How does Marburg virus spread between species? Young Ugandan scientist’s photos give important clues

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Alexander Richard Braczkowski, Research Fellow at the Centre for Planetary Health and Resilient Conservation Group, Griffith University

In the shadows of Python Cave, Uganda, a leopard leaps from a guano mound – formed by bat excrement – and sinks its teeth into a bat. But this is no ordinary bat colony. The thousands of Egyptian fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus) found in this cave are known carriers of one of the world’s deadliest viruses: Marburg, a close cousin of Ebola.

Over just four months, our cameras recorded 261 predator encounters: crowned eagles, Nile monitors, leopards, pythons and blue monkeys all caught feeding on, or scavenging from this virus-harbouring colony.

And yet, this wasn’t the work of a global health agency or virology lab. The discovery came from a 25-year-old Ugandan undergraduate, Bosco Atukwatse, working with our small Volcanoes Safaris Partnership Trust Kyambura Lion Project team in Queen Elizabeth National Park. His only tools: a trail camera, curiosity and ecological instinct.

I am a conservation scientist with over 17 years of experience in wildlife ecology, monitoring and human-wildlife conflict. I’m the co-founder of the Kyambura Lion Project, which made this discovery.

For years, scientists studying how diseases spread from animals to humans have hypothesised that zoonotic diseases jump from a wildlife reservoir (like a bat) to an intermediate host (monkey) and potentially to us, humans.

For past Marburg outbreaks in Uganda, two spillover pathways have been identified: the first, involves humans coming into contact with a fruit bat habitat (namely caves filled with bat guano). Indeed, fruit bats are thought to have infected two tourists at Python Cave in 2007 and 2008.

The second pathway involves humans and animals eating the same fruit that bats have fed upon or made contact with. This second spillover pathway was identified by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention scientists in 2023. They tracked bats from the cave entering cultivated gardens to feed.

But Atukwatse and the team of young Ugandan scientists (Yahaya Ssemakula, Johnson Muhereza, Orin Cornille and Winfred Nsabimana) have potentially found another pathway: predation by at least 14 species.

Such rich visual evidence of a viral interface – bats, predators and people – is virtually non-existent in the literature. Many theoretical depictions of this process exist, and there are isolated incidents of a monkey predating on a bat or wildlife feeding on bat guano, but Atukwatse’s discovery of this many different predators repeatedly feeding on a known Marburg virus reservoir is a first.

A leopard grabs a fruit bat at Uganda’s Python Cave. Bosco Atukwatse/Kyambura Lion Project

His discovery highlights two uncomfortable truths:

  • many potential zoonotic interfaces remain undocumented – often right under our noses

  • the people most likely to detect them first are those living closest to wild frontiers.

But the bigger message is this: global health institutions need to stop overlooking local scientists and start funding field-based detection systems across Africa and Asia.

If we want to detect the next outbreak early, we should be empowering more Atukwatses, not waiting for the next lab test.

A hunch pays off

In early February 2025, Atukwatse and our small team of local scientists was expanding our long-term African leopard and spotted hyena monitoring grid into a new part of Queen Elizabeth National Park – the Kyambura Wildlife Reserve and Maramagambo forest.

Atukwatse had heard from nearby guides that a large bat cave lay close to the survey grid. That kind of site, he reasoned, could be perfect leopard territory: a place to hunt, rest or avoid the heat.

This is ecological attentiveness at its best – the field biology equivalent of a commodities trader spotting volatility in a geopolitical flashpoint.

A blue monkey with bat in hand at Python Cave. Bosco Atukwatse/Kyambura Lion Project

Atukwatse had his radar on and acted on instinct, setting five camera traps at the cave’s entrance and along the surrounding animal trails. Just one week later, he got what he hoped for: three separate clips of a leopard hunting bats in broad daylight. He left the cameras in place in protective casing. He checked them every 7–10 days.

But that was just the beginning.

The scale of the discovery

When I first looked at Atukwatse’s videos, our joint excitement was around the leopard footage. We knew they were adaptable and could even eat small rodents , but no one had ever recorded them eating bats in Africa.

As more clips came in, we realised something bigger was unfolding. Blue monkeys were seen grabbing bats mid-roost. A crowned eagle and a Nile monitor fought over two bat carcasses. A fish eagle – typically a piscivore, which is a carnivorous species that primarily eats fish – was filmed clutching bats in its talons.


Read more: African wild dogs: DNA tests of their faeces reveal surprises about what they eat


Over 304 trap-nights, Atukwatse’s traps recorded 261 independent predator events from at least 14 different species.

Then came the second shock: over 400 human visitors – many of them tourists – were filmed approaching the cave mouth without any protective gear. Some stood just metres from a known Marburg virus reservoir. Importantly, the Uganda Wildlife Authority has built a sanctioned viewing platform about 35 metres from the cave. However, tourists broke park rules and walked within two metres of the cave mouth.

Bosco Atukwatse.

It was only after I visited the cave myself to take stills of the team that we put this all together. Atukwatse had just found the first visual evidence, at a large scale in nature, of at least 14 predators feeding on a known wildlife virus reservoir harbouring one of Earth’s deadliest viruses.

This wasn’t the result of million-dollar pathogen surveillance. It wasn’t even the core aim of our leopard survey. This happened because a young Ugandan field scientist followed his ecological gut.

Why does the discovery matter?

For decades, disease ecologists have known that major outbreaks often originate in wildlife – swine flu, avian flu and even SARS-CoV-2 all trace back to animal hosts. But what’s often missing is direct observation of spillover interfaces – the exact moments when a virus jumps from a bat, goose, or other animal into new species like humans, livestock or other wildlife.

Atukwatse’s discovery may be the first large-scale visual record of such an interface in nature: a roost of Egyptian fruit bats known to harbour a deadly virus, actively predated upon by at least 14 species, with hundreds of humans visiting the same cave mouth unprotected.

This may be a Rosetta Stone moment for spillover ecology – shifting our understanding from hypothetical models to a real, observable interface.

These kinds of spillover sites exist in other places in nature: in a Chinese wet market where a civet meets a meat processor, or in a Gabonese village where a bat is butchered for bushmeat. The difference? Most of them go undocumented. Atukwatse just filmed one.

– How does Marburg virus spread between species? Young Ugandan scientist’s photos give important clues
– https://theconversation.com/how-does-marburg-virus-spread-between-species-young-ugandan-scientists-photos-give-important-clues-259806

Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors are pressing them to default on loans to two African multilateral financial institutions: the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) and the Trade and Development Bank (TDB).

These creditors, in effect, are demanding that the two countries prioritise repayments to themselves over payments to these two banks.

As academics who have worked on the challenges of financing sustainable development in Africa, we believe this action is short-sighted.

The action by Ghana and Zambia’s official creditors has two significant implications.

