Africa. These are not definitive, and they have fuzzy boundaries, but they made the most sense to me. Each chapter begins with a story that I felt captured that period in time.

The 1798 L’Expédition d’Egypte (Egyptian Expedition) under Napoleon Bonaparte. Painted by Léon Cogniet in 1835 (Louvre). Wikimedia. CC BY

The early years came at a time (the late 1800s) when European nations were scrambling to parcel up Africa into colonies. Much of the archaeological work at this time was based on collections, with little analysis of the finds. Most of the research was carried out by museums employees, missionaries, administrators and travellers but little by trained specialists.

Archaeology in Africa cover. Author provided (no reuse)

In the early 20th century, archaeological approaches changed, leading to a clash of amateurs and professionals. By the 1920s, robust analytical approaches were being developed and used to interpret the past. However, archaeology was still chasing the ghosts of colonial misperceptions of Africa’s history. Bogus notions of an Atlantis, a legendary sunken utopia, in west Africa, or Hamitic people from Egypt bringing advanced technology to large parts of the continent, continued.


Read more: Colonialism in Africa: archaeology offers a deeper view


The second world war brought about a technological leap. Methods such as radiocarbon dating emerged along with other advanced methods that would fundamentally shift archaeological approaches. Early examples of radiocarbon dating in Africa were from Bernard Fagg’s work in Nigeria on the Jos Plateau. While stationed there as a colonial chief inspector of mines he was alerted to finely crafted terracotta heads. He and his wife, Catherine, searched for more and retrieved a large sample. He dated them, producing an age over 2,000 years old, much older than any known kingdom in west Africa at that time. It challenged colonial views that complex civilisations emerged far later in this part of the world than elsewhere.

The stone cairn in Great Zimbabwe’s valley complex. Photo: Andrew Moore, Wikimedia. CC BY

Growing from the 1960s, the diaspora of archaeology, was the role communities played in research, either as workers or by offering information and knowledge. This, I argue, represents a complete shift in archaeological frameworks and in giving agency to Africans.

Great Mosque, Kilwa Kisiwani. Photo: CosiMapi, Wikimedia. CC BY

The Swahili coastline is a perfect example. Previous work focused on the role that incoming Arabic groups played in transforming the socio-political landscape. Then a new approach emerged which turned the lens and examined how local communities carved out change along the coastline as part of a much longer history. Interest shifted from monumental settlements like the Great Mosque at Kilwa-Kiswani, in Tanzania, to everyday life.


Read more: Ancient DNA is restoring the origin story of the Swahili people of the East African coast


These chapters show how the lens archaeologists and historians use focuses on different pasts. As our contexts change, as our approaches shift, or as our science takes on new forms, our view of the past comes into a new focus. We see the past through the present – it is dependent on our social, technological, economic and political contexts.

What role does archaeology play in modern Africa?

Fort São Sebastião on Mozambique Island. Photo: Stig Nygaard, Wikimedia. CC BY

The past has created the world we inhabit. For example, the entire eastern seaboard, from Mogadishu in Somalia to Vilanculos in Mozambique, is shaped by the long history of trade, interaction, colonisation, slavery and conflict. During the colonial era, and in South Africa until the end of apartheid, much of this was not fully recognised or widely promoted. Refocusing on the past, in places with colonial pasts, can play a reparative role in acknowledging African histories that were poorly recorded, helping us to better understand how our society was shaped.


Read more: Looting of African heritage: a powerful new book explores the damage done by colonial theft


Archaeology matters beyond how we view ourselves and those around us. It has the potential to promote social harmony, improve spiritual and mental health by connecting people with their past and their ancestors, and create sustainable jobs. It also promotes local and indigenous ways of doing and knowing. In Egypt, the Golden Parade of the Pharaohs through the streets of Cairo, when 22 mummies were moved to their new museum in 2021, became an important symbol of nationhood and identity. However, so much of Africa’s heritage is currently at risk.


Read more: Côte d’Ivoire’s sacred talking drum is coming home: lessons from Kenya on how it could transform lives


The Aksum stelae. Photo: Sailko, Wikimedia. CC BY

Preserving the past is an important task for all archaeologists and historians. Rampant looting for museums and collections has led to the loss of important historical items, such as terracotta statues in Nigeria and Mali. Crime is another concern. Conflict during the late 1990s in Eritrea and Ethiopia resulted in the toppling of stelae (stone columns) and golden finds from Thulamela (a site in South Africa’s Kruger National Park) were stolen from the museum in Skukuza, never to be retrieved.

Climate change is having an irreparable impact on history and heritage. In east Africa, potentially more than a quarter of the Unesco World Heritage sites are at risk of flooding or erosion. Mozambique is already witnessing massive damage from cyclones. It is only through archaeology that we learn more of these important pasts and identify methods to protect and preserve them.

Where do you see the field going next?

It is a very diverse discipline with a lot of sub-fields. Each has their own ambitions, aims and goals. But I believe there are some overarching agendas.

Reviewing scientific papers of African research shows that the vast majority are authored by people from Europe and North America. This brings collaborations, funds and training opportunities, but it also causes problems locally. This power dynamic needs to be revised. There should be more of an emphasis on growing local capacity, facilities and training.


Read more: South Africa’s history uncovered: the 1,000-year gap they don’t teach in school


Archaeological science is advancing our knowledge of the past at a rapid rate. Genetic research is helping us understand human and animal movements across the continent, and chemical analysis of artefacts such as glass beads is helping us map trade networks. We need more laboratories in Africa. This will create jobs and skills development, and reduce the risks associated with moving sensitive heritage items far from their places of origin.


Read more: Nigeria’s city of Ilé-Ifẹ̀ has survived and thrived for 1,000 years: here’s how


I also feel that including local communities in archaeological research at various levels is a grand shift in the discipline. In the earlier years, community knowledge was undervalued, whereas today many studies place it at the centre of understanding. Studies of rock art, for example, struggled to understand the art’s meaning until scholars turned to the belief systems of people who produced it to unlock its symbolism.

While there are many challenges, archaeology is in a strong position to contribute to the future. However, archaeologists must ensure that they show how the past is relevant in the present, or it risks being left behind.

– Archaeology has evolved: Four eras of understanding Africa’s past
– https://theconversation.com/archaeology-has-evolved-four-eras-of-understanding-africas-past-287886

Zambia votes: who’s who and what issues are shaping the elections?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nicole Beardsworth, Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand

Zambia’s election, scheduled for 13 August, has shaped up into a battle between two alliances. The ruling United Party for National Development alliance is backed by 15 smaller parties. The Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance is headed by presidential newcomer Brian Mundubile and his running mate, Makebi Zulu.

The Tonse-Pamodzi alliance includes a group of smaller political parties without parliamentary representation, and many of the remaining structures of the Patriotic Front. Mundubile was formerly in the Patriotic Front, which was voted out in 2021. Alliances cannot register, so they have to run as a party but are backed by an informal alliance.

