Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jabulani Sikhakhane, Editor, The Conversation

Over the past 11 years, The Conversation Africa has published 12,961 articles by 8,257 authors, making the expertise of academics and researchers in Africa and other parts of the world accessible to the public, national and global policymakers, and other stakeholders. These articles are also republished by other media, making our work an important pillar of the media ecosystem.

It’s sometimes tough to gauge the true impact of the articles we publish. Replication by other news outlets – and readership on our site – help put numbers on their reach, but not how they might influence policy and opinion.

So it’s very gratifying when authors share stories that illustrate the ripple effect their articles have had. Here are some.

After the publication of her article on the pressures facing families that rely on social grants in South Africa, Nokukhanya Ndhlovu was invited by the country’s Public Protector to consult on hearings about child support and social assistance.

In Kenya, Joseph Ogutu’s analysis of a wildlife conservation policy fed directly into high-level discussions. The author was invited to make a presentation at an annual stakeholder meeting organised by the local governor’s office.

In west Africa, an article by Ifesinachi Okafor-Yarwood and Sayra van den Berg Bhagwandas on the central role women play in informal cross-border trade helped shift thinking among policymakers, helping gain broader recognition of women’s economic contributions. Following the article, the authors were invited to consult with policymakers at the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation.

Other stories demonstrate how impact can unfold through shifts in awareness and accountability. Coverage of issues ranging from social justice to agriculture have triggered consultations between researchers and policymakers, opening pathways for longer-term reform.

The impact of these articles, and thousands of others, is a reminder of why The Conversation Africa exists: to ensure that evidence informs debate, that African expertise shapes decisions, and that knowledge can help build better policy outcomes across the continent.

– The Conversation Africa: 11 years of impact
– https://theconversation.com/the-conversation-africa-11-years-of-impact-282317

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Sam Jones, Senior Research Fellow, World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), United Nations University

Mozambique is not in total crisis – but it is faltering. There has been no currency crash, no hyperinflation, no bank run. But over the past decade the main indicators of the country’s economic health have severely eroded.

An IMF assessment in early 2026 was remarkably blunt: public debt is unsustainably high, the external balance of payments is weak, and policy makers have limited options. Since then, tensions in the Middle East have further disrupted supply chains and dramatically raised global fuel prices. This is a major shock for small import-dependent economies, like Mozambique.

My analysis draws on over two decades of experience supporting economic research and policy analysis in the country. Currently, my work under the Inclusive Growth in Mozambique programme involves tracking the country’s economic performance through surveys of firms, students, and households.

The picture that emerges from this evidence is troubling. For ordinary Mozambicans, the deterioration in conditions over the past decade shows up in higher poverty, unreliable public services and a labour market that offers few decent opportunities – especially for the young.

My central argument is that muddling through is not a safe option. Without careful adjustments now and a deliberate shift toward growth and job creation outside extractives – the part of the economy that actually employs most Mozambicans – today’s pressures will keep building until a large economic correction becomes unavoidable and under far worse conditions.

A slow squeeze

The country’s present condition is one of vulnerable stagnation. Since the hidden debt crisis of 2016, real GDP growth outside the extractive sector has hovered around 2%, barely matching population growth. In per capita terms, the non-extractive economy has flatlined for a decade. Average real incomes outside mining and gas (or the public sector) have gone essentially nowhere.

Fiscal deficits of 4%-6% of GDP have been financed increasingly by domestic banks. But as both the IMF and World Bank have warned, that model is now reaching a breaking point. Banks can only absorb so much government debt before they run out of willingness – or capacity – to lend. When that happens, the government faces a choice between defaulting, printing money, or slashing spending abruptly. None is painless.

Evidence of these pressures is plain to see. Over a year ago, the global rating agency S&P classified local-currency debt as “selective default”. This is a formal determination that the government had failed to meet its obligations to domestic creditors on the original terms, even if it continued paying.

By late 2025, arrears had extended to short-term treasury bills – government IOUs that mature within months and are supposed to be the safest instruments in the domestic financial system. When a government struggles to repay even these, it signals serious fiscal distress.

On top of this, a decade of crisis management has displaced any serious thinking about growth. The government’s wage bill and debt service dominate spending, leaving chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, education, and agriculture. Schools and health facilities lack supplies, roads deteriorate, and social protection has weakened sharply.

Payments under the basic social subsidy programme have become highly irregular. Many elderly beneficiaries receive only a fraction of what they are owed. Poverty has increased, with around two thirds of the population now below the poverty line.

Demographic pressures are intensifying. Mozambique needs to absorb roughly 500,000 new labour market entrants annually by 2030, yet the formal sector generates a small fraction of new jobs. Informal work dominates and without a step-change in growth, it will only expand. Each year of stagnation adds another youth cohort to an already strained labour market. Delay does not preserve stability – it makes eventual adjustment larger and more costly.

The exchange rate question

The metical has been held stable against the US dollar since 2021, but in real terms it has appreciated by over 20%, eroding export competitiveness. Foreign exchange shortages are now pervasive. The parallel market premium reached around 14% by late 2025. Firms report severe and lengthening delays in accessing foreign exchange through formal channels.

The policy response has been administrative: raising exporter surrender requirements, tightening banks’ foreign exchange position limits, restricting overseas card usage. These measures treat symptoms, but the underlying misalignment only deepens.

The overvalued exchange rate functions as a tax on the non-resource economy. Recent fuel shortages and panic buying – driven in part by importers’ inability to secure foreign exchange and price uncertainty – provide a visible demonstration of the mounting costs.

The politics of adjustment

In practice, public sector employment has come to serve as a form of social protection for the urban middle class. Our research shows roughly half of all university graduates find employment in the public sector, and having a public sector job is one of the best predictors of not being poor.

The public sector wage bill underpins political legitimacy, which is why attempts to cut discretionary 13th-month salary payments were quickly reversed once key workers threatened to strike.

Exchange rate adjustment poses a parallel dilemma. A depreciation would raise the cost of imported food and fuel, hitting urban households directly, and any price increase would spark calls to hike minimum wages. With the memory of popular violence from the 2024 elections still fresh, there is a strong bias toward the status quo.

But as pressures mount, there is a growing risk of compounding distortions. So far the temptation has been to respond with new administrative controls, including import restrictions, tighter capital controls, and preferential credit allocation.

