Mozambique after 50 years of independence: what’s there to celebrate?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Luca Bussotti, Professor at the PhD Course in Peace, Democracy, Social Movements and Human Development, Universidade Técnica de Moçambique (UDM)

Mozambique’s government, led by the Frelimo party, has long been planning celebrations for 2025. It is 50 years since independence, won after an anti-colonial war against Portugal led by the same party.

Something has gone wrong, however, especially in the past two years.

Since the country’s popular rapper Azagaia died in March 2023 and peaceful processions in his memory escalated into violent clashes with the police, space has opened up for the establishment of a social movement of young people. This has since turned into a political movement, taking on the name “Povo no Poder” (“People in Power”). At its head is a brilliant politician, Venâncio Mondlane.

Povo no Poder was also the name of Azagaia’s hit song, which had been the soundtrack to 2008 protests against rising energy costs.

Azagaia’s POVO NO PODER.

The demonstrations in March 2023 marked a turning point for Mozambique. It was as if all the energy and indignation about a highly corrupt and increasingly authoritarian country that Azagaia had expressed through his songs had been passed on to previously fearful young people. Now they dared to challenge the police and army in the open and without any weapons.

In late 2024 Mozambicans took to the streets to protest against elections they claimed were rigged. Over 300 people were killed in demonstrations.

Efforts have been made to redress this serious wound. In preparation for the 50 years of independence Frelimo has been recalling key places and symbols in the liberation war, harking back to a time when they represented justice.

But attempts to evoke past glory and ideals are not resonating with ordinary Mozambicans. The mood in the country is subdued.

As a specialist in the politics of lusophone Africa, in particular Mozambique, based on years of research, I find it difficult to envision a future of peace and prosperity for the next 50 years. There are divisive elements at play across the country. The post-election crisis has its roots in widespread discontent. Mozambicans are also rising against the cost of living crisis.

Attempts to rekindle the flame

The newly elected president, Daniel Chapo, opened the 50th anniversary celebrations on 7 April in Nangade, in Cabo Delgado province. This is one of the places where the armed struggle against the Portuguese began.

National symbolism has focused on the torch of national unity, travelling the length and breadth of Mozambique to arrive in Maputo at the historic Machava Stadium on 25 June, Independence Day, for a concluding public ceremony.

Not everyone has shared this attempt to patch up a country torn both politically and socio-economically.

Too much has been lost in the intervening decades.

In the initial period of independence Frelimo adopted socialist policies and attempted to promote free and universal social services, primarily healthcare and education. Back then, the ruling class, starting with the country’s first president, Samora Machel, didn’t enjoy any particular economic privileges.

The reality today is quite different.

Journalist and social activist Tomás Vieira Mário, one of the main critics of the current regime, has traced the stages of independent Mozambique’s history. He’s pointed out the contradiction between the initial thrust by many Mozambican common people towards the liberation movement and subsequent, authoritarian developments.

He concluded in an article that all that remained to unite Mozambicans was the

mere sharing of the same territorial space. And a lot of blood.

He was referring to the long war against Renamo from 1976 to 1992 and again from 2013 to 2019, ethnic questions that have never been resolved, and finally the armed attacks in Cabo Delgado of jihadist and ethnic nature.

For his part, renowned philosopher Severino Ngoenha has also underscored the importance of a justice system that is fair and inclusive, and not at the service of one political party.

The new opposition is coming not from Renamo or Frelimo but from the streets. Popular protests have taken place this year even in areas once considered Frelimo strongholds. In Gaza province, southern Mozambique, for example, there have been outbreaks of violence, demonstrating that the bipolar system that emerged from the 1992 peace accord now seems incapable of responding to the new demands of Mozambican society.

On the political level, efforts are being made to overcome the post-electoral crisis and its wounds through the establishment of an Inclusive Dialogue Commission. This is being chaired by jurist Edson Macuacua, who is a vice-minister in the Frelimo government.

The commission is made up of representatives from all major parties as well as three members of civil society. The eventual aim is radical reform of the state.

But there are serious doubts about the success of this ambitious project which I believe are legitimate. The big question, beyond any institutional and electoral reforms, is whether the Frelimo party-state will be able to change its political culture in the next elections, accepting any negative results and, therefore, the loss of power.

Efforts are being made on all fronts to obstruct Mondlane from gaining a political foothold. Mondlane wants to start a new party called the Anamalala (meaning “It will end”, or “Stop!”).

The name has been rejected by the Ministry of Justice because a Mozambican party cannot be named using a local language – in this case Emakhuwa.

On the judicial level, several trials are underway against Mondlane and his closest associates, which could result in convictions for inciting protesters to destroy public infrastructure during the post-election demonstrations. If convicted, he would be declared ineligible to run in elections scheduled for 2029.

Inequality and disparities

Mozambique is among the six most unequal countries in the world and one of the poorest. According to World Bank data, 500,000 young people enter the labour market each year, with an average absorption capacity of about 25,000 in the formal sector, and 36% of young people unemployed in Maputo.

Meanwhile, the number of very rich is growing. Mozambique ranks 16th among African countries in terms of the number of millionaires, with 18% growth over the past 10 years.

This inequality puts national unity at risk.

The economic disparities between the capital, Maputo, and the rest of the country are increasingly evident.

Entire ethnic groups and territories are marginalised. Socio-economic and cultural divisions have been replicated in the case of discoveries of large natural resources in the north of the country. Large investments have been made in gas (Total and ENI-Exxon) and rubies in Cabo Delgado.

A new threat has arisen too: extremism. Islamist-motivated attacks have been occurring in Cabo Delgado since 2017. There was an attack recently on a military base in Macomia.

Efforts to encourage unity are coming from many quarters: from the promotion of inclusive dialogue; from a civic consciousness that has grown since 2023-2024; and from the country’s economic potential.

But social inequality remains. So do doubts about Frelimo’s willingness to make Mozambique a country where the winner governs without manipulating election results.

– Mozambique after 50 years of independence: what’s there to celebrate?
– https://theconversation.com/mozambique-after-50-years-of-independence-whats-there-to-celebrate-259528

Which African countries are flourishing? Scientists have a new way of measuring well-being

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Victor Counted, Associate Professor of Psychology, Regent University

What does it mean to live a good life? Psychologists and social scientists have been focusing on a new idea called flourishing – a sense of well-being that goes beyond just happiness or success. It’s about your whole life being good, including how you interact with other people and your community. So then, how do Africans fare when it comes to flourishing?

Victor Counted is a psychological scientist whose research across 40 African countries offers a data-rich rethinking of flourishing on the continent. His findings challenge the dominant narrative that Africa is “lagging behind” in development by showing a more nuanced picture of what it means to live a good life. We asked him more.


What is flourishing?

Flourishing is more than economic growth or individual happiness. It’s a multidimensional state of being that reflects how people feel about their lives and how well their lives are actually going. So it also measures people’s values within their community.

The idea of well-being often carries a Eurocentric emphasis on the individual – personal satisfaction, autonomy, achievement. Flourishing accounts for how whole a person is in relation to their environment.

