Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Lauren Johnston, Associate Professor, China Studies Centre, University of Sydney

China’s President Xi Jinping announced in February 2026 that from 1 May China would be granting zero-tariff treatment to 53 African countries. (That is all of them bar Eswatini, which supports Taiwan.)

China-Africa trade reached US$348 billion in 2025, up 17.7% from 2024. Chinese exports to Africa dominate trade flows, and amounted to US$225 billion, an increase of 25.8%. This compares to US$123 billion in imports from Africa, which grew by just 5.4%. Such a rising trade deficit between Africa and its largest sovereign trade partner points to the timeliness of new China policies that support African exports to China.

Beyond potential for trade facilitation and diplomacy, at a time of trade rivalry between the great powers, what might the change mean?

Based on years of study of China-Africa trade relations, I argue that there will be two probable main effects – one positive, one negative.

First, on the positive side, zero tariffs could provide incentives for cross-country export cooperation within Africa. On the negative, it risks creating conditions in which Africa’s stronger economies capture the most gain at the expense of weaker economies.

The existing regime

China’s Africa-specific trade preferences have evolved through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, established in 2000. China’s own global trade integration since its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 has also evolved.

Since 2005, African least developed countries have enjoyed zero-tariff access to China across 100% of tariff lines. Least developed countries are low-income countries confronting severe structural impediments to sustainable development. They are highly vulnerable to economic and environmental shocks and have low levels of human capital.

This policy restricted zero-tariff trade access to around 33 countries (subject to change owing to income growth and diplomatic recognition of Beijing). Africa’s middle-income exporters were excluded from the trade preferences.

South Africa, for example, continued to face tariffs on most exports, including fruits, wine and processed foods. Many were between 10% and 25%.

A handful of research papers have explored earlier Chinese trade preferences for Africa. For example, policy researcher and economist Adam Minson estimated that the least developed country tariff-free arrangements of 2005 would bring some countries as little as an additional US$100,000 annually.

My own PhD research found that by 2009 these preferential trade policies had not had any significant impact on exports. More recently, economists Zhina Sun and Ehizuelen Michael Mitchell Omoruyi found that the existing zero-tariff policy had promoted diversification of manufacturing exports to China and of regional trade. But there had been little effect on agriculture and mining export diversification.

One recurring recommendation has been to expand equal tariff treatment across African regional blocs. These include the East African Community, Southern African Customs Union and the Economic Community of West African States.

This could lead to production for export being organised regionally rather than distorted or even hampered by tariff differentials.

The reforms announced by Xi in February are a shift in this direction.

An incentive to co-operate?

By extending zero tariffs to almost all African countries, China has neutralised an element of distortion in its earlier tariff policy. When only some countries enjoyed tariff-free export benefits, investors and producers had incentives to locate export production in least developed countries to secure tariff-free access.

This worked some of the time, but not all the time. The reason for this is that least developed countries find it difficult to become exporters because they face inhibiting barriers to trade in general. Examples include unreliable electricity and poor infrastructure.

The zero tariff will put least developed countries at a disadvantage as they will lose the “special status” afforded them in the old regime. But the change could open another door. Production decisions can now take advantage of existing and potential cross-country and intra-regional supply chains based on comparative advantage – in place of being located where export tariffs were smallest.

Also, lowering tariffs for more developed African economies may enable African entrepreneurs to work across borders to engage in trade without facing different trade barriers by locality. That in turn may support Africa’s own agenda of trade integration.

To boost trade, China has also signalled it will expand trade facilitation measures. This includes upgraded “green lanes” for African imports. Prospective examples include:

• faster customs clearance

• streamlined phytosanitary procedures (rules governing food safety). An example would be setting up a clear set of criteria that enable an approved exporter, say of Kenyan avocados, to enjoy pre-approval for customs clearance.

• greater investments in training and trade-related logistics.

China has also set up a dedicated China-Africa trade facilitation hub in Changsha, the capital of Hunan province. The aim is to have a central point of trade-related expertise and industries, making it easier for African and Chinese firms do business.

The risk of uneven gains

There is a risk that the new tariff regime will mean that production for export will concentrate in more developed countries, such as South Africa, Morocco and Kenya. These economies are better positioned to expand exports when it comes into effect.

In contrast, least developed countries will continue to struggle with:

• constructing efficient trade-related infrastructure like telecommunications, electricity and port connectivity

• production at export scale

• reaching trade-related compliance standards such as the necessary fruit sizes and colour consistency.

China’s policy change calls for Africa’s frontier exporters to China to build trade-related supply chains across African borders to garner the scale and competitiveness to expand their own – soon tariff-free – exports to China. In turn, this would reduce the burden on least developed countries to need to export directly to China. Instead, they would only need to join regional trade supply chains.

Ideally within African sub-regions this could develop into a new incentive to create trade-related value chains.

The potential for equalisation

The May Day tariff reforms are a positive in removing formal tariff barriers at a time when tariffs are going up, led by the United States. This change simplifies incentives and eliminates structural asymmetries in China’s Africa trade regime.

Tariffs, however, are seldom the main constraint for African industrial transformation and export hopes. On top of this, uncertainty is complicating the global trade environment.

Nonetheless, these reforms are a step towards fostering sub-regional supply chains if African countries coordinate production strategies.

– China’s new tariff-free regime for Africa: the potential upside and downside
– https://theconversation.com/chinas-new-tariff-free-regime-for-africa-the-potential-upside-and-downside-277247

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Peter Twesigye, Research Lead: Power Market Reforms and Regulation, University of Cape Town

Millions of Kenyan households and businesses have been subjected to interruptions of electricity supply since late 2024 owing to production shortfalls. President William Ruto acknowledged this, explaining that “daily load-shedding” had become necessary and that power would be switched off in some areas between 5pm and 10pm to stabilise the national grid.

Until now, Kenya’s electricity supply has been mostly adequate to meet supply. However, there were multiple nationwide blackouts between 2020 and 2024. These disruptions were due to technical failures rather than unmet demand.

The uncomfortable truth is that Kenya’s demand surge is testing the limits of what grid engineers call “firm and operationally available capacity”. This is what can be counted on when the evening peak demand rises sharply, stretching the system’s ability to maintain frequency and voltage within limits.

By the end of January 2026, the published system peak was 2,439.06 MW compared to firm capacity of 2,495 MW. There was a narrow reserve margin of only 2.3%. This peak was recorded on 4 December 2025, and was framed by Kenya Power itself as a historic high.

Kenya has a reserve of nearly 800 MW on paper, but only about 56 MW of breathing room on firm capacity. This is a razor-thin margin for a system that must ride over:

• transmission constraints such as transformer overloads due to unexpected demand spikes and equipment failure

• inadequate generation forces for dispatchable baseload, from post-sunset loss of solar output of 514 MW and at times wind of 436 MW with low capacity factors

• limited flexibility to support timely ramping (how fast the rest of the system must move up or down when a generation unit trips).

My research focus is power market reforms, regulation and utility performance – including Kenya’s. My assessment is that Kenya’s power sector is not short of renewable energy resources to exploit. It is short of capital and a well-planned procurement pipeline of investments in new power plants and grid resilience.