The ongoing handling of the fuel price shock illustrates the pattern. Rather than adjust pump prices promptly, the government has held prices fixed, leaving distributors to manage a mounting shortfall through supply rationing.

Each temporary fix may ease immediate pressures, but tends to deepen the underlying misalignment, push activity into informal channels, and narrow future options.

Feasible pathways

Path 1: Muddle through and wait for the gas. This is the current trajectory. Fiscal adjustment occurs passively, driven by financing constraints rather than strategy. The hope is that LNG revenues could materialise from the early 2030s. Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin holds an estimated 100 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas – among the largest discoveries globally in the past two decades. But only one offshore platform (Coral South) is currently producing. Even if the 2030 timeline holds, continued stagnation would further erode public services, weaken institutions, and deepen social frustration – and another general election must be managed. By the time resource revenues arrive, the state may lack the capacity and public trust to deploy them effectively.

Path 2: Gradual, growth-first adjustment. The most economically coherent path, though politically demanding. The central premise: restoring non-extractive growth must take priority, even at the cost of short-term macroeconomic discomfort. Key elements would include:

• a phased depreciation of the metical to restore competitiveness, supported by clear communication and strengthened social protection

• acceptance of temporarily higher inflation, with policy focused on preventing second-round effects rather than suppressing the initial price shift

• a fiscal framework centred on spending quality and revenue efficiency

• wage bill containment through hiring restraint, attrition, and systematic payroll audits to eliminate ghost workers and improper payments

• re-engagement with external partners under a credible IMF programme framework; and

• an evidence-based and financially viable medium-term growth strategy targeting agricultural productivity, labour-intensive exports and a predictable regulatory and macroeconomic environment.

Path 3: Forced correction. If external shocks bite deeper, a large adjustment may be imposed suddenly – involving disorderly exchange rate movement, abrupt fiscal contraction, and potential banking sector stress. The longer gradual adjustment is postponed, the higher this probability.

The narrow path

There is no easy option. Every adjustment has visible losers, while the benefits remain uncertain, delayed, and diffuse.

But one priority stands out: boosting growth beyond extractive sectors. Without it, fiscal consolidation is self-defeating, job creation will remain grossly inadequate, and social pressures will only intensify. Stabilisation pursued in isolation, or at the expense of growth, could be bad medicine.

This growth strategy must be grounded in data, evidence and honest debate. Mozambique has not lacked for projects or initiatives, but it has lacked consistent use of rigorous data to identify what drives productivity and job creation.

The window for a controlled, policy-driven adjustment is narrowing fast. The alternative is not stability. It is adjustment under far worse conditions, at higher cost.

– Mozambique’s economy is failing: the tough policy choices that need to be made urgently
– https://theconversation.com/mozambiques-economy-is-failing-the-tough-policy-choices-that-need-to-be-made-urgently-281679

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Irene Appeaning Addo, Associate Professor of African Architecture, University of Ghana

The call to prayer echoes across the neighbourhood as people congregate under the sweeping domes and tall minarets of Ghana’s National Mosque in Accra. For many, it is a place of faith, community and national pride. Yet, few pause to consider that this landmark – now firmly part of Accra’s skyline – was funded and built by Turkey.

This detail points to a bigger story. Some of Ghana’s most important public buildings are shaped by global relationships as much as local needs. And those relationships are not just economic; they are deeply political.

Therefore buildings are not just functional. They are powerful expressions of political power, used to describe and project ideas about hierarchy, state authority, solidarity and modernity.

As a result, architecture can be used to explore the identity and ideology of African states and international partners who choose to finance or donate new buildings to Africa featuring western architectural aesthetics.

I am a scholar of African architecture. I collaborated with scholars from different areas of expertise, including political scientists, on a project that studied the connection between architecture and power in Africa. From Ghana, two projects were used to illustrate international relations in architecture, highlighting the interplay of power and agency. One was the National Mosque and the other was the seat of Ghana’s government, Jubilee House, an edifice funded by the government of India.

Ghana and India’s ties can be traced to their co-founding of the Non-Aligned Movement. These were a group of states not formally aligned with major power blocs during the cold war. Ghana and Turkey’s relationship goes as far back as 1957. Turkey is one of the leading investors in Ghana’s economy.

Our work established that when a country finances and constructs a major building abroad, it leaves a visible and lasting imprint on another nation’s landscape. The building becomes part of everyday life while reflecting the influence of its external sponsor. These buildings normalise the presence of the sponsoring nation and are a constant reminder of its political interests.

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Read more: Ghana and India: Narendra Modi’s visit rekindles historical ties

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History written in buildings

Foreigners have been shaping Ghana’s built environment for centuries, from colonial forts along the coast to post-independence modernist projects designed by international architects.

Ghana’s architecture tells a layered story of power and exchange. During the colonial era, Europeans constructed forts and castles that dominated coastal landscapes. These were not just military structures; they were symbols of control and gateways to global trade networks, including the transatlantic slave trade. Sections of these buildings were later repurposed as schools, embedding education within spaces marked by violence and coercion.

This dual legacy highlights how architecture can carry multiple, often conflicting meanings over time.

After independence, Ghana sought to project a new national identity through modern architecture.

Foreign architects were commissioned to design housing, universities and civic buildings that would signal progress and global relevance. This moment reflected both aspiration and dependence: a desire to appear modern on the world stage, combined with reliance on external expertise and resources.

‘Soft power’

Today, Ghana continues to engage with global partners through architecture and infrastructure development. The National Mosque is one example. Backed by Turkey with the active involvement of Ghanaian Muslims, it represents both religious solidarity and diplomatic outreach underpinned by local agency.

Its scale, design and prominence make it a visible marker of Turkey’s presence in Ghana. The National Mosque Complex is modelled after the Ottoman-era Sultan Ahmed Mosque in Istanbul, Turkey. The national mosque in Accra features domes, semi-domes and arcaded porticos. These are the characteristics of Ottoman architecture, a predominant classical style for mosques in Turkey and the Islamic world.

Another example of political “gift” is Jubilee House, the seat of government. While financed and constructed with support from India, it incorporates the form of the Akan stool, a deeply significant symbol of authority in Ghanaian culture. This blending of external funding with local agency and symbolism shows that these projects are not simply imposed. They are shaped through negotiation.