Almost every election in Zambian history includes negotiations on an opposition electoral coalition, but few survive to fight the elections. In 2026, the opposition cohered late in the face of what they say is significant state interference. They hope to take the election despite facing these challenges.

Having worked extensively across multiple Zambian elections and based on the research I have done as part of the Zambia Elections Research Network, my view is that the election will do two things:

  • test the strength of the Tonse-Pamodzi’s local campaign and remaining Patriotic Front loyalties

  • be a referendum on the United Party for National Development’s policies.

The election has turned into a more competitive race than most analysts had expected. With 14 candidates standing for the presidency, there are few recognisable party names. And for the first time in 30 years there isn’t a single former ruling party represented on the ballot.

Mundubile – and the National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity he’s heading – face a challenge of trying to sell themselves to Zambians in an extremely short period without the party labels or name recognition of previous contenders. His candidature on this new party was only announced in May.

The best performance of a newcomer candidate in Zambia’s history was in 2001, when the founder of the newly established United Party for National Development, Anderson Mazoka, faced down the Movement for Multiparty Democracy’s Levy Mwanawasa, who won the election with just 29% of the vote to Mazoka’s 27%.

The biggest factor playing on voters’ minds is the economy. While our survey conducted in late 2025 suggests that many Zambians are quite happy with many of the government’s flagship policies, the high cost of living and people’s expectations of the economy will be a key election issue.

It’s the economy …

When Hakainde Hichilema and the United Party for National Development won in 2021, he found the cupboard bare.

In November 2020 Zambia became the first African COVID-era debt default following years of unsustainable borrowing by the Patriotic Front government, which had run the country since 2011.

When Hichilema took over there was no clarity even on the extent of the debt. This was partly as a result of the contracting of debt at ministerial level and the broader weakening of institutions and oversight mechanisms.

He set about returning technocrats to the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury. A debt restructuring process was completed in June 2024. This cut over US$900 million from the total debt burden and spread future payments over a much longer period.

Zambia’s default status was officially lifted in November 2025, when ratings agency S&P Global raised its long- and short-term foreign-currency credit ratings with a stable outlook. Other economic wins included:

The restructuring deal is not without its critics. Nevertheless, five years after hitting rock bottom, Zambia is once again seen as a destination for global investment.

The Zambia Elections Research Network ran a survey in Zambia in late 2025 in which respondents ranked government’s performance on many of its key policies positively. The policies included cash for work programmes, the expansion of the constituency development fund and the introduction of free education. The survey was a nationally representative telephonic survey of 1,497 respondents.

But the primary complaint of many in Zambia is that the cost of living is still too high. And the changes at the macroeconomic level are yet to trickle down to household level.

The cost of a basic needs basket in Zambia increased by 43% between July 2021 and July 2026. But salaries have not kept up, according to the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection, which publishes a monthly cost of living bulletin.

Governance and legislation

The government’s achievements on deepening Zambia’s democracy and cleaning up corruption have been mixed.

The United Party for National Development government pursued an anti-corruption campaign. Many senior government officials were charged for corruption. Some were imprisoned. But none of the companies that took part in corrupt activities were charged. And few of the corruption scandals under the United Party for National Development administration have been pursued.

Hopes of progressive legal changes were raised in 2021 when the administration repealed the law on defamation of the president and finally brought in the Access to Information Act. But the overall record is much more mixed.

In 2025, the government introduced the contentious Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act, No. 7 (commonly known as “Bill 7”). But the change failed to meaningfully reform Zambia’s long-debated centralised constitution. Instead it nearly doubled the number of seats in parliament. It added 40 proportional representation seats without adequately specifying the mechanisms by which the elections would work.

In the final days before Parliament closed – and just three months ahead of the elections – the government pushed a massive 74 bills through parliament. These included crucial bills that would govern how the election was run. This “legislative overloading” reduced the already diminished oversight role of Parliament.

Opposition parties claim that state institutions were used to prevent them registering for the 2026 elections. It has been alleged that the Registrar of Societies – the body that governs political parties – changed the names of their office bearers, or changed their status from a political party to a church, or in some cases changed party names entirely. They argue that this state interference was the primary reason why for the first time in 30 years there isn’t a single former ruling party on the ballot.

The ruling party has also proven increasingly intolerant of dissent. Since 2021, several journalists and opposition leaders have been arrested, and no opposition rallies were approved to be held for five years. A key opposition leader was sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour for the defamation of the president. This has had a chilling effect on the opposition and civil society.

The battle of the alliances

Having been the leader of the opposition in Parliament since 2021 and the government chief whip from 2019 to 2021, Mundubile has a profile among those who watch politics in Lusaka. Relying on remaining Patriotic Front structures and sympathies in the party’s former heartlands, his alliance has run an impressive campaign with huge rallies across much of the country.

His campaign has done extremely well, despite having few resources, and it appears that he is gaining significant ground. While he has a considered manifesto, much of his campaign has tried to draw on remaining sympathies for the late former president Edgar Lungu, and he has pledged to “rule just like Lungu did”. Many of his promises on the campaign trail seem to pledge a return to the kind of decentralised patronage politics of the Lungu era.

For its part, the ruling United Party for National Development has put up a gruelling, if last-minute, campaign, and the president has been holding mass rallies across the country while also using his position to announce the opening of new development projects. Hichilema has also spent much of that time speaking off the cuff and attacking former party insiders and MPs for not supporting his constitutional reforms.

In a context where it appears that there was a deliberate attempt by state institutions to keep recognisable parties off the ballot, this election will be a test of the capacity of the Tonse-Pamodzi campaign, the remaining strength of Patriotic Front loyalties and a referendum on the United Party for National Development’s policies. Either way, the country is likely to have a much stronger opposition to contend with after the 2026 polls.

– Zambia votes: who’s who and what issues are shaping the elections?
– https://theconversation.com/zambia-votes-whos-who-and-what-issues-are-shaping-the-elections-289074

The world has changed. African countries must rethink how they grow their economies

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury University

The prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has exposed how vulnerable Africa’s economies are to geopolitical shocks. Fuel prices have remained elevated, squeezing economies that depend heavily on petroleum imports from the Middle East. These include Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.

This vulnerability also puts at risk the continent’s push to escape poverty through what economists call structural transformation: moving workers from low-productivity activities such as subsistence farming into more productive jobs in manufacturing and modern services.

The continent never fully participated in the export-manufacturing wave that transformed East Asia from the 1960s onward. And now Africa’s industrialisation ambitions have become even more difficult to realise as geopolitical rivalry, fragmented supply chains and artificial intelligence reshape the global economy.

As an economist who has written about how weaponisation of global trade affects African economies, I believe structural transformation still matters. But it must be reinvented around four priorities:

  • larger markets

  • reliable electricity

  • Africa’s comparative advantages

  • agriculture.