Policy makers have to do more to keep up with an economy whose peak demand now resets with unsettling frequency, affecting businesses and home users.

Kenya’s optimum outcome is not simply higher installed megawatt capacity. It is the combined effect of:

• sufficient energy capacity

• the system’s capacity to meet fluctuating demand, changes in generation output and unexpected outages

• ability to operate, refurbish and maintain the grid network to meet set technical regulatory standards.

How did supply fall behind demand?

Three structural drivers explain the current crisis.

First, no new interconnected power plants have been commissioned during the past four years. Kenya’s new capacity pipeline was constrained by a moratorium on new plants imposed in 2021. The moratorium was only lifted in December 2025 by the National Assembly, reopening the door to new procurement via competitive auctions.

Second, peak demand growth accelerated over the same time period. In February 2025, for instance, peak demand grew by the largest margin in five years. This growth was driven mainly by industrial and commercial users, a growing fleet of electric vehicles, new data centres, and an aggressive domestic power connectivity programme.

The utility surpassed 10 million customers with over 401,848 new connections in the year to 30 June 2025. This resurgence translates into a growth in sales to 11,403 GWh in just one financial year, 2024/25. The result was that a planning problem became an operational one. The mass connectivity programme stepped up over the past eight years is a triumph as the country rushes to achieve universal electrification goals. But it is also the core demand-side force compressing reserve margins.

The third factor that’s affected the power network is that industrial and commercial consumers are increasingly financing their own supply. Instead of waiting for grid reliability to improve, firms have been building their own dedicated power plants. By June 2025, so-called captive (self-consumption) capacity reached 603.8 MW (about 15.72% of total installed capacity), dominated by captive solar PV and bioenergy.

While these are cheaper and more reliable sources, they are not failure-free and also serve to mask the growing national deficit.

Furthermore, this trend complicates system planning because Kenya Power’s revenue base and load profile become less predictable, leading to system imbalances and frequent outages.

What’s behind the instability of Kenya’s electricity grid?

Kenya’s energy mix is renewables-led. Renewable energy stands at 80% of the energy mix and has been steadily rising over the last 10 years.

The largest technology shares are: geothermal 943 MW (25.92%), hydro 872.5 MW (23.9%), solar 514.1 MW (14.1%), wind 436 MW (11.9%), and bioenergy 163.8 MW. The country also imports electricity from Ethiopia and Uganda, accounting for 10.6% of the total.

This picture shows why system flexibility and network reliability are key. When solar and wind power aren’t available, the system must turn to geothermal, hydro and thermal while maintaining reserves.

With firm capacity only modestly above the latest peak, even a single contingency can force controlled load-shedding to preserve system integrity.

Kenya’s grid instability is not one problem, however. Network reliability is undermined by system leakages from unbilled or stolen energy. In 2025, average annual losses amounted to 23.36% – far above the regulator’s allowable benchmark of 17.5%. Reliability is improving, but still a far cry from best practice.

Another major factor is inadequate transmission infrastructure, primarily its high-voltage transmission lines. This means that Kenya also needs to massively invest in expanding its transmission system. Indeed, the power transmission monopoly – Ketraco – warns in its 2025-2044 master plan that keeping up with demand growth requires a multi-billion-dollar buildout. It points to an estimated financing gap of roughly US$4.38 billion across planned transmission investments.

What’s needed

Four options stand out for consideration.

The first is rebuilding the pipeline of new power plants. The quickest reliability gains will come from adding new low-carbon capacity from geothermal rehabilitation and new gas units. Policymakers must also ensure adequate extra generation capacity to provide power within seconds or minutes to cover a likely generation failure or demand spike.

Second, the system needs modern flexibility tools, such as battery storage, gas and imports. This is because storage and grid-stability investments can improve system flexibility and reduce the need for load-shedding when supply from renewables dips during peak demand.

Third, private capital participation is unavoidable if the grid is to stay ahead of demand. The most concrete step so far is the transmission monopoly’s US$311 million (KES 40.4 billion) public-private partnership signed in December 2025 with Africa50 and Power Grid Corporation of India.

Finally, stability depends on addressing system losses. This can be achieved by scaling up smart metering, restructuring distribution lines, and reducing vandalism and illegal connections. This can translate into added capacity.

– Power cuts are the new normal in Kenya – what went wrong and how to fix it
– https://theconversation.com/power-cuts-are-the-new-normal-in-kenya-what-went-wrong-and-how-to-fix-it-276611

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Anusuya Chinsamy-Turan, Professor, Biological Sciences Department, University of Cape Town

In biology and palaeontology (the study of extinct organisms) there are a few ways to estimate the age of an animal’s skeleton. One is the extent of fusion of sutures in the skeleton – how much the plates of bone have joined together as the animal matured. Another is the texture of the bone surfaces. Then there are growth marks recorded in the microscopic structure of bone.

Many modern animals grow in periodic spurts (fast at times, slowly at other times). It’s generally thought that they grow fast in the good seasons when the environment is better for them in terms of food, temperature and water. They are thought to grow more slowly during unfavourable seasons, when the growth marks form in their bones, rather like the rings formed in trees. By counting the number of growth marks inside the bone tissues, scientists estimate the age of the animal. This method is called skeletochronology.

Over the years there have been a few studies that have determined when the different growth cycles formed, and have proposed the utility of skeletochronology for age determination.

The application of skeletochronology has been particularly important in working out the age of extinct reptiles like dinosaurs. It’s also been used as the basis for constructing graphs showing how the animal grew over time and comparing the rate of growth of different dinosaurs. This is very useful when trying to assess how extinct animals (like dinosaurs) grew up, and in some cases reached gigantic proportions.

Our work in our palaeobiology laboratory at the University of Cape Town has shown that juvenile (wild and captive) caimans, American reptiles related to crocodiles and alligators, under one year of age showed growth marks in their bones. This was unexpected because the animals were too young to show annual periods of quick and slow growth.

This study by our team suggested there was a need for a more cautious approach to estimating the age of skeletons. This caution was reinforced by similar findings in our later work on Nile crocodiles.

More growth marks than expected

Our work on the Nile crocodiles began as an investigation into their growth dynamics. On three occasions we administered antibiotics to two-year-old crocodiles at the Le Bonheur Reptiles and Adventures farm, about 60km from Cape Town in South Africa. These antibiotics became incorporated into the bones of the growing crocodiles.

Later, when the crocodiles died, we skeletonised the carcasses and prepared thin sections of their bones which we examined under the microscope. The antibiotic markers allowed us to deduce how much bone growth had occurred in specific time periods.

Much to our surprise, we found that aside from a slowdown in growth during the unfavourable (winter) season, extra growth marks formed during the favourable (summer) season when fast growth was expected. These extra growth marks tell us that the crocodile responded to some environmental factors (perhaps temperature, rainfall, or competition) by slowing down their growth and forming a growth ring.

We found that the two-year-old crocodiles had as many as five or six growth cycles in their bones. We would have expected only one per year. This meant that if we applied skeletochronology, we would have overestimated the age of the crocodiles. Until now, most of the time when skeletochronology was applied, the concern has been about under-estimating the age of the animal (because growth marks are sometimes removed during normal growth processes).