It includes the social, spiritual and ecological contexts in which one lives. So, it’s not just about how one feels, but how one lives – fully, meaningfully and in a satisfying relationship with the world around us.

What’s the Global Flourishing Study?

The Global Flourishing Study tries to measure global patterns of human flourishing. It’s an ongoing five-year longitudinal study in over 200,000 participants across 22 countries.

I was one of the team of global scholars brought together to examine the trends on what it means to live well across cultures and life circumstances.


Read more: What makes people flourish? A new survey of more than 200,000 people across 22 countries looks for global patterns and local differences


The study identifies six key dimensions of flourishing:

  • Happiness and life satisfaction
  • Mental and physical health
  • Meaning and purpose
  • Character and virtue
  • Close social relationships
  • Financial and material stability

Participants rate how they’re doing in each of these areas on a scale from 0 to 10. Further questions capture experiences related to trust, loneliness, hope, resilience, and other related well-being variables.


CC BY-ND

Of the 22 nations, five were African: Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Egypt.

While these countries didn’t top the global rankings (Indonesia and Mexico did), Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt all reported relatively high flourishing scores, especially when well-being was considered apart from financial status.


Courtesy Victor Counted

Nigeria, for example, ranked 5th globally in flourishing scores that excluded financial indicators – ahead of many wealthier nations. Nigerians indicated strengths in social relationships, character and virtues (like forgiveness or helping others). But potential areas of growth included financial well-being, housing, ethnic discrimination and education.

Overall, this suggests that while material resources matter, they’re not the only thing that determines well-being. Kenya ranked 7th, Egypt 10th, Tanzania 11th and South Africa 13th. Each showed unique strengths in areas like meaning, social connection or mental health.

You did a separate study on flourishing in Africa. What did you find?

In a 2024 study we analysed data from the Gallup World Poll (2020–2022) to explore 38 indicators of well-being across 40 African countries.

This study offered a more detailed and culture-sensitive picture of how Africans experience and prioritise flourishing. The dimensions explored were derived from both local and universal sources, allowing for regionally relevant insights.

We found that African populations often score high in meaning, character and social relationships – despite economic hardship. This offers an important corrective to western assumptions about well-being.

Some of our key findings were:

● There is significant diversity between and within African countries. Mauritius consistently ranked highest in life evaluations (overall satisfaction with their lives), while countries like Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe scored lowest.

● East African countries such as Rwanda and Ethiopia showed strong performance in social well-being indicators (like feeling respected or learning new things daily) even when economic indicators were low.

● Countries in West Africa, such as Senegal and Ghana, scored high in emotional well-being, with many people reporting positive daily emotions like enjoyment and laughter.

● Southern African nations, despite challenges like income inequality, displayed resilience through strong community ties and cultural practices rooted in the philosophy of ubuntu.

The results reinforced that flourishing in Africa cannot only be reduced to gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (a measure of the average economic output per person in a country) – nor to western norms of success.

What can African countries focus on to flourish?

In my view, the path to greater flourishing lies in embracing local knowledge and investing in culturally relevant development priorities. Instead of following western pathways – centred on individual advancement – Africa can model alternative flourishing pathways that reflect what matters most to African people.

1. Prioritise local knowledge systems

African ideas about a connected society – like ubuntu (southern Africa), ujamaa (east Africa), teranga or wazobia (west Africa), and al-musawat wal tarahum (north Africa) teach people to care for each other and live in peace. These values help people live meaningful lives and can inform leadership and legislation.

2. Redefine development metrics

Western development models focus on individual achievement, economic output and material consumption. GDP per capita fails to capture the everyday realities and aspirations of African communities. We should also measure things like how happy people are, how hopeful they feel about the future, how strong and resilient their communities are, and how clean, safe and dignifying their living environments are.

This is not a new idea – for years development scholars have called for a shift away from narrow economic indicators toward a focus on human dignity, agency, and the real opportunities people have to pursue the lives they value. What’s new is the growing availability of data and the momentum to take these alternative metrics seriously in shaping national policies and priorities.

3. Invest in education for character development

Quality education is essential to unlocking the continent’s potential to flourish. But Africa needs more than just academic skills and workforce readiness – it needs a strategy for intentional development of values and habits that shape how a person thinks, feels, and acts with integrity.

Part of the problem lies in how the humanities – fields like history, literature, philosophy, and religious studies – are often undervalued or underfunded in education systems. But it is precisely these disciplines that nurture moral imagination, critical reflection, and civic responsibility. We need educational models that form not just workers, but whole persons – people who can think ethically, act responsibly, and lead with character in their communities.


Read more: What makes a person seem wise? Global study finds that cultures do differ – but not as much as you’d think


What does Africa offer the world in terms of flourishing?

Africa is not waiting to be saved. Across the continent, people are building communities of care, cultivating joy amid hardship, and passing on values of unity, faith, and compassion. This is what development looks like when rooted in human dignity.

Africa flourishing goals offer an alternative vision for development – one that starts with what Africa already has, not what it lacks. These are locally emic aspirations for well-being. They are shaped by Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems, cultural values, and religious/spiritual traditions. Pursuing these goals means prioritising wholeness over wealth, community over consumption, and resilience over rescue.

The continent has so much to offer the world: wisdom, strong community values, and ways of staying resilient and living fully even in hard times. But many of these local insights are missing in the global science of well-being.

– Which African countries are flourishing? Scientists have a new way of measuring well-being
– https://theconversation.com/which-african-countries-are-flourishing-scientists-have-a-new-way-of-measuring-well-being-257458

African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Misheck Mutize, Post Doctoral Researcher, Graduate School of Business (GSB), University of Cape Town

Eurobonds, debts owed in a foreign currency, have become a quick and attractive way for African countries to borrow money. They are behind a sharp rise in commercial borrowing as a percentage of total external debt: it has nearly doubled from 27% in 2011 to 52% in 2020. This has increased the debt vulnerability of most African countries.

Recent developments, however, show that most of the bonds have not been structured properly. As a result, African countries are paying way over the odds relative to their sovereign risks.

Based on my bond price modelling expertise, it is my view that there are two major drivers of the mispricing of African government bonds. They are interlinked.

Firstly, a lack of expertise in debt management offices, whose job it is to negotiate the terms of any debt deals and to oversee their execution. This is a topic I explored in a recent article.


Read more: African countries are bad at issuing bonds, so debt costs more than it should: what needs to change


The second factor, which I address here, is that in many African countries, finance ministers have assumed primary responsibility for Eurobond issuance. They engage directly with investment bankers, legal advisors and credit rating agencies.

In my view they shouldn’t.

Finance ministers should stay away from debt negotiations because they are political appointees. They operate under incentives tied to electoral cycles, not fiscal sustainability. Their short tenures and desire to fund visible projects often conflict with the long-term nature of sovereign debt obligations.

They don’t have the necessary expertise to handle the technical complexity required to get the best possible deal, either.

Simply calling for ministers to step aside would ignore the institutional realities in most African countries. In particular, debt management offices have severe capacity constraints.