Why the old model worked

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China and Vietnam all industrialised in broadly the same way. They expanded exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods such as garments, footwear, furniture and electronics. These industries created millions of jobs for workers with limited formal education while gradually building technological capabilities, productive firms and efficient logistics networks.

What made this possible was a relatively stable global trading system. Trade barriers generally fell, demand for manufactured goods expanded, and richer countries steadily moved out of low-wage industries as incomes increased. Governments could focus on becoming more competitive because the rules of international trade were comparatively predictable.

Africa never fully benefited from that opportunity. Manufacturing accounts for only about 10% of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa, compared with around 22% in East Asia and the Pacific. The continent’s share of global manufacturing has fallen from roughly 3% in the 1970s to less than 2% today.

The continent struggled to establish internationally competitive manufacturing even when the global trading environment was relatively open. Among the factors holding it back were:

  • unreliable electricity

  • high transport and logistics costs

  • small and fragmented domestic markets

  • weak industrial capabilities

  • limited access to finance

  • unpredictable policy.

As a result, many economies remained dependent on commodity exports while importing most manufactured goods.

These longstanding constraints have not disappeared. Instead, Africa now faces a double challenge. It must overcome the structural barriers that prevented the traditional manufacturing-led development model from taking off in the past, and also adapt to a global economy that’s changed dramatically. This challenge does not make structural transformation impossible. It simply means the old way of doing it won’t work.

Four changes have rewritten the rules

The first change is that trade itself has become a geopolitical tool. Countries use export controls, financial sanctions and control over strategic technologies to pursue national security goals. The disruption in the Strait of Hormuz illustrates this.

The second is that manufacturing can’t create jobs on the scale it once did. Automation has reduced demand for the low-skill factory jobs that once absorbed millions of workers.

This matters because by 2030 sub-Saharan Africa is expected to account for roughly half of all new entrants to the global labour force. That’s around 15 million young people each year. Creating productive employment will require growth across manufacturing, modern services and higher-value agriculture rather than relying on factories alone.

Third, China has remained competitive in labour-intensive manufacturing. Rising wages led many economists to expect production of clothing, textiles and footwear to relocate to lower-income countries. Instead, China still dominates. This makes it much harder for African producers to enter sectors that earlier industrialisers used as entry points.

The fourth change is artificial intelligence. AI is becoming a general-purpose technology that can help economies move labour and capital into more productive activities. For example:

  • AI-powered tools can help farmers make better decisions about weather, pests, input use and market prices

  • businesses can use AI to reduce costs, improve quality and participate in regional and global value chains.

How governments should respond

The African continent still needs millions of better-paying jobs and much higher productivity to reduce poverty and raise living standards. What has changed is the route to achieving those goals.

First, pursue economic security collectively rather than nationally. Structural transformation requires firms to invest in new industries. But they are less likely to do so if export markets are uncertain or supply chains are easily disrupted. A larger integrated market can reduce those risks.

Acting together also gives African countries greater bargaining power as the US, China and Gulf states compete to invest in the continent’s digital and physical infrastructure. Full implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area is more urgent than ever.

Second, invest in electricity. It is the foundation of both industrialisation and the digital economy. Manufacturing, digital services and AI-enabled industries cannot grow without reliable power. Yet electricity remains one of the biggest constraints. In sub-Saharan Africa 78% of businesses experience routine power outages. As a result they lose an average 8.4% of annual sales, compared with a global average of 5.2%. In Nigeria 86% of businesses own or share a generator. In Kenya it is 65%; in South Africa 63%.

This dependence on diesel generators increases reliance on imported fuel: a vulnerable spot.

Third, compete where Africa has genuine comparative advantages: industries linked to natural resources and growing domestic markets. Examples include:

Finally, recognise that agriculture is central to structural transformation, not separate from it. Around half of sub-Saharan Africa’s workforce is employed in farming. Higher farm productivity raises rural incomes, releases labour for productive activities and creates demand for manufacturing and services.

AI can accelerate this process by helping farmers.

Countries that successfully connect these new realities to the long-standing goal of shifting workers and resources into higher-productivity activities will be best positioned to achieve sustained and inclusive growth.

– The world has changed. African countries must rethink how they grow their economies
– https://theconversation.com/the-world-has-changed-african-countries-must-rethink-how-they-grow-their-economies-289060

Zed Beats: how home studios reinvented Zambian pop music and gave young people a voice

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mathew Tembo, Lecturer, Arts and Musicology Department, Copperbelt University

Zed Beats is a music movement that evolved in the late 1980s when young producers started using computers to blend western music with local languages and flavour. Today it’s an umbrella term for popular urban music in Zambia.

Musician and academic Mathew Tembo is a Zed Beats specialist. His PhD is on its history, production and musical labour from 1986 to 2024. We asked him to tell us about the music and how it shapes the country.


What is Zed Beats?

Zed Beats takes its name from the “Z” in “Zambia”. It’s a blend of indigenous musical elements with influences drawn from R&B, reggae, rap, Jamaican dancehall, hip-hop, Afrobeats, amapiano and other urban music genres trending at the time of its production.

The music, sung mostly in Zambian languages Chinyanja and Chibemba, along with some English, is produced on digital audio workstations by self-taught producers in home studios. The use of local languages makes Zed Beats resonate with young people, whose everyday conversations are carried out in these languages.

What forces created the ‘new’ music?

During the late 1980s and 1990s, Zambia’s live music scene was devastated by the HIV/Aids epidemic, which claimed the lives of a generation of top musicians working in genres like Kalindula and Zamrock. The collapse left Zambian radio and TV heavily dominated by foreign American, Congolese and Jamaican music.

Zed Beats stepped into this void, using affordable computer software to resurrect local music and give Zambians back their voice. It was a youthful voice that helped create a new urban identity and became a reset for the nation.

In my study I discuss how Zed Beats also emerged from a dire economy, using technology that made producing music more affordable. This reformed Zambia’s “musical labour” economy. It marked a move away from the traditional, collective effort of live bands touring night venues to individualised digital production.

Deejays became the new vehicle to spread the music, instead of traditional media. Women participated more than ever before in the production of popular music. As Zed Beats became more visible in southern Africa, it also became a source of national pride. Today, Zed Beats artists are internationally known figures who contribute to the music conversation in Zambia.

Who were the pioneers?

To understand the evolution of Zed Beats, a brief history of home studios is necessary.

In 1989, Mushima, the first known home studio, was established at the Lusaka home of Dr Katele Kalumba, a controversial politician, public health specialist and musician. However, the most influential producer of the 1980s and 1990s was sound engineer Michael Linyama. He and his business partner Francis Mwiinga were the first to use a computer to record music in a home studio in Zambia.

By the late 1990s, neighbourhoods across Zambian cities hosted home studios as spaces where musicians could record. In 1997, Daddy Zemus, considered to be the inspirer of Zed Beats, released his debut album Salaula (Pick from a Pile). Salaula refers to secondhand clothes imported from the US and Europe for resale at open markets in Zambia. With the harsh economic situation, this was a common practice in urban marketplaces.