Across the continent, similar patterns can be seen. China has funded major government buildings, including the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and the Zimbabwe parliamentary complex. These projects are often described as “gifts”, but they also reflect strategic relationships and long-term influence. Political scientist Innocent Batsani-Ncube has illustrated how China’s large-scale investment in the Zimbabwe parliament is used as a proxy for its sustained activities in and around African parliamentary institutions.

Ghana’s case

It is easy to view foreign-funded infrastructure as purely beneficial, especially given Ghana’s development needs. But architecture is never neutral. Buildings embody power relationships in terms of the scale, materiality, the architectural features and the location in urban areas.

They reflect who has the resources to design, finance and construct, and whose ideas are ultimately realised in physical form. A mosque, a parliament or a presidential palace is not just a functional space; it is a statement about identity, legitimacy and global belonging of both the sponsor and the recipient country. In this sense, architecture becomes part of diplomacy. It is a way of making relationships visible – and durable.

Describing these projects simply as soft power, however, does not capture the full picture. Soft power theory often assumes that influence flows smoothly from powerful countries to less powerful ones.

Ghana’s experience suggests something more complex. Buildings cannot simply be “exported” like films or fashion. They are rooted in specific places, histories and communities. This creates friction.

For example, Ghana’s engagement with foreign-built projects often involves negotiation over design, symbolism and use. Local government officials, religious leaders and communities play a role in shaping outcomes.

In the case of the National Mosque, Ghanaian Muslim communities were not passive recipients. Their advocacy and social influence were crucial to the project’s realisation. Similarly, the incorporation of the Akan stool in Jubilee House reflects an effort to assert cultural identity. These examples show that foreign influence is most often mediated by local contexts.

Ghanaian actors’ agency in these processes has limits, however. Many decisions about large-scale projects are made by political elites. As a result, the interests reflected in these buildings may not represent the broader population.

These examples point to broader questions. Do foreign-funded buildings contribute to long-term development, or are they primarily symbolic? How can Ghana ensure that such projects reflect local priorities and needs? And what does it mean to build a national identity in a world shaped by global partnerships?

The links among soft power, public and cultural diplomacy, and development across the continent will continue to be subjects of research.

International relations scholars Joanne Tomkinson and Julia Gallagher contributed to the research that this article is derived from.

– What Ghana’s foreign-built landmarks tell us about its global relationships
– https://theconversation.com/what-ghanas-foreign-built-landmarks-tell-us-about-its-global-relationships-279603

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Olayinka Ajala, Associate professor in Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University

The precarious security situation in Mali took a turn for the worse in late April 2026. Well coordinated attacks targeted several cities and claimed the lives of the defence minister, Sadio Camara, and several Malian soldiers.

The events are a culmination of increased attacks over the past few years on the military and state institutions in Mali.

We have been researching insecurity and politics in west Africa and the Sahel for over a decade. We believe the recent attacks trace back to grievances expressed by Tuaregs that the current military regime has not addressed. The Tuaregs are nomadic Berber communities in northern Mali.

First is the inability or unwillingness to address Tuareg discontent. Their grievances centre on political autonomy, marginalisation, cultural recognition, resource control, security and perceived state neglect.

Second, the continuous use of force by the military against rebels in the northern regions without regard for the collateral damage. The Tuaregs have long contested the militarisation policies of successive Malian governments.

Third, the uneven distribution of resources, which keeps the northern region marginalised. These include northern Mali’s resources such as gold deposits, salt mines, grazing lands, and strategic trade corridors. Revenues from these sources remain controlled by the state’s centre based in the south.

Addressing resource marginalisation could have a number of benefits. It could temper Tuareg grievances, restore trust in the Malian state, and shift conflict incentives away from rebellion towards political inclusion, stability, and sustainable peace in northern Mali.

The breakdown

In April 2026 the jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) joined forces with ethnic Tuareg rebels from the northern Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) to attack several cities in the country recently.

This mirrors a similar attack in 2012 when the Tuareg and al-Qaeda-affiliated militants launched an offensive against the state. The Tuareg-dominated National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) attempted to secede and initiated a rebellion.

The MNLA is a Tuareg‑dominated separatist movement. Founded in 2011, it is mainly composed of ex-Libyan war returnees and northern Malian Tuaregs. The organisation had about 10,000 fighters at its peak in 2012.

Despite their numbers, they lacked the military power to hold the territory. As a result they aligned with Islamists Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Shortly after pushing back Malian forces in late 2012, the alliance disintegrated.

The Islamist groups were better armed and funded. They forced the secular separatists out of major towns like Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The intervention of French forces in 2013 helped the Malian government regain most of the lost territories.

AQIM and its allies then moved into the mountains and surrounding desert areas. They shifted to guerrilla tactics, including suicide bombings and landmines.

The withdrawal of French forces in 2022 seems to have emboldened the Islamist militants. It removed counter‑terrorism pressure, disrupted intelligence and logistics and created a security vacuum amid weak Malian state capacity. This allowed Islamist groups to expand operations, recruit locally and regain territorial influence.

Lessons unlearnt

The largely popular military regime of Assimi Goita has failed to address the demands of Tuareg separatists. The Tuaregs have historically complained about exclusion from power by the southern dominated Malian state. Since the country’s independence in 1960, Tuareg leaders have argued that the structure of the Malian state does not reflect their political identity, economic interests and governance traditions. The demand for self-rule or autonomy has been suppressed, often by force.

More recently, increased drought, desertification and climate variability has devastated Tuareg pastoral livelihoods. These grievances pre-date Islamic insurgency and are fundamental in understanding the approach of the group.

The second unaddressed issue is that counterterrorism operations use force which creates collateral damage. Recent analysis shows that counterterrorism operations in northern and central Mali have resulted in large scale civilian harm, displacement and collective punishments. These have included arbitrary arrests and mass killings.

These factors have created conditions which Islamist groups have exploited for recruitment, territorial control and legitimacy.

The blame for this has been put on successive Malian regimes and previous French operations. This has been a key reason for France’s interventions being labelled as failures.

The third major driver of violence in Mali relates to the uneven distribution of resources. Since independence, public investment, infrastructure, social services and political attention have been heavily concentrated in the southern parts of the country.

Previous peace agreements have promised decentralisation, funding and integration of northern elites and ex-combatants. But implementation have been slow or nonexistent.

Is there a way forward?

The Tuareg question must be answered to reduce the tension between the regions of the country. It can be argued that Tuareg actors have twice miscalculated by entering arrangements with jihadist groups. But this does not diminish the need to address the structural inequalities and long-standing grievances underpinning Tuareg demands.