Nevertheless, as global financial conditions tighten and African countries seek to refinance maturing Eurobonds or issue new instruments, the risks of politicised borrowing must be minimised. Ministers should spend their energies on ensuring their debt management offices are well staffed with top quality teams. They should then leave it up to these technical staff to prepare and arrange the financing.

This would leave room for ministers to manage any disagreements between technical staff and the banks when necessary. And to close the final deal.

Ministers versus the experts

Eurobond issuance involves advanced financial engineering – pricing models, investor engagement, covenant structuring and legal compliance across jurisdictions. It takes a deep understanding of capital markets.

When debt management offices are operating at their best, they are filled with people who have this knowledge. They have a combination of financial market and public policy skills, including debt portfolio management, risk analysis and debt transaction processing.

In discussions with debt managers at the African Sovereign Debt Conference it’s become clear to me that debt managers are sidelined in the international bond issuance negotiations. They are also sidelined in the execution process, except for administrative support.

What happens instead is that finance ministers are usually key contacts of the investment bankers. By approaching a minister directly, investment bankers get to close their mandates faster.

But this minimises due diligence and bypasses internal safeguards. Ministers may not pay attention to complex legal clauses under foreign jurisdictions, details of investor negotiations and fee structures. They may accept unfavourable terms, ignore sustainability assessments and obscure fiscal vulnerabilities in pursuit of political wins and quick disbursements.

For example, in 2018, Ghana’s then finance minister was internationally lauded for financial stewardship. Ghana was the first African issuer of a longest tenure and a zero-coupon bond. A year later, the country defaulted, suggesting the bond terms weren’t great for the country. The minister nevertheless received several awards as the best and most prudent in Africa.

There is also the issue of conflicts of interest. When the same actor – in this case the finance minister – proposes, negotiates and approves a debt instrument, the system lacks accountability.

In many African countries, parliaments, audit institutions and civil society have limited understanding about the technical details of bond agreements. Ministers can easily sideline procurement rules and transparency mechanisms, resulting in non-competitive contracts and opaque fees paid to underwriters and advisors.

Investment bankers prefer this arrangement as it works in their favour.

Reforms that are needed

Before finance ministers can hand over control, debt management offices must be equipped. This requires targeted reforms, including:

  • Capacity building through strategic partnerships: African debt management offices should work with international issuing syndicates and development partners to gain first-hand exposure to structuring, pricing and marketing global bonds.

  • Human capital reforms: Governments must attract and retain highly skilled debt managers by offering competitive pay, professional development opportunities and protection from political interference.

  • Debt management offices must be staffed by dedicated quantitative analysts. They must also be equipped to use real-time market intelligence systems and formal investor relations programmes.

  • Gradual delegation: Authority can be shifted, starting with less complex debt instruments.

The role of the finance minister must evolve. Ministers should provide strategic leadership: approving borrowing strategies, ensuring alignment with macroeconomic goals, and engaging parliament and the public.

Their function should shift from operational to institutional oversight and accountability.

Structural reforms must embed the capacity, autonomy and transparency required for debt management offices to lead effectively.

In South Africa, for example, the assets and liabilities management division of the National Treasury department manages government’s annual funding programme.

Professionalising the debt issuance process is not just about avoiding technical mistakes. It’s also about creating resilient institutions that can withstand political turnover. That fosters credibility and long-term access to capital.

Ministers should remain accountable to the public, and debt management offices must do their work based on technical merit.

– African finance ministers shouldn’t be making bond deals: how to hand over the job to experts
– https://theconversation.com/african-finance-ministers-shouldnt-be-making-bond-deals-how-to-hand-over-the-job-to-experts-259017

Kenya’s police still kill with impunity – what needs to be done to stop them

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Kamau Wairuri, Lecturer in criminology, Edinburgh Napier University

Weeks ahead of the first anniversary in Kenya of the Gen Z-led anti-government protests that resulted in at least 60 deaths and displays of police brutality, news broke that Albert Ojwang, a young Kenyan blogger, had died in police detention. Kamau Wairuri who has studied the politics of policing in Kenya, sets out why these events aren’t outliers, what efforts have been made to reform Kenya’s security forces, and what still needs to be done.

When did this all begin?

Recent events are part of a long history of police brutality in Kenya that can be traced back to colonial times.

Historians (colonial and post-colonial Kenya) such as David Anderson and Caroline Elkins present gruesome details of how state authorities brutalised indigenous Africans during colonial times.

The colonial origins of the police – largely modelled along the approaches of the Royal Ulster Constabulary known for its brutality in Ireland – partly explains why Kenya’s policing is the way it is. The police force was never designed for service. It was designed to safeguard the interests of the white minority ruling elite.

While there have been important changes in the architecture of policing since independence, subsequent post-colonial Kenyan regimes have adopted the same brutal approaches to stay in power. My previous work demonstrates this use of state security apparatuses to enhance the capacity of incumbents to crack down on opposition protests.

The brutal policing experienced under the current Kenya Kwanza regime falls within this broader historical trajectory.

The ruling elite see and use the police as their last line of defence against challenges to their misrule.

But police brutality goes beyond the policing of politics to everyday crime control. Police violence is a common occurrence, especially against poor young men.

What’s changed

Kenya’s history has been marked by strong agitation for justice and reform. Again, this goes back to colonial times.

There have been important legal and institutional changes since independence. The most important was the disbandment of the Special Branch in 1998, an intelligence unit of the police responsible for political repression. It was replaced by the National Security Intelligence Service. This then became the National Intelligence Service.

The most important changes came about through the constitutional reform of 2010. This saw a change in the architecture of the police, including:

Internal Affairs, a unit within the police service, is supposed to investigate police misconduct. The policing oversight agency is a civilian-led institutions with a similar mandate. Ideally, the two institutions should work together in executing crucial investigations. Internal affairs should provide access to information from within the police service that would be difficult for outsiders to access.

The National Police Service Commission was set up to handle the management of personnel. It’s mandated to address the challenges of corruption, nepotism and negative ethnicity that have characterised recruitment into the police service.

But it’s clear from the continued police brutality that these institutions aren’t achieving the intended effect. This means that police officers can expect to continue acting with relative impunity despite the control measures in place.

What still needs to be done

Policing is often imagined as the investigation of crimes, arresting suspects, and presenting them to court for prosecution and punishment if guilty. In Kenya, the actions of the police often appear to substitute for the entire criminal justice system.

In many cases, officers go beyond the metaphor of judge, jury and executioner to also become the complainant, mortician and undertaker. For instance, Mbaraka Karanja died in police custody in 1987 and officers proceeded to incinerate his body.

In my view, the brutality won’t end until the following steps have been taken.

First, the National Police Service Commission needs to reclaim its mandate. It seems to have completely abdicated duty, transferring crucial responsibilities back to the inspector general of the police service. As the human resource unit of the police, the commission has an important role of professionalising the service and maintaining discipline. It’s presently not doing so.

Second, the Internal Affairs Unit needs to be strengthened and given more autonomy. So far, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness the unit given the secrecy that characterises the police service. A better-resourced unit will enhance investigations of police misconduct. It would unearth obscure squads within the police service and reveal evidence to help identify perpetrators.