The success of the song inspired other pop music acts to experiment with lyrics in local languages. Before that, pop musicians inspired by American music mostly sang in English.

In home studios, producers were able to multi-track and manipulate sounds using music software. This became a model for producing urban popular music. In 2001, Jordan Katembula’s debut album JK epitomised the new sound of Zed Beats. After the release of JK, the artist could not drive in the streets of Lusaka and other bigger cities without being mobbed by fans.

His song Balekuzembeleka (They Are Lying to You), sung in Chibemba, was about a love relationship. It resonated with young people and would establish a major theme in Zed Beats lyrics.

Who are today’s stars?

Zambia’s music economy continues to grow. Today, many musicians are able to make a decent career in music. Yo Maps, Slap Dee, Macky 2 and his brother Chef 187 are some of the Zed Beats musicians who’ve dominated the scene in the last decade or so.

Some of the biggest hits of the past few years have been Yo Maps’ Somone (Come and See), Slap Dee’s Asante (Thank You), Macky 2’s Winsula (Do Not Look Down Upon Me) and Chef 187’s Shadow Boxing. Their themes vary.

Somone is about a man who was refused by a woman for having too little money. In the song he asks her to “come and see” how successful he’s become. A reminder that people can change their circumstances.

In Asante, Slap Dee thanks God for guiding him through life and making him succeed. Winsula is a lament from a woman who has been treated unfairly by her man because she does not look as beautiful as she did when they first met. In Shadow Boxing, Chef 187 claims there is no rapper better than him out there. He is simply boxing himself (his shadow). The stories of rejection, resilience, love and faith make Zed Beats songs relatable.

What role do these artists play during elections?

Although Zed Beats musicians are not known for political lyrics, they are routinely used to mobilise voters, particularly during elections.

The tightly contested 2011 elections, for example, saw the opposition Patriotic Front win for the first time. Music played a big role in advancing their campaign, especially the catchy song Donchi Kubeba (Don’t Tell Them). In it, Dandy Crazy encourages people to accept favours from the ruling party but secretly vote for the opposition.

In 2016, JK’s Dununa Rivesi (Kick it Back) featured prominently during elections, played and performed at rallies.

For the 2026 elections, more than half of the most notable Zed Beats artists have been contracted to record theme songs or perform at rallies for the ruling party and the opposition.

Zed Beats is fluid. It plays various roles in Zambian society and can be heard wherever people gather in numbers. Its ability to draw from other musical influences and morph into different forms while maintaining its identity is the reason the music endures and is starting to go global.

– Zed Beats: how home studios reinvented Zambian pop music and gave young people a voice
– https://theconversation.com/zed-beats-how-home-studios-reinvented-zambian-pop-music-and-gave-young-people-a-voice-288438

Abuse and silence in South Africa’s classical music culture: what a student’s story reveals

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Carina Venter, Senior Lecturer in Musicology, Stellenbosch University

When I interviewed a man I will call Charles as part of my research on classical music and abuse in South Africa, he shared a poem with me. He’d written it when he was studying music at university in South Africa.

it is madness / this building / with its windows / cold and closed / so that not even the stale air can escape … with its countless doors / their iron locks and tiny square portholes…

You might think the writer was describing a prison or an asylum built centuries ago for those deemed unfit to live in “normal” society; not a university music department.

Charles told me that he was suicidal for much of this period and that he self-harmed. Queer, brown, gifted, and the first in his family to attend university, he’s the kind of student who might have excelled in post-apartheid South Africa. Yet he dropped out before he could complete his music studies.

When I asked him why, he said he’d been forced to “juggle” multiple traumas. In his university residence, he experienced racial abuse. At the same time, the musical world that had once given him a sense of belonging became a place of isolation, even incarceration. He described feeling trapped between his love of classical music and the reality of studying in an environment where he did not feel he belonged.

Charles spoke at length about the emotional abuse he experienced from his teacher, who repeatedly told him he was a failure despite his exceptional musical abilities. These experiences compounded his profound sense of isolation. It left him with what he described as feelings of “madness”.

Charles’s description of institutionalised music schools is not isolated. “The rooms suggest prison cells,” observed US harpist Judith Kogan of the prestigious Juilliard music school. Hungarian violinist Carl Flesch wrote about how powerful and charismatic music teachers “usually are vampires who suck out their pupils’ personality…”

In classical music education, especially when it comes to a performance career, the teacher is a formative influence on the student. They are in a position of power, not only by virtue of their reputation and expertise, but also their professional networks. They’re able to create opportunities for students, to recommend them to other influential people and institutions.

As a musicologist with interests in violence and trauma, I have researched how classical music responds to difficult histories and how these histories, including apartheid, have shaped our thinking and writing about music and race in South Africa. My most recent project narrows this to consider abusive behaviours within the institutions that produce classical music. This includes universities, professional organisations, orchestras and choirs.

All is not well

There have been suggestions that all is not well in South Africa’s classical music industry. A handful of media reports have focused on individual teachers or famous international performers accused of sexual abuse.

A 2024 report, with a focus on women in the South African music scene, found that just under one third of those surveyed felt pressured to enter a sexual relationship.


Read more: Sexual abuse and bad pay: women’s struggles in South African live music exposed


Yet South African classical music institutions and the industry more broadly have been vexingly silent about why abuse cultures might be ingrained in their teaching philosophies and practices.

Not even the #MeToo movement and a call for the South African music industry’s own reckoning with sexual abuse could rupture the sound-proof walls of South African classical music.

Tackling abuse is imperative to create safer environments for teaching and professional music-making. And also to reckon with the harms that colonial and apartheid cultural production have carried into the present.

Why the silence?

The silence is not entirely surprising. For centuries, classical music in South Africa has remained ensconced in an ethos of non-political neutrality. It was about universal beauty and musical genius. Not things like race, colonialism or apartheid.

It has often represented the most admirable of human qualities, telling stories about “great” composers or performers (often men) overcoming adversity through music.

But apartheid favoured white South Africans. It structured education, social life and economic possibilities according to racial privilege. Classical music performance and listening, part of the European tradition of high art, were largely reserved for white South Africans. It connected them to what was regarded as a western tradition of superior culture and civilisation.

Black students were able to study classical music at white universities only under exceptional circumstances. There, they were generally trained as classroom teachers rather than prepared for careers in concert performance or elite music education.

This history has lived on in many different ways, shaping music institutions after democracy.

Abuse in South Africa

In my own ongoing research, I have heard of powerful music professors or teachers who abused their students. Of male orchestral players and conductors forcing themselves onto women players. Of teachers trading in manipulation and humiliation.

Charles’s account is taken from the first work published on abusive behaviours in South African classical music. It exposes blurred boundaries: between the possibilities of teaching to create intimacy, knowledge and self-discovery – and teaching that harms students, reducing them to instruments serving the teacher’s gratification.

