Category: The Conversation

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Frank Quansah, Senior Lecturer, Educational Assessment, Measurement and Evaluation, University of Education, Winneba

Across Africa, countries are redesigning school curricula to prepare children for the demands of the 21st century. These reforms aim to nurture creativity, critical thinking, collaboration and problem-solving rather than rote memorisation in schools. Kenya, Rwanda, South Africa and Zambia have made changes, and Ghana is part of the movement too.

In 2019, Ghana introduced a new curriculum for basic schools that strongly promotes learner-centred teaching. The idea is simple: instead of teachers dominating classroom instruction through lectures and note-taking, learners are expected to take a more active part through discussions, group work, inquiry and practical learning activities.

But changing classroom practices is not as simple as introducing a new curriculum.

Existing research in Ghana and other African countries shows that schools continue to struggle with overcrowded classrooms, limited teaching materials and examination systems that still reward memorisation rather than critical thinking and creativity.

In our previous work on educational assessment, we also found that examination pressures can discourage the development of critical thinking and practical problem-solving skills promoted under Ghana’s new curriculum. The pressures can make it seem more practical and effective to give the teacher more control.

As education researchers, we wanted to understand whether teachers themselves believed in the value of learner-centred teaching. Our newly published study examined teachers’ beliefs about it. These beliefs matter because they are likely to influence how curriculum reforms are applied in classrooms.

Teachers support reform, but with reservations

In our study, we surveyed 282 basic school teachers in Ghana and examined their beliefs about the new approach. Most of the participants were professionally trained teachers (83%), and nearly 80% had 10 years or less of teaching experience. About 90% had received training on Ghana’s new curriculum. We used a statistical method called latent profile analysis to examine patterns in what they said.

The findings revealed two distinct groups of teachers.

The first group strongly embraced learner-centred teaching. These teachers believed learners should actively participate in lessons, collaborate with others and take some responsibility for their own learning. They were more likely to support flexible and interactive classroom environments.

But this group was the minority (74 teachers, 26.2%).

Most teachers fell into a second category that we described as “conditional learner-centred believers”. These teachers support student-led learning, but still believe the teacher must be the main authority figure in the classroom.

In other words, many teachers had one foot in the new and another in the old. They supported modern ideas about active learning while still believing that effective teaching depends heavily on teacher authority, structured instruction and delivering content directly.

This tension matters because research shows that teacher beliefs shape classroom practice. Teachers do not simply carry out curriculum reforms exactly as policymakers design them. They interpret reforms through their own experiences, professional training and classroom realities. And these interpretations, or beliefs, influence the way they teach.

Why reforms falter inside classrooms

Teachers’ hesitation arises from the realities they face in many schools in Ghana. These include overcrowded classrooms, limited teaching materials, insufficient instructional time and pressure to prepare learners for examinations that still reward memorisation.

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Read more: What’s stopping kids from learning useful skills? Short answer: exams

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Under those conditions, learner-centred teaching can be difficult to apply consistently. A teacher responsible for large classes may rely more on lecture-style teaching to maintain order and complete the syllabus, even when they value learner-centred education.

This challenge is not unique to Ghana. Many countries across eastern and southern Africa implementing competency-based or learner-centred curricula face similar gaps between reform ambitions and classroom realities.

Experience shapes beliefs

Our study also found that teaching experience mattered.

Teachers with more years of experience were less likely to hold a strong belief in learner-centred methods. One possible explanation is that they were trained under older education systems that put teachers at the centre.

Less experienced teachers, by contrast, are more likely to have received the training introduced in 2018 to align with the curriculum reforms.

In addition, experienced teachers have spent years working within traditional classroom systems and examination-driven school cultures. As a result, shifting towards newer instructional methods may not be easy, particularly in school environments where classroom conditions and assessment practices still favour the older ways.

Teacher training could determine reform success

In Ghana, workshops and professional learning activities are often encouraged as part of curriculum implementation, although participation levels vary across schools and teachers. Our findings show that teachers who attended more professional development programmes per year were about 30% more likely to support learner-centred teaching.

Instead of mainly giving instructions and explanations, teachers are now expected to guide discussions, encourage participation and support problem-solving activities. This shift requires continuous training and support.

Teacher support matters

Although the study involved only 282 teachers from one municipality in Ghana, the findings offer important insights into the challenges facing curriculum reform.

Education reforms often struggle in practice, as seen across several eastern and southern African countries, because too much attention is placed on curriculum design and too little on the realities teachers face every day. If governments want learner-centred education to work in practice, teachers need continuous professional support, better classroom resources and assessment systems that align with the goals of the new curriculum. Reducing overcrowded classrooms and improving access to teaching and learning materials may also make it easier for teachers to apply learner-centred methods consistently.

Professional development should move beyond one-time workshops, usually held during curriculum rollout. Teachers need regular opportunities to learn, practise and reflect on newer approaches within their everyday classroom realities.

– Ghana wants learner-centred classrooms – but many teachers still favour old methods
– https://theconversation.com/ghana-wants-learner-centred-classrooms-but-many-teachers-still-favour-old-methods-283010

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Christian Hamann, Researcher, Gauteng City-Region Observatory

Digital technologies create great opportunities, but the transformation they offer isn’t equally within reach of everyone. Access is determined by a vast digital divide.

The digital divide refers to the gap between individuals and households who have access to the internet, and those who do not. The digital divide can restrict education attainment, economic opportunity, the ability to adapt to rapidly changing employment environments, healthcare access, social inclusion, and overall quality of life.

While digital technology will bring about many environmental, social and economic gains, the pathway to South Africa’s digital future is not without challenges. The country needs to make the benefits inclusive and equitable.

As a researcher at the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (GCRO), I analyse urban development with the aim of providing evidence for policies. I recently explored Gauteng’s digital divide to understand how it might shape inequalities in the future. I asked whether residents of Gauteng – South Africa’s most populous province and a regional economic power house – have equal access to opportunities in our digital futures.

My findings show that there’s a marked digital divide in Gauteng. It is spatially concentrated and characterised by social inequality in terms of race and household income.

These findings matter because digitalisation and digital transformation are increasingly affecting the shape of the economy and society. Not having access reduces opportunities. Maximising the benefits of digital futures depends on reliable and affordable connections to the internet for everyone.

The measuring

South Africa’s digital divide is a function of extreme social inequality. Many residents still lack the financial means to access the internet, or live in areas with poor internet connectivity. Large parts of our society are unable to participate in digitisation and digital transformation and benefit from it.

I used Quality of Life Survey 7 (2023/24) data to explore how access to home internet varies in Gauteng. This survey series is one of the largest and longest-running social surveys in South Africa. It collects information from adult respondents in Gauteng to measure quality of life and understand the successes and challenges of the province.

The 13,795 survey respondents were asked whether their household had access to a selection of things that were in good working order. The list included things like a microwave oven or air fryer; a smartphone; a television; a personal computer, laptop or tablet; a car; fibre-based home internet; or other home internet connection.