Third, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority needs to defend its independence and develop popular legitimacy. With its limited success in prosecuting police officers – despite the prevalence of police abuse – many Kenyans have lost confidence in it. Crucially, the authority has failed in it’s deterrence role.

Fourth, the independence of the National Police Service needs to be safeguarded. The police service leadership continues to serve at the pleasure of the prevailing regime. This in turn shapes the priorities of the service. Inspectors-general have been forced to resign. President William Ruto confessed to having fired the director of criminal investigations when he took power. Ruto had initially claimed that the director had resigned.

Crucially, and in fifth place, there needs to be a change in policing culture alongside broader governance culture in Kenya. Impunity is rampant across the public service. Kenya won’t have a highly accountable police force while other agencies and senior officials are operating with significant impunity.

Identifying the levers of cultural change isn’t easy. There are many proposals to alter policing culture. These include a complete redesign of Kenya’s Penal Code to dislodge its colonial roots, transforming the training of police officers, and strengthening the policing oversight authority’s capacity to investigate cases.

But, in my mind, a crucial starting point is citizen agitation and demand for accountability. The light that Gen Z protesters, the media and civil society organisations are shining on police abuses should be encouraged. A clear signal that Kenyans will no longer tolerate police abuse is crucial for culture change within the service and among the political elite.

However, this needs to be understood within the reality that many Kenyans support police violence, believing it to be the most effective way of dealing with crime as my earlier research demonstrates. In another study, I note how police abuse is endorsed by politicians and religious leaders as a way of responding to crime and punishing groups of people they don’t like.

Combined with ineffective accountability mechanisms, this popular support for police violence, both tacit and explicit, gives the police the belief that they are the thin blue line between order and chaos. That they have the popular mandate to use any means they consider necessary – often brutal violence – to keep society safe.

In other words, the conversation on police reform requires a fundamental reframing to kick start the journey towards democratic policing. At present, we’re not only way off the mark, we seem to be heading in the wrong direction.

– Kenya’s police still kill with impunity – what needs to be done to stop them
– https://theconversation.com/kenyas-police-still-kill-with-impunity-what-needs-to-be-done-to-stop-them-259326

One year on: South Africa’s coalition government boosted optimism, but will it last?

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Matthias Krönke, Lecturer, University of Reading

For the first time since the end of apartheid in 1994, the ruling African National Congress lost its parliamentary majority in 2024. After 30 years in power, it had to form a coalition with 10 other political parties to govern the country. The creation of the “government of national unity” marked a turning point in the country’s democracy.

This development appears to have rekindled hope and positive sentiment among South Africans about the country’s future and its democratic processes.

The period leading up to the 2024 elections was characterised by widespread pessimism. Years of economic stagnation, high unemployment, severe electricity shortages, and high-level corruption cases had taken their toll on public trust and satisfaction with the ANC’s governance. Previous analyses by Afrobarometer (a research network that conducts public attitude surveys) had consistently shown declining satisfaction with the country’s direction and the functioning of democracy.

We are political scientists who have worked with public opinion data in South Africa for almost a decade. We analysed data from a special Afrobarometer survey just before and after the country’s 2024 election. The results show a sharp turnaround in attitudes on three issues: the direction of the country, government performance, and views on democracy.

One of the most significant findings is the shift in citizens’ perceptions about the general direction of the country. Before the election, a mere 14% of South Africans believed the country was heading in the right direction. Post-election, this figure surged to 39%.

South Africans’ renewed optimism after the formation of the unity government underscores the importance of electoral processes in shaping citizen perceptions of democracy and governance. Whether these sentiments are sustained will depend on a few things, including the coalition government’s ability to meet citizen expectations and address their most pressing concerns.

The post-election optimism boost

Afrobarometer interviewed the same group of adult South Africans before (April/May 2024) and after (August/September 2024) the election. This allowed us to track which respondents changed their views and in which direction. Here, we focus on citizens’ views of the overall direction of the country (optimism), government performance, and views on democracy.

A surge in optimism: The data show that 35% of the population became more positive in their outlook after the election. This was consistent across gender, age, and education levels. At the same time, 4% of the population maintained their positive outlook on the country’s trajectory.

About half (48%) continued to say that South Africa was going in the wrong direction after the election. A further 10% moved towards a negative outlook.

Renewed faith in democratic processes: Beyond general optimism, there was a resurgence in pro-democratic attitudes. The proportion of South Africans who believe democracy is preferable to any other form of government increased from 45% before the election to 55% after. Satisfaction with the way democracy works in South Africa jumped from 36% to 59%. These levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy were the highest recorded by Afrobarometer in South Africa since 2018 and 2011, respectively.

We found that three in 10 (29%) respondents were newly in favour of democracy after the elections. About four in 10 (39%) shifted from dissatisfaction or a neutral opinion before the election to stating they were “fairly” or “very” satisfied with the country’s democracy afterwards.

Where are the sore losers?: In both the case of support for and satisfaction with democracy, we found that a greater proportion of poorer citizens shifted their opinions, compared to their wealthier counterparts. In contrast, there were no clear patterns of opinion change by respondents’ gender, age, level of education, or race.

When examining the same question by party affiliation, the outcome was interesting. The share of partisans who preferred democracy increased among supporters of the ANC, the Economic Freedom Fighters and the MK Party after the election. A majority of supporters from the four major parties were satisfied with how democracy worked in the country.

Even ANC supporters remained largely satisfied with democracy despite the party’s electoral losses. Collectively, these findings suggest a post-electoral vote of confidence in multiparty competition.

Expectations of the new government: Citizens also appeared more hopeful about the new coalition government’s ability to tackle some of the nation’s most pressing issues. Pre-election evaluations of government performance on key services were overwhelmingly negative. The post-election wave showed some modest increases in optimism.

Two-thirds (67%) of South Africans felt the government of national unity would be more effective in the critical area of electricity provision. There was also hope for progress in other areas; 42% expected the new government to be more effective in creating jobs. Another 41% believed it would be more successful in fighting corruption.

Over the past year, the government seems to have met citizens’ expectations. South Africa has not experienced prolonged periods of power cuts over the past 12 months. However, the unemployment rate has remained unchanged, at 32.9%.

Looking ahead

The 2024 elections in South Africa seem to have served as an inflection point. It is contributing to a revival of optimism and pro-democratic sentiment. The shift from pre-election pessimism to post-election hope was palpable. Maintaining renewed public confidence, however, relies on a government’s ability to meet citizens’ expectations and deliver tangible improvements on their concerns.

The ongoing skirmishes between the ANC and the Democratic Alliance illustrate the coalition government’s difficulty in translating agreement on a broad agenda into specific outcomes.

The coming months and years will tell whether the unity government’s infighting ultimately squanders citizens’ goodwill.

– One year on: South Africa’s coalition government boosted optimism, but will it last?
– https://theconversation.com/one-year-on-south-africas-coalition-government-boosted-optimism-but-will-it-last-258497

Kwame Akoto-Bamfo: the Ghanaian artist using work about slavery to find justice and healing

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Ama Asaa Engmann, Associate Professor and Director of Christiansborg Archaeological Heritage Project, Associate Graduate Faculty, Rutgers University

Thousands of sculpted heads – captive African men, women, and children – meticulously created by the artist Kwame Akoto-Bamfo, emerge from the soil at the Nkyinkyim Museum, as a sacred gathering of ancestors. Together, they form a powerful monument to the horror, violence, and resistance to enslavement, as well as the ongoing work of remembrance and healing.