Charles saw studying music as a key to community, critical thinking and self-discovery. At first his music lessons felt like a safe space. But the warmth could at any moment give way to shouting and a lesson ending abruptly.

A teacher’s physical touch is often to demonstrate something about the mechanics of playing or singing. For Charles it began to feel it was also “to show that he (the teacher) was in control”.

What Charles experienced, I argue in my paper, is more than just a case of emotional harm committed against a student of colour in a teaching context. It carries with it the weight of a difficult past.

At its best, teaching and learning invites curiosity, creativity, critique and self-discovery. But emotional harm, sexual talk and a touch that feels controlling amounts to what I call the “pornographic in pedagogy”. Teaching where the transformative possibilities of education are replaced by a harmful play of feelings.


Read more: Sexism permeates every layer of the music industry – new report echoes what research has been saying for years


Charles’s story is not just the story of an elite teacher and a student. Particular aspects of classical music education and its cultural underpinnings lend themselves to abusive behaviours. This raises questions about the enduring silence in South African classical music about them.

If the history and present of South African classical music is going to be written in all its complexity, it will require for us to grapple not only with the influence of apartheid, but also with the sustained silence about abusive and harmful behaviours that have threaded through them.

– Abuse and silence in South Africa’s classical music culture: what a student’s story reveals
– https://theconversation.com/abuse-and-silence-in-south-africas-classical-music-culture-what-a-students-story-reveals-286773

Drought and the war in Ukraine changed what families in Kenya could afford to eat – research tracked food and cooking gas use

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Matthew Shupler, Postdoctoral Research Associate in Environmental Public Health, Harvard University

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had an almost immediate impact on global energy markets and the movement of food around the world. During the first year of the conflict, international crude oil and natural gas prices rose sharply. Disruptions to exports of wheat, maize, sunflower oil and fertilisers from Russia and Ukraine contributed to record global food prices.

Kenya was badly affected as the country imports about 92% of the wheat it consumes.

I am a global health researcher and was interested in tracking how the war in Ukraine affected Kenyans’ ability to afford food and cooking fuel. In 2022, I worked with a team in Mukuru, an informal settlement in Nairobi, to understand how the war had affected the way families used liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for clean cooking.


Read more: How Russia-Ukraine conflict could influence Africa’s food supplies


Most Kenyan households still rely on biomass fuels like wood for cooking, but LPG is used by about one-third of Kenyans. LPG is much more commonly used in Kenyan cities (about 60% use) compared with rural areas (about 10% use). Since Kenya does not produce any LPG domestically, changes in global energy prices and supply disruptions can greatly increase cooking costs.

During 2022, after Russia invaded Ukraine, food inflation in Kenya nearly doubled from 8.9% to 15.4%. This sharp price rise was driven by rising global food and transport costs and also a multi-year drought, which reduced harvests across the region.


Read more: Kenya’s cost of living crisis: expert unpacks what’s driving it and what should be done


We analysed data from families’ smart meters, which showed how often they cooked with gas and how much they spent on fuel. We also surveyed the households to understand how rising food and fuel prices changed what they ate during 2022.

We found these drastic changes in dietary and cooking behaviours:

  • three-quarters of families in our study changed the foods they cooked. More than half ate less meat and fish in 2022. They consumed more ugali (maize porridge, a staple food in Kenya), vegetables and fast food.

  • half of families skipped more meals

  • one-third reduced the amount of gas they consumed for cooking.

Following families through the food price crisis

Cooking in Makuru settlement. Courtesy Matthew Shupler.

Mukuru is a large informal settlement, with a population of 500,000-800,000 people. The families we surveyed were customers of a company called PayGo Energy. The company allows customers to pay for gas in smaller increments rather than having to purchase a full cylinder of gas at once.

As purchasing a full gas tank can be very costly for families living below the poverty line, a pay-as-you-go option can make cooking with gas more accessible for families. These families might otherwise cook with cheaper biomass fuels, like wood, that often generate more air pollution when burned.


Read more: Kenya’s maize price has doubled in a year: 6 ways to avoid a staple food shortage


Because PayGo Energy monitored their customers’ gas use using smart meters, we measured their use before and after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war to estimate the change in their consumption. We also surveyed the families and held focus group discussions.

We used a United Nations World Food Programme tool which measures the steps households take over the previous week to cope with food shortages. We also asked participants whether they were skipping more meals or eating different foods than usual.

Families used less gas

We found that households greatly lowered the amount they cooked with gas in 2022 compared with 2021. Families only used their gas stove for an average of eight days a month in 2022 compared with 19 days a month in 2021. Their total cooking time per month decreased from 12.8 hours to 8.3 hours.

These results matched our survey findings, in which 63% of participants reported changing the type of food they consumed, 50% shared that they skipped more meals and 30% stated that they cooked with gas less frequently in 2022 compared with 2021. One participant said:

I have shifted to rice and spaghetti because it takes less time to cook hence saves gas.

People ate less food

Another person said:

There has been a high rise in food and fuel (prices). We have had to create a balance by lowering the food and maintaining the gas usage.

Reducing their cooking time led households to spend an average of 86 Kenyan shillings (US$0.66) less per month in 2022 compared with 2021. One person told us they were decreasing their spending on cooking and skipping meals:

Our children have a feeding programme at school which is advantageous so we adults can just skip meals and wait for supper to save.

Finding policy solutions

Although our research studied the effects of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022, geopolitical conflicts will likely continue to threaten global food and energy security, as demonstrated by the war between the US and Iran.

In 2026, the Strait of Hormuz closure disrupted energy markets and raised concerns about fertiliser supplies and food prices. The impacts in east Africa are likely similar to what they were in 2022.


Read more: 80% of Africa’s fertiliser is imported: how food systems can adapt to the Iran shock


As economic crises will continue to occur and as climate change intensifies, national and global policies can help protect against food insecurity risk. This will require direct safety nets for families, including cash transfers or payments from the government.

The government could also subsidise nutritious foods that are cheaper and faster to cook, such as canned beans, frozen vegetables and fortified foods.


Read more: Russia-Ukraine conflict is driving up wheat prices: this could fuel instability in Sudan


Supporting small-scale farmers with better seeds, access to credit and water-saving farming methods can also help communities produce more food and become more resilient to drought and climate change. Taken together, making these investments can help build a more adaptable food system.

– Drought and the war in Ukraine changed what families in Kenya could afford to eat – research tracked food and cooking gas use
– https://theconversation.com/drought-and-the-war-in-ukraine-changed-what-families-in-kenya-could-afford-to-eat-research-tracked-food-and-cooking-gas-use-287424

Burundi refugees talk about life in South Africa after their long journey: hope and heartbreak side by side

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tackson Makandwa, Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Anthropology, University of KwaZulu-Natal

Over 250,000 people were registered as asylum seekers and refugees – people displaced by force – in South Africa in 2024. About 4% of them were from Burundi, some 3,000km away.