To achieve this, the Malian regime can copy the blueprint of former president Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger. Prior to his presidency, the Nigerien Tuaregs were similarly aggrieved. When he became president in 2011, he:

• integrated Tuareg elites and former rebels into state institutions

• decentralised state authority by allowing administrative and budgetary control at the regional level

• introduced disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes.

Issoufou also invested in infrastructural development in the areas that directly affected the Tuaregs. This included pastoralism, education and livelihood support. Water access in arid pastoral areas was improved. And connectivity and road safety was expanded.

Addressing the Tuareg agitations would reduce tensions in Mali.

– Mali attacks: Tuareg grievances hold the key to peace
– https://theconversation.com/mali-attacks-tuareg-grievances-hold-the-key-to-peace-281832

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tolu Olarewaju, Economist and Postgraduate Supervisor, University of Lancashire; Keele University

Nigerians have no reliable way of scrutinising the national budget. The citizen’s portal of the Nigerian Budget Office of the Federation is often offline, and when it is online, it is highly technical and difficult for ordinary citizens to understand.

Data on the Nigerian budget sourced elsewhere online is also frequently hard to find and incomplete. As a result, the Nigerian budget is treated like a government secret and Nigerian citizens are unable to effectively scrutinise the government’s income and expenditure decisions.

My research shows that this disrupts the social contract between the citizens and the government of Nigeria and creates an opportunity for corruption.

The World Justice Project estimates that corruption has cost the Nigerian economy more than US$550 billion since 1960. And a report by the accounting firm PwC shows that corruption in Nigeria could cost up to 37% of the nation’s GDP by 2030 if it’s not dealt with immediately.

I am an economist whose research focuses on poverty and corruption reduction. In a recent paper, I show how secrecy fuels corruption in the management of Nigeria’s finances. I set out how citizen monitoring and digital engagement can enhance transparency and accountability.

I also identify some obstacles to making this a reality in Nigeria. These include technical capacity limitations, weak enforcement mechanisms, and political resistance.

To overcome these challenges, the government must invest in digital infrastructure. Fostering civic engagement and independent oversight, too, can ensure sustained accountability and effective implementation.

Budgetary secrecy and corruption in Nigeria

The Open Budget Survey is produced by the International Budget Partnership. It provides the main global assessment of budget accountability in the world and evaluates:

• public participation: formal and meaningful opportunities for the public to engage in the national budget process

• oversight: institutions such as the legislature, national audit office and independent bodies

• transparency: comprehensive budget information, made available to the public in a timely and accessible manner.

Nigeria performed poorly in the 2023 survey. It scored 19/100 in public participation, 61/100 in oversight, and 31/100 in transparency. It ranked 92 out of 125 countries. This was below several African peers and the global average of 45.

This marks a decline from 2021. Nigeria scored higher then in public participation (26) and transparency (45), while oversight has remained unchanged.

The drop is largely due to the government’s failure to publish key fiscal reports on time. These include in-year reports and mid-year reviews.

The source of the problem

My research found that government budgetary secrecy and corruption in Nigeria have historical roots. They stem from the era of colonial taxation, when colonialists collected taxes but didn’t invest in the people’s wellbeing.

But these bad practices have intensified since independence. About 47% of Nigeria’s 232.68 million people live in multidimensional poverty. This is a clear sign that Nigeria is not spending its resources wisely. Development, job creation and service delivery are all lacking.

My research found that even when funds are budgeted, secrecy facilitates fraud in a number of ways.

The first way is through vaguely specified budgeted projects. Many projects are listed without quantity or location. They use terms like “empowerment and sensitisation” or “provision of infrastructure”.

Secondly, through the budgeting of non-beneficial initiatives. Nigeria’s approved federal budget for 2025 included US$1.5 billion for health, US$2.5 billion for education and US$1.7 billion for agriculture. However, a whopping US$17 billion was allocated for the presidency.

Thirdly, through inflated figures for budgeted items. For example, the purchase of a car for ₦375 million (US$278,000).

Fourth, through the under-delivery and abandonment of projects.

Nigeria’s budgetary corruption is reinforced by a complex three-tier system of budgeting at the federal, state, and local government levels.

• At the federal level, the budget is prepared by the executive (president and ministries). It is coordinated by the Budget Office, approved by the National Assembly, and enacted as the “Appropriation Act”. However, limited and delayed fiscal disclosures enable budget padding, vague allocations, and weak expenditure tracking.

• At the state level, budgets are prepared by governors and state ministries. They are approved by the State Houses of Assembly, focusing on state needs. However, inconsistent publication of budgets and reports at this level makes it difficult to monitor spending and creates room for misallocation.

• At the local level, budgets are prepared by local government officials. However, they are heavily influenced by state governments and approved by local councils. Here, a lack of financial autonomy and state control over funds leads to diversion, ghost projects, and minimal accountability to citizens.

The solution

The Nigerian government says it also has an Open Treasury Portal that provides transparency in its budgeting system. My research shows that this platform also suffers from technical glitches, incomplete data, and low enforcement.

BudgIT, a Nigerian civic technology organisation, uses data visualisation and storytelling to try to make the government budget more accessible to citizens, but its impact is also limited by insufficient data availability.

Advances in information technology make it possible for Nigeria to build a real-time online government budget system that the public can access and monitor. This would cover financial statements and reports across federal, state and local governments. Nigerians could also use a system like this to vote on projects the government should focus on.

South Korea has a similar model. Known as the Digital Budget and Accounting System (dBrain), it is a fully integrated system for budget planning, execution and monitoring of government finances across agencies in real time.

Another country, Georgia, has an e-budget transparency system. It provides real-time budget execution data and is integrated with the goverment’s e-procurement and treasury systems.

The US also has the USAspending.gov service, which tracks federal spending in real time and provides publicly accessible and searchable data on what the federal government spends.

Importantly, real-time online budget monitoring enables quick detection of corruption, but its effectiveness depends on clear and consistently enforced penalties.

What needs to be done

An online government budget system which the public could monitor would improve transparency and accountability in Nigeria. Technologies such as Enterprise Resource Planning systems and Integrated Financial Management Information systems enable real-time budget tracking and integrated financial management. Blockchain can further strengthen transparency through secure records. Also, cloud computing can improve accessibility and data security.

Data analytics and AI can enhance forecasting, automate monitoring, and improve decision-making. This would make budgeting more efficient, transparent and responsive.