In this analysis, I focused on the last two assets. Does a household have access to a fibre-based home internet connection or access to another home internet connection (Wi-Fi, home-based 5G, LTE connection or any other internet connection that is used in the household)?

Connectivity

Among all the survey respondents, 46% lived in households with home internet connections. The remaining 54% of respondents lived in households without any home internet connection.

The research also showed that 85% of respondents lived in households with a working smartphone. This means that most households had other means to access the internet from home. This can be through mobile networks or access to municipal Wi-Fi networks. However, mobile data is expensive and smartphones are somewhat limited when it comes to remote work or online learning.

A home internet connection is also very important for survey respondents with access to a resource like a laptop. About 39% of survey respondents live in a household with a personal computer, laptop or tablet, but 25% of these respondents do not have access to home internet. This reduces the potential value of having a laptop because the laptop cannot be connected to home internet in order to do remote work, pursue online qualifications, or just get useful information.

Spatial divide

Drilling further into the survey results shows that access to home internet is uneven across wards in Gauteng. In suburban areas like Centurion, Midrand and Randburg, more than 80% of households have home internet. Suburbs in South Africa are low density residential areas where households typically have above average incomes.

In low-income communities like Hammanskraal, Soweto and Katlehong, there are many wards where only 40% of households have home internet. Similarly, in parts of Mamelodi, Sebokeng and Daveyton, less than 20% of households in a ward have access to home internet.

The spatial patterns are substantially influenced by infrastructure and service coverage (5G and LTE coverage), the infrastructure rollout plans of fibre installers, and household income.

For example, fibre infrastructure rollout is driven by the private sector and requires space on the road verge. This means that rollout is focused on areas where there is guaranteed demand and where it is practically feasible to install fibre lines on road verges.

Why it’s important

The digital divide is deeply associated with socio-economic inequality.

Only 39% of black African respondents lived in households with home internet, compared to 87% of Indian/Asian respondents and 86% of white respondents.

Access to fibre-based home internet is further skewed. Only 18% of black African respondents lived in households with fibre-based home internet, compared to 74% of Indian/Asian respondents and 70% of white respondents.

Similar differences were visible between households with lower or higher income. Only 20% of households in the lowest monthly income bracket had home internet, compared to more than 80% of households in the top monthly income brackets. Once again, access to fibre home internet was even further skewed.

Only 5% of households in the lowest monthly income bracket benefit from having fibre, compared to more than 60% of households in the top monthly income brackets.

What should be done?

The digital divide needs to be narrowed if Gauteng is to follow a path of inclusive growth. This analysis can enable policymakers and community leaders to make strategic decisions about inclusive digital futures.

The results also show that closing the digital divide will require partnerships between the private and public sectors.

– Internet access is unequal in South Africa’s economic powerhouse: survey shows race and income mark the digital divide
– https://theconversation.com/internet-access-is-unequal-in-south-africas-economic-powerhouse-survey-shows-race-and-income-mark-the-digital-divide-282424

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Jonathan Munemo, Professor of Economics, Salisbury University

“Today, everyone recognises that trade is as much a security issue as an economic one.”

European Central Bank president Christine Lagarde made this comment in February 2026, while addressing the Munich Security Conference.

Although she was speaking about Europe, her words matter profoundly for Africa.

The continent’s 54 economies face a three-way tension that has no easy resolution.

Firstly, they must stay integrated enough with the world economy to grow. Secondly, they must pull back enough to protect themselves economically against the deliberate weaponisation of external dependencies. Weaponised interdependence is the use of a country’s position within global economic and technological networks as a tool of political influence or coercion against other countries. And thirdly they must remain open enough to diversify beyond commodities – which account for more than 60% of total merchandise exports in 45 African countries – if they are to build lasting prosperity and reduce their vulnerability to commodity price shocks.

As an economist who studies African trade and development, I don’t believe the answer to weaponised interdependence is retreating from the global economy. The real challenge for Africa is navigating this tension between interdependence, economic security, and diversification rather than simply choosing one objective and abandoning the rest. This will be one of the continent’s most important policy tests in the years ahead.

How interdependence became a weapon

To see why this tension is so difficult to navigate, it helps to understand what has changed. When the world economy was governed by shared rules and norms from the 1990s to the 2010s, deeper economic integration had some benefits. Countries that plugged into global supply chains and attracted foreign capital grew faster. Interdependence was an asset.

That is no longer the case. We have entered a new era that is being shaped by the deliberate use of chokepoints – economic and geographic areas that underpin the interdependent global economy – as instruments of coercion. In 2025, China imposed sweeping export controls on rare-earth elements, inflicting pain on importing countries deeply integrated with its mineral supply chains. The United States has repeatedly deployed the dollar and advanced semiconductor technology as weapons against adversaries.

The consequences can be sudden and severe. In early 2026, Iran disrupted tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz – the world’s most important geographic chokepoint, carrying roughly 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas on any given day, with no alternative routes.

African countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda – each sourcing more than half their petroleum imports from the Middle East – faced an immediate and unexpected surge in energy costs. Their fiscal positions were ill-equipped to absorb it.

Fertilizer and food prices followed. Financial markets roiled and remittances from diaspora workers in the Gulf region to highly dependent economies such as the Comoros, Gambia, Lesotho and Liberia fell sharply.

The timing was particularly painful. Africa had just achieved its fastest growth in a decade – 4.5% in 2025, according to the IMF. The World Bank has revised this down to projected regional growth of 4.1% in 2026.

Today, the world that made integration so attractive is now vulnerable to deliberate weaponisation by external actors pursuing geopolitical objectives.

The three-way tension, unpacked

The tempting response to weaponised interdependence is to reduce it. Yet history shows that retreating from economic integration can be costly. The protectionist wave of the 1930s – when countries raised trade barriers and turned inward – contributed to the collapse of global trade and deepened the Great Depression.

Integration is not merely a risk. It is a source of the prosperity that makes resilience worth building in the first place.

The World Bank projects that non-resource-rich African countries will have per capita incomes nearly 20% above their 2014 levels by 2026. Abandoning engagement to reduce vulnerability would mean sacrificing the growth needed for long term stability and economic security.

Worse, if African countries attempt to reduce their vulnerability independently, their exits from shared global markets lower the value of these markets for those who remain. That encourages further exits, in a self-reinforcing spiral. This dynamic is already playing out in other countries. US “Buy American” policies have prompted the EU to advance similar “Buy European” measures. Economists call this the “fragmentation doom loop”.

In addition, building alternative supply chains domestically is costly for exiting countries. Replacing established international production networks requires significant investment and can raise costs for businesses and consumers. The IMF has warned fragmentation would reduce incomes and everyone ends up worse off.

Diversification and economic security also pull against each other. Economic diversification would involve shifting African economies away from commodity extraction towards a broader private sector, and spreading trade relationships across multiple partners. It is essential both for long-term prosperity and for reducing exposure to commodity price shocks.

For example, Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire, which diversified away from commodity dependence, are projected to have per capita incomes more than 45% above their 2014 levels by 2026.