First, they are demanding that the two countries treat Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank as commercial creditors. This would undermine the banks’ credit ratings and increase their borrowing costs. It would also reduce their capacity to finance sustainable development in Africa.

Second, pressing Ghana and Zambia to default, rather than supporting pragmatic restructuring aligned with their strong growth prospects, exacerbates Ghana and Zambia’s financial vulnerability. Either they would have to use scarce resources to pay these debts or default on their obligations, in which case, the banks might well sue them.

Quotes from Ghana and Zambia’s ministries of finance suggest the decision to default is their own. However, they faced intense pressure from their official creditors to treat the two African multilateral financial institutions differently from all their other multilateral creditors.

Why does this differential treatment matter?

Preferred creditor status

Multilateral financial institutions, including the World Bank and African Development Bank, have a preferred creditor status. This is in recognition of the special role they play. They are expected to provide relatively low-cost funding for public investment, economic stability and long-term sustainable development in low- and middle-income countries.

Their preferred creditor status ensures that, when countries experience debt distress, their development mandate is prioritised over the concerns of commercial creditors. Commercial creditors normally only fund commercially viable transactions. They charge high interest rates to compensate for the risk of default on these transactions.

Both Afreximbank and Trade and Development Bank were created to fill a gap in Africa’s access to critical development finance. They provide financing for projects and transactions that commercial institutions and other multilateral financial institutions cannot – or will not – provide, because of capital limits, regulations or perceptions of risk.

For example, Afreximbank’s charter notes that

the decline in African exports has impacted adversely on the economies of African states and hindered their ability to achieve a self-reliant development.

It further recognises that stimulating economic development

can best be achieved through the creation of a trade financing international institution whose principal purpose is to provide and mobilise the requisite financial resources.

Historically, it has enjoyed preferred creditor status to support its role in meeting this purpose.

Why preferred creditor status is being challenged

The two countries’ official creditor committees, the rating agency Fitch and other commentators are challenging the preferred creditor status of the two African institutions. They argue that the two banks are different from multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the African Development Bank that only have states as shareholders. They suggest that the private shareholders in the two African banks should not benefit from preferred creditor status. Instead, they should receive the same status as commercial creditors.


Read more: Ghana and Zambia have snubbed Africa’s leading development bank: why they should change course


This view ignores the reason that Afreximbank’s and the Trade and Development Bank’s member states authorised them to have private shareholders. It was a deliberate, pragmatic measure designed to fill a gap in Africa’s access to affordable development finance.

The idea was to create new multilateral institutions that could raise capital flexibly and quickly on terms that the individual African states could not match on their own. Several other regional development banks have this hybrid model, including CAF, a highly rated development bank in Latin America.

It is perverse that this creative and pragmatic approach to filling a gap in the global financial system is now being used against the two African banks.

The consequences

The cost of capital for the two African financial institutions will increase if they are treated like commercial creditors. This will reduce their capacity to lend and their financing will become more expensive. It will also deepen inequality in the global financial system. Lastly, it will increase the risk of future African sovereign debt defaults.

In other words, downgrading their status risks undermining the very stability that official creditors claim to safeguard. It will also create another obstacle to Africa’s efforts to access stable, predictable and affordable flows of development finance.

The eventual outcome of the official creditors’ action will ultimately depend on negotiations between Ghana and Zambia and their creditors. This will include the two African institutions. It will also be influenced by how these different groups of creditors behave in other African sovereign debt restructurings.

However, the international community can seek to influence the outcome by taking actions in appropriate international settings.

Global leaders are searching for ways to scale up and strengthen the capacity of regional and subregional development banks like Afreximbank and the Trade and Development Bank. This requires respecting their preferred creditor status and increasing their access to affordable capital.

This is precisely the opposite of what is unfolding.

There is still time for the creditor governments to change course by demonstrating their support for African multilateral financial institutions.

– Africa’s development banks are being undermined: the continent will pay the price
– https://theconversation.com/africas-development-banks-are-being-undermined-the-continent-will-pay-the-price-259404

Can academics use AI to write journal papers? What the guidelines say

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sumaya Laher, Professor, University of the Witwatersrand

Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to “intelligent machines and algorithms that can reason and adapt based on sets of rules and environments which mimic human intelligence”. This field is evolving rapidly and the education sector, for one, is abuzz with discussion on AI use for writing.

This matters not just for academics, but for anyone relying on trustworthy information, from journalists and policymakers to educators and the public. Ensuring transparency in how AI is used protects the credibility of all published knowledge.


Read more: AI in education: what those buzzwords mean


In education and research, AI can generate text, improve writing style, and even analyse data. It saves time and resources by allowing quick summarising of work, language editing and reference checking. It also holds potential for enhancing scholarly work and even inspiring new ideas.

Equally AI is able to generate entire pieces of work. Sometimes it’s difficult to distinguish original work written by an individual and work generated by AI.

This is a serious concern in the academic world – for universities, researchers, lecturers and students. Some uses of AI are seen as acceptable and others are not (or not yet).


Read more: AI can be a danger to students – 3 things universities must do


As editor and editorial board member of several journals, and in my capacity as a researcher and professor of psychology, I have grappled with what counts as acceptable use of AI in academic writing. I looked to various published guidelines:

The guidelines are unanimous that AI tools cannot be listed as co-authors or take responsibility for the content. Authors remain fully responsible for verifying the accuracy, ethical use and integrity of all AI-influenced content. Routine assistance does not need citation, but any substantive AI-generated content must be clearly referenced.

Let’s unpack this a bit more.

Assisted versus generated content

In understanding AI use in academic writing, it’s important to distinguish between AI-assisted content and AI-generated content.

AI-assisted content refers to work that is predominantly written by an individual but has been improved with the aid of AI tools. For example, an author might use AI to assist with grammar checks, enhance sentence clarity, or provide style suggestions. The author remains in control, and the AI merely acts as a tool to polish the final product.

This kind of assistance is generally accepted by most publishers as well as the Committee on Publication Ethics, without the need for formal disclosure. That’s as long as the work remains original and the integrity of the research is upheld.

AI-generated content is produced by the AI itself. This could mean that the AI tool generates significant portions of text, or even entire sections, based on detailed instructions (prompts) provided by the author.

This raises ethical concerns, especially regarding originality, accuracy and authorship. Generative AI draws its content from various sources such as web scraping, public datasets, code repositories and user-generated content – basically any content that it is able to access. You can never be sure about the authenticity of the work. AI “hallucinations” are common. Generative AI might be plagiarising someone else’s work or infringing on copyright and you won’t know.


Read more: What are AI hallucinations? Why AIs sometimes make things up


Thus, for AI-generated content, authors are required to make clear and explicit disclosures. In many cases, this type of content may face restrictions. Publishers may even reject it outright, as outlined in the Committee on Publication Ethics guidelines.

What’s allowed and what’s not

Based on my readings of the guidelines, I offer some practical tips for using AI in academic writing. These are fairly simple and could be applicable across disciplines.