When people think about refugees, they often imagine families fleeing war and finding safety in another country. As social scientists, we’re also interested in what happens after they arrive. Does finding safety also mean finding a place to belong?

We believe that everyone has a story to tell, and we listened to the stories of Burundian refugees living in Chatsworth, Durban. This is a suburban area that was set aside for people of Indian descent under South Africa’s racial apartheid laws (repealed in 1991).

Our study brings to light the complex reasons these men and women left Burundi: conflict, political violence, persecution and fear for their lives. Burundi has endured decades of political turmoil, marked by recurrent episodes of ethnic violence, authoritarianism and civil wars.

We wanted to understand what everyday life looked like once Burundians were in the destination country.

South Africa allows refugees and asylum to settle and integrate without confining them to a camp system. However, displaced people must carve out lives within fragile economies, contested political spaces and precarious social landscapes.


Read more: Burundi at 60 is the poorest country on the planet: a look at what went wrong


Rather than focusing on the challenges of access to employment, shelter, or legal documents, we explored something less visible but equally important: how people hold on to hope while carrying the weight of loss, living with scars of war, grief and uncertainty.

We interviewed 15 Burundian refugees and asylum seekers, including their community leaders, in Chatsworth in 2025. From what emerged, the adopted “home” space of Chatsworth represents both safety and struggle.

The study reminds us to see refugees not simply as people in need of assistance, but as individuals with dreams, talents, families, and hopes for the future.

From Burundi to Chatsworth

Originally designed under apartheid’s Group Areas Act as a relocation site for Indian South Africans, Chatsworth has evolved into a multicultural township marked by socio-economic challenges and increasing migrant settlement.

For Burundian refugees, Chatsworth is both a space of possibility, where religious networks, informal economies and community solidarities provide forms of stability, and a space of precarity.

We collected data through walking in and around the area; we visited homes, restaurants and community spaces such as Catholic church venues. We met men from Burundi who were mostly contracted under a large South African grocery store delivery business.

Community leaders and other participants were accessed through organisations working with migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in the city of Durban, primarily through Refugee Pastoral Care, a programme run under the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Durban.

Every few years, anti-foreigner sentiments and organised activities flare up in South Africa. In June 2026 another wave of violence swept across the country, including the central areas of Durban, not far from Chatsworth.

Nevertheless, some Burundians in our study viewed South Africa and Durban (and suburbs like Chatsworth) in particular, as a place where they could find shelter and protection from physical harm. They were grateful to have escaped the violence of their home country and to be able to work and support their families.

Yet some also said they never truly felt accepted by the surrounding communities. One participant summed it up powerfully by saying that Chatsworth was

safe for my body, but not for my heart.

Another important finding was that hope is not simply wishful thinking. For the people we spoke to, hope was something they practised every day. Hope meant working long hours so children could attend school. It meant saving small amounts of money whenever possible. It meant attending church or mosque, where faith offered strength during difficult times.

For some, education represented the greatest hope for the future. Parents believed that although they had lost opportunities because of conflict, their children might enjoy a better life. Hope became a reason to keep moving forward despite heavy uncertainty.

For Burundians, as a refugee or asylum seeker, sorrow remained a constant companion. In this study, almost everyone carried painful memories of Burundi. Some had lost family members during the conflict there.

These memories remained vivid even after many years. Some still dreamed of returning home one day to rebuild their lives in peace.

The research also revealed that women and men sometimes experienced displacement in different ways. Women carried the responsibility of caring for children while also earning an income through informal work. They described drawing strength from women’s savings groups and prayer meetings, where members encouraged one another and pooled small amounts of money to cope with daily challenges.

Some men, on the other hand, spoke about losing the social status they once enjoyed in Burundi. Former teachers, business owners and professionals now found themselves doing physically demanding work simply to survive. Although some felt they had lost part of their dignity and identity, providing for their families gave their lives purpose.

As one pointed out:

I was a big man back in Burundi, all the politicians and the people in the army, Hutu or Tutsi, they know me, I was a very successful businessman … but when the war started, I was hunted like an animal. They took everything …

Hope and heartbreak

In this study, hope and sorrow reveal themselves as existing side by side. It is easy to think of refugees either as victims or as inspiring examples of resilience. The reality is far more layered and complex.

The Burundian refugees we met were both hopeful and heartbroken. They mourned the lives they had lost, while working hard to build new ones. They appreciated the safety South Africa offered while still longing for home and acceptance.

Their stories show remarkable courage, but they also remind us that recovery from displacement is about much more than crossing a border. It is about rebuilding a life, finding a sense of belonging, and holding on to hope even when sorrow never fully disappears.

– Burundi refugees talk about life in South Africa after their long journey: hope and heartbreak side by side
– https://theconversation.com/burundi-refugees-talk-about-life-in-south-africa-after-their-long-journey-hope-and-heartbreak-side-by-side-288774

Running for parliament in Malawi costs a fortune: economic crisis undermines democracy

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Michael Wahman, Professor, Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin

Malawi’s constitutional court annulled the 2019 presidential election. The 2020 re-run brought an extraordinary transfer of power from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party to the opposition Malawi Congress Party, raising hopes for economic and political renewal.

However, the new government came to preside over a period of deep economic crisis and growing public discontent driven by a series of overlapping shocks.

The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted supply chains. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 pushed up the cost of key imports like fuel, fertiliser and maize. Malawi has also endured successive floods, droughts and cyclones. Severe shortages of foreign currency, fuel and electricity compounded the effects of poor harvests.

By 2025, the World Food Programme estimated that nearly one-third of Malawians faced acute food insecurity. This meant that Malawi’s 2025 parliamentary election took place against the backdrop of profound political and economic turmoil.

We are researchers of Malawian politics, and in collaboration with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s Cost of Politics programme, we sought to understand how an economic crisis can shape an election campaign. Collecting new data from 2025, we were able to make interesting comparisons with the 2019 poll.

We found that the cost of running for parliament in Malawi has risen dramatically from an average of US$20,000 per candidate in 2019 to US$51,000 in the 2025 poll.

The economic crisis intensified candidates’ reliance on electoral clientelism. This is the exchange of benefits like cash or goods for political support, usually votes.

Malawi has one of the four highest poverty rates in the world, and for many people living in acute poverty, elections provided an opportunity to secure much-needed relief.

Clientelism, therefore, continues to play an important role in electoral competition, with weak political parties relying on well-resourced parliamentary candidates to finance campaigns.

Further, the oversight of campaign finance remains limited and weakly enforced. And the rising cost of campaigns has made it even harder for less well-resourced groups, particularly women and young people, to access political office.

The result is that politics excludes more people, and well-funded independent candidates can compete successfully against party nominees.

A heavy reliance on personal wealth distorts political competition. It also creates incentives for corruption, as MPs seek to get their money back once elected.

The cost of a seat in parliament

Malawi introduced new regulations in 2019 to curb this kind of politics. Before the 2025 election, there was further reform. Most notably, the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties was established a year earlier to enforce political finance rules, including a ban on material handouts during campaigns.