By contrast, Angola and the Republic of Congo, which remained heavily dependent on oil exports, are projected to have per capita incomes more than 25% below their 2014 levels. They have still not recovered a decade after oil prices collapsed.

Natural resources alone generate around 62% of Africa’s GDP, according to the African Development Bank. Moving beyond that concentration requires both diversification and deeper integration which provides access to foreign investment, technology transfer and larger markets.

But deeper integration is precisely what creates the vulnerabilities that great powers have learned to exploit. The US-China rivalry and the Iran crisis have made this plain. The goal of diversification cannot be pursued without the openness that creates security risks. This is a genuine structural tension that policy must navigate.

Strategies for managing the three-way tension

The resolution of these tensions does not lie in choosing one objective and abandoning the others. Three strategies, pursued in combination, can advance all three goals at once.

Pursue security collectively, not unilaterally. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is the continent’s most important instrument for avoiding the fragmentation doom loop. An integrated continental market of 1.4 billion people:

• creates the scale needed to attract diversified foreign investment

• gives African countries the collective bargaining power to negotiate with great powers from a position of greater strength

• enables the development of intra-African supply chains that reduce dependence on external actors, without sacrificing the gains of integration.

In the current environment, the AfCFTA is no longer primarily a trade liberalisation project. It is a security strategy.

Make partner diversification targeted. Not all trade relationships carry equal risk. The goal is to engage more strategically in the global economy by expanding trade and investment ties across a broader range of partners, particularly in sectors where multiple suppliers and markets exist. This reduces dependence on any single country and limits the ability of one partner to use economic ties as a source of leverage.

Build indispensability in critical supply chains. The most durable form of economic security is not reducing dependence on others – it is ensuring that others depend on you. Africa holds genuine chokepoint positions in several minerals critical to clean energy technology. Here are some examples.

The Democratic Republic of Congo accounts for roughly 65% of global cobalt production. South Africa dominates platinum-group metals. Guinea holds the world’s largest bauxite reserves. Zambia is a major copper producer and Zimbabwe is one of the world’s largest lithium producers.

The indispensability strategy means building on this: processing cobalt in the DRC rather than exporting raw ore, developing platinum beneficiation in South Africa, and building battery supply chain infrastructure around existing mineral wealth.

Done well, this simultaneously advances diversification (moving up the value chain, away from raw commodity exports), strengthens security (creating dependencies that deter coercion), and deepens integration on Africa’s own terms.

The Hormuz disruption of early 2026 was a warning. It demonstrated that the vulnerabilities created by decades of open integration are real, that external actors are willing to exploit them, and that the consequences for African economies can be swift and severe. But the answer is not withdrawal. Africa’s growth story has been built, in part, on engagement with the world economy. The task is to make that engagement more resilient.

– When global trade becomes a weapon, how can African economies protect themselves?
– https://theconversation.com/when-global-trade-becomes-a-weapon-how-can-african-economies-protect-themselves-284321

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Mulumba M Agaba, Researcher, University of Liverpool

Uganda’s environmental impact assessment system is meant to protect the environment from harmful development projects. For nearly 30 years, the law has required developers applying for approval to consider alternatives to their proposed projects, such as different sites, designs, technologies or even whether the project should go ahead at all. This is intended to make sure that the least environmentally damaging option is chosen. Biodiversity and environmental impact assessment researcher Mulumba M. Agaba examined 108 environmental impact statements submitted between 2001 and 2023 to assess whether developers were complying with this requirement.

Why aren’t developers allowed to propose only one option?

Environmental impact assessments globally are used to evaluate the environmental consequences of major projects before they are approved. They give decision-makers clear information about the likely impact of the project on the environment, and about whether less damaging options are available. In Uganda, assessors must be certified by the National Environment Management Authority. However, they are usually hired and paid by the project developer.

The main aim in project planning is to first avoid harming the environment. If that’s not possible, developers need to reduce the damage they do. The last option – repairing damage and paying compensation – should only happen when there is no better option.

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Read more: Environmental impact assessments don’t work in Nigeria: here’s why

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The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework and the Convention on Biological Diversity stress that it’s best to avoid environmental damage rather than managing it later.

For this reason, it’s international best practice for developers to come up with alternatives to their planned projects. Considering more environmentally friendly alternatives is an important step in constructing new projects and is meant to shape decisions before projects are locked in.

What’s wrong with the system?

We examined 108 environmental impact assessment reports to see whether developers had properly considered different project options. We also interviewed 18 environmental assessment practitioners about how alternatives are chosen, whether environmental concerns are taken seriously, and why these assessments so often fail to change the final decision on projects.

Our findings are concerning.

Developers routinely include other project options in environmental impact assessment reports, but the study found these were often given only limited attention. The alternatives were usually described briefly, with little evidence-based comparison. In many cases, the reports did not explain why one option would be better for the environment than another. The researchers concluded that alternatives rarely appear to shape the final decision on which projects are approved.

Second, biodiversity gets very little attention in these assessments. Even where different options are considered, they are usually judged mainly on cost or whether they are technically possible, while environmental impacts are treated as less important or ignored. For example, different options were not compared based on their likely impact on habitats, species, ecosystem services, protected areas and other environmentally sensitive areas.

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Read more: Uganda’s Batwa community are vulnerable to climate change, but aren’t involved in adaptation decisions

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Sectors vary in how clearly reports set out different options, how carefully they compare them, and whether they consider biodiversity when explaining a choice. Projects in sectors that face strong outside scrutiny, such as oil and gas, tend to do this better. Manufacturing and urban development projects tend to do this poorly.

There has been little improvement over time. Uganda’s National Environment Act was passed in 2019, and emphasises that the first priority is to cause no damage to the environment. But in the assessments that followed, there was no clear evidence that biodiversity was being better integrated into decision-making.

Which alternatives get attention, and which are ignored?

Our research found that most environmental impact assessments describe what might happen if the project does not go ahead, but they focus on how the economy will lose out rather than on how the environment will gain.

Technology and design alternatives are sometimes considered, but rarely in depth. Moving a development to a different location is often not explored at all.

The areas where projects could most reduce harm to the environment are the ones that get the least attention. For example, we found that developers rarely compare whether a different way of building or running a project would cause less environmental damage. They rarely consider changing timing or building methods.

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Read more: Kenya’s huge railway project is causing environmental damage. Here’s how

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Environmental impact statements usually stick to one chosen approach, and then add mitigation measures afterwards, rather than properly testing whether other approaches might be better for nature from the start.

There is a clear pattern. Alternatives that could genuinely reduce environmental harm are the least explored.

What can be done to change this?

Our research developed a Biodiversity Inclusion Index to assess whether 108 environmental impact reports properly considered alternative options and their effects on species, habitats and entire ecosystems.

The index examines whether biodiversity was properly considered when different project options were compared. It looks at whether the assessment explained how different choices could avoid or reduce harm to species, habitats and ecosystems.

The results are stark. The average score was just 0.33. This indicates weak and inconsistent integration of biodiversity across most projects. A good score would be 1 – meaning that biodiversity is clearly included in how alternatives are identified and justified.