Questions about method of establishing bone age

Our study of these living relatives of dinosaurs raises questions regarding the accuracy of using skeletochronology for estimating the age of dinosaurs. We know the four crocodiles were raised on a crocodile farm, which perhaps does not ideally reflect their a natural environment. But we are also aware that on the farm, they would have had optimal conditions for growth – and yet, under these ideal circumstances, they formed extra marks.

Currently investigations into dinosaur skeletochronology are plagued by several issues such as the presence of multiple closely spaced growth marks that are difficult to separate out, as well as some growth marks that cannot be followed around the whole circumference of the cross section of the bone. Added to this, we suggest that since living relatives of dinosaurs (birds and crocodiles) can form extra growth marks, some of the growth marks in dinosaur bones could well be “extra” and therefore unrelated to their age.

More research is clearly needed to investigate this matter. An obvious first step is to undertake a similar study of crocodiles and alligators in the wild – a feat easier said than done.

– Crocodiles can have extra growth cycles in a year – why this matters for estimating the age of dinosaurs
– https://theconversation.com/crocodiles-can-have-extra-growth-cycles-in-a-year-why-this-matters-for-estimating-the-age-of-dinosaurs-276077

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Laura Derksen, senior researcher at the Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, University of Oslo

In the global fight against HIV/Aids, one of the most exciting innovations is not a new drug, but a better filing system.

This is what we’re seeing in Malawi, one of the most HIV-affected countries in the world. About 7% of the population there live with the virus.

The country is one of the few meeting the United Nations 95-95-95 targets (95% of people living with HIV are diagnosed, 95% of those diagnosed are treated, and 95% of those on treatment have a viral load below 200 copies per millilitre). Sustaining this progress is a massive challenge in large clinics, and requires not only medical staff and supplies but efficient management of patient data.

Effective HIV treatment requires lifelong consistency. Patients must visit clinics every few months to refill prescriptions for antiretroviral therapy, a combination of drugs that prolongs life and prevents HIV transmission. In high-volume, under-resourced clinics, tracking who has missed an appointment is difficult.

As a team of management and global health economists, we wanted to know whether better data management could help explain Malawi’s success. Our recent research used an event study to analyse a gradual rollout of an electronic medical record system, to replace paper-based records, in 106 Malawian HIV clinics between 2007 and 2019. Event study analysis, which involves comparing outcomes before and after a policy change while accounting for clinic and year fixed effects, is a method for causal inference widely used by health economists.

At the time of electronic records adoption, roughly half of patients had stopped coming for treatment. The switch to electronic medical records allowed clinics to track patients more efficiently and support return to care among lapsed patients. Five years after the system was adopted, the annual number of patients who died was estimated to have fallen by 28%.

As with any study, there are important caveats to keep in mind. The findings are based on 106 clinics in Malawi, and while HIV clinics face common challenges across sub-Saharan Africa, results may not translate directly. The study also relies on administrative data, which means patient deaths could be slightly under-counted, and some patients who lapsed from care and returned under new identifiers may not have been accurately identified. Finally, it is not possible to directly observe whether clinic staff used the system to trace lapsed patients; instead, we infer this mechanism from the increase in the total number of patients actively returning to care after electronic records were introduced.

Paper records in a digital age

HIV care in Malawi is managed by the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with local and international organisations. HIV patient clinics are typically situated within larger hospitals or health centres. The 106 clinics in the study were responsible for treating 358,843 active patients as of 2018.

Under the traditional paper-based system, identifying a patient who missed a crucial appointment meant that staff had to manually sift through thousands of physical files. In an understaffed clinic, this often simply did not happen.

To address this, the Ministry of Health collaborated with Baobab Health Trust, a local NGO, to develop and implement a new electronic medical record system. The system involves touchscreen workstations designed for durability and ease of use. Because the system was designed to be user-friendly, it did not require hiring new, specialised personnel. Existing clinic staff were trained to operate the system in sessions as short as half a day.

How the system saves lives

The electronic system did not change the medication patients received, nor did it increase the number of doctors. Instead, it improved managerial efficiency. The system automatically generates a list of patients who have missed their appointments by a specific margin. This allows clinic staff to quickly identify who needs help and use their limited time to trace these patients. They could then call them or visit their homes to encourage them to return to care. According to the clinic staff we interviewed, patients often view this outreach as a form of social support and a sign that the clinic cares about their well-being.

The effects were immediate. In clinics equipped with electronic medical records, the probability of a patient being lapsed from care dropped significantly. In the year following its adoption, clinics saw a 17% increase in the number of patients actively in care.

The benefits were most profound for the most vulnerable patients: children. Children under the age of 10 are uniquely dependent on caregivers and are at the highest risk of dropping out of treatment. Before the electronic medical records were introduced, 57% of children had lapsed from care.

These lapses result in many child deaths, as HIV/Aids is fatal without treatment. Within five years of the adoption of electronic medical records, the number of children in this age group dying fell by 44%. The electronic system acts as a safety net, ensuring that when a child misses a visit, the clinic notices and acts before it is too late.

A cost-effective solution

The electronic medical system played an important role in Malawi’s success in the fight against HIV/Aids. By 2019, the rollout of this system across the 106 clinics in our study had prevented an estimated 5,050 deaths. The system helped clinics identify patients who had stopped receiving lifesaving care and encourage them to return.

The total cost for an average clinic to adopt the system, including hardware, installation and training, was approximately US$34,050. This was funded by the government with support from international donors.

Based on the number of deaths prevented within the first five years, we estimate the cost to be US$448 per life saved.

To put this in perspective, some of the world’s most highly rated charitable life-saving programmes are estimated to cost around US$4,500 per life saved. In the US, implementing electronic medical records to monitor the health of newborn babies costs roughly $531,000 per life saved.

The future of digital health in Africa

While the study focused on the transition from paper to electronic records up to 2019, the system has continued to evolve and scale. The 106 study facilities represent only a fraction of the more than 700 HIV clinics in Malawi. Scaling and sustaining this system across the remaining facilities represents a challenge and opportunity.

Our findings prove that digital health tools are not a luxury, and should not be reserved for rich countries. In low-resource settings, where staff are overburdened and patient volumes are high, managerial technologies like electronic medical records are a frontline, life-saving intervention. They allow health workers to shift their focus away from managing thousands of paper files and towards addressing patient needs.

As international aid dwindles, these kinds of efficiency gains will be key to delivering lifesaving care and maintaining progress in the fight against HIV/Aids.

– HIV in Malawi: digital filing system saved lives and boosted care – research
– https://theconversation.com/hiv-in-malawi-digital-filing-system-saved-lives-and-boosted-care-research-274646

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Atta Addo, Senior Lecturer in Digital Innovation and Entrepreneurship, University of Surrey

On a humid afternoon in Nigeria’s commercial capital, Lagos, a young trader in electronics pulls out his phone and opens Binance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency trading platform by trading volume. He’s not monitoring the Bitcoin market or chasing the next crypto craze. He’s paying a supplier in the Chinese port city of Guangzhou for 500 smartphones.

Like numerous other traders at the Lagos Computer Village, he has a Binance digital wallet to store, send and receive cryptocurrency pegged to the US dollar (USDT). Within minutes, his payment lands in China. His supplier confirms. The phones will ship tomorrow.