Kwame Akoto-Bamfo.

Kwame Akoto-Bamfo is a Ghanaian multidisciplinary artist who engages with the histories and legacies of the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism at home and, increasingly, internationally, on both sides of the Atlantic.

As an archaeologist who works in the field of critical heritage studies, Akoto-Bamfo’s work is important for its powerful engagement with memory, material culture and restorative justice. I feature it in a chapter of a new book that I co-edited called Architectures of Slavery: Ruins and Reconstructions.

Who is Kwame Akoto-Bamfo?

Akoto-Bamfo studied at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi. He obtained his bachelor’s and master of fine arts degrees, both in sculpture. After graduating, the artist worked as a school teacher and a university lecturer.

In 2015, Akoto-Bamfo rose to international fame through a series of large-scale installations. He called it ‘Nkyinkyim’ (“twisting” in the Ghanaian Twi language, as in the proverb, “Life’s journey is twisted”).


Read more: Book review: how Africa was central to the making of the modern world


Four years later, he established the ‘Nkyinkyim Museum’, a non-profit organisation known as the ‘Ancestor Project’. This open-air museum is located in Nuhalenya-Ada, a two-hour drive from Accra. It has become a space for people of African descent to engage in restorative healing through art and education.

Nkyinkyim Museum

At the site’s entrance, three twenty-five-foot monuments are displayed. They are made of stone, concrete and wood. The first is inspired by North and Eastern Africa, and the second by Sudano-Sahelian architecture. The third is inspired by the Forest regions in Central and West Africa.

Sculptures at the museum entrance. Kwame Akoto-Bamfo

The collection includes multiple installations in collaboration with the local community. They illustrate “the diversity in our narratives surrounding history, philosophy, and religious beliefs”. The artist himself, demonstrates a mastery of multimedia art forms, working in cement, terracotta, brass, copper, and wood, noting “one can reach different heights with different technologies.”

Today, the museum features a sacred healing space with a compelling display of thousands of unique concrete life size heads and 7,000 terracotta miniature sculpted heads. They include captive Africans abducted, sold and forcibly trafficked during the transatlantic slave trade.

An installation of the heads of enslaved people. Kwame Akoto-Bamfo

His sculptures capture captives’ shock, horror, anger, distress and fear—emotions. This is communicated through their facial expressions in an installation that is disturbingly evocative and profoundly haunting. It is inspired by ‘nsodie’, an Akan funerary sculpture tradition, that dates back to approximately the twelfth century. Akoto-Bamfo explains during our conversations relating to the research for book:

I wanted to draw upon Akan belief in commemoration and remembrance after death in order to honour the young, old, men and women, who originated from various ethnic groups and who died in the Atlantic Ocean during the Middle Passage and did not get that chance.

Each year, the annual ‘Ancestor Veneration’ ceremony takes place under the guidance of chiefs, priests, and priestess from various ethnic groups.

The museum displays 7,000 terracotta sculpted heads. Kwame Akoto-Bamfo

Visitors are invited to participate in certain Akan rites and ceremonies – free from photography and selfies that undermine or commercialise sacred funerary art practices. Says Akoto-Bamfo:

I am Akan, so initially I began with Akan traditional rites, but now our ceremonies welcome other African ethnic groups including the Ga-Dangme, Ewe, and Yoruba, from Ghana and Nigeria, as well as African descendant people in the African diaspora.

In contrast, the ‘Freedom Parade Festival’ allows participants to creatively express and contribute to an evolving heritage tradition, without the specified observances. For example, painted bodily adornment applied directly onto the skin, yet without the necessary spiritual rites.

A protest monument

Akoto-Bamfo’s sculptures have also gained recognition beyond Ghana’s borders. For instance, the permanent installation at the Legacy Museum and National Museum for Peace and Justice in Montgomery, Alabama in the US.

More recently, in 2021, his Blank Slate Project Monument toured throughout the United States. This included stops at Times Square in New York and the King Center in Atlanta. It depicts an enslaved ancestor, bent forward with his hands behind his back, head turned sideways, face on the ground, with a booted foot on his head.

The Blank Slate Monument in New York. Roshi Sariaslan

Akoto-Bamfo describes this work as “a noisy one — a protest piece that speaks against racist Civil War monuments.” The work was completed prior to the police killing of George Floyd that led to widespread protests in the US in 2020. It was first unveiled in a private viewing in Ghana, prior to its shipment to the United States.

He says:

We had a lot of discussions among those involved in the project: some feared it might incite violence, others said that it was a prediction.

The work is interactive. It holds a removable placard that invites viewers to inscribe their reactions to the statue, which are then exhibited. Akoto-Bamfo emphasises:

I wanted ordinary people, both individuals and communities, to relate, and to contribute to, not only towards my artwork but also to the wider ongoing discussions. As an artist, I believe that I do not have the sole right to speak. I wanted ordinary Americans to add their voices because I am already contributing.

In Europe too, his work is featured at the 169 Museum in Germany.

The effects of enslavement are still felt today. Kwame Akoto-Bamfo

In Ghana, Akoto-Bamfo’s work was initially seen as too controversial. The artist shares:

At first, I had to be extremely resilient because my work was concerned with the slave trade, slavery, colonialism, racism, and human rights. I embraced uncomfortable dialogue. Yet these were difficult topics for galleries and the art world at that time in Ghana.

He adds:

Today, however, some even view me as a spiritual leader… but I have always had an innate antipathy towards injustice. My work is not only about the past but what is unfolding now.

Akoto-Bamfo offers a closing reflection on why this kind of memory work matters:

I just want to use the little knowledge that I have to contribute towards the work of restorative and transformative justice.

– Kwame Akoto-Bamfo: the Ghanaian artist using work about slavery to find justice and healing
– https://theconversation.com/kwame-akoto-bamfo-the-ghanaian-artist-using-work-about-slavery-to-find-justice-and-healing-259184

Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Yuezhou Yang, Research Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science

Media coverage of Chinese land investments in African agriculture often reinforces narratives of a “weak African state” and the “Chinese land grab”, highlighting power imbalances between the actors involved in these land deals.

Are Chinese actors grabbing land in Africa and jeopardising local people’s land rights and food security?

China’s “Agriculture Going Out” policy, launched in 2007 as part of its broader “Going Out” strategy, was reinforced by the Belt and Road Initiative from 2013. Backed by these policies, Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa rose from US$74.81 million in 2003 to US$4.99 billion in 2021. By 2020, US$1.67 billion was invested in African agriculture, with nearly two-thirds targeting cash crop cultivation. Zambia ranked among the top ten African countries receiving Chinese foreign direct investment and loans.

My research on Zambian agriculture finds that Chinese land grabbing is a myth. Instead, Chinese investors have preferred different investment models according to the specific rules of land access, transfer and control of three land tenure systems in Zambia.