Only a small number of projects performed well. These are typically projects with international financing or higher regulatory scrutiny.

Why does this matter?

Once a project’s location, design, phasing and technology are fixed, environmental damage can only be fixed later. In other words, the focus shifts to mitigation. At that point, the best ways to protect the environment are already off the table.

This is not the way to protect Uganda’s biodiversity. Choosing a different site, adjusting a development’s layout, or changing when it is built can prevent irreversible damage. These decisions must happen before the development gets started because they determine whether ecosystems are protected or lost.

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Read more: Wild animals leave DNA on plants, making them easier to track – here’s what scientists found in a Ugandan rainforest

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Our research found that many Ugandan developments give the appearance of complying with environmental laws. But actually, they are locking in avoidable biodiversity loss.

The Biodiversity Inclusion Index offers a practical way to check whether alternatives analysis is genuinely considering biodiversity. It could be adapted by developers, regulators and reviewers to improve how project options are compared before decisions are locked in.

Environmental impact assessors can use this index to improve the quality of their assessments. Policymakers can use our research to find ways of better enforcing environmental protection.

– Are Uganda’s environmental impact reports just a box-ticking exercise? What a study of 108 projects reveals
– https://theconversation.com/are-ugandas-environmental-impact-reports-just-a-box-ticking-exercise-what-a-study-of-108-projects-reveals-281936

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Brandon Marc Finn, Research Scientist at the School for Environment and Sustainability, University of Michigan

Agbogbloshie, in Ghana’s capital city, Accra, is a sprawling, open-air scrapyard located next to a lagoon and a growing informal settlement. Roughly 6,000 people dismantle, recycle and burn old and broken electronics there.

The world produces approximately 62 million tonnes of electronic or e-waste every year. The Agbogbloshie site is one of the world’s biggest.

E-waste is old, broken and thrown away electronic devices with cords or batteries, such as cellphones, household appliances, and televisions. Over 80% is dumped in landfills or processed informally by workers who have no health and safety protections, operating largely without government oversight, support, or occupational safety.

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Read more: Why Nigeria needs to manage electronic waste better

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Much of the world’s e-waste is shipped to countries like Ghana in west Africa where copper and aluminium are extracted, and batteries containing lithium and cobalt are recycled. The old electronics are burned out in the open to extract the minerals. Uncontrolled acid leaching is also used.

The exact value of the minerals fed back into the global supply chain is unknown. However, we do know that informal workers are shortchanged. This is because exporters buy recycled minerals like copper at prices well below international market rates.

Continually recycling and reusing goods, instead of throwing them away, is a core part of the “circular economy” concept. It is supposed to promote sustainability and help address climate change.

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Read more: Toxic waste dumping in the Gulf of Guinea amounts to environmental racism

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But as researchers who study informal economies and how materials move through global supply chains, my colleagues Patrick Cobbinah, Dimitrios Gounaridis and I recently found that the reality behind these supposedly “sustainable” supply chains in Agbogbloshie’s e-waste sites is very different.

We found that informal recycling provides an income for workers which is often relatively better than other available work. But the side effects of burning plastic and metal or using acid to extract minerals from the e-waste are devastating to human health and the natural environment.

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Read more: How potential of massive e-waste dump in Ghana can be harnessed

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The situation in Agbogbloshie is part of a global injustice. Wealthy countries enjoy the benefits of recycled materials like copper and aluminium, while some of the world’s most vulnerable people are forced to compromise their own health and environments to sustain these supply chains.

Rather than turn away from people living in informal settlements and working in the informal economy, community engagement should influence government policy to improve their working conditions. Supportive infrastructure must be developed at the e-waste site and in the informal settlement. Equally importantly, international regulatory bodies and policy makers from exporting and importing countries must better govern the flows of e-waste. It’s too easily dumped in countries like Ghana with little to no recourse.

Where earning a living means breathing toxic air

The men and women working in and supporting the informal e-waste economy in Agbogbloshie are navigating what we call the “informal paradox”. This is where workers have to expose themselves and their communities to toxic pollution in order to get short term livelihood gains. The informal paradox shows that the immediate need to survive replaces the need to avoid chronic threats to human and environmental health.

For example, open burning of electronics has, in part, led to extreme exposure to particulate matter 2.5 (millions of tiny particles of polluting matter such as dust, dirt, soot, or smoke that are released by burning).

The e-waste workers in Agbogbloshie breathe this in at concentrations five times higher than the World Health Organization’s safety standards. This increases the risk of heart attacks, cancer, nervous system damage and other diseases.

The toxic dust also spreads out across nearby informal settlements and the entire city of Accra. Agbogbloshie’s soil and water are also highly contaminated with these and other heavy metals. The effects spill over to the nearby produce market and lagoon.

What 20 years of satellite data revealed about pollution and survival

To understand how serious and complicated this problem has become, we studied 20 years of satellite data and interviewed 55 community members and city experts in Accra.

Our research found that between 2000 and 2020, air pollution and particulate matter 2.5 increased dramatically around Agbogbloshie. The number of people in nearby informal or shack settlements steadily increased during that time, so more people breathed in the toxic soot.

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Read more: Humans generate 62 million tonnes of e-waste each year. Here’s what happens when it’s recycled

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People migrate from rural areas to Agbogbloshie to escape famine, conflict, and worsening farming conditions linked to climate change. For many, processing and recycling e-waste is the only way to earn a living.

The e-waste workers told us they are aware of the dangers they face. As one said:

The hunter does not fear guns, the same way we don’t fear the weapon we work with.

Informal work is the global norm, not the exception

A huge 61% of the world’s workforce is employed informally. This means that working informally is not something that only people on the margins of society experience. It is global and commonplace.

Therefore, new ways to include informal work in the world’s development and supply chains are needed. These must be based on working with, not against, the people who have the least access to services and opportunities.

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Read more: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa: how they stack up on reusing waste

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Guaranteeing basic human and labour rights must be a non-negotiable foundation of the global circular economy. There are also very real economic opportunities in improving working conditions in the e-waste sector. Global e-waste stocks are estimated to be worth US$65 billion. Yet many e-waste workers earn less than US$1.25 a day.

If responsibly managed in the interests of local communities, recycling could lift thousands of people out of poverty and contribute to an actually sustainable circular economy.

What to do about it

Ghana has ratified both international conventions that regulate e-waste. The country also passed a law to manage e-waste in 2016.

But government intervention remains very weak and sometimes even actively harmful. The government has carried out hostile evictions and housing demolitions to remove people from the dumpsite. These have not reduced e-waste recycling though, and have only made workers’ lives more precarious.

To properly address these problems, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly must end home demolitions and evictions in Agbogbloshie’s informal settlements.

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Read more: A rising tide of e-waste, made worse by AI, threatens our health, the environment and the economy

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Instead, the government should invest in and strengthen the ways residents are already working together to share resources and improve their neighbourhoods. One way to do this is by providing safer equipment, such as mechanised wire-stripping machines to stop the burning as well as protective gear. Local government in Accra could also ensure that e-waste workers earn fair wages in return for using safer, more environmentally friendly methods.