Five years ago, this transaction would have been nearly impossible. The Lagos phone buyer would have had to queue at the nearby commercial bank; fill out forms for foreign exchange; and wait as long as 7-21 days for clearance. On top of that, there was no guarantee of foreign exchange approval being granted. The other alternative was turning to the black markets, which attract exorbitant rates.

Now? Welcome to Nigeria’s quiet cryptocurrency revolution. He taps his screen a few times. Done.

Developing countries are recording high cryptocurrency adoption rates surpassing more advanced economies. Nigeria stands out, with one of the highest rates of crypto adoption globally. But the reasons aren’t clear.

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Read more: Crypto countries: Nigeria and El Salvador’s opposing journeys into digital currencies – podcast

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The focus of my scholarly research is digital innovation and entrepreneurship. My co-researcher and I sought to examine cryptocurrency adoption and diffusion and its use for cross-border payments in the Nigerian context. We took a case study approach. Data collection involved two rounds of interviews with retailers from Nigeria, suppliers from China, informal exchangers, crypto brokers, and mediators.

One might think cryptocurrency’s appeal lies in its technology: decentralisation, the fact that it cannot be altered once recorded, all that. But our research found something else. Crypto works in Nigeria because of human networks of trust.

We have evidence to suggest that crypto adoption and diffusion in this context occurs through:

• a reinforcing process of technology transformation, adoption and use

• a strong coalition of the interests of diverse actors

• a dynamic relationship between the technical elements of crypto and contextual political, economic, social, technological, legal, environmental influences.

Insights from the study might be useful for addressing adoption challenges and designing inclusive financial systems in similar contexts.

Meet the crypto brokers

Located in the capital of Lagos State, south-western Nigeria, the Computer Village hosts over 5,000 informal micro, small and medium enterprises. It is billed as Africa’s largest market for information and communication technology accessories. This was the focal point of our case study.

We interviewed retailers importing from China, the crypto brokers who help them, Chinese suppliers, and the network of intermediaries who make it all work. What emerged was a sophisticated parallel financial system processing millions monthly, built entirely outside traditional banking. Between July 2023 and June 2024, Nigeria is estimated to have processed US$59 billion in crypto transaction value, up to 85% of it from retail trade.

Here’s how it works in three quick steps lasting less than an hour:

• A crypto broker sits in a small office near the market. Retailers call in with the local currency, naira.

• The naira is converted into USDT using peer-to-peer exchanges; the stablecoin is sent to contacts in China.

• These Chinese traders convert USDT to yuan and pay the supplier directly.

One broker told us:

Retailers don’t need to understand blockchain. That’s my job. They just know their supplier gets paid fast, and they save money.

Crypto brokers charge lower fees than banks or Western Union. But speed matters even more than cost. In Nigeria’s volatile economy, prices can shift overnight. A delayed payment might mean your supplier raises prices or your goods arrive after competitors have restocked. Crypto eliminates that risk.

These brokers didn’t emerge from fintech accelerators or venture capital. Many were young tech-savvy relatives of traders who saw a problem and built a solution. They positioned themselves as indispensable – the only way to get past Nigeria’s restricted financial system and and do global trade.

Brokers guarantee payments personally. If something goes wrong, they cover losses from their own pockets to maintain reputation. One broker told us he absorbed a ₦2 million loss (about US$2,500) when a Chinese intermediary disappeared with funds. Retailers recommend brokers to fellow traders in the tight-knit market community. Chinese crypto traders work only with verified contacts, often through elaborate referral systems.

Cryptocurrency here doesn’t replace human relationships. It’s technology that enables and extends existing trust networks, letting them operate at global scale.

The infrastructure of resilience

The system relies on more than just brokers and goodwill. Stablecoins like USDT solve volatility. Mobile wallets work on basic smartphones. QR codes enable transactions even when internet is patchy. Peer-to-peer exchanges bypass bank restrictions legally. Nigeria’s central bank had banned banks from crypto transactions since 2021 but reversed its decision in 2023, citing global regulatory trends.

When suppliers in China initially refused to accept cryptocurrency, brokers enrolled Chinese crypto traders as intermediaries. These traders buy USDT from Nigerian brokers (often at slight discounts, giving them profit), convert it to yuan, and pay suppliers through conventional Chinese banking. The supplier never touches crypto. They just receive payment.

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Read more: Why do identical informal businesses set up side by side? It’s a survival tactic – Kenya study

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This is innovation through adaptation. It is not building a perfect system from scratch, but cobbling together solutions from available pieces until something works.

Computer Village itself plays a role. Concentrated markets create information flow. Success stories spread fast. A trader mentions his broker completed a payment in 20 minutes, and suddenly five more retailers want introductions. Physical proximity accelerates network growth in ways digital advertising never could.

What happens when the state pushes back

In 2021, Nigeria’s central bank ordered commercial banks to close accounts dealing with cryptocurrency. The government worried about speculation, money laundering and capital flight. This sounded the death knell for crypto in Nigeria.

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Read more: Digital trade protocol for Africa: why it matters, what’s in it and what’s still missing

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Instead, the network adapted. Brokers shifted to peer-to-peer platforms. Over-the-counter exchangers (informal traders who swap crypto for cash) expanded operations. Transaction volumes continued to grow.

What this means for Africa and beyond

Nigeria isn’t alone. Similar patterns appear across developing economies – Kenya, Ghana, Vietnam, India. Wherever formal financial systems strain under inflation, currency controls or institutional weakness, cryptocurrency fills gaps.

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Read more: Stablecoins are gaining ground as digital currency in Africa: how to avoid risks

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This isn’t speculation. Traders are using stablecoins as dollar-equivalent tokens that move faster and cheaper than wire transfers.

It’s also not “banking the unbanked” in the usual sense. Many of these traders have bank accounts. Banks just can’t provide what they need: rapid, affordable, reliable cross-border payments.

For policymakers, the lesson should be humbling. You can’t ban away an innovation that solves real problems. When formal institutions fail to serve economic needs, informal systems emerge. The question is whether governments will learn from these systems or simply fight them.

Mayowa Joy David contributed to the research on which this article is based.

– Nigeria’s crypto boom isn’t just about technology – trust plays a role in the local gadget trade with China
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-crypto-boom-isnt-just-about-technology-trust-plays-a-role-in-the-local-gadget-trade-with-china-268319

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Vincent Tawiah, Assistant Professor in International Financial Reporting, Dublin City University

China’s economic footprint in Africa has grown fast over the last two decades. Across the continent, Chinese-backed mines, oilfields, railways and industrial zones have gone from being ambitious projects to central pillars of national development plans.

This has been made possible by over US$181 billion in infrastructure loans and about US$50 billion in foreign direct investment.

The China-Africa relationship is often portrayed as one of two things: either a threat to sovereignty or a development opportunity.

But the findings in a recent paper suggest it’s not so simple. Foreign investment becomes harmful only when domestic institutions allow it to be. Some forms of foreign engagement – such as natural resources for loans – may add to environmental pressures. But some strategic investment can support greener development. This is particularly true in infrastructure and productive sectors.