What ties the three types of Chinese agricultural investments together is this: land institutions matter. Whether it’s central government rules or traditional authority, these systems shape how foreign investment happens and what impact it has.


Read more: Foreign agriculture investments don’t always threaten food security: the case of Madagascar


Each of the three models raises new opportunities and challenges for rural development and land governance. These findings matter because they offer insights into the future of land rights, livelihoods and state-building in African countries.

Not all land is the same

After independence, all land in Zambia was vested in the president, held in trust for the people. Today, the country still operates under a dual land system, as outlined in the 1995 Lands Act. State land, managed by the central government, includes both private and government leaseholds. Customary land, on the other hand, remains under the authority of traditional chiefs. The exact proportion of state and customary land in Zambia is contested, with estimates of customary land ranging widely from 94% to 54%.

This tenure distinction is significant because each type of land is governed by different rules regarding foreign access and ownership, which shape how foreign investors choose their investment models.

Over four months of fieldwork in Zambia, I gathered data on 50 Chinese agricultural projects (41 remained active) through 96 qualitative interviews. These projects were spread across three types of land tenure: private leasehold (37), government leasehold (1), and customary land (3).

Model 1: Commercial farm on private land

My fieldwork data showed that the majority of Chinese agricultural investments in Zambia are located on private leasehold land, typically following the commercial farm model. This type of land functions much like private property, held under 99-year leases that can be bought, sold or transferred. Investors use it for large-scale farming operations, such as maize, soybean and wheat production.

Even in these seemingly privatised spaces, however, state power remains influential. When Zambia proposed a draft National Land Policy in 2017 aimed at tightening rules for foreign land ownership, Chinese investors responded strategically. Many began aligning their projects with Zambia’s development priorities, emphasising contributions to local food security, donating to charities, and promoting themselves as responsible corporate actors.

Model 2: Farm block on government land

In northern Zambia, for example, a Chinese company partnered with the government to develop a farm block on state-owned land that had been converted from customary tenure for national development. Unlike the commercial farm model, the government played a central role, selecting the investor, managing the land and negotiating the deal. The project promised infrastructure and jobs, enhancing the political standing of local officials.

But this kind of state-led development works only when the promises are delivered. In other areas where farm blocks failed to materialise, traditional chiefs reclaimed the land. In the northern case, actual physical infrastructure investment helped reinforce state authority.

Model 3: Contract farming on customary land

The third model is very different. For instance, a Chinese agribusiness company arranged contract farming deals with over 50,000 smallholders in Zambia’s Eastern Province. Instead of buying or leasing land, the company provided seeds and bought cotton from farmers after harvest. This let the company access land informally, without triggering the legal and political risks of converting customary land to leasehold.

Operating on customary land posed challenges for investors. When farmers defaulted on loans or engaged in side-selling, companies had limited legal recourse and often had to negotiate with chiefs and local communities rather than the state. In such contexts, traditional authorities – not the central government – wielded the decisive power over land and its governance.

Why this matters

In a world where land deals are often controversial, understanding how local rules shape global investment is crucial. It’s not just about who buys the land, but under what terms, and how those terms are enforced. African governments are not just passive bystanders; they’re active players who use land institutions to negotiate power and development.


Read more: China and Africa: Ethiopia case study debunks investment myths


This research urges us to look beyond the headlines about “land grabs” and instead focus on the everyday politics of land. If African states want to steer rural development on their own terms, understanding and strengthening land institutions – both statutory and customary – is key.

– Are Chinese investors grabbing Zambian land? Study finds that’s a myth
– https://theconversation.com/are-chinese-investors-grabbing-zambian-land-study-finds-thats-a-myth-257644

Stone tools from a cave on South Africa’s coast speak of life at the end of the Ice Age

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sara Watson, Assistant Professor, Indiana State University

The Earth of the last Ice Age (about 26,000 to 19,000 years ago) was very different from today’s world.

In the northern hemisphere, ice sheets up to 8 kilometres tall covered much of Europe, Asia and North America, while much of the southern hemisphere became drier as water was drawn into the northern glaciers.

As more and more water was transformed into ice, global sea levels dropped as much as 125 metres from where they are now, exposing land that had been under the ocean.

In southernmost Africa, receding coastlines exposed an area of the continental shelf known as the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain. At its maximum extent, it covered an area of about 36,000km² along the south coast of what’s now South Africa.

This now – extinct ecosystem was a highly productive landscape with abundant grasslands, wetlands, permanent water drainage systems, and seasonal flood plains. The Palaeo-Agulhas Plain was likely most similar to the present day Serengeti in east Africa. It would likely have been able to support large herds of migratory animals and the people who hunted them.

We now know more about how these people lived thanks to data from a new archaeological site called Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1.

Archaeologists at Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1. Sara Watson, Author provided (no reuse)

The site sits 23 metres above sea level on the southern coast of South Africa overlooking the Indian Ocean. You can watch whales from the site today, but during the Ice Age the ocean was nowhere to be seen. Instead, the site looked out over the vast grasslands; the coast was 75 kilometres away.

Archaeological investigation of the cave began in 2014, led by Naomi Cleghorn of the University of Texas. This work shows that humans have been using the site for much of the last 48,000 years or more. Occupations bridge the Middle to Later Stone Age transition, which occurred sometime between about 40,000 and 25,000 years ago in southern Africa.

That transition is a time period where we see dramatic changes in the technologies people were using, including changes in raw materials selected for making tools and a shift towards smaller tools. These changes are poorly understood due to a lack of sites with occupations dating to this time. Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1 is the first site on the southern coast that provides a continuous occupational record near the end of the Pleistocene (Ice Age) and documents how life changed for people living on the edge of the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain.

Before the Ice Age, people there collected marine resources like shellfish when the coastline was close to the site. As the climate began to cool and sea levels dropped, they shifted their focus to land-based resources and game animals.

Archaeologists working at Knysna Eastern Heads site. Sara Watson, Author provided (no reuse)

I am one of the archaeologists who have been working here. In a new study, my colleagues and I analysed stone tools from the cave that date to about 19,000 to 18,000 years ago, and discussed how the techniques used to make them hint at the ways that prehistoric people travelled, interacted, and shared their craft.

Based on this analysis, we think the cave may have been used as a temporary camp rather than a primary residence. And the similarity of the tools with those from other sites suggests people were connected over a huge region and shared ideas with each other, much like people do today.

Robberg technology of southern Africa

In human history, tools were invented in a succession of styles (“technologies” or “industries”), which can indicate the time and place where they were made and what they were used for.

The Robberg is one of southern Africa’s most distinctive and widespread stone tool technologies. Robberg tools – which we found at the Knysna site – are thought to be replaceable components in composite tools, perhaps as barbs set into arrow shafts, used to hunt the migratory herds on the Palaeo-Agulhas Plain.

Stone tools, Robberg technology. Sara Watson, Author provided (no reuse)

We see the first appearance of Robberg technology in southern Africa near the peak of the last Ice Age around 26,000 years ago, and people continued producing these tools until around 12,000 years ago, when climate conditions were warmer.