Second, transparency at the point of e-waste sale is essential. New regulations are needed to compel large-scale scrap dealers to officially record the weight of the material they buy, and ensure they pay a publicly accessible market rate.

Third, working with the e-waste workers and community members to set up reliable, clean water sources, limit burning, and reduce the use of acid in e-waste recycling is also critical.

These steps require a transformation in the ways people think about and support those who live and work in informal economies and settlements. This process begins with treating people with the respect and dignity they and their work deserve.

– Poison or poverty: the impossible economic choices facing Ghana’s e-waste workers
– https://theconversation.com/poison-or-poverty-the-impossible-economic-choices-facing-ghanas-e-waste-workers-281479

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Caradee Yael Wright, Chief Specialist Scientist (Public Health), South African Medical Research Council

Climate change is making southern Africa hotter. While much attention has focused on climate impacts like droughts, floods and food insecurity, another crisis is unfolding quietly inside classrooms. Research has shown that some schools are becoming dangerously hot places for children to develop, learn and play.

Hot classrooms can affect concentration, memory, behaviour and academic success. Extreme heat also increases risks to children’s physical and mental health, especially in schools with poor ventilation, overcrowded classrooms and limited access to drinking water.

For many children, especially those in poor communities, school may now be one of the hottest places to spend their day. This is a serious but under-recognised education and public health issue.

Our research as environmental health scientists at the South African Medical Research Council highlights how rising temperatures are affecting daily life and well-being. Multiple studies support this.

Together with the University of Johannesburg, we’ve studied classroom thermal conditions and possible impacts on children’s health in Gauteng province – more than half of the temperature and humidity readings called for caution or extreme caution. Another of our studies, led by University of Johannesburg environmental health researcher Shalin Bidassey-Manilal, measured classroom temperatures in Johannesburg and found that almost all the children reported low concentration levels. One of our studies traced relationships between classroom temperature and absenteeism, which increased at temperatures over 25°C.

Yet, school buildings and playgrounds are not often designed or adapted for protecting children against extreme heat.

Home isn’t always safer either: we’ve shown that families living in government-built low-cost and informally constructed homes are the most at risk for indoor temperature extremes.

Our most recent study has shown that the impacts differ between rural and urban schools too. For example, one of our findings was that urban classrooms were better at keeping the temperature at a comfortable 25°C-28°C compared to rural classrooms. Differences like this deepen educational and health inequalities.

For many people, climate change still feels like a future problem. But for children sitting in overheated classrooms, it is already affecting their ability to learn, thrive and stay healthy. Education systems across southern Africa must better prepare for a hotter future.

Heat affects how children learn

The human brain works best within a relatively narrow temperature range. When classrooms become too hot, children may struggle to concentrate, process information and retain knowledge.

International studies have linked hotter classroom conditions to poorer test scores, reduced attention spans and lower productivity. Teachers may also experience fatigue, headaches and a reduced ability to teach effectively.

Young children are especially vulnerable because their bodies do not regulate heat as efficiently as adults. Children can also become dehydrated more quickly.

In many southern African schools, temperatures inside classrooms may be even higher than outdoor temperatures because of metal roofs, poor insulation, overcrowding and lack of airflow. Some classrooms effectively become heat traps. This problem is likely to worsen as climate change increases the frequency and intensity of heatwaves.

Poorer communities face the greatest risks

The impact of heat is not experienced equally.

We compared schools in urban and rural areas of South Africa (the city of Tshwane and rural Giyani). Among our key findings were that:

• the maximum daily average temperature in the urban school was 32°C; in rural schools it was as high as 42°C

• indoor temperatures and humidity levels at rural schools were more variable than those in urban classrooms

• fan cooling was effective in the city but not in rural classrooms

• broken or missing ceilings in rural schools made the rooms hotter

• urban classrooms were better at keeping the temperature at a comfortable 25°C-28°C compared to rural classrooms.

Some learners spend hours in classrooms made from corrugated metal or prefabricated materials that absorb and retain heat. Others walk long distances to school in extreme temperatures. Water shortages create additional risks. Without access to safe drinking water, children may become dehydrated during the school day.

The increase in temperatures due to climate change therefore risks deepening educational inequality across the region.

Heat is also a health issue

Extreme heat affects more than academic performance. Children exposed to high temperatures may experience headaches, dizziness, exhaustion and heat stress. Learners with asthma or other chronic conditions may face additional health risks, especially where heat combines with poor air quality. Sleep disruption during hot nights can further affect children’s concentration, mood and school attendance.

Teachers are also affected. High temperatures may contribute to fatigue, stress and reduced workplace wellbeing, particularly during prolonged heatwaves.

Despite these risks, many schools have no heat-health plans or guidance on how to protect learners and staff during extreme heat events. The National Heat Health Action Guidelines call for schools to consider heat in their planning.

Schools need to adapt to a hotter future

The good news is that many solutions are practical and achievable. Schools can reduce heat exposure through better building design, improved ventilation, shade trees, cool roofing materials and access to drinking water. Even relatively simple interventions, such as planting trees or adjusting classroom layouts to improve airflow, can make a meaningful difference.

Governments and education departments should also consider heat when designing new schools and upgrading older infrastructure.

School timetables may need to become more flexible during heatwaves, particularly for sports and outdoor activities.

Teachers and school staff should receive guidance on recognising signs of heat-related illness.

Heat-health warning systems could also include schools as priority sites for communication and intervention.

Importantly, children and young people themselves should be involved in climate adaptation planning. They are already experiencing the impacts of climate change directly.

– School in a hot world: what research is saying about children’s health and learning
– https://theconversation.com/school-in-a-hot-world-what-research-is-saying-about-childrens-health-and-learning-283300

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Samir Ramzy, Researcher, Helwan University

Three years into the civil war in Sudan that began on 15 April 2023, a coalition of civilian, political and armed factions has launched a new peace initiative.

Announced in the Kenyan capital Nairobi in May 2026, the roadmap seeks to end the conflict and revive Sudan’s stalled transition to civilian rule.

Its backers – a civilian, anti-war bloc independent of both warring parties – argue that previous peace efforts have failed because signatories weren’t given sufficient opportunity to address the root causes of the war.

The Nairobi document proposes a three-track process. It combines humanitarian measures, a renewable internationally monitored ceasefire and a political transition focused on state reform. It also seeks to address grievances, like the marginalisation of regions such as Darfur, to tackle the roots of conflict.

The roadmap seeks to exclude the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces from the political process. Its signatories argue that this is a result of their responsibility for the war. However, the warring parties are to participate in ceasefire talks.

In addition, the Nairobi initiative seeks to bar leaders of the Islamist movement organisation – including its political arm, the former ruling National Congress Party – from political participation and security-sector reform. The party was in power from 1989 to 2019.

In Sudan, “Islamists” generally refers to political actors associated with the National Congress Party. The party formed the ideological and political backbone of Omar al-Bashir’s regime. Bashir was overthrown in 2019. However, many of the movement’s networks within the state, security sector and business community have endured.