Based on these findings, and my work on economic, governance and environmental implications of Chinese investment and trade in Africa, it’s clear that Chinese engagement offers substantial economic opportunities. But it can also lead to the rapid depletion of vital energy and forest resources, undermining long-term development goals, if institutional “guardrails” are weak.

The results suggest that policymakers must insist on institutional reforms and environmental accountability if they want to achieve sustainable economic growth. Foreign economic activities must contribute to lasting national wealth rather than short-term extraction.

Beyond sustainability

The research looked at how Chinese foreign direct investment and trade influenced resource depletion across 28 African nations from 1998 to 2022.

It found that Chinese foreign direct investment accelerated depletion. This was notable in the energy and forestry sectors of countries with weak institutions.

Investment tended to push extraction beyond sustainable levels when:

• environmental standards are unclear

• enforcement bodies are underfunded

• governance is compromised.

Forests shrank faster, mineral reserves were exploited aggressively and energy resources were depleted with little long-term planning.

The same study also noted that these risks were lower where governance is robust.

It found that foreign investment did not automatically lead to greater resource depletion were countries had stronger institutions, clear regulatory frameworks and credible oversight.

Botswana and Mauritius are examples.

Botswana has successfully averted the “resource curse” – when resource wealth leads to economic stagnation and corruption. It has done this by anchoring its economy in a robust rule of law and transparent institutional oversight. Central to this strategy is the Pula Fund, a sovereign wealth fund established in 1993.

The fund manages the long-term proceeds from the diamond industry by reinvesting them into foreign currency assets. This ensures that non-renewable mineral wealth is converted into sustainable financial capital for future generations.

Similarly, Mauritius uses regulations to ensure industrial investment does not harm the environment.

When oversight was credible, investment was channelled into sustainable, inclusive growth. This preserves national wealth for future generations.

But where governance was weak, the same investment could result in environmental degradation.

The Democratic Republic of Congo illustrated this. It has the world’s largest cobalt reserves. But weak government and persistent conflict have made it difficult to enforce mining codes. Artisanal and industrial mining practices cause severe water pollution and deforestation.

Similarly, Equatorial Guinea has an economy almost entirely dependent on oil. Producing more oil is seen as more important than meeting environmental standards. Transparency and accountability are poor.

The findings suggest that the environmental impact of Chinese involvement is not fixed. It hinges on whether African states have the institutional capacity to manage extraction responsibly.

Trade matters too, but governance still determines outcomes

Over the last two decades, China-Africa trade has rocketed. It shot up from US$10 billion in 2000 to $348 billion in 2025.

China exports high-value manufactured goods like electronics and solar panels. African exports mainly raw materials.

South Africa, the DRC, Nigeria and Angola together account for nearly half of the continent’s total trade volume with China.

The research found that trade with China played a more mixed role than investment.

On its own, trade didn’t appear to cause widespread environmental degradation. But in countries with weak governance, soaring trade demand often reinforced unsustainable practices. The energy sector was a case in point.

Without the referees of strong institutions, the pressure to meet export quotas encouraged intensified, unregulated extraction.

South Sudan and Nigeria illustrate this well. Conflict or corruption compromised oversight. Massive demand for crude oil led to bypassed environmental audits and severe localised pollution.

This creates a resource trap. Angola, for example, values immediate trade revenue over long-term ecological health. This leaves local communities to bear the cost of degraded landscapes and contaminated water.

What African governments can do

Across all forms of economic engagement, one factor shaped the outcome: governance quality.

The findings point towards what’s needed.

Firstly, stronger environmental regulation and enforcement.

Secondly, clear standards, independent oversight bodies and well-resourced regulatory agencies.

Thirdly, environmental safeguards in investment agreements. As part of project approvals, governments can require:

• environmental restoration plans

• transparent reporting of environmental impacts

• community consultation.

Fourth, long-term resource management. Natural resources underpin energy security, biodiversity and future economic growth.

Fifth, transparency and public accountability. Open contracting, environmental disclosures and accessible data empower citizens and civil society to hold governments and investors to account.

Africa’s natural resources will become even more strategically valuable as global demand for minerals, energy and agricultural land continues to rise. Ensuring that this benefits African societies, rather than eroding their ecological foundations, will depend on one central factor: the strength of governance across the continent.

– China in Africa: investment and trade work well when there’s strong oversight, and badly when there isn’t
– https://theconversation.com/china-in-africa-investment-and-trade-work-well-when-theres-strong-oversight-and-badly-when-there-isnt-273815

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rose Miyonga, Researcher, University of Warwick

Between 1952 and 1963, Kenya experienced one of the most violent chapters in its modern history. The Mau Mau uprising, rooted in land dispossession and political repression under British colonial rule, escalated into a brutal counterinsurgency war.

An estimated 50,000 Kenyans died during the violent conflict between Mau Mau guerrillas and British forces, and from disease and starvation. Torture, sexual violence and forced detention were widespread. Over a million people were displaced into villages and detention camps in the 1950s.

Many victims of the uprising were buried in unmarked mass graves. Others survived, but were permanently scarred.

As Britain prepared to leave in the early 1960s ahead of Kenya’s independence in 1963, officials took painstaking efforts to hide the evidence of their brutality. They destroyed some archival material that described their violent conduct and secretly took other documents back to the UK.

Further, after independence, Kenya’s own government pushed Mau Mau survivors to “forgive and forget” the past.

This created a profound historical gap. So if archives were destroyed and public history suppressed, where else might the past be found?

As an oral historian, I set out to answer this question. I embarked on an oral history project, speaking to 60 Mau Mau survivors, visiting memory sites such as mass graves, and collecting material from archives in the UK and Kenya.

I set out my findings in a recent paper.

My research shows that many Mau Mau survivors are living with permanent wounds and disabilities, which serve as constant reminders of the past. During interviews, people were keen to show me their scars and wounds, using them to illustrate their painful histories. These included bullet wounds (and sometimes bullets still lodged in the body), scars from torture and amputations.

My study showed that the body can become evidence in contexts where written documentation is absent or contested. Physical scars authenticate memory. These injuries also ensure that the past is never fully forgotten. Chronic pain and disability materially shape everyday life, tying the present to wartime violence.

My research also included understanding the Mau Mau war through human remains. I visited memory sites where communities mourn and remember, such as mass graves. I also researched the contents of boxes at the National Museum of Kenya on Mau Mau victims.

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Read more: Kenya: the shameful truth about British colonial abuse and how it was covered up

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By sharing their experiences, survivors reclaim agency over their histories. Rather than being passive victims of silence, they become active custodians of memory.

My findings suggest that archives are not limited to documents stored in state repositories. In post-conflict contexts where records are incomplete or destroyed, memory often persists through bodies and landscapes.

Custodians of memory

Through my study, I was able to observe how people use their bodies to tell their histories. I noticed this most powerfully in the 2002 BBC documentary Kenya: White Terror.

In one section, Mau Mau survivor Mwangi Kinyari goes with presenter John McGhie to a detention camp, and takes him to the cell where he was tortured and held for eight days during a three-year imprisonment.