Read more: What stone tools found in southern tip of Africa tell us about the human story


The particular methods and order of operations that people used to make their tools is something that is taught and learned. If we see specific methods of stone tool production at multiple sites, it indicates that people were sharing ideas with one another.

Sites in southern Africa where Robberg technology has been found. Sara Watson, Author provided (no reuse)

Robberg occupations at Knysna date to between 21,000 and 15,000 years ago, when sea levels were at their lowest and the coastline far away.

The Robberg tools we recovered were primarily made from rocks that were available close to the site. Most of the tools were made from quartz, which creates very sharp edges but can break unpredictably. Production focused on bladelets, or small elongated tools, which may have been replaceable components in hunting weapons.

Some of the tools were made from a raw material called silcrete. People in South Africa were heat treating this material to improve its quality for tool production as early as 164,000 years ago. The silcrete tools at Knysna were heat treated before being brought to the site. This is only the second documented instance of the use of heat treatment in Robberg technology.

Silcrete is not available near Knysna. Most of the accessible deposits in the area are in the Outeniqua mountains, at least 50 kilometres inland. We’re not sure yet whether people using the Knysna site were travelling to these raw material sources themselves or trading with other groups.

Archaeological sites containing Robberg tools are found in South Africa, Lesotho and Eswatini, indicating a widespread adoption by people across southern Africa. The tools from the Knysna site share many characteristics with those from other sites, which suggests people were sharing information through social networks that may have spanned the entire width of the continent.


Read more: 65,000-year-old ‘stone Swiss Army knives’ show early humans had long-distance social networks


Yet there are other aspects that are unique to the Knysna site. Fewer tools are found in the more recent layers than in deeper layers, suggesting that people were using the site less frequently than they had previously. This may suggest that during the Ice Age the cave was used as a temporary camp rather than as a primary residential site.

Left with questions

Stone tools can only tell us so much. Was Knysna Eastern Heads Cave 1 a temporary camp? If so, what were they coming to the cave for? We need to combine what we learned from the stone tools with other data from the site to answer these questions.


Read more: Ancient human DNA from a South African rock shelter sheds light on 10,000 years of history


Something we can say with confidence is that we have a very long and rich history as a species, and our innovative and social natures go back a lot further in time than most people realise. Humans living during the last Ice Age had complex technologies to solve their problems, made art and music, connected with people in other communities, and in some places even had pet dogs.

Despite the dramatic differences in the world around us, these Ice Age people were not very different from people living today.

– Stone tools from a cave on South Africa’s coast speak of life at the end of the Ice Age
– https://theconversation.com/stone-tools-from-a-cave-on-south-africas-coast-speak-of-life-at-the-end-of-the-ice-age-258317

What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olivier Sterck, Associate professor, University of Oxford

Humanitarian needs are rising around the world. At the same time, major donors such as the US and the UK are pulling back support, placing increasing strain on already overstretched aid systems.

Global humanitarian needs have quadrupled since 2015, driven by new conflicts in Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza. Added to these are protracted crises in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and DR Congo, among others. Yet donor funding has failed to keep pace, covering less than half of the requested US$50 billion in 2024, leaving millions without assistance.

Notably, the US recently slashed billions of US dollars from global relief efforts. The slashed contributions once made up to half of all public humanitarian funding and over a fifth of the UN’s budget. Other donors have been cutting aid as well.

As funding shortfalls widen, humanitarian agencies increasingly face tough choices: reducing the scale of operations, pausing essential services, or cancelling programmes altogether. Disruptions to aid delivery have become a routine feature of humanitarian operations.

Yet few rigorous studies have provided hard evidence of the consequences for affected populations.

A recent study from one of the world’s largest refugee camps in Kenya fills this gap.

Our research team from the University of Oxford and the University of Antwerp was already studying Kakuma camp and then had an opportunity to see what happened when aid was cut. We observed the impact of a 20% aid cut that occurred in 2023.

The study reveals that cuts to humanitarian assistance had dramatic impacts on hunger and psychological distress, with cascading effects on local credit systems and prices of goods.

Kakuma refugee camp

Kakuma is home to more than 300,000 refugees, who mostly came from South Sudan (49%), Somalia (16%), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (10%). They have been housed here since 1992. With widespread poverty, lack of income opportunities, and aid making up over 90% of household income, survival in the camp hinges on humanitarian support from UN organisations.

When the research began in late 2022, most refugees in Kakuma received a combination of in-kind and cash transfers from the World Food Programme. Transfers were worth US$17 per person per month, barely enough to cover the bare essentials: food, firewood and medicine.

Over the span of a year, the research team tracked 622 South Sudanese refugee households, interviewing them monthly to monitor how their living conditions evolved in response to the timing and level of aid they received. We also gathered weekly price data on 70 essential goods and conducted more than 250 in-depth interviews with refugees, shopkeepers, and humanitarian staff to understand the broader impacts.

Then came the cut. In July 2023, assistance was reduced by 20%, just as the research team was conducting its eighth round of data collection. This sudden reduction in humanitarian aid created a rare opportunity to assess the effects of an aid cut on both recipients and the markets they depend on.

Consequences of aid cut

The 20% cut in humanitarian aid had cascading effects, affecting not just hunger, but local credit systems, prices, and well-being.

1. Hunger got worse. As a Somali refugee interviewed by the researchers put it: “After the aid reduction, the lives of refugees become hard. That was the money sustaining them. […] Things are insufficient, and hunger is visible.”

Food insecurity was already widespread before the cut, with more than 90% of refugees classified as food insecure. Average caloric intake stood below 1,900 kcal per person per day – well under the World Food Programme’s 2,100 kcal target and about half the average daily calorie supply available to a US citizen.

Food insecurity further increased following the aid cut, with caloric intake falling by 145 kcal, a 7% decrease. The share of households eating one meal or less increased by 8 percentage points, from about 29% to 37%. At the same time, dietary diversity narrowed, indicating that households tried to mitigate the negative impacts of the aid cut by reducing the variety of foods they consumed.

2. Credit collapsed. As a refugee shopkeeper of Ethiopian origin reported: “When we give out credit we have a limit; since the aid is reduced, the credit is also reduced.”

Cash assistance in Kakuma is delivered through aid cards, which refugees routinely use as collateral to access food on credit. When transfers are delayed or unexpected expenses arise, refugees hand over their aid cards as a guarantee to trusted shopkeepers, allowing them to borrow food against next month’s aid.

But when assistance was cut, the value of this informal collateral plummeted. Retailers, fearing default, reduced lending or refused lending altogether. Informal credit from shopkeepers shrank by 9%. Many refugees reported being refused food on credit or having to repay past debt before receiving any new goods.

3. Households liquidated assets. With no access to credit, households began selling off possessions and drawing down food reserves. The average value of household assets fell by over 6% after the aid cut.

4. Psychological distress increased. The aid cut reduced self-reported sleep quality and happiness, indicating that reductions in aid go beyond physical impacts and also have psychological effects.

5. Prices fell. With reduced expenditure and purchasing power, the demand for food dropped, and food prices went down, partially offsetting the negative effects of the aid cut.