The Nairobi proposal reflects a belief among the signatories that Islamist actors helped create the conditions that led to war in 2023 as a way to regain power.

The Nairobi initiative primarily brings together the Sudan Liberation Movement and the “Somoud” coalition.

The Sudan Liberation Movement is one of the main armed groups that has remained relatively distant from direct involvement in the ongoing war.

Somoud was formed in February 2025. It is a group of civic and political actors led by former prime minister Abdalla Hamdok. It includes several parties that played leading roles in the transitional government established after Bashir’s regime was overthrown. It lasted until the October 2021 military coup.

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Read more: Sudan’s civil war is rooted in its historical favouritism of Arab and Islamic identity

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The Nairobi initiative is part of a broader landscape of peace efforts in Sudan. These include:

• the Quad initiative. It involves the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt. It focuses on negotiations between the warring parties: the army and the Rapid Support Forces.

• the Quint mechanism. It brings together the UN, African Union, European Union, Arab League and Intergovernmental Authority on Development. It emphasises the design of a future political process in Sudan.

• a conference in Berlin in April 2026 with broad international participation.

Drawing on more than a decade of research on Sudanese politics, I argue that the Nairobi initiative has sharpened debate over the role of Islamists in Sudan’s post-war political order. How that question is resolved will prove crucial to the prospects for a negotiated settlement.

In my view, a ceasefire without broader political settlement could institutionalise Sudan’s current military fragmentation rather than resolve it.

The debate

The Berlin and Nairobi talks illustrate that several important factions are aiming for agreement on a ceasefire in Sudan. However, the issue of whether Islamist parties or leaders should be part of any settlement remains unresolved.

The Islamists’ current electoral weight is difficult to assess. Leaders of the Islamic movement have claimed a membership of around two million out of 53 million Sudanese. The former ruling National Congress Party had argued that it represents more than 25% of Sudanese society.

Such claims are difficult to verify. They were challenged by the mass protests that contributed to the fall of Bashir’s regime in 2019.

The Berlin conference ended with a statement calling for an “inclusive” political dialogue involving all Sudanese parties.

By contrast, both the Nairobi initiative and the Quad process have called for excluding Islamist leaders from the post-war political order.

Supporters of this position argue that the Islamist movement bears significant responsibility for the conflict. They point to their political and military influence during the three decades following Bashir’s 1989 coup, and a continued presence within key state institutions.

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Read more: Omar al-Bashir brutalised Sudan – how his 30-year legacy is playing out today

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These contrasting approaches reflect different political leanings.

The Nairobi coalition emerged largely from forces associated with Sudan’s 2019 uprising. It views Islamist exclusion as essential to preventing a return to the old order. The Berlin process, meanwhile, reflects a broader international preference for inclusivity as a foundation for peace.

Excluding Islamists entirely may prove difficult. Despite the collapse of Bashir’s regime, the Islamic movement retains influence within parts of the state and security apparatus. This includes government ministries, and intelligence and military institutions.

Sudan and the Islamist movement

Despite Bashir’s fall in 2019, Islamists remain one of Sudan’s most influential political forces. This is largely through networks linked to the former ruling party.

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, Islamist groups have broadly aligned themselves with the Sudanese Armed Forces. Some have played a direct military role through armed formations that have fought alongside the army.

Others have supported the army through political mobilisation. They have led fundraising, recruitment campaigns and public advocacy. Their influence within communities in northern, central and eastern Sudan has helped mobilise volunteers for army-aligned forces.

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Read more: Sudan at war: the art of peace talks and why they often fail

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This alignment reflects the legacy of Sudan’s post-2019 transition.

After Bashir’s removal, transitional authorities sought to exclude former regime networks from political power. Many Islamists came to view an army victory as the best chance of preserving any influence.

As a result, Islamist groups have become a target of several actors in the conflict. The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North are two of the principal forces fighting the army. They have explicitly called for the removal of Islamist influence from state institutions.

The challenge facing future peace efforts is that Islamists still retain significant political and military influence. This makes them difficult to ignore. Yet many of their opponents see their participation as incompatible with a lasting settlement.

What next?

Anti-army actors are unlikely to support the reunification of Sudan’s fragmented armed forces without guarantees that Islamist influence within the military and state institutions will be eliminated.

At the same time, any sustainable settlement is likely to require accountability for Islamist figures implicated in violence, abuses or crimes committed against Sudanese civilians.

This points to a difficult middle path: excluding individuals linked to serious violations or the former regime’s coercive apparatus, while pursuing broader state reforms designed to reduce party influence.

Efforts to exclude Islamists entirely may prove difficult to enforce. Yet attempts to restore them to the centre of power could deepen mistrust and internal divisions. This could further fragment Sudan’s political and military landscape. How Sudanese actors and international mediators handle this dilemma will help determine if peace initiatives produce a lasting settlement.

– Sudan peace: the shadow of the al-Bashir regime looms over talks
– https://theconversation.com/sudan-peace-the-shadow-of-the-al-bashir-regime-looms-over-talks-284346

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abiodun Olusola Omotayo, Ass. Professor, University of Maryland Eastern Shore; North-West University

Globally, agriculture faces mounting pressures. These are driven by climate change, land degradation, labour shortages, supply chain disruptions and the demand for food from a growing population.

At the same time, productivity is uneven. For example, maize yields in the US often exceed 10 tons per hectare. These high yields are driven by mechanisation, improved seed varieties, irrigation and efficient input use, supported increasingly by precision agriculture technologies. In contrast, yields in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa remain around 2-3 tons per hectare. This reflects constraints like limited access to inputs, reliance on rain-fed systems and weaker infrastructure and institutional support.

Smallholder farmers make up around 80% of farmers in developing countries. They often struggle with low yields due to limited access to key agricultural inputs such as improved seeds, fertilisers and agrochemicals (herbicides and pesticides). They are less likely to rely on irrigation and farm mechanisation. They also have high vulnerability to climate shocks.

Conventional farming practices, including reliance on rain-fed agriculture, the use of low-yielding local seed varieties, sub-optimal input application and heavy dependence on manual labour, are increasingly insufficient to meet the demands of 21st-century food systems.

In recent years, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools has been shown to improve input-output efficiency and enable real-time monitoring of crops and livestock. They’ve been shown to conserve soil and water resources, and reduce post-harvest losses particularly in technologically advanced agricultural systems in the US, China and Europe.

We have over 15 years of scholarship in applied economics, development, resource economics and agricultural economics, including technology adoption and sustainable agricultural systems. Our recent study compared AI adoption in agriculture between developed and developing countries.

We examined how artificial intelligence is accessed and used across different regions. Evidence from technologically advanced economies such as Europe, the US, Australia and Japan was analysed alongside studies from Africa, South Asia, Latin America and other low- and middle-income regions.

Our main finding was that AI has strong potential to improve agricultural productivity and resilience. But this potential depends on supportive policies, reliable infrastructure and equitable access. Without these, the technology could reinforce existing inequalities rather than reduce them.