Ignoring McGhie’s urges to be careful, Kinyari removes his jacket and insists on acting out a scene of torture, manoeuvring himself into a handstand position with his feet up on the wall and his hands on the dirt floor to demonstrate how he was hung upside down during torturous interrogations in that cell.

He then removes his belt and lifts his shirt to show the scars from the operation he had for the internal bleeding that resulted from beatings.

The descriptions of brutality he endured at the hands of white guards were powerful enough. Kinyari gives testimony of having his testicles beaten until he urinated blood, and his eyes seared with hot coals.

His words and descriptions communicate the facts of what happened, but there is something more that his body conveys through acting out the scene of his torture, using his body to write into the missing record of his experiences, and recentring himself in the frame of historical memory.

Aged 80, Kinyari seized an opportunity to speak back to the historical forces that had forgotten him. He used his entire body as a vehicle to do this.

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Read more: Kenya’s female freedom fighters were the silent heroes of the anti-colonial movement – here are some of their stories

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Mass grave sites also deserve greater recognition as spaces of history and remembrance. These mass graves are a visceral reminder of Mau Mau history, countering attempts to silence and sanitise the past. They offer insights into the brutality and devastation of the war.

Even though they are not marked or honoured in an official capacity, community members have found ways to tend to them as sites of mourning and remembrance.

Violence has profoundly shaped the past and present of Mau Mau survivors. This is evident both in survivors’ bodies and in the remains of those who were killed. These are archives in their own right.

Unhealed wounds aren’t only symbolic. They continue to shape survivors’ economic opportunities, health and wellbeing decades later. Embodied memory also strengthens contemporary justice claims. Survivors seeking compensation rely not only on testimony but on visible physical evidence of abuse.

What should be done

Bodies have powerful stories to tell. Unhealed wounds have resonance in the present, materially affecting survivors’ lives, illustrating the legacies of war. They are also record-keepers, offering evidence for people who still hope to have their stories heard and maybe even get compensation for their suffering.

Tending to these wounds would be literally and figuratively healing for the Kenyan nation. Ignoring these embodied archives risks reproducing historical erasure.

First, there needs to be urgency in recording survivors’ testimonies through oral histories and community memory work. The Mau Mau generation is ageing, and embodied memory will not last indefinitely.

Second, mass grave sites and human remains deserve formal recognition as spaces of national history and mourning.

Third, continued engagement with reparations processes is essential as it allows survivors of Mau Mau traumas to seek justice and closure.

Acknowledging embodied suffering is central to meaningful justice. Addressing these wounds – both literal and historical – could contribute to broader national reflection in a country still shaped by colonial violence and inequality.

– Mau Mau: how Kenya’s history of colonial violence speaks through living bodies and graves
– https://theconversation.com/mau-mau-how-kenyas-history-of-colonial-violence-speaks-through-living-bodies-and-graves-277118

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Brendon J. Cannon, Associate Professor, Khalifa University

Gulf states have become increasingly prominent in the squabbles, civil wars and inter-country tensions in the Horn of Africa over the past decade. The countries in this region include Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somaliland, Somalia and Djibouti.

As a result, the US-Israel war on Iran matters for the Horn, where Gulf money, Gulf diplomacy and Gulf defence equipment have become part of the operating environment of conflict and rivalry.

For over a decade, I have researched the interactions of sub-Saharan Africa with Arab Gulf states, as well as Turkey, Japan, China and others. In my view, Gulf states may scale back their engagement in the Horn as the security situation in the Middle Eastern region deteriorates.

This could potentially reshape conflicts, alignments and diplomacy across the Horn of Africa – if the war drags on.

Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar – important partners for Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia – will likely begin focusing inward on their own security. The strategic importance of Horn of Africa states for Saudi Arabia or the UAE will diminish.

In practical terms, this could mean a drop in high-level visits, a reduction in arms flows and a weakening of political loyalty as Horn actors adjust.

For the Horn, this could lead to two outcomes. One, an escalation in conflict, with states and armed groups seeking to settle scores while external patrons are distracted. Or second, a temporary cooling-off period as actors reassess the implications of reduced Gulf funding, arms and mediation.

Either way, the Horn is unlikely to grow calmer. Instead, longstanding grievances, between Ethiopia and Eritrea for instance, may become more pronounced.

Sudan’s war and Gulf backing

For Sudan, the implications of the ongoing conflict in the Gulf could be significant. The two warring parties – the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudan’s military – have relied heavily on external support.

Both may find themselves suddenly without the largesse and military equipment from Gulf backers, depending on how the Iran war unfolds. This drawback of support could hit the RSF particularly hard as its biggest external backer, the UAE, focuses on its own security. Sudan’s military, however, may continue to benefit from Turkish and Egyptian support.

Much recent commentary has focused on evolving “alliances” and “blocs” that pit the UAE/Israel/Somaliland/Ethiopia against Turkey/Saudi Arabia/Egypt/Somalia within Sudan’s civil war.

This framing, however, often misses two basic facts. First, these are not alliances but rather opportunistic alignments that bring together diverse actors and interests from outside the Horn. These alignments have always been opportunistic on the part of external state actors, such as Turkey, the UAE and Qatar.

They hold only as long as external patrons can plausibly deliver resources, arms and diplomatic attention without unacceptable reputational damage to themselves.

Second, state leaders in the Horn of Africa have largely steered these relationships themselves. They have used external patrons to advance domestic and regional interests.

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Read more: Middle Eastern monarchies in Sudan’s war: what’s driving their interests

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Gulf states’ opportunistic interventions were possible largely because they were at peace with one another and with Iran. That is no longer the case.

Sudan’s civil war may last even longer now that Gulf states are focused elsewhere. Neither side in the civil war will have the ability to land a knock-out punch.

Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland’s recognition

The Iran war could affect Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Somaliland in a number of ways.

Firstly, the diplomatic flurry of visits by Gulf leaders to Ethiopia and Somalia may slow. From 2023 to early 2026, Gulf leaders sought to shape political outcomes and advance investment and logistics interests. If this tempo slows, Horn actors will face less patronage and mediation, which may lead either to a pause in tensions or to quick escalation.

Secondly, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland – which Qatar and Saudi Arabia (as well as Egypt and Turkey) have taken a stand against – is now likely to be far from their agendas. Somalia’s long-standing ambition of reabsorbing Somaliland may also find waning external support.

Thirdly, Ethiopia’s interest in gaining access to the Red Sea has been one of the central issues in recent diplomatic manoeuvring in the Horn. With Saudi Arabia, in particular, focused on Iran, Addis Ababa may feel emboldened to formalise access through Somaliland (with which it had signed an agreement in 2024).

Turkey and Egypt may remain engaged

Two non-Gulf states, however, are likely to remain active in the Horn: Turkey and Egypt.

Turkey can still afford foreign policy opportunism in the region, as long as it does not become directly involved in the Iran war. For Ankara, the Gulf states’ distraction may create an opportunity to expand its influence. This could be through trying to help Somalia reassert control over Somaliland and other autonomous regions. It could also encourage Ethiopia to reduce tensions with Eritrea, or help balance relations between Ethiopia and Egypt. These would all enhance Turkey’s reputation outside its region and reinforce the image it has of itself as a rising, global power.