The Nigeria Tax Administration Act has introduced a digital tax system requiring Nigerian taxpayers to keep accurate transaction records.

The Nigerian government aims to use this to improve efficiency, accuracy and transparency in its tax system. The government should implement a similar system for all its own financial transactions.

– Nigeria’s budget is treated like a government secret: how an online public monitoring system could fight corruption
– https://theconversation.com/nigerias-budget-is-treated-like-a-government-secret-how-an-online-public-monitoring-system-could-fight-corruption-280503

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Frank Quansah, Senior Lecturer, Educational Assessment, Measurement and Evaluation, University of Education, Winneba

Across Africa and beyond, education systems are shifting to curricula designed to build critical thinking and problem-solving skills.

Competency-based curricula put learners at the centre. They are meant to prepare students for a rapidly changing world, where success depends on the ability to adapt, think critically and solve complex problems.

Unlike traditional curricula, which often emphasise covering content and memorising facts, competency-based curricula focus on how students apply what they learn in real-world situations. For example, instead of simply recalling scientific definitions, students might be asked to use a concept to explain how diseases spread.

Much of the discussion around this shift in education has focused on familiar challenges, including teacher preparedness, availability of learning materials, and how faithfully the curriculum is implemented.

While these factors are important, they do not fully explain why reforms often fall short of their intended goals, particularly in improving how students learn and develop competencies.

In a recent study I co-authored, published in Discover Education, we reviewed evidence from different countries, including Ghana, Kenya and Vietnam, about what is undermining learner-centred education. We found that the main constraint to reforms in teaching is assessment systems. Teaching and testing systems are mismatched. While curricula promote skills like critical thinking and problem-solving, national exams want learners to memorise facts and follow routine procedures. So that’s what teachers concentrate on.

The misalignment is holding students back from success: being able to apply what they learn in real-world situations. This ability is essential for further education, employment and everyday decision-making.

Exams shape what counts

In our study, we set out to understand why learner-centred reforms, which are central to competency-based education, often fail to produce meaningful changes in classroom practice. We reviewed research and policy evidence from multiple countries across Africa, Asia and beyond, focusing on how national assessment systems interact with curriculum reforms.

We found a pattern: high-stakes exams do more than assess learning; they shape what teachers teach and what students focus on.

Our analysis shows that this creates a “double bind” for teachers. They are expected to promote critical thinking and problem-solving, while also preparing students for exams that reward recall and procedural accuracy. In practice, this often leads to surface-level reforms. New methods are introduced but teaching remains focused on memorisation.

In many African countries, examinations such as the West African Senior School Certificate Examination and Kenya’s National Secondary School Exams exert strong pressure on teachers.

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Read more: Ghana’s colonial past and assessment use means education prioritises passing exams over what students actually learn – this must change

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As a result, learning narrows to what can be tested. This limits the impact of reform.

In effect, exams become the real curriculum, regardless of what official documents say.

Rethinking what assessment does

The stakes are high.

If competency-based education is to succeed, assessment systems need to be rethought, not just adjusted at the margins.

This does not mean abandoning national exams. Rather, it means redefining what they are designed to measure.

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Read more: Should Kenya abolish all school exams? Expert sets out five reasons why they’re still useful

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Assessment should focus less on what students can recall and more on what they can do with what they know. This could include tasks that require analysis, problem-solving and application in real-world contexts.

It also means moving beyond a single high-stakes test. Combining national examinations with school-based assessments (such as projects or portfolios) can provide a more complete picture of learning.

The challenge is to do this in ways that remain fair, reliable and scalable across entire education systems.

A practical way forward

In our study, we propose a practical way to address this misalignment. We call it the LEARN model (Learner-centred assessment design; Evidence of competence; Adaptive to context; Reflective and feedback oriented; Nationally relevant and scalable). It offers a system-level framework for policymakers and education systems to redesign assessment so that it supports curriculum reforms.

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Read more: Ghana’s high school system sets many students up for failure: it needs a rethink

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The model is built around five ideas:

• designing assessments that reflect how students learn, using tasks that require applying knowledge rather than simple recall

• focusing on evidence of competence rather than recall, emphasising what students can do with what they know

• allowing flexibility to adapt to different classroom and national contexts

• integrating feedback into assessment so that it supports learning, instead of just measuring it

• ensuring that systems remain nationally relevant while still being practical to implement at scale.

The model shifts the focus from standardising test formats to aligning what is assessed with what matters.

Our model shows it is possible to balance two goals that are often seen as competing: maintaining national standards while supporting meaningful learning.

– What’s stopping kids from learning useful skills? Short answer: exams
– https://theconversation.com/whats-stopping-kids-from-learning-useful-skills-short-answer-exams-281652

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Federico Donelli, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Trieste

India’s engagement in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea basin was, until recently, largely limited to UN peacekeeping operations and anti-piracy patrols.

Since the second half of the 1990s, India has participated in nearly all peacekeeping operations in Africa.

Anti-piracy efforts emerged between 2008 and 2014 as piracy off Somalia and the Gulf of Aden spread across a vast maritime space. This spanned east Africa and the wider Indian Ocean, bringing threats close to India’s shores.

Indian trade routes were exposed to new security risks, so a more sustained maritime posture was needed.

From the mid-2010s, therefore, India expanded its engagement in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin to secure shipping lanes linking it to global markets. At the same time, it sought to counter China’s growing naval presence along the western Indian Ocean coast, protect its diaspora and investments, and position itself as a regional security provider.

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi took office in 2014, this shift accelerated. India placed greater emphasis on proactive diplomacy, expanding high-level engagement, and trade and infrastructure links. It also pursued strategic coordination through bilateral agreements and naval exercises across west Asia and the adjoining African coastline.

India, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin

This evolution reflects India’s transition from a post-colonial, non-aligned actor to a more assertive power with ambitions outside the region. It is now Africa’s third-largest trading partner. Economic interdependence is growing alongside geostrategic interests.

Drawing on our work on international security in the western Indian Ocean and sub-Saharan Africa, we argue that over the past decade New Delhi has redefined the Indian Ocean as a protective buffer and a primary theatre of influence linking the Indo-Pacific to the Red Sea. The Horn of Africa lies at the heart of this connective space.

In 2023, India declared itself the Indian Ocean’s “net security provider”. It introduced a framework to strengthen regional security, deepen economic cooperation and address shared maritime challenges.