The potential and the gaps

Our review examined:

• patterns of AI adoption: including the extent of uptake across regions, and types of AI applications used in agriculture (such as precision farming, disease detection, yield prediction, and smart irrigation)

• levels of infrastructural readiness: including the availability of electricity, broadband connectivity, digital literacy support, data management systems, smart devices, and extension or technical support services necessary for effective AI adoption

• key concerns around ethics and data governance: including data ownership, privacy and security, informed consent, algorithmic bias, transparency, accountability, and equitable access to AI-driven agricultural technologies.

We also explored how national policies are responding to emerging risks. These include data privacy breaches, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, labour displacement, and unequal access to AI-enabled agricultural technologies. This approach allowed us to capture both global trends and region-specific realities.

AI is increasingly shaping agriculture in developed countries. Technologies such as precision farming tools are helping improve fertiliser use, irrigation, yield prediction and pest management, while also supporting more efficient resource use and greater resilience to climate variability.

The factors that made this possible included:

Digital infrastructure: In many developed countries, reliable internet, satellite systems, cloud platforms and connected sensors enable continuous data collection and analysis. This supports real-time farm decisions and the seamless use of precision agriculture technologies.

Strong institutional support: This has enabled rapid uptake of innovations in agriculture. The support includes established governance frameworks that provide operational clarity on data privacy, transparency and accountability. This enabled more responsible technological innovation.

Reliable electricity: This is essential for AI-driven agriculture. It ensures the continuous operation of digital systems and technologies such as sensors, automated irrigation, drones, and data platforms.

But we found that AI adoption remains limited in developing countries, where smallholder farmers dominate food production. The limiting factors included:

The digital divide: We identified this as the biggest barrier. Farmers often lack stable internet connectivity, affordable devices, or sufficient digital literacy.

Electricity: Shortages hinder the adoption and effective use of AI in agriculture by disrupting the operation of digital tools and infrastructure. These are required for data collection, processing and communication.

Cost: High cost of AI tools and a lack of digital literacy to engage with AI tools effectively.

Limited access to credit: Without sufficient financial capacity, farmers struggle to invest in digital technologies. They cannot afford the upfront purchase costs, installation expenses, or ongoing maintenance and subscription fees required to use AI tools effectively.

AI downsides

We also identified two factors that undermine the adoption of AI in Africa and other developing countries.

First, many AI models are not well suited to developing country contexts. Tools trained on data from industrialised farming systems often perform poorly in local environments. It leads to biased or inaccurate recommendations and increasing risks for vulnerable farmers.

For example, an AI-based yield prediction or pest detection model trained on large-scale monoculture farms in the US or the Netherlands could generate unreliable recommendations when applied to African smallholder farms characterised by mixed cropping, irregular input use, rain-fed agriculture and highly heterogeneous soil conditions.

Second, there are ethical concerns around AI use, particularly the lack of clarity on data ownership and privacy. Weak data governance is most pronounced in developing regions. Farmers often have little control over how their data is collected, used or monetised.

These challenges are not evenly distributed. But the risks are more pronounced in low-income regions, where regulatory systems are weaker and smallholders have fewer resources to manage technological change.

Without appropriate safeguards, AI could reinforce disparities already embedded in global food systems. It also risks deepening existing inequalities, limiting its contribution to sustainable development and food security.

Way forward

AI could transform agriculture in Africa and other developing economies but without the right policies, it may deepen inequality instead.

The priority is to fix the foundations. Reliable electricity, internet access, and affordable digital tools are essential. Without these, AI will remain out of reach for most smallholder farmers. Access to finance, training, and locally relevant data systems will also be critical.

Adoption should be gradual, starting with simple tools like advance mobile advisory services before scaling up.

AI must be inclusive and farmer centred. Done right, it can strengthen food systems. Done poorly, it risks leaving the most vulnerable further behind.

– AI offers promise for agriculture, but smallholder farmers risk being left behind
– https://theconversation.com/ai-offers-promise-for-agriculture-but-smallholder-farmers-risk-being-left-behind-279013

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Helga Dickow, Associate Researcher at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg Germany, University of Freiburg

In most multilingual African countries, language policy is a highly charged and controversial issue. It touches on regional identity, religion and political power – as is evident in Chad, in central Africa.

Around 130 languages are spoken in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious Chad. The two official languages are Standard Arabic and French. Neither has its origins in the country and neither is the mother tongue of the majority of the population.

Arabic has shaped the identity of most ethnic groups in northern Chad for several centuries, while French has done so for just under a century, primarily in southern Chad.

Having studied ethnic and religious conflicts in Chad for some time, I can suggest why the country’s new approach to language in education is not just about what happens in schools.

The new education minister, Mahamat-Ahmat Alhabo, issued a circular in April 2026 demanding that, from the coming school year onwards, Standard Arabic be granted the same status as French as language of instruction and examination.

This circular sheds light on the political situation in Chad, both domestically and internationally.

Domestically, the immediate granting of equal status to both languages suggests a deliberate effort to promote the Arabic-speaking economic and political elite. This comes at the expense of the Francophone population, from whom most of the political opposition originates.

It also reflects an ongoing shift away from the former colonial power, France, and an attempt by the current regime under Mahamat Déby to forge closer ties with the Arab world, particularly the United Arab Emirates.

Arabic and French: Islamisation and the colonial legacy

Arabic and French have different historical roots in the country. It is believed that Arabic reached the north of what is now Chad as part of the Islamisation process between the 8th and 11th centuries.

As in other countries, alongside Standard Arabic, a distinct colloquial language known as Chadian Arabic has developed, enhanced by vocabulary from regional local languages.

Today, Standard Arabic is the language in which the Qur’an is taught and recited. It is spoken by a small, predominantly Muslim, educated wealthy elite with close links with Arabic-speaking countries, often through temporary migration for study or work. The majority of those who would call themselves Arabophone generally speak the local Chadian Arabic.

French colonial rule from 1900 to 1960 established French as the language of worship and instruction in the southern regions of the country.

Employment in the colonial administration required knowledge of French. The southern part of Chad embraced the French language more. However, the Islamised north largely rejected it and relied on its own schools instead.

Chadian Arabic and French now serve as two lingua francas nationwide, especially in urban centres. However, they continue to represent different origins and religions: Muslims from the north and Christians from the south.

There are also political power dynamics: part of the Arabophone Muslim elite has held power for more than 40 years.

Bilingualism: requirement and challenge

Like many other states, independent Chad adopted the French education system and French as the official language under the leadership of its Francophone president, Ngarta Tombalbaye.

Although Arabic was recognised as a national language in 1962, French remained the sole official language of administration and education. Consequently, in the first decades following independence, the civil service and political power were dominated by a French-speaking elite.

After years of civil war, in 1978 power was transferred from the predominantly Christian south to the predominantly Islamic north. This was evident in the agreement to recognise Arabic as a second official language. President Félix Malloum, who had only been in power for a few months, agreed with his prime minister, Hissène Habré, who would rule Chad with brutal force from 1982 to 1990, that Arabic should also be included in the constitution.