  • The guidelines all say AI tools can be used for routine tasks like improving grammar, revising sentence structure, or assisting with literature searches. These applications do not require specific acknowledgement.

  • Across the guidelines reviewed, AI generated content is not allowed unless there are clear reasons why this was necessary for the research and the content is clearly marked and referenced as such. Thus, depending on how AI is used, it must be referenced in the manuscript. This could be in the literature review, or in the methods or results section.

  • Sage and the Committee on Publication Ethics emphasise that authors must disclose when AI-generated content is used by citing this appropriately. There are different conventions for citing AI use but all seem to agree that the name of the generative tool used, the date accessed and the prompt used should be cited. This level of transparency is necessary to uphold the credibility of academic work.

  • Other aspects linked to AI assistance like correcting code, generating tables or figures, reducing word count or checking on analyses cannot be referenced directly in the body of the manuscript. In line with current best practice recommendations, this should be indicated at the end of the manuscript.

  • Authors are responsible for checking the accuracy of any AI content, whether AI assisted or AI generated, ensuring it’s free from bias, plagiarism, and potential copyright infringements.

The final word (for now)

AI tools can undoubtedly enhance the academic writing process, but their use must be approached with transparency, caution, and respect for ethical standards.

Authors must remain vigilant in maintaining academic integrity, particularly when AI is involved. Authors should verify the accuracy and appropriateness of AI-generated content, ensuring that it doesn’t compromise the originality or validity of their work.


Read more: South African university students use AI to help them understand – not to avoid work


There have been excellent suggestions as to when the declaration of AI should be mandatory, optional and unnecessary. If unsure, the best advice would be to include the use of any form of AI (assisted or generated) in the acknowledgement.

It is very likely that these recommendations will be revised in due course as AI continues to evolve. But it is equally important that we start somewhere. AI tools are here to stay. Let’s deal with it constructively and collaboratively.

– Can academics use AI to write journal papers? What the guidelines say
– https://theconversation.com/can-academics-use-ai-to-write-journal-papers-what-the-guidelines-say-258824

Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Marinei Herselman, Lecturer, University of Fort Hare

The unintended consequences of measures introduced to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus from 2020 to 2022 have been studied extensively. Research in South Africa shows that some of these measures added to social ills, such as unemployment and poverty.

Another impact of “lockdown” was on gender-based violence. The government’s Gender-Based Violence Command Centre reported over 120,000 cases within the first three weeks of lockdown.

In the year 2019-20, 53,293 sexual offences were reported, an average of 146 per day. This was up from 52,420 in 2018-19. Most of these were cases of rape. The police recorded 42,289 rapes in 2019-20, up from 41,583 in 2018-19, an average of 116 rapes each day. Further, a total of 2,695 women were murdered in South Africa in 2019-20. This means a woman is murdered every three hours.

The lockdown measures required people to remain indoors. Schools and non-essential establishments like restaurants were closed. Travelling internationally and between provinces was prohibited.

Research showed that the lockdown measures trapped many women and children in abusive environments. The gender-based violence incidents highlighted gaps in support services and underscored the critical role of social workers in crisis situations.

In a recent paper, we described our study of the impact the lockdown measures had on gender-based violence in Matatiele, a small town in South Africa’s Eastern Cape, one of the poorest regions in the country.

The study highlighted the need to integrate gender-based violence support services into emergency plans to ensure continuity of care in times of crisis. In addition, the challenges faced by social workers during the pandemic showed systemic weaknesses in the support infrastructure.


Read more: South African women face exclusion from society due to gender-based violence – how they’re fighting back


We recommend prioritising gender-based violence services, expanding the social work workforce, and ensuring accessible, effective support mechanisms to safeguard survivors. By engaging local and provincial partners through cross-sector collaboration, South Africa can build a more equitable society and empower survivors during future emergencies.

Interviewing survivors of violence

Our findings were based on interviews with 30 survivors of gender-based violence and five social workers at the Thuthuzela Care Centre in Matatiele, which provides support for rape survivors. Twenty-four of the survivors (80%) were women and six (20%) were males. The participants were aged 18-35.

We found that 63.3% of survivors experienced gender-based violence differently during the pandemic, primarily because access to support services was reduced. Key findings were that:

  • survivors found it difficult to reach police stations, hospitals and support centres

  • a lack of transport and staffing made access to services even more difficult than usual

  • survivors were often imprisoned with their abusers, making it nearly impossible to escape the abusive environment

  • the closure of schools and community centres destroyed additional refuges and support networks

  • social workers reported that remote counselling methods, such as telephone calls, were less effective

  • poor internet connection and the inability to meet in person limited the quality of psychosocial support provided

  • many perpetrators faced job losses and economic hardships; this led to increased stress and violence.

Our findings highlight how public health crises can worsen existing social vulnerabilities. The COVID-19 pandemic starkly illustrated the vulnerability of survivors during crises and the role of social workers in providing support.


Read more: Spoken word poetry challenges gender-based violence in Namibia


Women’s experiences

As shown in the table, some participants said their experiences of abuse were the same before and during COVID-19. This might be because a participant was abused during the pandemic and had not been a victim before.

Supplied by author.

Most of the research participants said their experience of gender-based violence was different from how it had been before COVID-19. Asked to explain, most of them responded in similar ways.

One of the women said:

I have difficulty escaping my abuser.

Another said:

I struggled to sleep, and I was anxious for a long time. I accepted the situation and told myself that I will be fine. I was abused by a stranger, which made it difficult for me to get justice but I told myself that abuse is something that you cannot run away from.

Lack of sleep is a common challenge for many survivors of gender-based violence.

One of the male survivors in the study, a married man, spoke of the difficulty of dealing with societal norms which are rooted in patriarchy. There’s a local saying which captures the typical attitude: indoda yokwenyani ayikhali (“a real man does not cry”).

There appeared to be a general sense that gender-based violence would not change, so women and men just accepted and normalised it.


Read more: Men abused by women don’t all fight back. Some believe a strong man is non-violent – South African study


Next steps

An effective response to gender-based violence requires sufficient staffing of response facilities. There is also a need for robust communication tools and training to handle remote support scenarios as happened during COVID.

Gender-based violence is a serious problem that needs a multi-faceted response. Governments, and non-profit, non-governmental and civil society organisations must work together. This will help in achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 on gender equality. Gender equality is a fundamental human right. It is a foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. While some progress has been made in recent decades, the world is not on track to achieve gender equality by 2030.

To lessen the impact of future crises on survivors of gender-based violence, several steps are essential:

  • the government must recognise support services as critical in emergencies; social workers must be classified as essential personnel so that they can continue their work without restrictions

  • essential services such as safe shelters, mental health support and legal aid must be in place, and healthcare services must be fully available, well-equipped and well-staffed

  • the government must expand and train the social worker workforce, and provide specialised training for any crisis situation in the future

  • there is need to develop support channels, including online platforms, helplines and mobile outreach programmes

  • investing in reliable communication technologies and transportation can help people reach support services

  • long-term strategies should focus on reducing gender inequalities and challenging patriarchal norms.