Implications

The study carries two major policy implications.

First, aid in contexts like Kakuma should not be treated as optional or discretionary, but as a structural necessity. It is the backbone of daily life. Mechanisms are needed to protect it from abrupt donor withdrawals.

Second, informal credit is not peripheral, it is central to economic life in refugee settings. In many camps, shopkeepers act as retailers and de facto financial institutions. When aid transfers serve as both income and collateral, cutting them risks collapsing this fragile credit system. Cash transfer programmes must therefore be designed with these dynamics in mind.

– What happens when aid is cut to a large refugee camp? Kenyan study paints a bleak picture
– https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-aid-is-cut-to-a-large-refugee-camp-kenyan-study-paints-a-bleak-picture-259055

Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephen Onyeiwu, Professor of Economics & Business, Allegheny College

The Nigerian economy grew at a robust rate of 3.4% in 2024, the highest it has been since 2019 (except 2021 when the COVID rebound occurred).

This should have been cheering news, worthy of firecrackers and champagne-popping. Rather it came with a catch: the country’s poverty profile worsened.

In its annual review of the country, the World Bank applauded Nigeria for its economic reforms. These include the removal of fuel subsidies, liberalisation of the foreign exchange market and maintenance of a contractionary monetary policy. This is a policy of raising interest rates, reducing money supply and increasing borrowing costs to rein in inflation.

But the bank also drew attention to the fact that the country’s poverty profile has become grim. About 31% of Nigerians lived in poverty prior to the COVID-19 epidemic. Since then, an additional 42 million have become poor, increasing the poverty rate to about 46% in 2024.

Poverty is even worse in Nigeria’s rural communities: 75.5% live on US$2.15 or less per day (based on 2017 prices). The average poverty rate for sub-Saharan African countries was 36.5% in 2024 and 0.8% for East Asia and the Pacific.

Nigeria’s poverty rate would have been higher if the multidimensional poverty index had been used. In addition to income, the index considers access to education, health, decent housing, nutrition, sanitation, electricity and water. Access to these critical services has worsened for many Nigerians, despite improvements in macroeconomic stability.


Read more: Poor rural infrastructure holds back food production by small Nigerian farmers


A challenge for policy makers is how to translate impressive macroeconomic outcomes into high-paying jobs, lower poverty rates and access to health, good sanitation, education, electricity and affordable housing. The question is even more acute for people in rural areas.

As an economist who has studied the Nigerian economy for over four decades and lived in a rural community, I believe Nigeria needs a radical shift in its economic policy approach.

One major step should be a change in the country’s growth drivers. Oil, information and communications technology and finance are the major drivers of growth in Nigeria.

These sectors are not employment-intensive, and they require skills that most Nigerians don’t have. Because of the lack of employment opportunities in these sectors, most Nigerians gravitate towards the informal sector, which accounts for about 90% of employment in the country.

By continuing to urge Nigerians to be patient for economic reforms to have a positive impact on their living conditions, the Tinubu administration appears to assume that improvements in macroeconomic performance will eventually manifest in lower unemployment and poverty rates. This notion of “trickle-down economics” is misconceived and illusory.

The government needs to intentionally create transmission mechanisms through which economic growth and macroeconomic stability can raise living standards.

Fostering growth with development

Concerted efforts will be needed to target poverty in general, and rural poverty in particular.

Five key policies could get Nigeria closer to this goal:

Building productive capacities: People who live in rural areas in Nigeria are eager to work and full of creative ideas and entrepreneurial spirit. But they lack the resources and opportunity to fully unleash their potential.

Building their productive capacities would entail giving them access to basic education, technical and managerial skills, and other productive resources such as tools, equipment, finance and land. The government should identify the comparative advantage of different rural communities, and put in place policies that encourage those communities to use their comparative advantage and distinctive competencies.

Opportunity to diversify incomes: In developed countries, many people hold multiple jobs. Most rural dwellers in Nigeria, however, rely on agriculture as their only source of livelihood.

Because of limited access to inputs and modern technology, and outdated agricultural practices, their productivity is often very low. Their low income makes it difficult to save and invest in education, health and housing.

Non-agricultural activities, especially manufacturing, need to be located in rural communities, to give rural dwellers the opportunity to diversify their income sources.

Agriculture-led industrial strategy: This would involve the location of manufacturing plants close to the sources of agricultural raw materials.

Nigerian manufacturers locate their factories in urban areas. The result of urban-biased development strategy in Nigeria has been the lack of employment opportunities in rural communities, and a decline in the rural population, from about 85% in 1960 to 46% in 2023.

Moving manufacturing to rural areas would require massive investment in infrastructure such as electricity, water, roads and health services.


Read more: Nigeria’s new blue economy ministry could harness marine resources – moving the focus away from oil


Ending patriarchy and male domination: Women disproportionately bear the burden of rural poverty in Nigeria. A study in rural south-east Nigeria found that the poverty rate among women was 98%, compared to 85% for men. Men are often given preference regarding access to land, education, skills acquisition and financial inclusion.

Women are also imbued with the responsibility of caring for children, the elderly and the sick, as well as household chores. This leaves them with little time for paid work or opportunities to acquire marketable skills.

Ability to absorb shocks and vulnerability: Rural poverty is often exacerbated by shocks and vulnerability such as extreme weather conditions, attacks by insurgents and other criminal groups, and illness. With no safety nets, and little or no saving, most rural dwellers are unable to withstand shocks.

The Tinubu administration plans to disburse N25,000 (about US$17) each to 60 million Nigerians. But these kinds of support are too small, non-pervasive, irregular and unpredictable.


Read more: Nigeria needs to close the financial inclusion gap for women smallholder farmers


What India and China have to teach

Nigeria could do well to borrow from the Indian model of an institutionalised safety net.

India issues “ration cards” to eligible households. The cards enable poor people to purchase essential food items such as grains, milk, eggs, cooking oil and bread at subsidised prices from designated stores.

Nigeria could finance this kind of programme with a special tax on oil companies and financial institutions, which frequently post huge after-tax profits.

China has had an impressive record of poverty reduction. Using the US$1.90 poverty line, China’s poverty rate decreased from 88.1% in 1981 to 0.3% in 2018.

The fall in rural poverty is even more dramatic, from 96% in 1980 to 1% in 2019.

This reduction was accomplished in stages, starting with an increase in agricultural productivity. It then shifted focus to the development of non-agricultural sectors of the economy, including manufacturing. These sectors were able to draw surplus labour from the agricultural sector, giving them skills that led to higher wages and poverty alleviation.


Read more: Poor rural infrastructure holds back food production by small Nigerian farmers


Next steps

The World Bank in its report noted that addressing pressing social and humanitarian challenges remains critical to ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth in Nigeria.

Cash transfers and social assistance programmes could provide temporary relief for the poor in rural communities. But a long-term solution is to build their productive capacities and transform rural communities in ways that provide opportunities for income diversification.

– Nigeria’s economy is growing but rural poverty is rising: 5 key policies to address the divide
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-economy-is-growing-but-rural-poverty-is-rising-5-key-policies-to-address-the-divide-257152