However, the office is under-resourced and understaffed. Though handouts are not legal, the office could not investigate every allegation.

We sounded the alarm about the cost of Malawi’s parliamentary campaigns in 2019.

Our earlier survey found that the average parliamentary candidate spent around US$20,000 (in 2019’s exchange rate) on their campaign. This is an astonishing sum in one of the world’s poorest countries. Most of the money came from candidates’ personal savings, according to our survey of self-reported campaign spending.

Candidates invested in sinking boreholes, building bridges or even buying ambulances. They also provided personal goods, including cloth, money or food, to voters. A lot of this spending happened during election rallies.

Yet campaign spending in 2019 pales in comparison with the costs incurred during the 2025 election.

In nominal terms (without taking into account staggering inflation of 238% between elections in 2019 and 2025), we found that average spending rose by 500%. Even after adjusting for inflation, campaign spending increased by 78% in real terms.

On average, candidates spent about US$51,000 on their campaigns in 2025 (in 2025’s exchange rate). Among candidates who received more than 20% of the vote, average spending reached US$95,500.

We attribute the increase in spending to two factors:

  • a very competitive election environment – in 2019, candidates from the government party far outspent the competition; in 2025, candidates from both the ruling party and the opposition were able to spend large sums of money

  • the economic crisis, which increased the demand for handouts.

The drivers

Money-fuelled politics is one of the thorniest and stickiest issues in Malawian democracy.

Our research revealed confusion about the law around election handouts among both candidates and voters.

Politicians have raised questions about whether banning campaign handouts was ever realistic in a political environment where they are expected.

Further, candidates said Malawi’s economic crisis created pressures to provide handouts.

Like many African countries, Malawi is a place of stark economic inequality. Those seeking elected office usually belong to the country’s economic elite. For ordinary people facing severe hardship, elections became an opportunity to seek short-term economic assistance.

Candidates reported being asked to fund community development projects, pay school fees, and cover funeral expenses and medical bills. They were also expected to provide voters with cash, food and other basic necessities.

The Malawi Electoral Commission was praised for substantial improvements in its management of the election, but there has been little progress in addressing the role of money in politics.

This undermines electoral competition and weakens political representation.

What next

In fragile economic environments, democracies become more vulnerable to politics where money buys votes.

Policymakers need to make reforms that reduce candidates’ reliance on this exchange. Our research suggests that it may be necessary to:

  • change to a more party centred system where individual candidates are less pressured to provide private resources

  • create protected pathways for women to contest elections

  • invest in the enforcement of campaign finance regulation

  • enhance the role of civil society to oversee intra-party candidate selections

  • introduce spending caps for parliamentary campaigns.

Such reforms will be essential if African democracies are to become more resilient during periods of economic crisis.

David Kayuni, Lingalierini Mihowa and Nandini Patel contributed to this article.

– Running for parliament in Malawi costs a fortune: economic crisis undermines democracy
– https://theconversation.com/running-for-parliament-in-malawi-costs-a-fortune-economic-crisis-undermines-democracy-288240

Respectful maternity care starts with improving hospital culture: lessons from rural South Africa

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tanya Doherty, Professor and Chief specialist scientist, South African Medical Research Council

Every woman has the right to be treated with dignity, compassion and respect when giving birth. Yet for many South African women childbirth in public health facilities can be marked by poor communication, neglect, lack of privacy and, in some cases, verbal or physical mistreatment from health workers.

In a few cases, exposure to severe, disrespectful and abusive behaviour can lead to long-term psychological distress, affecting women and their families.

Efforts to improve respectful maternity care in South Africa have focused mainly on training individual healthcare workers through short courses. Training is important. But it often overlooks a crucial factor: the organisational culture in which health professionals work.

Health workers don’t operate in isolation. Their behaviour is influenced by heavy workloads, staff shortages, workplace hierarchies, team relationships and leadership practices. Providing more respectful care means addressing these underlying organisational factors.

We have spent more than two decades designing and implementing health systems research to improve care for women, newborns and children. Our recent study, conducted in nine rural district hospitals in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province, explored whether improving teamwork, learning and workplace culture could improve women’s experiences of maternity care.

This is the first study to assess the feasibility and effects of an intervention addressing both organisational culture and women’s experience of care.

After the intervention, we found improvements in key aspects of care: particularly in communication, autonomy and supportive care experienced during childbirth. Importantly, the largest gains were observed among women from poorer households and those who had attended fewer antenatal visits, who may be more vulnerable. It also improved organisational learning culture and health worker teams.

A different approach

We developed and carried out an intervention called Strengthening Teamwork and Respect (STAR) over a one-year period. The intervention did not focus solely on how staff treated women. It also encouraged teams to examine their own working environments, communication patterns and professional relationships.

The approach involved:

  • participaton: multidisciplinary teams of nurses, midwives, doctors, managers and non-clinical staff met approximately monthly. They reflected on challenges in their maternity units and developed locally relevant “change projects”.

  • leadership by local staff champions selected from within each maternity unit. The champions received a two-day training.

  • the use of structured activities to encourage reflection, dialogue, teamwork and problem-solving.

What we found

We surveyed more than 1,800 women who had recently given birth, as well as over 200 maternity healthcare workers, before and after the intervention.

Our main findings included an improvement in overall person-centred maternity care. Scores increased from 61.5 out of 100 before the intervention to 65.7 afterwards.

The greatest improvements were in areas related to communication and autonomy. More women reported that healthcare providers explained procedures, sought consent before examinations, involved them in decisions about their care, and allowed them greater choice during labour.

Supportive care also improved. Women reported shorter waiting times, greater trust in healthcare providers and a more positive overall experience.

One particularly striking finding concerned birth companions. Before STAR, almost nine out of 10 women said they were not allowed a companion of their choice to stay with them during labour. After the intervention, access to companionship increased substantially.

Many of the participating hospitals had chosen to make birth companionship one of their change projects. STAR teams developed ways to make it possible to have birth companions – things like name badges for companions, written confidentiality agreements, and informing security staff.

Perhaps the most encouraging finding was that the largest improvements occurred among women who often face the greatest barriers to good care. Women from the poorest households experienced greater gains than women from wealthier households. Similarly, women who had attended fewer antenatal visits showed larger improvements than those with more frequent antenatal care.


Read more: Burnout and bias can lead to poor care during childbirth – we created a project in Kenya that helps health workers


Our research also measured changes in organisational learning culture. We measured the extent to which workplaces encouraged learning, dialogue, innovation and shared problem-solving.

Healthcare workers reported stronger continuous learning cultures, greater openness to feedback, better systems for sharing lessons, and stronger leadership support. One of the greatest improvements was staff feeling more empowerment to initiate positive changes.

In highly hierarchical healthcare environments this can be transformative. When staff feel empowered, they are more likely to identify problems and work collaboratively to solve them.