Bongeka Zawani, a master’s student at the University of Fort Hare, carried out the study this article is based on.

– Women trapped with abusers: South Africa’s COVID lockdowns exposed serious protection gaps
– https://theconversation.com/women-trapped-with-abusers-south-africas-covid-lockdowns-exposed-serious-protection-gaps-243198

Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By John Mukum Mbaku, Professor, Weber State University

The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has raged since April 2023. It’s turned Sudan into the site of one of the world’s most catastrophic humanitarian and displacement crises.

At least 150,000 people have been killed. More than 14 million have been displaced, with over 3 million fleeing to neighbouring countries like Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Once a vibrant capital city, Khartoum is now a “burnt-out shell”.

This devastating war, rooted in long-standing ethnic, political and economic tensions, has been compounded by what international and regional actors have done and failed to do. As Amnesty International notes, the international response remains “woefully inadequate”.

The problem lies in the fact that external involvement has not been neutral. Instead of halting the conflict, many external players have complicated it. In some cases, international interventions have escalated it.

More than 10 countries across Africa, the Middle East and Asia have been drawn into Sudan’s war. This has turned it into a proxy conflict that reflects the interests of external actors, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Several actors have taken sides.

Saudi Arabia, for instance, backs the Sudanese army. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is alleged to support the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Egypt, citing historical ties, backs the army. For their part, Ethiopia and Eritrea reportedly support the paramilitary group. Chad has been accused of facilitating arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces via its eastern airports. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Iran have also been linked to diplomatic and military support to Sudan’s army.

These geopolitical entanglements have made peace nearly impossible, deepening the conflict instead of resolving it.

I have studied Africa’s governance failures for more than 30 years, from military elites and coups to state capture and political instability. Based on this, my view is that Sudan’s conflict cannot be resolved without serious international commitment to neutrality and peace.


Read more: Sudan’s peace mediation should be led by the African Union: 3 reasons why


The involvement of foreign actors on opposing sides must be reversed. International involvement must be premised on helping the Sudanese people develop the capacity to resolve governance problems themselves.

For this to happen, regional diplomacy must be stepped up. The African Union must assert its legitimacy and take the lead in addressing this challenging crisis. It can do this by putting pressure on member states to ensure that any ceasefire agreements are enforced.

The East African Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development can provide assistance in securing a peace agreement and ensuring it’s enforced. Members of these continental organisations can encourage external actors to limit their intervention in Sudan to activities that promote democratic governance and sustainable development.

The African Union

The African Union should play a central role in bringing peace to Sudan. But its absence has been conspicuous.

Despite adopting the “African solutions to African problems” mantra, the African Union has neither held Sudan’s warlords accountable nor put in place adequate civilian protection measures.

First, it could have worked closely with the UN to deploy a mission to Sudan with a mandate to protect civilians, monitor human rights (especially the rights of women and girls), assist in the return of all displaced persons and prevent any further attacks on civilians.

Second, the African Union could have sent an expert group to investigate human rights violations, especially sexual violence. The results could have been submitted to the union’s Peace and Security Council for further action.

Third, the African Union could have worked closely with regional and international actors, including the Arab League. This would ensure a unified approach to the conflict, based on the interests of Sudanese people for peace and development.

Finally, the AU could have addressed the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts, which include extreme poverty, inequality, political exclusion and economic marginalisation.

The African Union could also make use of the insights and knowledge gleaned by African leaders like Kenya’s William Ruto and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who have attempted to mediate, but have failed. The AU should also use the political expertise of elder statesmen, such as Thabo Mbeki, Moussa Faki and Olusegun Obasanjo, to help address the conflict and humanitarian crisis.

The United Arab Emirates

The UAE is alleged to back the paramilitary troops in the war. In recent years, the UAE has become increasingly involved in African conflicts. It has supported various factions to conflicts in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel region and Libya.

Its increased involvement in Africa is driven by several strategic interests. These include fighting terrorism, securing maritime routes, and expanding its trade and influence.


Read more: Sudan is burning and foreign powers are benefiting – what’s in it for the UAE


In 2009, the UAE helped Sudan mediate its border conflict with Chad. The UAE supported the ouster of Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, as well as Sudan’s transitional military council.

In 2021, the UAE signed a strategic partnership with Sudan to modernise its political institutions and return the country to the international community. The UAE has stated that it has taken a neutral position in the present conflict. However, on 6 March 2025, Sudan brought a case against the UAE to the International Court of Justice. It accused the UAE of complicity in genocide, alleging that the UAE “has been arming the RSF with the aim of wiping out the non-Arab Massalit population of West Darfur.”

The United States

During his first term, US president Donald Trump spearheaded the Abraham Accords. These agreements were aimed at normalising relations between Israel and several Arab countries, including Sudan. Subsequently, Sudan was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The accords appeared to have brought Khartoum closer to Washington. They provided avenues for the type of engagement that could have placed it in good stead when Trump returned to the White House in 2025.

However, Sudan’s internal political and economic instability, including the present civil war, has complicated the situation.

The Abraham Accords were a significant foreign policy achievement for Trump. A peaceful, democratically governed, and economically stable and prosperous Sudan could serve as the foundation for Trump’s “circle of peace” in the Middle East.

But Trump and his administration are preoccupied with other domestic and foreign policy priorities. During his May 2025 visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump did not officially address the conflict in Sudan. Instead, he placed emphasis on securing business deals and investments.

The European Union

The European Union has strongly condemned the violence and the atrocities committed during the war in Sudan, especially against children and women. The organisation has appealed for an immediate and lasting ceasefire while noting that Sudan faces the “most catastrophic humanitarian crisis of the 21st century”.

Unfortunately, member countries will remain preoccupied with helping Ukraine, especially given the growing uncertainty in Washington’s relationship with the authorities in Kyiv.

The preoccupation and focus of the EU and the US on Gaza, Ukraine and Iran may, however, be underestimating the geopolitical risks Sudan’s war is generating.

A peaceful and democratically governed Sudan can contribute to peace not just in the region, but also in many other parts of the world.

What now?

To end Sudan’s war and prevent future ones, international and African actors must do more than issue statements. They must act coherently, collectively and with genuine commitment to the Sudanese people’s right to peace, democratic governance and sustainable development.

Democracy and the rule of law are key to peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in Sudan. However, establishing and sustaining institutions that enhance and support democracy is the job of the Sudanese people. The external community can provide the financial support that Sudan is likely to need. It can also support the strengthening of electoral systems, civic education and citizen trust in public institutions.