Today, with shipping routes being recalculated and governments reconsidering their strategic partnerships, India’s position is being put to an operational test.

The Horn is a space where legitimacy, delivery and endurance determine who remains relevant after the headlines fade. For the first time, India’s quiet advance is visible. Next, it will have to solidify its presence.

Why the Horn of Africa is important for India

An initiative called the 2025 Africa-India Key Maritime Engagement, co-hosted with Tanzania, positions India as a security partner for African nations, particularly those along the Indian Ocean rim.

India is also involved in development and investment projects in the region. These include agricultural efforts to improve food security, infrastructure projects, and technical assistance in education and health. It also provides humanitarian assistance in Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti.

What distinguishes the past decade is the effort to align these activities within a broader strategic narrative – one that presents India as a partner offering technology and development without debt concerns or political conditions.

This narrative is attractive to local governments in the Horn. But it also creates a test: India must show that it can deliver consistently.

Ethiopia has an important role for India. It hosts the African Union, functions as a diplomatic centre and offers an entry point into African multilateral politics.

Somalia also matters. It sits close to critical sea lanes and is central to the security of the Gulf of Aden. External actors there can convert security assistance into political access.

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Read more: China’s military support for Somalia is on the rise – what Taiwan and Somaliland have to do with it

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India’s interest in Somalia and Somaliland has taken on a geo-economic dimension. Indian firms are focusing on gold and mineral resources, particularly in eastern Somaliland.

Although still limited in scale, this shift signals that India’s footprint in the Horn is no longer confined to security and development assistance. It is intersecting with resource access and supply chain strategies.

The competition

The corridor of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean has become a crowded arena for external powers over the past two decades.

Great powers have seen countries in the region as a platform for counterterrorism and naval reach. Small and middle powers (like Turkey, Iran and Gulf states) have sought to secure influence through ports, training missions, arms transfers, commercial access and selective mediation.

The result is a dense environment. Almost every external actor offers a package of security, finance, technology and diplomacy. Fragile local governments hedge among them.

India’s challenge is to deliver consistently through:

• creating defence and security training pipelines

• project delivery

• stable financing instruments

• sustained bureaucratic attention.

If India’s Africa policy is maritime-led, then things like naval exercises, information-sharing, coast guard cooperation and institutional training must become regular and visible.

If the strategy is also developmental and technological, then India must deliver flagship projects in digital infrastructure, health and agriculture.

From quiet influence to lasting power

India faces three constraints in growing its influence in the Horn of Africa.

1. Limited military capacity

India’s naval capabilities do not match the scale of China’s fleet or America’s technological edge and operational depth. This gap is not fatal if India’s aim is durable influence through partnership. It does mean that India’s leverage will depend on institutional cooperation and coalition-building.

2. Competitive density

The Horn’s architecture is made of foreign bases, port diplomacy and overlapping rivalries. India’s advantage is that it’s not overwhelmingly intrusive. But it could become just one more actor among many.

3. Institutionalisation

If India’s engagement depends too heavily on leader-level attention, it will remain vulnerable to distraction. Durable influence requires bureaucratic routines and financing mechanisms. It must survive political cycles and shifting crises. Ethiopia is a test case. High-level roadmaps will have to turn into visible digital infrastructure, health systems and agricultural support.

The broader point is that the Horn is not an empty theatre waiting for India to arrive.

– India’s Horn of Africa strategy has shifted: what it’s trying to do and how it could work
– https://theconversation.com/indias-horn-of-africa-strategy-has-shifted-what-its-trying-to-do-and-how-it-could-work-281252

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Stephanie Allais, Faculty member, Centre for Researching Education and Labour, University of the Witwatersrand

South Africa’s 50 public technical and vocational education and training (TVET) colleges are, in the main, struggling institutions.

In many, throughput rates – how many students qualify in the expected time – are low. Some lecturers are under-qualified and under-resourced. Relationships with employers, which are crucial for the type of training that these colleges offer, are uneven.

Colleges are hard pressed to provide training to young people with weak schooling behind them and no clear path to employment ahead. The youth unemployment rate is almost 44%.

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Read more: Life after school for young South Africans: six insights into what lies ahead

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The response to problems in the sector has been reform: rename the colleges, restructure them, give them new governance models, new qualification types, new funding arrangements. Over 30 years of democracy, South Africa has done all of these things, repeatedly. It has not worked.

And now there’s another round of changes being rolled out. There is little clearly documented explanation of what the new system is and how it will work in practice. But colleges have been instructed that most current qualification offerings will be phased out and replaced by new “occupational” qualifications.

In 2024 I wrote a paper tracing the history of the technical and vocational training sector, drawing on published literature, my research on skills development and my own involvement in South Africa’s education and training policy processes. The paper sets out why the sector is not working and what it needs to succeed.

In my view, based on the history of the sector, there is a serious risk that the latest reforms will make things worse.

Thirty years of the same mistake

South Africa’s policy vision and funding model for TVET colleges has, like that of many other countries, been to base funding on student enrolment for programmes that are linked to employer demand. It assumes colleges will respond to what employers want, and channel young people into jobs.

It has a long and largely unsuccessful track record, with problems in many countries – most extensively documented in Australia and the UK, the originators of the broad policy model.

The problem is structural. Funding institutions only through enrolments in specific programmes provides no institutional stability. It creates no incentive to invest in equipment, lecturers, or long-term relationships with employers. It treats colleges as if they were competing as private training providers.

When the programmes that attract funded enrolments change – as they do, repeatedly – colleges are left with stranded staff, obsolete equipment, and no financial buffer. And when new funding is made available, for new programmes, they don’t have lecturers who can teach them.

Private institutions tend not to offer manufacturing-related programmes – those are expensive. They focus on business-related programmes, which are cheaper.

Consider the National Technical Education Diploma (Nated) qualifications, the government-funded programmes that colleges have provided for decades. First, they were to be phased out. Then, when the National Development Plan created TVET enrolment targets, colleges were told to expand them. Colleges have built up staffing around them and enrolled students in them.

Now, the Department of Higher Education and Training has instructed colleges to phase them out. What replaces them are “occupational qualifications”.

The occupational qualifications problem

The department defines an occupation as

a set of jobs whose main tasks and duties are characterised by a high degree of similarity (skill specialisation).

The theory behind occupational qualifications is sound: link qualifications to specific occupations, make workplace experience part of the qualification, and graduates will have credentials that employers recognise and value.