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Read more: Egypt-Ethiopia hostilities are playing out in the Horn – the risk of new proxy wars is high

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Egypt’s involvement is driven by existential concerns over the Nile. This is particularly about a dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. This is a massive project on the Blue Nile that Egypt fears could reduce the flow of water on which its agriculture, economy and population depend.

For both Turkey and Egypt, curtailing Israel’s growing influence across the wider Middle East and the Horn of Africa remains a strategic priority. A stronger Israel would dilute Turkey’s desired role as a broker and patron in the Horn, and complicate Egypt’s efforts to constrain Ethiopia.

An emboldened Israel, however, could also reshape Egypt’s engagement with Ethiopia. Egypt and Turkey might offer Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed diplomatic incentives – including limited or symbolic access to the Red Sea in Somaliland’s port of Berbera, for instance. This would be in return for Addis Ababa’s agreement to reaffirm Somalia’s territorial integrity (and never recognise Somaliland). But this seems unlikely as neither Egypt nor Turkey possesses the power to put Somalia back together again.

The Horn’s own agenda

The real powers in the Horn of Africa remain the region’s own states and rival centres of authority. Horn states have the agency and interests to shape outcomes. They have long drawn external patrons into the region, playing them off against one another to extract resources, recognition and diplomatic support.

What the Iran war changes is not who sets the Horn’s agenda, but the external conditions under which Horn actors pursue it.

Gulf states have been opportunistic precisely because they had the capacity to act in the Horn when the Gulf itself was stable. That capacity may now be constrained.

This is not a new finding. In work published over five years ago, my colleague Federico Donelli and I argued that enduring security burdens at home limited the reach of Gulf ambitions in the Horn.

The Horn’s underlying conflicts and rivalries will therefore continue to interact in unpredictable ways.

– Gulf attention is turning inward: why the Iran war could destabilise the Horn of Africa
– https://theconversation.com/gulf-attention-is-turning-inward-why-the-iran-war-could-destabilise-the-horn-of-africa-277855

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Oliver Kiptoo Kirui, Research Fellow, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Countries in west and central Africa are facing a food crisis with multiple causes. Estimates in late December 2025 suggested that 41.8 million people were already in crisis or worse in October-December 2025. The number was expected to rise to 52.8 million in June-August 2026. Researchers Kirui Oliver Kiptoo and Chibuzo Nwagbosu explain how serious the situation is.

How severe is food insecurity in the region, and where are the hotspots?

Food insecurity has three aspects:

• chronic hunger

• constraints to food access

• acute crises.

West Africa, the Sahel and Cameroon are in crisis, according to the World Food Programme. It is increasingly concentrated in conflict-affected corridors where markets fragment, farms are abandoned, and humanitarian access is constrained. Key areas include the Central Sahel/Liptako-Gourma region and the Lake Chad Basin.

The problem is strongly shaped by the global humanitarian financing squeeze. The World Food Programme has warned that funding shortfalls are forcing ration reductions in countries like Mali.

Between October and December 2025, it was estimated that 41.78 million people faced food insecurity. For the June-August 2026 lean season, it is projected 52.78 million are at risk. The Food and Agriculture Organisation’s January 2026 regional update aligns with this projection.

The World Food Programme, covering a broader “west and central Africa” framing, has warned that June-August 2026 could see 55 million people endure “crisis hunger or worse”.

What is driving the crisis?

The crisis is best understood as layered risk:

• conflict and governance shocks create vulnerability

• climate events and price spikes trigger acute deterioration

• weak safety nets make recovery fragile.

Conflict, insecurity and governance fragmentation:

Conflict and insecurity are repeatedly identified in analysis as determinants. They shut down markets, restrict movement, displace households, and limit humanitarian reach.

The Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis clearly describes persistent crisis-level food insecurity. This is linked to conflict dynamics and associated economic stressors.

Governance shocks can amplify market disruption. Observations noted the role of border closures and disrupted financial flows linked to Ecowas sanctions on Niger. Political events can transmit into food access constraints.

Climate shocks and environmental stress:

Cadre Harmonisé (a regional framework used for the analysis and identification of areas at risk and populations affected by food and nutrition insecurity) flagged floods as determinants as early as the 2023 cycle. It noted heavy rains damaging crops in parts of Ghana, Niger and Chad. In a region where livelihoods remain heavily dependent on rainfed agriculture and pastoral systems, even “good production years” can coexist with acute food insecurity when insecurity blocks access to fields and markets.

Economic shocks, food price inflation and market disruptions:

The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (2025) highlights how elevated inflation undermines purchasing power and access to healthy diets. It emphasises that food price inflation is not just a macroeconomic variable but shapes nutrition and food security outcomes.

Displacement and disrupted livelihoods:

Displacement is both a symptom and a driver. It reduces household production and income, increases dependency, and strains host-community services and markets. The current displacement burden is massive across the region’s key hotspots. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees operational data shows that the DRC has about 6.47 million internally displaced persons, Nigeria has 3.54 million, Cameroon 1.0 million and Niger 0.59 million.

What is the impact of a reduction in food aid?

In late 2024 and early 2025, several major humanitarian donors – including the United States and a number of European governments – announced reductions or delays in aid disbursements amid domestic fiscal pressures and competing global crises. The effects were immediate in the Sahel. By early 2025, only about 50% of the funding required for humanitarian operations in the region had been mobilised.

Funding shortages are no longer just a logistical problem for aid agencies. They are now directly contributing to rising hunger and malnutrition. When funding falls, fewer people are reached, food rations are reduced, and nutrition programs are interrupted, especially during predictable seasonal peaks when needs are highest peaks.

The World Food Programme’s evidence from the central Sahel is unusually explicit. It reports that in Mali, where rations have been reduced due to funding shortages, the population facing crisis-level hunger has surged by 64% since 2023. In areas where full rations were maintained, the population facing crisis-level or worse hunger declined by 34%.

This suggests aid makes a big difference.

Funding constraints also reduce the region’s ability to prevent malnutrition deaths. The World Food Programme warned in January 2026 that the region could see 13 million children suffering malnutrition and described how assistance and nutrition programming would have to be scaled down without urgent funding.

Unicef’s Burkina Faso situation reporting is similar. It notes that food is being delivered “despite funding constraints”, even as insecurity and displacement rise.

At the system level, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reporting illustrates that Sahel humanitarian operations have repeatedly run with major gaps. It notes that only about half of the required funding has been mobilised for targeted assistance. A Sahel regional needs overview for 2025 warned early in the year that only 8% of required funding had been received. This very low funding at the beginning of the year makes it more likely that food and nutrition supplies will run out before the lean season begins.

What should be done?

The evidence points to an approach that combines short-term emergency response, medium-term recovery measures, and long-term structural reform.

Short-term actions:

Governments and regional bodies should treat the lean season as a predictable hazard. They must allow markets to work and aid to reach people who need it.

Cadre Harmonisé repeatedly shows that crisis outcomes concentrate where markets are disrupted and movement is unsafe.

The World Food Programme has warned that without urgent funding, millions may lose assistance. Donors can make sure nutrition-specific support is delivered in addition to general food aid and cash transfers – not replaced by them. Wasting levels are already high in several hotspot countries.