– Sudan: foreign interests are deepening a devastating war – only regional diplomacy can stop them
– https://theconversation.com/sudan-foreign-interests-are-deepening-a-devastating-war-only-regional-diplomacy-can-stop-them-259824

Detty December started as a Nigerian cultural moment. Now it’s spreading across the continent – and minting money

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Nnamdi O. Madichie, Professor of Marketing & Entrepreneurship, University of Kigali

Every December in Nigeria and Ghana a giant party takes place, unfolding in a whirlwind of concerts, festivals, weddings, art shows, dress-ups, meet-ups and travel. Locals and diaspora west Africans returning from overseas come together to create Detty December, a festive event stretching from mid-December to the new year.

Detty is a playful term for “dirty” in the regional Pidgin language and “Detty December” is a term commonly believed to have been coined by Afropop star Mr Eazi in 2016. It means letting loose and indulging in some fun and revelry.

Major events headlined by local and international music stars punctuate Detty December. In Nigeria events range from Flytime Fest in Lagos to Carnival Calabar, which showcases cultural heritage. In Ghana, festivals like AfroFuture and Afro Nation attract global celebrities and influencers as well as returning citizens.

But this isn’t just a holiday fling. Propelled by youthful energy and cultural innovation, it’s an economic phenomenon. And it represents a shift in Africa’s urban landscape and its relationship with the rest of the world.

Detty December now stands as a pillar of Africa’s creative economy, which has built on the global popularity of music from the continent, from Afrobeats to amapiano.

As marketing and entrepreneurship lecturers with an eye on the creative industries, we’ve researched Detty December and believe it’s a cultural tourism phenomenon with the potential to spread across the continent. In fact, it’s already begun to do so.

Nigeria: the economic power of Detty December

Despite infrastructure challenges, places like Lagos are new cultural epicentres. During Detty December the city becomes a carnival of reunions and celebrations. “I Just Got Backs” (IJGBs) return, music spills from every bar and events pop up daily.

Once simply a cultural moment, Detty December has rapidly become a powerful economic engine. It makes a big impact on hospitality, entertainment, tourism and local businesses.

In Lagos alone, the 2024 festivities generated an estimated US$71.6 million in state revenue. Hotels contributed US$44 million and short-term rentals added US$30 million.

Nationally, the impact is even more staggering. Detty December injected over US$220 million into Nigeria’s economy in 2023.

A major driver of this growth is tourism. An estimated 1.2 million visitors flocked to Lagos in December 2024. Nearly 90% of these were diaspora Nigerians.

Afrobeats star Wizkid’s Made in Lagos concert alone pulled in nearly US$650,000 in ticket sales. New song releases on Fridays have become features of the season.

Beyond direct spending, Detty December creates temporary and permanent jobs and bolsters small businesses.

Ghana: December in GH

The government of neighbouring Ghana has recognised this potential, strategically branding its festive season December in GH. This initiative leverages cultural tourism for substantial economic gain. The country even takes measures like visa-on-arrival in December to encourage visitors.

This builds on cultural tourism successes like the 2019 Year of Return campaign. In 2023, December in GH reportedly attracted about 115,000 participants.

Even in a challenging economic climate, Detty December continues to thrive. This indicates a desire for cultural connection and a much-needed escape, especially among the continent’s youth and its global diaspora communities.

South Africa: Ke Dezemba

From Flytime in Lagos and AfroNation in Accra to Alte Sounds in Kigali and the vibrant December nightlife in Mombasa or Johannesburg’s rooftop party events, African cities have become seasonal epicentres for cultural consumption.

“Ke Dezemba” is a term used in South Africa to describe the festive season. It’s a vibrant and celebratory term that’s often associated with summer holidays, braaiing (barbecuing) and social gatherings. It could become the branding of the country’s own Detty December.

South Africa’s global profile has been raised during its 2025 presidency of the G20. Adopting its own version of Detty December could continue to amplify Brand South Africa. It could show off the country’s vibrancy, creativity, hospitality and potential for investment.

Aligning cultural celebration with global visibility could reframe a season of revelry into a strategic cultural and economic asset. For South Africa, this could inject capital into the tourism sector, boosting hospitality, transport and ancillary services.


Read more: Culture can build a better world: four key issues on Africa’s G20 agenda


Beyond direct tourism, the spotlight on South African art and culture during this period could make a lasting impact on the creative economy, fostering growth and job creation.

Physical celebration could be digitally amplified to make a lasting impression.

A notable example is Spotify’s unveiling of its Detty December hub. The music streaming service intends celebrating the festive season across west Africa and South Africa with playlists of party tracks.

Spotify’s Phiona Okumu explains:

Detty December is a special time for our users in west Africa, and Ke Dezemba symbolises South Africa’s spirit of celebration.

How to make it work

The lessons from west African cities suggest that cultural economies thrive with:

  • flexible governance

  • inclusive participation

  • engaged diasporas

  • innovative business models.

For Nigeria’s Detty December model to be sustainable it would require strategic policy support, urban planning integration and investment in creative infrastructure.

A group of diasporans in Ghana at the AfroFuture festival. Fquasie/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

Funding models such as memberships and sponsorships are crucial for the longevity of music festivals. Policy support and infrastructure investment are necessary to unlock the full potential of the creative sector.

Cultural tourism, powerfully embodied by Detty December, is emerging as a viable economic strategy for African cities. This signals a broader recognition of culture’s economic power. It offers a compelling canvas for economic development and nation branding.

– Detty December started as a Nigerian cultural moment. Now it’s spreading across the continent – and minting money
– https://theconversation.com/detty-december-started-as-a-nigerian-cultural-moment-now-its-spreading-across-the-continent-and-minting-money-258949

Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Wunpini Fatimata Mohammed, Assistant Professor of Communication, Cornell University

Netflix began its Africa operations in South Africa in 2016. When the US streaming giant announced it was setting up shop in Nigeria in 2020, many west African film-makers, writers, artists and media audiences were jubilant.

Finally, west Africa’s creativity and brilliance would be formally recognised on the world stage. Netflix Naija’s purpose was to produce local content for Netflix just like Netflix South Africa and later Netflix Kenya.


Read more: Netflix Naija: creative freedom in Nigeria’s emerging digital space?


Some film-makers have been wary of US cultural imperialism happening through the market dominance of Netflix and other US streamers. Others have rushed to the streamer to sign deals that will gain their films and TV shows a global audience.

Netflix’s interest in African stories comes with a colonial power dynamic that research and scholarship has not fully explored. As a scholar of media and communication, I recently examined the effect US streamers are having on the stories being told in films in Nigeria and Ghana.

In my study, I argue that despite the growing global interest in African pop culture, African creative workers need to be careful about interest from global conglomerates. We can’t talk about African cinemas going global without paying attention to how Hollywood’s colonial relationship with Africa has shaped and influenced what African filmmakers believe will sell globally.