The framework has thousands of occupations.

The problem – and here is where our new research (not yet published online) is indicating an uncomfortable finding – is that many of the “occupations” to which these new qualifications are linked do not really exist in workplaces and labour markets. And there is little publicly available information about them.

Some “occupations” have special skills that need special training, and others are really just jobs.

For example, in our research (not yet online) across 53 food and beverage manufacturing plants, we found that there are artisan trades like millwrighting, fitting and turning, and electrical work which fit the idea of an occupation. But machine operators don’t fit that description. Yet machine operators are among the new qualifications to be offered. The employers we visited don’t need those qualifications. They would rather hire someone they can train themselves, to use the equipment in their plant.

Training in a “knowledge module” like “personal mastery and interpersonal relationships” is not specific to the “occupation” of operating a machine.

You cannot create an occupation by developing a qualification for it. It works the other way: the occupation must exist before you create a qualification for it.

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Read more: Jobs of the future: South Africa has major gaps in skills needed to shape the green economy

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This is not an abstract concern. Colleges are now being instructed to gain accreditation to offer these qualifications, to hire staff to teach them, to find workplace placements for students doing them – all on the assumption that there is a real occupational destination at the end.

For artisans, this assumption holds: there are real occupations that translate to opportunities in the workplace. But for the majority of new occupational qualifications being developed, far more analysis is needed.

What institutions actually need

Colleges cannot become strong institutions through enrolment-driven funding alone, any more than a school can become strong by being paid per pupil with no base funding for teachers or classrooms. And calling qualifications “occupational” does not mean that they will lead to work where there is no meaningful occupation in labour markets or workplaces.

Institutions need a stable core – employed lecturers, maintained equipment, administrative capacity – that allows them to function as institutions rather than as collections of projects cobbled together from different funding streams.

Some of them may be better off offering second-chance matric (secondary school leaving certificate) programmes instead of narrowly focused programmes where there are few real opportunities for employment in the surrounding areas, and no way colleges can find work placements for their learners.

Pockets of genuine excellence exist in the current system: colleges with good employer relationships and real employment outcomes for graduates. What they have in common is principled management, experienced staff, and enough stability to build relationships over time. The system should be trying to replicate those conditions.

In my view, what needs to happen is this:

• colleges should be funded with a core institutional grant, and enabled to provide a mix of training that reflects their local economic contexts

• occupational qualifications should be rolled out only where employers need them.

Otherwise the latest reforms risk repeating the errors of the past 30 years. Colleges and young people deserve better than that.

– Reforms to South Africa’s technical colleges keep failing students and employers: why?
– https://theconversation.com/reforms-to-south-africas-technical-colleges-keep-failing-students-and-employers-why-278711

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Ikechukwu (Ike) Nwaka, Assistant Lecturer, Business Economics, University of Alberta

Nigerian women of working age are mostly (90%) self-employed. By comparison, self-employment accounts for less than 16% of employment in high-income countries such as the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom. It is far lower in middle-income countries like South Africa and Turkey too.

Official statistics show that self-employment in Nigeria is concentrated in the northern regions. And there’s a gender difference: women make up the majority of those working for themselves (Figure 1).

What these numbers do not explain is why women are far more likely than men to operate businesses from their homes, or whether those businesses generate meaningful economic returns.

As economists working on labour, gender, energy and development, we addressed these questions in a recent paper.

Using nationally representative household data from 2010 to 2019, the study examines why Nigerian women run enterprises from their homes. These kinds of operations include selling goods from a front room, preparing food at home, or offering haircuts, beauty services, laundry and dry cleaning, and shoe repair. They also make textiles, crafts, garments, shoes and cosmetics at home rather than in shops, kiosks or workshops.

The findings challenge the idea that home-based self-employment is mainly about personal preference or flexibility.

Childcare responsibilities, housing access, electricity and cultural norms strongly shape women’s work location. These insights reveal that supporting women in business must go beyond training or microfinance, and remove structural barriers.

Childcare limits women’s workplaces

We first identified factors associated with operating home-based businesses, using data (2010-2019) from national surveys that follow the same households over time.

We then examined how individual, household and contextual factors shape the likelihood of operating a business from home. We found that childcare was the strongest factor influencing women’s choice of work location.

The presence of young children doesn’t much affect where men work. For women, however, having young children makes it more likely they will run a business from home.

In Nigeria, women shoulder most of the unpaid domestic labour, including childcare, cooking and cleaning. Home-based businesses allow women to earn income while doing that labour.

For many women, home-based work may not be the most attractive option. Rather, the patterns we saw in the data suggest that it’s a way to reconcile income-earning with unpaid domestic responsibilities. Other research into women’s experiences has also shown that working from home may be a necessity rather than a choice.

Why home ownership doesn’t benefit women equally

Homeowners who operate home-based enterprises are better positioned to use property as collateral, access credit, expand workspace, or invest in equipment. They are able to turn housing into productive capital.

However, these advantages are not equally accessible to women.

Only 8.2% of women aged 20-49 are sole owners of land, compared with 34.2% of men, according to World Bank research into gender disparities in property ownership in sub-Saharan Africa.

The Nigerian constitution grants women equal rights to own, inherit and manage property. But many face legal, financial and social barriers that limit their actual control over assets.

Even in owner-occupied households, customary and patriarchal practices can mean that ownership doesn’t translate into decision-making power. Consequently, the same asset generates different economic returns for men and women. It confines women to lower-return home-based activities.

We found that 67% of female homeowners operate home-based enterprises compared with 33% of male owners. Most men who own homes work away from home.

Geography and social norms matter

We found that home-based enterprises are concentrated in poorer regions where returns are low, particularly in northern Nigeria, as shown in figure 2.

Even after accounting for income and education, women in northern Nigeria are far more likely to run businesses from home than women in the south. Cultural and religious norms that restrict women’s mobility and public participation probably play a central role.

This complicates global policy narratives that frame home-based work as inherently empowering. In Nigeria, it often reflects the need to juggle paid work with household obligations under restrictive conditions. These businesses tend to cluster in low-entry sectors, offer limited skill development, and have little growth potential.

Education helps, but only up to a point

Education and household income do expand women’s options, but their effects are limited. Our study shows that better-educated women are less likely than equally educated men to remain in home-based businesses when alternatives are available.