Challenges remain

The improvements we observed were modest rather than dramatic.

Many longstanding challenges remain. Staffing shortages, workload pressures and service delivery demands often limited participation in the intervention. Attendance varied across professional groups. Maintaining momentum required ongoing support.

Our study was also conducted without a comparison group. This means we cannot definitively attribute all observed changes to the STAR intervention alone.

Nevertheless, the findings provide important evidence that respectful maternity care is not only about changing individual behaviour. It is also about creating work environments that support learning, teamwork, reflection and accountability.

Lessons for the future

Healthcare systems around the world are under pressure. The instinctive response is often to introduce more training, guidelines or policies. But respectful care cannot simply be instructed from above.

Women’s experiences are shaped by the culture of the facilities where they give birth. Improving those experiences requires creating workplaces that support the people who provide care.

The success of STAR suggests that healthcare workers themselves can be powerful agents of change when given the tools, support and space to lead.

For policymakers, the message is clear: dignity and respect during childbirth needs investment in the culture of the workplaces where care happens.

– Respectful maternity care starts with improving hospital culture: lessons from rural South Africa
– https://theconversation.com/respectful-maternity-care-starts-with-improving-hospital-culture-lessons-from-rural-south-africa-288230

Ghana’s housing problem goes beyond numbers – it’s also about quality

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Bismark Aha, Senior Lecturer in Real Estate, Nottingham Trent University

For years, Ghana’s housing debate has revolved around one headline figure: a national shortage commonly estimated at about 1.8 million homes. The number is useful. It signals that housing supply has failed to keep pace with population growth, urbanisation and household formation.

But it tells only part of the story. A household may have a roof over its head and still live without adequate sanitation, safe waste-disposal arrangements, clean cooking fuel, durable construction or enough space. Counting the homes that are missing does not tell us whether the homes that already exist are healthy, safe and adequately serviced.

In our recently published research, we examined this less visible side of the housing challenge. We used Ghana’s 2021 Population and Housing Census to analyse 836,515 households across all 261 districts. We asked a straightforward question: how adequate are the homes in which Ghanaians already live?

To answer it, we developed a Multidimensional Housing Quality Index that combined nine housing conditions recorded in the census. These covered structural durability, room crowding, drinking water, electricity, toilet and bathing facilities, cooking fuel and space, and waste disposal.

The findings indicate that Ghana’s housing policy must ask not only how many homes are missing, but also where existing homes fail to provide safe and adequate living conditions, which deficits occur together, and what combination of interventions is needed.


Read more: Why Accra’s property boom hasn’t produced affordable housing


A home can exist and still be inadequate

Each condition was assessed against a minimum adequacy threshold. The nine indicators were then combined and rescaled to a 0–100 index using a statistical method suited to indicators that record whether a standard is met. Higher scores indicate better material and service-related housing conditions.

The national average is 62.2. This figure should not be read as a pass mark. Its main value is comparative: it reveals how sharply housing conditions differ across places and population groups. Urban households score 73.1 on average, compared with 45.3 for rural households. That difference of almost 28 points is too large to be treated as an urban advantage. It reveals a sharp geographical divide in access to housing-related infrastructure and services.

We also used a multidimensional poverty method to identify households facing overlapping housing deficits. A household is classified as housing poor when its deficits account for at least one-third of the total indicator weight. Severe housing poverty is when they account for at least one-half. On this basis, 56.5% of Ghanaian households are housing poor and 37.2% are severely housing poor. These are housing-specific measures, not estimates of income poverty. They show how many households experience a sufficiently broad or intense combination of inadequate housing conditions.

Progress in one service can hide deficits in another

Some of the most revealing results concern the uneven distribution of access across basic services. Electricity meets the study’s adequacy threshold for 86.2% of households, while 82.4% meet the threshold for safe drinking water. These services are comparatively widespread.

But only 37.3% of households use clean cooking fuel, 42.9% have an improved toilet facility and 33.4% use an adequate waste disposal method. In other words, the relatively high access to electricity and safe drinking water has not been matched by comparable access to sanitation, clean household energy and waste disposal.

Housing quality is produced by a bundle of conditions working together. Electricity cannot compensate for unsafe sanitation. A durable structure does not compensate for reliance on polluting cooking fuels. Improving one service while neglecting the others can leave households exposed to overlapping risks.


Read more: Ghana’s new rental scheme won’t fix the real problem: a housing shortage


The national average hides local issues

The housing divide is often described as a contrast between the better-served south and the poorer northern regions. Our results confirm a strong north-south pattern, but they also show why regional averages are not enough.

Greater Accra, where the capital is located, has the highest regional score at 78.5, while Savannah Region, in northern Ghana, has the lowest at 36.1. Yet substantial differences also appear within regions. In Ashanti, home to the second city of Kumasi, district scores range from 24.3 to 84.1. Greater Accra’s districts range from 51.0 to 86.7.

This means a region that performs relatively well overall can still contain districts facing severe housing inadequacy. Conversely, a national programme aimed only at the lowest-performing regions may overlook deprived localities elsewhere.

Neighbouring districts also tend to have similar housing outcomes. This clustering is consistent with the influence of shared infrastructure networks, environmental conditions, settlement patterns and the uneven reach of public services, alongside differences in household resources.


Read more: Ghana’s informal settlements are not all the same – social networks make a difference in community development


What housing policy should do differently

The Multidimensional Housing Quality Index is not a replacement for the housing deficit. The two measures answer different questions. The deficit asks how many additional homes are needed. The index asks where the existing stock falls short, which deficits overlap and which services should be prioritised.

Using both would produce a more realistic housing policy. A district where the main problem is weak structural quality requires different intervention from one where homes are structurally adequate but sanitation and waste services are poor. Another district may need clean cooking support, electricity extension or improved water access.

A single national housing remedy will not address these differences. District housing profiles should inform the location and design of investment. Housing policy must also be coordinated with sanitation, waste management, energy, water, local government and spatial planning. These sectors jointly determine whether a dwelling is genuinely habitable.

The district estimates could support a housing quality atlas or public dashboard, allowing national agencies, assemblies and development partners to compare local conditions and track which deficits are changing. Future censuses and nationally representative surveys could then show whether housing deprivation is falling, persisting or changing in composition.

What the index cannot tell us

No single index measures every aspect of adequate housing. The census does not provide direct measures of housing affordability, tenure security, service reliability, neighbourhood safety or residents’ own assessments of their homes. The Multidimensional Housing Quality Index therefore measures observable material and service conditions, not the full meaning of housing adequacy.

That limitation is important, but it is not an argument for continuing to rely on the housing deficit alone. Ghana already collects detailed housing information through its census. The opportunity now is to use those data in an integrated way that can guide local decisions.

– Ghana’s housing problem goes beyond numbers – it’s also about quality
– https://theconversation.com/ghanas-housing-problem-goes-beyond-numbers-its-also-about-quality-288139