Read more: Black Panther, Wakanda Forever and the problem with Hollywood – an African perspective


What price is being paid to appeal to global audiences? Film-makers might focus so much on the western gaze that they lose focus on telling African stories authentically and respectfully.

In my study, I analyse various films including the Ghanaian film Azali and the Nigerian movie Lionheart to argue that that’s exactly what’s happening.

Dancing to the tune of the west

Despite the existence of thriving African film and TV industries before the advent of streaming technologies, we are seeing a replication of what I call the everydayness of colonialism in the area of media representations of the continent.

Here, African filmmakers and producers find themselves jumping through hoops to tell stories that are “fit” to be streamed to Netflix’s millions of American, European and global subscribers. Global cosmopolitan audiences are prioritised over African audiences.


Read more: Woman King is set in Benin but filmed in South Africa – in the process it erases real people’s struggles


African audiences at home and in the diaspora are the reason we have vibrant film industries such as Nollywood to begin with.

This displacement of African audiences happens both in representation and in access.

Most African movie audiences do not have access to Netflix and other streaming platforms due to the digital divide and the cost of subscribing. So the target audience shifts to the elite, both African and global, who can afford to stream.

Azali and Lionheart

Ghana and Nigeria’s film industries were developed by artists who wanted to reflect their societies to their communities. I found that with Netflix’s arrival, there is a danger of disrupting and undoing this important work.

The intervention of US streamers has led to the development of glossier versions of Africa. They are universal enough to be consumed by anyone, anywhere in the world, even if it means sacrificing the integrity of stories to achieve this global appeal.

In Azali, for example, I found that the film sacrificed authentic language and geographical accuracy to tell a story for a western audience.

Azali explores the themes of child marriage, child-trafficking and rural-urban migration in Ghana. Here, a film about the Dagbamba was set in the town of Zebilla, where Dagbanli is not the dominant language. The film cast non-Dagbanli speakers in major roles to speak a language they neither understood nor had any proficiency in. If Dagbamba had been centred as the primary audience of the movie, this cultural indignity might not have happened.

Lionheart, though star-studded, departed from traditional Nollywood narrative conventions. The film tells the story of a wealthy Nigerian family and the quest of a young woman to take control of the family business. The movie had high production values and told a story that would be considered universally relatable. However, it was disqualified in its bid for an Oscar nomination in the Best International Feature Film category because of its majority English dialogue. Despite appealing to Netflix in the area of production quality and storyline, African film-makers were still punished by the Academy.

Nigeria and Ghana’s film industries have traditionally told a wide variety of African stories. Netflix’s arrival is reducing African stories to stories about the elite and for the global cosmopolitan elite.

Stories about the majority of Africans are being erased. Africa becomes a backdrop to tell stories about the elite class.

In my study, I argue that narrative construction is an important part of identity and that when external factors begin to determine how African stories are told, it distorts the image of Africa for Africans and raises questions of cultural sovereignty.

Moving forward

It is refreshing to see African cultures appreciated on a global scale. But this shouldn’t erase narratives about the African masses and working communities.

There are film-makers that are resisting the Netflix canon. Nigerian actress and producer Funke Akindele shows that this is possible in A Tribe Called Judah. Her film set a new box office record in Nigeria by avoiding direct to Netflix/streamer distribution and staying true to African audiences. The film tells the story of how a single mother and her five sons navigate poverty in Lagos. It was later licensed to stream on Amazon Prime Video after it made history at the box office in Nigeria.

Other film-makers like Omoni Oboli, whose approach centres the Nigerian masses, has turned to YouTube. She tells Nigerian stories while resisting the exploitation that can often come with signing a Netflix deal.


Read more: The unique strategy Netflix deployed to reach 90 million worldwide subscribers


These projects offer an alternative. As Netflix expands, African creative workers and cultural policymakers must protect the narrative integrity of African stories and resist the economic exploitation of African film-makers. Productions can capture the nuances of African stories while representing African languages and cultures with respect and dignity – without selling out to western values.

– Netflix gives African film a platform – but the cultural price is high
– https://theconversation.com/netflix-gives-african-film-a-platform-but-the-cultural-price-is-high-259252

Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Adrino Mazenda, Senior Researcher, Associate Professor Economic Management Sciences, University of Pretoria

About 281 million people globally have migrated from their country of origin to another country. This movement can be temporary or permanent and can occur for various reasons, including economic opportunities, family reunification and education. Then there are also millions who are escaping conflict and seeking refuge in another country.

Countries at different stages of development also experience large volumes of internal migration. Migration within a country can be temporary or permanent too, and reflect economic reasons or insecurity.

Both types of migrants sometimes experience food insecurity: the physical and financial inability to access nutritious, safe and sufficient food to fulfil a person’s dietary requirements.

There are an estimated 2.89 million documented foreign migrants in South Africa, accounting for about 5% of the country’s population. Most immigrants in South Africa come from the Southern African Development Community countries. South Africa also experiences a high annual internal migration rate. About 850,0000 people temporarily and permanently relocate from rural to urban areas.

Gauteng, the province which contributes more than a third of South Africa’s economic output, attracts a disproportionate share of internal and international migration.

As social scientists who have been studying migration and food security, we conducted research to explore the food security status of migrant households (international and internal) and native Gauteng households, and to understand their differences, if any.

The study used data from the 2020/21 Quality of Life survey. This is one of the largest social surveys in South Africa, and respondents include both internal and international migrants. It is conducted every two years by the Gauteng City Region Observatory. Quantitative research methods and statistical analysis were then applied to identify patterns and relationships between food insecurity and migration variables.

Food insecurity remains a pressing concern in South Africa’s major cities, particularly among migrant populations. Not all migrants experience food insecurity the same way, however. Internal and international migrants differ not only from native Gauteng residents but also from one another. There are different factors influencing their vulnerability.

The differences

One differentiating factor between the internal and foreign migrants is government social support services. They seem to play a key role in determining the well-being of internal migrants. International migrants don’t qualify for such services. But they sometimes fared better than internal migrants or natives, likely due to age, education, or resourcefulness (social support networks).

Internal migrants experienced their own set of challenges. For example, poor health service provision and lack of medical aid were strong predictors of food insecurity. This suggests that addressing food access requires improvements in health services, insurance, and broader social infrastructure.

Improved access to healthcare reduces the financial burden on households dealing with medical expenses, so they can spend more on food. Access to maternal and child health services enhances nutritional knowledge and practices. That in turn improves the way households use food. Health insurance and unemployment insurance protect households from income shocks that could otherwise lead to food insecurity.

A stronger social infrastructure improves food access by enhancing education, healthcare, and social protection systems. Education boosts income and nutritional knowledge. Preventive healthcare reduces illness and medical expenses, freeing up resources for food. Social protection measures help households withstand financial shocks, ensuring consistent access to food.

Of course all this support has a cost that needs to be funded from the public purse, but its benefits may well outweigh the cost.