As household income rises, women are also less likely to operate enterprises from home. Importantly, observable characteristics do not explain the full gender gap. The study finds that less than half of the difference in home-based self-employment can be attributed to education, household size, marital status and housing. The rest likely reflects deeper structural forces that shape outcomes differently for men and women. These are forces like social norms, unequal access to finance, gendered returns to assets, and expectations around unpaid care work.

What this means for policy

Promoting home-based self-employment as a route to women’s economic empowerment can be misleading. When women are pushed into home-based enterprises because childcare is expensive, institutions and property rights are weak, or finance is inaccessible, entrepreneurship becomes a response to constraint, not opportunity.

Policies that reduce childcare costs, strengthen women’s property and inheritance rights, and improve access to credit are likely to do more to expand women’s choices than entrepreneurship programmes alone.

Digital infrastructure can help some home-based businesses reach wider markets, but only if deeper barriers are addressed. And because constraints vary across regions, one-size-fits-all solutions are unlikely to work.

More than flexibility

Home-based self-employment in Nigeria reflects deeply gendered expectations about work and care. Many women work from home not to assert independence, but because they have limited options.

Recognising this distinction matters. Celebrating women’s “flexibility” without addressing the constraints behind it risks turning resilience into a permanent requirement. A more equal future is one in which women can choose where and how they work, rather than adjusting their livelihoods around structural barriers.

– Working from home in Nigeria: study finds women don’t have much choice
– https://theconversation.com/working-from-home-in-nigeria-study-finds-women-dont-have-much-choice-274792

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Norman Sempijja, Associate professor, Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique

Mali has been in a state of political turmoil since 2012. That year saw a military coup as well as armed groups taking over northern regions of the west African country. In the intervening years, efforts at establishing transitional governments have failed, culminating in the military junta dissolving and banning all political parties in May 2025.

In addition, the country has seen waves of military interventions by outside players like France, the US and most recently Russia. All have invested heavily in trying to contain the extremist threat in Mali.

But groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have continued to expand their influence. And in late April 2026 the military government found itself having to fend off coordinated attacks from separatists and jihadists across the country. The defence minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed.

Foreign interventions over the past decade have often misunderstood what was happening on the ground. Extremist groups have capitalised on issues such as land disputes, corruption, and resource competition to gain legitimacy, often aligning with the community’s tensions. The weakness of state institutions and security forces has allowed groups such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) to consolidate power.

These groups have adapted by forming alliances and tailoring their narratives to local grievances, prioritising immediate issues over ideological objectives.

We are political scientists who have researched the security situation in Mali and the Sahel. Our recently published paper showed that non-state armed groups in the Sahel, particularly in Mali, have emerged as key power brokers, shaping local governance by filling gaps left by weak state institutions.

While external actors such as France, the US and Russia have prioritised counter-terrorism and state-building, they often overlook the governance functions of non-state armed groups. These groups often provide essential services and gain local legitimacy.

Recognising the role of armed groups as local power holders does not mean accepting or legitimising their actions. However, ignoring this reality has led to policies that miss the mark. When interventions focus only on military solutions, they risk misunderstanding why people interact with these groups in the first place.

Our findings challenge conventional interventions that focus solely on defeating non-state armed groups or reinstating centralised state control. We argue that security solutions alone are insufficient. We advocate for a more nuanced approach that integrates the potential for non-state armed groups when it comes to governance, legitimacy and local agency. Non-state armed groups have provided governance over territories in countries like Colombia, Syria and South Sudan, among others.

Armed groups as de facto authorities

Armed groups in Mali are not just fighting forces. In many parts of the country, they play a more complex role. It is difficult to estimate the exact number of groups operating within Mali. The largest and best known, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, is a coalition of five organisations and claims to have over 10,000 fighters in the country.

In central and northern Mali, bordering Algeria, the state is often distant, absent or mistrusted. Armed groups step into this vacuum. They settle disputes, enforce rules, collect taxes, and sometimes provide a basic sense of order.

For communities living with daily insecurity, these functions are not abstract; they shape everyday life.

Our study established that this does not necessarily mean the population agrees with these groups or supports their ideology. Many do not. However, when there are few alternatives, people adapt. They follow the rules because they need to survive, not because they believe in them.

This distinction is important. This helps explain why these groups are so difficult to dislodge. Their strength does not come only from weapons but also from how deeply they are embedded in local realities.

Why military strategies fall short

International efforts have largely focused on fighting these groups and rebuilding the authority of the Malian state. Although well intentioned, these kinds of interventions often overlook something essential: what happens to the spaces these groups leave behind?

An example is France’s 2013 intervention. The French army helped the Malian army to regain control of the northern part of the country from advancing Islamists during Operation Serval. The aim was to stop extremist forces from advancing to Bamako. This did not end the conflict. Many fighters moved to rural areas where the state had little presence and built ties with local communities.

In central Mali, where cattle farming is a key source of income, this dynamic contributed to the spread of violence between Fulani and Dogon communities, reinforcing grievances exploited by extremist groups.

Simultaneously, attempts to strengthen state institutions have struggled. In some places, security forces are seen as ineffective and even abusive.

Faced with this reality, people often turn to whoever can offer some level of predictability and protection, even if that actor is an armed group.

External involvement has also become increasingly fragmented. France’s withdrawal, rising anti-western sentiment, and the arrival of Russian-linked forces have created a crowded and sometimes conflicting intervention landscape.

Different actors bring different agendas, and their presence does not always translate into greater security. In some cases, it can even worsen things by reinforcing tensions or weakening trust in already fragile institutions.

Caught in the middle, civilians make difficult choices daily. Their decisions are rarely ideological but rather about survival.

Rethinking the response

We conclude from our findings that a more grounded approach would begin by listening to local realities. It would address the gaps that allow armed groups to take root. This means improving access to justice and security, supporting local institutions, and taking grievances seriously. It also means recognising that legitimacy is built from the ground up, not imposed from above.

Mali’s experience shows that there are clear limits to what military force can achieve on its own. As long as interventions overlook the everyday realities of governance and survival, they are unlikely to bring about lasting change. Until that shift happens, armed groups will remain hard to dislodge, not only because they can fight but also because, in many places, they have become part of how life is organised.

– Mali’s armed groups fill a government vacuum – addressing this is key to ending the violence
– https://theconversation.com/malis-armed-groups-fill-a-government-vacuum-addressing-this-is-key-to-ending-the-violence-281648