NGOs should scale up cash transfers where markets still function, and shift to in-kind where conflict isolates areas.

Medium-term actions:

Governments should expand social protection that can increase quickly when prices spike or floods hit. This is key especially where most households have to buy (not grow) their food.

Regional bodies should ease trade across borders and issue early warnings. This can reduce policy uncertainty that unsettles prices.

Humanitarian and development actors should focus on livelihood recovery where people have been displaced. For example, land restoration investments can deliver large returns and reduce repeat emergency caseloads.

Long-term actions:

The long-term objective is to address three constraints that keep arising: insecurity; weak services; and limited resilience in climate-sensitive food.

First, national governments and regional security mechanisms must pursue durable stabilisation strategies. Agricultural recovery and market integration can’t happen where there is conflict.

Second, invest in human capital and basic services that directly reduce nutrition mortality. These include primary healthcare, safe water, and child feeding programmes. Unicef’s Burkina Faso reporting shows large caseloads of severe acute malnutrition treatment even when there isn’t talk of a “famine”.

Finally, build climate resilience. This can be done through water control, soil fertility and rangeland management, and diversified income strategies. Financing should reward prevention, not only response.

– Hunger crisis is set to get worse in west and central Africa – why and what to do about it
– https://theconversation.com/hunger-crisis-is-set-to-get-worse-in-west-and-central-africa-why-and-what-to-do-about-it-276798

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christophe Premat, Professor, Canadian and Cultural Studies, Stockholm University

Sophie Oluwole (1935-2018) was a Nigerian scholar and the first woman to earn a PhD in philosophy in her country. She not only placed Nigeria’s rich Yoruba philosophical tradition on the intellectual map, she also helped redefine African philosophy, a field dominated by men.

As a scholar of cultural studies with a focus on francophone and west Africa, I recently co-authored, in French, a book called African Intellectual Sensitivities: From Western Discourse to African Voices (1988-2022). One of its chapters is devoted to Oluwole and African women intellectuals.

She did much more than break gender barriers. By placing Nigeria’s Yoruba thought in dialogue with the famed western philosophers like Socrates, she challenged the assumption that African philosophy was merely folklore. To her it was a rigorous intellectual tradition.

Who gets to think?

For centuries, western philosophy presented itself as the universal measure of reason. Beginning with German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), influential strands of western philosophy described Africa as “outside history”.

The continent was said to lack philosophy because it lacked a written tradition comparable to ancient Greece’s. Rational thought, many argued, needed text.

It was against this assumption that Oluwole built her work. She did not simply ask for African thinkers to be added to reading lists. She questioned the criteria used to define philosophy. In the process, she challenged a long-standing intellectual hierarchy.

A philosopher between worlds

Born in 1935 in what is today Ondo State, Sophie Bosede Olayemi Oluwole came of age during the final decades of British rule and the intense debates that would culminate in independence in 1960.

Like many girls of her generation, she initially trained as a teacher. But her intellectual curiosity pushed her further. She enrolled to study philosophy at the University of Ibadan, then the country’s premier university. It was an unusual choice for a Nigerian woman in the 1960s. She earned her PhD there in 1984.

Pursuing a doctoral degree took persistence in an academic culture overwhelmingly dominated by men. Her path reflects both the new educational opportunities after independence and the structural barriers women still faced in higher education.

Her intellectual career unfolded from the 1970s through the early 2000s, while Nigerian universities were wrestling with their post-independence identity. After 1960, several institutions sought to Africanise curricula and leadership. Yet philosophy departments often remained anchored in European traditions.

Oluwole herself was Yoruba, one of the largest ethnic and language groups in west Africa. The Yoruba were concentrated mainly in south-western Nigeria but also present in Benin and Togo.

Yoruba thinking is structured around a cosmology linking the visible and invisible worlds, ancestors and descendants, individual destiny and communal responsibility. Knowledge is not separated from ethics or spirituality; wisdom is understood as practical guidance for living well within a web of relationships.

She focused on the corpus of Ifá, a vast body of oral literature linked to ethics, cosmology and reflection on human destiny. At its centre stands Òrúnmìlà, a figure associated with wisdom and knowledge.

For Oluwole, Òrúnmìlà was not just a religious figure. He functioned as a philosopher – a teacher of critical inquiry and moral reasoning whose insights were preserved through disciplined oral storytelling.

She drew comparisons between him and the Greek philosopher Socrates. Socrates left no written work of his own. His ideas were transmitted through dialogue and memory. Why, then, should the spoken word disqualify an African thinker from being recognised as philosophical?

The problem, she insisted, was not Africa’s lack of philosophy. It was the narrow definition of philosophy inherited from Europe – one that privileged written texts and dismissed oral traditions as pre-philosophical. By questioning that definition, Oluwole was not only defending Yoruba thought. She was expanding philosophy itself.

The politics of the spoken

At the centre of Oluwole’s work was a simple but disruptive question: must philosophy be written to exist? In her book Philosophy and Oral Tradition (1997), she argued that African oral texts – including myths, proverbs and Ifá verses – contain structured reasoning and critical reflection, and therefore meet the criteria of philosophical thought. Texts are preserved, cited and institutionalised.

She exposed the colonial logic behind this hierarchy. During the 1800s and early 1900s, European scholars often portrayed Africa as a continent of myth rather than reason.

The absence of classical written texts was interpreted as intellectual absence. But storytelling does not prevent intellectual reasoning. Writing does not automatically produce critical thought. By analysing Ifá verses, Oluwole showed that they contain ethical reasoning, reflection on causality (cause and effect) and debate about human responsibility.

Her work entered into dialogue with broader debates in African philosophy. Thinkers like Benin’s Paulin Hountondji criticised the idea that African philosophy was only a collective worldview. They argued for critical and argumentative traditions. Oluwole demonstrated that such critical reasoning could also be embedded in oral forms.

A trailblazing woman

Oluwole’s work cannot be separated from her position as a woman. Philosophy remains one of the most male-dominated disciplines worldwide.

But Oluwole faced a double challenge. She was a woman in philosophy. She was also an African philosopher confronting Eurocentric standards.

She would become an increasingly public figure, making many TV appearances and speaking engagements, always spurring debate.

Why she matters today

The questions Sophie Oluwole raised remain pressing.

As calls to decolonise knowledge grow, universities around the world are rethinking what they teach. Yet change often focuses on adding authors to the syllabus. The deeper issue concerns the criteria used to define knowledge.

Oluwole’s work invites a more structural reflection. If philosophy is defined too narrowly, inclusion will remain limited. The definition of philosophy itself must be examined.

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Read more: Achille Mbembe on how to restore the humanity stolen by racism

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Her argument also speaks beyond Africa. Many indigenous knowledge systems continue to be marginalised because they are transmitted orally or embedded in ritual and narrative. They are treated as cultural heritage rather than intellectual production.

By defending the philosophical depth of Yoruba thought, Oluwole challenged this hierarchy. She showed that philosophy is not the property of one civilisation. It is a human practice shaped by different media and histories.

– Sophie Oluwole, the trailblazing Nigerian woman who redefined philosophy
– https://theconversation.com/sophie-oluwole-the-trailblazing-nigerian-woman-who-redefined-philosophy-277382