Gender disparities

Immigrants contribute significantly to South Africa’s economy. Migration enhances labour market flexibility, promotes economic dynamism, and supports livelihoods in both urban and rural areas, making it essential for inclusive economic growth. Internal migrants provide labour in sectors such as mining, construction and services, while also supporting rural households through remittances. They help stimulate urban informal economies.

International migrants bring valuable skills and resilience to various sectors, including agriculture, healthcare, manufacturing and construction. They contribute local income taxes. Some operate small and large formal businesses, which adds to job creation.

However, employment data reveals a pronounced gender disparity among international migrants and internal migrants.

In all population groups (native residents, internal migrants and international migrants), men are more likely to be employed than women. Among international migrants, over 1 million men were employed compared to 400,000 women. More women (281,553) than men (88,598) were classified as economically inactive – not available for work.

The primary reason for internal migration among both men and women was the search for paid employment. For men, the second most common reason was job transfers or accepting new employment.

In contrast, female migrants cited moving to live with or be closer to a spouse, family, or friends, often due to marriage, as their main motivation.

Way forward

Our study highlights the determinants of food insecurity among migrant populations. It also challenges harmful stereotypes and invites more inclusive thinking about social support and job creation.

The study’s findings can help inform the public about who needs more support and why. It shows that food aid and government support systems aren’t working as intended.

The main conclusions we reached from the study were that:

  • Rural health infrastructure is in dire need of public support.

  • Increased inequities in healthcare access are unjustified.

  • The medical and health bills of foreign citizens can be shared between home and host countries to reduce the strain on the host’s infrastructure through a combination of policy reforms, bilateral agreements and global cooperation mechanisms. Key to this is an inter-government billing system where host countries track migrants’ healthcare use and send bills to their home country governments or insurers.

  • It is desirable for migrants to hold valid health insurance as a condition of entry or residency.

  • Policies to promote agriculture and rural areas, particularly developing new rural housing schemes, appear to be a promising way to abate food insecurity.

  • Revitalising special economic zones, the designated areas offering incentives to attract investment, boost trade and create jobs, can help limit the concentration of migrants in Gauteng.

– Migrants in South Africa’s economic powerhouse often go hungry: the drivers and what can be done about it
– https://theconversation.com/migrants-in-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-often-go-hungry-the-drivers-and-what-can-be-done-about-it-256907

Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Issouf Binaté, enseignant-chercheur, Université Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké

Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa as the geopolitical and economic landscape in the region shifts. In Senegal, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation has entered a key partnership in the oil and gas sector. Meanwhile, Karpowership, a company providing electricity via floating power plants, now supplies energy to eight African countries. But Turkey’s not stopping there. As part of its soft power strategy, it is also winning hearts and minds through education and culture while deepening trade and security ties.

Historian Issouf Binaté, who has studied Turkey’s growing presence in west Africa, breaks down how Ankara is positioning itself as an alternative to both former colonial powers and newer global players competing for influence on the continent.

What drives Turkey’s growing influence in west Africa?

Turkey’s foreign policy in west Africa leans on two main pillars.

One is institutional power, driven by state-backed agencies (embassies, the religious affairs directorate Diyanet, and the economic cooperation agency (TIKA) .

The other is more grassroots, led by non-state actors such as religious foundations and NGOs.

These groups laid the groundwork for Turkey’s African expansion long before Ankara officially stepped in.

A key player in Turkey’s earlier outreach was the Gülen movement, named after preacher Fethullah Gülen (1941–2024). The Gülen movement pioneered Turkey’s soft power approach with “Turkish schools”, starting with the Yavuz Sultan Selim and Yavuz Selim-Bosphore high schools in Dakar in 1997.

Also at the end of the 1990s a network composed of Turkish business leaders and social activists under the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists, which claimed over 100,000 member companies, expanded Turkey’s influence across Africa. At that time, Turkey had only three diplomatic representations for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

The more recent contact with Africa comes at a time when western hegemony faces growing criticism from a new generation of Africans engaged in decolonial movements. Gülen-affiliated institutions now number 113, alongside religious and secular schools run by other groups like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi. Since the 2016 political rift between Gülen and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, these schools were gradually transferred to Maarif Foundation, Turkey’s state-run overseas education arm.

Back in 2003, Turkey had only 12 diplomatic missions across Africa. Today, that number has grown to 44, bolstered by Turkish religious foundations (like Mahmud Hudayi Vakfi and Hayrat Vakfi), NGOs, and entrepreneurs who have filled the gap left by the Gülen movement.

Another powerful player in Turkey’s Africa strategy is Turkish Airlines, now one of the top carriers on the continent. It is now flying to 62 airports in 41 African countries.

What role do west African students trained in Turkey play?

By investing in education, Turkey didn’t just open its doors to African students. It also planted the seeds for a long-term influence strategy. These students, and more broadly young African migrants trained in Turkey, are now among the key messengers of “Turkishness” back home.

In doing so, Ankara is following a familiar path once used by colonial powers. They used student mobility as a powerful tool for their diplomacy.

This policy of openness took several forms. As early as 1960, it welcomed students from non-self-governing territories in accordance with UN General Assembly resolutions.

Then, in the 1990s, Turkey continued this effort through a scholarship programme for African students, supported by the Islamic Development Bank. During this period, Turkey launched the Büyük Öğrenci Projesi (Great Student Project), which provided scholarships to international students.

Starting in 2012, this programme was re-branded as YTB (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, or Directorate for Turks Abroad and Related Communities). It introduced reforms, including a digital application process for scholarships via an app on the YTB website. This shift caused a dramatic spike in interest. Applications soared from 10,000 to 155,000 between 2012 and 2020.

For non-scholarship students, Turkey simplified visa processes, reduced tuition fees, and offered other incentives. These measures contributed to a significant increase in the number of applicants to study in Turkey. As the number of universities in Turkey jumped from 76 to 193 between 2003 and 2015, the country became increasingly attractive.

By 2017, Turkey had become the 13th most popular destination for students from sub-Saharan Africa, according to Campus France (a platform that supports international students studying in France). By 2019, there were an estimated 61,000 African students studying in Turkey.

Now, nearly three decades into this strategy, many of these former students are stepping into new roles. They are taking over from Turkish entrepreneurs in fostering socioeconomic ties with Africa. They also act as bridges, promoting Turkish universities and supporting visitors in areas like medical and industrial tourism.

In Istanbul, some run cargo companies – some of them informal – that ship goods to Africa. Others are working to formalise these ventures and build long-term economic bridges. Groups like Bizim Afrika, a network of African Turkish-speakers, and the Federation of African Students in Turkey (founded in 2019), are playing key roles in shaping this next chapter of Turkey–Africa relations.

How is Turkey’s strategy in west Africa different from that of China or France?