Following Idriss Déby’s seizure of power in 1990, the 1993 National Conference sought to establish a path towards democratic development in a unified Chad. The conference addressed the issue of language. However, the debate was no longer focused on Arabic or French. Delegates from across the country agreed that the goal should be bilingualism. The question was: Standard Arabic or local Chadian Arabic? Standard Arabic was chosen.

This presented an insurmountable challenge to the already poor education system for the coming decades. There was, and still is, a severe shortage of Arabic teachers and educational materials.

Consequently, few lessons took place, resulting in a low level of Arabic proficiency in state schools. Even universities where courses are taught in Arabic complain that they have to start with basic literacy. Bilingualism in Chad’s schools is still a long way off.

Furthermore, a large proportion of the Francophone population viewed Standard Arabic as a tool of political oppression and refused to learn it.

Language as a political and economic force

According to the circular, Standard Arabic is to be taught from the next academic year onwards with the same number of teaching hours as French. It will also become an exam subject for the final school leaving exam with immediate effect.

This will only benefit the children of the elite. They enhance their language skills by studying at the growing number of private schools that offer high-quality Arabic lessons or by studying abroad.

In practice, the groups that gained their wealth under Idriss Deby’s rule will retain their influence and status.

By contrast, the Francophone former elite will be politically and economically marginalised.

Conclusion

The shift to Standard Arabic reflects the current direction of Chad’s foreign policy. The country has ended its military cooperation with France and is seeking closer ties with the Middle East, particularly with the United Arab Emirates.

Since Idriss Déby’s death, the Emirates have stepped in on several occasions to provide generous financial support. But it’s come with conditions, such as Chad supporting Hemedti in neighbouring Sudan’s civil war, which risks involving Chad in the conflict.

In summary, the language policy of the Chadian regime is not without risk. Excluding a large part of the population from hopes of a better future could lead to conflicts that cannot be resolved peacefully.

– Chad is making Arabic equal to French in schools: the politics behind the move
– https://theconversation.com/chad-is-making-arabic-equal-to-french-in-schools-the-politics-behind-the-move-283313

Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Zayd Waghid, Associate professor, Cape Peninsula University of Technology

South African teacher education qualifications are expected to comply with the Minimum Requirements for Teacher Education Qualifications. But evidence points to gaps in teacher competence and the quality of instruction. Many students who enrol for teaching at South African universities have lower grade 12 results than those studying other degrees. This means universities need to provide support and a good foundation for them to develop as teachers.

Zayd Waghid and Yohana William’s book Preparedness to Teach draws on research between 2015 and 2018 into pre-service teachers’ beliefs, motivations and professional identities, and offers some ideas (which Prof Waghid sets out here) about improving teacher training. Their study involved 324 student teachers – 212 in first year and 112 in fourth year – from two historically disadvantaged universities in South Africa. The research is still relevant today as it captured the formation and development of student teachers’ beliefs, motivations and professional identities over time.

What have you identified as the problems?

First, there is a persistent gap between the theoretical knowledge taught at universities and its practical application in schools. Teacher education curricula generally focus on what to teach, how to teach (including using basic tools), learning through teaching practice, and being aware of the conditions in schools. However, many student teachers still feel unprepared to deal with classroom realities and the wider societal conditions that shape teaching. This disconnect can leave them disempowered in schools.

One of the student teachers we interviewed noted that although modern teaching approaches were taught at university, these were not always accepted in certain government schools.

Secondly, there are challenges of language and multilingualism in diverse classroom contexts. The Language in Education Policy promotes multilingualism and affirms learners’ rights to access education through the official languages in South Africa. But teacher education programmes have been criticised for inadequately preparing student teachers to develop learners’ reading abilities in their home languages. And research shows that African children are most disadvantaged when they do not develop a strong foundation in their mother tongue and are taught in another language.

Thirdly, the power imbalance between universities and schools means that teacher education curricula are designed without consulting current teachers in schools. This has certain implications for the way future teachers are prepared for schools. The book argues that this model works against genuine, mutual co-creation of knowledge.

Fourth, heavy workloads, large classes, learner discipline, weak parental support and limited school resources can weaken motivation and confidence among student teachers. By the fourth year, most student teachers in the study saw teaching as stressful: 76% at one university and 85% at the other agreed or strongly agreed.

Why do these problems matter?

These shortcomings and challenges can be expected to have an impact on the quality of primary education, which is critical for both individual and societal development.

Addressing these issues is vital for transforming an education system shaped by historical inequality, into one that is more equitable, capable of preparing, supporting and retaining high-quality teachers.

The number of graduates studying teaching increased by more than 200% over the ten years between 2011/12 and 2020/21.

How do you fix them?

1. Teacher education should not simply focus on delivering content. It must also help future teachers connect what they learn at university with the real challenges they will face in classrooms.

2. Teacher education programmes must better prepare teachers for multilingual classrooms. This means moving away from the idea that teaching happens in only one language. It means promoting learners’ different languages as a resource for inclusion and learning even if it creates some discomfort. While one cannot be an expert in multiple languages, technology does help here.

3. Universities, schools and communities must work together as an ecosystem in designing teacher education curricula. This will help ensure that teacher training responds to the real social, political and economic conditions of the communities that schools serve. It’s been done before, for example in a study involving a New Zealand university and three schools. In practice, it means that teacher educators and school staff co-teach in schools, and share practices and resources with the idea of making university content more practical and relevant.

4. The book argues that wider changes are needed to restore dignity to the teaching profession. This means improving teachers’ salaries, providing schools with better resources, and reducing heavy workloads. In its 2026 national budget, the South African government allocated R358.556 billion (over US$21 billion) to public schooling, teacher salaries, school operations, nutrition, infrastructure and early childhood development. Education received the largest portion of the budget for spending (23%). However, the question around whether existing resources are used effectively to support teachers in difficult classroom contexts remains vital.

5. Teacher education improves when institutions care about student teachers’ well-being and confidence. Student teachers need to feel safe, supported, and able to cope emotionally throughout their training. In practice, this means establishing a community of practice to build caring relationships. It can happen by recognising their struggles, creating a sense of belonging, and using innovative ways of keeping them connected, while building their confidence.

In a full-time Bachelor of Education programme in South Africa, student teachers must spend a minimum of 20 and maximum of 32 weeks in teaching practice in schools. What we found in the study, was that one student teacher’s positive experience during teaching practice helped her “fall in love” with teaching and strengthened her sense that she was prepared to become a teacher. Teaching practice was a turning point in shaping her identity as a teacher – which is a useful insight.

Mentorship is vital in helping student teachers build confidence and commitment during teaching practice. This is why regular feedback between universities and in-service teachers as mentors during and after teaching practice is critical in further strengthening student teachers’ experiences.

– Student teachers in South Africa face a stressful career: how to prepare them better
– https://theconversation.com/student-teachers-in-south-africa-face-a-stressful-career-how-to-prepare-them-better-281947