In substance, Turkey’s strategy isn’t so different from that of France or China. It also carries traces of colonial thinking, even though its approach leans more on religious soft power like building mosques across Africa. Unlike France, which used force in its colonial past, Turkey is trying to gain influence through other means. It uses familiar tools: embassies, schools, cinema, security services, and development agencies.

However, Turkey has learned from the criticism faced by western powers at a pivotal moment in Africa’s global relations.

While access to Europe, the US and Canada has become more difficult due to stricter visa rules, Turkey has opened its doors. It eased visa procedures for African business people, expanded its universities, and promoted medical tourism.

Turkey has become a hub for several sectors. It’s a major centre for nose surgery (rhinoplasty), hair transplants, and textiles. Its textile industry now supplies traders at Makola Market in Accra, Adjamé’s Forum in Côte d’Ivoire, and the Grand Marché in Bamako.

Turkey has also capitalised on the security crisis in the Sahel, where France’s military presence has become controversial. It stepped in by selling Bayraktar TB2 drones and offering private security services to some governments.

Is this Turkish presence set to last?

Turkey’s presence in Africa is now visible in several symbolic ways. You can see it in Maarif schools, murals at Abidjan airport, the “Le Istanbul” restaurant in Niamey’s government district, or the National Mosque in Accra, modelled after Istanbul’s Blue Mosque.

The. Amuzujoe

Turkey’s engagement is a work in progress. But its outreach to Africa is already yielding results. Trade volume reached US$40.7 billion in 2022. The return of the first waves of African students trained in Turkey has shifted the dynamic. Cooperation no longer relies solely on Turkish business people and social entrepreneurs.

Even though African elites often speak English, French or Arabic, new voices are emerging. Young people trained in Turkey are beginning to find their place. Many work in import-export, construction, and even Islamic religious leadership. This trend points to promising prospects for long-term ties.

For Turkey, Africa represents a continent with major economic opportunities. Becoming a trusted partner is now a key goal. On the diplomatic level, Turkey gained observer status at the African Union in 2005 and has hosted Turkey-Africa summits in Istanbul since 2008.

This growing involvement suggests that Turkey’s role in Africa is likely to last. It will depend on the continent’s market needs, especially at a time when many African countries are rethinking their relationships with traditional western powers and international institutions.

– Turkey is stepping up its influence in west Africa – what’s behind its bid for soft power
– https://theconversation.com/turkey-is-stepping-up-its-influence-in-west-africa-whats-behind-its-bid-for-soft-power-256929

Kenya police brutality – it will take more than laws and public anger to change behaviour

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Oscar Gakuo Mwangi, Adjunct Associate Professor, Departnent of Social Sciences, Pwani University

Kenya has once again been reminded of brutality within its police force. Two events in mid-June 2025 pointed to the grave challenge that Kenya must confront to reform the service.

The first was the death in police custody of a teacher and blogger. A few days later a bystander at the scene of a protest in Nairobi was shot and severely injured by police.

The use of excessive force to disperse and arrest peaceful demonstrators has got worse since the nationwide protests by young Kenyans in June 2024. Police have also been behind disappearances and extrajudicial killings.

Excesses by the National Police Service have prompted action in the past. Repressive laws have been repealed and mechanisms are in place to identify, report and punish police excesses.

Wide-ranging policing reforms mandated by the 2010 constitution have also been carried out since 2013. As part of these reforms, the Independent Police Oversight Authority was set up to investigate police wrong-doing. The conviction and dismissal rates are low, however, because of defective prosecutions, poor investigations, witnesses fearing retribution or victimisation, lack of evidence, and lengthy court trials.

I am a political scientist with a focus on Kenya’s security sector. It is my view that the quest to change police behaviour in Kenya must go beyond the rule book, recriminations and repeated political proclamations of police reform.

In my view real change will come about only if the state, firstly, puts funds into the recurrent and development expenditures of the police. The aim should be to ensure these institutions are able to enforce compliance and accountability. Secondly, the state needs to strengthen its partnership with local-level civil society organisations affected by policy brutality. And lastly, it must set up digital channels that people can confidently use to lodge their complaints.

Funding gaps

The National Police Service is underfunded. This has constrained its ability to maintain law and order. It has:

  • inadequate and poorly maintained equipment and gear

  • insufficient monthly fuel allocations for patrols and other critical functions

  • poor training and operational physical facilities.

Added to these constraints are dehumanising working conditions and deplorable living conditions. This undermines their morale and ability to deliver quality services.

Another blow to police morale is the entrenched culture of corruption. Corrupt practices skew recruitment, transfers, deployments, promotions and procurement.

At the same time, the police service is expected to deal with a host of domestic and global security challenges. These include cybercrimes, cross-border security, violent extremism and terrorism.

Money needs to be allocated to improve facilities, equipment and gear. This should also enhance its logistical and technological capabilities, and provide affordable and decent housing and medical cover for its officers.

Providing adequate resources can also counter the culture of corruption, which is often driven by poor renumeration and working conditions.

Budget allocations should sustain police reforms. This should include:

Partnerships with communities

Community policing in Kenya makes a significant contribution to local-level security. This form of policing is citizen-centred with an emphasis on addressing crime risk factors by encouraging citizen participation.

Also known by its Kiswahili name, Nyumba Kumi, meaning “Ten Households”, the key strategy is anchoring community policing at the household level. Despite several problems associated with formulation and implementation, community policing in Kenya has improved local-level police-community relations in some areas of the country.

The community policing strategy is aimed at addressing emerging security needs such as infiltration by terrorist groups. It serves the whole of Kenya in terms of local-level security and is viewed as one of the key areas of police reform and a shift to democratic policing.

Community involvement can address the lack of trust between citizens and police officers due to police bias or brutality. But this is a gradual process that happens through daily interactions between communities and the police.

Public participation channels

Public participation is enshrined in Kenya’s constitution as one of the principles and values of good governance. By establishing a complaints and redress mechanism, public participation can become an integral component of promoting effective handling of complaints.

The constitution has created different institutions to address public complaints. These include the Commission on Administrative Justice (Office of the Ombudsman), Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, and the Independent Police Oversight Authority. Some of these have digital public complaints systems, which provide more confidentiality and better access for people.

Other channels of handling complaints include civil society actors and the media. Civil society organisations provide civic education and mobilise citizens to take part in monitoring and evaluation government’s performance.

Making these channels more effective could help absorb public anger that could turn into violence.

Conclusion

Police brutality in Kenya has arisen through historical, social, economic and political factors. Mitigating it therefore requires a long-term, combined top-down and bottom-up approach.

Genuine political support from the country’s political leaders is essential to instil positive attitudes about Kenya’s political and security institutions. It also requires genuine support from local-level or grassroots communities. This, in turn, entails communities trusting each other and building social cohesion.

– Kenya police brutality – it will take more than laws and public anger to change behaviour
– https://theconversation.com/kenya-police-brutality-it-will-take-more-than-laws-and-public-anger-to-change-behaviour-259327